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HANSARD'S

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES:

THIRD SERIES,

COMMENCING WITH THE ACCESSION OF

WILLIAM IV.

18° VICTORIÆ, 1854-5.

VOL. CXXXVI.

COMPRISING THE PERIOD FROM

THE TWELFTH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1854,

TO

THE FIRST DAY OF MARCH, 1855.

First Volume of the Session.

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Kingston-upon-Hull—William Henry Watson, Esq. and William Digby Seymour, Esq., *v.* James Clay, Esq., and Frederick Samuel Robinson, Esq., commonly called Viscount Goderich, void Election.

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Cambridge Borough—Francis Mowatt, Esq. and Robert Alexander Shafto Adair, Esq., *v.* Kenneth Macaulay, Esq. and John Harvey Astell, Esq., void Election.

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Coventry—Sir Joseph Paxton, *v.* Charles Geach, Esq., deceased.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 13.

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THE MINISTRY.

AS IT STOOD AT THE MEETING OF PARLIAMENT, DECEMBER 12, 1854.

THE CABINET.

First Lord of the Treasury	Right Hon. Earl of Aberdeen.
Lord Chancellor	Right Hon. Lord Cranworth.
President of the Council	Right Hon. Lord John Russell.
Lord Privy Seal	His Grace the Duke of Argyll.
Home Secretary	Right Hon. Viscount Palmerston.
Foreign Secretary	Right Hon. Earl of Clarendon.
Colonial Secretary	Right Hon. Sir George Grey, Bt.
War Secretary	His Grace the Duke of Newcastle.
Chancellor of the Exchequer	Right Hon. William Ewart Gladstone.
First Lord of the Admiralty	Right Hon. Sir James Robert George Graham, Bt.
President of the Board of Control	Right Hon. Sir Charles Wood, Bt.
Secretary at War	Right Hon. Sidney Herbert.
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster	Right Hon. Earl Granville.
First Commissioner of Works and Public Buildings	Right Hon. Sir William Molesworth, Bt.
	Most Hon. Marquess of Lansdowne.

NOT IN THE CABINET.

General Commanding-in-Chief	Right Hon. Viscount Hardinge.
Master General of the Ordnance	Right Hon. Lord Raglan.
President of the Board of Trade	Right Hon. Edward Cardwell.
Paymaster of the Forces, and Vice-President of the Board of Trade	Right Hon. Lord Stanley of Alderley.
Postmaster General	Right Hon. Viscount Canning.
Lords of the Treasury	Lord Alfred Hervey, Lord Elcho, and Chichester Samuel Fortescue, Esq.
Lords of the Admiralty	Rear-Admiral Maurice Frederick Fitzhardinge Berkeley, C.B., Rear-Admiral Hon. Richard Saunders Dundas, C.B., Captain Peter Richards, C.B., Captain Alexander Milne, and Hon. William Francis Cowper.
Under Secretary for the Home Department	Hon. Henry Fitzroy.
Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs	Right Hon. Lord Wodehouse.
Under Secretary for the Colonies	Frederick Peel, Esq.
Joint Secretaries of the Treasury	Right Hon. William Goodenough Hayter, and James Wilson, Esq.
Secretary of the Admiralty	Ralph Bernal Osborne, Esq.
Joint Secretaries of the Board of Control	Sir Thomas Nicholas Redington, Knt., and Robert Lowe, Esq.
Surveyor General of the Ordnance	[Vacant.]
Clerk of the Ordnance	William Monsell, Esq.
Attorney General	Sir Alexander James Edmund Cockburn, Knt.
Solicitor General	Sir Richard Bethell, Knt.
Judge-Advocate General	Right Hon. Charles Pelham Villiers.
Chief Commissioner of the Poor Law	Right Hon. Matthew Talbot Baines.
Secretary to the Poor Law Commissioners	Charles Lennox Grenville Berkeley, Esq.

SCOTLAND.

Lord Advocate	Right Hon. James Moncreiff.
Solicitor General	Thomas Mackenzie, Esq.

IRELAND.

Lord Lieutenant	Right Hon. Earl of St. Germans.
Lord Chancellor	Right Hon. Maziere Brady.
Chief Secretary	Right Hon. Sir John Young, Bt.
Attorney General	Right Hon. Abraham Brewster.
Solicitor General	William Keogh, Esq.

QUEEN'S HOUSEHOLD.

Lord Steward	Right Hon. Earl Spencer.
Lord Chamberlain	Most Hon. Marquess of Breadalbane.
Master of the Horse	His Grace the Duke of Wellington.
Master of the Buckhounds	Right Hon. Earl of Bessborough.
Vice-Chamberlain	Right Hon. Lord Ernest Augustus Charles Brudenell Bruce.
Treasurer of the Household	Right Hon. Earl of Mulgrave.
Comptroller of the Household	Right Hon. Viscount Drumlanrig.
Captain of the Yeomen of the Guard	Right Hon. Viscount Sydney.
Captain of the Corps of Gentlemen at Arms	Right Hon. Lord Foley.
Chief Equerry and Clerk Marshal	Lord Alfred Henry Paget.
Mistress of the Robes	Duchess of Sutherland.

THE MINISTRY.

AS FORMED BY VISCOUNT PALMERSTON, FEBRUARY, 16, 1855.

THE CABINET.

First Lord of the Treasury	Right Hon. Viscount Palmerston.
Lord Chancellor	Right Hon. Lord Cranworth.
President of the Council	Right Hon. Earl Granville.
Lord Privy Seal	His Grace the Duke of Argyll.
Home Secretary	Right Hon. Sir George Grey, Bt.
Foreign Secretary	Right Hon. Earl of Clarendon.
Colonial Secretary	Right Hon. Sidney Herbert.
War Secretary	Right Hon. Lord Panmure.
Chancellor of the Exchequer	Right Hon. William Ewart Gladstone.
First Lord of the Admiralty	Right Hon. Sir James Robert George Graham, Bt.
President of the Board of Control	Right Hon. Sir Charles Wood, Bt.
First Commissioner of Works and Public Buildings	Right Hon. Sir William Molesworth, Bt.
	Most Hon. Marquess of Lansdowne.

NOT IN THE CABINET.

General Commanding-in-Chief	Right Hon. Viscount Hardinge.
Master General of the Ordnance	Right Hon. Lord Raglan.
President of the Board of Trade	Right Hon. Edward Cardwell.
Paymaster of the Forces and Vice-President of the Board of Trade	Right Hon. Lord Stanley of Alderley.
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster	[Vacant.]
Postmaster General	Right Hon. Viscount Canning.
Lords of the Treasury	Lord Alfred Hervey, Lord Elcho, and Chichester Samuel Fortescue, Esq.
Lords of the Admiralty	Rear-Admiral Maurice Frederick Fitzhardinge Berkeley, C. B., Rear-Admiral Hon. Richard Saunders Dundas, C.B., Captain Peter Richards, C.B., Captain Alexander Milne, and Hon. William Francis Cowper.
Under Secretary for the Home Department	Hon. Henry Fitzroy.
Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs	Right Hon. Lord Wodehouse.
Under Secretary for the Colonies	[Vacant.]
Under Secretary for War	Frederick Peel, Esq.
Joint Secretaries of the Treasury	Right Hon. William Goodenough Hayter, and James Wilson, Esq.
Secretary of the Admiralty	Ralph Bernal Osborne, Esq.
Joint Secretaries of the Board of Control	Sir Thomas Nicholas Redington, Knt., and Robert Lowe, Esq.
Clerk of the Ordnance	William Monsell, Esq.
Attorney General	Sir Alexander James Edmund Cockburn, Knt.
Solicitor General	Sir Richard Bethell, Knt.
Judge-Advocate General	Right Hon. Charles Pelham Villiers.
Chief Commissioner of the Poor Law	Right Hon. Matthew Talbot Baines.
Secretary to the Poor Law Commissioners	Charles Lennox Grenville Berkeley, Esq.

SCOTLAND.

Lord Advocate	Right Hon. James Moncrieff.
Solicitor General	Edward Francis Maitland, Esq.

IRELAND.

Lord Lieutenant	Right Hon. Earl of St. Germans.
Lord Chancellor	Right Hon. Maziere Brady.
Chief Secretary	Right Hon. Sir John Young, Bt.
Attorney General	Right Hon. Abraham Brewster.
Solicitor General	William Keogh, Esq.

QUEEN'S HOUSEHOLD.

Lord Steward	Right Hon. Earl Spencer.
Lord Chamberlain	Most Hon. Marquess of Breadalbane.
Master of the Horse	His Grace the Duke of Wellington.
Master of the Buckhounds	Right Hon. Earl of Bessborough.
Vice-Chamberlain	Right Hon. Lord Ernest Augustus Charles Brudenell Bruce.
Treasurer of the Household	Right Hon. Earl of Mulgrave.
Comptroller of the Household	Right Hon. Viscount Drumlanrig.
Captain of the Yeomen of the Guard	Right Hon. Viscount Sydney.
Captain of the Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms	Right Hon. Lord Foley.
Chief Equerry and Clerk Marshal	Lord Alfred Henry Paget.
Mistress of the Robes	Duchess of Sutherland.

THE MINISTRY.

AS IT STOOD SUBSEQUENTLY TO THE 22nd FEBRUARY, 1855.

THE CABINET.

First Lord of the Treasury	Right Hon. Viscount Palmerston.
Lord Chancellor	Right Hon. Lord Cranworth.
President of the Council	Right Hon. Earl Granville.
Lord Privy Seal	His Grace the Duke of Argyll.
Home Secretary	Right Hon. Sir George Grey, Bt.
Foreign Secretary	Right Hon. Earl of Clarendon.
Colonial Secretary	Right Hon. Lord John Russell.
War Secretary	Right Hon. Lord Panmure.
Chancellor of the Exchequer	Right Hon. Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Bt.
First Lord of the Admiralty	Right Hon. Sir Charles Wood, Bt.
President of the Board of Control	Right Hon. Robert Vernon Smith.
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster	Right Hon. Earl of Harrowby.
Postmaster General	Right Hon. Viscount Canning.
First Commissioner of Works and Public Buildings	Right Hon. Sir William Molesworth, Bt.
	Most Hon. Marquess of Lansdowne.

NOT IN THE CABINET.

General Commanding-in-Chief	Right Hon. Viscount Hardinge.
Master General of the Ordnance	Right Hon. Lord Raglan.
President of the Board of Trade	Right Hon. Lord Stanley of Alderley.
Paymaster of the Forces, and Vice-President of the Board of Trade	Hon. Edward Pleydell Bouverie.
Lords of the Treasury	Right Hon. Viscount Monck, Viscount Duncan, and Hon. Henry Brand.
Lords of the Admiralty	Rear Admiral Maurice Frederick Fitzhardinge Berkeley, C.B., Rear Admiral Henry Eden, Captain Peter Richards, C.B., Captain Alexander Milne, and Sir Robert Peel, Bart.
Under Secretary for the Home Department	Hon. William Francis Cowper.
Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs	Right Hon. Lord Wodehouse.
Under Secretary for the Colonies	John Ball, Esq.
Under Secretary for War	Frederick Peel, Esq.
Joint Secretaries of the Treasury	Right Hon. William Goodenough Hayter, and James Wilson, Esq.
Secretary of the Admiralty	Ralph Bernal Osborne, Esq.
Joint Secretaries of the Board of Control	Sir Thomas Nicholas Redington, Knt., and Henry Danby Seymour, Esq.
Clerk of the Ordnance	William Monsell, Esq.
Attorney General	Sir Alexander James Edmund Cockburn, Knt.
Solicitor General	Sir Richard Bethell, Knt.
Judge-Advocate General	Right Hon. Charles Pelham Villiers.
Chief Commissioner of the Poor Law	Right Hon. Matthew Talbot Baines.
Secretary to the Poor Law Commissioners	Charles Lennox Grenville Berkeley, Esq.

SCOTLAND.

Lord Advocate	Right Hon. James Moncreiff.
Solicitor General	Edward Francis Maitland, Esq.

IRELAND.

Lord Lieutenant	Right Hon. Earl of Carlisle.
Lord Chancellor	Right Hon. Maziere Brady.
Chief Secretary	Right Hon. Edward Horsman.
Attorney General	Right Hon. William Keogh.
Solicitor General	John David Fitzgerald, Esq.

QUEEN'S HOUSEHOLD.

Lord Steward	Right Hon. Earl Spencer.
Lord Chamberlain	Most Hon. Marquess of Breadalbane.
Master of the Horse	His Grace the Duke of Wellington.
Master of the Buckhounds	Right Hon. Earl of Bessborough.
Vice-Chamberlain	Right Hon. Lord Ernest Augustus Charles Brudenell Bruce.
Treasurer of the Household	Right Hon. Earl of Mulgrave.
Comptroller of the Household	Right Hon. Viscount Drumlanrig.
Captain of the Yeomen of the Guard	Right Hon. Viscount Sydney.
Captain of the Corps of Gentlemen at Arms	Right Hon. Lord Foley.
Chief Equerry and Clerk Marshal	Lord Alfred Henry Paget.
Mistress of the Robes	Duchess of Sutherland.

ROLL OF THE

LORDS SPIRITUAL AND TEMPORAL

In the *Third Session* of the *Sixteenth Parliament* of the United Kingdom of *Great Britain* and *Ireland.*

18° VICTORIÆ, 1854.

His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales.
His Royal Highness George Frederick Alexander Charles Ernest Augustus Duke of Cumberland and Teviotdale. (*King of Hanover.*)
His Royal Highness George William Frederick Charles Duke of Cambridge.
John Bird Archbishop of Canterbury.
Robert Monsey Lord Cranworth, *Lord Chancellor.*
Thomas Archbishop of York.
Richard Archbishop of Dublin.
George Douglas Lord Sundridge (*Duke of Argyll*), *Lord Privy Seal.*

Henry Charles Duke of Norfolk, *Earl Marshal of England.*
Edward Adolphus Duke of Somerset.
Charles Duke of Richmond.
Henry Duke of Grafton.
Henry Charles Fitzroy Duke of Beaufort.
William Amelius Aubrey de Vere Duke of Saint Albans.
Francis Godolphin D'Arcy Duke of Leeds.
Francis Duke of Bedford.
William Spencer Duke of Devonshire.
George Spencer Duke of Marlborough.
John Henry Duke of Rutland.
William Alexander Anthony Archibald Duke of Brandon. (*Duke of Hamilton.*)
William John Duke of Portland.
George Duke of Manchester.
Henry Pelham Duke of Newcastle.
Algernon Duke of Northumberland.
Arthur Richard Duke of Wellington.
Richard Plantagenet, Duke of Buckingham and Chandos.
George Granville Duke of Sutherland.
Henry Duke of Cleveland.

John Marquess of Breadalbane, *Lord Chamberlain of the Household.*
John Marquess of Winchester.
George Marquess of Tweeddale. (*Elected for Scotland.*)
Henry Marquess of Lansdowne.
George Ferrars Marquess Townshend.
James Brownlow William Marquess of Salisbury.
John Alexander Marquess of Bath.
James Marquess of Abercorn.
Richard Marquess of Hertford.
John Patrick Marquess of Bute.
Brownlow Marquess of Exeter.
Charles Marquess of Northampton.
George Charles Marquess Camden.
Henry Marquess of Anglesey.
George Horatio Marquess of Cholmondeley.
Henry Weysford Charles Plantagenet Marquess of Hastings.
Charles Marquess of Ailesbury.

George Thomas John Marquess of Westmeath. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Frederick William Marquess of Bristol.

Archibald Marquess of Ailsa.

John Marquess of Breadalbane. (*In another place as Lord Chamberlain of the Household.*)

Richard Marquess of Westminster.

Constantine Henry Marquess of Normanby.

James Andrew Marquess of Dalhousie.

Frederick Earl Spencer, *Lord Steward of the Household.*

Bertram Arthur, Earl of Shrewsbury.

Edward Geoffrey Earl of Derby.

Francis Theophilus Henry Earl of Huntingdon.

Robert Henry Earl of Pembroke and Montgomery.

William Earl of Devon.

Charles John Earl of Suffolk and Berkshire.

William Basil Percy Earl of Denbigh.

John Earl of Westmoreland.

George Augustus Frederick Albemarle Earl of Lindsey.

George Harry Earl of Stamford and Warrington.

George William Earl of Winchilsea and Nottingham.

George Earl of Chesterfield.

John William Earl of Sandwich.

Arthur Algernon Earl of Essex.

James Thomas Earl of Cardigan.

George William Frederick Earl of Carlisle.

Walter Francis Earl of Doncaster. (*Duke of Buccleuch and Queensberry.*)

Anthony Earl of Shaftesbury.

——— Earl of Berkeley.

Montagu Earl of Abingdon.

John Savile Earl of Scarbrough.

George Thomas Earl of Albemarle.

George William Earl of Coventry.

George Earl of Jersey.

John Earl Poulett.

George Sholto Earl of Morton. (*Elected for Scotland.*)

Cospatrick Alexander Earl of Home. (*Elected for Scotland.*)

Thomas George Earl of Strathmore. (*Elected for Scotland.*)

David Graham Drummond Earl of Airlie. (*Elected for Scotland.*)

David Earl of Leven and Melville. (*Elected for Scotland.*)

Dunbar James Earl of Selkirk. (*Elected for Scotland.*)

Thomas John Earl of Orkney. (*Elected for Scotland.*)

John Charles Earl of Seafield. (*Elected for Scotland.*)

Washington Sewallis Earl Ferrers.

William Walter Earl of Dartmouth.

Charles Augustus Earl of Tankerville.

Heneage Earl of Aylesford.

George Augustus Earl Cowper.

Philip Henry Earl Stanhope.

Robert Earl of Harborough.

Thomas Augustus Wolstenholme Earl of Macclesfield.

George William Richard Earl of Pomfret.

James Earl Graham. (*Duke of Montrose.*)

William Earl Waldegrave.

Bertram Earl of Ashburnham.

Leicester Fitzgerald Charles Earl of Harrington.

Isaac Newton Earl of Portsmouth.

George Guy Earl Brooke and Earl of Warwick.

Augustus Edward Earl of Buckinghamshire.

Charles William Earl Fitzwilliam.

Francis Earl of Guilford.

Charles Philip Earl of Hardwicke.

Henry Stephen Earl of Ilchester.

George John Earl De La Warr.

William Earl of Radnor.

Frederick Earl Spencer. (*In another place as Lord Steward of the Household.*)

Henry George Earl Bathurst.

Arthur Wills Blundell Sandys Trumbull Windsor Earl of Hillsborough. (*Marquess of Downshire.*)

George William Frederick Earl of Clarendon.

William David Earl of Mansfield.

William Earl of Abergavenny.

Henry John Earl Talbot.

George Augustus Frederick John Earl Strange. (*Duke of Athol.*)

Ernest Augustus Earl of Mount Edgcumbe.

Hugh Earl Fortescue.

Edward Earl of Digby.

George Earl of Beverley.

Henry Howard Molyneux Earl of Carnarvon.

George Earl Cadogan.

James Howard Earl of Malmesbury.

George John Danvers Earl of Lanesborough. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Francis William Earl of Charlemont. (*Lord Charlemont.*) (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Stephen Earl of Mount Cashell. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Robert Earl of Mayo. (*Elected for Ireland*).

John Earl of Erne. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

John Otway O'Connor Earl of Desart. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

William Earl of Wicklow. (*Elected for Ireland*).

George Charles Earl of Lucan. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

James Earl of Bandon. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

James Dupré Earl of Caledon. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

James Alexander Earl of Rosslyn.

William Earl of Craven.

Arthur George Earl of Onslow.

Charles Earl of Romney.

Henry Thomas Earl of Chichester.

Thomas Earl of Wilton.

Edward James Earl of Powis.

Horatio Earl Nelson.

William Earl of Rosse. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Charles Herbert Earl Manvers.

Horatio Earl of Orford.

Henry Earl Grey.

William Earl of Lonsdale.

Dudley Earl of Harrowby.

Henry Earl of Harewood.

Gilbert Earl of Minto.

Charles Murray Earl Cathcart.

James Walter Earl of Verulam.

John William Spencer Brownlow Earl Brownlow.

Edward Granville Earl of Saint Germans.

Edmund Earl of Morley.

George Augustus Frederick Henry Earl of Bradford.

Henry Beauchamp Earl Beauchamp.

Richard Earl of Bantry. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Richard Earl of Glengall. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Thomas Philip Earl De Grey.

John Earl of Eldon.

Richard William Penn Earl Howe.

Charles Sommers Earl Sommers.

John Edward Cornwallis Earl of Stradbroke.

George Henry Robert Charles William Earl Vane.

William Pitt Earl Amherst.

John Frederick Earl Cawdor.

William George Earl of Munster.

William Earl of Burlington.

Robert Dundas Earl of Camperdown.

Thomas George Earl of Lichfield.

George Frederick D'Arcy Earl of Durham.

Frederick John Earl of Ripon.

Granville George Earl Granville.

Henry Earl of Effingham.

Henry John Earl of Ducie.

Charles Anderson Worsley Earl of Yarborough.

James Henry Robert Earl Innes. (*Duke of Roxburghe.*)

Thomas William Earl of Leicester.

William Earl of Lovelace.

Thomas Earl of Zetland.

Charles Noel Earl of Gainsborough.

William Fitzhardinge Earl Fitzhardinge.

Edward Earl of Ellenborough.

Francis Earl of Ellesmere.

John Earl of Strafford.

Charles Edward Earl of Cottenham.

Robert Viscount Hereford.

William Henry Viscount Strathallan. (*Elected for Scotland.*)

Henry Viscount Bolingbroke and St. John.

Evelyn Viscount Falmouth.

George Viscount Torrington.

Augustus Frederick Viscount Leinster (*Duke of Leinster.*)

Henry Viscount Maynard.
John Robert Viscount Sydney.
Francis Wheler Viscount Hood.
John Viscount De Vesci. (*Elected for Ireland.*)
Cornwallis Viscount Hawarden. (*Elected for Ireland.*)
John Bruce Richard Viscount O'Neill. (*Elected for Ireland.*)
Edward Jervis Viscount St. Vincent.
Henry Viscount Melville.
William Leonard Viscount Sidmouth.
George Viscount Gordon. (*Earl of Aberdeen.*)
Edward Viscount Exmouth.
Richard John Viscount Hutchinson. (*Earl of Donoughmore.*)
William Thomas Viscount Clancarty. (*Earl of Clancarty.*)
Stapleton Viscount Combermere.
Charles John Viscount Canning.
Charles John Viscount Canterbury.
John Viscount Ponsonby.
Rowland Viscount Hill.
Henry Viscount Hardinge.
Hugh Viscount Gough.
Stratford Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe.

Charles James Bishop of London.
Edward Bishop of Durham.
Charles Richard Bishop of Winchester.
Christopher Bishop of Bangor.
Hugh Bishop of Carlisle.
George Bishop of Rochester.
James Henry Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol.
Henry Bishop of Exeter.
Charles Thomas Bishop of Ripon.
George Bishop of Peterborough.
Connop Bishop of St. David's.
Henry Bishop of Worcester.
Ashhurst Turner Bishop of Chichester.
John Bishop of Lichfield.
Thomas Bishop of Ely.
Samuel Bishop of Oxford.
Thomas Vowler Bishop of St. Asaph.
James Prince Bishop of Manchester.
Renn Dickson Bishop of Hereford.
John Bishop of Chester.
Samuel Bishop of Norwich.
Alfred Bishop of Llandaff.
John Bishop of Lincoln.
Walter Kerr Bishop of Salisbury.
James Henderson Bishop of Meath.
Ludlow Bishop of Killaloe, Kilfenora, Clonfert, and Kilmacduagh.
Marcus Gervais Bishop of Kilmore, Elphin, and Ardagh.

William Lennox Lascelles Lord De Ros.
Jacob Lord Hastings.
George Edward Lord Audley.
Peter Robert Lord Willoughby de Eresby.
Thomas Crosby William Lord Dacre.
Charles Rodolph Lord Clinton.
Thomas Lord Camoys.
Henry Lord Beaumont.
Charles Lord Stourton.
Henry William Lord Berners.
Robert John Lord Willoughby de Broke.
George Lord Vaux of Harrowden.
St. Andrew Beauchamp Lord St. John of Bletso.
Charles Augustus Lord Howard de Walden.
William Bernard Lord Petre.
Frederick Benjamin Lord Saye and Sele.
Henry Benedict Lord Arundell of Wardour.
John Stuart Lord Clifton. (*Earl of Darnley.*)
Joseph Thaddeus Lord Dormer.
George Henry Lord Teynham.
Henry Valentine Lord Stafford.
George Anson Lord Byron.
William Lord Ward.
Hugh Charles Lord Clifford of Chudleigh.
John Lord Gray. (*Elected for Scotland.*)
Charles Lord Sinclair. (*Elected for Scotland.*)
John Lord Elphinstone. (*Elected for Scotland.*)
Charles Lord Blantyre. (*Elected for Scotland.*)
Charles John Lord Colville of Culross. (*Elected for Scotland.*)
Henry Francis Lord Polwarth. (*Elected for Scotland.*)

EDMUND Lord BOYLE. (*Earl of Cork and Orrery.*)

THOMAS ROBERT Lord HAY. (*Earl of Kinnoul.*)

DIGBY Lord MIDDLETON.

WILLIAM JOHN Lord MONSON.

GEORGE WILLIAM FREDERICK Lord BRUCE.

GEORGE JOHN BRABAZON Lord PONSONBY. (*Earl of Bessborough.*)

GEORGE JOHN Lord SONDES.

NATHANIEL Lord SCARSDALE.

GEORGE Lord BOSTON.

HENRY EDWARD Lord HOLLAND.

GEORGE JAMES Lord LOVEL and HOLLAND. (*Earl of Egmont.*)

GEORGE JOHN Lord VERNON.

GEORGE DOUGLAS Lord SUNDRIDGE. (*Duke of Argyll.*) (*In another place as Lord Privy Seal.*)

EDWARD WILLIAM Lord HAWKE.

THOMAS HENRY Lord FOLEY.

GEORGE RICE Lord DYNEVOR.

THOMAS Lord WALSINGHAM.

WILLIAM Lord BAGOT.

CHARLES Lord SOUTHAMPTON.

FLETCHER Lord GRANTLEY.

ROBERT DENNETT Lord RODNEY.

RICHARD NOEL Lord BERWICK.

JOHN Lord SHERBORNE.

HENRY Lord TYRONE. (*Marquess of Waterford.*)

RICHARD Lord CARLETON.

CHARLES Lord SUFFIELD.

GUY Lord DORCHESTER.

GEORGE Lord KENYON.

RICHARD Lord BRAYBROOKE.

GEORGE HAMILTON Lord FISHERWICK. (*Marquess of Donegal.*)

JAMES Lord DOUGLAS of DOUGLAS.

HENRY HALL Lord GAGE. (*Viscount Gage.*)

EDWARD THOMAS Lord THURLOW.

ROBERT JOHN Lord AUCKLAND. (*Bishop of Bath and Wells.*)

GEORGE WILLIAM Lord LYTTELTON.

HENRY Lord MENDIP. (*Viscount Clifden.*)

FRANCIS Lord STUART of CASTLE STUART. (*Earl of Moray.*)

RANDOLPH Lord STEWART of GARLIES. (*Earl of Galloway.*)

JAMES THOMAS Lord SALTERSFORD. (*Earl of Courtown.*)

CHARLES Lord BRODRICK. (*Viscount Midleton.*)

FREDERICK Lord CALTHORPE.

ROBERT JOHN Lord CARRINGTON.

HENRY Lord BAYNING.

WILLIAM HENRY Lord BOLTON.

JOHN Lord WODEHOUSE.

JOHN Lord NORTHWICK.

THOMAS ATHERTON Lord LILFORD.

THOMAS Lord RIBBLESDALE.

RICHARD HOBART Lord FITZGIBBON. (*Earl of Clare.*)

CADWALLADER DAVIS Lord BLAYNEY. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

HENRY Lord FARNHAM. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

JOHN CAVENDISH Lord KILMAINE. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

ROBERT Lord CLONBROCK. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

EDWARD Lord CROFTON. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

EYRE Lord CLARINA. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

HENRY FRANCIS SEYMOUR Lord MOORE. (*Marquess of Drogheda.*)

JOHN HENRY LOFTUS Lord LOFTUS. (*Marquess of Ely.*)

JOHN Lord CARYSFORT. (*Earl of Carysfort.*)

RICHARD PEPPER Lord ALVANLEY.

GEORGE RALPH Lord ABERCROMBY.

JOHN THOMAS Lord REDESDALE.

GEORGE Lord RIVERS.

ARTHUR MOYSES WILLIAM Lord SANDYS.

GEORGE AUGUSTUS FREDERICK CHARLES Lord SHEFFIELD. (*Earl of Sheffield.*)

DAVID MONTAGU Lord ERSKINE.

GEORGE JOHN Lord MONT EAGLE. (*Marquess of Sligo.*)

ARCHIBALD WILLIAM Lord ARDROSSAN. (*Earl of Eglintoun.*)

JAMES Lord LAUDERDALE. (*Earl of Lauderdale.*)

GEORGE ARTHUR HASTINGS Lord GRANARD. (*Earl of Granard.*)

HUNGERFORD Lord CREWE.

ALAN LEGGE Lord GARDNER.

JOHN THOMAS Lord MANNERS.

JOHN ALEXANDER Lord HOPETOUN. (*Earl of Hopetoun.*)

FREDERICK WILLIAM ROBERT Lord STEWART of STEWART'S COURT (*Marquess of Londonderry.*)

Richard Lord Castlemaine. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Charles Lord Meldrum. (*Marquess of Huntly.*)

James Lord Ross. (*Earl of Glasgow.*)

William Willoughby Lord Grinstead. (*Earl of Enniskillen.*)

William Henry Tennison Lord Foxford. (*Earl of Limerick.*)

Francis George Lord Churchill.

George Francis Robert Lord Harris.

Charles Lord Colchester.

William Schomberg Robert Lord Ker. (*Marquess of Lothian.*)

Francis Nathaniel Lord Minster. (*Marquess Conyngham.*)

James Edward William Theobald Lord Ormonde. (*Marquess of Ormonde.*)

Francis Lord Wemyss. (*Earl of Wemyss.*)

Robert Lord Clanbrassill. (*Earl of Roden.*)

Robert Lord Kingston. (*Earl of Kingston.*)

Edward Michael Lord Silchester. (*Earl of Longford.*)

William Lord Maryborough. (*Earl of Mornington.*)

John Lord Oriel. (*Viscount Massereene.*)

Thomas Henry Lord Ravensworth.

Thomas Lord Delamere.

John George Weld Lord Forester.

John James Lord Rayleigh.

Ulysses Lord Downes. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Robert Francis Lord Gifford.

Percy Clinton Sydney Lord Penshurst. (*Viscount Strangford.*)

Ulick John Lord Somerhill. (*Marquess of Clanricarde.*)

James Lord Wigan. (*Earl of Crawford and Balcarres.*)

Thomas Lord Ranfurly. (*Earl of Ranfurly.*)

George Lord De Tabley.

John Lord Wharncliffe.

William Lord Feversham.

John Singleton Lord Lyndhurst.

James Lord Fife. (*Earl of Fife.*)

John Henry Lord Tenterden.

Thomas Span Lord Plunket. (*Bishop of Tuam, Killala, and Achonry.*)

Thomas Lord Melros. (*Earl of Haddington.*)

Henry Richard Charles Lord Cowley.

William Lord Heytesbury.

Archibald John Lord Rosebery. (*Earl of Rosebery.*)

Richard Lord Clanwilliam. (*Earl of Clanwilliam.*)

Edward Lord Skelmersdale.

William Samuel Lord Wynford.

Henry Lord Brougham and Vaux.

William Henry Lord Kilmarnock. (*Earl of Erroll.*)

Arthur James Lord Fingall. (*Earl of Fingall.*)

Charles William Lord Sefton. (*Earl of Sefton.*)

Nathaniel Lord Clements. (*Earl of Leitrim.*)

George William Fox Lord Rossie. (*Lord Kinnaird.*)

Thomas Lord Kenlis. (*Marquess of Headfort.*)

William Lord Chaworth. (*Earl of Meath.*)

Charles Adolphus Lord Dunmore. (*Earl of Dunmore.*)

Robert Montgomerie Lord Hamilton. (*Lord Belhaven and Stenton.*)

John Hobart Lord Howden.

Fox Lord Panmure.

George Warwick Lord Poltimore.

Edward Mostyn Lord Mostyn.

Henry Spencer Lord Templemore.

Edward Lord Cloncurry.

James Lord De Saumarez.

George Godolphin Lord Godolphin.

Lucius Bentinck Lord Hunsdon. (*Viscount Falkland.*)

Thomas Lord Denman.

Robert Campbell Lord Abinger.

Philip Lord De L'Isle and Dudley.

William Bingham Lord Ashburton.

Charles Lord Glenelg.

Edward John Lord Hatherton.

George Stevens Lord Strafford.

Archibald Lord Worlingham. (*Earl of Gosford.*)

Edward Berkeley Lord Portman.

Thomas Alexander Lord Lovat.

William Bateman Lord Bateman.

Francis William Lord Charlemont. (*In another place as Earl of Charlemont.*)

Francis Alexander Lord Kintore. (*Earl of Kintore.*)

Cornelius Lord Lismore. (*Viscount Lismore.*)

Henry Robert Lord Rossmore.

Robert Shapland Lord Carew.

William Francis Spencer Lord De Mauley.

John Lord Wrottesley.

Charles Lord Sudeley.

Frederick Henry Paul Lord Methuen.

Edward John Lord Stanley of Alderley.

Henry Lord Stuart de Decies.

William Henry Lord Leigh.

Beilby Richard Lord Wenlock.

Charles Lord Lurgan.

Arthur Lord De Freyne.

James Lord Dunfermline.

Thomas Spring Lord Monteagle of Brandon.

John Lord Seaton.

Edward Arthur Wellington Lord Keane.

John Lord Campbell.

North Lord Oxenfoord. (*Earl of Stair.*)

Charles Crespigny Lord Vivian.

John Lord Congleton.

Denis St. George Lord Dunsandle and Clanconal. (*Elected for Ireland.*)

Richard Lord Dartrey. (*Lord Cremorne.*)

Richard Bulkeley Philipps Lord Milford.

James Lord Elgin. (*Earl of Elgin and Kincardine.*)

Frederick Temple Lord Clandeboye. (*Lord Dufferin and Claneboye.*)

Albert Denison Lord Londesborough.

Samuel Jones Lord Overstone.

Thomas Lord Truro.

Robert Monsey Lord Cranworth. (*In another place as Lord Chancellor.*)

John Cam Lord Broughton.

Edward Burtenshaw Lord Saint Leonards.

Fitzroy James Henry Lord Raglan.

Mem.—*According to the Usage of Parliament, when the House appoints a Select Committee, the Lords appointed to serve upon it are named in the Order of their Rank, beginning with the Highest; and so, when the House sends a Committee to a Conference withthe Commons, the Lord highest in Rank is called first, and the rest go forth in like Order: But when the Whole House is called over for any Purpose within the House, or for the Purpose of proceeding forth to Westminster Hall, or upon any public Solemnity, the Call begins invariably with the Junior Baron.*

LIST OF THE COMMONS.

LIST OF MEMBERS

Returned from the respective Counties, Cities, Towns, and Boroughs, to serve in the *Sixteenth Parliament* of the United Kingdom of *Great Britain and Ireland*: Amended to the Opening of the Third Session on the 12th Day of December, 1854.

ABINGDON.

ANDOVER.
William Cubitt,
Henry Beaumont Coles.

ANGLESEY.
Sir Richard Bulkeley Williams Bulkeley, bt.

ARUNDEL.
Rt. hon. (Edward Howard) Lord E. Howard.

ASHBURTON.
George Moffatt.

ASHTON-UNDER-LINE.
Charles Hindley.

AYLESBURY.
Austen Henry Layard,
Sir Richard Bethell, knt.

BANBURY.
Henry William Tancred.

BARNSTAPLE.

BATH.
George Treweeke Scobell,
Thomas Phinn.

BEAUMARIS.
Hon. (George Augustus Frederick Paget) Lord G. A. F. Paget.

BEDFORDSHIRE.
Francis Charles Hastings Russell,
Richard Thomas Gilpin.

BEDFORD.
William Stuart,
Samuel Whitbread.

BERKSHIRE.
George Henry Vansittart,
Robert Palmer,
Rt. hon. William (Keppel) Viscount Barrington.

BERWICK-UPON-TWEED.
Dudley Coutts Majoribanks,
John Forster.

BEVERLEY.
Hon. Arthur Gordon,
William Wells.

BEWDLEY.
Sir Thomas Edward Winnington, bt.

BIRMINGHAM.
George Frederick Muntz,
William Scholefield.

BLACKBURN.
James Pilkington,
Montague Joseph Feilden.

BODMIN.
William Michell,
Charles Brune Graves Sawle.

BOLTON-LE-MOORS.
Thomas Barnes,
Joseph Crook.

BOSTON.
Gilbert Henry Heathcote,
Benjamin Bond Cabbell.

BRADFORD.
Robert Milligan,
Henry Wickham Wickham.

BRECKNOCKSHIRE.
Sir Joseph Bailey, bt.

BRECKNOCK.
John Lloyd Vaughan Watkins.

BRIDGENORTH.
Henry Whitmore,
John Pritchard.

BRIDGEWATER.
Charles John Kemeys Tynte,
Brent Spencer Follett.

BRIDPORT.
Thomas Alexander Mitchell,
John Patrick Murrough.

BRIGHTHELMSTONE.
Sir George Richard Pechell, bt.,
Hon. (Alfred Hervey) Lord A. Hervey.

BRISTOL.
Hon. Francis Henry Fitzhardinge Berkeley,
William Henry Gore Langton.

BUCKINGHAMSHIRE.
Caledon George Du Pré,
Rt. hon. Benjamin Disraeli,
Hon. Charles Compton Cavendish.

BUCKINGHAM.
Rt. hon. Richard Plantagenet Campbell (Chandos-Grenville) Marquess of Chandos,
John Hall.

BURY.
Frederick Peel.

BURY ST. EDMUND'S.
Rt. hon. Frederick William (Hervey) Earl Jermyn,
James Henry Porteous Oakes.

CALNE.
Hon. Henry Petty (Fitzmaurice) Earl of Shelburne.

CAMBRIDGESHIRE.
Hon. Eliot Thomas Yorke,
Hon. (George John Manners) Lord G. J. Manners,
Edward Ball.

CAMBRIDGE (UNIVERSITY).
Rt. hon. Henry Goulburn,
Loftus Tottenham Wigram.

CAMBRIDGE.
Francis Mowatt,
Robert Alexander Shafto Adair.

CANTERBURY.
Rt. hon. Sir William Meredyth Somerville,

CARDIFF.
Walter Coffin.

CARDIGANSHIRE.
Rt. hon. Ernest Augustus (Vaughan) Earl of Lisburne.

CARDIGAN.
Pryse Loveden.

CARLISLE.
Rt. hon. Sir James Robert George Graham, bt.,
Joseph Ferguson.

CARMARTHENSHIRE.
David Arthur Saunders Davies,
David Jones.

CARMARTHEN.
David Morris.

CARNARVONSHIRE.
Hon. Edward Gordon Douglas Pennant.

CARNARVON.
William Bulkeley Hughes.

CHATHAM.
Leicester Viney Vernon.

CHELTENHAM.
Hon. Craven Fitzhardinge Berkeley.

CHESHIRE.
(Northern Division.)
William Tatton Egerton,
George Cornwall Legh.

(Southern Division.)
Sir Philip de Malpas Grey Egerton, bt.,
John Tollemache.

CHESTER.
Hon. Hugh Lupus (Grosvenor) Earl Grosvenor,
Hon. William Owen Stanley.

CHICHESTER.
John Abel Smith,
Hon. (George Charles Henry Gordon Lennox) Lord G. C. H. G. Lennox.

CHIPPENHAM.
Joseph Neeld,
Henry George Boldero.

CHRISTCHURCH.
John Edward Walcott.

CIRENÇESTER.
John Randolph Mullings,
Hon. Ashley George John Ponsonby.

CLITHEROE.
Le Gendre Nicholas Starkie.

COCKERMOUTH.
Henry Wyndham,
John Steel.

COLCHESTER.
William Warwick Hawkins,
Rt. hon. (John James Robert Manners) Lord J. J. R. Manners.

CORNWALL.
(Eastern Division.)
Thomas James Agar Robartes,
Nicholas Kendall.

(Western Division.)
Michael Williams,
Sir Charles Lemon, bt.

COVENTRY.
Rt. hon. Edward Ellice,
Sir Joseph Paxton, knt.

CRICKLADE.
John Neeld,
Ambrose Lethbridge Goddard.

CUMBERLAND.
(Eastern Division.)
Hon. Charles Wentworth George Howard,
William Marshall.

(Western Division.)
Henry Lowther,
Samuel Irton.

DARTMOUTH.
Sir Thomas Herbert, K.C.B.

DENBIGHSHIRE.
Sir Watkin Williams Wynn, bt.,
Robert Myddelton Biddulph.

DENBIGH.
Frederick Richard West.

DERBYSHIRE.
(Northern Division.)
Hon. George Henry Cavendish,
William Pole Thornhill.

(Southern Division.)
Charles Robert Colville,
William Mundy.

DERBY.
Michael Thomas Bass,
Laurence Heyworth.

DEVIZES.
George Heneage Walker Heneage,
John Neilson Gladstone.

DEVONPORT.
Sir Thomas Erskine Perry, knt.
Sir George Frederick Berkeley, K.C.B.

DEVONSHIRE.
(Northern Division.)
Sir Thomas Dyke Acland, bt.,
Lewis William Buck.

(Southern Division.)
Sir John Buller Yarde Buller, bt.,
Lawrence Palk.

DORCHESTER.
Richard Brinsley Sheridan,
Henry Gerard Sturt.

DORSETSHIRE.
Rt. hon. George Bankes,
Henry Ker Seymer,
John Floyer.

DOVOR.
Hon. Henry Charles (Cadogan) Viscount Chelsea,
Edward Royd Rice.

DROITWICH.
Rt. hon. Sir John Somerset Pakington, bt.

DUDLEY.
John Benbow.

DURHAM.
(Northern Division.)
Robert Duncombe Shafto,
Hon. (Adolphus Frederick Charles William Vane-Tempest) Lord A. F. C. W. Vane-Tempest.

(Southern Division.)
Hon. (Harry George Vane) Lord H. G. Vane,
James Farrer.

DURHAM (CITY).
Robert John Mowbray,
William Atherton.

ESSEX.
(Northern Division.)
Sir John Tyssen Tyrell, bt.,
Rt. hon. William Beresford.

(Southern Division.)
Thomas William Bramston,
Sir William Bowyer Smijth, bt.

EVESHAM.
Sir Henry Pollard Willoughby, bt.,
Charles Lennox Grenville Berkeley.

EXETER.
Sir John Thomas Buller Duckworth, bt.,
Edward Divett.

EYE.
Edward Clarence Kerrison.

FINSBURY.
Thomas Challis,
Thomas Slingsby Duncombe.

FLINTSHIRE.
Hon. Thomas Edward Mostyn Lloyd Mostyn.

FLINT.
Sir John Hanmer, bt.

FROME.
Hon. Richard St. Lawrence (Boyle) Viscount Dungarvan.

GATESHEAD.
William Hutt.

GLAMORGANSHIRE.
Christopher Rice Mansel Talbot,
Sir George Tyler, knt.

GLOUCESTERSHIRE.
(Eastern Division.)
Christopher William Codrington.

(Western Division.)
Robert Nigel Fitzhardinge Kingscote,
Robert Blagden Hale.

GLOUCESTER.
William Philip Price,
Hon. Maurice Frederick Fitzhardinge Berkeley.

GRANTHAM.
Glynne Earle Welby,
Hon. (Montagu William Graham) Lord M. W. Graham.

GREENWICH.
Peter Rolt,
Montagu Chambers.

GRIMSBY (GREAT).
Rt. hon. William Richard (Annesley) Earl of Annesley.

GUILDFORD.
Ross Donnelly Mangles,
James Bell.

HALIFAX.
Rt. hon. Sir Charles Wood, bt.,
Frank Crossley.

HAMPSHIRE.
(Northern Division.)
Rt. hon. Charles Shaw Lefevre,
Melville Portal.

(Southern Division.)
Henry Combe Compton,
Hon. (William Henry Hugh Cholmondeley) Lord W. H. H. Cholmondeley.

HARWICH.
John Bagshaw,
David Waddington.

HASTINGS.
Patrick Francis Robertson,
Frederick North.

HAVERFORDWEST.
John Henry Philipps.

HELSTON.
Sir Richard Rawlinson Vyvyan, bt.

HEREFORDSHIRE.
James King King,
Thomas William Booker,
Charles Spencer Bateman Hanbury.

HEREFORD.
Sir Robert Price, bt.,
Henry Morgan Clifford.

HERTFORDSHIRE.
Abel Smith.
Sir Henry Meux, bt.,
Sir Edward George Earle Lytton Bulwer Lytton, bt.

HERTFORD.
Hon. William Francis Cowper,
Thomas Chambers.

HONITON.
Joseph Locke,
Sir James Weir Hogg, bt.

HORSHAM.
William Robert Seymour Vesey FitzGerald.

HUDDERSFIELD.
Hon. George Frederick Samuel (Robinson) Viscount Goderich.

HUNTINGDONSHIRE.
Edward Fellowes,
Hon. William Drogo (Montagu) Viscount Mandeville.

HUNTINGDON.
Jonathan Peel,
Thomas Baring.

HYTHE.
Edward Drake Brockman.

IPSWICH.
John Chevallier Cobbold,
Hugh Edward Adair.

KENDAL.
George Carr Glyn.

KENT.
(Eastern Division.)
Sir Edward Cholmeley Dering, bt.,
William Deedes.

(Western Division.)
Sir Edmund Filmer, bt.,
William Masters Smith.

KIDDERMINSTER.
Robert Lowe.

KING'S LYNN.
John Henry Gurney,
Hon. Edward Henry (Stanley) Lord Stanley.

KINGSTON-UPON-HULL.
William Henry Watson,
William Digby Seymour.

KNARESBOROUGH.
John Dent Dent,
Basil Thomas Woodd.

LAMBETH.
William Arthur Wilkinson,
William Williams.

LANCASHIRE.
(Northern Division.)
John Wilson Patten,
James Heywood.

(Southern Division.)
William Brown,
John Cheetham.

LANCASTER.
Samuel Gregson,
Thomas Greene.

LAUNCESTON.
Hon. Josceline William Percy.

LEEDS.
Sir George Goodman, knt.,
Rt. hon. Matthew Talbot Baines.

LEICESTERSHIRE.
(Northern Division.)
Edward Basil Farnham,
Hon. Charles Cecil John (Manners) Marquess of Granby.

(Southern Division.)
Sir Henry Halford, bt.,
Charles William Packe.

LEICESTER.
Sir Joshua Walmsley, knt.,
Richard Gardner.

LEOMINSTER.
George Arkwright,
John George Phillimore.

LEWES.
Hon. Henry FitzRoy,
Hon. Henry Brand.

LICHFIELD.
Rt. hon. Henry Manners (Cavendish) Lord Waterpark,
Hon. (Alfred Henry Paget) Lord A. H. Paget.

LINCOLNSHIRE.
(Parts of Lindsey.)
Rt. hon. Robert Adam Christopher,
James Banks Stanhope.

(Parts of Kesteven and Holland.)
Hon. William Alleyne (Cecil) Lord Burghley,
Sir John Trollope, bt.

LINCOLN.
Charles De Laet Waldo Sibthorp,
George Fieschi Heneage.

LISKEARD.
Ralph William Grey.

LIVERPOOL.
Hon. Henry Thomas Liddell,
Thomas Berry Horsfall.

LONDON.
John Masterman,
Rt. hon. (John Russell) Lord J. Russell,
Sir James Duke, bt.,
Lionel Nathan (Baron) De Rothschild.

LUDLOW.
Hon. Percy Egerton Herbert,
Hon. (William John Frederick Powlett) Lord W. J. F. Powlett.

LYME REGIS.
William Pinney.

LYMINGTON.
Sir John Rivett Carnac, bt.,
Edward John Hutchins.

MACCLESFIELD.
John Brocklehurst,
Edward Christopher Egerton.

MAIDSTONE.
James Whatman,
William Lee.

MALDON.
John Bramley Moore.

MALMESBURY.
Thomas Luce.

MALTON.
Hon. Charles William Wentworth Fitzwilliam,
John Evelyn Denison.

MANCHESTER.
Rt. hon. Thomas Milner Gibson,
John Bright.

MARLBOROUGH.
Rt. hon. (Ernest Augustus Charles Brudenell Bruce) Lord E. A. C. B. Bruce,
Henry Bingham Baring.

MARLOW (GREAT).
Thomas Peers Williams,
Brownlow William Knox.

MARYLEBONE.
Rt. hon. Sir Benjamin Hall, bt.

MERIONETHSHIRE.
William Watkin Edward Wynne.

MERTHYR TYDVIL.
Henry Austin Bruce.

MIDDLESEX.
Rt. hon. (Robert Grosvenor) Lord R. Grosvenor,
Ralph Bernal Osborne.

MIDHURST.
Rt. hon. Spencer Horatio Walpole.

MONMOUTHSHIRE.
Charles Octavius Swinnerton Morgan,
Edward Arthur Somerset.

MONMOUTH.
Crawshay Bailey.

MONTGOMERYSHIRE.
Herbert Watkins Williams Wynn.

MONTGOMERY.
David Pugh.

MORPETH.
Rt. hon. Sir George Grey, bt.

NEWARK-UPON-TRENT.
Granville Edward Harcourt Vernon,
John Henry Thomas Manners Sutton.

NEWCASTLE-UNDER-LYME
William Jackson,
Samuel Christy.

NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE.
John Fenwick Burgoyne Blackett,
Thomas Emerson Headlam.

NEWPORT.
William Biggs,
William Nathaniel Massey.

NORFOLK.
(Eastern Division.)
Henry Negus Burroughes,
Edmund Wodehouse.

(Western Division.)
William Bagge,
George William Pierrepont Bentinck.

NORTHALLERTON.
William Battie Wrightson.

NORTHAMPTONSHIRE.
(Northern Division.)
Stafford Augustus O'Brien Stafford,
Thomas Philip Maunsell.

(Southern Division.)
Richard Henry Richard Howard Vyse,
Rainald Knightley.

NORTHAMPTON.
Rt. hon. Robert Vernon Smith,
Raikes Currie.

NORTHUMBERLAND.
(Northern Division.)
Hon. Algernon George (Percy) Lord Lovaine,
Hon. Charles (Bennett) Lord Ossulston.

(Southern Division.)
Wentworth Blackett Beaumont,
Henry George Liddell.

NORWICH.
Samuel Morton Peto,
Edward Warner.

NOTTINGHAMSHIRE.
(Northern Division.)
Hon. (Henry William Cavendish Bentinck) Lord H. W. C. Bentinck,
Hon. (Robert Renebald Pelham-Clinton) Lord R. R. Clinton.

(Southern Division.)
William Hodgson Barrow,
Hon. Charles (Pierrepont) Viscount Newark.

NOTTINGHAM.
Rt. hon. Edward Strutt,
John Walter.

OLDHAM.
John Morgan Cobbett,
William Johnson Fox.

OXFORDSHIRE.
Rt. hon. Joseph Warner Henley,
John Sidney North,
George Granville Vernon Harcourt.

OXFORD (CITY).
James Haughton Langston,
Rt. hon. Edward Cardwell.

OXFORD (UNIVERSITY).
Sir William Heathcote, bt.,
Rt. Hon. William Ewart Gladstone.

PEMBROKESHIRE.
Hon. John Frederick Vaughan (Campbell) Viscount Emlyn.

PEMBROKE.
Sir John Owen, bt.

PENRYN AND FALMOUTH.
Howel Gwyn,
James William Freshfield.

PETERBOROUGH.
Hon. George Wentworth Fitzwilliam,
Thomson Hankey.

PETERSFIELD.
Sir William George Hylton Jolliffe, bt.

PLYMOUTH.
Roundell Palmer,
Robert Porrett Collier.

PONTEFRACT.
Richard Monckton Milnes,
Benjamin Oliveira.

POOLE.
Henry Danby Seymour,
George Woodroffe Franklyn.

PORTSMOUTH.
Rt. hon. Sir Francis Thornhill Baring, bt.,
Rt. hon. Charles Stanley (Monck) Viscount Monck.

PRESTON.
Robert Townley Parker,
Sir George Strickland, bt.

RADNORSHIRE.
Sir John Benn Walsh, bt.

RADNOR (NEW).
Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas Frankland Lewis, bt..

READING.
Francis Pigott,
Henry Singer Keating.

REIGATE.
Hon. Thomas Somers Cocks.

RETFORD (EAST).
Hon. William Ernest Duncombe,
Rt. hon. George Edward Arundell (Monckton-Arundell) Viscount Galway.

RICHMOND.
Henry Rich,
Marmaduke Wyvill.

RIPON.
William Beckett,
Hon. Edwin Lascelles.

ROCHDALE.
Edward Miall.

ROCHESTER.
Hon. Francis John Robert Villiers,
Sir Thomas Herbert Maddock, knt.

RUTLANDSHIRE.
Sir Gilbert John Heathcote, bt.,
Hon. Gerard James Noel.

RYE.
William Alexander Mackinnon.

ST. IVES.
Robert Laffan.

SALFORD.
Joseph Brotherton.

SALISBURY.
William James Chaplin,
Edward Pery Buckley.

SALOP, OR SHROPSHIRE.
(*Northern Division.*)
William Ormsby Gore,
John Whitehall Dod.

(*Southern Division.*)
Robert Clive,
Hon. Orlando George Chas. (Bridgeman) Viscount Newport.

SANDWICH.
Hon. Charles Pelham (Pelham-Clinton) Lord C. P. Clinton,
James MacGregor.

SCARBOROUGH.
Sir John Vanden Bempde Johnstone, bt.,
Rt. hon. George Augustus Constantine (Phipps) Earl of Mulgrave.

SHAFTESBURY.
Hon. William Henry Berkeley Portman.

SHEFFIELD.
John Arthur Roebuck,
George Hadfield.

SHIELDS (SOUTH).
Robert Ingham.

SHOREHAM (NEW).
Sir Charles Merrik Burrell, bt.,
Hon. (Alexander Francis Charles Gordon Lennox) Lord A. F. C. G. Lennox.

SHREWSBURY.
George Tomline,
Edward Holmes Baldock.

SOMERSETSHIRE.
(*Eastern Division.*)
William Miles,
William Francis Knatchbull.

(*Western Division.*)
Charles Aaron Moody,
William Henry Powell Gore Langton.

SOUTHAMPTON.
Brodie M'Ghie Willcox,
Sir Alexander James Edmund Cockburn, knt.

SOUTHWARK.
Sir William Molesworth, bt.,
Apsley Pellatt.

STAFFORDSHIRE.
(*Northern Division.*)
Charles Bowyer Adderley,
Smith Child.

(*Southern Division.*)
Hon. George Anson,
Hon. Henry William George (Paget) Earl of Uxbridge.

STAFFORD.
John Ayshford Wise,
Arthur John Otway.

STAMFORD.
Hon. (Robert Talbot Gascoyne Cecil) Lord R. T. G. Cecil,
Sir Frederic Thesiger, knt.

STOCKPORT.
James Kershaw,
John Benjamin Smith.

STOKE-UPON-TRENT.
John Lewis Ricardo,
Hon. Edward Frederic Leveson-Gower.

STROUD.

George Poulett Scrope,
Edward Horsman.

SUFFOLK.

(Eastern Division.)

Sir FitzRoy Kelly, knt.
Sir Edward Sherlock Gooch, bt.

(Western Division.)

Harry Spencer Waddington,
Philip Bennet.

SUNDERLAND.

George Hudson,
William Digby Seymour.

SURREY.

(Eastern Division.)

Thomas Alcock,
Hon. Peter John Locke King.

(Western Division.)

William John Evelyn,
Henry Drummond.

SUSSEX.

(Eastern Division.)

Augustus Eliott Fuller,
Charles Hay Frewen.

(Western Division.)

Hon. Charles Henry (Gordon Lennox) Earl of March,
Henry Wyndham.

SWANSEA.

John Henry Vivian.

TAMWORTH.

Sir Robert Peel, bt.,
John Townshend.

TAUNTON.

Rt. hon. Henry Labouchere,
Sir John William Ramsden, bt.

TAVISTOCK.

Hon. George Henry Charles Byng,
Robert Joseph Phillimore.

TEWKESBURY.

Humphrey Brown,
John Martin.

THETFORD.

Hon. William Henry (FitzRoy) Earl of Euston,
Hon. Francis Baring.

THIRSK.

Sir William Payne Gallwey, bt.

TIVERTON.

John Heathcoat,
Rt. hon. Henry John (Temple) Viscount Palmerston.

TOTNESS.

Rt. hon. Edward Adolphus (Seymour) Lord Seymour,
Thomas Mills.

TOWER HAMLETS.

Sir William Clay, bt.,
Charles Salisbury Butler.

TRURO.

Henry Hussey Vivian,
John Ennis Vivian.

TYNEMOUTH.

William Schaw Lindsay.

WAKEFIELD.

George Sandars.

WALLINGFORD.

Richard Malins.

WALSALL.

Charles Forster.

WAREHAM.

John Samuel Wanley Sawbridge Erle Drax.

WARRINGTON.

Gilbert Greenall.

WARWICKSHIRE.

(Northern Division.)

Charles Newdigate Newdegate,
Richard Spooner.

(Southern Division.)

Hon. Heneage (Finch) Lord Guernsey,
Evelyn Philip Shirley.

WARWICK.

George William John Repton,
Edward Greaves.

WELLS.

Robert Charles Tudway,
Rt. hon. William Goodenough Hayter.

WENLOCK.

Rt. hon. George Cecil Weld Forester,
James Milnes Gaskell.

WESTBURY.

James Wilson.

WESTMINSTER.

Sir John Villiers Shelley, bt.,
Sir De Lacy Evans, K.C.B.

WESTMORELAND.

Hon. Henry Cecil Lowther,
Hon. Thomas (Taylour) Earl of Bective.

WEYMOUTH AND MELCOMBE REGIS.

William Lockyer Freestun,
George Medd Butt.

WHITBY.

Robert Stephenson.

WHITEHAVEN.

Robert Charles Hildyard.

WIGAN.

Joseph Acton,
Hon. James Lindsay.

WIGHT (ISLE OF).

Francis Vernon Harcourt.

WILTON.

Charles Henry Wyndham à Court.

WILTSHIRE.

(Northern Division.)

Walter Long,
Thomas Henry Sutton Sotheron.

(Southern Division.)

Rt. hon. Sidney Herbert,
William Wyndham.

WINCHESTER.

John Bonham Carter,
Sir James Buller East, bt.

WINDSOR.

Hon. (Charles Wellesley) Lord C. Wellesley,
Charles William Grenfell.

WOLVERHAMPTON.

Rt. hon. Charles Pelham Villiers,
Thomas Thornely.

WOODSTOCK.

Hon. John Winston (Spencer Churchill) Marquess of Blandford.

WORCESTERSHIRE.

(Eastern Division.)

George Rushout,
John Hodgetts Hodgetts Foley.

(Western Division.)

Hon. Henry (Pyndar) Viscount Elmley
Frederick Winn Knight.

WORCESTER.

William Laslett,
Osman Ricardo.

WYCOMBE (CHIPPING).

Sir George Henry Dashwood, bt.,
Martin Tucker Smith.

YARMOUTH (GREAT).

Sir Edmund Henry Knowles Lacon, bt.,
Charles Edmund Rumbold.

YORKSHIRE.

(North Riding.)

Edward Stillingfleet Cayley,
Hon. Octavius Duncombe.

YORKSHIRE—*continued.*
(*East Riding.*)
Rt. hon. Beaumont (Hotham) Lord Hotham,
Hon. Arthur Duncombe.
(*West Riding.*)
Richard Cobden,
Edmund Beckett Denison.

YORK.
John George Smyth,
William Mordaunt Edward Milner.

SCOTLAND.

ABERDEENSHIRE.

ABERDEEN.
George Thompson.

ARGYLLSHIRE.
Sir Archibald Islay Campbell, bt.

AYRSHIRE.

AYR, &c.
Edward Henry John Craufurd.

BANFFSHIRE.
James Duff.

BERWICKSHIRE.
Hon. Francis Scott.

BUTESHIRE.
Rt. hon. James Archibald Stuart Wortley.

CAITHNESS-SHIRE.
George Traill.

CLACKMANNAN AND KINROSS SHIRES.
James Johnstone.

CUPAR, &c.
Edward Ellice.

DUMBARTONSHIRE.
Alexander Smollett.

DUMFRIES-SHIRE.
Hon. Archibald William (Douglas) Viscount Drumlanrig.

DUMFRIES, &c.
William Ewart.

DUNDEE.
George Duncan.

DYSART, &c.
Robert Ferguson.

EDINBURGHSHIRE.
Hon. William Henry Walter (Montague-Douglas-Scott) Earl of Dalkeith.

EDINBURGH.
Rt. hon. Thomas Babington Macaulay,
Charles Cowan.

ELGINSHIRE AND NAIRNE.
Charles Lennox Cumming Bruce.

ELGIN, &c.
George Skene Duff.

FALKIRK, &c.
James Baird.

FIFESHIRE.
John Fergus.

FORFARSHIRE.
Hon. Adam (Haldane-Duncan) Viscount Duncan.

GLASGOW.
Alexander Hastie,
John MacGregor.

GREENOCK.
Alexander Murray Dunlop.

HADDINGTONSHIRE.
Hon. Francis Wemyss (Charteris) Lord Elcho.

HADDINGTON, &c.
Sir Henry Robert Ferguson Davie, bt.

INVERNESS-SHIRE.
Henry James Baillie.

INVERNESS, &c.
Alexander Matheson.

KINCARDINESHIRE.
Hon. Hugh Arbuthnott.

KIRKCUDBRIGHT.
John Mackie.

KIRKWALL, WICK, &c.
Samuel Laing.

LANARKSHIRE.
William Lockhart.

LEITH, &c.
Rt. hon. James Moncreiff.

LINLITHGOWSHIRE.
George Dundas.

MONTROSE, &c.
Joseph Hume.

ORKNEY AND SHETLAND.
Frederick Dundas.

PAISLEY.
Archibald Hastie.

PEEBLES-SHIRE.
Sir Graham Graham Montgomery, bt.

PERTHSHIRE.
William Stirling.

PERTH.
Hon. Arthur FitzGerald Kinnaird.

RENFREWSHIRE.
William Mure.

RENFREW, &c.
Hon. Edward Pleydell Bouverie.

ROSS AND CROMARTY SHIRES.
Sir James Matheson, bt.

ROXBURGHSHIRE.
Hon. John Edmund Elliot.

SELKIRKSHIRE.
Allan Eliot Lockhart.

STIRLINGSHIRE.
William Forbes.

STIRLING, &c.
Sir James Anderson, knt.

SUTHERLANDSHIRE.
Hon. George Granville William (Leveson-Gower) Marquess of Stafford.

WIGTONSHIRE.
Viscount Dalrymple.

WIGTON, &c.
Sir John MacTaggart, bt.

IRELAND.

ANTRIM.

George Macartney.

ARMAGH.
Sir William Verner, bt.,
James Molyneux Caulfield.

ARMAGH (CITY).
Ross Stephenson Moore.

ATHLONE.
William Keogh.

BANDON BRIDGE.
Hon. Francis (Bernard) Viscount Bernard.

BELFAST.
Richard Davison,
Hugh MacCalmont Cairns.

CARLOW.
John Ball,
William Bunbury M'Clintock Bunbury.

CARLOW (BOROUGH).
John Alexander.

CARRICKFERGUS.
Hon. Wellington Henry Stapleton Cotton.

CASHEL.
Sir Timothy O'Brien, bt.

CAVAN.
Hon. James Pierce Maxwell,
Sir John Young, bt.

CLARE.
Sir John Forster FitzGerald, K.C.B.,
Cornelius O'Brien.

CLONMEL.
John O'Connell.

COLERAINE.
Rt. hon. Richard Southwell (Bourke) Lord Naas.

CORK COUNTY.
Edmund Burke Roche,
Vincent Scully.

CORK (CITY).
Francis Bernard Beamish,
William Trant Fagan.

DONEGAL.
Thomas Conolly,
Sir Edmund Samuel Hayes, bt.

DOWNSHIRE.
Hon. (Arthur Edwin Hill) Lord A. E. Hill,
David Stewart Kerr.

DOWNPATRICK.
Hon. Charles Stewart Hardinge.

DROGHEDA.
James McCann.

DUBLIN.
James Hans Hamilton,
Thomas Edward Taylor.

DUBLIN (CITY).
Edward Grogan,
John Vance.

DUBLIN (UNIVERSITY).
George Alexander Hamilton,
Rt. hon. Joseph Napier.

DUNDALK.
George Bowyer.

DUNGANNON.
Hon. William Stuart Knox.

DUNGARVAN.
John Francis Maguire.

ENNIS.
John David FitzGerald.

ENNISKILLEN.
James Whiteside.

FERMANAGH.
Mervyn Edward Archdall.

GALWAY.
Sir Thomas John Burke, bt.,
Thomas Bellew.

GALWAY (BOROUGH).
Anthony O'Flaherty,
Martin Joseph Blake.

KERRY.
Henry Arthur Herbert,
Hon. Valentine Augustus (Browne) Viscount Castlerosse.

KILDARE.
William Henry Ford Cogan,
David O'Connor Henchy.

KILKENNY.
William Shee,
John Greene.

KILKENNY (BOROUGH).
Michael Sullivan.

KING'S COUNTY.
Patrick O'Brien,
Loftus Henry Bland.

KINSALE.
John Isaac Heard.

LEITRIM.
Hugh Lyons Montgomery,
John Brady.

LIMERICK.
William Monsell.

LIMERICK (CITY).
James O'Brien,
Francis William Russell.

LISBURN.
Jonathan Joseph Richardson.

LONDONDERRY.
Thomas Bateson,
Theobald Jones.

LONDONDERRY (CITY).
Sir Robert Alexander Ferguson, bt.

LONGFORD.
Richard Maxwell Fox,
Fulke Southwell Greville.

LOUTH.
Chichester Samuel Fortescue,
Tristram Kennedy.

MALLOW.
Sir Charles Denham Orlando Jephson Norreys, bt.

MAYO.
George Henry Moore,
George Gore Ouseley Higgins.

MEATH.
Frederick Lucas,
Matthew Elias Corbally.

MONAGHAN.
Charles Powell Leslie,
Sir George Forster, bt.

NEWRY.
William Kirk.

PORTARLINGTON.
Francis Plunket Dunne.

QUEEN'S COUNTY.
Michael Dunne,
Sir Charles Henry Coote, bt.

ROSCOMMON.
Fitzstephen French,
Oliver Dowell John Grace.

ROSS (NEW).
Charles Gavan Duffy.

SLIGO.
Sir Robert Gore Booth, bt.,
Richard Swift.

SLIGO (BOROUGH).
John Sadleir.

TIPPERARY.
Francis Scully,
James Sadleir.

TRALEE.
Daniel O'Connell.

TYRONE.
Rt. hon. Henry Thomas Lowry Corry,
Rt. hon. (Claud Hamilton) Lord C. Hamilton.

WATERFORD.
Nicholas Mahon Power,
John Esmonde.

WATERFORD (CITY).
Thomas Meagher,
Robert Keating.

WESTMEATH.
William Henry Magan,
William Pollard Urquhart.

WEXFORD.
Patrick McMahon,
John George.

WEXFORD (BOROUGH).
John Thomas Devereux.

WICKLOW.
Hon. William Thomas Spencer (Wentworth Fitzwilliam) Viscount Milton,
William Wentworth Fitzwilliam Hume.

YOUGHALL.
Isaac Butt.

HANSARD'S

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES,

IN THE

THIRD SESSION OF THE *SIXTEENTH PARLIAMENT* OF
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF *GREAT BRITAIN* AND *IRELAND*
APPOINTED TO MEET 20 AUGUST, 1852, AND FROM THENCE
CONTINUED TILL 12 DECEMBER, 1854, IN THE EIGHTEENTH YEAR
OF THE REIGN OF

HER MAJESTY QUEEN VICTORIA.

FIRST VOLUME OF THE SESSION.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Tuesday, December 12, 1854.

MINUTES.] PUBLIC BILLS.—1ª Select Vestries; Enlistment of Foreigners.

MEETING OF THE PARLIAMENT.

THE PARLIAMENT, which had been prorogued successively from the 12th August to the 19th October, to the 16th November and to the 14th December, having been summoned by Proclamation to meet on the 12th December, met this day accordingly.

The Session of the Parliament was opened by The QUEEN in Person.

THE QUEEN'S SPEECH.

THE QUEEN, being seated on the Throne, and the Commons being at the Bar, with their Speaker, HER MAJESTY was pleased to make a most gracious Speech to both Houses of Parliament, as follows:—

"*My Lords, and Gentlemen,*

"I HAVE called you together at this unusual Period of the Year, in order that by your Assistance I may take such Measures as will enable Me to prosecute the great War in which we are engaged with the utmost Vigour and Effect.

"THIS Assistance I know will be readily given; for I cannot doubt that you share My Conviction of the Necessity of sparing no Effort to augment My Forces now engaged in the *Crimea.* The Exertions they have made, and the Victories they have obtained, are not exceeded in the brightest Pages of our History, and have filled Me with Admiration and Gratitude.

"THE hearty and efficient Co-operation of the brave Troops of My Ally The Emperor of the *French,* and the Glory acquired in common, cannot fail to cement still more closely the Union which happily subsists between the Two Nations.

"IT is with Satisfaction I inform you, that, together with The Emperor of the *French,* I have concluded a Treaty of Alliance with The Emperor of *Aus-*

tria, from which I anticipate important Advantages to the common Cause.

"I HAVE also concluded a Treaty with the United States of *America,* by which Subjects of long and difficult Discussion have been equitably adjusted.

"THESE Treaties will be laid before you.

"ALTHOUGH the Prosecution of the War will naturally engage your chief Attention, I trust that other Matters of great Interest and Importance to the general Welfare will not be neglected.

"I REJOICE to observe that the general Prosperity of My Subjects remains uninterrupted.

"THE State of the Revenue affords Me entire Satisfaction; and I trust that by your Wisdom and Prudence you will continue to promote the Progress of Agriculture, Commerce, and Manufactures.

"*Gentlemen of the House of Commons,*

"IN the Estimates which will be presented to you I trust you will find that ample Provision has been made for the Exigencies of the Public Service.

"*My Lords, and Gentlemen,*

"I RELY with Confidence on your Patriotism and public Spirit. I feel assured that in the momentous Contest in which we are engaged you will exhibit to the World the Example of a united People. Thus shall we obtain the Respect of other Nations, and may trust that, by the Blessing of God, we shall bring the War to a successful Termination."

HER MAJESTY then retired.

House adjourned during pleasure.

House resumed.

ADDRESS IN ANSWER TO THE SPEECH.

THE QUEEN'S Speech having been *reported* by the LORD CHANCELLOR,

THE DUKE OF LEEDS rose to propose that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, in answer to the most gracious Speech they had just heard. His Grace said, that he felt deeply the importance of the duty he had to perform at such a time as this, and, little accustomed as he was to address their Lordships, he trusted to their indulgence on this occasion. In the first place, Her Majesty informed them that Parliament was summoned at this unusual period of the year in order, that by their assistance, She might be enabled to take measures for the prosecution, with vigour and effect, of the great war in which this country was now engaged, and She expressed her firm confidence that that assistance would be readily given, for there could be no doubt now of the necessity of sparing no efforts to augment the forces now engaged in the Crimea. He was sure that Parliament and the country would, with one voice, one heart, one soul, respond to Her Majesty's appeal, and that whatever supplies of money, men, or arms, the exigencies of this war, with its attendant expenditure, might require, they would be granted at once, and with no sparing or niggard hand. This would be done, well knowing that, as it had been well said, England could never afford to wage a little war, and that the more vigorously the war was carried on, the sooner might we hope to arrive at its result—a permanent and honourable peace. Her Majesty told them—

> "The hearty and efficient co-operation of the brave troops of my ally the Emperor of the French, and the glory acquired in common, cannot fail to cement still more closely the union which happily subsists between the two nations."

Her Majesty next said—

> "It is with satisfaction I inform you that, together with the Emperor of the French, I have concluded a treaty of alliance with the Emperor of Austria, from which I anticipate important advantages to the common cause."

And next that She had—

> "concluded a treaty with the United States by which subjects of long and difficult discussion have been equitably adjusted."

This latter agreement, he trusted, would strengthen the bonds which united two nations having one permanent interest and being of one common race. But, with reference to the alliance which Her Majesty and the Emperor of France had jointly concluded with the Emperor of Austria, we might well rejoice that the righteousness and justice of the cause in which we were embarked was thus bringing a great Power like Austria over to our side, notwithstanding the ties of long and firm alliance which had previously existed between her and that other Emperor, with whom we are unhappily at war. This approach, on the part of Austria, to the views and policy of our own country and France, afforded the surest—he might say the only—chance of restoring to the world the blessings of tranquillity and peace. To that great nation, with which we were now so closely, and, he trusted, indissolubly united—to whose hearty and efficient co-operation with its brave troops we owed so much—matchless sharer in all those victories which would for ever shed imperishable glory upon our united arms—honour be to that great nation, and to that great man who has been called to rule her destinies, whose great sagacity and true patriotism have convinced him that the close and intimate alliance of France with England afforded the best security for the future peace of the world. Her Majesty, in alluding to the splendid actions of our soldiers in the Crimea, said that the exertions they have made, and the victories they have obtained, have not been exceeded in the brightest pages of our history, and had filled her with admiration and gratitude. He need but refer to the brave deeds by which our gallant Army and Navy, with those of our ally, would be immortalised. He thought, indeed, that history could afford no equal example to that of the daring valour with which the almost impregnable position of the enemy on the heights of the Alma, strengthened by every means that art as well as nature could provide, was assailed and taken. And where could we find any parallel to that desperate and headlong charge of our scanty force of cavalry at Balaklava? Where could we find a parallel, he repeated, to that resolute and indomitable valour with which our handful of brave men, attacked unexpectedly under cover of darkness and mist, fought at Inkerman, hand to hand, foot to foot, bayonet to bayonet, for hours against the overwhelming masses of a resolute and barbarous enemy? They fought, until our brave Allies, with their fiery and effectual charge, came to our assistance, and, by their force, united with our own, drove the assailants back to the shelter of their batteries. Alas! these engagements had been not only most glorious, but they had been most fatal; and many of their Lordships' House, and many a family throughout this realm of Britain, were left to deplore the loss of some near and dear relative. In their sorrow all must sympathise; but it would be some consolation to the bereaved, and they might find some comfort in the reflection, that their relatives had met a glorious death, fighting for their Queen, for Europe, and for freedom's cause. Their names shall ever be immortal in the roll of fame; all honour to the brave survivors a grateful country will not fail to pay. He was quite unable to do justice to all their deeds of heroism. From their commander—the brave companion in arms of the illustrious Wellington—the leader whose daring genius planned and executed that unrivalled movement, after the victory of the Alma, by which our armies were enabled to take up a commodious and impregnable position on the most assailable side of the fortress, had shown his generalship to be worthy of the incidents of his earlier career; and that illustrious Royal Duke, who had shown that he possessed all the skill and coolness of a great commander, with all the hereditary valour of his illustrious race—from officers of every degree, and of every military rank from highest to lowest, down to the toil-worn private sentinel, one and all had shown that "every man" had "done his duty." England still owned sons who would continue to make her name honoured and respected to the ends of the earth. And, while the Army had done all this, honour was also due to the nation, for never had there been a time when the unanimous spirit of the people was expressed with higher enthusiasm, or with a stronger sense of the justice of our cause, than the spirit which now pervaded all ranks and classes of society throughout this realm. The ranks of labour contributed their means, and day by day we saw a multitude of recruits leaving their homes and ordinary occupations to uphold our standard and to fill our camp. We saw, day by day, large contributions of money, intended not only to afford relief to the widows and children of those who fell in the war, but to afford comfort to the sick and wounded, and succour to the worn-out men of the army, whose strength was broken by their toil. All ranks, too, had united to give to the struggling soldier the comforting assurance, in the hour of trial and danger, that whatever fate befell themselves, their wives and their children would be provided for at home. To secure this, a fund had been raised by voluntary offerings which exceeded by far any similar contribution that had ever been made. And here we owe a tribute of grateful feeling to that fine Colony across the broad Atlantic, whose people, loyal, true, and brave, have so nobly come forward to assist with their contributions the fund provided for the relief of the widows and orphans of the brave defenders of their parent country. What esteem and gratitude do we not owe to those excellent and pious women—not only those who from holy and religious feelings devote their lives to attending and comforting the sick, but to those who, leaving all the comforts of friends and home, have freely offered their services of mercy to encounter all the drudgery of the hospitals in its most hideous form — honour, my Lords, all honour be to those angelic women, those blessed ministers of mercy, whose gentle and tender care would visit the disabled soldier, and soothe him upon his cheerless couch of pain! And now, in conclusion, let him express a hope that ere long success might crown our efforts, and that, by the blessing of Divine Providence, peace might soon again resume its wonted sway, and the gentler arts of commerce and industry, so roughly interrupted by the rude voice of war, might again flourish; and, above all, he hoped that with returning peace the blessed light of Christianity might spread its benign influence through those fine regions where it was as yet unknown, or known only to be despised. Then, indeed, glorious would have been the cause for which such great calamities had been endured, and for which our bravest and our best had bled. His Grace concluded by moving, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty in answer to Her Gracious Speech from the Throne."

The following is a copy of the Address *agreed to*—

"Most Gracious Sovereign,

"We, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal Subjects, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to convey to Your Majesty our humble Thanks for Your Majesty's most Gracious Speech from the Throne.

"We humbly Thank Your Majesty for informing us, that Your Majesty has called us together at this unusual Period of the Year, in order that by our Assistance Your Majesty may take such Measures as will enable Your Majesty to prosecute the great War in which we are engaged with the utmost Vigour and Effect.

"We assure Your Majesty that this Assistance will be readily given, and that we fully agree with Your Majesty in the necessity of sparing no Effort to augment Your Majesty's Forces now engaged in the *Crimea;* while we rejoice to learn that the Exertions they have made, and the Victories they have obtained, which are not exceeded in the brightest Pages of our History, have filled Your Majesty with Admiration and Gratitude.

"We participate in the Conviction expressed by Your Majesty, that the hearty and efficient Co-operation of the brave Troops of Your Majesty's Ally The Emperor of the *French*, and the Glory acquired in common, cannot fail to cement still more closely the Union which happily subsists between the Two Nations.

"We learn with Satisfaction that, together with the Emperor of the *French*, Your Majesty has concluded an Alliance with the Emperor of *Austria*, from which Your Majesty anticipates important advantages to the common Cause.

"We humbly thank Your Majesty for informing us, that Your Majesty has also concluded a Treaty with the United States of *America*, by which Subjects of long and difficult Discussion have been equitably adjusted.

"We thank Your Majesty for the Announcement that these Treaties will be laid before us.

"We humbly concur in the hope expressed by Your Majesty, that although the Prosecution of the War will naturally engage our chief Attention, yet that other Matters of great Interest and Importance to the general Welfare will not be neglected.

"We rejoice to learn that the general Prosperity of Your Majesty's Subjects remains uninterrupted, and that the State of the Revenue affords Your Majesty entire Satisfaction; while we humbly beg to assure Your Majesty of our Desire to continue to promote the Progress of Agriculture, Commerce, and Manufactures.

"We humbly thank Your Majesty for the Confidence with which Your Majesty relies on our Patriotism and Public Spirit, and for the Conviction expressed by Your Majesty, that in the momentous Contest in which we are engaged we shall exhibit to the World the example of a united People; and we share Your Majesty's Opinion, that we shall thus obtain the Respect of other Nations, and may trust that, by the Blessing of God, we shall bring the War to a successful termination."

LORD ASHBURTON: My Lords, on rising to second the Address to Her Majesty which has just been read, I cannot but express my regret that the sudden illness of a noble Earl lately called up to your Lordships' House should have deprived your Lordships of that attractive interest with which his recognised talents and original turn of mind would have invested this hackneyed task. I shall, however, do my best to follow the able and comprehensive speech of the noble Duke. Absorbed by the fearful interest of the war, he has scarcely alluded to the solution, by treaty, of our long-pending differences with America, a solution which will be hailed with joy wherever the English language is spoken, a solution which gives evidence of the wisdom of the rulers of the two countries who are now, as they have been under former auspices, ready to submit to the decisions of reason rather than appeal to the vengeance of the sword.

The Address which I have the honour to second, pledges your Lordships to no opinion upon this subject, nor, indeed, upon the subject of the other communications made in the speech, but it does pledge you to a solemn engagement with regard to the future conduct of the war in answer to the solemn appeal which fell so impressively this morning from the lips of Her Majesty.

I believe if the question had then been put at once, there would have been an answer, as plain, as simple, as unanimous, as enthusiastic, as the response to Maria Theresa from the magnates of Hungary. Never, perhaps, at any period of our history has unanimity been more important to the vital interests of the country than it is at the present moment. It is desirable even as regards the enemy with whom we are engaged in arms.

Let us leave him no hope that, from internal dissensions, from hesitation of purpose, from doubt or distrust of the justice of our cause, we may fail to push hostilities with all our heart, and soul, and strength, without stint of men, without stint of expenditure, until we shall have obtained a righteous settlement of our claims. It is due to our faithful and gallant allies, the French people, the unflinching partners of our dangers and of our glory—it is due to the straightforward loyalty of their Emperor—it is due still more to our new allies, the Austrians, in proportion to the magnitude of the peril which they encounter in our united cause. We venture at most 30,000 men, landed on the extreme south of the Russian dominions. They are attended by a fleet in which they may be withdrawn in case of reverses. The Austrians, on their part, venture not 30,000, but 300,000 men, exposed along their whole eastern frontier to the masses of the enemy. To them there is no retreat, no security, but in victory. It is due to our brave army that lavishes its blood, performing deeds worthy of the most heroic times of chivalry; it is due lastly to the desires and demands—it is due to the example of the entire people of Great Britain, who, setting aside party differences and religious animosities, are ready to devote their lives, their fortunes, to the success of this contest, which your Lordships by your decision this night may either greatly imperil or greatly promote.

Never, perhaps, has been seen such a concurrence of noble feelings in the prosecution of a noble cause. No sex, no age, no station, has been backward in sacrifices. The old have brought their contributions, the young have enlisted, pauper school-children subscribe their mite; noble women, nurtured in luxury, have deserted their homes, their all, to attend hospitals in a barbarous land; the very criminals entreat to be allowed to starve themselves, that the widow and the orphan of the soldier may be fed.

Excuse me, my Lords, if I may, for a moment, have seemed to urge these facts as if you alone in the midst of a united people were inaccessible to the same generous influences. I have stated them because I deemed it would be grateful to you to meditate, as it is grateful to every generous mind to expatiate on whatever is great and good in the conduct of those whom he loves and prizes as his countrymen. It is with perfect security that I leave this question in your Lordships' hands. You will not exhibit this night to the world the example of disunion in this the most august assembly of the realm.

THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, Her Majesty has called us together at an unusual period of the year to deliberate upon subjects of the highest and gravest importance, not to this country alone, but also to Europe and the world; and if, under these circumstances, it had been my duty to raise any objection or any cavil to the terms of the proposed Address in answer to the Speech from the Throne—if it had been my intention to propose any Amendment, or to enter into any controversy—I should undoubtedly have preferred that some of Her Majesty's Ministers should have first had the opportunity of stating fully their views and of explaining the conduct pursued by Her Majesty's Government, in order that I might have had the advantage of referring to their statements. But, my Lords, upon the present occasion I have no such intention; for, under existing circumstances, even were the Speech from the Throne open to greater objections than, I am happy to say, I consider it to be, I should think it my duty to abstain from moving any Amendment, or adopting any step calculated to interrupt the general unanimity of the House. I have thought it more becoming and more convenient, honoured as I am by the confidence of a large number of Members of your Lordships' House, that I should take the earliest opportunity of declaring, on the part of the great Conservative body of this country, the view which they take, and the course which they are prepared to pursue, at this momentous crisis. Both my noble Friend who moved and my noble Friend who seconded the Address, have, so far as my friends are concerned, done us but scant justice in supposing the impossibility that, upon such an occasion as the present, there should be anything but unanimous agreement. The present is no time for discussing whether the war might or might not have been avoided. This is no time for considering whether, by a different course of proceeding, Her Majesty's Ministers might have effected the objects they had in view, without involving the country in the dangers and calamities of war. In that war we are now, as a nation, fairly embarked; in that war the nation, as one man, sympathises with the Crown and with the Government; in the prosecution of that war the nation, as one man, is pressing forward with a unanimity of feeling and an abnegation of every selfish consideration which are almost unparalleled in the history of our country; and I may truly say, that in the prosecution of this contest it is not the Government who are appealing to the country, but it is the country that is urging upon the Government the prosecution of the war with vigour. My Lords, I rejoice at the altered tone of the present Speech from the Throne as compared with the Speech prepared by the Ministers for the opening of the last Session. I rejoice that at last the gravity of the circumstances has forced itself upon the mind of the Government; that even the noble Earl at the head of the Government—that *médecin malgré lui*—appears to see that there is no course now to be taken but that which is the most direct—the safest and the most honourable because the boldest—and the most consistent with the principles of justice. At the opening of the last Session of Parliament, I confess it was with surprise that I heard in the Speech which Her Majesty had been advised by Her present counsellors to deliver to Parliament, to see how little the Government anticipated the probable, nay, almost the certain, war which was impending, and how calmly and deliberately they talked about the various measures of internal improvement, or the various measures of internal innovation, which were to be introduced and carried through both Houses of Parliament during the Session. I remember that at that time the noble President of the Council, in bringing forward one of the suggested measures, and one not the least important—a projected reform in the constitution of Parliament—stated that a war with Russia need not be considered as a matter of such importance as to interfere with the ordinary deliberations of Parliament. Nay, more, the noble Lord said that he thought the period at which we were entering upon war with Russia was the period of all others to select for the amendment of the constitution of Parliament, and that it would be a splendid moral spectacle for Europe and the world to see that we considered a war with Russia as a matter of such trivial and unimportant concern that we hardly gave a sideglance at the war, but turned our main attention to the arrangement of our own internal affairs, and, among others, to the revision of our Parliamentary system. Various other measures suggested in the Speech from the Throne were either brought forward or promised. Peace we were told to look forward to, and meanwhile the Government were drifting towards war. That, my Lords, was the expression of a Member of the Government. But while the Government was felt to be drifting towards war, there was no end to the promise of measures which were to be brought under the consideration of Parliament. Votes were to be taken for the war; some thousands of men were to be sent to the East, and great expectations were held out of the marvellous successes to be achieved. Now, my Lords, I rejoice greatly in the altered tone of the present Speech from the Throne. The promises of last year failed. Those promises produced no fruit. Of all the great measures which were proposed, hardly one—if one—was eventually carried. The Government were compelled to abandon the whole of them in consequence of the universal conviction that the war with Russia—the probability and almost the certainty of which was denied by the Government—was the one event upon which the hearts, the minds, and the feelings of the whole country were set, and was the subject which alone deserved serious and important attention. Now, forgive me for saying that a tone more worthy of the occasion pervades the present Speech from the Throne. My Lords, it recognises this as a great and important occasion. It recognises the war in which we are engaged as a great contest, calling for the united efforts of the whole country, and requiring that it should task its energies to the utmost. Her Majesty, devoting almost the whole of Her address to Parliament to that single and engrossing topic, expresses a confidence, which is not misplaced, that towards the vigorous and successful prosecution of the war no efforts on the part of the people, no energy on the part of Parliament, no sacrifice on the part of the country will be felt too great in order to support Her Majesty in the most just and honourable course which she is pursuing.

My Lords, before I proceed to comment upon any portion of the Speech relative to that absorbing topic, I will in a very few words, pass over the few other subjects to which the Speech refers. Of course, it must be a matter of sincere rejoicing to all to be informed, upon the authority of the Speech from the Throne, that the state of the revenue is highly satisfactory, and that the general prosperity of the country is uninterrupted. Undoubtedly, so far as the agricultural interest is concerned, the blessing of Providence, which has given us a bountiful and abundant harvest, combined—by a curious and unprecedented coincidence under such circumstances—with a range of prices higher than were ever known under any similar circumstances, has added to the means of those directly interested in the land, and has placed them in a position of greatly increased prosperity. I hope, my Lords, that the same may be the case with other branches of commerce. I learn with satisfaction that it is so from Her Majesty's Speech. But I confess that, unless I am mistaken, the present prosperity of some of the manufacturing districts is not such as to be made a subject of congratulation in the Speech from the Throne. It may be that there is a fair amount of business doing, and that a fair amount of profit is realised; but this I know, that in Manchester, and in some of the manufacturing districts in that part of the country, a number of mills are working short time, and a considerable number have stopped altogether. There is at this period less demand than I ever recollect for land for building purposes; and certainly, though I do not pretend to say—for I am thankful that it is not the case—that any great and extensive distress prevails, I should hadly have thought that our manufacturing prosperity at this moment was such as to demand peculiar notice in the Royal Speech. I may add that, for the first time for a long period, considerable facilities have been afforded for recruiting Her Majesty's military forces in Manchester and the adjoining towns, arising partly from the general stimulus which has been given to the feelings of the country on the subject of the war, but in some measure, doubtless, from a considerable number of hands being unemployed.

Her Majesty informs us that she has concluded a treaty with the United States of America, by which subjects of long and difficult discussion have been equitably adjusted. It must, of course, be a matter of satisfaction for us to know that any subjects of difference—and especially of long-standing difference—with a community connected with us by the ties of blood, of language, and, in a great measure, of laws, and with whom, upon all occasions, I trust it will be the desire, as I am sure it is the interest, of this country to keep up the most close and intimate connections, have been adjusted. That treaty will be laid before your Lordships, and until it is before us it would be improper for me to pronounce any opinion upon its merits, or as to how far it deserves the character given of it by the advisers of the Crown.

My Lords, the other subjects which are to occupy the attention of Parliament in the course of the present Session—the species of "*et cætera,*" which is substituted for the magniloquent promises held forth in former Speeches—are included in a very modest paragraph, which expresses a hope that, "amid the pressure of war, other matters of great interest and importance to the general welfare will not be neglected." We have not received, either from Her Majesty's Government or from the Mover or Seconder of the Address, any intimation of the character of those various important measures. They are perhaps in the secret knowledge of the Cabinet; or, for ought I know, they may be hidden from the discernment and knowledge of the Cabinet itself. Upon this topic we may safely express our most cordial concurrence in Her Majesty's Speech; for I am confident that whenever "any matters of great interest and importance" are introduced by Her Majesty's Government, they will receive due consideration. That is a sentiment upon which there can be no difference of opinion.

Now, my Lords, having touched upon those questions mentioned in the Royal Speech which have no reference to the war, I proceed to that much more important and all-engrossing topic to which the greater portion of the Speech from the Throne is devoted. And, in the first place, I must be permitted to express my cordial concurrence in the language which is now in the Speech with regard to the hearty and efficient co-operation of the brave troops of our ally the Emperor of the French, and in the hope which Her Majesty entertains, as well as in the conviction which She expresses, that common dangers, common perils, common glories, and common interests, may cement more strongly the alliance which happily subsists between the two countries. My satisfaction at this recognition on the part of Her Majesty is increased by the knowledge that its importance is also recognised by Ministers, who not very long ago entertained very different views. I rejoice to think that that passage in Her Majesty's Speech has been fully concurred in by the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty and by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Control. I rejoice also that the noble Earl at the head of the Government can feel and can acknowledge that there is a great important advantage to be derived from an intimate alliance between this country and France, although the destiny of France may not be swayed by the House of Orleans. The Royal Speech refers to the gallant and cordial co-operation and the entire harmony which have prevailed between the troops of our ally and those of our own army, as well as to their heroic achievements. Private and public accounts concur in showing us that two nations, which for many years have been accustomed to regard one another with feelings of enmity, have not only laid aside altogether those feelings of enmity, but, side by side, are rivals in glory and brothers in arms on fields similar to those where they formerly encountered one another as foes, breast to breast, and hand to hand. As upon those occasions former experience led each to respect the valour of the other, so present experience leads them to regard each other as brothers in arms, engaged in a rivalry without jealousy, in the accomplishment of a common object, each doing honour to the courage and bravery of the other, and animated by a common feeling of glory. Words must fail to express the debt of gratitude which this country owes to those gallant and devoted men; but doubtless comfort and satisfaction will be carried to many a gallant heart when the assembled Parliament of England record their admiration of the deeds and their gratitude for the services of our gallant troops. My Lords, when I remember that, of that numerically small army which was sent out from this country a few months ago, probably not one in 100 of the privates, and probably not one in ten of the officers, had ever before heard a shot fired in anger; when I remember that they went forth, at the first outset of their campaign, to pine away in inaction, and that their ranks were thinned by disease — morally depressing, if anything could depress, their indomitable courage— when I remember that an army composed of such materials, so weakened, so dispirited, was led to invade the dominions of a powerful enemy; when I remember that they were led forth with the most scanty equipments, having with them nothing but what was absolutely necessary for their march, and hardly sufficient for their due provision and sustenance; when I remember that such a body of men, under such circumstances, found themselves in front of a force numerically superior, entrenched upon heights, fortified with all the skill and all the power which the might and military genius of Russia could supply, and fortified upon ground the natural difficulties of which were such as to impede even an active and unincumbered man in the ascent, although not checked by the enemy; when I remember that these heights were bristling with batteries, from which shot and shell were poured which mowed down the ranks of our men as they ascended that glorious but blood-stained hill; when I remember, too, that in the face of numbers not inferior to their own, against all the difficulties of position, against all the opposition of the most powerful artillery, they advanced, weakened in numbers, falling by scores, but the survivors closing their ranks and pressing forward with indomitable courage; when, under these circumstances, hand in hand, that body of men, who had never before heard a shot fired, repulsed a veteran army from a position so fortified, that it had been the boast of Russia that no army could dislodge them in less than three weeks, while this great success was achieved by our raw army in the course of three hours; when we remember that within a fortnight afterwards, the position of our men being changed, they being the besieged instead of the besiegers, they were assailed by an army seven times their number; when we recollect that—although no doubt having some advantage of position—our troops were called to the conflict from successive and continuous labour at the intrenchments, suffering from cold, from privation, from hunger, in some cases from all but nakedness; when we remember that they were placed under the disadvantage of a surprise in the darkness of a foggy morning; when I find that these men, who won the heights of Alma in the course of three hours from a numerically superior army, resisted the assault of an army seven times stronger than themselves, and for eight hours maintained the unequal contest, sometimes even without ammunition, our troops, reinforced and supported by a portion of their gallant allies, maintained their position on these blood-stained heights; when I remember these deeds of arms—aye, and even the unfortunate but astounding charge made by our gallant cavalry—I say that no words can do justice to the merits of such brave and heroic soldiers. I say that when we read the history of this campaign—when we read it, not as politicians, but as men and as Englishmen—there cannot be a heart that does not throb with honest and generous pride that these much-enduring, all-daring, all-achieving men were our countrymen; that they were British subjects like ourselves; and there is hardly an eye from which a tear will not spring unbidden when we reflect that so many of them are numbered with the dead. My Lords, I will not dwell further on the subject, on the glory that has been achieved, upon the sacrifices they have made, or the sufferings they have endured. Their country will remember them. Their country will know how to value those who still remain; and, whatever may be the honours and rewards by which this country can show its gratitude to those who, in such unequalled circumstances, and under such serious difficulties, maintained, upheld, increased the glory of the British flag, those honours and those rewards will certainly be granted with no nigged hand, but with universal approbation, and with the cordial consent of a grateful country. While I am speaking of honours to be conferred upon our own gallant officers and men, I know not whether I am going beyond the limits of Parliamentary licence, and trenching upon that which is the prerogative of the Crown, if, while speaking of the honours to be conferred upon our own gallant officers—I know not, I say, whether I am trenching upon the prerogative of the Crown—but this I know that at the head of the army of our ally there is a General who has acted with ours in the most cordial and uninterrupted harmony, by whose advice we have benefited, by whose assistance we have largely profited—I know not whether I am making a suggestion which I ought not to make, when I say I am satisfied that nothing could be more grateful to the feelings of the British army and of the country at large—nothing, I think, would be more due to the gallantry and cordiality with which the whole of the French forces have supported ours throughout this great contest, than, if it were possible, to confer upon General Canrobert some mark of military honour.

I have now attempted to do justice to my own feelings with regard to the merits of this gallant army, and with regard to the sacrifices and privations which it has had to contend with. I wish, my Lords, that I could here close the observations I have to make; and I hope it may not be considered inconsistent with the determination with which I started of endeavouring not to disturb the unanimity of your Lordships, when I say that it will be necessary for me to comment to a certain extent upon what appear to have been some of the shortcomings of the Government in the mode in which they have conducted the war. My object, however, is not so much to revert to the past as to ensure attention for the future. I am deeply sensible, my Lords, of the responsibility attaching to every man who upon this subject utters an opinion, and I am most especially anxious that not a word should fall from me which might savour of exaggeration with respect to our apparent losses and the difficulties which our army has had to overcome. I am also anxious that not a word should fall from me which could give the slightest encouragement to that powerful adversary against whom we are at war, and against whom we are determined to contend to the utmost of our power, even to our last man and our last shilling. Nor do I intend to cavil at those minor details in which a better and more effective arrangement might have been made, though I must be permitted to say that when Her Majesty's Government, in order to ensure the more effectual carrying on of the war, received the assistance of an additional Secretary of State, relieved from the charge of any other department, and charged alone with the superintendence of the war, we might have expected that greater attention would have been paid to these minor details, that there would have been less omissions, and that better provisions would have been made for carrying on the war than in any former war in which this country has ever been engaged. But, my Lords, I am well aware that there must be omissions in carrying on any service of so extensive a character, and I am not disposed to cavil at minor details, or to enter into discussion upon this or that matter in which I think a better arrangement might have been made. My complaint against the Government is this—that they have from the commencement, and before the commencement of war, lived, as it were, from hand to mouth; that they have never anticipated in due time the contingencies of the struggle in which they were about to engage, that they never considered the greatness of the undertaking upon which they were entering, and that they never made adequate and timely provision to meet, not the contingent exigencies of the day, but those exigencies which the fortune of war rendered inevitable. I have always understood that one of the first maxims of war is to leave as little as possible to chance—to be prepared against every possible contingency, and to make those preparations—extravagant if you will—but certainly on such a scale as to prevent anything going wrong, which might have the effect of deranging the whole plan. I cannot but entertain a doubt, however—knowing the unwillingness and reluctance with which Her Majesty's Government permitted themselves to be dragged into the war—I cannot but entertain a doubt whether they had among them those who were capable and disposed to take a sufficiently comprehensive view of the great and important interests involved in this war, and of its mighty consequences and requirements, or that, if there was such a man, he was not able to impress the reflections of his own mind upon those of his colleagues. From the very first to the very last, there has been apparent in the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government a want of previous preparation —a total want of prescience; and they have appeared to live from day to day providing for each successive exigency after it arose, and not before it arose. "Too late" have been the fatal words applicable to the whole conduct of Her Majesty's Government in the course of the war. We were "too late" in our declaration of war. We were "too late" in deciding that the passage of the Pruth was a *casus belli* in the first instance. We were "too late" in sending our troops to the Black Sea, and we were too complaisant to the Emperor of Russia, who thanked us for refusing to act in concert with our French allies and send a fleet into the Black Sea at a time when the French thought it desirable. Our co-operation then would have been of immense importance, and our non-compliance, which extorted thanks from the Emperor of Russia, controlled to a great extent the action of our allies. We were "too late," my Lords, in declaring the war, we were "too late" in entering the Black Sea, and we allowed the massacre of Sinope to take place. At that time the Turks were under the pledge of protection from this country, but in the teeth of a powerful armament Sinope was taken and destroyed; the Turkish fleet was destroyed in its own waters, and we were standing idly by, not at Sinope, but in the Black Sea; and, for the purpose of co-operation, were either powerless or unwilling to interfere in time. And, my Lords, when we did go to war, what was the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government? It was thought fit—I know not for what reason—but it was thought fit, in the year 1854, to bring forward a financial Budget at an unusual period—the 6th of March. On the 6th of March the financial Budget was brought forward; and, though war was not declared until the 27th or 28th of March, it was proposed to take an increase of something like 10,000 men in the Army, and I think a small increase was to be taken in the Navy. And what was the calculation the Chancellor of the Exchequer made for the probable additional expense to be incurred in consequence of the war? The calculation was 1,250,000*l.*, being an expense of 50*l.* for the transport of 25,000 troops. And where? To meet the Russians? To defend Constantinople? No; but to take them to Malta and to bring them back again. This was the declaration of the Chancellor of the Exchequer—namely, that the intention of the British Government was to ask Parliament for the means only of sending 25,000 men to Malta and back again, and for such an object the income tax was to be doubled for half a year. These were the provisions made upon the 6th of March, in reference to which, when proposed in the House of Commons, it was said—"When Russia sees these preparations she will indeed be aware of the energy and determination, the vigour and decision with which this country is about to carry on the war." Why, my Lords, when the Emperor of Russia read that declaration, he could but come to one of two conclusions, either that the British Government were gulling Parliament and imposing upon British credulity, or that they were not really in earnest. These 25,000 men might go to Malta and back again; but as to interfering with any of the military operations of Russia, that was impossible. Now, my Lords, what was the force which we sent out? One remembers—and remembers with mingled feelings of satisfaction and regret—the mustering of those gallant men, the *élite* of the British army, from 25,000 to 30,000 strong, who were sent from this country, and with regard to whom the Government took the greatest possible credit for the unparalleled exertions they had made in sending out in the course of so short a time—namely, in the months of March, April, May, and to the beginning of June—so numerous a force. I do not deny the exertions of the Government, and I do not deny that during those three months the utmost activity prevailed in every department; but is the sending out of an army of 30,000 men from a country like this an achievement to be looked upon with national pride? I do not deny the activity which prevailed during two or three months, but why was not that activity anticipated by two or three months? What did you do? You sent out from 25,000 to 30,000 men, and, having done that, you folded your hands and said, "We have done all that is necessary." You exhausted every available means to send out these 25,000 or 30,000 men, and you then had to depend upon a raw militia and to your recruiting power for making a slight increase to the army. And when you sent out these men in conjunction with the French army, did you suppose that neither disease, nor the sword, nor casualties would have the slightest impression upon that small force of 25,000? If such misfortunes were to occur, where was a body of men to come from to reinforce them? Where were your Mediterranean garrisons? Why were they not increased beyond their ordinary and very insufficient strength? And where was your second army of reserve? Where were your reinforcements? You had them not. You had nothing in the shape of an army of reserve except the reserves you had in England, which were unavailable in case of disaster, and consequently you launched forth your army to depend upon its own resources without sufficient provision being made for them, or due foresight exercised upon the part of the British Government. Perhaps it may be said—though that would be no answer to the question—that the object for which the troops were sent out was the defence of Constantinople and the support of the army of Omar Pacha, in preventing the Russians from penetrating further into the Principalities. Setting aside the very subordinate condition in which that hypothesis places the British army, I say that, from the first, that was not the declaration of the British Government of the intention and object of the war. Nor was it possible for the war to be limited to such an object. I remember that on the 19th of June, in answer to my noble and learned Friend, who is not now in his place (Lord Lyndhurst), the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Clarendon) opportunely declared, as he had declared before, that the object of the war was not merely to afford protection to Constantinople, but to settle at once and for ever that question of Russian supremacy which had been growing in importance for years, not to say centuries—which had been forced upon us, and which was to be settled once and for ever. That was the declaration made by the noble Earl on the 19th of June; and it was made in almost similar terms on the 31st of March, the day on which the Queen's Message announcing the declaration of war was delivered. It may be said, that when the Principalities were relieved from Russian invasion, the whole course of the campaign was altered—that, in fact, the Allies assumed the offensive, and gave up the defensive. I can understand that argument, but I don't admit it, because I consider that before the siege of Silistria was raised you were bound to ulterior objects, to attain which a force of 25,000 men was entirely inadequate. But when the siege of Silistria was raised, what had you to say? The siege of Silistria was raised about the 23rd of June; the Turkish troops had been victorious, and, by their own unassisted efforts, had repelled the invaders, who from strategical reasons had retraced their steps, and withdrew from the Principalities. Then, my Lords, some alteration of your course followed upon that altered state of affairs, and indeed we have from the declaration of the Government themselves an intimation that, towards the middle of July, the expedition to the Crimea was decided upon. The noble Lord the President of the Council, on the 24th of July, made a most remarkable statement in the House of Commons, in which he declared that there could be no hope of a just and honourable peace so long as Russia was permitted to hold the menacing position she occupied in Sebastopol. I remember that when a noble and learned Friend of mine referred to the conduct of the war, and to an expedition to the Crimea, the noble Earl at the head of Her Majesty's Government reproached him as indiscreet, observing that he was only affording the Emperor of Russia an opportunity of fortifying and strengthening the works of Sebastopol. I don't think the Emperor of Russia required any such warning. On the contrary, he seems to have been much more alive to the exigencies of the case than Her Majesty's Government, and for years he appears to have been incessantly labouring in fortifying Sebastopol, and rendering it as impregnable as possible. Well, my Lords, on the 24th of July, Lord John Russell, in the other House of Parliament, announced that Russia could no longer be permitted to hold her menacing position in the Crimea, and we knew, from the explanations that took place at that period, that an expedition to the Crimea had been decided upon. And decided upon by whom? It was decided upon by the Government at home. The noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville), in the beginning of October, in an address to the Staffordshire yeomanry, was one of the Members of the Cabinet who furnished that information to the public out of doors. He said—

> "Government did not conceal from themselves the great responsibility of their urging on the commanders of both services an attack upon Sebastopol; they were not ignorant of the opinion entertained by many distinguished officers of every country in Europe, that, if not impregnable, the attempt was of a most difficult nature; but they did feel that the independence and integrity of Turkey were a mere joke so long as that fortress was deemed impregnable. . . . And they (the Government) did think that, with the assistance of the French, those two forces, acting in cordial co-operation, could achieve all that it was possible for men to accomplish."

Lord J. Russell on the 27th of October observed—

> "Immediately after the siege of Silistria was raised, it became a question both with the Government at home and with the generals, what should be done on the shores of the Black Sea."

I should have thought that even before the raising of the siege of Silistria, it had been considered what should be done next, supposing the siege to be raised. It appears, however, that only on the event of the siege of Silistria being raised did the Government determine what to do next. The noble Lord continued—

> "The Government at home thought the time was come to occupy the Crimea and capture Sebastopol. The instructions of the Governments of England and France were received at Varna about the middle of July; a meeting of the generals of the allied forces took place, and the expedition was resolved upon."

Thus, by the confession of two noble Lords, one in this and one in the other House of Parliament, it was the Government at home, notwithstanding the representations made by generals of high distinction, in every country, of the insuperable difficulties of an attack upon Sebastopol, who urged on the commanders of the allied forces the necessity of making the attempt. It was not the act of the generals in command of the army, but it was urged upon them by the Government at home; and, being so urged, it became doubly the duty of the Government at home to see that no single circumstance was omitted, and no provision neglected, which was calculated to diminish the difficulties with which the enterprise was beset, and which could render the task not merely practicable, but comparatively more easy of fulfilment. Well, my Lords, what steps were taken? What steps were taken from the middle of June until the end of June, when you received intelligence of the raising of the siege of Silistria, and when you began to consider "what next?" What steps were taken to reinforce your army originally of 25,000 men, for the more extensive field of operations upon which you determined to place them? I believe that reinforcements were sent out of something like 5,000 men; and from that time till the day after the battle of Inkerman — I don't mean to say that driblets here and there may not have gone out—but from that time till after the battle of Inkerman, when the 46th Regiment arrived at Balaklava, the army, which was originally composed of from 25,000 to 30,000 men, was left without reinforcements. The battle of Inkerman was fought by not more than 8,000 out of from 14,000 to 15,000 British bayonets, which constituted your whole force then left in the Crimea. In calling attention, then, to the course which Government pursued, I cannot refrain from saying that they took steps in the dark without calculating the consequences of their actions, and without making provision to secure success.

My Lords, I have now to mention a subject which, perhaps, I ought to have mentioned before. Her Majesty's Government sent out these troops originally to Varna, and I must ask your Lordships' permission to read to you a statement from an eye-witness, a gallant friend of mine, well known to your Lordships, but whose name I am not permitted to name at present, as I am anxious that in the discussion this day justice should be done to the merits of the army, and no undue reproaches cast upon them. My gallant friend says—

> "I have no idea what line you intend to pursue, but I do hope that there is to be no reproach of delay at Scutari or Varna. From too close an economy we had given up all those necessary appendages for a field army, without which it can neither take care of itself nor move against the enemy. We had regiments and very good ones, but nothing else. No commissariat, no staff corps, no waggon train, no medical establishment for the field. All this, and, still more important, a transport system for cavalry and artillery, had to be formed and organised in a country affording absolutely nothing to help you, and I protest when I look back on the work done in the organisation of the army at Scutari and Varna, I am sure that nothing but the spirit and zeal of English officers could have carried it out. The chief blundering was in the shipment of stores without method or order, by which no one knew where to find them. One day I had 100 men searching the Turkish Custom House for missing tent-poles, which were found after eight hours' labour."

What was the consequence of all this? Was the army incapable of movement? No; but it was detained in inaction, amid the pestiferous atmosphere of Varna, and there, "night by night," says my correspondent—

> "Those dreadful graves, fifty or sixty feet long, were dug of an evening on the hill near Varna, for the poor fellows sure to die in the course of the night."

Surely these are circumstances which raise to the highest pitch the indomitable courage and energies of the men. It might be necessary, my Lords, that when the army marched to the banks of the Alma, or even when it marched from Alma to Balaklava and Inkerman, it should carry with it the smallest possible incumbrance. It would hardly be possible for an army to carry with it any superfluities to the field, but certainly it ought to have had medical supplies and comforts for the hospitals at Varna and Scutari. If such advances as have been made were to be attempted, these supplies ought to have been at hand. The Government had ample means of taking them, and every arrangement ought to have been made to secure them. At one time it was denied that there was any want of medical attendance; we were told that there was a larger proportion of medical officers attendant upon our force than ever had been known upon any previous expedition sent out by this country. I remember seeing two or three columns occupied in one of the newspapers full of particulars as to the amount of stores; and when public charity and sympathy came forward with offers of assistance—of stores of all descriptions, linen, rags, and other appliances for the wounded —they were told that there was abundance of everything, that there was no want of supplies, that there was abundance both of medicines and of medical officers. Well, a lady has been sent out under the sanction of the Government—a lady to whose heroism and that of her companions it is impossible for language to do justice—who, sacrificing as they did all that can render life attractive, giving up all the comforts and luxuries of life, devoted themselves with noble self-devotion to mitigate the sufferings of our wounded and dying soldiers in the crowded and pestilential hospitals of a foreign country. What was the account contained in the very first demand made by these ladies sent out under the sanction of Government? Why, it was an ardent, an almost importunate request to the British public to send out those very articles which the Government said were already supplied in profusion;

and this was accompanied by the statement that in one day eleven men had sunk from exhaustion, in consequence of not a single bottle of wine being at hand for their relief. Now, this is a subject in regard to which, I say, a heavy responsibility devolves upon the Government. I cannot tell how far these charges are correct, but I know they are in every man's mouth; and I felt, consequently, that it was my duty as a Peer of Parliament, and as one deeply interested in the welfare of the brave men whom we have sent out to fight our battles, to comment upon what is generally said; and I therefore ask the Government not only to deny, but to disprove these statements, if disprove them they can. Well, then, you have lately sent out—"too late" again!—you have sent out on the 15th of October, for the first time, a supply of winter clothing for the troops, who were absolutely in rags and about to encounter the horrors of a Crimean winter. On the 15th of October you sent out to Balaklava an abundant supply of winter clothes. You embarked them on board a magnificent vessel—how manned and commanded, I ask the noble Duke to explain? You sent out also large stores of ammunition, together with this supply of warm winter clothing, as well as a large supply of medicines and medical comforts. The medical stores ought to have been landed at Scutari; but when the vessel arrived there it was found that all these stores, although directed first to Scutari, were deposited in the hold beneath piles of ammunition and shot, so that it was impossible to get at them without discharging and unloading the whole of the ammunition and general stores. Consequently the vessel went on to Balaklava without landing them at Scutari. At Balaklava Bay, if I am not misinformed, this vessel, after losing two of her anchors, was for seven days allowed to drag outside, although having on board a cargo of inestimable value—in money value, I believe, something like half a million, but of a value at that moment not to be measured by money. Yes, I am told—but I can hardly believe it—that for seven days that vessel was dragging in thirty fathom water in the open sea outside the roads of Balaklava—that she was not taken inside; and the consequence was the loss of that vessel, of her cargo, ammunition, warm clothing, and medical stores. And now there is another question I wish to ask the noble Earl and Her Majesty's Government. I don't wish to cast any unjust or undeserved stigma upon those who are responsible to the country; but I am told (and I have it on authority which I believe to be valid) that representations had been made to the First Lord of the Admiralty to the effect that the commander of the ship to which I am referring—the *Prince*—to which you were intrusting such a priceless cargo, was wholly incompetent to take such a trust, and had proved himself so incompetent upon his voyage to the Baltic that, in the opinion of a distinguished officer, if that vessel were sent out under the command of that captain, she would be lost upon her voyage. Moreover, I am told that the officer whose opinion was thus expressed was asked if he would commit this statement to writing; that he did so; that that statement was handed to the First Lord of the Admiralty; and, notwithstanding such a statement was received on such an authority, this vessel, purchased by the Government, was not sent out under the command of an officer in Her Majesty's service, but was sent out under the command of that very commander of whom this character had been given to the First Lord of the Admiralty. I do not state this as a fact within my own knowledge; but I ask the noble Duke (the Duke of Newcastle) if it be so? and, if so, I ask whether, for the loss of that vessel—of her priceless cargo, and her crew of 150 men—Her Majesty's Government are not deeply responsible? But whether the facts on this point are, or are not, such as they have been represented to me, why was this vessel, with such a cargo, permitted so long to drive outside the bay? Why was she not, at any risk and at any inconvenience, taken into Balaklava, by which this casualty and the lamentable loss we have sustained through it would have been prevented? Now, my Lords, in making these comments I hope and feel that I have made them with no desire to embarrass the Government, but for the purpose of affording the Government an opportunity, if possible, of repudiating and refuting them; and, if they cannot, of strongly urging upon the Government to avoid such acts for the future.

But, my Lords, when I charge the Government with an utter unconsciousness of what they were about to do, I cannot have a stronger proof of the justice of the charge than the very circumstances under which we are meeting this day. Parliament stood prorogued until the 14th of

November. On the 10th or 11th—I am not certain as to the exact day—a Privy Council was summoned for the purpose of further proroguing Parliament, and a further prorogation accordingly took place from the 14th of November to the 14th of December, without being accompanied by the words, "then to meet for the despatch of business." It was thus perfectly clear, then, that on the 10th of November the Government had not the slightest inkling as to the actual meeting of Parliament on the 14th. I admit it is perfectly competent for the Government, upon any unforeseen emergency, to call Parliament together at an earlier period than that to which it is prorogued, but in this case, from the terms of the notice officially issued—from the omission of the words I have mentioned—there was a general understanding that there would be a further prorogation, and that Members of both Houses would be enabled to form their engagements accordingly, without inconvenience. Well, but on the 20th of November "a change came o'er the spirit of the dream" of the Government, and that which they evidently considered unnecessary on the 10th they deemed so urgent and pressing on the 20th that they immediately summoned Parliament together—not on the day to which it had been prorogued, but two days earlier. There was therefore, in the opinion of the Government, not an hour to be lost. Now, what was the sudden exigency which had arisen in those ten days? What had occurred in the interval to make the meeting of Parliament expedient on the 20th of November which did not make it equally expedient on the 10th? Undoubtedly, in the meantime the news of the battle of Inkerman had arrived. But am I to be told that a provision which was so urgent that the period to which Parliament had been prorogued must be anticipated in order to meet it—which was of such importance and pressing urgency that Parliament must be called hastily together in order to provide for it—am I to be told that the necessity of such a provision was simply occasioned by a battle in which, undoubtedly, you lost a large numerical proportion of your men, but which is yet not to be compared with many engagements of modern times? If you calculated that you were going to take, to keep, and to raze Sebastopol without any addition to that small force, was it only on the 20th of November, and not previously to that day, that it came into your heads that it was possible and advisable to take measures for increasing the effective strength of your army? Your Lordships must remember that the Government have not yet condescended to inform us in what manner it is intended to strengthen the army, or what they mean to do to meet the emergency. We have been told, indeed, by the organs of the Government that they have money in abundance, and don't stand in need of a loan; and it is also hinted that it is intended to take powers to enable a portion of the militia of this country to volunteer for foreign service, and occupy the places of some of our foreign garrisons. Now, if that is the case, did not the necessity for that measure exist, and was it not foreseen before the 20th of November, or was it that, after establishing a Minister of War in the middle of June, you and the rest of his colleagues threw upon him all the responsibility and labour of the war, scattered yourselves all over the country, never taking into consideration the pressing military emergencies of the country until you met in November? At all events, upon the face of the case, I cannot but think that the Government stand convicted of a want of foreknowledge of the exigencies of the country up to a very late period, as exemplified in the time to which they had prorogued Parliament, and the sudden reflection which led them to desire an earlier meeting.

My Lords, I have spoken of the gallant services of the army in the Crimea; and gallantly have they been supported—more especially on shore—by the sister service. I, however, observe no reference in Her Majesty's Speech to the success achieved by our arms in the Baltic, or to the great progress made by our exertions there towards arriving at an honourable and successful issue of this great struggle. Now, I should be sorry to say a single word of disparagement of the gallant men whom we sent out there, but, certainly, never did a mighty force—one of the most powerful armaments which this country has ever sent forth—sent, too, with no little amount of self-laudation—accomplish so little. Your Lordships will all remember a certain Reform dinner, at which much was said of the mighty deeds to be done by a Reform Admiral, and at which very considerable powers were given to the Admiral to proclaim war; and, when it was proclaimed, it was rather boastfully done.

Your Lordships cannot have forgotten that order of the day—that signal which was given in language, perhaps, not so concise as that of Nelson, but in the same spirit. I am sure you recollect the injunction to every man on board the fleet to sharpen his cutlass and prepare for immediate action—to give a good account of the Russian fleets if they happened to meet them, and if they slunk in their harbours they were to be pulled out by main force. I am not about to depreciate the conduct of our fleet. On the part of individual officers an opportunity has been afforded for the exhibition of great skill and seamanship and of great valour. But as far as all the results of war go—of all that most expensive and most formidable fleet—those results are literally *nil.* You crumbled down a half-finished fortress which you were not able to occupy; and now one by one your ships are dropping home from the scene of their labours, but not of their exploits. Now, I need not say that I am not a naval man, and so far, perhaps, do not speak with much authority; but I apprehend that the Government ought to have known beforehand the strength of Cronstadt—ought to have been aware of the peculiar characteristics of the Baltic, which is a sea not altogether unknown to British navigators—and the peculiar strength possessed by the Russians for the defence of their forces there. What did the Government do? Why, they sent out a fleet of such superior power that it would have been an act of madness on the part of the Russian fleet to come out and meet them in the open sea; and at the same time they sent out a fleet the vessels comprising which, in consequence of their magnitude, were of such a draught of water that it was absolutely impossible, looking at the depth of water in the Russian strongholds, that they and the enemy's ships could come into conflict. The consequence of this was, that Sir C. Napier had been condemned to an ignominious inaction, which is only paralleled by that old verse, which many of your Lordships no doubt remember—

> "While Chatham's Earl, with weapon drawn,
> Was waiting for Sir Richard Strachan;
> Sir Richard, longing to be at 'em,
> Was waiting for the Earl of Chatham."

So stood Sir Charles, and so stood the Russian Admiral. Both were, no doubt, longing to engage, but somehow, from the nature of things, it was impossible they should come to blows. This is another instance in which the Government will be fairly charged with having condemned to ignominious inactivity one of the finest fleets sent out from this country, and this from neglecting the most ordinary precautions which the exigency of the service required. Other persons communicated with the Government on this subject, pointed out the shallowness of the water, the necessity of employing vessels of small draught of water; but the Government took no notice, or only said, "Pooh! pooh! What do they know about it?" Their views were altogether neglected, until again it was too late; and when it was too late, and a whole year had been lost, then the very vessels which ought to have been constructed at first were begun to be built. Thus the expenses and opportunities of one year were altogether thrown away, and we are, so far as the Baltic is concerned, in the exact position in which we were before. Now, I repeat that I allude to all this, not for the purpose of discouraging those gallant men who, whether in the Baltic or the Black Sea, have done their best to maintain the honour of our flag; but if we are to come to a successful issue of this great and serious war—if we are to look to conquering an honourable peace—we must strike decided blows; I say "conquering" an honourable peace, because I feel assured that without conquering a peace you will not obtain it. Depend upon it, knowing as I do the resources of the Russian Empire, and knowing the character of the great man who rules it — for he is a great man, although now employing his vast resources for unworthy purposes—you will obtain no peace unless you conquer it. You must obtain by your arms such advantages and such a superiority as to force the Emperor—reluctantly as it may be—to submit to your terms of peace; but if you do not achieve some great successes you may have a prolonged, a sanguinary, and possibly a disastrous war, but an honourable and a successful peace you cannot have.

There is only one more passage, my Lords, in Her Majesty's Speech to which I consider myself compelled to refer. Her Majesty announces with satisfaction that She has concluded a treaty in conjunction with the Emperor of the French with Austria, from which She anticipates "important advantages to the common cause." My Lords, I confess that this is a paragraph which creates some considerable doubt in my mind. There can be no doubt that if for the prosecution of the general cause of the war we have drawn to our side, instead of being in a very doubtful neutrality, the great military resources of Austria, the hearty co-operation of Austria in the war will be of the greatest importance, and of signal benefit to the Powers already allied. But, looking to the course which Austria has hitherto pursued, I must be pardoned if I hesitate to express my satisfaction at such a treaty having been formed until I, in common with your Lordships, am made acquainted with the nature of the stipulations and conditions of that treaty, the engagements into which Austria has entered, and those by which we are mutually bound to Austria. I do not deny that we ought to make every allowance for the position of Austria. She has been playing a dangerous and not very dignified game, and has been playing it with considerable dexterity up to the present time. She may now feel it her interest and safety to throw off that doubtful mask which she has hitherto worn, and throw herself frankly into the arms of the Allies, and join in a sincere confederacy with the Western Powers. I trust it may be so. Up to the present moment, however, although it was a favourite text with Her Majesty's Government that negotiations were protracted in order to secure the immense advantages of the co-operation of Austria and Prussia, I have yet to learn what practical result, what benefit we have derived, and what co-operation we have had either from Austria, or still less from Prussia. So far as I can make out the course pursued, with regard to the first of these Powers, she appears to have been doubtfully neutral, and the other doubtfully, or rather practically, hostile; and looking to the part which Austria has played throughout this campaign, I am not at all sure that she has not been in a great measure the cause of your want of success in the Crimea, and of the lamentable loss of life there. It was not till after the success achieved by the Turkish arms at Silistria that Austria volunteered her intervention; but when the siege of Silistria was raised—when the Russian army was in full retreat—when Omar Pacha, at the head of a triumphant army, might have found occupation for a large portion of the forces of the Czar's army—at that moment Austria came in with her intervention, concluded a treaty with Turkey, the effect of which treaty was to give her the occupation and control of the Principalities, to cover, in point of fact, the Russian retreat, to prevent the Turkish advance, to produce the demoralisation of that hitherto successful army, and set at liberty the whole of those forces which the Russians had concentrated in Bessarabia. The Czar was thus enabled to throw these forces upon our troops, which were already outnumbered by the troops they were besieging, and this fresh reinforcement, raising the armies opposed to them to four, five, and six times their numbers, was poured upon them mainly, as it appears to me, in consequence of the intervention of Austria. Well, when I consider that this has hitherto been the effect of the intervention of Austria, I may be permitted to doubt the effect of the advantages of the treaty which we are told has been entered into—at all events, until the terms of that treaty are before us. We may possibly have entered into what, for anything I know, may be exceedingly inconvenient engagements, and bound ourselves to conditions which it may be very difficult to accomplish; but which we should in honour be bound to carry out. I know not what are the stipulations which have been made, but I am sure that Her Majesty's Government will feel—and it is the only point in which I shall attempt to state an objection, not to the Address itself, but only to the terms of the Address—that it is unreasonable to call upon the House of Lords to express their satisfaction at a treaty the contents of which are known only to Her Majesty's advisers, who may, indeed, fairly express their own sentiments on the subject, but who must feel it impossible to call upon us to do so, inasmuch as for good or evil we know not one single sentence of what it contains. I feel quite confident that, having made this suggestion, the Ministry will look upon it as so reasonable that they will consent to modify so far the terms of the Address as not to call upon the House of Lords to express satisfaction at the conclusion of a treaty of which they know nothing, but couch the Address in the ordinary form, and declare the gratification of your Lordships that Her Majesty should, in conjunction with Her ally the Emperor of the French, have concluded a treaty with the Emperor of Austria. I do not move this in the form of an Amendment, but am quite certain the Government will themselves see the reasonableness of making such an alteration as will relieve us from all difficulty whatever with regard to the unanimous adoption of this Address. My Lords, I feel it to be of deep importance for the prosecution of this war that we should have not only, as we have, the cordial, deliberate, steady, reflecting sanction of the people of this country, but also that we should have the opinion of Parliament expressed in the most unmistakeable terms; that no questions of difference as to the mode in which the war has been or may be conducted should interfere with the unanimous declaration of Parliament that we will give to Her Majesty every support in our power; that the world at large may see the spectacle of a great nation sinking all political animosities, all party contention — uniting heart and hand, with all the means at their disposal, with all the influence they can exercise among their fellow-countrymen, to prosecute the war, and—even although they may not entertain confidence in those who have the management of that war—giving them to the full extent all the support they can require. And I think I am speaking the sentiments of the country and of my own friends and supporters when I say that, so far from grudging them any supplies, any support which is necessary for the successful prosecution of this great and important war, it will be the country which will urge forward the Ministers to spare no pains, to omit no exertion, to make every sacrifice and every effort for the purpose of securing a just and honourable peace, in consequence of a successful and vigorously prosecuted war. And to those gallant men who are at the present moment, under circumstances of considerable difficulty, gallantly fighting the battles of their country, who have now to a certain extent been reinforced, and who have exhibited indomitable perseverance and a noble courage under all the circumstances of difficulty and discouragement to which they have been exposed—to them I would say, yet a little more patience, a little more courage, a little more perseverance; the end is not yet, but the end is approaching; the eyes of the country are upon you, and the united hearts of your countrymen are with you; their sympathies are with you in your unparalleled exertions; men, women, and children are collecting stores to alleviate your distress, to minister to your comfort, and to assuage your sufferings; fresh reinforcements are at hand, and your unflinching courage and perseverance during your obstinate resistance shall serve as a model to them, exciting them to emulate your glory and prove themselves worthy of being your fellow-soldiers. Go on, I would say, in the gallant course which you have commenced, and believe that the hearts of your countrymen are with you, that there is a tear for those who have fallen in their country's service; and when you return from this expedition, which, with all its difficulties, with all its glories, and with all its labours, must and will be successful, your example will inspire others, and you will be the men who will have brought peace to Europe and maintained untarnished the honour of the British flag, who will have defended the weak from the power of the oppressor, and who will deserve and will receive the blessings of England and of the world.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: My Lords, whenever upon former occasions it has been my duty to follow the noble Earl who has just addressed your Lordships, I have always felt the position in which I stood, and the difficulty against which I had to contend in endeavouring to reply to arguments brought forward by so able and practised a debater; and, unquestionably, on the present occasion, so rightly characterised by the noble Earl as one of momentous importance, I feel this difficulty to be so much greater than it has ever before been, that I must beg the indulgence of your Lordships whilst I endeavour to reply to the statements of the noble Earl as to the conduct of the Government, and more particularly as to the administration of the department of which I have the honour to be the head.

My Lords, let me at the outset say that I rejoice that the noble Earl, in the speech which he has addressed to your Lordships —although, indeed, I think that in the latter part of that speech he rather departed from the spirit of its commencement, and entered somewhat into unfair and party attacks—I rejoice, I say, that in that speech the noble Earl has informed our powerful enemy that the only cause of disunion which can be found in your Lordships' House is the question whether Her Majesty's Government have been energetic enough in carrying on this war. I rejoice in this, because at a moment like the present the interests of a humble individual like myself, or of any Government, are small indeed when compared with the interests of this great country. Better that we should suffer in the estimation of every man in this country, or in the world, than that the Emperor of Russia should be under the smallest delusion as to the sentiments of the country or of this House.

My Lords, in the answer which I hope to make to the speech of the noble Earl, I am not about to attempt what might be called an "out-and-out" defence of the policy of the Government, or of the administration of the department to which I have the honour to belong. I am far too sensible of my own shortcomings, and of the difficulties of administration, to be prepared to say that everything that has been done has been done in the best possible way, that no mistakes have occurred, or that if we were now to begin again as on the 29th of March—the day on which war was declared—with the knowledge and experience we have acquired, we should do the same things exactly in the same manner; but, on the contrary, I can say that some things not done then would now be done, and some things done then would now be omitted or amended. Before, however, I proceed to comment on the principal charges of omission or commission brought by the noble Earl, I must, in justice to the Government, endeavour to recall to the attention of your Lordships the circumstances attending the declaration of war and the measures adopted by the Government since the commencement of hostile operations. The noble Earl opposite appeared to me to be somewhat inconsistent in the charges which he made against the Government; for he began by saying that it was clear that at the commencement of warlike operations we had some other object in view than the mere defence of the Turkish territory and the assistance of the Turkish forces; but shortly afterwards, when it served his purpose, he endeavoured to prove that until the siege of Silistria was raised we had no notion as to what was to be done next. My Lords, I say without hesitation that the first presumption of the noble Earl was the correct one, and that we had from the very first a double object. One of those objects undoubtedly was the support of Turkish interests and the protection of Constantinople from any possible attack by the Russian forces at that time in the Principalities; but the second object was, that if war should once be declared, and if we should be compelled to send an army to the East, we would not be satisfied with the mere expulsion of the Russian troops from the Principalities—we would not be content with the *status quo*—but would endeavour to obtain such security for the future as would prevent the recurrence of the evils which had involved us in war, and the renewal of any attempt on the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire. Let me add, my Lords, that in keeping in view this double object, the policy of Her Majesty's Government has been identical with that of the Government of the Emperor of the French; and, let me tell the noble Earl, that not merely from the first moment of warlike operations, but from the very commencement of the negotiations which preceded the declaration of war, our policy has been in entire accord with that of the Emperor of the French, and our union with that great empire has been most complete. I must say, my Lords, that I rather pity the noble Earl for his not very dignified attempt to sow dissensions between Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French, by resuscitating on this occasion some miserable election speeches delivered long ago by Members of the Government; for the noble Earl knows as well as I know that there never was an alliance more firm, and never a determination to maintain it more fixed in the minds of every Member of a Government than is this alliance and our determination. And when the noble Earl turns round and taunts my noble Friend at the head of the Government with having at last, at a moment like the present, discovered that an alliance with France is worth having—even with others than Orleanists—he must be well aware that the policy of my noble Friend and of the Government has always been to strengthen and cement that alliance: that, as when Louis Philippe was on the French Throne, we were faithful to our alliance with the French people, so, and, perhaps, even more so, is it fixed now in consequence of the resolute character of the Emperor of the French and the open-handed spirit of confidence he has shown. My Lords, I have already stated that the policy of the Government as regarded the war was twofold in its purpose, commencing with the immediate protection of the Turkish empire; and, in the second place, having for its object the prevention of a recurrence of evils similar to those which have led to the present war; and, I apprehend, that the noble Earl might have discovered that fact for himself if he had considered the steps taken by the Government at the commencement of the war in a quarter of the world to which he had referred at the conclusion of his speech—of course I allude to the Baltic. The noble Earl has commented with considerable severity upon the result of the operations in the Baltic, and upon the conduct of my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Commander in Chief in that sea; but, my Lords, I think that even if the results which were anticipated from our operations in that quarter have not been achieved, nevertheless they undoubtedly have not been unattended with beneficial results. It is true that Cronstadt and Sweaborg have not fallen, and that the Russian fleet is yet intact—but let your Lordships bear in mind the results to the pride and position of Russia—that fleet yet intact has never been able to take the sea, and the trade of Russia has been entirely suspended. ["No, no!"] Noble Lords opposite say "No;" but I am not alluding to trade carried on overland through a neutral State, but to the trade with which a fleet could interfere, and I repeat that the trade of Russia in the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland has not only been crippled, but has been completely suspended. It is not unnatural that the public should look somewhat slightingly upon the capture of Bomarsund, partly on account of the facility with which the operation was completed, and partly owing to the far greater magnitude of the other siege operation we have undertaken; but if your Lordships will consider, and if the public will consider, not what Bomarsund was, but what it was rapidly becoming, I think that both your Lordships and the public will be of opinion that a great object has been attained by its destruction. It was a fortress to which in a few years Sweaborg and Cronstadt would have been as nothing, and in its harbour and under its guns the whole fleet of Russia would have been able to lie in security. I have no hesitation, my Lords, in saying that had Bomarsund not been destroyed, in a few years the Gulf of Bothnia would have become a Russian lake, and Stockholm would at any moment have been at the mercy of Russia. I say, then, that the noble Earl was not justified in commenting upon the operations in the Baltic in the manner which he has thought fit to adopt. But I will now pass to another subject.

The noble Earl commented upon the Budget which was proposed to Parliament at the commencement of the war, and he said that the Government had prepared an estimate for merely sending 25,000 soldiers to Malta and back again, and the noble Earl dwelt upon a phrase which appeared very agreeable to him, "Malta and back again." I do not know where the noble Earl found any such phrase in any speech of a Member of the Government, or whether it is only a picture of his own imagination; but I can safely assert that it never was intended that the troops who were sent to Malta should come back, unless the Emperor of Russia should abandon his views and sue for peace before they got any further—a contingency which was considered by no means probable. The number of troops originally sent out was between 28,000 and 30,000, and part were despatched to Malta before the commencement of hostilities, not to remain there or to be brought back, but to facilitate the conveyance of the whole force to Turkey. When the noble Earl also laughed at the supposed boasted activity of the Government, which he said consisted in the operation of sending a body of 25,000 men, in a period commencing with March, and extending over April, May, and even the beginning of June, I beg to acquaint him that he is entirely mistaken. The whole force was sent to Turkey, with the exception of some regiments of cavalry, before the end of April, and Lord Raglan, on the 22nd of April, received from me instructions to move forward his forces towards Varna. That force, in conjunction with the army of the Emperor of the French, was, in the first instance, ordered to Gallipoli. This was done, acting on the opinion of military men, who recommended that we should take up a position at Gallipoli, with instructions to the commanders of the united forces to throw up new works, and to occupy a position between the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea. The march of the Russian forces across the Danube took place, and on the 22nd of April orders were issued to move troops to Varna for the support of that place, and subsequently for the support of Silistria. I may here mention that about this time a new complication in the aspect of affairs appeared in Greece, which threatened to embarrass the operations of the other nations engaged in the contest; and I think that it was on the 20th of May that forces, both English and French, were sent to the Piræus to secure that neutrality on the part of Greece which had already begun to be somewhat doubtful. The noble Earl then came to that part of his case in which he thought it favourable to his views to represent that it was only after the siege of Silistria was raised that we contemplated the invasion of the Crimea; and in support of that statement, he quoted passages from speeches made by the noble Lord the President of the Council and my noble Friend near me (Earl Granville). The noble Earl said that it was only after the siege of Silistria was raised that we began to inquire what was to be done next, and that the generals received orders to proceed to the Crimea; and he proceeded to say that it was in spite of the representations of the generals that that order was given by the Government at home, and without due deference to military opinion, which, he was persuaded deprecated the undertaking. Now, let me inform the noble Earl that he is in error in the whole of that statement. From the very first the invasion of the Crimea was contemplated, and I only wish that it were consistent with my duty to lay before your Lordships the despatches between Lord Raglan and myself with reference to the conduct of this war; but I think, my Lords, that you would agree with me that this is not a fitting time for the production of such documents, and that if, during the conduct of the war, I were to produce them, it would be dangerous for the public service; but the production of these documents would prove that which I now ask you to believe on my authority, that on the very day on which the first official instructions were first given to Lord Raglan, instructions were also given him in a separate despatch to make inquiry with reference to the condition of Sebastopol, the forces in the Crimea, the means of invasion, and the best mode of carrying it out; and when the noble Earl says that the orders for the invasion of the Crimea were given in spite of the opinions of the generals, I admit that the orders were given by the Government at home, but I deny that they were given in spite of the opinion of any generals, but, on the contrary, as far as any military opinions were received, they were in favour of undertaking the expedition, and all the information we were able to acquire—I admit it was less than we could have obtained in any other country—tended to show that the operation was one proper to be undertaken. Well, my Lords, the noble Earl proceeded to say—upon the authority, I believe, of some speech he had seen in a newspaper—that it was not until the end of July that these orders were issued—and in that statement he is again in error. The siege of Silistria was raised about the 22nd of June, and the moment that intelligence was received, the Cabinet met and decided that now, as the first object of their policy was accomplished, and any immediate march of the Russians into the Turkish territory prevented, the moment had arrived for attempting the second object of the war, and for striking a home blow at the power of Russia; with the view of depriving her of the means of aggression which she had employed against the Turkish empire. On the 29th of June—only seven days after the raising of the siege of Silistria—directions were given in a despatch to Lord Raglan to undertake the expedition to the Crimea. The noble Earl has commented on the allegation that, when the expedition was ordered, we did not strengthen the forces under the command of Lord Raglan to the extent we ought to have done; but I cannot forget that at the time of which I am now speaking—the end of June—there was not a voice in this House or a voice in this country, which, although raised in condemnation of acts of the Government, did not assert that our forces were sufficient to accomplish the object in view, and did not deprecate delay, for which it was said there was no reason. Let me call your Lordships' attention to the circumstance that the noble Earl, in dealing with the question of the insufficiency of the force employed, has entirely thrown out of the account the fact that the expedition was not undertaken by our own army of 30,000 men alone, but that it was undertaken in conjunction with a great military Power; and certainly, in speaking of the sufficiency or insufficiency of a force, we ought to speak of it in the aggregate. But, my Lords, the first step which we took in directing that expedition was to send out to Lord Raglan such reinforcements as were in a condition, at that moment, to take the field effectively. So long as the defence of the Balkans was the only consideration, we thought the force under Lord Raglan sufficient for the purpose; and, believing that it might be possible to carry on operations in conjunction with France in other quarters, we had reserved at home a fourth division of infantry as well as some companies of artillery. The moment, however, it was determined that the forces were to be concentrated in the Crimea, that reserve division was sent out under the command of that gallant officer Sir George Cathcart. Three companies of artillery, two regiments of cavalry, and a second battery train of forty-two guns—a previous battery train with the same number of guns, with an abundant supply of ammunition, having been before sent out—were added to the force. Here let me point out, in reference to the insufficiency of stores complained of by the noble Earl, that I believe there never were in any former war two battering trains sent out in so complete a state of efficiency, or with anything like so large a supply of ammunition. I can only say that I believe, if you look back to the annals of the Peninsular war, you will find no example of such a force. I can only say that as regards the amount of ammunition sent out, those who were considered to be most competent to give an opinion having given it in conjunction with my noble Friend the Commander in Chief, I issued directions for doubling the amount which they had recommended.

The noble Earl touched lightly upon a point which has been more vehemently complained of out of doors—namely, the delay which took place between the 29th of June and the embarkation of the troops from Varna; but he read a letter from an officer, who said that it would be most unjust to accuse the troops or any one concerned in the movements of the army on account of the delay which had taken place. My Lords, I say at once that by me certainly no blame whatever shall be cast upon any portion of that army. I believe that no blame belongs to them; and certainly I am not the man to blame them. But, my Lords, if the noble Earl means to say that, because no blame attaches to the army, it therefore does attach to the Government, will he be good enough to look at the facts of the case, and, having studied them, then pronounce an opinion? If he do so, I cannot help thinking that it will be somewhat different from the opinion which he so recently expressed. In the first place, the operations of the Turkish army on the Danube necessarily, and without any blame to the allied Generals, entailed some delay; for the late Marshal St. Arnaud had thought it desirable to send forward a portion of the French army in the direction of the Danube, and those operations of course caused some delay; but that was of minor importance. The preparations which had to be made for embarking so very considerable a force as the united armies unavoidably occupied a considerable time. I believe that at no former period has so large a fleet of transports ever been congregated for the passage of an army from one shore to another as was collected upon that occasion; but though the officers employed in that service had used their best exertions, sufficient time had not elapsed to enable them to provide such a number of flat-bottomed boats, and other materials and appliances for embarkation and disembarkation, as was necessary. With the greatest energy and activity, Sir Edmund Lyons, Sir George Brown, and other officers, were employed for nearly a month in obtaining those materials and planning those operations the neglect of which might have occasioned the embarking and disembarking of the troops to be attended with very different results from those which actually ensued. By far the most serious cause of delay, however, was the breaking out of cholera in the camp; but when the noble Earl states that the army was quite wasted by cholera, and that orders were given to go to the Crimea only after the army had so suffered, I must tell the noble Earl that he is wrong again, both in his facts and dates. The order was given to go to the Crimea before the breaking out of the cholera, and it was subsequently to that event that this frightful malady afflicted our troops and caused increased delay. The way in which it afflicted our army may have been somewhat exaggerated by the noble Earl when he drew that sad and touching picture of the graves prepared in the night for the burials in the morning; but, at the same time, I readily admit that the calamity was most serious. It caused a considerable number of deaths in our force, and a still greater number, I regret to say, in that of our French Ally. But that was not the worst effect. Those who died were few in comparison with those who were debilitated and incapacitated for a time from any exertion, however slight. The army was barely recovering from that disaster when the fleet was prepared for embarking a portion, at any rate, of the troops, and a sudden blast of that malady at night appears to have blown from the shore, and to have struck those ships which were ready to embark our troops. Adopting what is considered the best practice in such cases, they put to sea; but I believe that in one ship, in one single night, nearly 100 men perished of that fell disease. They put to sea with a view of stopping the disorder. A gale came on, and in the eveinng they were obliged to close the hatches. The result was that the malady increased, and I need hardly tell your Lordships that additional delay was the consequence. My Lords, let me say, in passing, that I, for one, greatly doubt whether the misfortune of that delay—except as regards its cause—was so great as has been represented. The climate of the Crimea is very peculiar, and during the summer months that of the neighbourhood of Varna is far more salubrious than a portion of the Crimea. So I am informed, at least, by a medical man who is very conversant with the subject; and I greatly doubt whether, if we had gone to the Crimea at an earlier period, we should have escaped that great calamity, the cholera, which befell us in Bulgaria. My Lords, as regards the deficiency of preparation which the noble Earl charges against the Government, I really do not know to what the noble Earl refers, except what he has specified, the paucity of men. I can only say that those preparations were not only immense, but minute; I can only say that the transports collected and sent out for the purpose were such as I believe in no former period of this country it would have been possible to have obtained, and which we were only able to procure in consequence of the immense increase of steam navigation within the last two or three years; I can only say, as regards the quantity sent out from this country of stores and ammunition of all kinds, that no practical man has ever expressed an opinion of their inadequacy; but, on the contrary, as I said of ammunition, so I say of medical and other stores, that the quantities which were pronounced by those best able to judge to be sufficient were in most cases doubled, and in some cases trebled, by us. I said at the commencement of my observations that I was not about to tell your Lordships that there were no mistakes—that I was not about to tell you that every arrangement had been perfect. I say, then, that it is not sufficient to prove that this immense amount of ammunition and stores was sent out if it were not available at the moment where it was wanted; and here I readily admit that mistakes have been made, and that there have been defects, which, I hope, in the future progress of the war, may be avoided. But the noble Earl really speaks of this expedition to the Crimea as if the force which was carried across those seas was of so small and trivial an amount that it was not worth speaking of. He forgets the great operation of embarkation, and he forgets the still more admirable and successful manner in which that great armament was disembarked. The English force alone was 27,000 men, and the French force amounted to 24,000 men. I am speaking now of the two forces which were carried across at the same time, and which were disembarked within a few hours of one another. Besides these there was, I believe, a body of 8,000 Turks attached to the French army. My Lords, that body of nearly 60,000 men landed at once on the shores of the Crimea; and I believe that the records of history do not show any undertaking upon such a scale so successfully accomplished throughout. Then came the battle of the Alma. The noble Earl, with his accustomed eloquence, has dwelt upon the courage and enduring gallantry of our troops. I will not at this moment break in upon the answer which I am making to the noble Earl by attempting to add anything to what he has said upon that subject. Then followed that flank march to Balaklava which was so justly characterised by the noble Duke who moved the Address. But I now come to the charge of the noble Earl with reference to the want of reinforcements. I have already stated that when the expedition to the Crimea was decided upon, the original force of Lord Raglan's army, which amounted to something not much short of 30,000 men, was increased by about 7,000 additional troops.

The noble Earl said that no reinforcements were subsequently sent, except a few driblets, until after the battle of Inkerman. The noble Earl is again not accurate. I do not wish to quibble upon figures; I do not wish to take advantage of small mistakes on the part of the noble Earl. I will endeavour to explain to the House why it was impossible to send out larger reinforcements at that moment, even if reinforcements had been considered necessary; but I say that the noble Earl, nevertheless, is not correct, and that reinforcements were prepared as soon as the force of 7,000 to which I have referred were sent off, and that before the news of the battle of the Alma had reached this country a force of between 6,000 and 7,000 more men was under orders to proceed to the Crimea. The *Prince* steamer carried the first portion of those reinforcements as well as the stores to which I shall presently allude; and if the remaining reinforcements did not proceed with the rapidity with which previous ones had been sent out to Lord Raglan, it was because the whole available steam transport service at that moment in the country had been sent out to the Crimea. Others were coming in, no doubt, from our Colonies and from distant parts, and as they came in they were taken up by the Government; but at the moment when those 7,000 men were ready to be embarked, steam transports were not at hand for their conveyance. The noble Earl says that throughout these transactions there has been a want of prescience on the part of the Government,—that our policy has been one of hand to mouth,—and that we never anticipated from one day to another what we should be called upon in the future to undertake. My Lords, the noble Earl seems to forget that no country can possibly enter upon war at its commencement in so perfect a state for carrying on that war as it will become in a short time—in some months, or a year or two, perhaps—after that war has been commenced. Not even the most military nations of the Continent can do this; and still less a country like this, which has never kept up a large standing army, but whose army has generally been in great part scattered over the whole surface of the globe—a large portion in the Colonies, and only a fraction, so to say, within the precincts of this island. Well, but did we show that want of prescience which the noble Earl ascribed to us? What were the steps which were taken by the Government when I held in conjunction the offices of Colonial Secretary and Secretary of the War Department? Upon the first declaration of war I sent out to all the Colonies to withdraw as many regiments as possible from them, with the view of strengthening the home force. Ten regiments of infantry were at that time ordered home, besides several companies of artillery, and I may state that, at this moment—to show that there was not that want of prescience and foresight, but that, on the contrary, we have already profited by that prescience—at this moment, some of the regiments which, a few months ago, were in the Colonies, having been recruited—inadequately, I admit, on account of the exigencies of the service—since their arrival here, are now upon their way to reinforce the army of the Crimea. But I readily admit—and when your Lordships look at the extent and distance of the Colonies you will not be surprised at the fact—that some of those regiments have not yet arrived, and that even after they shall have arrived, it will be impossible for some time to recruit them properly and to make them fit for foreign service. I have alluded to the impossibility of commencing a war with such forces as, no doubt, it might be desirable to pour into a country with which you are engaged in hostilities. With reference to this subject, I ask you to look at the position of our great and powerful military ally. France has now collected a very powerful army; but was it not the fact that at the commencement of hostilities she was unable to send those reinforcements which she is now pouring in? Look again at another Power, which I rejoice to think we may also call our ally. Look at the great military Power of Austria. What have they been doing during the last four or five months? Were they in an effective state to take the field at the time when war was declared by this country? Certainly not; and if they had been obliged, as we were, to send a force into the field, is it not notorious that they would have been obliged to send one much more inadequate and much less fitted for the service in view than they will now be enabled to do? My Lords, if that is the case with great military nations—nations whose whole military system is based upon conscription—what must it be with a country whose military system rests entirely upon voluntary enlistment? This country never undertook a war under the circumstances in which the present war has been undertaken. On former occasions we had a mixed system; but now it is entirely and simply voluntary. On former occasions we had the power of impressment as regards the Navy, and we had the ballot as regards the militia. True it is that we have the power of the ballot still with regard to the militia; but I rejoice to think that at present, at any rate, it has not been found necessary to call it into operation; and I say that it is a proud thing for this country, so long as we are enabled to maintain our position in Europe, to assert our rights, and to espouse the cause of justice on behalf of others, without compelling men to enter into our armies and to fight our battles. But of course, when it has been the policy of this country to keep a very limited force—when the economical feeling of the House of Commons has placed great restrictions upon expenditure in all the military departments—it is not wonderful that at the commencement of a war our forces should not be of such an amount as the energy and zeal and keen anxiety of the country might desire; or that those recruits whom we should be able at first to collect should not be sufficiently trained to send out to serve with those more practised and admirably disciplined troops which at the beginning proceeded to the Crimea. I have no difficulty in saying, moreover, that for an occasion such as this, the voluntary system has this inconvenience. It has been practically found hitherto, and it is now more especially evident, that men in this country are more anxious to enlist when success has been somewhat retarded, when increased energy appears to be necessary, and not when all is proceeding with every probability of an early and successful issue. This theory, if theory it be, has been completely established by the experience of the last few months. At the first declaration of war recruits came forward freely; but they soon relaxed, and during the summer months they were few indeed in number—so much so as to cause very considerable anxiety on the part of the Government. But as soon as it appeared evident that the siege of Sebastopol was likely to be protracted, and that the undertaking was one of greater hazard and difficulty than had been supposed—from that moment, when the energy of the people was aroused, the zeal and readiness of the young men of the country to enlist also increased, and week by week it has been progressing, until last week, I believe, we more than doubled the number offering in any previous week since the commencement of the war, and enrolled six or sevenfold the number which we had the power of recruiting some five or six weeks ago.

My Lords, the siege of Sebastopol commenced, after a considerable amount of necessary preparations, upon the 17th of October, and it soon afterwards became apparent, from the intelligence which reached this country, that that siege was likely to be more protracted than I readily admit the Government at first expected. I say I readily admit—if that be any blame to the Government—that we did hope and believe that long before the time at which we are now assembled that fortress would have fallen; and if we erred in that expectation—if we were over-confident—I believe that we erred in common with many men of great experience in war, and men whose opinions were well worth having—and we erred in our confidence in common with the public at large both in this country and in France. My Lords, from the moment it appeared that that siege was likely to be protracted, every exertion was used by the Government to obtain reinforcements, and to send them with as little delay as possible to the Crimea; and here, again, I am about to admit that, under any other circumstances than those which existed those reinforcements ought not to have been sent, because the regiments which have gone out have arrived too recently in this country to be effectively recruited, and men have gone out in those regiments who have not been trained so efficiently as we could wish, and who have not become habituated to the life on which they are about to enter. I do not hesitate to say—your Lordships may blame me if you will—I do not hesitate to say that it has been my duty to order those troops to proceed to the East with very great regret, and the Government has only done so because it felt the exigency of the moment required that every possible exertion should be made to succour our brave army, at whatever sacrifice. And, my Lords, when you blame the Government for not having sent these reinforcements sooner, let me tell you this, that the generals on the spot who are most competent to judge did not desire to have recruits, such as we have now sent, prematurely. They would rather they had been reserved for the next campaign, unless those events had arisen which rendered it necessary—which induced Lord Raglan to press for them—which induced the Government to send them without any delay. My Lords, that events have turned out differently from what was contemplated in more respects than one I have already admitted. Undoubtedly, we did not expect the Russian power in reinforcing her troops before Sebastopol would be so great as it proved to be. We did not doubt her military power. We were aware of that; but we did not expect than an army could be moved from Odessa to Sebastopol with the marvellous rapidity with which that movement was effected; and, probably, some of your Lordships will be surprised to hear that, through the extraordinary efforts of the Russian Government, by the means they were able to command of an unlimited number of cars and cattle, their marches were effected at such a rapid rate that on one day a march of forty-two miles was actually effected. Now, I may be imprudent in making these confessions, but I wish to deal frankly with your Lordships.

I have said we do not profess perfection. I am ready to admit that errors, if errors they are, were committed. We did not calculate on the powers of the Russian Government to send reinforcements to Sebastopol in time for the battle of Inkerman, and I believe, my Lords, that there are few in this country—few in any other country—who did expect it. If the siege had been protracted some three or four weeks longer, we might have expected them; but certainly we did not expect them at the time of their arrival. I can only say that we did not form our opinions on any haphazard or guesswork, but we took the best opinions we were able to obtain in this country—of those who could inform us as to the means and capabilities of the Russian forces and the character of the country they would have to traverse.

What have been the reinforcements which in reality have been sent out from this country? The noble Earl and the country at large have greatly underrated them. Since the month of June more than 20,000 men have been sent from this country to the army under Lord Raglan, and in the course of the last two months (the greater portion being within the last three or four weeks) 12,300 men have been sent—of course being a portion of the 20,000. I believe your Lordships will be surprised when I tell you that the whole number of men which from the time of the commencement of hostilities up to the close of the year (for few more have to be sent out before the close of the year) has been sent out, including officers, will have exceeded 53,000—when you consider this, too, is an army in reality sent out almost on a peace establishment, for the war establishment has hardly come into operation. The noble Earl thinks I have given him an advantage in that admission. What I mean by a peace establishment is this; that the increase of the army has hardly become available subsequently to the 29th of March, when the declaration of hostilities was made, and I consider all this has been done on an establishment not yet raised to that strength to which I hope before many months it will be raised. When you reflect that not many months ago we were told on high authority that, in the event of that, I am sure I may now call it, bugbear invasion, not 10,000 men of our regulars could be brought to defend our own shores, and how we have been able to send out this large force to the Crimea, I do not think the exertions of this country ought to be underrated, or that, in reality, so little has been done as has been represented by the noble Earl. My Lords, even looking back at operations conducted by this country at a time when we had been longer at war, I doubt greatly whether on any former occasion within the same space of time so many British troops have been sent out under the command of any English general. The noble Earl alluded, in the course of his speech, to the inadequate supply of stores of all kinds which have been sent out to Sebastopol. I feel I should be trespassing too long on your attention, otherwise I have returns here which will show the enormous amount of gunpowder and guns which has been sent out for the service of this army.

THE EARL OF DERBY was understood to say, he had not charged the Government with having failed to send out gunpowder and guns.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: But the noble Earl is aware that Government has been taxed with neglect on this point, though not by him or in this House; and, if I touch upon a question not alluded to by the noble Earl, I think your Lordships will not feel I am dealing unfairly by you if, at this early stage of the debate, I enter into details with which it is my peculiar province to be intimately acquainted, and which any other Member of the Government may not have so readily at hand, for the purpose of refuting any accusation which may subsequently be made. With regard to the provision of ordnance, sixty-two position guns were sent out at the commencement. I have already said two complete battering trains of forty-two guns, with an enormous supply of shot and shell, were sent out; seven nine-pounder batteries, with two troops of horse artillery, were also sent; and I believe, on no former occasion was the same amount of ordnance supplied to any British army in so short a period. This statement will bear, perhaps, on the face of it more tangible proof of the exertions which have been made to leave no arm of the service unsupported. The small-arm ammunition sent out, on the whole, amounts to the enormous quantity of 22,933,000 rounds, of which 18,000,000 rounds were for Minié arms. I can only say, if you are not satisfied with these exertions, we are still sending more, and, if ships can be obtained, we shall continue to send more ammunition of all kinds. What I have stated to your Lordships, however, does not represent the whole force at the disposal of Lord Raglan, even as regards guns and ammunition. From Malta, besides what I have mentioned, there have been sent forty-two large guns and mortars, 9,000 shells, and something like 27,000 round shot, principally of very large size.

I now come to a matter of charge on which the noble Earl commented with considerable severity. He said we had shown no foresight as to the requirements of the troops in clothing, and that on the 15th of October the first supply of warm clothing arrived in the Crimea. The noble Earl is quite right with regard to that single fact; but I think the noble Earl will not deny that if the supply sent out in the *Prince*, taken with the supply sent contemporaneously in other steamers, had all arrived at its destination, there would not be much to complain of with regard to the privations of the army, considering the character of the climate, and the period of the year when warm clothing becomes necessary in the Crimea. I have no hesitation in saying that supplies of warm clothing were sent out in time, and, but for that great calamity which befell the *Prince*, the whole army would have been supplied before any suffering from cold could have arisen. I should say that orders for the supply of warm clothing were given by myself in the months of July and August, and, as soon as steamers were provided and the orders executed, it was despatched to its destination. The quantity which was sent out and lost in the *Prince* alone consisted of 35,700 pairs of woollen socks, 53,000 woollen frocks, 17,000 flannel drawers, 2,500 watch-coats (double coats to go over the ordinary great coats), 16,100 blankets, and 3,700 rugs. I am quite afraid of wearying your Lordships, but it may be desirable, with a view of showing the care that has been taken of the army, to state the sum total of the supplies sent out for its service, some, of course, very recently, because fresh supplies were ordered on the loss of the *Prince* becoming known. The number of worsted socks is 150,000; of woollen frocks, 90,000; of flannel drawers, 90,000; of boots, 91,397 (pairs); of shoes, 13,000; of woollen gloves, 80,000 (pairs); of overcoats, 30,000; of fur caps, 35,000; of leather gauntlets, 20,000; of long woollen stockings, 80,000 (pairs); comforters, leather mits, and other articles in proportion. Also 40,000 railway wrappers, 40,000 waterproof capes, 12,000 buffalo hides, 12,000 pairs of sealskin mits, 40,000 fur coats, besides horse-cloths and a variety of other articles. That your Lordships may see that the Government has not been neglectful, I may mention that before we were aware that the *Prince* was actually lost—when we received the rumour of her loss by the telegraph—we immediately sent agents to Glasgow, Nottingham, and Leicester, and the woollen manufacturing districts, for the purpose of buying up all stores of the kind upon which they could lay their hands, so that if their loss should be confirmed, we might be able to replace them. Before authentic intelligence of the fate of the *Prince* reached us, those stores were in a great measure replaced, and within two or three days of their arrival, the greater portion was embarked, and on their way to their destination. They consisted of 54,896 woollen socks, 24,200 woollen frocks, 34,100 flannel drawers, 3,475 watch-coats, 39,550 blankets, 22,800 rugs, and 14,457 great-coats. The whole of these articles have been supplied and sent out since intelligence of the loss of the *Prince* has been received. The greater portion of the vessels have sailed, and many that have not sailed will sail within the next two or three days at the utmost. This, however, is not all that the Government has done with a view to securing the health and comfort of the troops by supplies of warm clothing. As soon as it became apparent—I will not say apparent—but as soon as it became probable—that the troops would have to winter in the Crimea without the protection of roofs over their heads, orders were issued for a supply of sheep-skin coats for the clothing of the whole army. It was found to be an article not much used in this country, and only 5,000 could be supplied in England; but larger quantities were procured from France, the Austrian provinces, and other places, and so confident were we that Parliament would not grudge any expenditure, that I sent, through my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Lord Stratford, at Constantinople, to endeavour to buy up 25,000 sheep-skin coats there. I would not have entered into all these details if the noble Earl had not endeavoured to raise an impression that the comfort, safety, and protection of the army had been neglected. Great, indeed, would be the responsibility of any Government guilty of conduct so cruel and so disgraceful to humanity as that which has been surmised. Huts, also, have been ordered for the troops, because tents must be utterly inadequate, and I am happy to say that, independently of those already provided from Turkey and from Malta, a certain number have been supplied from Trieste. Huts for 11,500 men have been already sent from this country, and huts for 3,200 more are in vessels which will sail in the course of the next day or two. A further supply will speedily follow. The noble Earl alluded in one part of his speech, to the condition of the army, stating they were nearly in rags. This is, undoubtedly, the fact; that, in consequence of the hard labour to which the troops have been exposed in the trenches and elsewhere, the uniforms with which they left this country have been completely worn out. But this consequence was anticipated, and before any representations were made from those in authority in the Crimea, complete new suits of uniform were ordered for the whole of the army—not the regular uniforms supplied at stated periods, but a third suit in addition to those usually given, which have been supplied gratuitously, without any deduction to which the soldier is ordinarily subject. Those uniforms have all arrived in the Crimea by this time, presuming that calamities, which no human power can control, have not occurred to some of the vessels. The greater part we have heard of having arrived, and in all human probability the whole must be there by this time. The Government has taken upon itself to act towards the army on a scale of liberality heretofore unusual, confident that Parliament and the country will approve of what has been done in this respect. Besides these clothes being given without deduction, extra rations have been served out of all descriptions—meat, spirits, and vegetables—and no deductions have been made for these extra rations.

Let me here remark upon some words which fell from the noble Earl—that the army was half starved. Now, that I must entirely deny. I admit that accidents have occurred; I admit that everything has not been perfect; but this I say—and I say it fearlessly—that no army ever was better fed than this army has been; and that is universally admitted by all the officers and men with whom there has been any communication. My Lords, I can confidently assert there has not been even a single day—unless it was the day when the first march from the place of disembarkation took place—when regular rations have not been supplied to the troops; and, if they have more frequently been salt rations than might have been desired, I think your Lordships will admit the peculiarity of the service, and the position of your army, justify the circumstance; and it is, perhaps, only wonderful that the Commissariat has been able to supply so large a quantity of fresh provisions—which have been served out to the army, I believe, generally speaking, not less than three or four times a week.

THE EARL OF DERBY said, he had not remarked on the general condition of the army with regard to provisions. He had stated only that a considerable portion of the troops engaged at Inkerman retired from the trenches, and had not had any food, before engaging in the battle.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: I misunderstood the noble Earl. Of course, the fact is undeniably true, and does greatly enhance the conduct of the men on that occasion. The men, most of them, had come from the trenches; the remainder of the 8,000 troops engaged were called from their quarters so unexpectedly that they had not received their breakfasts, and, until a late hour in the afternoon, they were fighting without having had any food. My Lords, I believe that it is unnecessary to make any statement with reference to the Commissariat beyond what I have already said as to the supply of rations, and the condition of the army. That there were, in the first instance, mistakes, was unavoidable; but I believe, on the whole, the Commissariat has done its duty well, and given satisfaction to the army it has served; and I believe, also, that those who most desponded of the operations of that branch of the service, have since most readily admitted that its performance has exceeded their expectations. I have here a return of the quantity of commissariat stores sent out, and the number of officers employed, but I will not trouble your Lordships with them, because I confidently expect that the blame supposed to have attached to that department, at the commencement of operations, was blame—so far as it was just at all—only called forth by the novelty of the duty and the exigencies of the service, and subsequently most amply atoned.

The noble Earl commented with much severity on the medical department. Here, again, let us bear in mind the position in which this department was at the commencement of the war. I am not about to defend it — quite the reverse — but I say that its defects were consequent on that ill-judged economy which prevented an efficient medical department being kept up in time of peace; and that the blame ought not to be attached to those under whom the medical department had acted, and still less to the medical department itself. I ask your Lordships to consider in how different a position our medical department has had to conduct the business of the war compared with that of our gallant Allies. When the war broke out, the French had an organised hospital corps; we had none. We had not even a code of hospital regulations. The whole thing had to be created *de novo;* and under these disadvantageous circumstances, it is almost wonderful that greater errors have not been committed, and that greater calamities have not occurred. My Lords, I regret to think that more suffering has, under these circumstances, been entailed upon our gallant men than might have occurred under a different system; but if the noble Earl wishes to represent that the Government is to be blamed for any want of care or forethought in this respect, let me mention a few facts which will exonerate us from any such charge. Your Lordships will remember that in February or March last Mr. Guthrie addressed a letter to the newspapers with respect to the number of army surgeons to be sent out, stating that the number of army surgeons with our troops in the Peninsula was quite insufficient, and that we ought to add a third assistant surgeon to every regiment sent out. I consulted with Dr. Smith—the head of the medical department—who was adverse to an increase of the regimental surgeons, and who was of opinion that the best mode of strengthening the medical department was by adding to the medical staff, and not to the regimental surgeons; experience having shown, as he stated, that the greatest requirements were in the hospitals, where the regimental surgeons were not available. I had to decide between these two opinions, and I came to this conclusion—that both were right, and that the best way was to increase the number both of the regimental and the staff surgeons. The staff was, therefore, increased, as was recommended by Dr. Smith, and the regimental staff was increased in the mode pointed out by Mr. Guthrie. Now, my Lords, what is the number of medical officers at the present moment serving with the army? The number of staff medical officers is 280, of regimental medical officers 192, and of Ordnance medical officers fourteen—making 486; or, including nine staff medical officers who are ready to join the army, giving a total of medical officers of the army in Turkey of 495. This gives, according to the present estimated strength of the army in the East, one medical officer to every seventy-seven men—being about double the number of medical officers that served with the army in former wars. I do not compare what has been done now with what was done fifty years ago with a view to show that there is nothing more to be done to complete the medical administration of our army. On the contrary, I believe that there is a great deal yet to be done, and that, while we have improved on the system of former wars, a great improvement—I am speaking, of course, of our medical department—may be made in our present system. The noble Earl said that the charity of this country had been called into requisition to supply the deficiency of hospital stores in the East. That the charity of the country has been called forth is a fact at which I, on the part of the Government, rejoice; but that it has been called forth by any insufficiency of supplies sent from home, I cannot admit. That the charity of the country has been called into action by the insufficiency of supplies upon the spot, where, and at the moment when they were wanted, may be true, and the report that the stores wanted in the hospital at Scutari were at the bottom of the ship that was lost the other day, while those which were at the top were obliged to be taken on to Balaklava, is but too true; and I am bound to admit that the same thing has occurred in two or three instance. The supply of beds and bedding sent to the army in the East was calculated upon the number of 16,000 patients. That this supply was all sent out at the commencement of the operations I will not asserts. As we began the war without a hospital corps, the greater part of this supply had to be contracted for, and some of the supplies were not delivered so fast as they ought to have been, although they were supplied before they were wanted. Now, take an article upon which a great deal has been said. The quantity of lint sent to the army was 26,564 lbs. Now, my Lords, I dare say that this immense quantity of pounds will not convey to your minds a more accurate impression of the real quantity sent out than it did at first to my own. It will, perhaps, give your Lordships a better idea, when I state, from a computation which has been made, that this quantity of lint would cover no less than thirty-six acres of ground. Then the bandages of calico and linen were 117,500, and of adhesive plaster 20,550 yards were sent out. I think your Lordships will now believe that great exaggerations with regard to these deficiencies have been current, and will believe that they have all been on a much larger scale than the noble Earl supposes. The noble Earl said, that when the nurses arrived at Scutari they were unable to supply port wine to the sick.

The Earl of DERBY: I said that eleven died in one night from exhaustion in consequence of the want of such nourishment as they ought to have had. This statement appeared in a letter from one of the nurses.

The Duke of NEWCASTLE: I have not seen the statement, but if it has been made by one of the nurses it must be believed, because I cannot think that any one who has gone out in the self-sacrificing spirit which has distinguished those noble women would place her hand to any statement that was not literally correct. But your Lordships must not suppose that there has been that neglect on the part of the Government in the supply of this article that might be inferred from this statement. The quantity of port wine sent out for use to the hospital at Scutari was 4,880 dozen, and the greater portion of this supply ought to have been in store long before the arrival of the wounded patients from the battle of the Alma; 1,200 gallons of brandy were also sent out, and 31,180 lbs. of sugar, and all other articles of medical comfort, as they are called, have been sent out in similar proportion. My Lords, that those who have visited these hospitals should have been painfully struck with the scenes of suffering in them is not to be wondered at. An influx of thousands of wounded men must strike every bosom with horror, and I fear that sufficient precautions had not been taken for the disembarkation of those men from the ships that brought them to Constantinople, so as to save them a great amount of suffering. But those who have in the hospitals of this country witnessed any sudden influx of wounded persons under similar circumstances, and the confusion which arises, will make some allowance for the authorities of this establishment, though it will not diminish their sympathy for the sufferers. I am bound to say that I think the management of the hospital at Scutari has been influenced too much by those feelings of attention to economy which, although right under ordinary circumstances, are wrong under circumstances such as the present. I think also that there has not been that complete organisation in this establishment without which it could not be expected to work effectively. But, my Lords, what are the steps which the Government have taken to rectify these errors? Instructions were sent out as soon as any deficiencies were complained of to get, at any cost, the supplies requisite for the wounded. For the better administration of the hospitals, a general officer was directed to proceed to Constantinople to take charge of the hospitals and their military affairs, with a view of improving the organisation of its medical system, and the Government have also sent out a commission of three gentlemen, two of whom are medical men, for the purpose of inquiring into all the complaints which have been made on this subject, not so much with the view of condemning or punishing individuals, as to ascertain the facts, and to rectify all just cause of complaint. I am sorry to find that an impression has gone forth that this commission has only been issued by the Government in order to bolster up a defective system, and to make up a case that is to be laid before Parliament to show that no blame is to be attached to any one. Now, my Lords, I think I have proved to your Lordships that no such idea could have actuated the Government, and that no such disposition animates the gentlemen on the commission. And whatever their report may be, the only desire of the Government in appointing the commission is that the public services shall thereby be benefited. I regret to say that one of the gentlemen forming this commission (Dr. Spence) perished on board the *Prince*. He was the individual whose appointment to this commission gave colour to this rumour, because when in this country he was assistant to Dr. Smith. To show that there was no such desire on the part of the Government or the commission, the two survivors, who were empowered to fill up any vacancy that might occur in their number on the death of Dr. Spence, with the view of laying bare everything that was wrong, and of rectifying what was defective, proposed to the Rev. Sidney Godolphin Osborne, who happened to be then at Scutari, that he should be joined in that commission. I do not think that any one will deny that this gentleman is a most ardent investigator of abuses, and that in his hands the deficiencies of the Government and of the medical department are not likely to receive too lenient a construction. That rev. gentleman was at Scutari upon a charitable commission, which he is discharging most ably and admirably, and he declined to serve on the medical commission, and I therefore mention the fact, only in order to disabuse the public mind of any error as to the principle upon which that commission was constituted.

My Lords, the next and most important matter to which I shall advert, is one to which allusion has been made both by the noble Duke (the Duke of Leeds) and by the noble Earl opposite. When, at the commencement of the war, the practice of the French to employ female nurses in their hospitals was spoken of, the opinion of the medical men and of the medical department was given against the employment of female nurses. I did not feel myself at liberty to act at variance with that opinion and the experience on which it was founded, although I now feel that that experience was based upon a totally different state of things, and that those opinions were formed upon circumstances which did not in the least resemble the present. The reason why, in former times, nurses were found unsuited to the care of English soldiers was, because the women selected for that service were not, as now, women of education and of pious feelings, who volunteered their services, but women hired for the service, who, both abroad and at home, grew callous, and manifested a harshness and want of sympathy with the sufferers that rendered them unfit for the due performance of their duties. My Lords, when complaints first reached this country of the state of the hospitals at Scutari, we again directed our attention to the plan of sending out nurses, and we intrusted the organisation of that establishment to hands which, humanly speaking, must ensure success. I cannot give too high praise to those ladies who have so nobly volunteered their services—the names of Miss Nightingale and of those ladies who have so nobly stepped forward in the cause of Christian love, will be handed down to posterity in company with those of the gallant men who have been wounded in the service of their country. They have left comfortable and, in many instances, luxurious homes, for the purpose of adopting a profession which is most distasteful to women of delicate minds, in the hope of assuaging the sufferings of our gallant countrymen, and of fulfilling a Christian duty. I believe that through the instrumentality of these ladies more will be done to re-establish the efficiency of our hospital establishments than has ever been done by the medical men themselves, although there never have been greater exertions, greater self-denial, or greater zeal, shown by the members of that profession, with hardly a single exception, than have been evinced by that large class who have had to undertake these onerous duties. A charge has been made by the noble Earl with reference to that ship whose loss has been attended by such serious consequences to the comfort of the army in the Crimea. He said he had been given to understand that the Admiralty had been warned as to the efficiency of the officer in command of that vessel. [The Earl of Derby: I did not state it of my own knowledge.] No, I stated the noble Earl said he had been given to understand that the captain of the *Prince* was unsuited to his duties, and that the Admiralty had been warned that the vessel would be in the greatest danger if it were sent to sea under the command of that officer. Complaints were also made relative to the time that had elapsed between the arrival of the *Prince* and the disembarkation of her cargo, during which interval she lay in the roads without having her cables clinched, and without disembarking the valuable cargo she had on board. Now, I will only say, that when I heard of this delay in the discharge of her cargo, I wrote at once to Lord Raglan. The first impression on my mind was, that great blame was attributable to some department, and I directed that immediate inquiry should be made into the cause of that disaster and delay. No answer, of course, could be received by this time; but I am bound to say, in extenuation of the conduct of the captain, that I have been informed, on the authority of one who was present during the storm, that the state of the sea during the whole of those days was such that the vessel could neither be brought into the narrow harbour of Balaklava nor discharge her cargo, and that she was only enabled, with the assistance of small steamers, to disembark that portion of the 46th Regiment which she conveyed to the Crimea. With regard to the other statement, of the incompetency of the master, I never heard, until the noble Earl made that statement, one word on this subject. I was not aware that any such accusation had been made; but when I heard it, I requested a noble Friend to leave the House and endeavour to obtain the facts for me. He has just placed in my hands the following statement, which will, I think, place the conduct of the Admiralty in a very different light—

> "The Admiralty were informed by a naval officer that he distrusted the ability of the master who commanded the *Prince*, upon which an inquiry was instituted, and the directors of the steam-ship company under whom the master of the *Prince* had been employed declared they had the greatest confidence in him. The result of the inquiry being favourable to the master, he was continued in his command, but two naval officers were placed in the vessel—Commander Bayntun, as skilful an officer as is to be found in the service, and a lieutenant. Both of them were on board at the time of the accident."

I think, therefore, however deeply we may lament the loss of the *Prince*, that this House will not condemn the unfortunate officer who was in command of the vessel; still less will it condemn the Board of Admiralty, who appear to have taken every possible precaution, first, in ascertaining the character of the captain; and secondly, in endeavouring to obviate the possibility of accident by giving the commander the assistance of two naval officers.

Now, my Lords, before I conclude, I think I ought to remark that, from what the noble Earl has said, he appears to have lost sight of the power and strength of our Allies. He seems to have forgotten that we are not fighting alone, but that there is a large French army, and a considerable body of Turks. My Lords, we have, on the part of this country, done everything that we could to facilitate the operations of our Allies—and most rightly have we done so, for we owe to her generous confidence much of the assistance we have derived from France on every occasion. But the means of transport in the power of France being so much inferior to those possessed by this country, we are at this moment conveying 8,000, or, I believe, nearer 10,000 troops of the French army in British transports from Toulon to the Crimea. We have conveyed other French troops from other ports, and shall continue to render such assistance, feeling confident that in no way can the ships of this country or the money of this country be better applied than in assisting that gallant army to arrive at its destination to fight in the common cause to which we are committed.

I am really almost afraid to state what we have done, lest it should create—what the occasion forbids—a smile, when I mention the attempts which have been made in other ways by the Government to facilitate these operations and to assist our army. We have sent out increased means of conveying heavy guns and various stores which it has been found so difficult to carry up to the works, even during the dry season, and now, of course, much more difficult at this period of the year. We are sending out a complete railroad, stationary engines, and other appliances for the purpose of saving the physical exertion of the men, and allowing guns of large calibre to be carried to their positions, which otherwise, I believe, it would be impossible at this period of the year to do. I must, however, mention that we have not undertaken to carry this out ourselves. We are quite aware of the way in which Government undertakings sometimes fail in comparison with private enterprises. We have called in the assistance of most competent persons to carry this plan into effect. And now let me say to the country that the two gentlemen, Mr. Peto and Mr. Betts, who have undertaken the task, on my first proposing it to them, at once said, "Every exertion in our power shall be used—all our property which may be required, rails, engines, everything, shall be placed at your disposal. One condition alone we make; that is, that we shall not derive one farthing of profit from this affair in any way." They said, "It shall not be undertaken as a contract; we will act as your agents, and do everything for you, sending to the Treasury the bills which, under ordinary circumstances, would come to us." I feel bound in justice to make this statement; it is what might have been expected from the known character of those gentlemen; it is, moreover, only what we have met with daily in lower grades of life and among those of lesser means. I mention this to their honour, but also as a sample of the spirit and energy of the country. As Messrs. Peto and Betts, with large means, have acted, so, I am convinced, would act the humblest man in vindication of the cause he believes to be right, and for the support of those who fight for that cause.

My Lords, although I have seen this morning a document bearing the authentic stamp of the party of which the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) is the head, in which "the critical position of our affairs connected with the war" is mentioned—I refer to a circular addressed to Members of the Parliamentary Opposition—I say of these affairs I, for one, do not despair. Things may be at first critical, as they are, and as all affairs in the course of a war will be; but I hope none of your Lordships nor the country will believe for a moment that the Government is at all dispirited—that we have no expectation of success. But what is still more important, let not your Lordships for an instant imagine that these brave men, with the gallant General at their head, are at all dispirited or discouraged. If I had not already trespassed on your Lordships so long with dry details, painfully to myself, but not uselessly, although I am aware tediously, I should be unwilling on this occasion to attempt any elaborate eulogium on that gallant army. My Lords, I feel they are above all praise of mine. I believe the records of war do not show greater deeds of valour, greater constancy, greater endurance, greater patience under privation and suffering, and greater courage in the moment of action. The same, too, must be said in a different degree of the naval force. Without the assistance of our fleet the efforts of our army would have been in vain, and whatever assistance our fleet could give to aid the efficiency of our army has been cheerfully given. Times have been in the history of this country when there has existed a jealousy between the two services. Thank God it exists not at this moment. I trust it never will again. So far from jealousy, the navy has shown—I speak not of the admirals nor of the captains, but of every man on board the ships—so far from jealousy, their whole anxiety has been to assist in every way the sister service. They have known that the ships of Russia were not for them to assail; they knew that those ships were placed beyond their power by those who feared to come out to face them; they knew that in alliance with France they could, if an opportunity had been afforded, have added another page to the book of fame, and proved that they, captains or men, were not degenerated from their ancestors—that they were still rivals of the fame of the sailors of Nelson—they knew that every one of those Russian ships which are now either tilted over in the harbour in order to bring their guns to bear on the allied armies, or sunk at its mouth, would, if they had ventured upon the ocean, have become an honourable prize to them and their friend and ally. But, finding this opportunity of obtaining glory denied to them, the navy has lost no occasion of slaving and toiling for the assistance of the army. To them is owing the manner in which the army was embarked. To them is due the success of the disembarkation. Let me not pause here. To them it is owing that, after the battle of the Alma, when heaps of our wounded lay on the field for miles, and when the means of conveying them were not sufficient, the navy assisted to bring them to the ships, and treated those soldiers during their passage in the ships to the hospitals with that same tenderness which has distinguished them towards their comrades in cases of cholera, attending upon them with an interest and with a kindness which reflects immortal honour on the service. I rejoice to think the seamen and marines of the fleet have been enabled to join, notwithstanding, in the siege of Sebastopol, and on land and in the trenches they have shown they are as gallant and as determined as their ancestors ever were.

My Lords, let me say one word more with reference to our Ally. From the first moment of this great enterprise all fears of mutual distrust and mutual differences have disappeared, and the greatest concord and friendship have existed between Lord Raglan on the one side, and Marshal St. Arnaud, so long as he was spared to us, and since then with General Canrobert, on the other; and not only between the generals, but among the officers, and even the private soldiers, has this spirit been exhibited. Side by side they have fought; side by side they have passed the weary moments of disease; and I believe never, under any circumstances, have two nations, even between whom long years of amity had existed, shown more true concord, more true co-operation, than has been evinced by these gallant allies and friends. My Lords, we can now refer with some exultation to the observations which we have heard of late years—to those prophecies that the military character of this country had perished through the long peace; that the enjoyment of luxuries and refinements and the acquisition of wealth had so weakened our energy and reduced our power that when war should come we should succumb to the first attacks of an enemy, and that we could never again make head against a foe who had been trained under a more military system than ourselves. My Lords, I think we have shown that such is not the case—that luxury has not weakened the character of the aristocracy or the gentry of this country. I think we have proved that years of peace have not enervated the spirit of the other classes of the community—that instead of being enervated, they have been elevated by the knowledge and civilisation which have spread among them.

My Lords, the noble Earl made an eloquent reference to the losses which we have sustained in these dreadful battles. It has been my painful duty on more than one occasion to break the sad tidings of the loss to affectionate relatives—to those who were always watching for reports of those who were most dear to them; and I have no hesitation in saying I have felt as keenly as any one the publication of those *Gazettes* which carry grief to hundreds of homes in this country. This very day there has been a *Gazette* with a number of men mentioned whose relatives—mothers, sisters, wives—have been anxiously waiting for the last three weeks for tidings. If I do not dwell upon this subject it is not that I do not feel as keenly as any one—that I do not sympathise with those who now mourn their losses, but that even at this moment the impression should not go forth that there was any spirit of weakness in this country. I believe those who are bereaved of their relatives are proud that they have fallen gloriously in the service of their country. In alluding to the army I must not forget to mention the absence of crime among it, which has been remarkable; and I think that fact must give the highest satisfaction to those noble Lords and others who occupy seats in this House and elsewhere who, during the last twenty years, have devoted their attention to the amelioration of the condition of the soldier in all respects. I think the conduct of the men in this war has shown the wisdom of the course which had been taken. We now see that the old theory, that men who are unfit for any other vocation make the best soldiers—that men devoid of religion, of faith, and of honour are the best fighters—has been refuted. We have seen our men fight as men never fought before, and yet they have shown by their letters home and by their conduct in the camp that they are men endowed with the highest feelings of piety and religion—that they are men as little given to the commission of crime of any kind as any class of men in the kingdom. What has been their patience! We are frequently told that it is an Englishman's privilege to grumble. But it is we who grumble. It is we, who indulge in luxury and comforts at home, who are apt to grumble at little reverses and misfortunes. But what has been the conduct of these men, exposed as they have been to the chances of the climate, disease, and death? They have shown much enduring patience. Nothing can be more touching than the remark of a stalwart soldier, lying wounded in the hospital, on the arrival of the nurses —"This is indeed like England. Now we know our country cares for us poor wounded soldiers." That single reflection was a consolation to him for all he had undergone. Moreover, our soldiers had received such provocation as, thank God, no army before has received at the hands of any civilised enemy. This enemy which our men met, not content with the legitimate use of their weapons, had the barbarity—the atrocious villainy I will call it—to murder in cold blood the wounded soldiers as they lay helpless on the field; and not the ignorant serfs alone did that, but men holding the position of officers. Our men have had to fight the savage and uncivilised Kafirs, but in no instance have they experienced such barbarism as with the Russian soldiers. I believe that our men, influenced by a spirit of Christianity, have forborne to revenge themselves, and thus have shown themselves superior to the soldiers of him who is fighting, according to his own statement, as the special champion of Christianity.

I hope, before I quit this part of the subject, I may be allowed to say one word respecting my illustrious friend the Commander in Chief. Your Lordships have no conception of what that noble General has done. No one but one who has been in constant communication with him can form any adequate notion of his merits. I believe, highly as he is respected by the country, his merits will not be known until some future day, when not only his despatches, but his private letters, which at present are in my possession, and, of course, must for a long time remain there or with my family, are published. It would be almost insulting to speak of Lord Raglan's courage, for that he possesses with all his officers; but he has shown greater qualities than this; and a friend who has seen him on the field speaks of the "divine calm" which prevails in Lord Raglan's mind, whether under a shower of balls or when shocked by the news of such disasters as the wreck of our transports. It may be my duty on an early day to refer to the services of Lord Raglan, and therefore I shall say no more of them at present—but I could not avoid some slight allusion to them. The noble Earl opposite has put a question which he said might probably be beyond the province of a Member of this House, whether as we are now about rewarding the services of our army, and the admiration of our Sovereign has been expressed at their deeds, some expression of the admiration of our Sovereign and Her people for the army of our brave Ally should not be conveyed with it. I know not whether it be beyond the province of the noble Earl to make the suggestion, but it obliges me to make a statement. Her Majesty has not required the suggestion of anybody in the matter. A fortnight or three weeks ago I received Her Majesty's commands to convey privately to Lord Raglan Her intention to confer the Order of the Bath on General Canrobert, and to convey that determination either to the Ambassador of the Emperor of the French, or to the Emperor himself. The official notification has only been delayed because it was thought the compliment would be more highly appreciated if offered at the same time that it was conferred on our own gallant soldiers.

My Lords, the noble Earl has spoken—and I have more than once heard—of the resolution of this country to prosecute the war with energy. I am confident that that resolution exists. I look around me, and in every direction, and among all classes in this country, I see an ardent desire manifested for the energetic prosecution of the war—I see hardly a dissentient. In that country which we were once told never sympathised with us in any of our difficulties—I mean the sister country—we see the same feeling exhibited; and if we look to the Colonies, we find in each and all the most gratifying testimony of approval and support. We have lately received a most gratifying proof of the existence of this feeling in the Colonies, in the contributions to the Patriotic Fund, which have been forwarded from Canada; and I rejoice that these contributions were not remitted solely to this country, but that they were sent, in equal proportions, to France. That circumstance shows the complete union of the French and English population of Canada, and the complete identification of that Colony with the struggle in which we are engaged. The army have done their duty, and the country is prepared to do its duty likewise. The blood of our soldiers must not have been spilt in vain. I am not afraid that we shall suffer any harsh judgment for our acts. The people of this country are generous and just, and I can only say—and I say it with truth—that I for one rejoice in the pressure which is placed upon us from every part of the country and by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) and many noble Lords who may, perhaps, follow him in the course of this debate, because I see in it a proof that there is everywhere a determination to carry on this war with vigour, and that any exertions on our part to ensure that object will be seconded by the Parliament and the people. I am deeply sensible of my own personal position with respect to these matters. I am conscious that there are many who could better have undertaken the heavy duties which have devolved upon me. Often have I reflected upon the position which I, a civilian, have been called upon to occupy in carrying out the arduous operations of the war, and I have felt that, with the exception of my noble and gallant Friend on the cross-bench (Viscount Hardinge), there are at the present moment in this country, and in an official position, which entitles me to claim their opinions and advice, to assist and guide me, none of those experienced generals who learnt the art of war under that great man who has so lately departed. Those officers have gone into active service with the army, and we have therefore been placed under the greatest disadvantage with regard to the small amount of military experience in our military offices—with the single exception of my noble and gallant Friend the General Commanding in Chief (Viscount Hardinge)—which we have had to assist us. I can assure your Lordships that we have no object but success, and to attain that object we are determined to make every exertion. Reverses in war must come; we must expect them; and I feel confident that the country will not be dispirited by them. I will promise that they will not cause the Government to flinch. If reverses come, I believe that the country and the Government will alike be urged to fresh efforts. It is said that an English army never knows when it is beaten, and I am confident that if we should fail of complete success it will be found that that characteristic of our Army still exists.

I ought, before I sit down, to explain to your Lordships the objects for which Parliament has been called together, at this unusual period, for a short season. The noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) rightly anticipated that one of the measures which the Government are about to propose is a Bill to enable the militia regiments to volunteer for service abroad. The object of that measure will be obvious at once—namely, to enable us to remove to the seat of war those regiments which at present garrison Gibraltar, Malta, and the Ionian Islands. By such means I hope that in a very short time we shall be enabled considerably to strengthen the army under Lord Raglan. As that measure will be immediately laid before the House of Commons, and will, I hope, soon afterwards, come up to this House, I will not now enter into any further details upon the subject. I shall have the honour of laying upon the table of your Lordships' House a Bill to enable Her Majesty to drill and pay, within this country, foreign troops to a limited extent. Your Lordships are aware that, under existing Acts of Parliament, although we may pay foreign troops on foreign service, we cannot drill or train foreign troops in this country. We believe that, as in the last war, so on the present occasion, it is very important that the Government should have this power. It will only be necessary to give it to a limited extent, inasmuch as the forces so drilled and trained will be sent out from time to time to join our army in the East, and therefore the numbers under training in this country at one time need not be very considerable. Another measure, which, however, does not require the assent of Parliament, but which the Government have decided upon and have already commenced, it is right that I should mention to your Lordships. It is that of increasing the organisation of the army by adding four companies to each regiment of the army sent on foreign service, thus rendering the number of companies in each of those regiments sixteen. I will explain the object of this measure. In conducting a war at the distance of upwards of 3,000 miles from this country, of course very great inconvenience is felt in sending out reinforcements of all kinds; it is therefore most desirable that, for the future conduct of the war, we should have an army of reserve in some form or another, and the most fitting place for at least a portion of that reserve would, in our opinion, be Malta. I do not mean to say that we may not be obliged to resort to other places; but our general proposal is, that, while eight of the sixteen companies shall form the fighting companies, as at present, for foreign service, four companies shall be advanced from the depôt at home to the depôt of reserve at Malta or elsewhere, while four more companies remain, as at present, in depôt at home. There will be this further advantage in the plan—that whereas at present, as we have only four companies in depôt at home, both subalterns and men are necessarily sent out to the army at too early a period of their training, the four companies of reserve will insure a more efficient training, and render their services more valuable when they join the army. We propose, in adding these four companies to the battalions, that, with the view of encouraging enlistment from the militia, commissions should be given, one in each battalion, to militia officers, upon condition of their bringing a certain number of men with them from their regiments. I think noble Lords will see that this measure holds out considerable encouragement to enlistment, while at the same time it does not inflict any hardship upon the officers of the army. Another, although a small addition to the army, which we propose, is one of considerable importance in my estimation. We propose to add to the two Rifle Brigades, as they are now called, a third battalion to each. The Rifle Brigade at present consists of only two battalions, and the 60th Regiment of Rifles of two battalions. The value of that arm of the service has been shown in the present war, as well as upon former occasions; and we believe it will be very desirable to increase the force by one battalion each. Every effort has been made, and will continue to be made, to bring the greatest amount of force to bear. I sincerely trust that it will not be necessary to depart from that glory of England—the system of voluntary enlistment. We have resorted to various modes of enlistment, and of encouraging enlistment. My noble Friend the General Commanding in Chief has, with the consent of the Government, given to each battalion serving under Lord Raglan two officers' commissions for sergeants. One of these commissions was given after the battle of the Alma, and another has since been given. I believe this measure will prove a very considerable encouragement to the soldier. It is a system which I am confident will be generally approved and found to work well, notwithstanding that in some quarters, undoubtedly, prejudices still exist against it. Lord Raglan has also been empowered to grant good-service pensions to non-commissioned officers under his command; and I can only say that, in conjunction with my noble Friend (Viscount Hardinge), I shall make every exertion to increase the efficiency of the force.

My Lords, I must apologise for having trespassed at such length upon your Lordships' attention; but as the noble Earl opposite entered into all those points of reprehension of the Government which have been rife during the recess, I felt that it was my incumbent duty upon this, the earliest occasion, to give such explanations as might be in my power of the circumstances to which he has alluded here, and to which others have referred elsewhere. I have not endeavoured to extenuate faults, but, at the same time, I have endeavoured to lay before your Lordships what I believe to be a correct statement of the exertions which the Government has made. This, I am bound to say, that if blame attaches anywhere, it does not attach to any one of the army, officers or men, who are serving in the Crimea. I can assure your Lordships that, if we possess the confidence of Parliament, we will prosecute this war with a firm resolve and with unflinching perseverance. My Lords, I do not understand the phrase of "moderation" or of "moderate counsels" in war. I believe that any such counsels as counsels of moderation in war are counsels of imbecility. I have said that we will prosecute this war with firm resolve and with unflinching perseverance. While, on the one hand, we will not refuse to entertain overtures of peace, we shall not assent to any which are not only honourable but safe. My Lords, we place the fullest confidence in the armies; we trust with entire confidence in a noble people; and firm in the alliance and the friendship of a brave, a generous, and a powerful Ally, we have no fear of the issue of this contest; but, believing in the justice of our cause, and with a humble but firm confidence in Him who rules the fate and decides the destinies of nations, we have the highest hope of bringing the contest to a satisfactory issue. It is not for us to determine the time when it will be possible to close a war like this; but with these aids and assistance we confidently hope to bring the mighty contest to such an issue as may assure for a series of years the repose, the civilisation, and the prosperity of those countries of Europe which have been so unfortunately plunged into confusion by the pride and ambition of one aggressive Sovereign.

Earl GREY: My Lords, having been one of the very few of your Lordships who objected to the whole of that policy which has brought us into the present war, I think I should state upon this occasion that I cordially concur in the Address which has been proposed, and which I trust will be unanimously adopted. For though my opinion of the original impolicy of the war—I might use a much stronger word—is not altered, but confirmed by all that has since taken place, I thought from the first, and I think now, that, being once embarked in the contest—having once taken that line which, unfortunately, as I think, was chosen—there is no alternative but to carry on the struggle with the utmost energy and firmness. I therefore cordially join with your Lordships in voting the Address to Her Majesty, of which, if I rightly understand it, the main object is to pledge this House to second to the utmost of its power the efforts of the Government in carrying on the present contest. I am also glad to take this opportunity of saying that, while I deeply deplore all the misery which the war has carried into so many families, the waste of human life, and the employment for mutual destruction by Christian nations of those resources which might have been made to contribute so much to the general improvement and happiness of mankind, I still gladly acknowledge that, in the midst of all the evils of war, some good has undoubtedly arisen. I cannot but rejoice that, in the course of this contest, it has been proved to all the world that the British nation has not degenerated from its ancient courage. Tales had been circulated, both in this and in foreign countries, that we were so intent upon the arts of peace and the pursuit of wealth that, if the occasion called for it, we could not sacrifice that beloved wealth, or peril the lives which had been made easy and prosperous by the arts of peace, in carrying on any contest in which the nation embarked. It has been said, too, that the form of our Government would prevent the general union of the whole nation so as to put forth its strength in any struggle in which it might have the misfortune to engage. I am glad that, by this war, such idle and unfounded delusions have been dissipated; that it has been shown that our soldiers are not less, but, if possible, more, heroic than in former times; that the country, when, rightly or wrongly, it has believed that justice called it to enter into a quarrel, will put forth its strength without stint, and without regard to the sacrifices which the struggle may impose upon all ranks of the people; and that our free Government, instead of being an obstacle to the exertion of the full force of the nation, is, on the contrary, that which gives it double energy. I rejoice that all these things have been shown, because I believe that they afford no slight guarantee for the future tranquillity of the world, when the present contest shall have been brought to a close. I should now have sat down, were it not that, very unexpectedly to me, the whole policy of the Government, the whole manner in which the war has been conducted by Her Majesty's Ministers, has been so elaborately discussed by the noble Earl opposite and by the noble Duke at the head of the War Department, who followed him; and the noble Duke more especially, in the course of his speech, has expressed opinions which seem to me so erroneous that I feel it to be necessary—not to follow him in the long examination into which he entered as to all the acts and measures of the Government—but to make a few remarks upon some of the statements which have fallen from him. I think the noble Duke is entitled to credit for the candour with which he has admitted that mistakes have been committed by the Government in the conduct of the war. I, for one, should never have found fault with the Government for mistakes of detail. Every man of common intelligence must be aware that when the country had been so long at peace, and when, after forty years without experience of war, we are at once engaged in such a contest as is now going on, it was unavoidable that mistakes, and great mistakes, should be committed. I should not, therefore, think the Government liable to any great blame if they had only fallen into errors of detail; but when the noble Duke challenges the House, as he has done in his speech, to approve the general conduct of the war by Her Majesty's Government, I cannot help saying that I think your Lordships and the country have no right to be satisfied with it. I think there has been one great and fatal error which has run through the whole of their proceedings—the error well described by the noble Earl opposite, who said that everything had been done "too late." In comparing the speech of the noble Duke with the statement of the noble Earl opposite, it is impossible not to see that he has failed to rebut its main allegations; he has not been able to show that there are not good grounds for believing that in the first instance the Government were not aware of the magnitude of the task they had undertaken—that they did not consider sufficiently what would be the nature of the contest in which they were engaged, and that they did not, with that foresight and with that judgment which we ought to expect in the rulers of a great empire, form the general plans on which they were to act. Some observations which had fallen from the noble Duke have, I think, shown where the original error was. I was more than once struck, during the course of the noble Duke's speech, by his reference to the wars of former times. He said the Government had sent out to Sebastopol a battering-train of more than double the power which the Duke of Wellington had ever had under his command, and that there were means placed at the disposal of the commanders in the Crimea far beyond those which any British general had ever before possessed. The noble Duke said he had consulted with those who were experienced in war, and had met all they had pointed out as necessary. I fear that here is the noble Duke's error. He has looked at times past without considering how great are the changes which have taken place in the world in the course of the last half-century. Does he forget how greatly the country has increased in population since the time the Duke of Wellington conducted that memorable contest in the Peninsula? Does he forget that our increasing population is as nothing to our increasing wealth, and that even the increase of our national wealth is an inadequate measure of the great increase in our resources? When the Duke of Wellington was in Spain, steam power had not been successfully applied to ocean navigation. When the Duke of Wellington was in Spain, all those wonderful improvements in mechanical science which railroads have called into existence were entirely unknown. Science has since those days doubled, and trebled, and quadrupled the powers of man; and, under these circumstances, was it safe to follow the beaten track, and to apply, as the noble Duke says he has done, to professional men, who could tell him the provisions of former wars, who could point out to him what was done in former times, and call upon him to follow the example? A very different course should have been taken. All the resources of modern times should have been called into vigorous exercise. The Emperor of Russia, as the noble Earl has well said, has shown himself alive to those resources; and indeed, the noble Duke says he never gave the Emperor of Russia credit for being able to make those prodigious exertions he has done, and for being able to make in a fortnight a march which it was thought he could not accomplish in six weeks. It appears to me that throughout the war our measures have not been duly considered, and adopted in sufficient time; and there has been the great error. The noble Duke says he has applied to some gentlemen connected with railroads who are now going to send out labourers and all the materials for the construction of a railway from Balaklava, in order to provide greater facilities for carrying guns and stores to the army. Now, my Lords, is it not rather late in the day to commence this kind of work? and was not the idea an obvious one from the first? The Government surely knew that they had artillery and stores to carry up to positions where they could be employed against the town, and they also knew that on every railway in the kingdom science had discovered modes of economising labour, and of giving greater effect to works of this description. If these measures had been adopted earlier, let us consider for a moment what might have been the result. We all know what was our position at the battle of Inkerman. It is utterly impossible to describe adequately the merits of the soldiers engaged in that struggle, and to express our feelings as to the heroism with which they encountered the difficulties of that day; but, at the same time, our reflections are mixed with pain, and not unalloyed with indignation, that our troops should have been exposed to so arduous a contest with odds so much against them. They were contending with—I am afraid to say how many to one—five or six to one, at the very least; and had they been repulsed, and had that position been taken by the enormous army which Russia brought into the field, I firmly believe that the capture or destruction by the enemy of the whole allied army would have been the probable consequence. We were fighting for our very existence, and, by a miracle, the heroism of our troops, favoured by Providence, prevailed. But is it right that so great, so extreme a danger should have been incurred, and that the most valuable blood of the country should have been shed like water, under difficulties so great, and in circumstances in which success was so nearly impossible? When I passed through Newcastle on Saturday I was told that some of the steam colliers belonging to that port had just been taken up for the public service, and were then preparing to carry the workmen who were to be employed in constructing the railway at Balaklava. It seems, therefore, that they are going out now, in the middle of the month of December; but if they had been sent out earlier a great risk might have been escaped. Before the battle of Inkerman, we are told, the necessity for additional works of defence to strengthen the position attacked by the Russians had been seen, and that, in point of fact, the reason for not executing them was, that the troops were too hard pressed by their labours in the trenches—that their numbers were so small that they were already overworked; and it being therefore impossible to impose this additional task upon them, reliance was placed upon the natural strength of the ground. If the assistance which now, so late in the day, is being sent out had been at hand, the position might have been made so strong that the enemy would never have risked an attack upon it. Then, again, it was only a week or ten days ago that the first ships conveying wooden houses for the troops to winter in left the shores of this country, and as, at the very earliest, they cannot be put up before the middle or end of January, a considerable portion of the winter will have passed over by that time. Surely the wintering of the troops was a matter which might have been foreseen by the Government; for, even if Sebastopol had fallen, the probability was that the town would have been destroyed in the struggle, and that some place or other would be required in which to lodge the troops. Even if they should have been withdrawn from the Crimea altogether, it was extremely improbable that provision could be found for them in any place it might be desirable they should be taken to, and huts for the troops to winter in would still have been necessary for their health and comfort:—and, therefore, months ago there were no reasons why these measures should not have been adopted. The noble Earl opposite has referred to the fleet in the Baltic, as showing a general want of plan for the conduct of the war. I do not see that this charge has been at all answered, for though it may be true, and I dare say is so, that it was impossible that more should be effected there, surely, before it was determined to send so large a fleet to the Baltic, it should have been considered what it was to do when it got there. If upon deliberation it was held that a blockade of the Russian fleet was all that could be accomplished, a smaller force would have sufficed for this purpose, and then some of the means there uselessly employed would have been set free for other objects. There were many other objects to which the means wasted in the Baltic might have been applied with more advantage. For instance, instead of fitting out so much larger a fleet of ships of the line than was wanted in the Baltic, why were steam gunboats not built at an earlier period? I have heard many naval officers discuss the measures that have been taken, but I never heard one who did not say that the moment there was a question of carrying on war, either in the Baltic or the Black Sea, the first thing to be looked to was a large flotilla of steam gunboats. Now, it is true that steam gunboats have been built, but when? I believe it was not till the month of June that they were ordered, and though it was then shown that they can be built rapidly, they have been too late for the present season. The want of them should have been foreseen; and, the moment there was real cause to apprehend a quarrel, a large flotilla of steam gunboats should have been built, regardless of the expense, and despatched to where their services would have been of the most value. The importance of these gunboats cannot be overrated. For instance, if we are to judge from General Canrobert's despatch, the Russians have received considerable supplies from Asia, which have been conveyed across the Sea of Azoff. Our large ships cannot go into that sea; but if we had had forty or fifty gunboats, each mounting one gun of large calibre, the Sea of Azoff would have been effectually closed against Russia. What I feel is, that the whole subject has not been considered together; that a general scheme of the manner in which the war was to be conducted was not framed in the first instance, upon a careful review of all the information accessible to Government, and of all the circumstances of the country and the times in which we live. Instead of this having been done, if we look to the measures which have been adopted, we shall find great activity indeed in meeting wants when they are actually felt, but no foresight in providing against them beforehand—no anticipation of exigencies likely to arrive—and no taking of measures so that when the want arose the supply might be there. Instead of this, you first had to feel the want, and then to take measures to provide against it. There are some remarkable proofs of the absence of such a well-considered plan as would have ensured a uniformity of principle and consistency in all the operations of the war. Take one example. Some time ago Odessa was bombarded, but the batteries only were attacked, and it was said as a reason for sparing the town that it would be a dreadful thing to carry on war by a wanton destruction of private property; but in the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia a different principle has been adopted, and the Government has thought fit to sanction the destruction of private property, and to incur a risk far greater—namely, of arousing the hostility of a people whom it was their interest to conciliate. This was done because it was considered necessary to destroy the resources of an enemy in time of war; and, if that was a sound principle, was it not also equally sound to destroy the large resources and all the wealth that had been accumulated at Odessa? I have not the slightest doubt that the corn, and other stores at Odessa, were the very means which enabled the Emperor of Russia to carry his forces to the Crimea in a manner which has so much surprised her Majesty's Government. Though I feel it is assuredly a very dreadful thing to carry on war by destroying private property, still, I am afraid we cannot carry on war without it, and, when the expedition to the Crimea was despatched, I cannot understand why measures were not taken to prevent the resources then at Odessa from being made available to the Russians. After the Russians had sunk several of their ships in the mouth of the harbour of Sebastopol, our whole fleet was no longer of any real use off that port, but, by an attack upon Odessa, it might have made a most valuable diversion, which would have prevented our troops having so large a force to contend with. Having made these observations, I will only add that I really do not desire to criticise minutely and to point out all the faults which one might easily find in the conduct of the Government in the management of the war. All I wish is to show that there has been a want of foresight and judgment in some of their past operations, in order that they may be induced now to look a little further before them, and to take their measures accordingly. If they do this, it is all I desire from them, and my first wish would be to strengthen them as far as possible. This would certainly not be a proper opportunity for me to say a word with regard to the measures which are coming before us hereafter, and I have but one single observation to make on that part of the speech of the noble Duke. He says it has been determined by Government to reward the troops in the Crimea by giving to every battalion engaged one commission for each of the two battles of the Alma and Inkerman to non-commissioned officers. I entirely approve that determination, and I think it only fair and right to the non-commissioned officer. But it has hitherto been the custom, when sergeants have distinguished themselves, to give them ensigns' commissions, and that plan has not answered. I appeal to those who know the state of the Army, and who are acquainted with the manner in which the system of promoting non-commissioned officers has acted, to confirm what I say. A sergeant, when promoted, is required to live as an officer with the mere pay of an ensign, and, what is more—he is generally somewhat more advanced in life, has seen more service, knows more of the Army, and has been used to have more responsibility placed upon him than the ensigns of eighteen or nineteen with whom he is associated, who have no responsibility, and who, in fact, are only beginning to learn their profession. Therefore, seeing the manner in which the system of promotions hitherto carried out has acted, I trust the noble Duke, in giving to sergeants a well-merited reward for their conduct in the field, will depart from former precedent, and give them commissions as captains of regiments. By doing this a real and substantial reward will be given them; they will be placed in a position of respectability, and with it the means of supporting that position. To follow the old system will place them in a position which has led to the ruin of many, for I have known many instances of sergeants who have been promoted to ensigncies who have been ruined by their false position.

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL said, he thought Her Majesty's Government had no reason to complain of the tone and temper of the discussion which had taken place, and felt assured that the remarks which had been made upon the conduct of Government by the noble Earl opposite, and his noble Friend who had just sat down, evinced nothing of a factious spirit. His noble Friend (Earl Grey) said he was desirous of abstaining from entering into details, and wished only to notice general points in which a want of foresight had been exhibited. His noble Friend had, however, in his opinion, noticed nothing but details; and had entirely lost sight of the greater and more important features of the case, as it presented itself to the notice of the Government and of the country. The first point noticed by his noble Friend had reference to the intimation given by the noble Duke the Secretary for War that he had accepted the offer of a contractor for the formation of a railway between Balaklava and the camp of our army. His noble Friend asked if this was not a very obvious idea, and if it would not have been just as easy on the part of the Government to have provided for such a work long ago. Now, if Government had made any such provision at first, they would have been laughed at, and most deservedly too, for nothing but circumstances, which no human foresight could possibly have foreseen, could have rendered it possible that such a railway could be constructed. The fact of our army having landed at many miles distance from Sebastopol and the uncertainty of the direction of their operations after the landing should have been effected, showed at once how absurd it would have been to have contemplated any operation of such a nature. Nothing but the unforeseen circumstance of the flank march upon Balaklava, and of our having possession of the harbour there, could have rendered such an expedient possible. And, indeed, when we were in possession of Balaklava, he doubted whether by any aid the guns could have been placed in position earlier than in seventeen days, by which time they were actually employed. Another point of great importance, commented upon by both the noble Earls, was the preparations made for the despatch of the Baltic fleet. But there was one circumstance wholly kept out of sight by both. There was an old proverb, "Out of sight out of mind." Now, the Russian fleets had been so completely kept in their own harbours that everybody seemed disposed to forget that they existed. It ought to be remembered, however, that at the beginning of this war England was unprovided with a sufficient number of line-of-battle ships to meet the Russian fleet in the Baltic, and, consequently, if the Government had neglected to prepare men-of-war, and had devoted their attention to gunboats only, these would have been soon destroyed by the fire of the enemy's heavy ships. When our fleet first sailed to the Baltic the number of line-of-battle ships under Sir C. Napier did not exceed eighteen, while the Russians numbered twenty-seven; and so great was the disparity in number that he remembered a naval officer remarking that he supposed, of course, the Government counted upon a junction of a number of French ships. That junction, however, as their Lordships would remember, did not take place until some time afterwards. Although, then, it was a matter of obvious propriety to have both line-of-battle ships and gunboats for operations in the Baltic, yet the time of the Government was wholly occupied in preparing the former, in order to render the British fleet able to cope with that of the enemy; and had the labour in dockyards been diverted to the building gunboats they would not have been able to get the fleet ready for sea. The noble Earl, in his remarks on the forbearance of our navy at Odessa, had not been more fortunate. It might be a matter of opinion whether that town ought to have been destroyed, but his own impression was that if such a course had been taken the greatest possible damage would have been done to the Crimean expedition. There was good reason to believe that, although the newspapers of this country published at an early date that the expeditionary force was intended for the Crimea, the Russians did not believe we should be such fools as to publish our real intention to the world. They believed, on the contrary, that the expedition was meant for Odessa, and they congregated a large body of troops in its neighbourhood for the defence of that town, failing to send them to the Crimea. In this way the enemy were prevented from sending large reinforcements, which would have been long before on their march to Sebastopol had Odessa been attacked, as suggested. He declined altogether to go over the debates of last year in answer to the assertion of the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) that war ought to have been declared earlier. He could only express his own gratification that no stone had been left unturned to secure the great objects which this country had in view by a course of negotiation; but although war was not formally declared until the 27th March, still active preparations for both Army and Navy were going on previous to that date. With regard to the noble Earl's attack upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer's financial arrangements in March last, as merely contemplating the sending of 25,000 men to Malta, and bringing them back again, their Lordships must remember that those were but interim arrangements, and that the more complete estimates connected with the war were brought before the House at a later period of the Session. The noble Earl appeared to think that, the army of Omar Pacha having repulsed the Russians, the inactivity of our army at Varna was very highly to be deprecated, and that the expedition to the Crimea was, more or less, a mere afterthought. Their Lordships must, however, recollect that, although the winter campaign had been more or less a defensive one upon the part of the Russians, a few days before the declaration of war in this country the army of the Russians had assumed the offensive, had forced the line of the Danube, and had advanced almost to the fort of Kostendje. Omar Pacha expressed anxiety for the safety of Varna itself. Under these circumstances, looking at the insurrection in Greece, and to the manifestation of sympathy among the Christian inhabitants of Turkey in favour of Russia, he thought the Government was justified in sending out the troops with a view, in the first instance, to the defence of the line of the Balkan. If the troops had been sent in the first instance to Sebastopol, such a course could not have failed to be considered in the highest degree rash. He believed that, in spite of the brave defence made by the Turkish garrison of Silistria, that place would have fallen before the repeated attacks of the Russians unless our army had been at Varna, giving the Turks the moral support of their presence, and unless certain arrangements had taken place with Austria, which he believed had had a material effect upon that portion of the campaign. As to the occupation of the Principalities by Austria, a very erroneous idea prevailed in this country with regard to it. The noble Earl opposite forgot that the convention between Austria and the Porte was entered into on the 14th of June, several days before the final assault on Silistria failed, and he could not doubt for a moment that considerable effect was produced on the Russian armies in the Principalities by the fact of that treaty having been concluded. The siege of Silistria, be it remembered, lasted upwards of two months; during that period Omar Pacha had a large force concentrated at Shumla, yet prudently declined a battle — a fact which proved that he did not consider his army able to contend alone with the Russian forces. If, therefore, the allied army had gone at once to the Crimea, it was by no means improbable that Omar Pacha would have been overwhelmed by the superior forces and superior numbers of the enemy. It was evident, indeed, looking to all the circumstances, that the Government could not have undertaken the expedition to the Crimea until the siege of Silistria was raised. As to the treaty with Austria, on which the noble Earl commented, it had always appeared to him (the Duke of Argyll) that there were two great general views, one of which we must take, of this war. There was the view, which he was sure not one of their Lordships held, that the object of this war was some such vague one as had been mentioned on various platforms out of doors—some object of warring against despotic Governments, and of supporting what were called "oppressed nationalities." But if their Lordships did not adopt this view, they must heartily embrace the other—namely, that the only and single object of the war was to resist the progress of the dominion of Russia in the east of Europe, and that we must pursue that object in an unselfish spirit, as one in which the interests of all the rest of Europe were immediately concerned. He contended we ought to urge this object of the war on the existing Governments of Europe, and that we ought not to be discouraged in our efforts by any amount of reluctance or slowness of which otherwise we might have a right to complain. That was the course which the Government had pursued, and he thought it was a wise course; and though, perhaps, he was disposed to agree with those who thought the policy of Austria might have been better if a more frank and open part had been taken at an earlier period of the contest, yet he thought we were bound to let other nations judge for themselves of their own interest, and that we should not meanwhile use towards them the language of distrust and suspicion. He trusted that the measures of the Government in this direction would at last be crowned with a very considerable degree of success. The noble Earl (Earl Grey) had begun his speech by declaring that nothing which had occurred had shaken his original opinion of the impolicy of the war. Now, he (the Duke of Argyll) must express the very different impression which he had received from watching the progress of events during the last few months. He was convinced that if ever there was a war of European interest—if ever there was a war which was above all things in the interest of those Powers connected with the east of Europe—this was that war. This, too, was evidently the conviction of the Powers in question; but, notwithstanding, they were lagging behind us in the honourable course of asserting the independence of Europe and resisting the aggression of Russia. Why were they so lagging? Did it not prove that there existed that overweening influence on the part of Russia which his noble Friend was disposed to deny? He confessed that the impression he derived was that the fear of that Power was in every Cabinet, and was oppressing all the Courts of Europe. The day, however, had now come when a united stand ought to be made against her oppressions, and it was the duty and privilege of the two great Western Powers to take the lead in that great contest. So far, therefore, from being shaken in the least as regarded the justice and expediency of the war, the first of which not even the noble Earl had impugned, he was confirmed—and he believed, with some few exceptions, the people of this country were confirmed—in the belief that this was a war not only of justice, but of expediency.

THE EARL OF HARDWICKE thought that the result of the discussion in which they were engaged had been to leave their Lordships very much in the same position as they had been at its commencement—namely, to leave undisturbed the opinion that at the outset of the present contest the Government were not prepared to carry it out to the great extent which the occasion demanded. His noble Friend the noble Duke opposite had, indeed, made the admission that there had been considerable shortcomings upon the part of Her

Majesty's Ministers, and, among other things, had informed the House that when the war in which we were involved had been entered into, the invasion of the Russian dominions constituted a portion of the design which the Government had in view in its prosecution. Well, but if that were the case, was not he (the Earl of Hardwicke) justified in saying that Ministers had made no adequate preparation for the attainment of the great object which they professed to have in view? But it appeared that when the design of invading Russia was formed, the Government were of opinion that the Russian forces in the Crimea could not have been reinforced with such rapidity as was actually the case. Now, that was an important admission and one which showed that the Government had not obtained sufficient information upon a point of considerable importance. They ought to have been aware that the Russian army in the Principalities having been set at liberty by the intervention of Austria, might, without difficulty, turn themselves to the prosecution of any operations which they might think fit. The greater portion of that army, thus released from the necessity of carrying on a contest with the Turkish forces, were in fact within twenty days march of the Crimea; and yet Her Majesty's Ministers had no idea that the troops in that quarter could be speedily reinforced. It might be true, as the noble Duke had stated, that upon no former occasion had so large an army been sent out for the purpose of military operations, as that which had lately been sent to the East. Such might have been the case; yet larger reserves had invariably been collected upon previous occasions than had been maintained in the present instance. He had risen principally to thank the noble Duke for having said a word in favour of the navy; for though the term "forces" was used, it was generally thought that the term applied to the army in the Crimea, and not to the navy. The noble Duke had done justice to the navy in the Black Sea, and he (the Earl of Hardwicke) begged to differ from his noble Friend near him (the Earl of Derby) in the opinion he entertained of the Baltic fleet. The noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) had stated that gunboats alone would have been of no use in the Baltic; but he (the Earl of Hardwicke) would remind the noble Duke that between Cronstadt and St. Petersburg there was a flat of water ten or twelve miles long, about nine miles in breadth, and five feet deep; and he thought that a squadron of gunboats would have operated with great effect on Cronstadt, and even upon St. Petersburg. It would be too late next year for any operation of that sort. For himself, he never expected that Sir Charles Napier would attempt to deal with the strong fortresses of Cronstadt and St. Petersburg; but he knew well that if the Admiral met the Russian fleet in the open sea, he would have given an account of them. He was not one of those who thought that wooden ships could have any great success against stone walls and casemated batteries. He absolved his gallant Friend who commanded the Baltic fleet from anything like misconduct or neglect; but, on the contrary, he thought that he had very ably conducted our fleet without disaster, and believed that if he had attempted any attack upon the stronghold, disaster was likely to have ensued. If he had any fault to find with his gallant Friend it was that there had been rather too much jollifying before he went out, so that the public had been led to believe that something great was to be done. In the failure of the attack by the fleet on Sebastopol, Sir Charles Napier had a complete answer to any remarks that might be made on his conduct. Having said this much on that point, he wished now to ask what they were fighting for—what was the object of the war? The original object was to drive the Russians out of Turkey, and to keep them out; but by the invasion of the enemy's country and the attack upon Sebastopol, the character of the war had been entirely changed. The liberties of Europe were not now invaded, for the Emperor of Russia had been driven out of Wallachia and Moldavia, and was confined to his own territories. He wished success to our arms for the honour of the country; but in his opinion, even if Sebastopol were taken, they would be further from peace than they were now. They might hold the Crimea as a material guarantee, and blockade the Russian ports. But could they do it long? He did not think they could. They might depend upon it, that by and by the taxpayers of this country would seek to be told for what purpose the war was carried on. By permitting the Emperor of Russia to cross the Pruth and occupy the Danubian provinces they had committed him with his own subjects. His own opinion was, that they would have more difficulty in making peace than they imagined, unless they distinctly stated what their object was in detail. Not one word had been said by the Government with respect to the treaty with Austria, of which they were called upon to express their approval. He protested against being called upon to agree to an Address pledging the House to agree with what they knew nothing. If the Government were going to enter into a bargain with Austria to support her in Poland, Italy, and Hungary, in consideration of the support she was about to give France and us in this war, they might be assured that the people of this country would not for a moment support any such bargain.

The Earl of CARLISLE said, he wished to make a few observations with regard to the present position and prospects of the war. But, in the first place, he wished to say that he agreed most cordially with all that had been said as to the admirable conduct, the brilliant valour, and steady devotedness, which had distinguished both the naval and military service, and the army more especially, because upon it had devolved the greater share of the labour. It had been reserved for them, in connection with our gallant ally, to exhibit to the world some of the most distinguished excellences which had marked different epochs in the world's history—the steady devotion of the heroes of antiquity—the isolated daring of the days of chivalry—in combination with the resources of modern science and skill. In common with the people of this country, he thought it could not be denied that we had a just cause of quarrel in this war; but he would not say that he had so clear a conviction of its necessity, and he had felt that the tone prevalent in the expression of public opinion at the commencement partook too much of what he called swagger, and too overweening a confidence in the certainty of success. Feeling, however, that they were now embarked in a war which could not be said to have been undertaken from either ungenerous or self-interested motives, he thought it must be the wish of them all that while it lasted it should be carried on with all possible vigour, in order to ensure at the earliest moment an honourable and durable peace. The spirit and energy of the country were heart and soul in sympathy with the brave defenders of our cause. There was no danger of any Ministry that could exist in the country now failing either in vigour or constancy in supporting to the utmost of its power our gallant forces, nor was there the least danger of the Government assenting to any conditions inconsistent with the honour and credit of this country and of its allies. He hoped the Government would bear in mind that, though a portion of the public of this country might put itself forward to discourage any notion of peace, except upon extreme conditions and subversive bases, they might depend upon it that the calm, sober, reflecting, conscientious feeling of the country would be ultimately—he believed at once—with those who, on the indispensable conditions of the terms of peace being fair, safe, and honourable, should attain them at the earliest possible period. He believed that the Government, now that they were upon the alert, would carry on the war with all possible vigour.

The Earl of ABERDEEN: My Lords, I should be sorry to detain your Lordships at this late hour for any length of time, but I wish to advert to some expressions which have fallen from the noble and gallant Earl opposite (the Earl of Hardwicke), and to refer to an objection taken by a noble Earl who spoke earlier (the Earl of Derby) to an expression in the Address. The noble and gallant Earl said, that this war was undertaken in defence of the liberty of the Turkish empire; but, he added, you have changed the whole character of the war, and this expedition to Sebastopol has removed you from the possibility of obtaining what you desire. Now, I humbly beg to remind the noble Earl that if there be one point more than another more vital to the safety and independence of the Turkish empire, and more clearly injurious to the power of Russia, it is the destruction of the fortress of Sebastopol. Therefore having driven the Russians out of the Principalities, the next direct object of the war, which everybody must have had in view from its very commencement, and from which we could only have been restrained by a doubt of its practicability, was an attack upon and destruction of Sebastopol. Notwithstanding the mistake in the eager desire and expectation with which this country viewed the first landing in the Crimea and its immediate consequences—a mistake in which all Europe shared at the time—still I think that there are good grounds to hope that success will attend our efforts. I totally disagree from the noble Earl in thinking that the prospect of peace wil be diminished by that success. Quite the contrary; I feel satisfied that nothing could contribute so much to the probability of obtaining those terms of peace which my noble Friend near me (the Earl of Carlisle) has alluded to as the signal success which I hope we may achieve in this undertaking. The noble Earl also referred to the mention of the treaty with Austria in the Speech, and said that he was unwilling to express satisfaction at a treaty of the contents of which he was ignorant, and which might bind us to terms of a highly objectionable nature, such as would not be sanctioned by the people of this country; and he talked of our supporting Austria in Italy, Poland, and Hungary, and denounced any such object as a part of that engagement. The noble Earl may make himself perfectly easy upon that score, as no engagement of such a description either exists or ever entered into our minds. It is unnecessary, however, to say this, as I presume that your Lordships do not think it possible that we should have made such an engagement. But the noble Earl who spoke early in the evening (the Earl of Derby) did not, I think, correctly understand the import of the sentence in the Address to which he objected. We do not propose that the House should express any satisfaction with the treaty. We propose only that the House should "learn with satisfaction" that Her Majesty has made a treaty from which She anticipates important advantages. That is all the satisfaction. It is not that we are "satisfied" until we know what it is, but that we "learn with satisfaction" that the Queen has entered into a treaty from which She anticipates advantage. Now, my Lords, I think that you may safely express as much satisfaction as that without committing yourselves to a particle of satisfaction with the treaty itself.

THE EARL OF DERBY: The phrase, as interpreted, then, is, that we are exceedingly glad that Her Majesty and Her Majesty's advisers approve of the treaty which they have made.

Motion *agreed to, Nemine Dissentiente;* and a Committee was appointed to prepare the Address: The Committee withdrew; and, after some Time, Report was made of an Address drawn by them, which, being read, was *agreed to,* and Ordered to be presented to Her Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.

House adjourned to *Thursday* next.

The Earl of Aberdeen

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Tuesday, December 12, 1854.

MINUTES.] NEW WRITS (*during Recess*).—For King's Lynn Borough, *v.* Robert Jocelyn, esq., commonly called Viscount Jocelyn, deceased; for Wigan Borough, *v.* Ralph Anthony Thicknesse, esq., deceased; for Forfar County, *v.* Lieutenant Colonel Lauderdale Maule, commonly called the Honourable Lauderdale Maule, deceased; for Frome Borough, *v.* Lieutenant Colonel Robert Edward Boyle, commonly called the Honourable Robert Edward Boyle, deceased; for Limerick City, *v.* Robert Potter, esq., deceased; for Coventry City, *v.* Charles Geach, esq., deceased; for Bedford Borough, *v.* Henry Stuart, esq., deceased; for Abingdon Borough, *v.* Montagu Bertie, esq., commonly called Lord Norreys, now Earl of Abingdon, called to the House of Peers.

NEW MEMBERS SWORN.—For Forfar County, Viscount Duncan; for Wigan, Joseph Acton, esq.; for Kingston upon Hull, William Henry Watson, esq.; for Canterbury, Right. Hon. Sir William Meredith Somerville, bt.; for Kingston upon Hull, William Digby Seymour, esq.; for Cambridge Borough, Francis Mowatt, esq.; for Marylebone, Right Hon. Sir Benjamin Hall, bt.; for Maldon, John Bramley Moore, esq.; for Cambridge Borough, Robert Alexander Shafto Adair, esq.; for Bedford Borough, William Stuart, esq.; for King's Lynn, John Henry Gurney, esq.; for Frome, Viscount Dungarvan; for Limerick City, James O'Brien, esq.; for Coventry, Sir Joseph Paxton.

NEW WRITS (*now Ordered*).—For Marylebone, *v.* Lord Dudley Coutts Stuart, deceased; for Limerick County, *v.* Wyndham Goold, esq., deceased; for Ayr County, *v.* James Hunter Blair, esq., deceased; for Antrim County, *v.* Edward Pakenham, esq., deceased; for Fermanagh County, *v.* Sir Arthur Brinsley Brooke, bt., deceased; for Gloucester County (Eastern Division) Sir Michael Hicks Hicks Beach, bt., deceased.

PUBLIC BILL.—1° Outlawries.

THE QUEEN'S SPEECH.

Message to attend HER MAJESTY: the House went; and being returned—

MR. SPEAKER *reported,* that the House had that day been to the House of Lords, when Her Majesty was pleased to make a most gracious Speech to both Houses of Parliament; and that for the sake of greater accuracy, he had procured a copy thereof.

The right hon. Gentleman then read the Speech to the House.

THE ADDRESS IN ANSWER TO THE SPEECH.

MR. H. HERBERT: Sir, in rising to move that a humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, in answer to Her Most Gracious Speech, I am unable to urge the appeal which is often put forward by Members standing in the position which I do, of having never addressed the House before, inasmuch as on several occasions I have had to acknowledge with gratitude the indulgence and forbearance of the House. But I trust I may be permitted to remind the House that on those occasions to which I refer, I have confined myself to those discussions which affected the social condition of that part of the United Kingdom with which I am more immediately connected, and with which, from previous habits, I might be supposed to be better acquainted; but I have left to others the discussion of those larger and more important questions to which I have felt they were more fitted to do justice. I trust, therefore, that the House will believe me when I say, with all sincerity, that I feel no one ever yet asked the indulgence of the House who had greater need of it than the individual who now addresses it. I am sure the House will have heard with pleasure at a period when we are engaged in a fearful contest with an adversary of tremendous power, that Her Majesty has been able to contract a treaty which will draw closer those bonds which unite us to our Transatlantic brethren. I am sure, also, the House will respond to the sentiment expressed, that when measures shall be introduced bearing on the social condition of this country, hon. Gentlemen will endeavour to abstract their minds from the all-engrossing topic which now occupies their whole attention, in order to give those measures full and fair consideration. Sir, there is one topic which is alluded to in Her Majesty's gracious speech—a topic which absorbs the mind of every man, woman, and child in these dominions. I allude, of course, to the war. In asking from the House permission to make a few remarks on this important subject, I feel that I labour under great and peculiar difficulties; inasmuch as, in order to arrive at a fair appreciation of the position in which we now stand, it will be absolutely necessary for me to take a short glance at some of the more prominent events of the war. I can appeal to the experience of every hon. Member how, in the intense anxiety with which we look forward to intelligence, and in our anxiety for the future—how little of interest are the details of the past. Yet it is absolutely necessary that I should ask your permission to refer to them. And in making a retrospect, I think I may say in the outset, that the country has ample cause to congratulate itself on the important results that have already been attained, as well as the splendid success of our arms. In making that assertion I hope I may not be misunderstood—I hope I may not be understood to undervalue the great sacrifices that have been made—I hope I may not be understood not to lament the loss of those brave soldiers who have fallen so gallantly in battle—I hope I may not be understood not to appreciate the loss of those sailors who have recently found a grave in the stormy waters of the Euxine—I hope I may not be understood not to sympathise deeply with those who are now lamenting the decease of those who were near and dear to them. I believe that we are able to offer to these last this—the greatest worldly consolation—that their country not only appreciates their bravery and devotion, but can say that the sacrifices that have been made have not been made in vain. It was on the 27th of last March that Her Majesty informed us of the failure of her constant and patriotic endeavours to secure to Her subjects and to Europe the blessings of peace. It is not my intention to make any allusion to what preceded that period—there were ample discussions upon it in this House and out of it, and I feel, therefore, that it would be impossible for me to enlist the attention of the House, even if it were necessary—which I do not consider it is—to enter into any detail of the negotiations which preceded the war. But what was the position of affairs when Her Majesty made the announcement to Parliament to which I have referred? War had commenced. The winter had been passed in a series of skirmishes between the Russians and the Turks. It was perfectly true that the Turks had shown a degree of energy for which we were little prepared; it was perfectly true that Oltenitza and Citate could bear witness that, if properly led, and under circumstances suited to their military character, they had in no way degenerated from the valour of their ancestors; but, Sir, I believe that there were few who were sanguine enough to think that those efforts could be protracted for any lengthened period. I believe there were few who would have ventured to assert, notwithstanding the successes of the Turks, that they would be able to meet their gigantic antagonist in the open field, and that the result of a regular campaign would not be most disastrous to their arms. In the month of February previous, Sir John Burgoyne had been sent to Constantinople. I believe I speak the sentiment of the House when I say, that an abler officer, and a man more capable of forming a sound opinion on the actual state of affairs, does not exist than Sir John Burgoyne. He went in conjunction with a distinguished French officer of engineers, and he had there the benefit of constant communication with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, a man probably more able to form a just estimate of those matters than any man alive. He had also the benefit of the assistance of Mr. Colquhoun, our Consul at Bucharest, who was then getting the best possible information with regard to the resources of the enemy, and the forces he was likely to bring into the war. Well, this was the result that Sir John Burgoyne came to—not that we should be in a position to make an offensive movement upon the Danube, but that our first and principal effort must be to defend the Dardanelles and Constantinople. It was supposed that the Russians were advancing with at least 200,000 men, and he came to the conclusion, that the first move that we might expect would be the advance of the Russians over the Balkan, and their reappearance at Adrianople. The Russians passed the Danube on the 27th of March. Our troops were in the meantime sent out. They first went, as the House is well aware, to Gallipoli, where energetic preparations were made to resist the enemy if he should arrive so far. Silistria was besieged; and who, at that time, could have predicted that a third-rate fortress could have resisted successfully the armies of Russia? But, Sir, the gallantry of an Englishman, the gallantry of the brave Butler, now, unhappily, no more—added to the warlike character of the Turks, which some had been accustomed to decry, commanded, as it were, by him, although not officially, was able to stop the whole of the Russian army. In the meantime our forces were ready to advance, and although the enemy retreated without our being able to strike a blow, yet who can doubt that the moral effect was produced? Who can doubt that the presence of the Anglo-French army at Varna had a moral effect on the resistance of the Turks at Silistria? Well, about the time that our army was preparing to march, the Russians retreated. And I think it fortunate that the advice of some who advocated the immediate advance of our troops into the Dobrudscha was not complied with. When I recollect the great mortality at Varna in consequence of the mysterious dispensation of Providence, our troops being attacked by a frightful disease, I cannot help thinking that we have reason to be thankful that the fell disease attacked them when it did, instead of when they were engaged in the pestilential marshes of the Dobrudscha. Well, Sir, threatened on the one hand by Austria, and on the other by the Anglo-French army, the Russians retreated. The campaign, which had been ostentatiously begun by the declaration of the Emperor of Russia, that he was marching in defence of the orthodox faith—which could mean nothing else than that he was going to Constantinople—the campaign, which began by crossing the Danube, ended with the Russians retreating across that river, and behind the Pruth. And thus, without a blow being struck, without a man being lost in actual combat with the enemy—although we deplore the loss of a great many from the attacks of a more terrible enemy—yet without a blow by the enemy, the first and immediate object of the campaign was attained. The Emperor of Russia was forced by the pressure of circumstances to do that which he had refused to moderate remonstrances, namely, to give up those provinces that he had so unjustly seized; and the Anglo-French army was sent forth to prosecute the second and not less important portion of its destiny, namely, to obtain—and we may thank the enemy for the phrase—a material guarantee against these aggressions of Russia being renewed. I may now be permitted to glance very shortly at our naval operations. I am very well aware that there are some who perhaps in some degree are disappointed that the countrymen of Nelson, and of those heroes whose exploits adorn our naval annals, have fought no great battle, that the recital of no brilliant results have been added to the already brilliant chronicle. But, Sir, we must remember that on former occasions when those great battles were fought, we had an enemy to deal with who did not skulk behind impregnable fortresses—who never refused to meet us in the field, with whom it was an honour to be allowed to cross arms—who, in many a well-fought engagement, gave us proofs of his valour, devotion, and skill. We are apt to forget, in the remembrance of those brilliant victories, of which we are all so justly proud, the long period of time that intervened between them, the long period over which they were extended—we are apt to forget the blockades and the hardships that were endured before any of those great results were accomplished. And we are also apt, I am sorry to say, to underrate the services that have been performed. I may fairly ask, is it nothing for our sailors to have navigated with success in dangerous seas—is it nothing to have swept the flag of our enemy from the seas, and to have offered him combat in those waters which he was accustomed to call Russian lakes? Is that service nothing which has enabled our commerce to continue undisturbed—which has enabled Her Majesty this day to inform us that she views with satisfaction the general prosperity of the country? Is it nothing that our flag should be as safe now with a war raging as it has been in time of profound peace? Is it nothing that an unarmed pleasure yacht should be enabled to navigate the waters almost within range of the guns of Cronstadt, and that another should depart with perfect safety, laden with necessaries for our troops in the Crimea, and land them within a few miles of the great fortress of Sebastopol? Nor can I quit this subject without congratulating the House upon the attitude which has been assumed by our sailors during this war. Almost as far back as I can remember prophecies have been made with regard to the impossibility of manning our fleets. It was prophesied that whenever a war should break out, it would be found necessary to resort to the press-gang. But what has really been the case? In time of peace our sailors may have been unwilling to join the fleet, and there may, perhaps, have been some difficulty in manning the ships; but the instant danger menaced their country, there they were as ready as of old to maintain the honour of their native land. But to return to Varna, where I left our troops. We know that the greatest possible difficulties were experienced, and that much time was necessarily spent in making those gigantic preparations essential for the expedition in which we were about to engage; but at last everything was ready for the expedition to the Crimea: in the midst of disease, and under the greatest possible difficulties, the army was got into a state of preparation for that memorable expedition. On the 3rd of September the allied forces left Varna, and in eleven days they landed at Old Fort. Not having myself any military experience or knowledge, it would be presumptuous in me to criticise the instructions which Lord Raglan issued to the forces on their embarkation; but I think that the most ignorant amongst us could hardly read those instructions without being convinced that in Lord Raglan we had a commander in whom the country might repose every confidence—a commander who both inherited the hereditary gallantry of his race, and who was gifted with a prudence, a discretion, and a foresight, which would command success, if success were possible, and which were worthy of that great school in which he had been trained to arms. On the 20th of September was fought the memorable battle of the Alma—a battle memorable, not only for the valour displayed by the allied forces, but for the fact that it was the first occasion in modern history on which French and English soldiers had fought together. In many a painful field had they learned to respect each other's valour, but never before, in modern times, had they fought side by side; and I trust that that battle set a seal upon that alliance which, if it shall continue, as I trust in God it may, will be the best guarantee for the peace of Europe, and against the aggressions of any one Power upon the people of another country. I will pass over shortly, because I feel it impossible to do them justice, the details of the famous flank movement of the Allies after the battle of the Alma, and I will remind you that great difficulties were experienced in getting up the guns necessary for the siege of Sebastopol; but on the 17th of October the first shot was fired; and it soon became evident that the difficulties which the allied forces would have to encounter had hardly been foreseen by the commanders. On the 25th of October occurred the battle of Balaklava. I shall not enter into the details of that day. It is a mournful subject for us to consider. It was a mournful day for England—that day on which the gallant light cavalry brigade rode to their death. But if a mournful day, it is also a day to which we may look with pride—for I believe there is not an Englishman who would not feel proud of being the countryman of but one of those heroes. I believe there is not a parent who mourns the loss of a son on that ensanguined field, who, when time shall have dulled the first poignancy of his grief, will not, as he wipes away a tear and checks the rising sob, say with feelings of pride, "My boy was one of those 600 brave men who rode to death that day." Well, Sir, the siege progressed. On the 5th of November was fought the memorable battle of Inkerman. On that occasion 8,000 of our countrymen, who were alone engaged, well and bravely sustained the honour of old England. Well and bravely did they maintain the reputation of that Army that never knows when it is beaten. Since that time it must be allowed that we have been unable to prosecute the siege operations with the same vigour as before. The Russian flag, according to the latest advices, still floats over Sebastopol; and it may be frankly admitted—though I make the avowal without any official authority—that both the Government at home and the allied commanders abroad underrated the difficulties they had to encounter, and were not sufficiently aware of the great resources which our enemy would have at his command. I will not ask if that is any reason why we should relax in our endeavours, or why the House should refuse to the Government those supplies which are necessary to carry on the campaign with vigour. I will not do so, first, because I think it is a question unworthy to be put to a British House of Commons; and, secondly, because it is a question which has already been loudly and distinctly answered by the unanimous voice of the British people. Never, Sir, in our history, has there been such unanimity displayed; never has the spirit of our people been so roused. Does a want occur, instantly a subscription is made to supply it. Are our soldiers supposed to suffer privations, either in the hospitals or in the field, instantly a thousand hands are stretched out to supply that need. I am sure—I most firmly believe—that on no occasion has there been such unanimity. As an Irish Member, I may be permitted to congratulate the House on the state of Ireland at this particular moment. Sir, it was no novelty that Ireland should fill your ranks with soldiers who, to use the words of a leading journal, "Never in the hour of danger were craven or untrue." It was nothing new that the shout of the Connaught Rangers should mingle with the cry of the Cameronians; or that the Enniskilleners should charge side by side with the Scots Greys. But, Sir, there have been periods in our history when an English Minister would have hesitated to withdraw troops from Ireland—there have been times when it would not have been safe to have done so. Those times, I hope, are passed for ever away. I have recently come over from Ireland, and I can bear my testimony to the patriotic spirit which animates every class of my countrymen. I have seen persons of different creeds and of different parties vieing with each other in patriotic efforts to respond to the appeal which has been made to them by Her Majesty. I believe, Sir, that your hopes are our hopes—your sympathies our sympathies—and I trust I may soon add, your triumphs our triumphs. If such, then, is the state of things at home, what is the state of things abroad? We are in alliance with the bravest and most powerful nation in Europe. In conjunction with our gallant Ally, we have established a position which I believe to be impregnable, and from which, indeed, it would be an insult to our troops, who have held it against such odds, to fear that, with the reinforcements they are receiving, they will not be able further to maintain it until the great object of our hopes and desires shall have been attained. We have obtained a position, moreover, into which we shall be able to throw any quantity of ammunition, or of such supplies as may be necessary to mitigate the calamities of war. Her Majesty has informed us that she has concluded a treaty of alliance with Austria, and that that treaty will shortly be laid upon the table. Until the details of that treaty shall have been laid before us, it would be quite presumptuous in me to attempt to discuss them; but I may say this—that if we had learned that Austria had concluded a treaty with our enemy, we should, no doubt, have considered it as a fearful disadvantage, and it would have been received by us as a severe blow. I think, therefore, that I am not asserting too much, even without knowing anything of the details of the treaty, when I say, that we may consider we have gained a very considerable advantage. But, Sir, what is now the condition of our enemy? He is left with the unanimous public opinion of Europe against him; his flag has been swept from those seas which he has been accustomed to call Russian lakes, and even in Asia he has been unable to resume the offensive, for after gaining a victory he was so weak that he has been obliged to continue on the defensive. Still it is necessary that we should not underrate our antagonist. That great and ponderous machine may be slow in its movements and not easy to move; but we do not know how severe a blow it may be able to give. It, therefore, behoves us to take every measure and to strain every nerve to forward the great object we have in view. I would appeal to the House whether this is a period for any man, however much he may differ from the Government upon the details of the war, or with regard to some of the objects that might have been gained, and that have not been gained—whether this is a period at which to indulge in any party attacks, or whether all these minor differences of opinion ought not rather to be merged in a desire to support the Government in those great operations which we are carrying on? Sir, I hope that this appeal may be responded to; and that on this occasion all may show our enemy that he has made war not upon this Government or upon this party of Englishmen, but upon the whole English people. Let us show our foe that, regardless of danger and expense, we will prosecute the great enterprise in which we are engaged. Let us show him that we will send any number of men that may be necessary—men such as scaled the heights of the Alma, dashed through his ranks at Balaklava, and defeated his battalions against such fearful odds at Inkerman. I hope the House, by its unanimity, will be worthy of the people of England. The pride of all England is in arms. The people of England, humbly founding their trust in the Great Disposer of Events, have accepted the challenge so haughtily thrown down before them by the Emperor of Russia, and have chosen the fairest spot in his own dominions as the arena in which the great quarrel may be brought to an issue. The hon. Member concluded by moving—

"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, to convey to Her Majesty the Thanks of this House for Her Majesty's Most gracious Speech from the Throne:

"Humbly to thank Her Majesty for informing us that Her Majesty has called us together at this unusual period of the year, in order that by our assistance Her Majesty may take such measures as will enable Her to prosecute the great War in which we are engaged with the utmost vigour and effect:

"To assure Her Majesty that this assistance will be readily given, and that we fully agree with Her Majesty in the necessity of sparing no effort to augment Her Majesty's Forces now engaged in the Crimea; while we rejoice to learn that the exertions they have made, and the victories they have obtained, which are not exceeded in the brightest pages of our history, have filled Her Majesty with admiration and gratitude:

"We participate in the conviction expressed by Her Majesty, that the hearty and efficient co-operation of the brave Troops of Her Ally the Emperor of the French, and the glory acquired in common, cannot fail to cement still more closely the union which happily subsists between the two Nations:

"That we learn with satisfaction that, together with the Emperor of the French, Her Majesty has concluded a Treaty of Alliance with the Emperor of Austria, from which Her Majesty anticipates important advantages to the common cause:

"Humbly to thank Her Majesty for informing us that Her Majesty has also concluded a Treaty with the United States of America, by which subjects of long and difficult discussion have been equitably adjusted:

"To thank Her Majesty for the announcement that these Treaties will be laid before us:

"Humbly to concur in the hope expressed by Her Majesty, that, although the prosecution of the War will naturally engage our chief attention, yet that other matters of great interest and importance to the general welfare will not be neglected:

"That we rejoice to learn that the general prosperity of Her Majesty's subjects remains uninterrupted, and that the state of the Revenue affords Her Majesty entire satisfaction; while we humbly beg to assure Her Majesty of our desire to continue to promote the progress of Agriculture, Commerce, and Manufactures:

"To thank Her Majesty for expressing the hope that, in the Estimates which will be laid before us, we shall find that ample provision has been made for the exigencies of the Public Service:

"Humbly to thank Her Majesty for the confidence with which Her Majesty relies on our patriotism and public spirit, and for the conviction expressed by Her Majesty that, in the momentous contest in which we are engaged, we shall exhibit to the world the example of a united people; that we share Her Majesty's opinion, that we shall thus obtain the respect of other Nations, and may trust that, by the blessing of God, we shall bring the War to a successful termination."

Mr. LEVESON GOWER: Sir, in rising to second the Address, I feel great diffidence in attempting the performance of the task allotted to me, although the able speech of my hon. Friend has greatly diminished the difficulty of that task. I do not consider that I have ability sufficient to do anything like justice to the subjects suggested by Her Majesty's Speech. I am sure that every one present must feel the deepest regret that he has lived to see the day when he has heard from Her Majesty's Throne a Speech delivered in which allusion is made to one topic only, and that one war. Still, Sir, under the circumstances of the time, and considering how the whole mind of the country is engrossed with that one topic, I think Her Majesty's advisers will be supposed to have done wisely in confining themselves to that single question. Every Englishman will read with gratification the terms—worthy of the occasion—in which Her Majesty has expressed Her approbation of the services of Her troops in the Crimea. The speech of my hon. Friend has relieved me from the necessity of alluding to the events of that campaign, and I feel that I cannot embody in words my admiration of the services of that noble set of men. In whatever light we view their conduct—whether we view their gallantry in action, their humanity in the hour of victory, or their cheerful endurance under sickness and privation—we must consider it in every light worthy of our approbation. I am told that in the hospitals at Scutari, their beds extended miles in length—all filled with the sick and wounded—and yet was not heard one word of murmur or complaint from the lips of those men, who are comforted by the reflection that they have fought and suffered in the service of their country. We must all have been glad to hear the tribute which Her Gracious Majesty has paid to the bravery of the French troops. That the armies of England and France, who, for centuries, whenever they have met in battle, have been opposed to each other, should, now that they fight together, be moved by a spirit of emulation to outdo all their former deeds, need be a matter of no surprise; but that in that spirit of emulation there should be mixed not a particle of jealousy—such a spirit as was displayed in the impetuous rush of the French in our support at Balaklava and Inkerman—I confess exceeds my expectations. Sir, the fact of my seconding the Address implies that I have confidence in Her Majesty's Ministers, and I hope I shall not be deemed presumptuous if I state why I consider they have deserved that confidence. In the first place, by maintaining as long as possible the policy of peace, they have not only united all classes in this country in support of the war, but they have turned the whole opinion of Europe in their favour. Then, by revising the practice of the laws which regulate belligerents and neutrals, they have obtained the good-will of neutral Powers. By a straightforward policy, coupled with continued good faith, they have preserved the most complete agreement with the French nation during all the negotiations which have taken place with respect to this contest. In Germany what have they done? I believe that by the assistance of their unacknowledged allies, the German people, they have gradually drawn the German Governments towards the Western Powers; and we have heard, with great gratification, that a treaty has been signed with Austria—a treaty which, we are told, promises advantage to the common cause, and which has caused the greatest irritation to Russia and to her partisans throughout Europe. At all events, it is a treaty on the right side of neutrality. In Greece the firm attitude assumed by the Allies has put down an insurrection which presented a most anxious question, and on which the Emperor of Russia placed the greatest reliance. As far as I am able to judge as a civilian, I think the conduct of the Government in respect to its military operations has, in many of its features, been bold and energetic. I think that if, at the beginning of the year, the Government had come forward and stated that they intended to make themselves masters of the Baltic, to keep the fleets of Russia shut up in their ports, to fetter the commerce of Russia in every part of the world, and to take possession of and destroy the important fortress of Aland—I think that such a programme would have fully satisfied the expectations of the country. If Government had come forward with the promise that during the year they would send an expedition of 55,000 men, well disciplined and well equipped to the Crimea, I think their ability to do so would have been little credited. If a year ago we had been told that we should be in possession of Balaklava, and in a position from which we cannot be driven out, and from which, as I have been told, we certainly shall be in possession of Sebastopol, the last thing any one would have urged against Government would have been want of vigour. If, Sir, they had been accused of anything in that respect, it would not have been want of energy, but rashness. What does rashness mean? Engaging in any enterprise without taking precautions to ensure success. Now I believe there has been no want of energy on the part of the Government to ensure our getting possession of Sebastopol, and if you do that you destroy the power of the Emperor of Russia to put into execution those schemes of mad ambition which have caused the present war. I am sure the House of Commons will be united on this occasion; and though some may differ from the views I have enunciated, I venture to say to the dissentients that, unless they are prepared to put another and a better set of men in their place, they ought to support the present Government. I venture also to remind those dissentients, that every word that shall be spoken in this debate will be read with the greatest avidity not only in St. Petersburg, but throughout Europe; and that every symptom of division or petty criticism among us will serve to encourage the enemy, and will have a most injurious effect on neutral and wavering States. Therefore, considering the sacrifices this country is ready to submit to for the purpose of bringing this war to the hoped-for conclusion, and considering that we have soldiers in the East cheerfully laying down their lives day after day for their country, I think it is not too much to ask that the House of Commons should unite themselves as one man in support of whatever Government has the war in charge, and by that means carry them through the deplorable and inevitable but triumphant struggle in which they are engaged to a successful issue.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That," &c. [*See* p. 101.]

Sir J. PAKINGTON said, that if he was desirous of availing himself of an early opportunity of taking a part in the debate on the Motion which had now been submitted to the House, he did so because he had a strong impression that in the present state of public affairs it was the duty of men of all parties in that House frankly to state their sentiments, and not because he entertained the slightest desire to criticise, and especially in any hostile spirit, the speeches which had been delivered by the two hon. Gentlemen opposite, the Mover and Seconder of the Address. On the contrary, he recognised readily the fairness of the tone in which those hon. Gentlemen had spoken. He took no exception to the spirit in which they had addressed the House, and he would readily admit the ability with which they had discharged the duty intrusted to them. He confessed, also, that it was to him a source of the greatest possible satisfaction on that occasion that he found himself unable to take any serious exception to the Address to Her Majesty which had been moved and seconded by the two hon. Gentlemen opposite in answer to the gracious Speech which Her Majesty had delivered from the Throne. In contemplating the first paragraph of that Speech and of the Address, namely, the paragraph in which Her Majesty had appealed to Parliament for support in the great war in which She was now embarked, he entertained the sanguine hope that among every party in that House there would prevail a degree of cordial unanimity, such as was never exceeded in any popular assembly. He was sure he might say, in the name of the great Conservative party, both in that House and in the country, that they did not yield to the Gentlemen who had framed that Address, or to any body of men in that House or in the country, in the firm resolve to extend to Her Majesty that support which She desired. The next portion of the Speech appealed to the House to sanction an augmentation of the Army. He felt himself equally unable to take the slightest exception to this demand on the part of Her Majesty's Government. On the contrary, he believed the feeling of those Friends with whom he had the honour of acting was not that they should now hesitate in acceding to the desire of the Government for increasing the Army, but that they should rather be disposed to find fault with the Government for having so long delayed that increase. The question had not been, "Why do you increase the Army now?" but rather, "Why have you not sooner adopted that measure?—why have you not sooner taken precautions to show that you were aware of the magnitude of the struggle in which the country is now unhappily engaged?" He feared the only construction that could be put on the policy adopted by the Government, and on the course which they had taken, was, that until lately—until the last month, when they appeared to have awakened as from a dream—they had been entirely unconscious of the magnitude, the difficulties, and the perils of the struggle with Russia in which they were embarked. There had been no fault on the part of that House. In the last Session of Parliament, whatever demands the Government made were freely and liberally granted; and the noble Lord opposite (Lord John Russell), on more than one occasion, frankly admitted the spirit in which they were met. It was, therefore, not from any want of support from that House that the Army was not sooner augmented. But he believed he might trace what he called the crippled state of our military armaments mainly to the financial arrangements of the Government during the past Session, and to that attempt announced on the part of the Chancellor of the Exchequer—to the principle of which he and his Friends took no exception, but of the impossibility of which they warned him—that in so great a struggle they were to pay all the expenses of the war entirely from the revenue of the year. To this part of the speech then, he was sure no one on that side of the House would be disposed to take any exception. He now approached two passages of the Speech from the Throne to which he could not but advert—he alluded to the paragraph in which reference was made to the conduct of our army in the East, and to that which referred to the conduct of our noble Allies, the French. He approached this portion of the Speech with a feeling—which he thought every man must entertain who touched upon it—of the difficulty of expressing his opinion as he could desire. No language could exceed the debt of gratitude which we owed to the British army. Well did the language of Her Majesty's Speech say, that "the exertions they have made and the victories they have obtained are not exceeded in the brightest pages of our history, and have filled me with admiration and gratitude." Not only did he hold this language to be just—not only did he think the page of history recorded no parallel to the gallantry shown by our army in the field—but fiction had hardly imagined, we had not read in fable or in song, anything equal to the gallantry of that noble army. And brought, as he was, by this paragraph of the Speech to a consideration of the deeds of the army, he was naturally led to think of those who had bled and suffered in the sanguinary struggles in which our army had been engaged. He hoped that in that assembly and at that moment it would not be considered inappropriate or improper if he paused for a moment to pay a tribute of respect and deep regret for the memory of the gallant Colonel Blair. They all valued and esteemed him as a friend—he said this because he was sure no party feeling could mix on such a subject as this—he was esteemed by all; and he was sure that all must feel deep and heartfelt regret that one so full of promise, and with regard to whom there was so much reason to hope that a career of distinction and usefulness awaited him, had been so soon and so prematurely carried off. There was another name connected with that House—a gentleman long familiar with them all, of whom he could not refrain from making one passing remark. Colonel Blair was no more; but he did hope they would again see among them in renewed health and vigour the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster (Sir De Lacy Evans). In naming these names, no man, he trusted, would feel that he was making invidious distinctions. Where all had earned honour, to them honour was due—but he was now referring to Members of that House—men with whom they had all daily mixed—to men whom they all knew well—and he thought that every one who heard him would agree with him, that among the noble deeds that had distinguished the gallantry of the British army in the Crimea, there had been nothing more gallant, nothing more heroic, than the manner in which that gallant veteran left his bed of sickness on the day of Inkerman to share in the dangers of that terrible contest—an act of gallantry exceeded only by the generosity he showed when he refused to resume the command of the division which, unhappily, he had been obliged to resign into other hands. He hoped the House would pardon him for having stepped aside for a moment from the strict business before them, and expressing the hope that they would soon see the hon. and gallant Gentleman to whom he had made reference once more restored to his place among them. On this passage of the Speech too much could not be said; but so much was felt in the breast of every Englishman with respect to the noble deeds of the army that to dwell on them would be superfluous. Honour to all! They had saved the honour of their country by their gallantry, and deeply were they indebted to them for their heroic achievements. In the same spirit might he speak of the conduct of our Allies, the French; and he was glad to hear the language used by the hon. Gentlemen opposite—especially by the Seconder of the Address—on this subject. The hon. Member referred in terms most just and proper to that noble emulation and total freedom from anything like jealousy, and that unparalleled gallantry with which the French army had borne their share of glorious deeds in the Crimea. And here he would mention, in passing—for he could not refrain from doing so—the superfluous, the unnecessary gallantry, as some might think, and the noble spirit, with which General Canrobert rode side by side with Lord Raglan during the early portion of the day of Inkerman, and the ready gallantry with which General Bosquet—whose division was so placed as to be most at hand to aid the British troops when necessary—had ever shown himself willing to render assistance. He had heard with unqualified satisfaction the reference made in the Speech to the conduct of our Allies, and he hoped it would be known, not only to the French nation, but to the French army, that the Parliament of England acknowledged and appreciated their conduct. The next paragraph in the Speech to which he felt bound to refer, and on which he found himself unable to speak in the unqualified terms he had hitherto had the pleasure of doing, was undoubtedly one of the greatest importance—he meant that which referred to the treaty of alliance with Austria. The House must bear in mind that they were at present in ignorance of the nature and purport of that treaty. The noble Lord, he thought, had intimated that that treaty would be laid on the table forthwith; but the bearing of that treaty on the present state of affairs in the East, and on the future prospects of the war, was so important that he could not help hoping Her Majesty's Government would think it not inconsistent with their duty to give, as soon as they could, some statement of what the real scope and nature of that treaty is. Public feeling on this question, with respect to Austria, was very strong: it had been greatly excited with regard to the conduct and the intentions of Austria; and her conduct and intentions had been watched with an anxiety proportioned to their importance. An impression prevailed that we were very little informed as to what the real position of Austria in the East has been, and that we were very little informed as to the nature of the treaty concluded between Austria and the Porte; and impressions also prevailed, that Austrian influence had prevented Omar Pacha from keeping in check the Russian forces in Bessarabia, and so left free the division of General Osten-Sacken and the forces under Prince Gortschakoff to swell the Russian force in the Crimea, and to increase the risks and dangers of the British army at Inkerman. Now, these were serious matters. They could not fail to recollect what was said upon this subject at the commencement of last Session of Parliament by the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty, in the discussion which then took place on the negotiations that had been pending. The right hon. Baronet, if he remembered right, claimed as one advantage which had resulted from the conduct of the Government and from the delay that had occurred, that we had secured the co-operation of the German Powers. How had that been carried out? Where had been the co-operation of the German Powers from the time when the right hon. Gentleman spoke up to the present moment? This country had viewed—and naturally viewed—with suspicion the conduct of the Austrian Government—conduct which, he believed, had been marked by great ability as regarded the objects of that Power, but which had not been considered as equally conducive to the objects which the Western Powers had in view. Under these circumstances, the treaty which they now heard had been entered into with Austria was regarded in this country as a matter of no common interest, and, therefore, he hoped the noble Lord would think it consistent with his duty to inform the House as soon as possible of its contents. In the meantime, he trusted that it would be distinctly understood — and he confessed he had watched with some degree of anxiety the wording of this part of the Address—that the Address to which they were now asked to agree did not pledge the House to any expression of opinion as to the treaty, which had not been laid before them. There was one other paragraph in the Royal Speech which he must notice—a very mysterious paragraph, which referred to measures which they were told would promote the welfare and interests of the country. These measures were not specified in the Address; but he would only express the hope that a Reform Bill did not form part of the programme. They could not forget that the noble Lord told them last year that the moment of a great war with Russia was precisely that in which they should promote a Reform Bill, as it would afford the noble spectacle of a country which was not only in a position to make war with Russia, but to reform its institutions at the same time. He hoped the noble Lord had changed his mind on that point, and that a Reform Bill, at least, was not one of the measures included in this mysterious paragraph. With that proviso, he might say that he agreed to that paragraph of the Address; for, notwithstanding the duties devolving on the British Parliament at this most important crisis of European affairs, and the anxious considerations connected with the war to which they must attend, he could not think it creditable to that House to be unable at the same time to devote attention to matters of domestic importance. Having thus stated that he had no fault to find with the language which the Government had advised Her Majesty to use in Her Gracious Speech, he felt strongly with the hon. Gentlemen opposite (the Mover and Seconder), both of whom had rather appealed to the Opposition side of the House on the point, that the present was not a moment for party struggle. He did not wish to address the House that evening in any party spirit. He admitted the importance of our showing to Europe and to the world the example not only of a united Parliament, but of a united nation. He adopted this part of the language of the Address most cordially; and if they had duties to discharge which implied the existence of differences among them, let it be clearly and broadly understood that those differences referred only to the mode in which they best could support their Sovereign in the endeavours She was now making to conduct this great struggle to a successful issue. But, on the other hand, he would not admit that it could be consistent with the duty of Members of that House to abandon their right to criticise the conduct of the Government. On the contrary, he thought that now that they were about to intrust to the Government large powers and great resources—now that the Government were appealing to the House for the means of carrying on a European war of such magnitude—it became the duty of the Members of that House—a duty from which they could not shrink—to state what grounds of complaint they thought might exist against the manner in which the Government had conducted the war hitherto, and to call upon them for some explanation on those points in respect to which public anxiety doubts the wisdom of their course. This was a right and duty which he, for one, could not consent to abandon; and there was an impression strongly existing in the public mind, that whatever anxiety the Government might have had—as he questioned not they had been anxious—to carry on this war to a successful issue, they had not shown that wisdom, foresight, or prudence, in the measures which they had taken which were most likely to conduce to the great end which they must all alike have in view. In the last Session of Parliament, Members on that side of the House had found it their duty to criticise the conduct of the Government in respect to their negotiations. It was then averred, and he thought with truth—for it was never refuted—that at the time when, during those negotiations, which unhappily terminated in war, it was most essential that the conduct of the Government should be marked with firmness, energy, and decision, and by language the most intelligible, their conduct, on the contrary, was timid and vacillating; and now, when the nation was unhappily involved in an arduous war—more arduous than the Government have yet shown they deemed probable—when it was the paramount duty of the Government not only to show the boldness, decision, and courage, which were the common inheritance of Englishmen, but at the same time to temper those qualities with the caution, prudence, and foresight of statesmen, he feared they must be accused—as the hon. Seconder of the Address seemed to anticipate—of rashness and imprudence. The public mind was at the present time so entirely engrossed by the events passing in the Crimea, that for the moment attention was diverted from the great expedition to the Baltic Sea. But public attention would again turn to that subject; and when they considered the magnitude of the armament and its absolute fruitlessness—when they reflected on that magnificent fleet, composed of the combined navies of France and England, the finest that had ever floated on the ocean, and considered that it had returned without accomplishing any one act that could be named ["Oh, oh!"], they had a right to demand some explanation on the subject from the Government. He heard some expressions of dissent from Gentlemen opposite. Did they allude to the capture of Bomarsund, and think that the event was of importance enough to call for eulogies and thanks? Because, if they did, he must say that he did not recognise the capture of that place as forming any exception to the description he had given of the results of the expedition. In fact, knowing the gallantry, the zeal, and spirit, of our sailors, and believing that, both in the Baltic and Black Sea, they were actuated by a desire to emulate the brave deeds of the British army, he could only compare the whole history of the expedition to the Baltic to that well-known military exploit of which they had not lately heard much, but with which they were all familiar in their early days—

> "The King of France marched up the hill
> With twenty thousand men,
> And when he got up to the top
> He straight marched back again."

He would not allude in terms of censure to the Admirals of our two fleets, because at present there was no information to justify it; and because, if he did allude to them, he might anticipate the discussion which he believed was expected to take place at a dinner at the Reform Club, which possibly might be given to those Admirals on their return to England, when no doubt the First Lord of the Admiralty, even in a more triumphant tone than he assumed last spring, would congratulate the club that both the Admirals belonged to it. He (Sir J. Pakington) intended to pass no censure on either of those Admirals, but he thought he had a right to ask the Government what had been the causes of the failure which had undoubtedly, to a great extent, attended our naval operations?—what was the cause that so grand an armament had produced such small results? He believed that the real fault was, that the Government adopted an unwise course in sending so large an armament to the Baltic. The Russian fleet was not likely to come out. They all knew that the Russian fleet was not disposed to meet the British unless on very favourable terms; and with a fleet of the magnitude sent to the Baltic it was not to be expected that the Russians would contend. Then, again, our ships were so large, that they could not approach the coast; and for the purposes of blockade the armament was altogether on a scale, in his opinion, perfectly unnecessary. There was another subject on which the public mind was much excited—the conduct of the fleet, namely—owing, he presumed, to the instructions given by the Government—with respect to the bombardment of Odessa. The bombardment of Odessa, if he recollected aright, was accompanied by something like an apology from the Admiral of the Black Sea fleet, excusing the incivility which he had been obliged to show in attacking them as he did, and which he said arose from the sole ground that the Russians had fired on a flag of truce. But why had Odessa been left undestroyed? Had not subsequent events—had not the operations at Sebastopol—made it clear how unwise it was on the part of the Government to leave the town of Odessa untouched? Was it respected because it was a commercial town? But Odessa could hardly be regarded merely as a commercial town, when they found the extent to which it was fortified—when they found a large military force constantly established in it. Its peculiar situation, with respect to the Principalities on the one hand, and with respect to the Crimea on the other, must be borne in mind; and it would be found that Odessa had practically been a great centre of military operations, and had mainly aided in sending reinforcements to the Russian army in the Crimea. His own impression was—and he believed it was that of the public—that the Government had acted unwisely in leaving to the Russians a place like Odessa, from which they could throw reinforcements into the Crimea, and which they could make a great centre of military operations. He should now approach the conduct of the Government in respect to the attack on Sebastopol. He did not think that the present was a moment in which it was proper to raise the question as to the policy of our attack upon Sebastopol, or for calling on the Government for an explanation of their policy in having made that attack. They had loudly professed, and only recently the noble Lord the Prime Minister had repeated the declaration in a marked manner, that theirs was a policy of peace. Now he (Sir J. Pakington) thought it very questionable whether by the attack on the Crimea war had not been greatly protracted; but he did not at present mean to imply any opinion of his own as to the policy of that attack, as the time for entering on that subject had not yet arrived, and he reserved to himself the right to concur in the wisdom of that course, if the Government could convince him, as they probably might, that it was the best course that could be taken. But there was another view of the subject which he thought they were in duty bound to take, and to which no answer could be given, and that was, that Government were not justified in attacking the Crimea at all unless in a manner which should, humanly speaking, ensure success, and that, whatever the abstract policy of the attack might be, the Government were bound by their duty to their Sovereign and country not to attack a great fortress such as Sebastopol with inadequate means. Such was the impression of the country, and Members of that House would depart from their duty if they did not call on the Government for explanations on this point. Public opinion directed three accusations against the Government—first, that they had attacked that great fortress with inadequate means; second, that the forces they sent to the Crimea for this purpose had been left uncared for and unsupported; and third, that if anything could have added to the difficulties and dangers of the undertaking, it was the unwise manner in which the Government and the organs of the Government advertised, if he might so speak, and proclaimed the intended measures, and put the Emperor of Russia on his guard with respect to the attack which was to be made on his territory. He held in his hand an extract from a speech made by the noble Lord opposite on the 24th of July last. The noble Lord had not long since made a speech at a public dinner given to him at Bristol, in which he made a statement which, so far as his recollection served, had not previously been placed before the public—namely, as to the time at which the Government made up their minds to attack Sebastopol, and the time at which they communicated that decision to the generals of the army. The noble Lord stated at Bristol that the instructions of the Government to attack Sebastopol were sent out—he was now speaking from memory—so that the generals would receive them at Varna about the middle of July. The decision must therefore have been taken not later than the commencement of the month; and, looking to these dates, he presumed it was likely that when the siege of Silistria was raised, the Government then took into their consideration the policy of attacking Sebastopol, as, according to the noble Lord, instructions were sent out so as to reach Varna about the middle of July. On the 24th of that month the noble Lord seemed to have been unable to restrain his eagerness to communicate the fact to this House; and in these terms the noble Lord made the communication—

> "But, Sir, there is another mode in which the position of Russia is menacing to the independence and integrity of Turkey. I mean the establishment of a great fortress, prepared with all the combinations of art, and containing within its port a very large fleet of line-of-battle ships, ready at any moment to come down with a favourable wind to the Bosphorus. I say that is a position so menacing to Turkey, that no treaty of peace could be considered wise which left the Emperor of Russia in that same position of menace."—[3 *Hansard*, cxxxv. 608–9.

The noble Lord, upon the same day, when he found that all parties in that House had put that construction on those words, which in his (Sir J. Pakington's) humble judgment was the only construction open, endeavoured to qualify their force and remove the impression they had produced, and he (Sir John Pakington) well recollected the surprise that attempt produced. But repeating the words again, he (Sir John Pakington) asked, what would be the construction naturally put on them, coupled as they were with almost daily declarations from one leading paper in London, that an attack on Sebastopol was the only means of humbling Russia, and that by the attack on Russia the great ends of the war were to be attained. He asked, not only what other construction could be put upon these words within the walls of that House, but what other impression could be made upon the Emperor of Russia? These words, of course, would speedily wing their way to St. Petersburg; and depend upon it that from that moment the defences of Sebastopol were strengthened, and not a moment was lost in preparing for our reception. On the 5th of August the *Times* excited a general feeling of wonder in the country, by declaring, in a remarkable paragraph, that on that very day the expedition was to sail. I maintain that in this way the Emperor of Russia had a warning that he ought never to have had, which in common prudence he could neither mistake nor neglect, and which they might rely upon it he did neither mistake nor neglect, which enabled him fully to provide for the defence of this great fortress. And he had ample time. The Government had sent out their instructions in the beginning of July, and the expedition did not sail till the beginning of September—a very late period for commencing such an enterprise. And what was the amount of force sent? 27,000 English troops only landed in the Crimea in September. He believed that the whole force, English and French, for the investment of Sebastopol, did not exceed 50,000 men. He also firmly believed—for the conviction was forced on him by the events which had taken place—that that force of 50,000 men was sent to undertake this great enterprise without the Government having any knowledge whatever of the Russian force in the Crimea, or the strength of the fortress which they were about to attack. The great error which had beset the Government, and which had paralysed and weakened all their measures, had been that of underrating the strength of the enemy with whom we were to contend. He was confirmed in this belief by the language used by the Prime Minister at a festivity which took place in the town of Aberdeen. The noble Lord, as usual, spoke much of peace, and he went on to say—

> "Still, when war became inevitable, I declared that, so far as I was concerned, it should be

carried on with the utmost vigour and energy of which the Government was capable. Gentlemen, perhaps the moment is not opportune to ask whether that pledge has been fulfilled? If, gentlemen, you will consider what has been done in the course of six short months, I think you will admit that this country never made an exertion at all comparable with that which she has just made. An army has been collected and transported from the shores of this country, such as never left them in preceding history—an army such as the Duke of Wellington never commanded, and appointed in all its parts in a manner which, humanly speaking, is calculated to ensure its success."

He traced in those words the error which had pervaded the whole conduct of the Government. It was perfectly clear to him, from that language of the Prime Minister, coupled with the subsequent conduct of the War Department, that they were ignorant of or underrated the strength of Sebastopol. This force of 27,000 English was landed on the shores of the Crimea under the idea, that as soon as it was there, they had nothing to do but to march upon Sebastopol and take it. In this there was no foresight or prudence; and no allowance was made for the necessary casualties of war—for those who must fall in battle, and those who sunk under the climate of a foreign country. Lord Aberdeen said, that the army was appointed in all its parts in a manner to ensure success; and yet it was, when landed in the Crimea, deficient in artillery, and almost without cavalry, and with a most scanty provision of such equipments as are essential to the health and comfort of the men, and especially tents and covering for service in the field. Could the House forget the description of the suffering of our officers and men during the first three days after their landing? The Prime Minister, therefore, was anything but justified in his boast of the completeness of its appointments. The gravamen of the charge against the Government was, that they sent the army to attack the Crimea without any of the reserves essential for their support. He called upon the Government for an explanation on this point, and he thought the House and the country had a right to demand it. Were the Government justified, he would ask, in sending an expedition into the Crimea without providing a reserve for its support when it had landed? The conduct of the Government in this respect was open, he thought, to grave doubt—nay, more, he was afraid, to severe censure. The country had a right to call upon the Government to explain why the expedition in the Crimea had been left without reserves and without reinforcements; and he hoped the Government would lose no time in giving this explanation. He was not in possession of any official information, but, speaking from those sources of information which were open to all the world, and speaking merely from memory, he believed he was perfectly correct in saying that the army in the Crimea received nothing worthy of the name of reinforcements from the time when it landed in the beginning of September, till the 46th Regiment landed in November, after the battle of Inkerman. He was quite aware that, shortly after the battle of the Alma, a body of 3,000 men, 1,000 cavalry and 2,000 infantry, landed at Balaklava. He made no complaint against the Government for not having sent a larger force into the Crimea in the first instance, for he was quite aware that the difficulties of conveyance might be urged as a reason for not having landed a larger force than 27,000 men; but the 3,000 men landed at Balaklava a few days after the battle of the Alma did little more than fill up the gaps which had been created by the battle. Yet, from the time that the army sat down before Sebastopol, it was left there—numbers falling daily in the trenches, diminished in numbers by the loss experienced in the battle of Balaklava—decimated by disease and suffering from change of climate and exposure to cold and fatigue—without any reinforcements whatever, except some few draughts which were sent out to various regiments from time to time, but which in the aggregate made no serious addition to the army, until the day that the 46th Regiment landed. It was under these circumstances that this gallant band of men, dwindling away day by day, was on the 5th of November attacked at Inkerman by the Russian forces. What, he would ask, was the actual force with which we had fought at Inkerman? 27,000 men were landed originally in the Crimea, 3,000 men were landed a few days afterwards; but on the 5th of November—on the day of Inkerman—had they 20,000 men present? Had they 18,000, or even 15,000, effective men along the whole position from Balaklava to the heights before the town? He believed not; but this at least they knew on the authority of Lord Raglan himself, that the men who resisted the Russian army on that day did not exceed 8,000 men. The hon. Gentleman who seconded the Address talked of fearful odds; but how was it that they had had to contend against those fearful odds? We ought to thank God that the British forces were not destroyed at Inkerman. But it was not to the credit of the British Government that there should have been only 8,000 men to resist the Russian force. The valour of our soldiers—and, as the Royal Speech has said, history hardly records such a struggle as that—alone saved us; and it was, indeed, little less than marvellous. It was only by the mercy of God that that gallant band had been able to withstand the power of the Russian forces. But why were there only 8,000 men there? Their valour was, indeed, such as to claim the highest credit. It was no common valour; it was not the mere courage of man fighting against man; but it was an enduring, indomitable courage, which enabled this band of heroes, hour after hour, to struggle against those heavy masses of Russians that were hurled upon them. 'T was nothing less than miraculous that we were now able to congratulate ourselves upon their victory, instead of having to mourn over the loss of our whole force. But how was it that there were only 8,000 men left to sustain this conflict? They had a right to demand from Government an explanation why those odds existed on that day? His firm persuasion was, that, if the Government had shown a proper degree of foresight, if they had been up to their own undertaking, if they had formed proper reserves for the army, if they had taken means to fill up the vacancies occasioned by battle and disease, and to keep up the army even to its original number of 27,000 men, in that case he believed no battle of Inkerman would ever have been fought. To parody a trite phrase well known in the sister country, "England's weakness was Russia's opportunity." The Russians had gathered together their legions. She knew the British army was reduced to a handful of men, and, brave as they knew the British soldiers to be, they had hoped to overpower them by the force of numbers; and under that impression she attacked them at Inkerman. This he firmly believed they never would have done had we been there in that strength which common prudence and foresight would have told us we ought to have been. But this was not all. What had been the sufferings of our men since that time? They had been on those bleak heights under canvas in the worst weather, the ground impassable around them, exposed unprotected to the severity of the climate, and to the fury of that awful hurricane which had been so fatal to our shipping. But why was it so? Why were they left thus unprotected? By the improvidence of Her Majesty's Ministers. He thought he had a right to ask the Government to explain why this was so. The House of Commons had liberally granted supplies, and furnished them with the means of sending forth this great army—and it had a right to ask why the Government had left this army to perish of cold, exhaustion, and even of hunger? Within the last few days he had seen a private letter from a distinguished officer in the Crimea. Of course he was not at liberty to mention his name, but he pledged himself to the House that he was an officer of high rank in the army and a man of unimpeachable character and veracity; and in a letter of his to a member of his own family occurred these few but most important words, "the spirit of the men is good, but their sufferings are almost beyond endurance." He could scarcely advert with calmness to such a state of things, and he could see no excuse for it. Who could read the newspapers of that very day, who could read Lord Raglan's despatch, and the account which he gave of the state to which the weather had reduced the ground, and then say that the men ought now to be under canvas, exposed to the rigour of the climate? The Government could not, in answer to this part of the case against them, plead that they had been taken by surprise. They might have foreseen these things, they could have foreseen them, and they ought to have foreseen them. The expedition did not leave Varna until September. He was greatly inclined to believe that if they could dive into the real ideas of the Government it would turn out that they had expected to take Sebastopol by a *coup de main.* Perhaps it was possible that they might have so taken it; but, on the other hand, it was certain that the Government had no right to presume upon doing so. Whatever their views might have been as to the result of a sudden attack, they were bound to be prepared for the other alternative. They had no right or reason to expect a speedy capture of Sebastopol. It was a great fortress, and whether we were or were not prepared for the actual extent of the Russian resources, no man could think the Czar would consent to surrender his stronghold at the first summons; neither had they any reason to expect that the climate of the Crimea would change simply because they had sent the flower of the British Army to be exposed to its severity. They had no right to expect a speedy capture of Sebastopol, for it must be recollected that the expedition was not sent to the Crimea until the middle of September, and then the Government did not send men enough to secure the speedy attainment of their object. They talked of the "siege" of Sebastopol, but it might almost be doubted whether we were justified in calling it a siege. Was that a siege where the attacking army was so weak in numbers as not to be able to invest the fortress, but was only able to draw themselves up on one side of it, leaving the enemy free to come and go and to bring in their supplies and reinforcements just as often and as largely as they wished. Under these circumstances, what right had the Government to suppose that such a fortress would at once yield to an attack? We might ultimately triumph, and he hoped to God we should! We might capture Sebastopol; but under such conditions of attack, being unable as we were, to invest the place, but only to draw ourselves up on one side of it, it was certain, and must always have been certain, that the attack must be a protracted one; and it was equally clear that if it was protracted, and if our army were to remain there until the advent of winter, the men, if unprotected by better shelter than canvas tents, must be exposed to the sufferings to which he had already adverted and had described in the language of a man who had experienced them. But this was not all. The force was so reduced in numbers that these brave men did not suffer only from cold and privation, but were forced to endure fatigue to such an extent that it was wonderful that sufficient men were still left for the necessary labours of the siege. Why, it actually appeared that the officers have to spend two nights out of three in the trenches. Perhaps the Government might tell them that supplies of warm clothing and other articles had been sent, and had been most unhappily lost by the visitation of Providence in that unfortunate vessel, the *Prince*. That was, indeed, a most lamentable accident, and one for which the Government, of course, could in no way be held responsible; but then he had a right to ask how was it that the warm clothing which was on board the *Prince* had not been sent sooner? How was it that it had not arrived until the month of November—until after we heard that the cold was so intense and unbearable that even the soldiers who slept under their tents could scarcely endure it? And when were the huts to be sent out to cover the men who would probably have to remain before Sebastopol to carry on a protracted siege during the winter? They were only now going—in December. Had any of the materials even yet left England? He knew not. He only knew that he that morning met an officer who was about to leave England to superintend the erection of the huts, and he believed it was impossible that these men should be covered by anything better than canvas tents before we were far into January. It was painful to contemplate the consequences which might ensue to the lives and health of these men, whose bravery they now acknowledged in high-sounding phrase, while they did not even extend to them the common care which was due to every one engaged in fighting the battles of their country. He thought he was justified in saying, that they would be abandoning their duty that day if they did not call upon the Government to explain these things. They were bound to call for an explanation, not only in the name of the people of this country, but also in the name of the army which was undergoing these sufferings. If the Government would give a satisfactory explanation—if they would show that hereafter the House of Commons might rely, not only on their good intentions—which he had never doubted—but also on their exercising that prudence and foresight which hitherto had not been manifested, they would have nothing to fear from the Conservative party. Hon. Gentlemen on that side of the House were not the Whigs of 1793, they were not the Coalitionists of 1853. They desired nothing but the honour of their Sovereign and the welfare of their country. If the Government asked for supplies, they should have them with no niggard hand; if they asked for Parliamentary support, they should be met in no factious spirit; but if this concession were made on the one hand, they must exact this condition on the other—that the war should be conducted with vigour, wisdom, and foresight greater than that which had hitherto been displayed. For these explanations, therefore, he asked, and the Government was bound, in duty to the country, to give it. Parliament would hear it. He asked them what was to be their future course, and by their answer it must be judged whether the House of Commons would be justified, and whether the people could be satisfied that the future conduct of public affairs should rest in the hands of the existing Administration.

SIR ROBERT PEEL said, the right hon. Baronet who had just addressed the House had thrown quite as much spirit into the character of his observations as the justice of his complaints required. He (Sir R. Peel) was not, however, going to quarrel with him for that. He liked every man to express his opinions with determination and decision; and, in fact, his own object in rising was to give expression to his own sentiments with some little spirit. The right hon. Baronet had made a very straightforward speech; but if that House was prepared to endorse the right hon. Baronet's opinions, he thought it would be far from reflecting the general sentiments and views of the country at large. The right hon. Baronet said, that he must do his duty here in expressing his opinions freely, and certainly he did not think that a full discussion on this subject would be distasteful either to the House or to the Government, for he believed the Government would be most anxious to listen to any complaints or criticisms that could be made, since it was from such complaints generally that investigations and inquiries arose, which, happily, in this country rarely failed to remedy what was deficient, and to better that which was wrong. They might perchance, as usual, have a little effervescence of party spirit that evening, but that over, he could not but think that the result of any discussion must be that that House would confirm the favourable opinion which had been expressed over and over again in the country with regard to the conduct of this war. If, however, it was to be the policy of hon. Gentlemen opposite, as the right hon. Baronet has just stated, to find fault with the conduct of the war, he thought it was the duty of the supporters of the Government to endeavour to refute such complaints. Nor did he think that it would be difficult. For some of these attacks were unfounded, and some were mischievous. But at any rate we had of late had so little opportunity of seeing any serious attack on the conduct of the Government, that the announcement of the right hon. Gentleman was quite refreshing. Indeed, it must be welcome to the Government, for they were quite losing caste in the country for want of a sufficient opportunity to defend themselves. The war had only lasted a short period, but it must have struck every impartial observer that the hostile attempts made by the opponents of the Government against them had been singularly unfortunate. We had had sarcasms without end, and charges of the most awfully serious character, but evidently made, not in the idea that they were well founded, but merely to gratify a fanciful alliteration of terms, and to display a little opposition. This, however, was quite a new policy, for the recognised leader of the Opposition, in bringing forward his brilliant and well-conditioned attacks against the Government, had always avoided impugning the conduct of the war. From the commencement of the war the greatest valour had been manifested by our troops, and he did not believe there was a single man in that House or in the country whose breasts did not fill with sentiments of gratitude and admiration on reading of the chivalrous conduct of our officers and the indomitable bravery of our men. They were mostly men who for the first time in their military career had met the awful shock of battle, who had never before seen human blood spilled in deadly combat, but their courage and their steadiness in resisting the overwhelming forces of the enemy had been such as had never been equalled in the heroic stories of ancient Greece. This war had taken away from us some of the last-surviving heroes of the Peninsula. Cathcart and Strangways both fought in Spain and at Waterloo, and now after forty years' repose they had fallen together, and now he believed shared the same grave, surrounded by their companions in arms, whose exploits presented the most brilliant and enduring record of the character and reputation of the British arms. He did not see any reason for despondency in the position of our army before Sebastopol. We knew that in former times great military manœuvres had been carried out in the winter. It was then that Napoleon inaugurated that splendid campaign which, crowned with the victory of Marengo, freed Italy of the Austrians, by passing through the defiles of the St. Bernard. Nor did Wellington hesitate to engage in a campaign during a Pyrenean winter, in the face of such an army as that commanded by Soult. Therefore, he saw no objection to our present operations in the Crimea, but, on the contrary, regarded them in a favourable light, and for this reason:—Supposing that we had taken Sebastopol at once by a *coup de main*, we should never have been able to keep it for any length of time; and besides, we should not have known the spirit of our men, after forty years of peace; and certainly we could not have known anything of the genuine character of our alliance with France. Instead of that, however, we had successfully met and conquered the best and bravest of the Russian troops and the ablest of the Russian generals; we had likewise cemented, as it were, by a baptism of blood, our alliance with the French; and now, if Sebastopol should fall—as he trusted it speedily would—it would not fall as the hazardous result of a sudden manœuvre, but as the crowning victory of a brilliant campaign. But he had heard with surprise the charge of the right hon. Gentleman (Sir J. Pakington), that the Government had left the troops in the Crimea to perish from cold and exhaustion. This was an accusation, he must say, that was most unfounded, and that must be freely repelled. True we had three of the worst scourges attacking us; namely, the ravages of actual warfare, the stealthy inroad of pestilence, and the fury of the elements. These combined evils had made sad havoc with our troops, and deprived them of those necessaries and comforts which the Government had forwarded to them; but still he was sure that there was no class of men in this country who would be so unpatriotic as to give the cue to the spirit of despondency, just because the inevitable casualties which invariably attend warlike operations had, from our inexperience, unfortunately outstepped our calculations. The right hon. Gentleman said, that only 27,000 were landed in the Crimea, but he (Sir R. Peel) believed that there were only 24,000 actually landed, which force at one time was reduced as low as 15,000, but if that number had since been thus greatly reduced, they must recollect that the losses that had been sustained did not exceed the unhappy losses incurred in the last war. If they turned to the pages of the concluding part of the last century, they would find that a large army was sent out to the West Indies in 1794, and that we lost in a single year no fewer than 18,500 men; while in the two following years, so heavy were the casualties, that they amounted to upwards of 40,000; and if, in 1813, after we had been seventeen years at war, with a population of only 13,000,000, we were able to equip the large force of 237,000 men, surely, with a population now far exceeding 20,000,000, with such resources as we now had at our command, and with a man, let him say, of the abilities of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) for our Chancellor of the Exchequer, was it possible, he asked, that we could have any difficulty in replacing our armaments? Why, none whatever; the only thing was, that we must set at once about it. Therefore, he thought the Government had acted prudently and wisely in calling Parliament together at present, in order to obtain powers for sending the militia to our dependencies abroad, so as to allow our regular troops at once to proceed to the scene of action. Looking at the aspect of affairs in an impartial spirit, it would be unfair to attribute our losses, grievous as they had been, entirely or even principally to the Government's want of foresight; because he firmly believed the present position of affairs was in a great measure owing to the vacillating policy of Prussia and to the dubious policy of Austria. They did not know exactly what were the terms of the treaty of alliance recently entered into with the latter Power; but, as the right hon. Member for Droitwich (Sir J. Pakington) had acutely observed, there could be no doubt that the presence of the Austrian troops in the Danubian Principalities had enabled the Emperor of Russia to concentrate his forces in another quarter where he expected an attack to be made by the Allies. He sincerely trusted, however, that this treaty would be universally beneficial. As regarded Prussia, he did not believe that the Sovereign of that country truly represented the sentiments of his people. He believed they were far too noble a nation to sanction the policy which their Government had pursued. But the King seemed to be acting up to the character of his race. When Napoleon won the battle of Austerlitz, M. Haugwitz, the Prime Minister of the King of Prussia, went to congratulate him on his success; whereupon Napoleon turned round and replied in terms which were as applicable to the same quarter now—"What! you want to be the ally of all the world, without giving any pledge of your sincerity." Prussia had always been as unstable as water. She was the first to declare war against France in 1792, and she was also the first to conclude a hollow and ignominious peace with the same State. Pretending friendship to George III., she seized upon Hanover to gratify her own ambition, and in obedience to the commands of Napoleon; but she scarce enjoyed her spoils, and, the following year, was cursed beneath the withering blast of war; and our King, George III., in declaring war in those days, observed, what can be again so justly applied to her —"It seems as if Prussia's ancient sentiments of honour were utterly extinct." But, whatever might be the policy of Austria or Prussia, let us have confidence in ourselves. Hand in hand with our French allies, let us put forth our whole power to vindicate in the face of the world the cause of justice and civilisation. There was nothing now to impede us; everything was in our favour. We have not been forced into this war, as Walpole was in 1739, by the people, who were led astray by the leading men of that time; no cry for war has forced the Government in vulgar haste to assume the offensive—on the contrary, the supreme appeal to arms has been adjourned until all efforts have failed to avert it. We have immense resources. The nation is unanimous about this war; but, having once thrown down the gauntlet to our enemy, he said, let us all pursue the contest with the utmost vigour. A French General once went to Napoleon when he was about to enter into a great engagement, and warned him that it would cost a great deal of money and men's lives, but Napoleon only rejoined, "*Quand il est question d'une grand bien, il faut y aller rondement.*" So with this country at present. We have a great struggle on our hands, and we must go at it like men. Let the Government fully accept the responsibility which the confidence of the country devolved upon them, and let their supporters in Parliament show a little more spirit than characterised debates on this subject during the last Session of Parliament. But, Sir, whilst we are shaping the course of this great struggle in harmony with France, there is one topic to which he wished to draw attention, for he was sure there were very many in the country who, equally with himself, felt indignant at the continuance of the nuisance to which he was about to refer. He yielded to none as a friend of liberty, and sympathiser with the exiles of oppressed nationalties, but they must all have observed with disgust, that there were foreigners who had taken refuge within the hospitable limits of this country, who embraced almost every public occasion to abuse the Sovereigns whom the people and the Government of this country had accepted as their allies. He went the other day to St. Martin's Hall to hear Kossuth, and, though we were just entering into a treaty with Austria, that individual, who was glad to find shelter in this country against the storms in his own, delivered a most brilliant invective against the Emperor of Austria, and told us that we had more need of Poland than Poland had need of us. We might very well despise all this trash in time of peace, but in time of war it was a serious question whether foreigners should be permitted thus to assail those who were in alliance with us. Victor Hugo also held forth in the same strain at Jersey. That individual had a sort of personal quarrel with the distinguished personage whom the people of France had chosen for their Sovereign, and he told the people of Jersey that our alliance with the French Emperor was a moral degradation to England. What was all this to M. Victor Hugo? If miserable trash of this kind was to be addressed to the English people by foreigners who found a safe asylum in this country, he would appeal to the noble Lord the Home Secretary whether some possible step could not be taken to put a stop to it. There was only one other topic on which he wished to touch. He would not like to say an unkind or unhandsome word of anybody, but he thought that some explanation was required with regard to the operations of our Baltic and Black Sea fleets, and the persons in command of them, in order to clear up the feeling of dissatisfaction existing in the country respecting that subject. The Admirals had had, no doubt, a delicate task to perform, and he was not disposed to judge them in any harsh spirit; but he hardly thought Admiral Dundas had shown all that vigour that might have been desirable; and he could not help feeling that, if the flag-ship had been the *Agamemnon*, and not the *Britannia*, a different course would have been pursued. We ought, however, to bear with the course that had been adopted, and hope that the explanations to be offered would clear up this matter. With respect to Admiral Napier, although there might be a feeling of dissatisfaction entertained in the public mind, still it would be most unjust to cast a slur upon him and his fleet, as the right hon. Gentleman (Sir J. Pakington) had done, as if Bomarsund was their only achievement. He thought Admiral Napier had exercised a wise discretion in not risking his force if he had inadequate means at his command. We must recollect, also, that in the last war—which was all that we had to refer to for examples—an army of about 20,000 men, under such experienced commanders as Lord Keith and Abercromby, sailed in a fleet of 120 ships for Cadiz, and attacked that place unsuccessfully. This showed how difficult it was with a large land force to conduct operations of this kind, and we know that Sir C. Napier had no sufficient means at his disposal for undertaking extensive operations. All he hoped, however, was, that next year, and even at the present moment, this contest would be carried on with increased vigour. We all knew now the kind of enemy with whom we had to deal—he had been unmasked. What a hypocrite! He had roused the religious fanaticism of his subjects, and encouraged his troops in the indulgence of sensual excesses to blind them to the perils to which they were exposed and the certain destruction into which they were often remorselessly sent. We know, also, the barbarities to which they resorted. It was to be feared, indeed, that the Czar was determined to carry on the war to the last extremity in justification of his own policy; and, indeed, he did not believe that a peace would now be cemented upon the ruins of Sebastopol, or when the triple standards of the Alliance floated on the turrets of St. Vladimir; but we knew whom we had to fight—we knew that our foe valued no friendship and respected no rights; and if he was contented to live without faith, without pity, and almost without respect, he hoped that Her Majesty's Government, in connection with the Government of France, and irrespective of any other vacillating or dubious Powers, would be enabled, under Providence, with the confidence and support of the British people, to teach the Emperor of Russia to feel that his lawless ambition and his aggressive aspirations would add neither dignity to his own Crown nor imperil the liberty or the independence of Europe.

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT: Sir, the charges which have been brought against the Government to-night are of a character so serious that I hope the House will grant me their attention while I endeavour to give an answer to the statements of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Droitwich, and to offer that explanation of the course of the Government which he claimed as a right, and justly claimed it, as a Member of Parliament, to exact from them. That explanation I will endeavour to give by a plain and straightforward narrative of the events of the war as they occurred, so far as they came under the direction of the Government; and the House of Commons must then judge whether, when they have considered the past conduct of the Government in the prosecution of the war, the Government are entitled to ask for further powers and further assistance for the purpose of carrying it out with vigour. Sir, the charges, as I understand them, which have been made by the right hon. Baronet are many in number. He states that the army was originally sent out by the Government without any distinct plan or intention; that when at last the Government resolved upon a plan, it was not such a plan as was justifiable, considering the forces at their command, and the information they possessed of the power and strength of the enemy they were about to attack. The right hon. Gentleman says further, that the army was too small for its object, that that army was not a well-appointed, but an ill-appointed army, and he quoted instances in which it had suffered in its efficiency from the want of due preparation on the part of the Government. He says, also, that that army was sent out too late, that the reinforcements were not sufficient—that that army, too weak in the first instance, was allowed by the neglect at home to dwindle down till it was absolutely insignificant. Now, Sir, I cannot do better than state—and I will do it in a very few sentences—what was the intention of the Government at the time that this army was first sent into the field; and I will show next what efforts were made in order to produce that army on the field in the highest state of discipline and efficiency; and thus you will see how much truth there is in the allegations that the army was too weak for its purpose, and that it was suffered to become still weaker by the want of sufficient reinforcements. Now, it was in April that the Government sent instructions to Lord Raglan as to the course he should pursue with the army under his orders. That army was numerically very inferior in strength to that now under his command.

Let me here say that in every step we took at home or abroad, through our Ministers here, through our Generals there, we acted in concert with our Allies, whose good faith in council has been as signal as their gallantry in the field; and when I speak of instructions given or intentions entertained, I speak of intentions entertained and instructions given, not by the English Government alone, but by the allied Governments acting in strict concert together. Well, at the time this army was sent to occupy a portion of the Turkish territory, we had a large fleet in the Black Sea. There was then a very powerful Russian army occupying the Danubian Principalities. There had been but few contests then between the Turkish and the Russian forces, and the strength of the Russian army had not been broken by disease and the deficiency of their Commissariat. Those who had the best means of forming a military opinion in this matter had not then very great confidence in the power of the Turkish army to resist the attacks which the Russians might direct against it, and thought—and I believe justly thought—that in the then aspect of affairs there was danger that a bold stroke might be made against the Turkish capital, and that the Bosphorus might fall into the hands of the Emperor of Russia. I am not now speaking of things that were probable, but in war you must also look to things that are possible, and guard against them. There was, also, the possibility that if the Turks failed to resist successfully the attacks on their position at Widdin and Kalafat, the Balkan might be turned, or that the Russians might, without crossing the Balkan range, go to the right of it, and advance down on Constantinople, and that that capital would in that way have been endangered.

Well, the English and French armies were occupied in ascertaining what would be the best line of defence, and strengthening it, in order to keep Constantinople safe from any *coup-de-main.* But Lord Raglan, in his instructions, was told that a portion of our army should be encamped at Unkiar Skelessi, not only on account of the salubrious and well-watered nature of that portion of the country, but also because it placed him within reach of Varna, should the line of the Balkan be attempted to be forced by the Russians; and, likewise, if any attempt should have to be made on the Russian territory, such as was ultimately contemplated, great advantages would be enjoyed there for carrying out that object. I mention this to show that the Government had a distinct plan, which was—first, to secure the Dardanelles; next, to defend Constantinople; next, that capital being safe, to defend the lines of the Balkan; and, lastly, to be ready, should opportunity arise, to strike a blow at some vital part of the Russian Empire. That which had been foreseen took place—the Russians forced the Danube, Silistria was invested, and Omar Pacha considered that he was in great danger, and that he should be unable to maintain that fortress unless the Allies made a combined advance that should threaten and menace the Russian army, and so force them to raise the siege. We all recollect the events of that siege. We all recollect the gallantry of our own countrymen in a miserable outpost of that fortress—but it was not their gallanty alone, or their valour, but it was a consciousness on the part of the Russians, that an advance of the French and English armies from Shumla and Varna would render it impossible for them to maintain their position, that caused them to raise the siege. We are very apt, after the fact, to underrate the value of successes achieved, and I have to-night heard hon. Gentlemen speak of gallant exploits elsewhere in a tone that I did not expect to have heard. Silistria, however, was relieved. An argument may be advanced, as to whether the importance of such relief should have been allowed to interpose before other military operations. No doubt that interposition lost time, but you gained immensely by it; you gained for the Turkish army a great moral *prestige,* and destroyed that *prestige* which had so long throughout Europe been attached to the Russian army. It was the first great enterprise of the Russian arms in this war, and it failed. Do not undervalue the importance of that at the outset of a contest. Well, that accomplished, it remained for the Government to decide on the next enterprise which would most tend to strike some effectual blow at the power of Russia in the Black Sea, and so place her neighbours for the future in a state of comparative tranquillity. On the 22nd of June the siege of Silistria was raised, and on the 29th instructions were sent to Lord Raglan—who, from the first, had been desired to ascertain, by every means in his power, the amount of the Russian forces in the Crimea, and to ascertain how far, with the powers at the disposal of the Allies, an attempt on Sebastopol would be successful. The officers who commanded those two armies were men of great military experience, and the Government reposed in them—one of whom is now no more—as it does now in the survivor and in the successor of the other, unbounded confidence. The right hon. Baronet asks whether we gave them any positive instructions after we had received any positive information on which we could rely? If we had shown so little trust and confidence in those men who were selected to hold posts of such responsibility as the command of our armies, we being six weeks distant from the scene of action—if we had had so little confidence in them as to have told them, whether your information be favourable or not, you must wait until we have decided on it, and weighed the grounds of your recommendation—then the allied Governments would not only, as the hon. Baronet has said, have lost weeks, but months, and delayed so long that no expedition could have been attempted. Well, those officers took every means to ascertain the force of Russia in the Crimea. They held a council of war, and decided, as I think they had a right to decide, that the attempt should be made. They knew the forces at their own command, and, from information received, they also knew what forces they would be likely to meet; and Lord Raglan knew better than any man what accession to his forces he could count upon, for no man knows better what is or is not the military capacity of England. From the moment they had come to a decision, the allied Commanders applied every energy of their minds to make preparations for that immense armament which conveyed our armies to the Crimea.

Right hon. Gentlemen talk of the lateness of the expedition, and think nothing so simple as the embarkation of 50,000 men, and of carrying them across the sea, and landing them in face of an hostile army, with boats built and prepared for the landing of horses and siege guns. Right hon. Gentlemen talk of this as of landing at a pier in a time of profound peace. These preparations took much labour, and reflect infinite credit on those engaged in them, and I do not know that any expedition ever sailed so perfect and complete in all its departments, and with the exception of that confusion which must of necessity arise in moving so vast a body of men on so capricious an element as the sea, I do not think that there was ever moved so immense a force with so little loss and with so great success. Now, I ask, was the army landed in the Crimea so insufficient for the purpose for which it was intended? Lord Raglan took with him 27,000 men to the Crimea, which, together with our Allies, formed a force of more than 50,000 men. What had they to meet? Nearly the whole of the Russian force in the Crimea, and they met it in an entrenched position, which gave to their numbers an advantage almost equivalent to doubling their force. They held on the heights of Alma a position as strong as that which we held at Inkerman; but they held it with a very different result.

Let me now inquire whether there was nothing else that delayed this expedition? Before it sailed from Varna there broke out a fearful pestilence among our troops; that pestilence thinned their ranks most grievously, and our troops had to meet an enemy worse than any human enemy, and far more dispiriting and terrible to the soldiers. We were, unfortunately, not the only sufferers; our Allies suffered also from this disease, and among them its ravages were more fearful than among our own troops. I do not exactly know the extent of the loss they suffered, but I know the loss from disease was far greater than any which we sustained in action. No sooner had that disease culminated, and commenced to decline among the troops on land, than it broke out in the fleet, which put to sea, as it was thought that the disease could so best be remedied; but the fleet soon returned, having in a few hours sustained a loss the mortality of which, from its rapidity, was fearful in the extreme.

Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud had now to recruit their army, and to raise them from that depression consequent on sickness, while making the preparations for the invasion of the Crimea. It is quite clear that, had they been able to land in the Crimea earlier, they would have been enabled to have gained much as compared with the enemy? The difficulty which the Russians had to contend with in receiving reinforcements arose from the difficulty of passing over a soil which became broken up in wet weather. Therefore, the longer the fine weather, the longer could the Russians pour in reinforcements; that they made good use of their time none could deny, and I suppose that there never was an army moved on land so skilfully and rapidly as was the corps of General Dannenberg which was brought from Odessa. The right hon. Baronet has said, that we have underrated the power and skill of our enemy. I recollect that last Session I made some observations on that head; and I said that the public opinion of the country was doing that which the right hon. Baronet now accuses us of doing. From the campaign on the Danube, which had this peculiarity, that there was not one pitched battle fought during it, the public chose to assume that the Russian power was waning, if not extinct, and that there was nothing easier than to conquer whenever we chose. I pointed out that the Russian soldier, who is a Russian peasant, is a man of a primitive nature, and, like all primitive people, is strongly and ardently attached to his native country. We are apt to think that those of a country who have no free institutions like our own are unable to feel that patriotism which we feel; but we have had a lesson in this respect, and others will admit, now that they have seen the defence made of Sebastopol, the tenacity with which the Russians defend their country, a tenacity to which, when I formerly alluded to it, I was accused of connivance. But the right hon. Baronet states that the army was insufficient in number, and has been utterly without reinforcements. Now, the army, when first sent out, was composed of four divisions, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and light division, besides cavalry and artillery, and it consisted of 22,680 men. In June, before the orders were given to make a descent on the Crimea, if circumstances were such as to justify such an attack, a fifth division was formed and placed under the command of the lamented Sir George Cathcart. Now, let me state the reinforcements that were sent out to the army:—In June, there were 941 men; in July, 4,588 men; in August, 2,032 men—yet the right hon. Baronet tells us that from the moment that the expedition was decided on no reinforcements were sent to the army. [Sir J. PAKINGTON: I did not say that.] Then I was so unfortunate as to have misunderstood the right hon. Baronet; but, perhaps he will admit that, subsequent to the orders and subsequent to the landing in the Crimea, he said no attempt was made to reinforce the army. But to continue: in September there were 1,286 men sent out; in October, 2,855; and, in November, 7,037. Now, these were before other reinforcements, which I admit were called for by subsequent events, and which were requested by Lord Raglan; but I do not count them, or seek to take any advantage from them, but, month by month, state to you the number of troops which were sent out. But you may argue that these reinforcements were small for a Power like England, that can pour out its battalions like water. But I ask, on whom rests the responsibility that England, at the commencement of a war, must make small wars? It has been the fault of every Parliament; we have always had the same stereotyped system of economy in military affairs. I am speaking the whole plain truth in this matter. I am as much to blame as any one. I have held for some years the responsible situation of Secretary at War, and I know what have been my own shortcomings in this respect, but whenever I have brought forward, as I have done, what are called Peace Estimates, I have constantly been met with Motions for large reductions. I say, therefore, that it has been the fault of all parties, all Administrations, and every Parliament. I am afraid I cannot give my assent to any exception, however eager I may be to do so. I have seen Administrations formed of various parties—I have seen them taking different courses on almost every conceivable subject, but on one they have all agreed, and that has been the one to which I have alluded—one of improvident economy. What has been the result? At the commencement of the war we had to make means and to create an army, and to use it at the same time. I recollect at the time when the Militia Bill was brought forward by the right hon. Member for Midhurst (Mr. Walpole)—and every year that has passed has confirmed the opinion I entertained of the wisdom of that measure—we had a great many discussions on the military available strength of the country, and hon. Gentlemen used arguments to show that after deducting the troops necessary for the occupation of our garrisons, we had not 10,000 available bayonets left in England. I have shown the number of men originally sent out, and of the reinforcements since sent; I will now add to them those that have been ordered to embark from the different Mediterranean garrisons, and which are sent from home, including also 1,700 men still waiting for ships. I am not now speaking of what have been actually under Lord Raglan's command, but of those which are passing under his command, which when they have passed there will, from first to last, have been, in cavalry, infantry, artillery, and sappers, 53,044 men. This is the number of non-commissioned officers and privates, exclusive of officers; if you add them, the numbers will be between 54,000 and 55,000 men. I do not believe that the country is aware of the efforts that have been made—they have seen it stereotyped through leading articles that Lord Raglan has been left with 16,000 bayonets. But what does 16,000 bayonets mean? It means all that are left, after deducting all the men on detachment duty, all the cavalry, artillery, engineers, and all officers and non-commissioned officers; and the 16,000 bayonets are put forward as the whole available army. Why, the Duke of Wellington had at the battle of Waterloo only 18,000 British bayonets, and, if you subtract all the officers, non-commissioned officers, cavalry, and artillery, and men not actually engaged, you will attain your object in making a small show upon paper, but you will deceive yourselves and the country as to the efforts she is putting forth.

The right hon. Baronet has said, and with perfect fairness and truth, that the Government has no right to complain of the House of Commons, and they have behaved with fairness and liberality, and have not made objections to any call or demand which the Government has made; but the right hon. Gentleman says that the question is, whether these powers or further powers should be intrusted to the hands of those who have shown so little wisdom, prudence, and foresight? The right hon. Baronet drew a picture of a Member of Parliament's duty: it was his duty to give his support to a war which he felt to be just, and to give his support also to any Government he thought capable of conducting it efficiently. But, according to the right hon. Baronet's own statement, he has given extraordinary powers to the present Government, whom he thought incapable of using them with sufficient wisdom, prudence, or foresight. If that be his rule, it is not mine. If we are to derive any advantage from this strange proceeding on his part, I reject it; if he thinks the Government incapable of carrying on affairs, it is not his duty to intrust them with power, but to transfer it to some other men more honest and capable of conducting affairs, so as to satisfy himself and the country. The right hon. Baronet has also asserted that they had neglected to supply the army with proper appointments; he founds his charge on a proceeding which, in a military point of view, was necessary, and on which the Government could not have dictated, and neither did they pretend to dictate, to military men. The right hon. Baronet says they landed without tents, and he conceives that the Executive were in fault for having sent out a great army without a sufficiency of tents; but every regiment that went out with its arms and munition took also tents, and I do not believe that any army ever before went out so perfectly appointed in these respects. There is no doubt about their having the tents, but it is said Lord Raglan landed on the 16th of September without tents. The night was wet, and the men were exposed to a great deal of suffering, but they only did for a few days that which the Duke of Wellington and the Spanish army did for four years. No doubt much sickness was caused by this—it is very easy to judge of this after the fact, and Lord Raglan is blamed for having landed without tents, and having brought them so unprovided to Balaklava. But let me put another question, and then let any one judge whether Lord Raglan is to be blamed. He knew that they had to meet a very powerful army, which had intrenched itself, and it was very obvious that within a short time of landing, and probably at the time of landing, they would have to meet an energetic, determined, and skilful enemy. Lord Raglan might have brought all his tents, but then he would have left behind him all those battalions the space for which would have been taken up by the tents. A powerful force is stationed at the Alma, and nothing can be done until their position is forced or turned. Now, if the result of the battle of the Alma, instead of being a glorious victory, had been an undecided success in consequence of the want of two or three battalions, the expedition would have been lost, and what would then have been said of Lord Raglan? It would have been said, "Why did you fill your ships with ambulances and tents when you had men, and such men, lying idle at Varna? You were going upon an expedition in which you knew that the first blow was everything, and to take men with you, and plenty of them, should have been the one and the only consideration." But now the battle of the Alma has been won, it is easy for the right hon. Gentleman to say that it might have been won with fewer men. Just so. The right hon. Gentleman thinks nothing of the expedition to Bomarsund. There was certainly, he says, a blockade, but you sent your great ships into the Baltic upon an expedition ending in nothing. One right hon. Baronet thinks nothing of the capture of islands almost inaccessible, held by a very powerful enemy, in which buildings had been marked out for erection which would have made them into another Cronstadt or another Helsingfors, so that there might be in the Gulf of Finland another perpetual menace to another capital. This is the result which the right hon. Gentleman treats with such supreme contempt; but the Emperor of the French differs from him in opinion, for he gave a marshal's bâton to the general who commanded the French troops engaged in the expedition.

I now come back to the Alma, and the right hon. Gentleman's charge, that tents were not provided for the troops. I hope the explanation I have given will be obvious to every one and satisfactory to the country. I do not believe that one iota of blame attaches to Lord Raglan for that proceeding. I believe he did what every man in his place ought to do—he judged of the circumstances as they then stood, he did not pretend to prophecy the success of the army, but he took every means to ensure it. It is now easy to say that his success was certain, and that he should have left men behind and taken tents with him instead.

I must here diverge for a moment to meet a charge which the right hon. Gentleman has not made, but which has been frequently made elsewhere, and I shall make a very frank statement on that subject to the House; nor shall I, in defending what appears to me to be defensible, condescend for one moment to conceal what I think, with respect to details which have been in my opinion, unsatisfactory. Last Session we had a great deal of discussion as to the merits of the Commissariat, and the Commissariat was then subjected to much popular criticism. I believe that the opinions then formed with regard to the Commissariat were exaggerated, and not founded on fact, but I am not prepared to say that at the end of a long peace the Commissariat or any other department of the army was necessarily, or could be, in as perfect a state as experience and practice could make it. I have no doubt, therefore, that there was ground for a certain portion of criticism upon the part of those who were determined to find fault; but the Commissariat has outlived those criticisms, and I believe it is now universally admitted that there never was an army better fed than the army of Lord Raglan. Their rations have been increased, and they are now 50 per cent larger in meat than the rations of British troops have been at any previous time. When fears arose as to their health from the non-use of vegetables, immediate steps were taken to supply them from Trieste, Venice, and Smyrna with fresh vegetables; and when I heard that they were being sold to the men, I wrote to Lord Raglan, that, in my opinion, whatever was necessary to make the soldiers efficient in the peculiar position in which they were placed with a view to the public service ought to be supplied at the expense of the public. But it has been stated that there has been great mismanagement with respect to the medical department of the army during the campaign, and I am very anxious that the House should know the exact truth upon this subject, because, I think, nothing can be so detrimental to the public service as for the public to imagine that when our bravest men were laid prostrate by suffering, be it from wounds or be it from sickness, they met with heartless neglect, at a time when they had earned for themselves a right to the utmost care and solicitude. Let me first state what was the amount of the staff which we sent out. For a long period no army had left the shores of England so large and so well appointed; and certainly none had ever left it to conduct operations so important, but so hazardous, as the army of Lord Raglan. It was felt that, going to a climate so doubtful, the efficiency of the medical staff was a matter of paramount importance. When, therefore, the army was first organised, the Government took the opinion of a gentleman upon a matter of detail, which I instance in order to show the care and attention with which these matters were looked to; they took the opinion of Dr. Guthrie, a surgeon of great eminence and talent, who had stated that there was an error in the organisation of the medical department. He said—

> "You have but three medical officers to a regiment; you have a large staff; the staff surgeon has none of that local interest in a regiment which the regimental surgeon has. In the field, the regimental surgeon has the strongest interest in bringing his men to a state of health as rapidly as possible, and getting them back to their battalions, while the staff surgeon has no interest, one way or the other, in clearing the hospitals, and therefore do not give so many men to your staff, but give a fourth surgeon to every re-

giment, and your medical department will be more efficient."

Dr. Andrew Smith, the head of the medical department of the Army, differed from Dr. Guthrie upon that question. He said—

> "In no battle is every regiment engaged; and, if you give a fourth surgeon to every regiment, those regiments which have suffered most will not have enough, while those who have not suffered at all will have too many. Those who have suffered must depend on the staff; but the staff will be weakened, and the colonels of the regiments which have not been engaged will not let a surgeon of their own go, for they will say that their own regiments may be engaged on the next day."

I consulted Lord Raglan as to which system he preferred, and he said he thought Dr. Guthrie was right. But there was great authority on either side, and we said to Dr. Guthrie, "Take your large regimental establishment;" and to Dr. Smith, "Take your large staff establishment." Dr. Andrew Smith had devoted himself to the work night and day; he collected all the purveyors of hospitals who had had experience in previous wars. They met at his house, and drew up a report as to the proper amount of stores to be sent out for the use of the army. They drew upon their recollections of the Peninsular war, and made their calculations at so much per head. Well, we trebled it. The Government felt that since the period of the Peninsular war great improvements had been made, the comforts of the soldiers were now more attended to, and more must be done than had been done in the campaigns of Wellington. I mention this to show that it was our object to make these preparations for the army as good and as ample as possible. I am not saying that all has been done successfully, or could not have been done better, but that we spared no exertion to make it as efficient as we could.

But now, what number of medical gentlemen were appointed to the army? Of staff medical officers there were 280, of regimental medical officers 192, and of ordnance medical officers fourteen, making a total of 486; or, with the nine medical officers of the 5th Division, of 495. I think it only fair to state, that upwards of 100 of these have been added since the battle of the Alma; but at that time also it must be recollected that the force was much smaller. At that battle the medical establishment, as it was at first fixed for the army, amounted to 275. On looking at the *Moniteur de l'Armée*, I find that the medical establishment for the French army amounted to exactly the same number, although their army was numerically—I speak of the two armies as sent to Turkey—larger than ours. If we had chosen to limit our medical staff to the number engaged in the Peninsula, we should have sent out one surgeon to every 145 men, while the number we have sent to the East is one to every seventy-seven men, or very nearly double the number. Much complaint has been made upon this subject, and a great deal of the blame which has been cast upon it is just in this sense—that when sickness makes its ravages upon an army which is at the same time engaged in constant operations against an enemy, the strain upon the medical officers becomes so great that no number you can send out will be sufficient. But was there no difficulty in getting together this large staff? It was necessary to send all the most experienced men we could find, and we drew from the depôts all the regimental surgeons of military experience to send to the East; but it was also necessary to keep some at home, because we had the cholera in England as well as in Turkey, and we could not trust entirely to civilians for attendance upon the troops, because, when any virulent disease such as the cholera arises, a civilian, who has a large practice in the country, and whose clients are very important to him, says, "It will not be honest in me to receive your pay, as I can no longer attend to your regiment." We had great difficulty in getting these men together, for they were scattered about in emigrant ships, in merchant ships, and in various other vocations in different parts of the world. We also employed numbers of civilians, giving them a temporary rank in the army, and they did not wish for more, as they were only desirous of the opportunity of getting practice and experience. I think the House will do me the justice to admit that, as far as the medical staff is concerned, the Government cannot be charged with looking at it in a niggard spirit, or with not anticipating great drains upon that establishment, which was just double in number that which had ever before been sent with an English army. I must not take up the time of the House by reading the long lists which have been published of the *matériel* which was sent out. I am not speaking to that which is the weak point in the department—namely, its distribution, but to the fact of its having been prepared and sent out—to the fact that Dr. Smith was indefatigable in his endeavours to supply the army with every possible comfort, nay, with every possible luxury, that could be of use in a hospital. The list contains the items of blankets and bedding, of good cotton sheets 19,000, and everything upon that sort of scale. I will not say more on this part of the subject, but I wish to impress upon the House and upon the right hon. Gentleman (Sir J. Pakington) that it has not arisen from heartless indifference to the sufferings of the troops that they have been exposed to privations.

I have already alluded to a statement, that after the battle of the Alma a great deal of unnecessary suffering was inflicted on our troops in consequence of the bad arrangements of the medical staff. I can refer upon this subject to documentary evidence, but I think I can put the case to the House in a manner which will convince them that there has been great misapprehension and great exaggeration of the evils which have existed, and which at the commencement of a war always must exist. It was stated, for example, that the wounded of the British army at Alma lay upon the field of battle untended for two or three days—that they were brought down to the ships with their wounds undressed, and put on board one of them in such numbers that it was rendered unsafe. I believe that a great deal of this misapprehension arose from ignorance of what happened in places beyond the observation of those who made the allegations. The French army took fewer men than we did, and carried their ambulances with them; they had, I rejoice to say, fewer wounded than we had, and, being nearer to the sea, all their wounded were carried immediately to the ships. Our troops were some of them four or five miles from the sea, and a field hospital was established at some farm buildings at or near the spot where they had fallen. All the men whose cases permitted them to be moved were moved into it, and those who could not be moved were treated on the field, their wounds were dressed, and as much comfort afforded them as possible. —little enough that is. All such plans after a great battle, and upon the battlefield, are necessarily rough and inefficient for the comfort of the men, but this is one of the stern necessities of war. The men were brought down the next day, or the day following, from the field hospital, or from the field, and placed on board ship. It was supposed that those who were thus carried down were being brought for the first time from the spot at which they were wounded, and that no treatment had yet been afforded them; but I have evidence which satisfies me that in not one single instance was a man allowed to leave this field hospital without his hurts being dressed; but I will take a previous case, namely, that of the *Kangaroo,* after the landing at Old Fort; but it is quite true that a number of men, far beyond what she could possibly carry, were in the first instance placed on board the *Kangaroo.* The statement, however, that 1,500 persons were placed on board is an exaggeration, for I believe that the number did not much, if at all, exceed 700. It was stated that the officer in command made a signal that he was overloaded, and that the medical officer remonstrated against so large a number being placed on board, and 450 only were sent in her. The medical department was free from blame; but persons commanding transports, and those who are without the same responsibility as medical men, are often very unwilling to put themselves out of the way for a department which is not their own. But the wounded were immediately removed from the *Kangaroo* to another vessel. It was also stated that 100 died of the cholera during the passage; the number, I believe, was really twenty-two, and that is a small proportion, when it is recollected there were many cholera cases, and at that period the proportion of deaths to sickness was greater than it had ever been before in any of the London hospitals. I admit that there was great discomfort, but I maintain it could not be avoided. The men could not be left on the field, Lord Raglan was obliged to remain two or three days on the spot, because he was aware that if he left them they would be massacred by the Cossacks; and, of course, their sufferings on board ship were great before they reached the general hospital of Constantinople. But it is said that their wounds were not dressed during the whole time that they were on board ship. I am informed by surgeons accustomed to the treatment of gunshot wounds, that no surgeon would think of dressing or re-dressing a wound of this description within three or four days after it had been made; the great object being not to disturb the wound, and to keep the dressings wet. It may, therefore, most likely be true, that the wounds were not dressed on board, and yet that the sufferers did not experience any unnecessary neglect. I have dilated rather at length upon this subject, because I do feel that, if it were true that anything like systematic or heartless indifference had been manifested by any department, but above all by the medical department, it would produce a terrible reaction in the spirit of the people of this country, and destroy that confidence in the administration and management of the army, which has of late years made it so much more easy to recruit its ranks.

As I am upon this point, I will now say a few words with regard to the general hospital at Scutari, and this is a subject which, I admit, has caused me much anxiety. The distance at which we are placed from the scene of action is such, that we are helpless to assist in any great emergency; we can send out stores and men, but we cannot direct their immediate application. I will not conceal what I consider to be the real truth with regard to this hospital, although I have seen evidence upon both sides so contradictory that I would defy any man who was willing to give credit to either party to know what conclusion to come to. We have been told, for instance, that it was not possible to procure lint in the hospital, and the greatest indignation has been expressed against the persons charged with these matters for leaving the hospital so unprovided. I have accounts from medical men, which I will not read. They are the persons who have been impugned, and unjustly impugned, by public opinion, and their statement is, that there never was for a moment a deficiency of lint, of linen, or of anything else; but there had been the greatest mismanagement as to their distribution. At the time the army left Varna the general hospital was there, and orders were then given that the stores should be sent down to Scutari, but that order, in the hurry and bustle of the departure, was never executed. The principal portion of the stores remained at Varna, while the whole mass of the wounded were sent to Scutari; fortunately there was, with the assistance of the Turkish Government, a sufficiency to meet the difficulty of the moment. There never was a deficiency of these things, but, such a deficiency being apprehended, the medical officers accepted a loan of a quantity of lint and other articles from the Turkish Government for the use of the hospital. Therefore there was at one time an apprehended deficiency; there never was a positive deficiency; but I will tell you what there has been—there has been a system engendered during the peace which has greatly incumbered the hospitals of check and counter check for the purpose of economy. There have been all manner of forms to be gone through before stores could be issued to the medical officers. Every account I get says this; the medical men in their vocation are beyond all praise, says the gentleman at the head of the establishment; they work night and day—their tenderness to the sick, their humanity, their zeal, their energy, are mentioned by every one, friend and foe. But it does appear to me that the deficiency is this, that, with plenty of stores, no one seemed to know where to lay their hands upon them; with plenty of materials at their disposal, the forms were so cumbrous that they never could be produced with that rapidity which was necessary for the purposes of a military hospital. The moment we heard complaints of this kind we sent out a commission with authority to inquire into the causes of these evils, and set them right. We thought there might be timidity on the part of some of the officials in asking for what they might require, and we telegraphed to Lord Stratford, telling him the supplies were to be unlimited, and that the hospital was to be provided with everything. We did everything we could, and I am glad to see, by the accounts I get from persons on whose judgment I can depend, that things have been set right. One gentleman, whose letter is private, but whose name alone would be a guarantee that he was not disposed to criticise too favourably upon this subject, says—

> "I see there much to blame and much to praise. But day by day I see manifest improvement. To manage more than 3,000 casualties of the worst nature is indeed a task to be met in an entirely satisfactory way by nothing short of a miraculous energy."

He says—

> "With regard to the past, I could pick many a hole, and show where head has been wanted and duty neglected; but I see so much exertion being made that I will throw a veil over that; if the wheel is in the rut, at any rate I can say every one is putting his shoulder to the wheel to get it out again."

I do believe that those who have been so free to blame have not really considered and made allowance for the difficulties of the case. When 1,000 or 1,500 sick and wounded men are simultaneously brought into a hospital, if you had all the order and all the appliances you could wish, you never could prevent a scene of confusion arising from the sudden influx of so many disabled men. I hope the House will do me the justice to acknowledge that in speaking on this question I have not concealed my honest opinion. I might have read to you flat contradictions of everything that has been advanced, written by men who made their statements in perfect good faith, who could give the dates of the particular cases with the greatest accuracy, and I have no doubt they would give to the House the exact facts, but they would not give to the House what I should like it to have—a fair general view of the real circumstances of the case. If I might be allowed to say one word on this subject before I leave it, it is this:—one thing which the Government did to ensure the comfort of the sick and wounded has been eminently successful. The House will recollect that, some time ago, a lady, Miss Nightingale, undertook to carry out to Scutari a number of nurses for the purpose of alleviating the sufferings of the sick and wounded. I have received, not only from medical men, but from many others who have had an opportunity of making observations, letters couched in the highest possible terms of praise. I will not repeat the words, but no higher words of praise could be applied to women for the wonderful energy, the wonderful tact, the wonderful tenderness, combined with the extraordinary self-devotion, which have been displayed by that lady, and I am glad to say that the characteristics which have been shown by that lady, the force and influence of her character, seem to have penetrated all those working with her, and I believe, not only the patients themselves, but every person connected with the hospital will be benefited by the admixture of this new element in the management of a military hospital.

I have been led away from my subject in this digression, but I hope the House will pardon me, and I will now come back to what I was saying in answer to the observations of the right hon. Baronet. I have stated what was the force of our armament —I have shown the amount of the army which was originally sent out, and which is now about to be sent to Lord Raglan, taking the reinforcements due to him, and adding them to those already in his possession, and a letter has just been put into my hand from Sir Henry Ward, stating—and I was delighted to hear it—that he had letters from Admiral Boxer, in which he mentioned that 24,000 English and French troops had passed through the Bosphorus up to the 5th of last month. I have shown you the number of the reinforcements; I have shown you that they amounted, first, in June, to 941; July, to 4,580; August, 2,032; September, 1,286; October, 2,855; and November, 7,037; making altogether 18,739, exclusive of the reinforcements since sent; and I have shown you, including the original army and the other reinforcements, we have sent out 54,736 men; and I ask you whether, consulting our history, England, in the first year of any war in which she was engaged, ever sent forth such an army as this? You say, and say with truth—and I believe you—"You have absorbed our reserve." We have done so. The right hon. Baronet says the questions he put to-night were not all, and that on another day he might call us to an account for sending an expedition against Sebastopol at all. I will not wait for that time, but I will tell him why we did so. Because we knew that Sebastopol is the stronghold of the power of Russia in the south; we knew that the blockade of Russia, however effectual, will not strike home in a manner that will be sensibly felt; and we knew that the destruction of her fortresses along the Circassian coast, although it shakes her power to the centre in those provinces of Asia which she has of late years appropriated, is not still such a blow as would be inflicted if by any means at our disposal we could destroy her fleet and arsenal at Sebastopol. It was a great undertaking; I admit it was a great hazard, but I tell you next year it would have been impossible. Round that mighty fortress, day by day, and night by night, have been rising chains of forts; and if we were to give them time, they would continue to rise until the fortress would be absolutely impregnable. If Sebastopol is not taken or destroyed in this campaign, it will never be taken or destroyed. There was a great risk in the undertaking, it is said. I say there was. But I recollect an hon. Member in the last Session saying he had seen a gentleman of influence in the City who had told him there was but one feeling there of unanimity as to the way in which the war should be carried on. He said, "We all hope that the war will be carried on with the utmost vigour and determination, but no risk must be run whatever." Now, if we can conduct a war with that happy mixture of energy and determination, combined with no risk to ourselves—that happy mixture of prudence and boldness which would inflict all the loss upon the enemy, and none upon ourselves, truly we might say the golden age of war has come. But in carrying on war, you must run great risks if you would acquire great advantages. It is said it was a great hazard. Unquestionably it was; but I know that many military men with, in many respects, opinions adverse to my own, have said, "They must do it now, or they never will do it at all." I admit that there was very great hazard, but it struck me that the prize was of such enormous importance that we should have been unworthy of our places if we had not attempted, while we could with any chance of success, to strike a blow at the only vulnerable place, which is the very centre and heart of the power of Russia in the Black Sea.

Well, I hope, Sir, that the right hon. Baronet will be satisfied with this answer, which is the only one I can give him, and that the result will prove the wisdom of the proceeding. We know the hazards of war; but it is easy to judge of events after they have taken place. But let the right hon. Baronet reflect on the course which was taken by certain parties with reference to this subject during the last Session. I confess that all last summer, when I heard the language in which the Government was urged to make an attempt upon Sebastopol—they thought the subject had escaped the attention of the Government, I suppose—but the language in which it was urged was in itself so arrogant, so ignorant, and so presumptuous, that I used to feel when I heard it a sort of superstitious fear that such arrogance and such presumption would bring down the vengeance of Heaven upon us. They talked of Russian power, judging from the weakened, dispirited, and demoralised army, that could make no progress in the campaign upon the Danube. They talked of the power of Russia as if it were nothing. We did not enter into this war in that spirit. We knew the great resources she possessed, and we did everything in our power to ensure success. It is true that I have heard a criticism made by some military men upon the whole proceeding. They say, "You have sent out more men than you can well maintain, you have sent out a number that you will find it difficult to feed and to clothe; it is much more than you can manage." That was the difficulty I spoke of before—of making a great start in the first year of the war. It is a difficulty which you have had to encounter when you have had to make an army, when you have it not ready made. But recollect this—we have not well-seasoned soldiers in this country. See the difficulties we have had to encounter. We have no conscription in England; we have no compulsory service whatever in England; we have to trust entirely to the voluntary system. You cannot make an army as other nations may. You cannot make an army by a stroke of the pen, or by an ukase raise 100,000 soldiers. We must get men willing to come; but on the other hand, when they do come, you have got the materials which no conscription in the world can furnish, you have got for your materials men not dragged from their reluctant homes against their wills, and from their peaceful pursuits, to be forced into scenes of blood and scenes of horror to which they were totally averse. You have got free men—men animated by high spirits, young adventurers, full of life, full of enthusiasm, full of ambition—men whom no suffering can break, who can never complain that one hardship or suffering to which they have been exposed has been forced upon them by a tyrannical Government. You have had that difficulty, but you have had another—at least when we are talking of augmentations—we have had a difficulty which has pressed very hardly upon us; for some time past emigration to a considerable extent has been going on from this country, and more especially from the sister country—Ireland—which has dried up to a certain extent the sources of our military supply. You have, at the same time, had great prosperity in trade and agriculture, which has produced an enormous demand for labour and consequently created high wages; now all that would not be in favour of the recruiting sergeant. But when I look back to the records of history, and see what were the means by which in former wars we attempted to get men, how we persuaded men into the militia by a bounty of 10*l.*, and draughted them out of it by a bounty of 11*l.*, and, after all, we could only raise something like 24,000 men in one year, and when I look at what has been done during this the first year of the war, I must confess the contrast is not unfavourable. Taking into account the enlistments, both in the regulars and the East India Company's service, and all other additions, we shall by the end of the month have added by free enlistment something like 40,000 men, such as I have described, to our army. I do say, then, I reply with confidence to the inquiry as to the augmentation of the army. We are getting men not faster than they are required, but faster than we can form them into regiments, drill them, and make them skilful and useful soldiers of their Queen and country.

On that point I will stop to say that Lord Hardinge, the Commander in Chief, at the very commencement issued a regulation in regard to the troops for the East, that he would not allow a single man to go out unless he was previously practised in the use of the Minié rifle. It has been the fashion, I regret to say it, for some time past to depreciate the value of the services of Lord Hardinge. I have served with Lord Hardinge as Commander in Chief, and with others as Commander in Chief, and I have been able to see what Lord Hardinge has been able to accomplish under circumstances of great and extraordinary difficulty. If you look at the nature of the successes which our arms have achieved in the Crimea, I think it will strike you that the next thing to be noticed, after the indomitable courage and fortitude of the men, is the skill with which they have used their weapons, and the superiority of the weapons which have been placed in their hands. If it had not been for Lord Hardinge, I do not believe you would have had a single division armed with Minié rifles. I do not mean that Lord Hardinge sent them, but, if he had not during the short time he was at the head of the Ordnance Department insisted upon their introduction, that they would not have been in use now. Many officers of high military rank were notoriously prejudiced in favour of the old regulation muskets, and could not be got out of the routine, and even such men as the late gallant Sir Charles Napier had said, "There is nothing like Brown Bess; for God's sake don't take away Brown Bess." But Lord Hardinge had laid down a regulation that not a recruit should leave this country unless he was properly instructed in the skilful use of this formidable arm. And what is the opinion of the men of the division who are armed with the Minié as to the use of this rifle, and what was the opinion of the rest of the men from witnessing its effect? That opinion was manifested on the dreadful day of Inkerman, where, whenever a man, not having the rifle, saw a man fall who had, he ran, seized his Minié, and used it for the rest of the day. It is not only the superiority of the weapon, but the consciousness which it gives the man who has it that he is dependent upon his skill, and must devote his mind to exercise that skill. The result is, that, instead of firing at random, and only one ball in 600 or 700 taking effect, they saw the soldier using his weapon with the facility and activity with which a gamekeeper would his fowlingpiece, and taking the proper precaution to make every shot tell. Well, Sir, we have had this army to create, to drill, and to send out. Men are coming in rapidly; we shall be able to augment the regiments largely, and thus establish a reserve, so that another year it shall not be said, as it has this year, "You have put our all upon one great effort." It has been said, we should have sent out, earlier, two, three, four, five, or six regiments; but could we have done so? What will the right hon. Baronet say when he is told how long it takes to make a soldier? What were the regiments that have been sent out? Three months ago regiments that have been sent out were in our Colonies, or returning from a tropical climate, mere skeletons of regiments. They were to be engaged in Crimean duty, and had to be totally reformed. Some of these regiments were not in England at this time; some were in Canada; others in the West Indies. How, then, can it be said to us, reinforcements should have been sent out three months ago? We could not get a man of those regiments which the right hon. Baronet says ought to have been sent out, and he must recollect that we cannot create an army, we must get the men first, then make them into soldiers by drilling them and instructing them in the skilful use of their weapon; for nothing would be so injurious to the reputation of our army as sending men into the field inefficient for their duty.

I hope, Sir, that this House will believe that the Government have not been neglectful of these considerations, and have made every exertion to raise and strengthen our army. Look back at the history of all previous expeditions, at the commencement of our wars and show me one which has been equal in strength to that which has now been sent out. Show me one in which at the end of the first campaign they had come out with a higher reputation. Can it be said now, as Sir Henry Bunbury says of our army before the expedition to Egypt, that the public had lost all confidence in the skill, and even the courage, of our officers and men; and that one of the greatest benefits of the successful campaign of Sir Ralph Abercrombie was to restore the reputation of the armies after the disastrous disgraces which England had undergone. But I want to know what is our position at present. I want to know whether, at any period in the history of England, our military character stands higher than it does at present. I want to know what is the effect upon the public opinion of Europe of the manner in which our battalions have conducted themselves. I want also to know what is the effect upon Russia, and upon its armies, of the manner in which our battalions have repulsed every attack they have made; and I must say I think that those persons who take upon themselves to criticise our operations, and to say that Alma ought to have been turned instead of stormed, could not have studied the map of the country on which their opinions are offered, or they would see that the ground on the right of the Russians on that occasion was so steep and so inaccessible that its commander did not even think it necessary to strengthen it; and if Lord Raglan, whose conduct has been attacked and whose reputation has been assailed for not turning that position, had adopted the course which has been so suggested, he could have done nothing which the commander of the Russian troops could have more desired. He would have desired nothing better than to have separated the English and French armies, and to have placed his own army between the English forces and the fleet which formed the basis of our operations. So, likewise, it has been alleged against Lord Raglan that he ought to have assaulted Sebastopol immediately after the march to Balaklava. But, Sir, I don't think that we, sitting here, are very good judges of such operations. I know that many eminent military men thought the army was not sufficiently strong, and were highly averse to such an undertaking. Talk of leading flesh and blood against batteries, and that that ought not to be risked, because the position might have been turned! What would such men have said if he had led the troops against a town of which we knew nothing of the interior, where it was impossible to say how much of Prince Menchikoff's army might have been, of the defences of which we knew nothing, and where our soldiers might have been exposed to massacre in detail in a town, every house of which was a fortification. I confess I do defer to the opinions of the eminent men who commanded the French and English armies on that occasion.

But now, Sir, is it true, as has been asserted by the right hon. Baronet, that we took no precautions with regard to warm clothing. Warm clothing was sent out, and that brings me to another point. It has been, as we all know, a matter of the greatest regret that the ship *Prince*, conveying those stores, was unfortunately lost. But I must say that that loss has been greatly exaggerated. The value of the cargo of that ship was estimated at no less a sum than 500,000*l.*; but I understand that it was not more than 180,000*l.* This was, no doubt, a great loss, but much less than has been reported. However, immediate steps were taken to remedy that loss; supplies were obtained from Constantinople, and there is reason to believe that that loss has not been seriously felt. With regard to the clothing of the army, it so happened that when Lord Raglan applied for clothing, the answer was, "it has been already ordered and a great part has been already embarked." So that the letters of Lord Raglan, in asking for supplies, had already been anticipated Then the Government have been charged with being ignorant to the severity of the climate of the Crimea, and had not adopted those means which are best calculated to protect the troops from its injurious influence. Now, what is the position in which we have been placed? I have a letter from a gentleman a Member of this House, but whom I do not now see in his place, who says—

> "*Experto crede*, I know the climate of the Crimea well; don't believe the accounts that are published about the temperature; but whatever you do, follow the custom of the country; they must know best, and they clothe themselves in skins, and not in woollen."

I then requested the opinion of a gentleman of great experience in Arctic researches, and he came to me and said—"Don't dress the men in skins, stick to wool, that is the only thing to keep them warm." Now I ask the House, how was I to decide between these two eminent authorities? Without attempting to do so, I thought the safest thing—and in that view the Duke of Newcastle coincided—was to take the advice of both, and to send out both skins and woollen; and my hope is, that before long, every man in the army will have a change, both of woollen and of skins, from top to toe. But, besides that, we have sent out seal-skin caps, which are so made as to cover the face and ears; waterproof leggings also are supplied; likewise an outer coat of waterproof, under which can be worn a long vest made of tweed lined with hare-skin, rabbit-skin, cat-skin, and every other kind of skin. Besides this, we have sent out a peculiar description of coat—not lined in the usual style, but according to what is called the Canada fashion; and lastly, there will be a sheepskin coat I hope for each man. Thus, I think it will be seen that the men will be supplied with ample means to clothe themselves both with skins and woollens that must keep them warm.

Then with regard to providing huts for the troops, what have the Government done? They felt that, in this particular, time was everything. To have them built here at home and then send them out to the Crimea was felt to be a process that would occupy much too long a space of time; but the moment the requisition for huts arose, we telegraphed to Lord Westmoreland at Vienna and to Lord Stratford at Constantinople, desiring them to send out instantly such huts as they could have constructed in those countries. Lord Westmoreland immediately forwarded all the huts he could procure by way of Trieste; and huts, and materials for constructing them, were also forwarded from Malta and Constantinople. If, therefore, any huts or buildings should be sent out by us from this country—and which I hope will be the case—whenever they may arrive at the Crimea, they will be rather accessories and additions to what have already been supplied, than that of furnishing an article not yet possessed by the army.

It is thus, then, that I answer the charge brought against us of having shown a heartless neglect, and a gross indifference to the comfort and safety of what I believe to be the noblest army in the world. I have alluded to the manner in which our army is raised, and which I consider to be the best mode that any nation can adopt. What is the proof of that? Witness their conduct at the battle of the Alma. I do not believe that any action was ever more difficult in point of attack than the carrying of the heights of Alma. Nor do I believe that you ever before heard an instance of such self-reliance, of such self-confidence, as was displayed at Balaklava, especially in sustaining the charge of the Russian cavalry by the 93rd Highlanders, under that tried soldier, Sir Colin Campbell. Every man remained in his place as they stood, two deep; as it has been well described—"As the Russians came within 600 yards, down went that line of steel, and before that fire and those immovable ranks the Russian horsemen turned and fled." Well, what have you at Inkerman? The commencement of the battle at Inkerman evidently showed that it had been in preparation weeks before. So far back as the 24th of October, a council of war was held by the Russians, and the whole of the battle was well arranged. The country, for upwards of 100 miles round, was swept of everything. Every cart, every bullock, every horse, every carriage, was appropriated to bring troops to this action. I believe the course taken by the enemy was unexampled in the history of military warfare. It was preconcerted that this attack should take place. Everything was to depend upon it; and the Emperor of Russia was assured that the result was certain. Our men, who, on coming back to the camp after keeping their lonely watch, said that they heard the bells tolling in the churches of Sebastopol, and that the murmuring voices of great masses of men were heard. No doubt the religious ceremonies of the Church were used—it were to be wished that they had been used for an occasion of a more sacred character, but no doubt appeals were made to the patriotism and religious feelings of those large masses of men. In the night heavy artillery was moved up to heights commanding our camp. As at Talavera, it was a surprise; men in the guise of deserters drew our sentinels from their posts, so that no alarm was given. At last came that terrible onslaught of 40,000 men on 8,000. Yes. Well, the morning came, clouded by a heavy mist. There were 8,000 men—as one right hon. Gentleman has said, who brings a charge against the Government for that fact, as if the whole army consisted only of 8,000 men. Those 8,000 soldiers stood for hours, hurling back, with a fortitude and a courage more like gods than men, the attacking force that had come against them, and whose numbers were so great, that, as one body was repulsed, another and another came up and took its place. Sir, I do not believe, if we were to go back to those battles of old which have attained a sort of mythical position in history, that any instance could be found of such courage, such unshrinking valour, as those 8,000 men displayed under such trying circumstances, for so long a period, and against such immense odds. It was a thorough soldier's battle. There was, there could be no manœuvring. There you saw the character of the English soldier—led, no doubt, by regimental officers, but it was the battle of the soldier standing in the ranks, and dying or conquering where he stood. Who were the men who displayed such signal courage? Why, Sir, they were the soldiers themselves. I rejoice at the number of the letters that have been published in the newspapers written by soldiers. I rejoice that the people of England should know of what materials their armies are composed. The people of England are apt to look at a soldier as only fit for parade, and at an officer as exclusively possessing the moral and intellectual qualities of a soldier; but, after seeing the courage, and good conduct, and the patience displayed by these men under unheard-of difficulties and sufferings, that opinion can no longer be entertained. I ask the House to look at that army which is without a crime, in which the office of Judge Advocate is a sinecure, and mark the simple piety shown by the men writing to their wives, saying to them that they are sure their children's prayers are heard, that God may protect them in the hour of action. Another speaks of eight officers being buried in one grave, and that there was not a dry eye among all the men who witnessed the solemn ceremony. These were the men who showed mercy to the vanquished, and that under circumstances of the most horrid provocation.

But now, Sir, comes the picture too truly drawn, I admit, by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich, of the melancholy losses which our army have sustained. Among them is one, Sir George Cathcart, who, to the qualities of an accomplished soldier, added the enlightened views of an able administrator. There was no man whose single life was more valuably used. He had qualities of the highest character, and his loss is a public loss, which will not be easily repaired. It is impossible not to be struck, in reading the names of those who have fallen, with the numbers of those who have gone to the war from a sense of duty, and who have shown in these latter days how little even high position and those luxuries which wealth commands can enervate the spirit of men who are devoted to the cause of their country. This spirit has animated the army from the lowest to the highest ranks. It is, however, a painful subject to dwell upon. I lament, as much as the right hon. Gentleman can do, the losses which we know that many even in this House have sustained. I cannot look around me without knowing that there are the parents, and brothers, and other relatives of many of those gallant men who have so cheerfully laid down their young lives for the service of their country. But I turn from this painful subject, and say that, at any rate, it is satisfactory to me to know that after all the great loss during these operations, that loss has not been so large as on former occasions. England has undergone far greater losses at Talavera and Albuera than it has sustained in the Crimea. At Albuera, out of 6,000 or 7,000 men, only 1,800 escaped unwounded, whereas in all the engagements in the Crimea, from the beginning to the end, there has not been a greater loss by the sword in battle than 1,350. More have died—our whole loss amounts to no less than 4,456; but this number includes 2,782 who have died of disease and of wounds, as well as 1,350 who have been killed. Now, sad as that record is, still it is much less than what the exaggerated statements I have seen make our losses to be. I have, therefore, thought it my duty to make this statement in order to remove any more painful feeling than the truth really warrants.

In conclusion, let me say here, that we hope that the most public recognition will be made which we can give, of the assistance we have received, and of the gallantry with which that assistance has been given by our powerful Allies. I can assure you that it is a pleasure to me to read those private notices which have passed between General Canrobert and Lord Raglan, in which they speak in terms of the greatest praise of each other. It is delightful to know that our army cheered most enthusiastically the advance of General Bosquet's division when they came up at that opportune moment and relieved the shattered battalions that had been resisting for so fearful a period the attacks of the almost overwhelming enemy. I believe it is impossible to overrate the good which will result from the union of the French and English armies on the field of battle; the effect will be far greater to both countries than the most skilful diplomacy could have accomplished, and I am glad to see such frequent public recognition of the services which our Allies have rendered us. We are now in alliance with the most military nation on the face of the earth—long our rival, once our enemy. She is now bound to us in the strongest bonds of friendship. While we shall be acquiring the dash of the French, the French will be acquiring the firmness of the English. I believe in that union of the two armies we see the best prospect of attaining that great end we have in view in this war. I ask those who, two months ago, were looking despondingly at the state of things, to look at the position of England now; and also to look at what has been the effect of the war already upon our enemy? In previous wars we had alliances with countries who took our money, but the Governments of which too generally intrigued against us. We are now in alliance with the most military and chivalrous nation in Europe, and we see the opinion of Europe day by day coming nearer and nearer to us, while Russia is placed in a state of degradation and isolation. Her hostile army is now entrenched above her own chief arsenal, and her fleet has been sunk by her own act, while her forts on the Caucasus have also been destroyed by her own hand. These are the effects of the first campaign. I ask, where can you find, in the history of this country, a campaign of not more than a few months' duration attended with such results? But still I hope to see our army considerably increased, and if you, the House of Commons, think it ought to be, tell us so. I tell you that the country is determined, at all hazard and at all cost, that the army of Lord Raglan shall be supported. If the House of Commons does not answer to that feeling of the country, then the House of Commons must take the consequences, for, depend upon it, there is but one feeling upon this subject. We are engaged in a war which was entered upon with reluctance; we must carry it on vigorously to obtain that which is the object of all war—namely, peace; for peace to be obtained must be obtained by conquest. Let no exertions be spared which will enable us by vigorous operations to gain that end. I say further, if you think the Government worthy to be intrusted with those powers, then intrust them; but I would sooner a thousand times sink ten Governments rather than any other policy should be adopted. I care not in whose hands the war is placed provided it be carried out with vigour and determination; and provided the representatives of the people honestly and truly carry out the will of the nation, that the noblest of armies shall be assured of the means—so far as human means can avail—to obtain a perfect and a glorious triumph.

MR. LAYARD:* Sir, few Members of this House have risen to address you under a more painful sense of responsibility than that under which I labour at this moment. My embarrassment is considerably increased by having to follow the speech of consummate ability and great eloquence which we have just heard from my right hon. Friend. Every man who loves his country, and exercises an influence, however humble, in her councils, must feel that, at a moment like the present, an act of indiscretion, or an error of judgment, may be attended by the most serious consequences. No one can be more persuaded of this fact than I am. At the same time I am labouring under those conflicting feelings which must agitate, more or less, every Member of this House. I cannot but ask myself whether at such a critical period as the present it were better to avoid all allusion to the past—to hope that the lessons we have received may enable us to do better for the future—to overlook all the instances of mismanagement and neglect which have undoubtedly occurred, and to support the Government, without any reference whatever to their policy, past, present, or future, and to their conduct of the war? or whether it be not the duty of those who may yet have it in their power to raise their voices once more in this House, to warn the country of the calamities which may still be in store for it—to point to the misfortunes under which we have suffered, in the hope of avoiding similar misfortunes hereafter—and to obtain from the Government, once for all, such a declaration of the policy they intend to pursue as may warrant this House and the country in placing confidence in them for the future? Did I believe that this momentous Eastern question would end with the capture of Sebastopol, I should have little difficulty in making up my mind as to how I ought to act. I believe that Her Majesty's Ministers will make every effort in their power to accomplish this object. I have no doubt that the Government are at this moment making every human exertion to prosecute with vigour the war in the Crimea, and to capture that vast stronghold which we are now besieging. But it is, at the same time, my conviction that the capture of Sebastopol, however gigantic that undertaking may be, is only the first link in the chain—only the first step in that great war in which we are now engaged. I believe that whether Sebastopol fall or not, we shall have to choose between a hollow—I might almost say disgraceful—peace, utterly inconsistent with the great sacrifice of blood and treasure that this country has been called upon to make; or a struggle which, for its severity and the magnitude of its results, has, perhaps, been unequalled in the history of the world. Such being my conviction, how can I after that which has passed, by words express, or by silence infer, any confidence in Her Majesty's Government? If I could bring myself to believe that the calamities over which we have to mourn—for calamities they undoubtedly are—were the results of mere mismanagement or mere inexperience, and that in future those who have the direction of affairs would profit by their former errors, even then I would not withhold my confidence from Her Majesty's Government. But I am convinced that the greater part of what has occurred is to be attributed to a want of principle in the conduct of the war, to a want of definite policy. And how could it be otherwise? It is impossible that a Government constituted like the present could act upon any political principles, or with any definite policy. How could that be expected from a Cabinet the Members of which embrace every shade of political opinion—from that of the Holy Alliance down to the most advanced stage of modern liberalism? It must be evident, that to come to any understanding between themselves, men of such conflicting and opposite views must surrender at least half their opinions to meet half way. A half-and-half policy and half-and-half measures are consequently inevitable. But, Sir, this is not a moment for half-and-half measures or a half-and-half policy. We cannot conceal from ourselves that the country is in danger, and that we are in a most momentous crisis of our history. If at any time vigour and decision were necessary, it is surely at such a time as this. I am perfectly well aware of the weight of the appeal that has been made to us this evening, and which has over and over again been made to us in this House and out of doors. At such a moment of national difficulty, we are told, it is the duty of all to work as one man. This is not the time to oppose the Government, however wrong or incapable its Members may be. Support them now, and they will do better for the future. But what has been the case for the last two years? When we were in the midst of those unfortunate Vienna Conferences and negotiations, I was told, when I wanted to warn the country against the inevitable result to which they must lead, that as we were trembling between war and peace, it was better to remain silent, and not by any unwise discussion or exposure impede the action of the Government. I need scarcely recall to the recollection of the House the result of our silence. Again, at the end of last Session, when I ventured once more to warn the House against the calamities that were inevitably in store for the country if we persisted in the doubtful and uncertain policy which we were then pursuing, I was urged, even by persons in whose judgment I had great confidence, and to whom, therefore, I looked for advice, to abstain from any attack or observations upon the Government, which at such a time might lead our enemies to believe that we were not an united people. I listened, to a certain extent, to this appeal. Would that I had been able to avert those calamities which I then foresaw! Would that I had had that influence in this House and in the country which might have compelled the Government to listen to the words of caution which I ventured to address to them! The confidence of this House was most generously and liberally accorded to Ministers. We have seen the results. Nothing whatever have they done, except after the strongest possible expression of public opinion—I might say of public indignation—it is only then that they have been driven into doing what is right. But, let me ask, is this statesmanship? Are our Ministers to remain idle until they are afraid of losing their places, and then only to do just as much as the public voice may demand? If so, any twelve men we could collect between Westminster Hall and Charing Cross would be just as capable of administering the affairs of the country as as those who now form the Cabinet. But before I proceed to make any remarks upon what has passed, or to suggest any policy for the future, let me be distinctly understood upon two points:—In the first place, let me be foremost to declare that there is a duty incumbent upon all—a duty from which no man who values the character of his country, and who can appreciate the noblest examples of devotion and courage, could shrink—that of giving the most efficient and immediate succour to that band of heroes—for heroes they are, Sir, such as the world has never seen, or may, perhaps, never see again—who, thrown upon the inhospitable shore of an enemy, are engaged in an undertaking of unexampled magnitude and difficulty. I will support the Government, heart and soul, in any effort they may call upon us to make for this object. They may command me as they would one of their most ardent and devoted supporters. In the second place, let me declare that I am faithful to those principles upon the profession of which I was elected to this House. Although it has been my misfortune to differ completely from Her Majesty's Ministers on their foreign policy, and in their conduct of this war, I still look up to my noble Friend the Lord President of the Council, and those who hold his political opinions, as the great leaders of the party to which I belong. With regard to those charges, of a personal charge, of faction, and of disappointment, which are liberally thrown abroad, and I regret to find encouraged by some Members of the Government, I can afford, from a conviction of my honesty of purpose, to treat them with the contempt they deserve. There is one other point which I do not wish to overlook. It has been said, with the sanction of Ministers too, that any attack or criticism upon the policy or conduct of Her Majesty's Government will be at the same time an attack and criticism on that of our ally. Feelings of delicacy, which I believe the House will appreciate, prevent me going as fully into this question as would be necessary to refute the charge altogether. The same insinuation was thrown out last year, and I met it by proving from State documents, published by ourselves, that the French Government had taken the initiative in every single instance in the policy which the British Government was reluctantly forced to adopt. I should have no difficulty in doing the same now; but I will content myself in calling to the remembrance of the House, that there is a wide difference between the position of the Government of the Emperor, our ally, and our own; and that considering the very great difficulties with which he has had to contend, instead of making any reflection or criticism upon him, we should express only admiration and gratitude at the courage, consistency, and ability with which he entered and has subsequently maintained an alliance, the result of which may confer greater lustre upon that name than even those mighty deeds which have rendered it immortal. I cannot omit this opportunity of again bearing my humble testimony to the extreme integrity and ability with which his Minister (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) has seconded a policy, which, from his knowledge of our national character and our language, he is so well calculated to carry out; nor would it be pardonable in me to omit an allusion to the great debt the country owes to that noble Lord (Lord Cowley) who has so well represented at the French Court, during a time of such extreme difficulty, the interests of this country.

If I may refer without presumption to anything that I may have said last Session, I will remind the House, that on one occasion, after drawing the public attention to the state of affairs and the policy of the Government, I declared that I had at least the satisfaction, melancholy as that satisfaction was, of having twice warned my country against the calamities which were impending over it. Would that I had proved a false prophet! But it was too evident to those who were acquainted with the East, and with the mode in which Ministers were dealing with this question, that that which has occurred was inevitable. Although I should have no difficulty in showing how utterly deficient were our preparations for war—how completely the Government rejected all advice and neglected every precaution—how the commonest foresight might have prevented the gravest misfortunes—I do not wish to enter into details, nor would I even allude to them, unless almost challenged to do so by the statements, so much at variance with the facts, which we have just heard from the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War. I shall, however, only refer to these statements incidentally, and as the occasion may require. I wish to avoid mere matters of detail, in which there is always much to criticise and to condemn. Unlike the right hon. Gentleman, who has avoided the great points and principles at issue, and has endeavoured to blind the House by a cloud of details, I wish to treat this question in a manner worthy of its immense importance, and as one of general policy.

Sir, I have always divided the so-called Eastern question into two distinct phases —that during which peace was possible, and that during which peace was impossible. They are separated by the passage of the Pruth. I have still, and ever shall have, the solemn conviction, not founded upon mere conjecture, but upon the impression I received when present at Constantinople during the mission of Prince Menchikoff, that had the Government assumed a proper tone, the war would have been avoided. Now that we have learnt the vast power of Russia, increasing from day to day, and the extent of her ambition, it may, perhaps, be considered fortunate that peace was not maintained. This, however, is no justification of the conduct of the Government. The Pruth once passed, war became inevitable. Most unfortunately Her Majesty's Ministers shut their eyes to the fact. They still believed that war could be avoided; not perceiving that Russia had embarked in an enterprise, and taken a step, from which she could not recede without either obtaining advantages and concessions, to which we could never accede, or forfeiting that influence in the East to which she attached such immense importance, and which was the fruit of so many years of steady and persevering labour. It was then that the Government, instead of adopting a policy worthy of the country, and taking a line of their own, threw themselves into the arms of Austria, who became at once the arbitress of the question. Hence those Vienna Conferences which so greatly embarrassed us and gave rise to many of the most serious difficulties which have arisen. Even still hoping in peace, we declared war; but we were both unprepared and unwilling to take any serious steps towards prosecuting a war. We began by sending a few troops to Malta—believing, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer has admitted, that we should soon have to bring them back again. This step did not, as we had vainly expected, intimidate the Emperor of Russia. Something else was therefore to be done. We determined upon moving our troops a step onwards, and they were sent to Gallipoli. Let me remind the House that all this while, in our belief that we should escape war, we had utterly neglected even the commonest precautions. It is scarcely credible that we had not even ascertained the number and condition of the Turkish troops opposed to the Russians on the Danube—that we were completely ignorant of their position, and of the probable nature and duration of the defence they were able to make. It was not until the spring of this year that Sir John Burgoyne was sent to Omar Pacha's camp. He declared, on his return, that the line of the Danube was untenable, and that the Turkish troops had only to retire behind the Balkan. His opinion was far from being borne out by the result; but, unfortunately, our troops were detained at Gallipoli, and had now commenced entrenching themselves in the expectation of the Russians advancing on Constantinople. However, the Turks maintained their ground, and it was necessary to take another step. Without any regular plan whatever of campaign having been determined upon, the Government now ordered our army to be sent to Varna. I earnestly entreated the Government, as soon as I heard of the destination of our troops, to reflect upon the step they were taking. I pointed out to them that Varna was one of the most unhealthy spots in Turkey in Europe, and that pestilence and disease would inevitably fall upon our army. The right hon. Gentleman who has spoken this evening met my warning as such warnings are usually met by him. From that Pandora's box before him, from which issues every manner of delusion and deceit, he pulled paper after paper, return after return, to prove that Varna was the most healthy place in the world, and that our troops had never been so well even in English barracks. While the right hon. Gentleman was speaking, the Angel of Death was already hovering over our devoted men. Ere long our army was decimated. I loath these official returns, which will prove everything and anything —which would prove, like a lawyer's plea, to the dying man—neglected and alone— first, that he was not dying at all; and secondly, that, although dying, he was surrounded by every assistance — every comfort. Fortunately for us, the siege of Silistria was raised; and, in alluding to Silistria, I trust I may remind the

House that, although the hon. Member who moved the Address only spoke of Captain Butler, yet there was another British officer there to whose courage, ability, and energy the successful defence of the place may partly be attributed: I mean my gallant friend, Major Nasmyth. But, had the siege not been raised, we could not have relieved the fortress. I had warned the Government that our army would find no means of transport in Bulgaria. And so it proved. Our movements were paralysed owing to this want. As yet we had done nothing. The Government felt that the popular feeling was against them. Fearing that this feeling might lead to their fall, they determined upon doing something, and hastily resolved upon the expedition to the Crimea. Now, I do not intend to enter into any military criticisms. I have neither the knowledge nor the experience to enable me to do so, and I confess I think it would have been wise in the right hon. Gentleman to have abstained from defending those military manœuvres which have never been attacked. But this I may be allowed to say, that either one of two things must have been contemplated by the expedition to the Crimea—the taking of Sebastopol by a *coup de main*, or by a regular siege. Supposing it had been possible to take Sebastopol by a *coup de main*—and I do not deny the possibility—and it had thus fallen, what would you have done? Abandon the place, as you did Bomarsund? If so, what would have been the use of taking it, except merely for the satisfaction of destroying it? Even in that case you must have moved your armies somewhere. But you could not have given up at once the only guarantee you had in your hands. If, on the other hand, a regular siege was anticipated, it could scarcely have been commenced before the winter. In either case, therefore, our army would have to be supported and maintained during the winter. Is it, then, credible that, such being the case, our troops were sent to the Crimea without any reserve—any depôt—any base of operation? They were entirely dependent for everything upon this country. The Government had been warned over and over again that supplies could not be procured from Bulgaria. The country had been depopulated and devastated by three armies. Sinope had been pointed out to them as a port on the Black Sea nearer than any other to the Crimea, and communicating with the fertile provinces and large cities of Asia Minor, from which not only cheap and abundant provisions, but supplies of all kinds might be obtained. But these warnings and recommendations were made in vain. I know nothing more reprehensible—I had almost said more wicked—than this abandonment of a gallant army on an enemy's shore, without a reserve, and without supplies; whilst those who had thus sacrificed them appear to have given scarcely one thought more to their fate.

The right hon. Gentleman, in describing the armada which conveyed our troops across the Black Sea, and which I willingly admit to have been the most magnificent that ever sailed upon the face of any sea, attributed the admirable arrangement and disposition of the ships to Lord Raglan. I feel certain that Lord Raglan would be the last man to wish to appropriate to himself that credit which was due to my gallant friend Captain Mends, of the *Agamemnon*. It was he who drew out those directions and instructions which have deservedly excited so much admiration, and who, with remarkable energy and skill, superintended their execution. The right hon. Gentleman then described the landing of our army, and, in doing so, he dwelt upon the sufferings our troops had endured during the first night, exposed to a heavy rain without tents. He then accounted for this want of tents, and explained to the House, with great apparent candour and his wonted skill, the reason why they were not at hand. The explanations given by the right hon. Gentleman illustrate so remarkably the mode in which the House and the public are deceived in matters of this nature, and the value of Government statements, that I cannot but allude to them. We were told that the importance of tents to the health and comfort of the men was well known, and by no man more felt than by Lord Raglan; but that as he had to choose between bringing over tents or battalions, he did not hesitate. Would the House, continued the right hon. Gentleman, blame him for doing so. Had he preferred the tents, what might not have happened at Alma, and then what would the country have said. But the troops, too, with true English feeling, preferred enduring every discomfort and suffering to embarrassing the movements of their general by asking for their tents. The House cheered this explanation; and it well deserved their cheers, supposing it to be the true one. But, what was the fact? Neither the tents nor the battalions were left behind. The tents were not only brought, but they were landed, and our troops slept for two nights under canvas. The difficulty lay in want of transport—a difficulty felt throughout the campaign, owing to inconceivable neglect—and the tents were reshipped because there were no means of carrying them. The troops might have had their tents every night except perhaps one, that of the forced march; as it was, they were without them for nearly three weeks, a want of proper protection to which may be attributed much of the cholera and disease which visited the army after its landing in the Crimea. Now I am upon this subject I will allude to several other statements of the right hon. Gentleman, which I regret to say are of similar value. He has entered into an elaborate defence of the Commissariat. I really know not why, as no one has attacked it. I do not wish now to go fully into this question, although I am far from agreeing in all that has fallen from the right hon. Gentleman, and cannot certainly admit that the answer we hear so often, that our armies are as well off now as they were in the Peninsula, is a sufficient excuse for that which has occurred. Amongst other merits he attributed to the Commissariat was, their having been able to supply—unheard-of luxury!—vegetables to the troops. Now, what was the fact? Vessels with vegetables had certainly arrived at Balaklava, but, owing again to the utter want of transport, their cargoes could not be conveyed to the camp, and few, if any, of the regiments ever received them. The right hon. Gentleman told us, too, that in order to bring battalions to the Crimea, the ambulances had been left behind, and that Lord Raglan was quite right in doing what he had done, as the ambulances might have impeded our advance at a moment when promptitude was of the utmost importance. What was the fact again here? The House will not forget that the day after the battle of the Alma, Marshal St. Arnaud proposed to Lord Raglan to follow the enemy at once, a step which might have been attended by the most important results—perhaps the total rout of the Russian army, and the fall of Sebastopol. Why did Lord Raglan decline to advance? Because he had no means of moving his wounded. Had the ambulances been there, as they ought to have been, this might not have been the case. The history of these ambulances will illustrate the manner in which the Government has managed details during this war. Instead of young and active men having been sent out to attend to the wounded, old pensioners, who after long service had retired to pass the remainder of their days in the sanctum of the public-house, and most of whom were suffering from *delirium tremens*, were selected for this duty. They were expected to take charge of mules—animals of all others the most difficult to manage, and which they had probably never seen before. The result was, that the woods about Varna were soon full of wild mules and fragments of harness, the pensioners were found dead by the roadside, and the ambulance corps became perfectly disorganised and useless. Notwithstanding all that is known in this country, the right hon. Gentleman denied the stories that have been current with regard to the medical staff. He contradicted the statement that many of the wounded had been left for two nights on the field. On this subject I can speak with some confidence, having myself been a witness to the fact. I should be the last man to condemn the medical staff, which, with one or two exceptions noticed by Lord Raglan himself, has nobly done its duty. But I think it unwise in the right hon. Gentleman to deny such established facts, and to justify neglect of duty which Lord Raglan himself has condemned. He has endeavoured to explain away that lamentable story of the transport so laden with the dead and dying, that her captain was compelled to hoist a signal of distress. To this fact, too, I can bear personal testimony. The medical officer, through whose neglect the vessel was detained twenty-four hours, was tried by a court martial, and acquitted on a technical point; but Lord Raglan, in confirming the decision, which he did most reluctantly, administered a severe reprimand, both to those who formed the court and to the medical officer. Whilst having thus to speak of the misconduct of one medical man, I cannot refrain from calling the attention of the House to an act of true heroism and devotion on the part of another. Dr. Thomson, with his Irish servant, one Magrath—and his name well deserves to be recorded—was left in a miserable half-ruined village, after the battle of Alma, with 700 wounded Russians. His only protection was a note written by Lord Raglan to any Russian officer who might chance to come to the spot. For five days and nights those two men remained amidst the dead and the dying, burying with their own hands nearly fifty every day, dressing their wounds, administering to their wants, and feeding them from the small stock of provisions which had been left for their support. On the fifth day they were relieved by the officers of Her Majesty's ship *Albion*, when, almost exhausted, amidst a heap of dead and dying, they were watching the approach of a body of Cossacks, the advanced guard of a Russian division. I can scarcely picture to myself a position more truly worthy of compassion than that of these two men. It grieves me to add that Dr. Thomson fell a victim to his devotion the day after he rejoined the army. I cannot but think that, if there be any members of Dr. Thomson's family living, some acknowledgment of this noble act would be well bestowed, and would not be distasteful to the Crown or to the country. After the victory of the Alma—a victory which for the glory it has shed upon our arms and upon our national character has scarcely a parallel in our history—the army, by a forced march, suddenly appeared before the southern side of Sebastopol. Had the Generals who commanded the allied forces deemed an immediate assault either advisable or possible, the time for attempting it would have been when the Russian garrison and Russian army suddenly found that we had turned their flank, and had appeared before a part of the town which had been scarcely defended—which was, indeed, almost open. It was only by taking advantage of the panic which appears undoubtedly to have prevailed in Sebastopol, that a *coup-de main* could have been successful. When one day had been allowed to elapse without an assault, it was evident that a regular siege became absolutely necessary. The Government must or ought to have been aware of the fact within a very few days. How was it, I ask, that no exertions were then made to send out reinforcements of any kind? How was it that every effort was not made to enable our army to undertake the siege of so gigantic a fortress? One would have thought that after such a battle as that of the Alma even the Government would have seen the absolute necessity of immediate reinforcements and a reserve. Were we in a condition to embark upon such a siege as that of Sebastopol? Were we provided with even the necessary materials? I remember two or three days after our batteries had opened their fire, reading the report of a speech made at a public meeting by a noble Friend of mine, and a Member of Her Majesty's Government (Earl Granville), in which he declared that if he only ventured to tell his audience the number of guns and amount of ammunition sent out to besiege Sebastopol, he should be laughed at as inventing a Munchausen tale! This seemed like mockery to those who now stood almost inactive before that stronghold bristling with cannon. It may astonish the House to learn, and the fact is strictly true, that had we continued the fire we opened the first day, and which barely sufficed to keep down that of the enemy, our ammunition would have been exausted in six days. Against an inexhaustible supply of materials of war of every kind—against the greatest arsenal in Russia—the united Woolwich, Plymouth, and Portsmouth of the empire, we could only bring sixty guns and mortars without having recourse to the armaments of our ships of war. After the first two days, consequently, the siege was virtually suspended, and from besiegers we became besieged. Our difficulties now increased from day to day. Deceived by the assurances of the Government that Austria was faithful to us, and that Russia could not withdraw her troops from Bessarabia, our Generals trusted in a false security. Day by day, unknown to them, reinforcements were arriving from Odessa. The *corps d'armée* which had recently occupied the Principalities, and which, if Austria had acted with common good faith, would still have been required on their frontiers, marched into the Crimea. Nearly 100,000 men were gradually collected on our flank. Then was fought that fatal battle of Inkerman, a battle which, glorious as it was, is yet one too many in our annals. Great as was the sacrifice—great as may have been the mourning and sorrow which it may have brought on many a home—yet that grief may be somewhat alleviated by the reflection that with one voice the civilised world has proclaimed its admiration, which history will re-echo, of the unparalleled courage and heroism that were shown by those that fell on that memorable day. The House, too, has to mourn more than one of its Members, and to rejoice over the gallant deeds of those who are still spared to it. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir John Pakington) has alluded to the distinguished services of my gallant Friend the Member for Westminster, who rose from a bed of sickness, and hastened to that terrible scene where his high sense of duty called him—whose calm courage and eminent military abilities were never more displayed than in the expedition he has now unfortunately been compelled to quit, an event which must be regarded as a public misfortune. I cannot omit a reference to another Member of the House, and a gallant Friend of mine, the hon. Member for Ludlow (the hon. Percy Herbert), whose chivalrous bravery and indomitable energy have secured for him the confidence and admiration of the British army. But, as General Bosquet has so well observed, to speak of those who distinguished themselves would be to speak of all who fought on that day. And in mentioning the name of my gallant friend (General Bosquet), let me bear my humble testimony to the display of those eminent qualities which have rendered him the object of admiration—I may well say of enthusiasm—to the British army, as it has more than confirmed the opinion which his country had already entertained of his fitness for a great commander. Never were those qualities more signally displayed than on this memorable day. With admirable coolness, judgment, and courage, he led his division to the support of the British army, overpowered by numbers, decimated by the severest of fires. Well might our gallant troops, when he had redeemed the fortune of the day, look upon him as their deliverer, and cheer him with that hearty English cheer, which, as he has told us himself, made so deep an impression upon his noble heart. I trust that Her Majesty's Ministers will not forget that upon no one could be conferred a mark of Her Majesty's favour that would cause greater satisfaction to our army or to the country, and I may confidently add, to the French people. This great battle has been already well described. It was, indeed, a battle of heroes, and "a soldiers' battle." The highest military authorities have declared, that in war bayonets have rarely, if ever, been crossed. But on the heights of Inkerman, from early dawn to the middle of the day, it was one terrible struggle hand to hand. Our weary soldiers stood as ramparts before the overwhelming columns of the enemy; it was only by opposing their bodies to them that they could check their advance. Terrible as were the losses of that day, they were not, I trust, suffered in vain. At Alma, the British and French troops fought apart; but at Inkerman theyf ought side by side. They charged in one line, and their cheers of victory were mingled together. A mutual feeling of confidence, of esteem, of admiration, was thus engendered, which, I trust, may last through many generations, and may cement for ever an union which may be the source of boundless security and happiness to the human race.

The enemy were defeated at Inkerman, but was our position changed? No, we remained, and still remain, the besieged. We are still before a fortress of gigantic strength, with an army outnumbering our own upon our flank. Nothing but almost superhuman exertions can maintain our position. Of this I am certain, that everything that courage and devotion can accomplish will be accomplished. Upon those gallant and devoted men who are struggling with unparalleled constancy and long-suffering against dangers, privations, and difficulties, which might appal the firmest mind, I have every reliance. But it is for the Government to do its duty. No exertion should be spared to relieve and assist them. The country will never permit them to be sacrificed. Let them be properly succoured—let the resources of this great country be rightly applied—and Sebastopol must fall.

Having thus reviewed the conduct of the war in the East, let us turn to the policy of Ministers in the West. Again we have that same want of any definite policy, of any well-matured plan, of any well-directed effort. What has been done in the Baltic? I do not wish to criticise the deeds of our Navy, and of its Commander, which my right hon. Friend has, I think, somewhat needlessly defended. I am quite willing to believe that they have accomplished all that was practicable. I do not wish to underrate the importance of the capture of Bomarsund, or the difficulty of that undertaking; but what I wish to ask is this, what fruits has the country gained by this feat of arms? You have destroyed the fortifications of Bomarsund, but have you prevented their reconstruction? Have you any pledge that in a few years hence they will not be rebuilt? and in a manner which may not admit of their being again captured with so little trouble and loss? I cannot understand the policy of deserting the place the moment we had captured it; nor can I understand the mockery of addressing a proclamation to the unfortunate inhabitants of the Aland Islands, scarcely 20,000 in number, whom you had inveigled into joining you against their Sovereign, warning them at their peril from entering into any future relations with the Emperor of Russia! Your conduct with regard to Bomarsund, so far from having had any good result, appears to me to have been productive of great mischief. You have shown to Sweden, who might have proved a most valuable ally, and who might have become a real check upon Russian ambition in the north, that our policy consists merely in isolated acts, and has no definite object. You have led her to believe, and very justly, that if she were to declare for you, and engage in war with a powerful neighbour, you would desert her as soon as you found it convenient—probably addressing her a recommendation such as you have insultingly and in mockery addressed to the inhabitants of the Aland Islands, not to have any future relations with Russia! Can you then expect that Sweden will be your ally, or that you will obtain any definite result by your ill-digested expedition in the Baltic?

But, Sir, to whatever quarter of the globe I turn, I find the same want of design and of principle in the policy of Her Majesty's Government. It is really so important that this state of things, which must inevitably lead to misfortune and disgrace, should be properly placed before the House and the country, that I venture to claim the attention of the House to the few remarks I think it my duty to make upon the subject. I will take Greece as my first instance. We have not forgotten that the Greeks, at a time when the Ottoman Empire was in its greatest straits, made a wanton and scandalous aggression upon the provinces of Thessaly and Epirus. They ravaged these provinces, drove off innumerable flocks and herds, and plundered the property of the unfortunate inhabitants. The sufferers were principally Greeks and Christians like themselves. Is it not natural that, after the world had declared this to be a most unjustifiable and unprovoked aggression, we should support the Porte in a most just and legitimate claim for indemnity? Have we done so? No! on the contrary, we have used our influence to make the Porte withdraw its claim for indemnity, and, on a shallow pretence, we have released Greece from paying that penalty which she had most justly incurred. What has been the inevitable result? Why that the Christian population of Thessaly and Epirus, whom, above all other Christian subjects of the Porte, it was of the utmost importance to conciliate, have found that they can hope for no protection or relief from their Government, and that their only chance of safety hereafter would be to join with the invaders. The inhabitants of Greece at the same time see that they can commit an act of wanton aggression on a neighbouring State with impunity. Do you not think that, if we should experience any reverse in the East, such a state of things will inevitably lead to fresh outbreaks of a most formidable and embarrassing nature, in Turkey in Europe?

Look again at our policy in Asia. It was of the utmost importance that the Circassians and Georgian tribes hostile to Russia should be aided and encouraged in assuming the offensive, in order to prevent Russia removing her troops and garrisons from Circassia and Georgia and throwing them into Sebastopol. What have we done to effect this object? We sent to Circassia two utterly incompetent agents—unacquainted with the language and the manners of the people. Their mission, as might have been expected, proved a complete failure. We have opened no communication with Schamyl, and we have completely overlooked the importance of a flank movement upon the operations of our enemy in the Crimea. Again, with regard to Persia. It was of no less importance that that Power should be induced or compelled to declare itself. Like Prussia, it wished to maintain a neutrality which could only be dangerous or inconvenient to us. It would have been of incalculable advantage to us if Persia could have been brought to join us against Russia. With such an enemy on her flank, the movements of Russia in Asia Minor would be paralysed. We know the importance she attached to the neutrality of Persia during her war with Turkey in 1828. I repeatedly called the attention of the Government last Session to the state of our relations with Persia, and an hon. Friend of mine, the Member for Poole (Mr. H. Danby Seymour) placed a notice of Motion upon the books of the House on the subject. It is only at the last moment that the Government have thought it necessary to send a fit agent there, who cannot arrive at his post before the mischief is well nigh done. Again, we left the Turkish army in Asia to perish, without taking a single step to ascertain its condition—without offering to send one officer to aid in perfecting its discipline or directing its operations. When that army is defeated and almost destroyed, we despatch a British Commissioner to report upon its condition! Had it not been for the diversion made in the rear of the Russian army by the indomitable Schamyl, the whole of Asia Minor might even now have been in the power of Russia. As it is, our culpable neglect will probably entail upon us an immense loss of life and treasure. Such having been the policy of the Government in all parts of the world, such having been its results, I again ask what, with the exception of having obtained an uncertain footing in the Crimea, has been done towards the true and satisfactory settlement of this great question?

As I have ventured thus to criticise and condemn the past policy of the Government, I may be reasonably asked what I have to suggest for the future. But before pointing out what might be done, what policy might be pursued, it is of the utmost importance to ascertain the true position of Austria. Without some positive and definite assurance upon this point we cannot act with decision or upon principle. Not only for the sake of our future policy, but to set at rest the anxiety felt in the country, we should be fully informed on this subject. We hear that there is a probability of fresh negotiations, under Austrian superintendence, which may lead to peace. After what has passed under similar auspices, it is but right the House should know something about the probable nature of these negotiations. We are about to separate, and may not be called together again for one or two months. After the experience we have had of the diplomatic capacity of the Government, can we with any confidence permit them to engage in fresh Vienna Conferences? I am again told, as we were told last Session, that we have at last succeeded in obtaining the alliance of Austria. The right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty will not, I should presume, go so far now as to add Prussia. But if such be the case, as I conclude we are bound to assume by the expression in Her Majesty's most gracious Speech, I should like to know why the treaty, which we are told has been concluded with that Power, has not been laid upon the table of the House. The other treaties referred to have been—why not, therefore, this treaty? We must infer that the Government have some good reasons for wishing the contents of the treaty not to transpire whilst this debate is pending. But before we vote the Address in answer to Her Majesty's Speech, it appears to me to be of the utmost importance that we should know what the provisions of that treaty really are. As the Government has not thought proper to inform us upon this point, I must assume that they are such as I have been able to ascertain them to be from reliable sources. If so, I will venture to assert that your treaty is worth little more than waste paper. Instead of leading to a solid alliance, it will only prove a fresh obstacle and difficulty in your way. I believe the effect of the treaty to be this, that unless Russia should consent before the end of the year to certain propositions as the basis of a peace, Austria will enter into an alliance offensive and defensive with England and France. What are these propositions? They are founded upon the four points of which we have heard so much. Now I, for one, believe that these four points are most mischievous—that they contain admissions on questions of principle to which this country ought not to accede. I am convinced that if they are received as the basis of negotiations, and form the grounds of any peace with Russia, the whole question for which we are now sacrificing our best blood will be left completely as it was when we began this war, and that we shall only be deferring to a period when we may be far less able to meet it than at this moment, the settlement of a question of the most vital importance to the civilisation and liberties of the world. What, let me ask, are these four points, the concession of which you deem sufficient to repay us for the sacrifices we have made? The first converts the sole protectorate of Russia over the subjects of the Porte professing the Greek faith, into a quintuple guarantee in favour of all Christians in Turkey. After all, a guarantee in such a case can amount to nothing else but a protectorate. If you cannot enforce your guarantee, it is of no value. Will any one believe that this quintuple guarantee will not eventually enable Russia to resume her former influence in Turkey, and to push her former claims in favour of the Christian subjects of the Porte professing the Greek faith? They would look up to her as their real protector, and over them she would still exercise that influence which, founded upon a similar creed and mutual sympathies, we have admitted to be so dangerous to the independence and very existence of Turkey. Moreover, we all know what the result of a triple protectorate has been in Greece, what mischief it has caused, how fatal it has been to the advancement and prosperity of that country. Can any one believe that a quintuple protectorate in Turkey will create anything else but interminable squabbles and dissensions, and may not lead to a more serious state of things than has even hitherto existed? No more effectual means could be devised of defeating our own object with regard to Turkey, of checking the progress of the Christian races, and of rendering them incapable of governing themselves. I am as ready to admit as any man, that, after what has been done for Turkey, after the sacrifices we have made in her behalf, we have the fullest right, in fact I may say it is our duty, to demand that the fullest protection and liberty should be granted to her Christian subjects. But if a protecting power be absolutely necessary to enforce the guarantee, then why not have recourse to a second-rate Power, which has no great political interests in Turkey, and whose influence in that country is neither the object of fear nor of jealousy? Why not vest the right of protecting the Christian subjects of the Porte, of all denominations, in Sardinia—in whose liberal and enlightened policy we have the best security for its fair and just exercise? Let us now turn to the second point—the one which contains to my mind the admission of a principle of the utmost danger. It converts that which was a mere guarantee on the part of Russia—a guarantee of so uncertain a nature that politicians of high authority believed it to have long since ceased—into a quintuple protectorate over Servia. With regard to the quintuple protectorate over Wallachia and Moldavia, mischievous and inconvenient as it may prove, I believe to be of such immeasurably less importance than that over Servia, that I shall not do more than allude to it. But if you give Austria the power of interfering in the affairs of Servia, you will destroy every prospect of the only ultimate settlement of this great Eastern question which has so long, and which will yet for many years, threaten the peace of the world. Let your protectorate be quintuple or separate, it must inevitably get into the hands of either Russia or Austria. Servia is too remote from England and France to permit of our supervision or interference. Austria already assumes that she will be your delegate, and will exercise for you the protectorate. In your name she will crush those germs of liberty and independence, and that inherent love of free institutions which distinguishes the Servian, and to which I look with confidence for the true settlement hereafter of the Eastern question. You know, by the protest laid upon the table of this House last Session, how the Servians view Austrian interference, and, depend upon it, that by sanctioning that interference, you are committing a terrible act of injustice and wrong, besides defeating your whole policy. The third point is the free navigation of the Danube. But how can you make the navigation of the Danube free without any territorial change? By the Treaty of Vienna, Russia binds herself to maintain the free navigation of the Danube, and she asserts that she has never impeded it. If one treaty be of no avail, what will a second do? Nothing. With Bessarabia in the hands of Russia, every stipulation for the free navigation of the Danube is a mere farce. My only hope, Sir, is in the fourth point—the revision of the treaty of 1841. It is of so vague and indefinite a nature that we may include anything in it—the destruction of Sebastopol, the cession of the Crimea, the independence of Circassia, and I cannot believe that, under it, Ministers will dare make proposals to Russia which will not give effective guarantees of a substantial peace, and which, consequently, Russia cannot possibly accept.

These negotiations, founded upon the four points, will be carried on through Austria. Again you have made her the arbitress of the fate of Europe. Again you have resigned yourselves into her hands. Austria may turn round upon you, and say that Russia having accepted these propositions—and I can tell the House she has done so without reserve—she, Austria, cannot admit any construction that you may choose to place on the fourth Article; that she is consequently relieved from all further obligations; and that, as far as she is concerned, the *casus belli* ceases. And can we expect any other course after the policy she has pursued? It is not by what we may wish her to do, or we may think that she ought to do, but by what she ever has done, that we must form an opinion upon the policy she is likely to pursue. The true policy of Austria was admirably summed up in a sentence spoken scarcely two months ago by her representative in the Principalities, Count Coronini, at a public dinner in Bucharest, at which the British representative was present. "Austria does not wish you success in the Crimea, nor does she wish you failure!" No! she neither wishes the allies success nor failure—but she eagerly waits until we, as well as our enemy, may be weakened, when she can step in as the arbitress and carry off the spoil. What has her conduct hitherto been? Have we derived any assistance from her? Far from it. She has so treated the inhabitants of the Principalities, as if they were her conquered subjects, as to make them pray for a return of even the Russians. She has impeded or checked the movements of Omar Pacha and his army; and though she knew that we were fighting her battles, she has had the selfish, mean, and cold-blooded policy to allow the Russian Government to withdraw its troops from Bessarabia in order to pour them upon our devoted bands in the Crimea. How many times during the last year might a word, a movement on the part of Austria, have spared us the worst calamities of the war! Can we hope now that Austria will turn round and adopt any other policy? I, for one, cannot believe it. You tell us that this treaty with Austria anticipates negotiations for peace—that there is a possibility of negotiations for peace during the recess—will not this House be wanting in its duty to the country if it separates without obtaining from the Government some distinct account of the nature and object of this treaty. But, whatever the Government may wish, I bebelieve peace at this moment, and upon such conditions, to be utterly impossible. There are no terms we can offer, after the sacrifices we have made, and the lengths we have gone, that the Emperor of Russia can, consistently with his honour and his dignity, accept.

Peace being then, I believe, impossible, it remains to be seen how the war is to be conducted, and what policy we are to pursue. Ministers are not, I am convinced, aware of the magnitude of the struggle in which they have embarked; nor are they alive to the difficulties and dangers which await them. Up to this moment their policy has merely consisted in providing for the emergencies of the moment, or in waiting until they were pushed into action by the pressure of public opinion. But this will not do. It is full time to look this great question in the face, and to be prepared to deal with it in a manner worthy of its magnitude and of its vital importance to the country. If we are not prepared to do so, we should not have entered into this war. As yet, you have not looked beyond the Crimea. But you must now do so. The vigorous prosecution of the siege of Sebastopol is not the vigorous prosecution of the war. Suppose Sebastopol taken—what then? The Russians may shortly have 200,000 men in the Crimea. ["Oh, oh!"] An hon. Gentleman cries "Oh, oh!" Well, let him give his attention to the matter for one moment. Last Session I was laughed at for saying that the Russians could send reinforcements into the Crimea. The march from the Principalities would, I was assured, take at least three months—if, which we were told was not to be contemplated, Austria would permit the departure of the Russian troops. What has happened? In our camp before Sebastopol we acted as if such were really the case. Our generals unfortunately relied upon the assurances of the Government, and in one night we found that Russia had at least 100,000 men on our flank. The Secretary at War has gone into details respecting small matters—let me ask the House to go into details for one moment upon great matters. According to Lord Raglan's despatches, and according to the estimate of the French Commander in Chief, there were 60,000 men engaged in the attack on the heights of Inkerman. Amongst these troops, we are told, on equally high authority, there were none which were engaged at Alma. Now, estimating the remainder of those who had been at Alma at 35,000 men, we have 95.000 men. But there was Liprandi's corps, recently arrived from the Principalities, amounting to between 20,000 and 25,000 men, which made the feint on Balaklava; 10,000 men, it is believed, were engaged in and supported the sortie on the French lines, at the extreme left of our position; the batteries, continuing their fire as usual, must at least have required 5,000 men more. If these numbers be correct, and I take them from official despatches, the whole number of troops on the 5th of November, in and near Sebastopol, must have amounted to nearer 150,000 than 100,000 men. We have since heard that another *corps d'armée* is advancing. What is there then, I ask, to prevent the Emperor sending 50,000 men more into the Crimea?

We have taken away our fleet from the Baltic, and, consequently, released the Russian troops from the defence of that portion of the empire. What is there to prevent the Emperor from sending his Guards into Poland, to relieve such troops as might at the same time be marched towards the Crimea? It is very well to say that we are now in the winter season—that the roads are bad—that armies cannot be moved. But the fate of an empire—the results of the policy of a long line of great monarchs—the fruits of years of wisdom, cunning, and toil—are at stake; and will they be sacrificed without almost superhuman exertions? No. The roads might very well be impassable under ordinary circumstances, but we have seen that they are not impassable now. Even post-horses and waggons have been employed to bring down one division of the Russian army, and similar efforts will be made to move other reinforcements. If you are determined to make war upon new principles, you must expect such results as these. The only mode of preventing Russia moving or feeding her troops was by dealing with Odessa differently from the manner in which you treated that great station and granary, in that absurd and useless attack you allowed our fleet to make upon it. Had Odessa been Rome, Naples, or Athens, I can well understand the feeling which might have prompted us to spare it. But Odessa has no historic fame—it is not the repository of art. It is nothing else but a great depôt: one of the granaries, not only of Russia, but of Europe—a station for troops, and the place from which the Russian armies, both in the Crimea and Bessarabia, and, consequently, those engaged in an attack upon Turkey, and in war with us, are supplied. I respect that feeling of humanity which might have led you to avoid, if possible, a bombardment. But what, under the circumstances, would have been the proper course? It appears to me that you might, consistently even with your principles, have summoned the garrison to lay down their arms, and to surrender the granaries and military stores within twenty-four hours; and have declared that, in the event of refusal—giving them that period to send out their women and children—you would have used force. Do you think a Russian fleet would have spared Liverpool or Hull? Again, up to this very moment, there has been no effective blockade of the Russian ports in the Black Sea. On the 24th of September, after the British troops had landed, and when the Russians had sunk their seven ships of war in the mouth of the harbour of Sebastopol, so ignorant were we of what was going on, and so lax and ineffective had been our blockade, that, although we were actually within sight of the place, a great part of our fleet was ordered to prepare for action, and to put to sea, to follow eight Russian vessels, which were supposed to have sailed for the purpose of making a descent upon the Turkish coast! The trade between Constantinople and the Russian ports of the Black Sea, and the Sea of Azof, is, and has been, carried on as usual, notwithstanding the war. The only difference has been that the export of wheat has been, very naturally, prohibited by the Emperor of Russia; but that of linseed—a most important branch of Russian trade in the East—is carried on as usual, and the article regularly quoted in the Constantinople market. Thus, whilst British merchants have been compelled, by the uncertainty and inconveniences of a nominal blockade—and, perhaps, may even have been induced by national feelings—to withdraw from the trade, at great loss and inconvenience, Greeks and others, our enemies, have profited by their withdrawal, and have made large fortunes at our expense. It is impossible to carry on war effectively on such a system.

I will suppose Sebastopol taken. Will that settle the question? Certainly not. The Russians may withdraw their troops from the fallen fortress, and, leaving a sufficient number at Perekop to prevent you quitting the Crimea, at the risk of losing the fruits of your hard-earned victory, they will march the remainder into Asia, to reinforce those they have already collected there. At this moment they are preparing for such a measure. They hold Bayazid, a place of great military importance, from its position at the junction of the frontiers of Georgia, Persia, and Turkey, and as commanding the high roads to Tabreez, Erzeroum, and Bagdad. General Bebutoff is now collecting troops and supplies at this point, and there is nothing to prevent him next spring from overrunning the whole of Western Asia. Should he obtain possession of large portions of Persia and Asia Minor, with the mouths of the Euphrates and Tigris, what would be the effect upon our Indian possessions? Could we then treat, on anything like advantageous terms, with Russia? Could we leave these countries in her hands?

Undoubtedly not. She would hold as vast and as substantial a material guarantee as we should have in the Crimea. I do not wish to weary the House by entering fully into this question — notwithstanding its enormous importance — but I warn the House and the country that, unless we do something more than we have hitherto done to meet the difficulties which are arising in that direction, we shall have fresh disasters and calamities in Asia, far greater than any that have hitherto befallen us. We do not even know at this moment what number of troops the Russians have collected upon their Asiatic frontiers. We are utterly unprepared to meet any army, however small, in that part of the world. As for the Turkish army, which was defeated in Asia Minor last year, it has dwindled down to nothing. Had we sent out proper officers to assist the Turks in that quarter last year—had we sent fit agents to Circassia and to Schamyl—had we placed our relations with Persia upon a proper footing, we might have prevented Russia collecting an army at Bayazid by threatening her on her rear and flank; but it is now too late; and whatever will have to be done hereafter will have to be done, as heretofore, with terrible sacrifices and loss.

But supposing that we could successfully undertake a war in Asia, and that Russia could even be driven out of those provinces which she has torn from Persia and Turkey, will any definite and permanent result be obtained? Will any additional security be afforded for the protection of Turkey, and for the effective control of this colossal Power? Certainly not. Did we enter into this war, let me ask, for a great end? Is it one on which the very existence of this country may be at stake? Is it one which we are waging on behalf of the liberties and independence of Europe? If, as I believe it ought to be, such be really our object, then any hollow, unsubstantial peace will be far more dangerous, far more fatal, than any loss or any disaster we can contemplate in the struggle. I believe this war to be such as I have described it to be. I believe that no war was ever waged in which were involved such vast results, not only to Europe, but to the world. We now find that this gigantic Power has been advancing silently, but securely, from year to year—that it extends with a consolidated strength which almost defies us from Kamschatka to the Baltic Sea. It would, indeed, seem that Providence had willed that Russia should have chosen such a time as this to defy France and England, when, united, they may still be able to check, ere it be too late, the progress of this mighty Power. Had she waited until she could have availed herself to the fullest extent of all her vast resources—had her railways been extended to Odessa and Sebastopol—had she been provided with all the inventions of modern science applied to war, who could have foretold the issue of a struggle which would have threatened the independence of almost every nation in the world? But do you think now that you can ultimately cripple her, and prevent her assuming that dangerous preponderance by making an isolated and ill-digested attack here—destroying a fortress there—invading an Asiatic province or half checking a lucrative trade? It is in Europe alone that you can effectually stop her progress and prevent the accomplishment of her object; it is by establishing an independent kingdom, with free institutions, on her frontiers—a kingdom embodying the Sclavonic element, and becoming the rival of that vast Sclavonic Empire in the north. I know that false enthusiasm and ill-advised efforts have, unfortunately, brought discredit upon the cause of Poland in this country, and have, I fear, caused us to look upon it with indifference, if not with stronger feelings; but, depend upon it, that it is alone by erecting Poland again into an independent kingdom, that you can obtain the only results which can justify your having entered, as you have done, into this terrible struggle.

Now one word as to the management of the war. Ministers are determined upon carrying it on upon three new principles—the greatest economy, the greatest humanity, and the greatest publicity. They must consequently be prepared for the inevitable results of such a system—immense sacrifice of life and money. What is their greatest economy principle? To do everything on the smallest scale at the greatest possible expense. I could cite instance after instance in proof of this to the House. I saw a letter a few days ago from a merchant at Liverpool, who, being himself a gainer by the prodigality of the Government, would not have written as he did were not the facts of the case as gross as he stated them to be. After describing the manner in which, at the last moment, transports had been taken up by the agents of Government in the most reckless manner, and contracts for horse-boxes entered into without any stipulations whatever, he ends by saying, that this lavish expenditure of the public money had almost turned his hair grey. I need scarcely remind the House of the fate of those horse-boxes. The first time the vessels in which they were fitted up were exposed to a slight sea, they all gave way, and above 200 of our cavalry horses were thrown overboard, at a time when cavalry was of the utmost importance to our operations in the Crimea. Scarcely a day passes that I do not receive from some quarter or another letters from persons who bring to my notice, because I have taken a part in this question in the House, similar instances of wanton extravagance and culpable neglect. Up to the present moment the Government have endeavoured to carry on this war upon principles of economy utterly inconsistent with its objects, and the magnitude of the undertaking. Now they find that the nation is indignant at the shameful instances of mismanagement and negligence which have occurred, they are rushing into the wildest extravagance. Any proposal, however ridiculous, any invention, however absurd, is taken up. I verily believe, that if a man were to propose to make cannon out of green cheese his offer would at once be entertained. But this is not the way to carry on a great war. Is there to be no statesmanship, no forethought, no precaution? Then there is the greatest humanity principle, of which I have already given an example in the treatment of Odessa. This principle appears to me to consist in sacrificing ten British lives for the sake of one Russian, and destroying our trade for the benefit of that of our enemies, a principle to which, however generous and noble, I cannot, I confess, subscribe. There remains the greatest publicity principle. Now I should be the last man to say one word against the freedom of the press. The Government, on the other hand, has certainly no reason to complain of the press, for the Government itself has given it that importance and influence which it enjoys, and the existence of which Ministers find so inconvenient. The public find that it is only by pressure brought to bear through the press that Ministers can be brought to do their duty. It has been the press which has roused public indignation by descriptions of the sufferings and wants of our gallant troops, and which has compelled the Government to provide a tardy remedy. It is the press, too, which, by its descriptions, in some instances—and I allude especially to those of a leading journal—most truthful and graphic of the deeds of our heroic countrymen, has cherished the national enthusiasm and brought recruits to our ranks. It is not for us then, or the Government, to complain of the press. Yet how have the statements put forward by the press been denied by the Government, nevertheless they have proved too true. Let me take the medical staff as an instance. The right hon. Gentleman had again to-night, with his wonted ability, entered into an elaborate argument to disprove the statement made with regard to that department. Again he tells us that all those medical stores and comforts of which the army stood so much in need had been sent out. But where were they, I ask? I know that a medical man stated that he could dispose of all his medicines and medical stores for half-a-crown, and be a gainer by the bargain. At the last moment, in consequence of the repeated representations of the press, the Government has sent out a commission to inquire into the conduct of the medical men attached to the army. But we do not blame them, they for the most part have done their duty; it is the Government that we blame, who entered into war without making any proper provisions whatever for the safety and comfort of our troops; who appear to have imagined that battles could be fought without killed or wounded; who neither provided means of transporting the sick and maimed, nor established a proper hospital for their reception, until, as usual, it was too late. But do you think that you will obtain any reliable information, or get at the truth, by your commission? I doubt it. I heard a medical officer say that if he gave such evidence before it as he conscientiously believed to be true, he would probably find himself soon afterwards gazetted to Cape Coast Castle, Demerara, or some equally healthy and desirable station. Unfortunately the Government by their conduct have compelled the public to seek for the truth in the press. But whilst the country thus reaps the benefit, it must also be prepared to meet all the disadvantages of publicity. We must have accurate descriptions of the dresses of our generals—the result is, that when the next battle is fought we lose eight generals killed and wounded. We must know at what time our reliefs are sent down to the trenches and in what number—the enemy avails himself of the knowledge to inflict considerable loss upon our troops. We must be told that our position has weak points, and that our guns can only fire so many rounds—the besiegers are naturally encouraged in their attack and persevere in their defence.

As to the materials we have for carrying on this war, they are such as this country—indeed, no country—ever possessed The great battles which have been described this evening sufficiently testify to the courage and devotion of our soldiers. Our navy is not inferior. Never, perhaps, have the two services been more efficient, nor men more admirably officered—never has there been a more cordial unity existing between them. From various circumstances the navy has had less opportunity of engaging in active operations than the army, and, consequently, less opportunity of distinguishing itself. But it has nobly shown its devotion, and the deep sense it has of the conduct of our soldiers, by the manner in which it has treated the sick and wounded. It would be difficult to describe all our gallant seamen have done in this respect—indeed it would, be difficult to say what we should have done without them. With that gentleness and kindness so peculiar to the British seaman they brought down the wounded from the field of Alma, tended them like nurses, and carried them on board our ships. The officers, with indefatigable zeal, directed their exertions and shared in their labours. Where all have done their duty so nobly it is almost impossible to single out a name for special mention. But there is one name dear to the House and the country which I cannot omit—that of my gallant friend (Captain Peel), one always foremost in the work of humanity and in the hour of danger, whose calm and undaunted courage are only equalled by his tenderness—those two elements in the character of a hero. Nor can I, upon such an occasion as this, pass over the name of that gallant and able Commander who has been the soul of this expedition—who, in the midst of difficulties and dangers, has inspired our army as well as our fleet with hope and with confidence. I allude, of course, to Sir Edmund Lyons, to whom, indeed, this country owes a deep debt of gratitude. Not only on sea, but on land, has he ever been ready to share in the dangers and sufferings of all, and has shown that indefatigable zeal, that undaunted courage, and that deep sense of duty, which distinguishes that great school of British seamen, of which the immortal Nelson was the type. And while speaking of our army and our navy, let me not overlook a somewhat humbler, may be, but certainly not less useful or honourable, class of men—I mean our merchant service. Both officers and men have distinguished themselves, no less than the navy, in the zealous and punctual discharge of the arduous and responsible duties which have devolved upon them. They have always been foremost in danger as well as in every good work. If I were to mention one name amongst many deserving the highest commendation, I might cite that of Captain Methuen of the *Colombo*, who, at all times ready to undertake any duty which might be considered necessary for the public service, offered to tow a man of war into action on the day of the bombardment of Sebastopol.

I feel that it would be impossible to speak too highly of our army. It was argued at one time, that if we educated our soldiers we should render them less brave—less efficient. The result of this campaign has for ever destroyed this narrow-minded prejudice. Their heroism in the field—their high sense of duty—their forbearance under unequalled provocation—their tenderness to the wounded—have excited the admiration of their countrymen and of their allies. Would that the regulations of the service and our antiquated official routine were not opposed to the mention in public despatches of the names of those who specially distinguished themselves! This omission is a proof of narrow-mindedness, and is an act of injustice utterly intolerable, utterly inconsistent with the spirit of the age. It cannot be continued. I wish others would imitate the example of that gallant officer (Sir De Lacy Evans), who, with true good taste and feeling, recommended to the notice of the Commander in Chief a sergeant (Sulivan) who had shown remarkable courage and coolness in action. It has hitherto been the custom to reward a man who has distinguished himself in the field by giving him a five-pound note, or some such reward; but do you not think that the heroes of Alma and Inkerman would set far greater value on an honourable badge than on a mere pecuniary recompense? You are endeavouring to raise the moral and intellectual standard of your men; let the mode in which you will in future show your sense of this improvement be more consistent with it. Can any one doubt that those who have served their country so well, would not be proud to have their names brought to the notice of their fellow-countrymen in a despatch? Let us devise some mode similar to that introduced by the French Emperor into his army, of recompensing the soldier for his services on the field. Let there be an order of merit—some badge—to which shall attach an honourable distinction, and which, not given indiscriminately, a man may be proud to wear. Such a recognition of their services would elevate the character of our soldiers, and render them still more fit to rise from the ranks. I could relate a thousand anecdotes to illustrate the courage and devotion of our troops in the present campaign, but I will only refer to an instance of a noble sense of duty which particularly struck me. A sergeant in the artillery, lying on the ground, with both his legs taken off by a cannon-ball, turned to his commanding officer, and asked him whether he thought he should die. "That is in the hands of God," was the reply. "But whatever He may will, you will have the satisfaction of feeling that you have done your duty." "I am proud to hear you say that, Sir," was the noble answer. "If I die I shall die happy; if I live I shall remember what you have now said to me to the end of my days." Does not such a man as that, I ask, deserve a place in a despatch? And such was the noble feeling—the feeling that they were doing their duty, and that in the knowledge of having done their duty was their chief reward—which enabled 8,000 men on the day of Inkerman to wage a hand-to-hand fight with an overwhelming enemy from the dawn to the middle of the day. It was this high sense of duty—this consciousness that the eye of their country was upon them—which has made them brave every danger and patiently submit to every privation. What reward could we find too exalted for such men? Be assured that the more consistent those rewards may be with that high standard of education which you wish to introduce into our army, the more will they be prized. Do not fear, as some would fain make you believe, that such a mode of treating the soldier will be destructive to discipline—would destroy the necessary distinction between officers and men. These are the narrow prejudices of narrow minds. While speaking on this subject, let me also advert to the officers of regiments. They are almost as much overlooked as the non-commissioned officers and rank and file. The Commander in Chief's despatches are but too frequently the records of the imaginary deeds and virtues of generals, aides-de-camp, and officers of the staff. The more humble individual who does the real work, who has the greater share of the danger, who endures all the privations, and is exposed to all the sufferings, is but too generally forgotten or overlooked. Let us remember for a moment what our battalion officers have gone through in this expedition to the Crimea; and in alluding to those officers, I include those of the battalion of Guards also. They have been landed without any means whatever of transport. They have had to carry upon their own backs all their baggage, together with provisions for three days; a hardship, I believe, never before endured by the British officer, and to which the French officer has not been exposed. Had proper precautions been taken, they would have had at least the means of transporting such things as were absolutely necessary. It may be said that the common soldiers have been subjected to the same hardship; but it must be remembered, that from their previous condition in life they are far better able to bear such fatigue than their officer; that, moreover, as soon as they reached the end of their day's march they would throw off their packs, whilst the officer was obliged to place the pickets, see to the comfort of his men, and to perform many other necessary duties before he could relieve himself of his burden, or obtain a little rest. The sufferings of the officers in this campaign have been unequalled. I remember hearing one say, that out of seventy-six hours he had only slept four. They have had not only to lead their men to battle, and to go through all the ordinary duties of a camp, but they have had to pass hour after hour, night and day, in the trenches, exposed to a heavy fire, and suffering from wet, cold, and hunger; and yet all these hardships and privations have been borne patiently and unostentatiously, with the knowledge that they are never to be mentioned in despatches, brought to the notice of their country, or to share in the rewards of their more favoured companions in arms. Their only reward has been the feeling that they have done their duty. The description of their sufferings, and those of their men, and the testimony to their heroic conduct in the public press, have justly excited the sympathies and admiration of the country, and have led to most laudable exertions towards giving them some consolation and relief. I trust I may not be considered impertinent, if I warn the public not to run into extremes, as is somewhat too frequently the practice in England. Our Government has been allowed almost to leave our men to perish through want, and then, when a sudden reaction comes, we overload them with indiscriminate kindness and charity. Let us not forget that in all human probability we are only at the beginning of a great war, and that yet much will have to be done by the country. Let us not waste our money in sending out jams and marmalades, and such like delicacies, or in objects which will perhaps arrive too late, and prove utterly useless. Let us husband our resources till they are required; and, above all, let us not, by doing too much, relieve the Government from the responsibility of doing their duty. Our Commissariat, as well as the other departments connected with the provisioning and maintenance of the Army, must be improved; and it is only by a strong expression of public opinion, or by compelling the Government to do that which they ought to do, and not by doing it for them, that we can hope for a better state of things, or for more than temporary amendment. It is all very well for the right hon. Gentleman to tell us that our troops are as well provisioned now as they were during the Peninsular war. Has no progress been made in the space of nearly fifty years? Have the public profited by every modern invention and improvement, and is the Commissariat alone to stand still? Let us hear nothing more of the Peninsula, but let this department, and all those connected with the public service, be administered as any private undertaking would be if it had the slightest chance of success. I cannot see that that Government deserves much credit which can only say that our Army is as well provisioned now as it was in the Peninsula. I do not hesitate to declare, that in this, as in every other department, you must change your whole system. This is not a moment to stand upon punctilios of etiquette, upon precedence, and upon official routine. The public interests—the safety of our troops—are at stake, and they are of more importance than red tape. I tell you plainly, although such plain speaking may be unpalatable, that you must cut down boldly to the root of the evil. Service in the Peninsula must no longer be the qualification for high and responsible posts in the Crimea. Men of seventy years of age may have been most gallant and able officers, but nature, at that age, will no longer support the fatigues, privations, and hardships which those who are charged with arduous duties in war must of necessity go through. To place men of that age in such positions is as unfair to them as to the public. You expose them to the loss of a well-earned reputation by intrusting them with functions which they are physically incapable of discharging to their own credit, or to the satisfaction of the country. We want younger and more active men. We may shut our eyes to these facts for the time, but depend upon it they will be forced upon us sooner or later with terrible reality. Our fear to look them in the face has already been the cause of great misfortunes, I may say calamities. I do not wish to mention names; the Government know well that there are men at the head of departments who are, I will not say incompetent, but physically incapable, of doing the work required of them. If any private establishment were to attempt to carry on business as Ministers have attempted to carry on this war, it would be bankrupt in a week.

I must apologise to the House for having intruded myself upon its attention so long. I have endeavoured to treat this question as a great question, and to go beyond mere details; into which, however, I have to some extent been dragged by the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. I am aware that these discussions are not palatable to the House; but I trust I may venture again to warn it, that unless the Government be forced, by some expression of our opinion, to take a more vigorous and definite course, equal to the magnitude and importance of the struggle into which we have entered, or to adopt a policy more intelligible and defined, calamities even more terrible than those which have fallen upon us are yet in store. All those from which we have hitherto suffered have arisen from the want of a definite policy, and from the absence of those ordinary precautions which any well-digested plan would have enabled us to take. I do not hesitate to say, that at least one-third, if not two-thirds, of the lives that have been lost in battle and by disease might have been spared had the Government done its duty. Let Ministers take warning in time by what has passed. Let them, although it is now late, adopt some policy, and take a larger view of this great question. I entreat the Lord President of the Council, by the illustrious name he bears—I implore him, by the position he holds as the head of the great Liberal party in this country—to use the influence which he so justly possesses to prevail upon his colleagues to adopt, ere it be too late, a policy which may not, perhaps, be so well calculated as that they have hitherto unfortunately pursued, to reconcile the conflicting opinions of a Coalition Ministry, but which will be more consistent with the honour, the true interests, and the immortal traditions of this mighty empire.

COLONEL DUNNE said, that he would not have risen to address the House were it not that no Member of the Government had attempted a reply to the speech of the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War had directed the defence of the Government upon the attacks which he assumed to have been made upon the officers in command of our forces in the East; but he (Colonel Dunne) denied that any attacks had been made upon our officers, or even upon those officers who had the direction at home. The real attack that had been made, and one which was supported by the country, was directed against the Ministers of the Crown for the manner in which they had carried on the war. He would abstain from entering into the cause of the war, although he believed it to be now generally admitted that it was mainly owing to the vacillation of the Premier and the weakness of the Government; and therefore their conduct of it ought to be strictly scrutinised. The first subject touched upon by the Secretary at War was the accusation that the army had been unduly detained at Varna. He (Colonel Dunne) believed that the delay at Varna was the result of no policy whatever—that there was no military ground for it—and that the simple reason for the step was that the army was not prepared to go elsewhere; no means of conveyance were provided for an advance into the Dobrudscha or Moldavia, and Sebastopol was then comparatively undefended on the land side; there could be little doubt that the time we wasted at Varna was employed by the Russians in strengthening the fortifications, whilst our army was greatly weakened by disease during their detention at Varna. The right hon. Secretary at War stated that the number of men at first sent out was 22,680; and that, subsequently, in the months of June, July, and August, reinforcements of 941, 4,588, and 2,032, respectively, followed. Now, the fact was, that these three so-called reinforcements were no reinforcements at all, but were parts of the army originally sent out, which was intended to be a force of 32,000 men. Again, the requisite proportion of cavalry and artillery was not furnished for the support of the infantry, and we had a fewer number of guns in proportion to the amount of infantry than any other European army. Russia had three guns to every 1,000 men, while the practice of our service required that our army should have two and a half guns for every 1,000. Now, he asked the Secretary at War, had our army either the proportion of guns or of cavalry which was considered to be necessary, according to the recommendation of the Military Commission, which was appointed soon after the close of the last war? He (Colonel Dunne) admitted that the Commissariat had latterly done its duty well, but it was badly served at first. On this head he would not bear hardly on the Government; for he would admit that the long peace had made it extremely difficult to get together an organised corps of officers perfectly competent by training and experience for such peculiar duties as the Commissariat had to perform, and great allowance for their shortcomings ought, therefore, to be made. With regard to the medical department; it was a mistake not to attach the medical officers to the brigades in the first instance, as their services would thus have been rendered much more speedily and effectively available. Officers and stores were sent out in abundance by the Government; but, unfortunately, the stores did not reach their destination, and there was so much confusion that the stores were in one place and the wounded in another. Again, when the army landed at the Crimea, the Government had not prepared proper reserves. The Secretary at War said, that in the months of September and October 3,041 men were sent out as reinforcements; but nearly the whole of this number would be required to replace the loss at the Alma. Military men calculated that, after an action like that, the effective strength of the force would be reduced by one-third of the number engaged; but, after establishing a base of operations at Balaklava, we had only 3,041 men to replace our losses. The deficiency of the force of the British army was shown by the fact that Lord Raglan had been obliged to relinquish a portion of his position because he had not men to hold it. He was surprised that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War had replied to some criticisms that had been made on those in command of the armies; but he thought there was one criticism that had appeared in the papers which was just, and that was with reference to the state of the position attacked at Inkerman. Sir De Lacy Evans had pointed out its danger, and why was it not fortified? Simply because Lord Raglan had not sufficient men to do so without stopping the siege; and this, together with passages in Lord Raglan's despatches, proved that he had not a sufficient number of men under his command. The right hon. Secretary at War said that the army sent out to the Crimea was well appointed in all its details. But the siege train, such as it was, did not reach Varna until June, and even then it was totally inadequate for the attack of a fortress like Sebastopol, and our troops would have had no guns for the purpose had not the Russians, by sinking their ships, set free a portion of the armament of our fleet for use on land. He did think that all that could be done by the army would be achieved by our army in the Crimea—he thought that Sebastopol would ultimately be taken; but the fact was, that throughout the war every step had been taken too late, and the consequence was, that the success which he hoped and believed would ultimately attend our efforts would be purchased at double the cost at which it might have been secured by more efficient measures in the first instance.

Mr. DISRAELI: I participate, Sir, in the surprise expressed by the hon. Member that none of Her Majesty's Ministers have thought it necessary to reply to the speech of the hon. Member for Aylesbury. He is not a supporter of this side of the House. He does not sit upon these benches, and he somewhat ostentatiously informed the Lord President that he was peculiarly attached to him. I have no wish to tamper with the allegiance which the Member for Aylesbury owes to the Lord President, but on the subject before the consideration of the House I have given him that respectful attention due to every Gentleman who is master of the subject on which he addresses the House. I could not also forget, in the individual instance of the Member for Aylesbury, that a man of genius addressed the House; and, remembering that he has come from the scene of those memorable actions which now fill the minds and touch the hearts of the people of this country, and that he has risen to make serious charges against the Ministry, the fact that he has not been answered by the Government is not a circumstance which the hon. Member need consider as one which will depreciate him in the public estimate. So far as I can judge of the fortunes of a human being—so far as I can form an opinion upon the course of human life—I think the Member for Aylesbury will be remembered when the great portion of the existing Cabinet will be forgotten.

I did not expect, Sir—and I witnessed with regret the necessity—that I should have again felt it my duty on the present opening of Parliament to vindicate the freedom of discussion. Remembering the position of this country—remembering what has occurred since we last met—remembering that the fate of this empire is perhaps at stake—remembering the thrilling events that have happened—remembering that the people of this country expect, if not redress for their grievances, yet some sympathy with their deep emotion—I was surprised to find that the Government should have advised the Sovereign to assemble Parliament, and should have given instructions to their followers that discussion should not only not be encouraged, but resisted. That they should have attempted to conduct affairs—that they should have attempted to govern this country—without unnecessarily appealing to the sense of the House of Commons, I can easily comprehend. Their difficulties are great—their embarrassments are increasing. They might have thought that time and fortune might have so mitigated their position, that two months later they might have appealed with more advantage, but having felt it their duty or necessity to take this step, I was surprised that an hon. Gentleman who seconded the Address, and the brother of a Cabinet Minister, should have impressed on the House the expediency of its silence. But this is not all. We have had the luxury of one Cabinet Minister on this memorable opening of Parliament, and while he has chiefly filled his speech with a vindication of his own office, which had been only partially attacked, he favoured us with the discreet admonition that the loyalty and discretion of the House of Commons would be best proved by not at the present moment expressing opinions in the face of an anxious country; to say nothing, Sir, of an absent army, which must, I think, under all its difficulties, under all its sufferings, under all its deeds of heroic achievement, have been sustained by the conviction that when the representatives of the people of England assembled they would have expressed their sympathy with their sufferings, and perhaps have criticised a Ministry, who, in their opinion, had not done their duty to relieve them. It may be clever in the Lord President to be silent, and the other taciturn Secretaries of State who surround him, but I doubt whether that silence is a proof of respect for public feeling, and whether a sense of duty ought to have impelled them to restrict that frank expression of opinion which is the soul of the House of Commons.

Sir, my right hon. Friend the Member for Droitwich has to-night taken a course which will be appreciated by the country; and had this debate terminated with the answer to his speech I should have been content to be silent, for I think that he has indicated the course which it becomes a Conservative Opposition to pursue. I am totally at a loss to comprehend how right hon. Gentlemen can bring themselves to such a pitch of feeling that they can rise and protest against the critical opinion of a Member of Parliament on the conduct of the affairs of the country. I had last year to refer to this; there was not an occasion on which the Government brought forward measures, in every one of which they were ultimately defeated, when Gentlemen on these benches expressed a criticism, that they were not challenged to propose a vote of want of confidence in the Government; as they had been challenged to-night by the Secretary at War, if they had not faith in the Government, not to trouble the House with factious criticisms—not to echo here what, perhaps, may be the opinion of the country —but to test the opinion of the House as to their trust in the Ministry. I had occasion last year to notice the unconstitutional course so freely adopted by these Gentlemen. I had occasion to show then, that such a course struck at the root of public discussions and public freedom. I held that it was a privilege of Members of this House freely to canvass the conduct of Government, without being forced to incur the responsibility of asking the House of Commons to sanction a change of Ministry. In 1803 we had a Ministry carrying on a war—we had an Opposition supporting the measures of the war; and when Mr. Wyndham canvassed the policy of the Government—and he was no mean authority, and eminently qualified, from his official experience, to speak on such a subject—Mr. Wyndham said, that he trusted that the unanimity of the nation on the subject of the policy of the war would not for a moment be mistaken for a unanimity of sentiment as to the conduct of the war. So spoke Mr. Wyndham, and he was followed by eminent Members of the House, and no one impugned their privilege so to address the House; or, when they criticised the conduct of the Government, told them to refrain from such remarks, and to test the question by a vote of want of confidence in the Ministry. Yet this repartee of last Session has been brought forward again by the Secretary at War. Sir, I protest against these opinions. I see their object, and know what their consequence will be. It will stop debate, it will degrade the character of the House, and put an end to discussion, which is the soul of truth, and without which this House can never exist.

But an hon. Baronet, who bears an honoured name, also rose early and unexpectedly in the debate, and made a remarkable observation. Indulging, as I thought, in a misapprehension, to which I am surprised his acute mind could be liable, the hon. Baronet referred to a speech which I had felt it my duty to make last year, in which I said, in speaking of the causes of the present war, that no captious criticism respecting the conduct of the war would ever, I hoped, be heard from us, and so seemed to think that he had established a case of inconsistency against my right hon. Friend in the course we are now pursuing. I think I then said, representing the feelings of my friends around me, that no future Wellesley, on the banks of the Danube, should ever complain, whatever other difficulties he might have to encounter, of the obstacles offered to him by an English Opposition. I need hardly say that observation referred to the military conduct of the war. I meant to say, and I think my meaning was understood by the House, that we had neither the presumption nor the wish to criticise the conduct of naval and military commanders—that we would place in them that unlimited confidence which we were sure the country was prepared to place in men who had been selected by the responsible counsellors of Her Majesty; and that, whatever might be the fate of their operations, they should not look back with feelings of bitterness to the factious criticism of political parties as having prevented or retarded that success to which their genius and their labours might have entitled them. But surely the hon. Baronet the Member for Tamworth would not lay down for a moment that it is not the duty of the House of Commons carefully to scan, and severely even to criticise, the military expeditions conceived, and planned, and matured in the Cabinet of the Sovereign? The hon. Gentleman will not, I suppose, for a moment maintain that Walcheren expeditions are not to be criticised, that conventions of Cintra or Sarratoga are to be passed by a humble House of Commons in subdued silence? Why are we a House of Commons? What chance have we of commanding the confidence of the people as being the sacred depositaries of the national sentiment, if, when national disasters occur, no echo to the feeling of the people is to be found in this House? If here, of all places, we are to be met by a Minister who says, "If you disapprove of what has occurred, notwithstanding the emergency, notwithstanding the difficulties in which the Sovereign and the nation are placed, we call upon you to put your opinion to the test, whether or not there shall be a sudden change of the Ministers of the Crown." I am sure that Gentlemen, on whichever side they may sit, will see upon reflection that these are principles too dangerous to public liberty to be encouraged, and that we must not for a moment sanction the appeal of a Government that, upon their measures, whether successful or unsuccessful—however they may have been conceived, whatever may have been their objects or their consequences—it is the duty of the House of Commons, from a feeling of patriotism, to be silent, or to incur the responsibility of administration. Why, suppose that the House of Commons were silent—suppose that in this probably brief Session we had abstained from all criticism upon what has occurred and is occurring—suppose that we had met and adjourned, having passed those necessary and formal measures which the Lord President has ready to propose to our notice—should we prevent discussion?—should we prevent the expression of dissatisfaction and discontent in the country? You would have a dissatisfied people out of doors, who, feeling that they could not give a constitutional expression to their sentiments, would have recourse to agitation—more inconvenient, I should have thought, to a Minister, than the discussion of public questions in this House, where observations are at least conceived in the spirit of patriotism and expressed in the language of gentlemen.

Having adverted to this remarkable expression on the part of the Government of a principle so unfavourable to public discussion, let me recall the House to the consideration of our actual condition. I want to divest the subject of that cloud of official statistics which the Secretary at War has found it convenient to throw into our faces. I find no fault with the Secretary at War for taking this his first legitimate opportunity to vindicate the conduct of his office with respect to many accusations which have been made against it, not in this House; but allow me to remind the House, that the Secretary at War has been most successful in answering the charges which have not been made in the House of Commons. We are called upon to-night to decide whether we will agree to this Address, which, as far as I can follow its language, is an echo of the speech in my hand—a speech in some circumstances most remarkable, inasmuch as I believe it is the shortest speech that ever yet was delivered from the Throne, and is confined almost to one subject. Let me remind the House, however, that this speech commences by an admission of great importance—by an announcement which is certainly calculated to excite the attention of the whole country. We have here, in the gracious Speech of Her Majesty, an announcement that Her Majesty is involved in a great war. Now, I want to impress the importance of this expression upon the notice of the House. This time last year, when we were virtually, though not formally, in a condition of hostility, no Minister acknowledged that the war, which was soon formally to be announced, was a great war. The most distinguished Member of the Cabinet, the Lord President himself, had his hands so full of business last year that he had hardly any time to think of the war. Far from its being a great war in the opinion of the Lord President when Parliament last met, it was scarcely a war at all; but, even if it did result in such a catastrophe, the noble Lord was almost prepared to carry on a little civil war of his own. I do not mention this to taunt Her Majesty's Ministers, but these are the only traits by which we can ascertain what were then their feelings and opinions with respect to this immense event. But when it became a formal as well as a virtual war, when it became necessary that a message from Her Majesty should be delivered to this House, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer had, in consequence, to explain to the country and to the House how the war was to be carried on, it is quite clear that the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not consider it to be a great war, for he brought forward a very meagre estimate, which anticipated the expense of the transport of troops to foreign countries, and also the expense of their return, both included in the estimate of the year. I believe I am not misrepresenting the right hon. Gentleman when I say that we have upon our votes of last Session a sum of money for the transport of 25,000 men to Malta and back again, a vote proposed by the Minister of Finance, and passed by a subservient and uncritical Parliament. It is quite evident, then, that these eminent Gentlemen had not the least idea that they were engaged in a great war. The noble Lord and the Chancellor of the Exchequer may have thought we were engaged in war, but they cannot have believed it was a great war, when the noble Lord was so indifferent to these foreign and external circumstances that he was prepared to propose a reconstruction of this House, and when the Chancellor of the Exchequer, when called upon in his official capacity to propose the first vote for the carrying on of the war, anticipated, not merely the expenditure necessary for the transport of troops, but the expenditure necessary for the return of those troops to this country, all in the course of the year. I think, therefore, Sir, it is necessary for us to consider the great importance of this phrase. Last year, according to the noble Lord, a war with Russia was a circumstance so insignificant that it ought not to prevent a reform in Parliament. The noble Lord now has found out that this is a great and not an insignificant war. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, when he was of such a sanguine complexion, that on his first proposition of expenditure he anticipated that the troops would return to this country in the course of the year, proved that, in his opinion, the war would not be a war really, but a demonstration. I am not now imputing it to the Government as matter of blame ; at the same time I reserve to myself the right to impute it to them as matter of blame—but I say it is quite clear that the Ministers of this country, at the commencement of last Session, had no conception whatever of the position in which they were, or of the magnitude of the circumstances which they had to encounter.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Droitwich has, I think, indicated, under these circumstances, the course which a Conservative Opposition, rightly distinguished from other Oppositions to which he has referred, is justified in taking. When Her Majesty appeals for support —when Her Majesty announces She is involved in a great war, and asks us for our assistance—it is our duty to express to Her Majesty that there are no means at our command that we will not place at Her disposal; but surely, if it is so evident, so demonstrative, so transparent that Her Majesty's advisers find themselves in a position which they did not anticipate—which they had not the prescience or sagacity to suppose would occur—it surely is not an unreasonable or factious course that, while we say we are prepared to support Her Majesty in this great struggle by every means in our power, we reserve to ourselves the right of expressing an opinion on the conduct of the Government in respect to this war in the interval, and to judge from that conduct of the manner in which they may spend the resources which we may place at their disposal. We have had a speech from the only Minister who has condescended to address the House of Commons thus suddenly summoned. We have had a speech of detail—I may say of statistics — adverting to subjects which never have been introduced into our discussions, and which have really in no sense met the great objection which has been urged by my right hon. Friend. The Secretary at War has proved to us, according to his view, that the hospitals at Scutari at this moment are admirably attended to and regulated. I hope they are. I am willing to believe, upon the statement of the right hon. Gentleman, that they are so. The right hon. Gentleman has endeavoured to persuade us that the medical assistance which our army enjoys is sufficient, or, at least as great as any Ministerial ability could have supplied. I hope that it is so. All that the right hon. Gentleman says I wish to believe. But were it otherwise—if it were true that there had been this cruel suffering and apparent neglect—if it were true that the Commissariat (which no one has attacked, but which the right hon. Gentleman has so elaborately vindicated) has been so deficient—if there had been too few surgeons, too few nurses, and a meagre Commissariat—I am sure that I should not have been one who would have attempted, from such circumstances, to bring charges against the Administration of this country. I remember—and I may refer to the words, for I dare say no one else remembers them—that, having last year to touch on this subject, I said myself that at the beginning of war, after a peace so prolonged as that by which the blessing of Providence we had enjoyed, the difficulties of inexperience must be so great that it would be most unjust and unbecoming for the House of Commons critically to examine the conduct of individuals who, after all, must be animated by sentiments as humane and influenced by responsibility much greater than ourselves. And to-night, Sir, I have not heard any expressions used in this House impugning the arrangements of the Commissariat or arrangements of a similar kind to which I have adverted: but to accusations that may have appeared in anonymous quarters the right hon. Gentleman has found time to make an elaborate answer, though no Member of the Government has found time to make an answer to charges brought in debate against the Administration by a Member of this House, expressed with a knowledge of the subject, and conveyed with ability and in a spirit deserving, in my opinion, the thought and attention of this assembly. I will advert in a moment to what was the charge brought forward by my right hon. Friend—a charge, let me again impress on the House, not brought forward in the way of ostentatious accusation as the foundation of Motions against the Government—not brought forward with any anxiety to damage the character of the Government—but brought forward necessarily from the position which we all occupy at this moment, from the sudden summoning of Parliament, which calls upon us, by the Address moved by the hon. Gentleman opposite, to express our opinion on public affairs. Before I advert to what was the distinct and really the only charge, yet so important that no other was necessary, which has been made by my right hon. Friend, let me for a moment take this great question out of that cloud of the details of office with which it has been conveniently incumbered by the Secretary at War, and place it in its true and rude simplicity before the consideration of the House of Commons and of the country.

It is some nine or ten months ago, after an agitating year of warning, that Her Majesty was advised by Her Ministers to send a Message to Parliament to announce a declaration of war against Russia. I say that no Ministers ever gave such important advice to their Sovereign under such favourable circumstances as my Lord Aberdeen and his colleagues. Why, look at the facts! They had a unanimous Parliament, and a unanimous people. The war was popular. This House had expressed its willingness to vote any supplies, without any reference to party confidence whatever, which Her Majesty's Ministers might propose. They had an overflowing Exchequer. They had a prosperous people. In addition to all these advantages, they had the most powerful ally in the world. Let it be understood you entered upon war under these circumstances. These circumstances are forgotten in the petty views and the petty details and the petty consequences which have been permitted to steal into our debates. We hear of the inconvenience of free government to powerful political action. It is said that, although the public spirit under a despotic Government may not be equal to the spirit of a free people—that, although the conscript (not too adroitly introduced by the Secretary at War) may not fight as the militiaman who has been voluntarily enlisted, a despotism has still the advantages of unity of design, of singleness of purpose, and of that decision, vigour, and effect which is the consequence of such antecedents. But Her Majesty's Ministers had both the unity of despotism and all the spirit of a free people on their side. What they wanted they might have had as readily as the Emperor of Russia when he signs a ukase. There was no number of men, no amount of treasure, which they might not have commanded, and the money was given freely by a free people, and the men were animated by that immortal spirit which has rendered their achievements the mark for the approbation of an admiring world. They had, then, an overflowing purse, a prosperous people, and a popular war. They had the most powerful ally in the world. They had this combination of circumstances in their favour, on entering into this war, which no Ministry at any period ever enjoyed before. I now ask the House for a moment to turn round and consider, not whether there were sufficient nurses or surgeons at Scutari—not what was the number of pots of marmalade which should be sent out towards the support of our starving troops—but I ask the House to consider what have been the results which this Ministry, with these enormous advantages, have obtained.

You determined to attack the powerful ruler of a country against whom you had declared war in two opposite quarters of the world—the extremities almost of his vast dominions; you fitted out armadas to attack him in two seas; you sent out an army which was to encounter him on the most important European river. What have you done? The Secretary at War sneers at the notice which my right hon. Friend took of the achievements in the Baltic. If the ideas of the Secretary at War, that such success is a sufficient return for the efforts of this country are correct, then I confess I have little hope of the successful conduct of the war by the present Government. Why, Sir, let me recall to the house the strength of the united fleet that entered the Baltic. It was greater than any armada that ever figured in the history of our times; it was greater than the united fleets of France and Spain that met Nelson at Trafalgar. Let me recall to the House the circumstances under which the sailing of that fleet was inaugurated. It occasioned a debate in the House of Commons, and, therefore, I have no doubt it will be in the recollection of every one present. The head of the Admiralty of this country, the profound statesman and experienced senator who had so long presided, at various periods, over that department, himself was a guest at a public dinner which was given to the commander of that important enterprise. A veteran statesman, one who had presided long over the foreign affairs of the nation, a department which, it is supposed, imparts a peculiar character of discretion to human conduct —that noble Lord was also present upon that occasion, and in the face of Europe, and before an applauding country—these, two of the men of whom, in this House, we are most proud—statesmen to whom Europe looks up with respect and awe—were the principal guests at a public banquet given at a political club, in order to inaugurate the captaincy of this great enterprise. What were the expectations which these speakers permitted the country to indulge in? We are at this moment entirely engrossed in the important affairs which have taken place in the Black Sea. For more than two months the feelings of every hearth in this country have been there absorbed; but at that moment no one thought of the Black Sea, or of Sebastopol. They were of minor importance and of diminutive proportions compared with those vast preparations and that enormous armament which was draughted from our shores under the blessings and the benison of our most experienced statesmen, and had the advantage, moreover, of being commanded by a true Reformer. Well, the Secretary at War pretends that the capture of Bomarsund was all that was intended or thought of at that moment. I will not say that the Secretary at War had then never heard of Bomarsund, because he is a well-informed Gentleman, and it might be personal; but this I do know, that I have read, in an authoritative document, that it was not only projected, but that at one time it was settled, that the half-finished fortifications in the Baltic should be destroyed by Russia preparatory to the entrance of our fleets into that sea; and, therefore, under those circumstances, and remembering the policy which was afterwards partially followed, I hardly think it was worth while to send for a marshal of France and 10,000 French troops to destroy that which a company of marines would have finished in a few hours, and which, at all events, was not accomplished by that vast armada which had been sent out. Surely, then, my right hon. Friend was not irregular in alluding to the expedition to the Baltic, and saying that, although one of our greatest enterprises, it has not been attended by any results at all commensurate with the expectations of the country. If my right hon. Friend were not justified in this observation, why did not the noble Lord the President of the Council propose a Vote of Thanks to those who were concerned in that enterprise? Had the noble Lord proposed such a Vote, we should have been enabled to make inquiries, and the Ministers might have been able to throw some light on that perplexed and obscure subject, and have afforded some satisfaction to the public mind.

Then, Sir, I come to the second act of this war, which, let me impress upon you, was entered upon with advantages which no Ministry ever yet experienced, and with a combination of circumstances in our favour which never can occur again probably in the history of this country. What did you do with the army which you sent?

You explained your conduct, and you explained their course; but your explanations do not affect the result, and you cannot deny that they have accomplished nothing—that the plans which you had devised were barren and fruitless. The Secretary at War tells us that the Government were watching all that time the course of events, and that such troops as might have been spared by the pest, which was not contemplated, would have acted at the right moment and in the right quarter on the Russian forces; but he has not told us that if it was necessary to move those troops there were any means to move them. Whatever might have been the fate of Silistria—whatever might have been the conduct of the Turkish army on the Danube—you have not answered the question whether you had prepared adequate, or any, means to move our army from Varna to the scene of action; and I think the hon. Member for Aylesbury has fully demonstrated that you had not. What is your next act? You attack with a force of 20,000 or 30,000 men a fortress probably as strong as Gibraltar, and better provisioned. And under what circumstances did you undertake this enterprise? The Secretary at War tells you that their object was to strike at the heart of Russia in the south; and therefore they attacked Sebastopol. It was true, he admits, that in so doing our army was prepared with no reserve. Brave words, these! But why attack the place at the wrong time, and with ineffective means? It may be a question whether there should be a campaign in the Crimea; none that there should not be a winter campaign. But you have chosen a winter campaign, and what have been your preparations for it? In November you gave orders to build huts. You have not yet sent out that winter clothing which is adapted to the climate. My right hon. Friend (Sir John Pakington) fell into a slight error, which I am sure he will permit me to correct, in his allusion to the loss of the *Prince*. He said that the winter clothing had been despatched by the *Prince*, and that the Government were exonerated because that clothing was lost. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. S. Herbert) speaks the truth, and frankly. He seems to think there is nothing like a clean breast for a Minister in a scrape, and he takes great credit for this specific clothing for the Crimean climate; but the fact is, that the cargo of the *Prince* did not contain any special winter clothing. It was only the common warm clothing for the troops, and not a cargo in any way occasioned by the winter campaign, which your policy has rendered necessary. You have invaded the Crimea; you have attacked Sebastopol; but you have chosen to do so at the very worst period. You have commenced a winter campaign in a country which most of all others should be avoided. You have commenced such a campaign—a great blunder—without providing for it—the next great blunder. The huts will arrive in January, and the furs probably will meet the sun of May. These are your preparations!

But you say that time was of the greatest consequence—that if you had delayed fresh frosts would have been encountered. Surely, however, when a Ministry has so managed the affairs of a country as to bring it to such a condition that at last they have to go to war with one of the greatest military Powers in the world, you will agree that the decision should be arrived at after deep thought, with ample knowledge. Surely one would have thought that statesmen who arrogate to themselves all the ability and all the experience of this House would so have played their cards, that in trying this great issue they would have essayed it under the most favourable circumstances, and not have incurred fearful odds. It is now two years since you were dallying with Russia with your diplomatic overtures. You may possibly have supposed that your negotiations would terminate in peace. I believe the majority of you did; because I know that when a body of men of different opinions counsel together, they always take refuge in the consolatory conviction that they will not be called on to act. I believe, then, that this Cabinet of Coalitionists from the first flattered themselves that the tremendous circumstances they have to encounter, and which engage their most anxious thoughts by day and night, would never be a part of their lives. The First Minister of the Crown had never dreamt that at the termination of his career he would be acting against that Russia of which he was the cherished and almost the spoiled child. And another Minister, who has indulged in dreams of political Liberalism, scarcely thought that the latter days of his eminent career would thus approach his purpose. We know this from the Chancellor of the Exchequer at Manchester, and from his Budget in the House of Commons. We know by your confession that not two of you are of the same opinion; yet, as responsible men, it was your duty to have formed some policy two years ago. You appear to me not to have embraced any definite object or adopted any definite system. If you had, you would not have told us now that you are obliged to enter upon a winter campaign in the Crimea, because time is precious and that another month's delay would have rendered it impregnable. This I maintain — that the Ministry which has involved this country in a war with Russia ought not to have taken such a course, unless they were prepared for all those consequences which men of experience, ability, and knowledge must have known, unless they shut their eyes wilfully to those consequences, must have ensued.

I said just now that they had called Parliament together unexpectedly; but what I object to in the Government is, that they have done everything unexpectedly in this great affair; they have done everything too late; and in all they have recommended they have given signs of vacillation of opinion and uncertainty of purpose, and, necessarily, feebleness of execution. These are little things—they may be nothing; but the doctors came after the men were wounded, and the nurses appeared always after the wounded had expired. These things were never cared for until the indignant sorrow of the nation called upon them to exercise the duties of Ministerial humanity. But the same fate seems to await them in all their course. Now it is the surgeons that are too late, now the nurses; after the battle reinforcements arrive; and at last the storm and hurricane, that everybody had been expecting, overwhelms our navies. This is not an overcharged picture, for it is founded upon fact. Does the House think it is judicious that, under such circumstances, Parliament should meet *sub silentio?* But even the resolution to call Parliament together was taken too late. They prorogued the Parliament to the 14th of December, and then, so uncertain was their purpose—so vacillating their conduct—so undefined their object—that, having assembled and counselled the Sovereign to prorogue Parliament to the 14th of December, they find it necessary to invade the prerogative, and are obliged to avail themselves of the scurvy aid, comparatively speaking, of an Act of Parliament, to call us together on the 12th. I should like to know what influenced these Gentlemen when they counselled the Sovereign to prorogue Parliament to the 14th? And yet these are the men on whom the fortunes of the country depend. What are we to think of men who, taking into consideration all the circumstances of the nation, recommend to the Sovereign to prorogue Parliament till the 14th, which, virtually, was a meeting after Christmas, and then, in a panic, avail themselves of an Act of Parliament, and call us together on the 12th? I want to know why they changed their opinions? I want to know why it is necessary to provide now for an immediate increase of the forces, and why that was not done when it was recommended and sanctioned by the Sovereign? It is in perfect keeping with the whole conduct of the Government, and adds another to the catalogue I have mentioned. I want to know, in the dismal and deplorable circumstances in which we are placed, and in which we are alone sustained by the unsurpassed heroism of the English troops, why they determined upon a winter campaign in the Crimea, without that assistance and support our soldiers ought to have received? Such a step would have been considered most unnecessary and unwise if Ministers had only ordinary foresight and sagacity. I will not say the disastrous position of our forces, when I recollect the glorious feats of arms they have accomplished—but certainly I may say that it is a deplorable state of things in which we find ourselves.

It appears that towards the end of Her Majesty's Speech there is a specific for our dangers. It is not from the deeds of daring of our own gallant countrymen, or the enthusiasm and loyalty of the country, we are to look for extrication from the position in which we have been placed; but rather, as it seems to me, from the fact, as Her Majesty informs us, that, "together with the Emperor of the French, I have concluded an alliance with the Emperor of Austria, from which I anticipate important advantages to the common cause." If the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) condescends to address the House, I would impress upon him that it is expected from him, by the House and the country, that on this subject he should speak with some degree of frankness. We are asked in the Speech from the Throne to maintain this great war, and to prosecute it with vigour and force. I maintain that it is impossible to form an estimate of what our means will be to enable

Her Majesty to prosecute the war, unless we have some idea of the assistance she is to receive from her Allies. We know the assistance she receives from her Ally the Emperor of the French. It is precise, it is generous, it is cordial, it is sincere. It is doubly generous, because it is accorded to a Government, many Members of which were distinguished for the vituperative language in which they have spoken of that Prince. I know of nothing more to the credit of the French people—I know of nothing more to the credit of the French ruler and the French people—than the cordial manner in which they have co-operated with the present Government in this war. I remember when the First Lord of the Admiralty inaugurated his manifesto against the Government of Lord Derby by a diatribe against the Emperor of the French—while I remember that another Member of the Cabinet, not so eminent, determined, in order to make his court in the proper quarter, to outdo the right hon. Gentleman; and, not satisfied with abusing the Emperor of the French, maligned and slandered the people of that country—when I remember these facts, and that the chief of the present Cabinet raised an opposition to the Government of which I was a Member on account of our indecent and precipitate recognition of Napoleon as Emperor, I must say that I admire the candour and generosity of our Allies. In his character, and in the character of his people, I have unlimited confidence. I believe the motives of our alliance are beyond the intrigues or the insolence of individuals; it is a principle of civilisation, and a question of high feeling, which the Government, in my mind, do not comprehend, which will continue to bind together France and England. France is an ally that does not want to be paid for the aid she gives you. She is not to be subsidised. She is a friend with whom a treaty need have no secret article.

A year ago, after the massacre of Sinope, when the Parliament met, and there were indignant demands from the Government of some explanation of their conduct, the First Lord of the Admiralty rose—and they could not trust a bad cause to a better man—and, with all his specious eloquence, came forward to the table, and told us then, "I will not defend the past; it is liable to much misconception. We may have been idle or vacillating, but we had a great object to gain and to accomplish, and that is the alliance of the German Powers." The massacre of Sinope took place in order that we might obtain the alliance of the German Powers. Well, have they become our allies? I do not see that there is a treaty yet with Prussia; but Austria, we are told, has entered into a treaty from which we anticipate great advantages to the common cause. Now, I say that we should be the most spiritless body of men that ever lived, if, recollecting that a year ago an attempt was made to excuse your backslidings by the alliance with the German Powers—when we recollect that a year has elapsed, and that this treaty has not yet been brought into action—I say that we should be the most spiritless body of men on earth if we did not demand from the Government some franker explanation than we find in this niggard notice in the Speech of the Austrian Treaty. The noble Lord may say that it is not yet ratified, and that it will be laid on the table, and then we may all read it, but I can hardly believe that a man of his ability and spirit will make such a wretched excuse. I may agree with him that it is unusual, but the noble Lord should make a precedent on such an occasion, when sacrifices are demanded from the country, and should frankly inform us of the terms of this treaty.

Sir, if the assistance we are to derive be of a provisional and contingent character, I should say that, although we are ready to support Her Majesty with all the means in our power, it will be the greatest hallucination if we imagine that Austria is going to supply any of those means. I should have thought, indeed, that the noble Lord and his colleagues had had enough of the four points. If I remember right, the present Government was formed upon four points. Was not there the preservation of peace—was not there there the extension of free trade—thirdly, was there not Parliamentary Reform—and then, as the fourth point, was there not national education? It was upon these four points that the Coalition Ministry was formed; but if we are to judge by this precedent—if we are to suppose that the four points which Austria is to secure are not easier of accomplishment than the four points which the noble Lord promised us, and for which some hon. Gentleman opposite sacrificed their principles, and some only sacrificed their party—but for which the noble Lord sacrificed both—I should certainly feel that we were not entitled to receive much encouragement from this promise of the Austrian alliance. Sir, I maintain that it is the duty of the Government, on the subject of this Austrian alliance, to be frank. If they will not be frank with their opponents, whether they sit upon this side of the House or the other, I would humbly venture to say it would be wise upon the subject to be frank with the people of this country. The people of this country are not so blind to questions of this character as they were a few years ago. The people of this country are now beginning to comprehend the enormous issue at stake; and if they find that, with Parliament called together, their affairs in an unsatisfactory state, this old ghost of the Austrian alliances is again to haunt the Chamber of their representatives, as our main hope and aid, I think it is not at all unlikely that they will feel considerable disrelish at our condition, and think, therefore, it would be wise in the Government to tell us what Austria really means. I think the House of Commons ought to know whether Austria intends merely to watch the game, and profit by the first opportunity, or whether she means to employ her troops? Is she an ally in spirit and in blood, as our ally in France? Yes, England has a right to demand that from the Government which has the management of the crisis, and I suppose we shall hear to-night; for, if not, I am convinced that this meeting of Parliament, and this communication from Her Majesty, will not have the effect on the country which I, for one, earnestly desire. But if we are to have only an equivocal alliance—if we are only to have an interference that will serve but to bewilder and to mystify—if we are to negotiate when we ought to act, to stop the course of national conduct when the country, slow to enlist in questions of this kind, but when, as their blood is up, determined to accomplish their object, I say, if that is what we are to have, for me, at least, let there be no Austrian alliance—no four points, no subsidies, no secret articles—but let France and England together solve this great question, and establish and secure the liberties of Europe.

Lord JOHN RUSSELL: Sir, the right hon. Gentleman opposite, the Member for Droitwich (Sir J. Pakington), in a speech of remarkable ability, and, at the same time, I think, of great fairness, asked for an explanation from the servants of the Crown with respect to the circumstances upon which he entertained doubt, and with respect to certain points of policy that have been pursued; and he ended with saying, as I understood him, that, although he entertained those objections, it did not appear to him that they amounted to such a charge against the Government as would induce him to take part in any Motion for a change of Ministers; but that, if hereafter he did not find that those warlike operations were carried on according to what he believed to be the true policy of the country, he would himself join in any Parliamentary effort that might be made with reference to such a state of things. That declaration was in itself a satisfactory one, and with the conduct of the right hon. Gentleman I have no fault to find. But the right hon. Gentleman who has now spoken (Mr. Disraeli) has spoken in a totally different spirit. He has attempted by every means—while he, like his right hon. Friend, does not propose to displace Her Majesty's Ministers—he has attempted to weaken the confidence which the country may feel in their efforts—he has attempted to weaken the alliance between this country and France—he has thrown out every objection that can occur to his fertile mind with respect to the alliance into which we have recently entered, and he has, in short, said everything that could be calculated to damp the hope which this country, as I believe, confidently entertains of a glorious termination to the war. Sir, I cannot say, therefore—while I admire the speech of the right hon. Member for Droitwich, and especially the feeling with which he spoke of two hon. Members of this House, one of whom is now no more—I cannot say there was a single gleam of patriotism throughout the whole of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire. The right hon. Gentleman began with a most curious prologue, which seemed to me, at that late hour of the night, peculiarly unnecessary—namely, a protest in favour of liberty of speech in this House, and said it was his determination to resist any attempt by Ministers to suppress that freedom of speech, Sir, which you ask from Her Majesty at the beginning of every Session. Why, I am accused in certain not unpleasant publications of never speaking without uttering an encomium on Magna Charta, but an encomium on Magna Charta would not be more unnecessary or out of place than the eloquent protest of the right hon. Gentleman in favour of liberty of speech. But he is so indignant upon this subject because he imagines that certain directions have been given which have not been given or thought of—but given to certain Members of this House—orders given, the right hon. Gentleman says, to the creatures of the Government. The right hon. Gentleman, who respects freedom of debate, calls a number of these Members the creatures of Government. That is not very respectful to that part of the House to which he refers. We certainly have a very great question before us, and we are engaged in a great contest. The right hon. Gentleman says that we have never conceived the true magnitude of the war. The right hon. Member for Droitwich alluded to a speech of mine last year. In this very speech of mine I find that I most distinctly recognised the importance and magnitude of the enterprise. I said—

> "It is in this mighty contest that Europe is engaged, and I should be misleading the House if I were to tell them that, when engaged in a conflict with such an enemy, with a Sovereign of immense power, of great influence, and of great talents, we may hope for an early termination of the contest." [3 *Hansard*, cxxxv. 611.]

That shows, at all events, that I did not attempt to diminish the greatness of the contest, or induce the House to hope for a very speedy termination. As my right hon. Friend the Secretary at War has so eloquently enlivened and unravelled the details of this subject, I will not attempt to go over the same ground; but I will touch on some of the greater points of this question before the debate is closed. In the first place, with respect to the army we have sent to the East. That army, at the request of Omar Pacha, took up a position in Varna and the neighbourhood, from which it was supposed an effort might be made to raise the siege of Silistria. But it is said that we have not shown that that army was provided with the means of transport. I can only say that the means of transport were collected, and that if the siege of Silistria had not been raised, those means would have been sufficient, and the army would have advanced, though it was by no means an easy operation at that season of the year. But is it such an easy thing at the commencement of a war to provide all the means for carrying it on? I remember the Duke of Wellington saying in private that he was obliged to leave a brigade of infantry at Lisbon for three months because he had no means of transporting it to head-quarters, although all the means of Portugal were at his command. But the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) said, you suffered the army to land on the beach of the Crimea without any provision for them on that occasion. Would he have had Lord Raglan to have sent word the night before, that the means of transport might have awaited his arrival? With an enemy in his neighbourhood, could he have said that he intended landing at Eupatoria? Still there were means provided at Varna and its neighbourhood. But the main question is, whether such an expedition should have been undertaken. In considering that question I beg the House to consider what must have been the alternative. We had sent an army to assist Turkey; not only an English but a French army was assembled in that country, and the Danube having been recrossed by the enemy, what was the course open to us? Should we have taken the army back to Constantinople, and allowed it to remain there the rest of the summer? No; it is quite obvious such a course would have been a great disappointment to the people of this country; it would have been a great disappointment to the army itself, and the national spirit would have been shaken by taking a course which implied so great a fear of the forces of Russia. Well, then, should we order the army across the Danube to act against the Russian army? If we had done so, we should have been met by the immense forces concentrated in Bessarabia, and, therefore, no such movement could have been undertaken with any effect. There remained, therefore, the question of the expedition to the Crimea, and although there were many parties against that expedition, there were some of the ablest men both in the French army and fleet and the English army and fleet who spoke with confidence of such an expedition. I confess I was one of those who felt confidence in it. I believed it was a great risk, but I believed there was a great object to be attained; that if we destroyed that stronghold of Russian power—Sebastopol—we should be enabled to give to Turkey that security which was the great purpose of the war. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Droitwich alluded to a speech of mine, and said that in that speech I gave notice to Russia that such an expedition was to be undertaken. But the tone of that speech was entirely misapprehended. It had often been asked what was the object of the war; and I was endeavouring to point out those guarantees upon which

Turkey might again be enabled to resume her relations with Russia. I said that the Treaty of Adrianople could not be renewed, and that no security for peace could be had so long as Russia had a stronghold supplied with all arms, and a large fleet ready to sail with a fair wind down upon the Porte. But, Sir, with respect to the sentiments which I then uttered, I have referred to them now not merely for the purpose of showing what a wrong interpretation had been placed on them, but for the purpose of saying that what I considered to be necessary then I consider to be necessary now. I believe no peace will be safe for Turkey, I believe no peace will be honourable to this country, which left Sebastopol in the same menacing position in which it had been of late years before the war. Well, if that is the case, how important it is that, by our success in the Crimea, we should attain the means of fixing these conditions. The question really was, whether an expedition should be sent against Sebastopol this year before any additional fortifications could be constructed for its defence; or whether it should be sent in some future year, when our own army might be stronger, but when not only Sebastopol, but the intrenchments of every landing place in the Crimea, would have been strengthened. I will not refer to what the right hon. Gentleman opposite said with respect to the Baltic fleet, except to say that I think the Admirals who have commanded both in the Black Sea and the Baltic have been very unfairly attacked. I believe that it would have been a great misfortune if, by an unsuccessful attack on a place like Cronstadt, which has great means of defence, we should have involved the loss of three or four of our line-of-battle ships. The panic caused by such an event would have been very injurious to us, and would have impeded the general progress of the war. Nor will I enter upon the question of reinforcements, as the subject has already been alluded to at great length by my right hon. Friend the Secretary at War. I will only say that, in the war of 1793, and in the war which followed the peace of Amiens, we were only able to send, in the first instance, 1,700 men, and in the second instance, 3,000 men, even after the war had lasted for four years. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Droitwich, and my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury, referred to the treaty with Austria; I do not pretend to give the House an accurate statement of the terms of that treaty, but I am quite ready to say what I think has been the position, and what is the position, of Austria in regard to this country. I have never been satisfied that Austria has pursued that course which her duty to Europe should have induced her to take. I think that in this case, which concerns all Europe, and with which the independence of Europe is intimately concerned, Austria, as a great European Power, ought to have earlier joined the maritime Powers. I think, besides, that Austria was more nearly affected by the question at issue, and that her danger was greater than that of England and France; but, on the other hand, a cautious Power like Austria saw that the danger to her of a war with Russia was greater than it could be to England and France. Neither England nor France had anything to fear from an invasion of their territories by Russia. No one could expect a Russian army of invasion to land in France or England; but not so with regard to Austria. Austria had got a large army in Poland, and if Gallicia had been attacked by Russia, after one or two victories the road to Vienna would have been open. The military establishment of Austria was low, and had been reduced very lately, and her first step was to increase her military force. It was only at the end of July last that her preparations were nearly completed; and I remember perfectly well at the end of the Session that I stated, in answer to a question from the hon. Member for Montrose (whose absence this evening I lament)—that I said, though Austria was pledged not to make any arrangement with Russia, except on certain bases that had been laid down, she was by no means pledged to undertake a war in conjunction with the maritime Powers. She has now gone a step further, but she has not even yet gone so far as to say that, if before the end of the year peace be not made with Russia, she will become a belligerent. She has only gone this length—she has agreed that, if she should be at war with Russia, a treaty offensive and defensive should *ipso facto* exist between Austria, England, and France. She has likewise agreed that, before the end of the year, she will take into further consideration what steps she will be prepared to take with respect to the terms of peace with Russia. Now, I understand the meaning of that article—certainly as not containing anything very precise in itself—I understand, however, the meaning of that article to be that, if England and France shall propose conditions of peace which are in conformity with the four bases, and which seem to Austria to come within the terms of those bases, and if Russia shall refuse her assent to such treaty of peace, then Austria will no longer hesitate, but take part in the alliance against Russia, and that an offensive and defensive alliance will take place. I do not wish to overstate the engagement in any way; and I admit that Austria might still, at the last moment, say that the terms proposed—these four bases explained in a way I did not expect—would reduce Russia too much, and diminish too greatly her weight in Europe, and that she could never be expected to agree to them. Such might be her language. She leaves herself at liberty to say this without any breach of faith, and one of the last things I should wish to do would be to impute to Austria a breach of faith if ultimately she did not form part of the alliance; but my explanation is that she does concur with us in respect to the bases that are absolutely necessary for the security of Turkey; and that if Russia does not consent to a treaty of peace founded on those bases, then that in the next campaign the forces of Austria will be joined with those of England and France. It may be said that we should have gone further and have got better terms. It is easy to say that these are terms which should not have been accepted; but we could not force terms on an independent Power; and it is better to have such a treaty with Austria rather than leave Austria unconnected with us and without any ties to bind her to us. That was the belief of Her Majesty's Government, and still more strongly the persuasion of the Government of the Emperor of the French—that it was wise to enter upon these engagements, such as they were, and that the success of the war was thereby promoted. I have always thought it was much to be lamented that Austria should be so tardy, and Russia had been enabled to despatch a part of her troops on the Danube to the Crimea, which placed our gallant troops there at so great a disadvantage. I would agree with much of what the hon. Member for Aylesbury has said with respect to three of the conditions, but that I never have been able to get anybody to tell me how we are to effect our object except by a long and protracted war. I cannot see how the Emperor of Russia, being of the same religious communion as 11,000,000 of the subjects of the Sultan, and having their sympathy, how he is ever to be prevented from having a considerable influence over those subjects. I believe we may limit that influence, and prevent his having the power which the Menchikoff note proposed he should have. I believe by uniting the other Powers in a general guarantee, and accepting from the Sultan, instead of a treaty with Russia, a general declaration in favour of his Christian subjects, we may deprive Russia of her protectorate. But I do not believe that any articles that could be framed could entirely deprive Russia, in time of peace, of the influence I have mentioned. If that be the case, so much more necessary is it that we should not allow to Russia the means of invading or conquering Turkey. This appeared to me, in July last, to be the essential terms of peace, and I have not altered my opinion. I was sorry to hear my hon. Friend speak of the battle of Inkerman as a "fatal battle." Now, my belief is, that though the losses were heavy, and though the nation has great reason to deplore those losses, and although many families will spend the approaching season in affliction who might have hoped to pass it in joy and comfort, yet that, for a great national object, the victory has not been thrown away. The bravery, the unflinching valour, which were displayed upon the heights of Inkerman, will teach the nations of Europe to respect our character and the military prowess which we have shown, and it is as likely as almost any event that could be named to bring about the conclusion of an honourable peace. Deeds like these, you may depend upon it, though not followed by the rout of an enemy, or accompanied with the gain of a large territory, or the surrender of a fortress, will be fruitful of consequences. They maintain the character of the nation by whose soldiers they are achieved. While this country has such deeds of heroism to boast of, you may depend upon it that the mightiest nations of Europe will dread our enmity, and be anxious to secure our friendship. With this persuasion, I shall, on a future occasion, ask the House to vote its thanks to those gallant men, and to our gallant allies, the French army, who fought by the side of our troops at Alma and Inkerman, and assisted them to defeat the enemy. With such an alliance, with such prudent conduct in regard to other Powers, and with the determination in this country, which I believe is strong, that the war in which Her Majesty is at present engaged must be brought to a just, and honourable, and glorious termination, I feel full of hope for the result of the contest.

Question put, and *agreed to.*

Committee *appointed,* "to draw up an Address, to be presented to Her Majesty upon the said Resolution:"—Mr. Henry Herbert, Mr. Leveson Gower, Lord John Russell, Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Viscount Palmerston, Sir George Grey, Sir James Graham, Sir Charles Wood, Mr. Sidney Herbert, Sir William Molesworth, Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Solicitor General, Sir John Young, Mr. Cardwell, The Judge Advocate, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Hayter, and Mr. Bouverie, or any Five of them:—Queen's Speech *referred.*

Adjourned at half after Two o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Wednesday, December 13, 1854.

MINUTES.] NEW MEMBERS SWORN.—For Barnstaple, Richard Samuel Guinness, Esq., and John Laurie, Esq.

PUBLIC BILL.—1° Militia.

QUEEN'S SPEECH—THE NAVY.

Report of Address *brought up,* and read.

ADMIRAL WALCOTT observed, that no naval officer having addressed the House on the debate of the previous evening, he might be pardoned for occupying their attention for a few moments. Sir, it appears to me that perfect unanimity in Parliament at this crisis is vitally necessary for the welfare of the country. Every public measure which affects the one absorbing topic of our times, must be the collective act of all. The noblest motives of human action nerved us to begin the contest, from which England's honour forbids us to retire till the flag is furled in victory—patriotic foresight for the security of our possessions, and hatred of oppression. We were stimulated by no apprehension of invasion, no desire of adding fresh dominions, no fears of a discontented population; unenfeebled by an almost continuous peace of nearly forty years, the national spirit instinctively acknowledged the justice and imperative necessity of the war, forced upon us by a Power, dangerous from its violation of treaties, and formidable from its brute force. To the appeal of the Sovereign the whole people responded with one heart and voice. Our debates, then, must be free from party spirit and factious opposition. The conduct of our commanders by sea and land must be estimated, and their energies quickened, by impartial judgment and generous confidence; the operations of the fleet and camp must be neither impeded nor crippled by jealous criticism, or that unhappy stint which in former wars prolonged their miseries abroad and burdens at home. Our resolutions must be neither slow nor feeble, our ample resources must be ungrudgingly applied, there must be no room for unavailing regrets in the future, or misunderstanding and doubt of our earnestness and sincerity on the part of a people which now enthusiastically calls upon us to be bold, and cheerfully consents to every sacrifice that may add strength to its heroic defenders. To every measure calculated to place the naval and military forces in a condition to fulfil the expectations of the country, my hearty concurrence will be given. Whilst I cannot but deplore many acts of improvidence in the preparations and prosecution of the war, I will not stop to dilate on the unwelcome truth. My main motive in rising is to give utterance to my exultation, when I consider the ardent bravery, the patient endurance, the magnificent display of lofty heroism made by our army in the Crimea, in the face of an unprecedented opposition, by an enemy superior in numbers and resources, an antagonist whose strength we now begin to estimate without exaggeration in either extreme, and their forbearance to foes stained by inhumanity and the grossest treachery. To the future I look forward without the slightest feeling of despondency, for I am convinced that our splendid army under its great chief (a worthy successor of his illustrious master) will be found equal to every emergency, and come forth from any position, however perilous in which it may be involved, with new honour and additional lustre to the high reputation which it bears deservedly among the military nations of the earth. It is our paramount duty to secure efficient reinforcements, and to maintain to a standard commensurate with our power and their requirements, our fleets and armies, in order to ensure the success of forthcoming contests at the least possible loss to the sister services. Not to strain every effort to carry out this object would be criminal; to pause, and nicely count the cost, would be ignominious. The sword we have drawn untarnished, must be sheathed without a stain: sorrow and suffering are unavoidable, but never let the mourner say their dead fell in vain, or that timid counsels inflicted more wounds than the weapons of the Czar. It has not been the good fortune of the navy to achieve hitherto its wonted victories, but I am sure the army is not insensible to the great services it gave, such as were invaluable in all its eventful progress. Need I allude to the zeal, the ability, the prudence shown in the embarkation of the troops at Varna, their transport to and landing at Eupatoria, and the support on these aboard rendered by our fleet? The names of the Admirals so commanding, and the co-operation of the officers and men employed, will stand illustrious in the annals of the British Navy, and give a happy augury of the prowess they will evince when more immediately engaged with an enemy which has not dared to cope with them at sea, and I trust I may, without injustice to other officers, associate the name of a near relation (Admiral Sir Edward Lyons), having exhibited the highest qualities in the performance of the duties which more immediately attached to him. Side by side our soldiers and sailors fight with the sailors and soldiers of France, whom an alliance of principle, not policy, binds to us the joint conservators of European civilisation. Their interests are identified with our own, their glory is our glory, and they will add triumph to triumph. The cordial friendship of that country, cemented by our mingled blood, will, in my heart I believe, counterbalance the evil of the war.

Mr. PELLATT said, he could not suffer this opportunity to pass without congratulating the House upon their determination not to tie the hands of the Government in any manner with respect to the conduct of the war; and he believed that if the country gave them a generous support the result would be, it would be brought to a successful conclusion; for never had our troops met with more brilliant success than during this campaign. He represented not only merchants, bankers, and tradesmen, but especially the working classes, and he assured the House that the feeling of the whole metropolitan population was one of entire unanimity in favour of prosecuting the war with energy, and, at the same time, they desired that the powers of the Government for pursuing it with honour and success should be increased. He thought the emergency should be met by a special war tax, to be levied on land, the funds, railways, and other capital; and that, by way of compensation, the duties on French wines should be reduced to 1*s.* a gallon. Such a reduction would tend to cement our present cordial alliance with our French allies, from which he anticipated the most important results. The stamp on newspapers might also be abolished. Such an alteration in our system would be far better than an increase of the income tax, which already pressed with great severity on the working classes.

Sir H. WILLOUGHBY said, it appeared to him that the Government were asking too much of the House, when they asked them to express their satisfaction at the treaty between France and England and Austria—a document of which they knew at present nothing. What had passed between Austria and the German Powers had excited great interest as to her future policy; and it was going too far to imply any satisfaction with that of which the House was still ignorant. In the other House, indeed, it had been stated, that the expressions used in the Address pledged the House to nothing; but in that House they had received no such assurance. He thought there was much to regret in the way in which the House dealt with foreign affairs; public opinion was never consulted, because everything was done by the Government before the people knew anything about it. Their sentiments, therefore, on any subject having relation to our foreign policy, always came too late. They never had an opportunity of influencing public opinion, and therefore did no good. Thus if they had in 1853 boldly expressed their views and resolutions as to the course to be pursued in regard to Russia, that would have produced far greater effect than all the protocols and despatches which they had the pleasure of reading—after the events. It was a most important question—what was the expression of the House on foreign policy? It was truly nothing. If they wanted, indeed, to know anything about foreign affairs, they must consult documents with which they were not furnished, except in other channels than their own papers. And usually it was not in this country that they learned anything at all, but abroad. Thus, in 1853, a despatch from our own Foreign Minister was published in every European journal before the House of Commons had it! The House was a cipher as to foreign policy; and he desired to know how long this was to continue, and whether, in the present instance, the treaty would be laid upon their table before they were called upon to express an opinion upon it? There had been another convention between Austria and Turkey as to the occupation of the Principalities, as to which he had asked last year whether this country was a party to it. The Austrians entering the Principalities, not as declared belligerents, but neither as allies, had paralysed the movements of the Turks, and enabled Russia to detach a large force to act against us in the Crimea. In fact, the real source of the mischief was the vacillating policy of the German Powers; and Austria had an excuse for this in the absence, on our own part, of any definite policy. It appeared to him that Austria wished England and France to pay the piper, while she derived all the benefit, without sharing a shilling of the expense. Unless we had a clear and decided policy, we could not expect to obtain that firm and lasting peace which was the object of all these costly and bloody proceedings. With regard to the expedition into the Crimea, more detailed information was necessary. It now appeared that the Government assumed all the responsibility of it, and that none of it belonged to the commanders; let that be distinctly understood. An expedition in July might have been wise, which in September would be unwise. It was a question of time; and the Government had selected a time when they might have expected that the Russians would be able to send large reinforcements into the Crimea, being relieved trom the Baltic fleet, and all danger of Turkish invasion having disappeared; added to which it was a time at which storms in the Euxine were to be expected, which might have perilled and defeated the whole enterprise. He had been in the Crimea himself, and knew that at that period of the year storms were certain to occur. The expedition had been made on an entirely wrong foundation. The base of its operations was to be the fleet—a fleet on a lee shore, liable to sudden and violent storms. If the storm which had taken place on the 14th of November had, as it might have, happened on the 14th of September, we should have lost half our ships and very likely half our troops, and certainly the expedition would have been defeated, if not destroyed. It was a question of time, and the wrong time had been chosen. There was another point which he wished to have cleared up —what was the real object Government proposed to itself in sending the expedition to the Crimea? Supposing Sebastopol to be taken, would the Allied Powers be any better off? Could we hold it? If we could, would it be of any use to us? He had been there, and thought not; and, at all events, we had not gone the right way to take it. It was not a mere fortress, it was a fortified position some ten or twelve miles in extent, with about a dozen forts, of which when one was taken, another could at once play upon it. And to invest such a fortified place—without investing which it was almost impossible to take it—would require 100,000 men, defended as it was by an army 40,000 in number—instead of which we had 50,000 French and English. We must remember that our small army had, for the first time, been thrown on a hostile shore, where no supplies or assistance could be obtained. Our military history afforded no parallel to such a case as this; and if we were brought well out of the difficulty, we should owe it only to the courage of our forces, and not to any wisdom with which the plan had been conceived, or any skill with which it had been contrived. What was the policy and what were the prospects of the Government? Could they explain? They had no definite policy; and without it the war was as likely to last ten years as two.

Mr. ALCOCK said, he did not wish to disturb the unanimity which appeared to prevail respecting the Address. At the same time that was a proper opportunity to make observations on the general subject of the war. He believed that the country had a right to be, as he believed it was, dissatisfied with the manner in which the war had been conducted. Parliament had been even too willing to grant anything that could be required to enable the Government to carry on the war with vigour; but up to the present time nothing had been done. Ministers would have to explain to the country with regard to the fleet in the Baltic, how it was that the finest fleet that ever sailed from the shores of England, having gone eight months ago full of expectation and hope, had returned, having done nothing. He certainly did find fault with the Duke of Newcastle for having sent such a fleet to a station where it was impossible that it could do anything worthy of its magnitude and efficiency. If it had been three times the force, would he have expected it to attack the Sebastopol of the north, to attack Cronstadt and take St. Petersburg? Did he know that it was absurd to expect that it would take Cronstadt? If he did so, he must say that he was grossly deceived and grossly in error. If his intention was merely to make a demonstration, the fleet was three times too large for such a purpose. Half of it would have sufficed to keep the Russian fleets in their harbours, and to protect our commerce; the other half ought to have been in the vulnerable part of Russia, in the Black Sea and the Crimea. Therefore, he said the Minister had foolishly thrown away a powerful fleet and an enormous expenditure for no object whatever. But if the Minister of War was open to censure for having so injudiciously sent such an enormous force to the Baltic, he was still more open to censure for not having sent a sufficiently large army to the Crimea. It was said last night by the Secretary at War that this was the largest army this country had ever sent forth, namely, 53,000 men. But what had other nations done? In 1832 the French and English took upon them to separate Belgium from Holland, and the French Government sent 66,000 men to besiege Antwerp, the citadel of which was occupied by 5,000 Dutch troops. In 1812 what force did France send to invade Russia? Not less than 450,000 men. In 1828, when Russia invaded Turkey, an army of 160,000 men crossed the Danube in the first campaign, and in the second campaign 140,000 more; while at the signing of the Treaty at Adrianople, in 1829, there were only 15,000 of these men left. But in the year 1854, when England, France, and Turkey combined to make war against Russia, they sent 50,000 men to invade Russia—a country occupying a sixth part of the globe, and containing 70,000,000 of people. No wonder that the Allied Powers had done nothing up to this very time. A military man of some distinction, who had recently published *A Tour in Turkey*, recommended a campaign of a very different kind from that which had been adopted. He said that the allied army should have attacked the Crimea from the south-east part, and that they should have made sure that all the Caucasian ports were free from the power of Russia. They ought to have made a point of taking Anapa. This was a first-rate fortress, the key of the Caucasus and the Sea of Azoff, and yet we had never attempted to take it. After taking possession of that fortress, they ought to have raised thousands of irregular horsemen among the Caucasians, and at the same time opened a communication with the Circassian chief Schamyl. One of the greatest difficulties which had been experienced by our armies had been the want of horses, both to mount our own cavalry and to supply the means of transport; but if we had possession of Anapa we should have found plenty of excellent animals. Our forces ought to have captured the town, to have spent their money amongst the people, and to have taken every opportunity to cultivate their friendship. Already the Tartars were well disposed towards us, and there would have been no difficulty in raising an excellent corps of irregular cavalry from amongst them. Why then, he would ask, had this important step been overlooked, and why had not our generals put themselves in communication with the great chief Schamyl? Had what he was recommending been done, our rear would have been secure, and the allied troops might have advanced gradually and with perfect safety upon Sebastopol. These advantages, he was afraid, we had now in a great measure lost; for the Russian Government must already have perceived the friendly disposition of the Tartars towards our troops, and would, of course, take care to counteract that feeling next year. With respect to the Address he had, of course, no objection to it. On the contrary, his only complaint was, that the Government should not have taken more vigorous steps at an earlier period, and he trusted that such succours would be sent to the Crimea as would, at any rate, render the position of our army safe.

Colonel SIBTHORP said, he fully agreed with the right hon. Member for Droitwich (Sir J. Pakington) that the Government had exhibited gross apathy, and that, had more vigour marked their measures in the outset, a great deal of bloodshed would have been saved. He yielded to none in admiration of the courage displayed by our troops, and he would be willing to lend his assistance to any body of statesmen who would bring the contest to a successful issue. With regard to Austria, he confessed the noble Lord the President of the Council entertained a better opinion of that Power than he did. As the House might suppose, he had no very great admiration for foreigners. Without at all intending to question the respectability of tailors, it was said that nine tailors made a man. He was sure it would take ninety-nine foreigners to make one thorough good Englishman. He wished there were more men in the Government like the noble Lord the Member for the Home Department—colleagues who would show some signs of his wisdom, energy, and spirit of independence; but that was hopeless. He would support the Government if they would pursue a vigorous policy; but there must be an end to all shirking for the future.

Mr. RICE said, he could not listen to the observations of the hon. Member for Surrey (Mr. Alcock) with reference to the Baltic fleet without saying that it did not require to be a naval officer to see the insufficiency of the crews on board that fleet before it went to sea. It was the finest fleet of ships that ever had been sent from this country, and there were most gallant officers on board of it, and nothing could more decidedly show their gallantry than the readiness with which they went to sea with such crews, one-half of whom were landsmen. Now, however, it was in a most efficient condition, both as regards officers and seamen. What would have been the consequences if that fleet had not been in the Baltic? They would have had the Russian fleet in the North Sea. The hon. Member for Surrey seemed to think they had sent out too large a fleet. They ought not, however, to despise the Russian fleet; and the House should reflect on what might have been the consequence if we had sent a limited and insufficient fleet in the Baltic to meet them. They were told how easy it was to demolish stone walls with ships; but they had seen in the Black Sea how difficult it was for ships to act against stone walls. Notwithstanding the gallantry with which the ships were brought into action against these walls, there was no doubt they had got the worst of it. It was true the batteries of the enemy were silenced, but before twelve hours had passed those batteries were mounted and fit for service again. Putting aside the operations at Bomarsund, which they were told were to be counted as nothing, he thought that two very important results had been derived from the expedition to the Baltic. In the first place the ships and commerce of Russia had been kept within their ports; and, in the next, though they had this year sent out an inefficient body of seamen to the Baltic, yet next year they would have an efficient body of seamen, and then they could send an efficient fleet to sea, with men, officers, and ships almost perfectly untouched; and they had formerly an imperfect knowledge of the Baltic, but now everything connected with it was known, and they could send there next year an efficient fleet, with a perfect knowledge of the seas they had to navigate.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: I am sure, Sir, it is the wish and feeling of this House, of which I recognise the propriety, that we should not now repeat the discussion of last night; but at the same time there are one or two questions that have been put by hon. Members in the course of this conversation in the presence of Members of the Government, and I think it would not be entirely respectful to them that these questions should remain without an answer. In speaking of the questions that have been put by hon. Gentlemen in the course of this conversation, I certainly do not intend to refer to inquiries that were made, both by the hon. Baronet opposite and the hon. Member for Surrey, with respect to military operations. The hon. Member behind me says, Why did you not attack Anapa? another hon. Member says, Why did you not organise an irregular force? another hon. Member says, What will you do with Sebastopol if you should get it; and what do you think are the advantages you will gain by the capture of Sebastopol? In declining to answer questions of this description, allow me to represent to the House the position in which the Government is placed, and why it will not, I hope, be thought disrespectful to the House that silence should be observed in this matter. And it is better to illustrate what I mean by reference to what formerly took place than by any abstract argument. During the progress of the summer, pressed by the natural wish of Members of the House to obtain information, my noble Friend the Member for the City of London, in referring to the objects of the war, and the conditions on which peace might be made, adverted to the menacing attitude of Russia in Sebastopol, and indicated his opinion that no peace could be deemed satisfactory that would leave Russia in that menacing attitude with reference to the Black Sea. What was the consequence of that declaration? Why, immediately it was endeavoured to be turned into a communication on the part of my noble Friend of the military measures that were to be undertaken by the Government, and last night in this House, as well as elsewhere during the recess, the Government and my noble Friend were made the objects of criticism for having given notice to the Emperor of Russia of the military operations that were to be undertaken. When hon. Gentlemen, therefore, ask what we expect to gain from the capture of Sebastopol, and what course we shall pursue when we get it, I hope the House will see that there are the most obvious reasons of prudence for being silent on the subject, and that these very same reasons impose upon us the very same rule with reference to the question why no attempt on Anapa has been made. All I will say is, that the Government have taken their resolutions deliberately, that they are ready to follow them out by the most effective and energetic means, and to abide by the judgment of this House on the result. The hon. Member behind me (Mr. Alcock) says that nothing has been done—and I do not pretend to say that everything has been done. I do not pretend to say that everything has been done that should have been done; but I think it right to advert to the admirable speech which my right hon. Friend (Mr. S. Herbert) made last night, and to say that the Government will take their stand on that most reasonable, fair, and candid statement, in which my right hon. Friend laid claim to no impeccability with regard to those operations. If Napoleon thought that he who has made war without many errors has not made war long, the observation is also applicable to the management of the political portion of the great game of war; and if the persons who criticise those proceedings do not speak in an unfair and uncandid spirit, they must be ready to admit that what you are to expect from a Government charged with the management of the political operation of the war is, not that they should stand a minute criticism of every detail, but that their general measures should have been taken according to wisdom and prudence. When the hon. Member says that nothing has been done, I will not say that he does not do justice to the Government, for the interests of the Government are too small to be considered; but I would venture respectfully to ask him, does he do justice to the House and to the country, when he states at this moment that nothing has been done? But the hon. Gentleman has, indeed, answered his own question with respect to the Baltic; for in alleging that nothing has been done, he says my noble Friend the Duke of Newcastle ought to have known beforehand that it was impossible to do anything, and because it was impossible to do anything he should not have sent out one-half the fleet that was sent to the Baltic. The answer of my hon. Friend the Member for Dover (Mr. Rice) is a sufficient answer to that point. How do the facts stand with regard to the Russian force in the Baltic? The Russian fleet there amounted to twenty-nine sail of the line, and the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Alcock) says we should have sent there a fleet of one-half the magnitude we did send. When the fleet under Sir Charles Napier first sailed for the Baltic, it amounted only to twelve sail of the line. I will not go the length to say that the crews of the ships were open to all the criticism of my hon. Friend, but many of them were undoubtedly new men, and those who were not new to the naval service were new to one another. Therefore they were not in the highest state of efficiency, or in the state of efficiency they are now. But does any one say that the Government had increased that fleet without the most urgent necessity? Were we to expose that fleet to the action of twenty-nine sail of the line of Russia for a moment longer than it was in our power to remove that inequality? The moment it was in the power of my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty, he raised the strength of the fleet to nineteen sail of the line, and it must be admitted that that number was not excessive when we consider the fleet that was opposed to it. It is true it is joined by the French squadron, but that was at a very much later period. And in the first instance the occupation of the Baltic fell to the English squadron alone, and the business of England was not to wait until the French squadron could be spared, but to occupy the Baltic from the first moment when the breaking up of the ice opened that source of danger to British trade. The hon. Gentleman having spoken thus of the fleet in the Baltic as having been twice over too large—an opinion in which, I think, the House will not concur with him—then referred to the Crimea, and asked, "What brought you to suppose, when you considered the great masses of men that are necessary to conduct the invasion of a powerful country, that Russia could be simply invaded by an army of 50,000?" But who ever supposed that Russia could be invaded by an army of 50,000 men? The force first landed on Russian territory may have been about 50,000 men; and I find the hon. Gentleman includes that in his category that nothing has been done. The hon. Gentleman seems to think that the landing of 50,000 men in the Crimea, the horses of the cavalry and artillery, and of heavy guns to carry on the siege, was doing nothing. But the hon. Member is wrong if he supposes that the operation was so limited. 50,000 men represented the number that could be carried over from Varna to the Crimea at one time, and it was an operation that reflected the highest credit on the military and naval commanders. The hon. Gentleman entirely forgets that even at that moment the force that has been sent to the East by England and France does not fall short of 80,000 men. And how do matters stand now? My right hon. Friend (Mr. S. Herbert) acquainted the House last night that the British force sent to the East is now close upon 55,000 men. I cannot give the same formal and official return up to the latest moment of the French force, but I apprehend that I am fully justified, from the information in our possession, in stating that the French force despatched to the East up to the present moment is little short of 100,000 men—certainly not less than from 90,000 to 95,000. If the hon. Gentleman objects that it is absurd to invade Russia with 50,000 men, French and English, my reply is that that may be very true, but that in reality the invasion is one in which little short of 150,000 men are engaged by the united power of England and France. The hon. Baronet opposite asked two questions with respect to the treaty entered into between Austria and the Porte, which questions he put to my noble Friend the President of the Council during the last Session. He wished to know whether England was or was not a party to that treaty. Now it is plain on the face of the case, that, that being a treaty simply between Austria and the Porte, neither England nor any other Power was a party to that treaty. That treaty was concluded between Austria and the Porte, as two independent Powers, for objects very material and valuable to their respective interests and views, and therefore it was not a matter which rested with this country to decide, but was one simply for the consideration of those two Powers. The right hon. Baronet then complained that the treaty that has been referred to in Her Majesty's Speech as having been concluded between France, England, and Austria, has not been laid upon the table, and yet that the House has been called upon to express its satisfaction with that treaty. With respect to the laying of that treaty upon the table, I say that the Government regret their inability to have done so before the discussion on the Address as much as the right hon. Baronet himself. They are sensible of the inconvenient position in which the House is necessarily placed in being called upon to refer to a document of the contents of which the House is not fully cognisant; but the right hon. Baronet is aware that the treaty has not been ratified, and that until the ratifications of the treaty are exchanged, it would be a departure both from uniform practice and from obvious prudence, if the Government were to lay that treaty upon the table; but, of course, it will be laid upon the table the first moment that it is in the power of the Government to make it known to Parliament. The right hon. Baronet may dismiss from his mind all such apprehensions as he seems to entertain, that the House will be called upon to commit itself to the contents of that treaty. It is open to the right hon. Baronet, if he please, after having voted for the present Address, to express his disapprobation of the treaty in any manner he pleases, and if he think fit—though I do not anticipate it—to move a vote of censure on the Government for having advised Her Majesty to negotiate such a treaty. The proof of what I say is to be found by simply reciting the passage of the Address which refers to it. The Address merely states—

> "That we have heard with satisfaction that, with the Emperor of the French, Your Majesty has concluded a treaty of alliance with the Emperor of Austria, from which Your Majesty anticipates important advantages to the common cause."

We pronounce no opinion upon the question whether the treaty promises to be greatly advantageous to the common cause, but merely say we learn with satisfaction that Her Majesty entertains such an expectation. Without having the smallest desire or disposition to restrain these criticisms on the Government—which I grant are necessarily incidental to our free institutions and to the imperfections of men, and which in many cases may be highly conducive to the better prosecution of measures connected with the war—I do hope I shall not hear from Gentlemen in this House the declaration that nothing has been done. Even with respect to that part of the operations which undoubtedly is the less prominent—namely, the operations in the Baltic—is it true to say that nothing has been done, when the trade of Russia has been stopped, when the overpowering fleet of Russia has been locked up, and when a great portion of the land force of Russia has been diverted from those undertakings in the south to which the Emperor would have been free to apply them if it were not for the presence of your fleet in the Baltic? Still less should hon. Gentlemen say that nothing has been done in the Black Sea, when you recollect that it is but one year since when the question was, "Is Constantinople safe?" That is no longer the question—Constantinople, humanly speaking, is secure. Then came the question whether the Danube would be crossed. It is true it was crossed, but the Russians gathered nothing but defeat and disgrace by crossing it. That is not all. You have effected, in the face of a powerful force, a successful landing in an enemy's country, and established there a position from which there is not the slightest reason to suppose you can be dislodged. You have fought two battles with splendid success; you have seen the military character of your country raised after forty years' peace, at a moment's notice, to a higher pitch of glory than almost it had ever attained before; and you may hope—which it is not justifiable to call more than a hope, for the issue being still in the hands of Providence, to use confident language respecting it would be to be almost guilty of blasphemous presumption—you may hope for still greater successes. Saying nothing, however, of that hope, and looking only to that which has been actually accomplished, I hope no Member of this House will join with the hon. Member for Surrey in saying that nothing has been done.

Mr. WHITESIDE fully subscribed to the prudence of not disclosing to the enemy the course of conduct it was intended to pursue; but he rose to complain that during the whole of this autumn everything done in this country or intended to be done had not only been published here, but made public to the world. The intended attack upon Sebastopol had been a daily subject of discussion—he presumed in order that the Emperor of Russia might not be taken at a disadvantage—and he could not repress his regret that care had not been taken that our important councils should have been conducted with more secrecy. He concurred with the right hon. Gentleman, that it was not fair to say that nothing had been done in the Baltic and the Black Sea. If he might offer a suggestion, he would say that we should not be misled by the glories of the past. Nelson's historian has said that he has not left the mantle of his inspiration to his successors; and people must not be too exacting, but should be content that our Admirals are alive and our ships safe. His (Mr. Whiteside's) objections to the course of proceedings of the army were very few. Last year he had given his support to the calling out of the militia, believing that measure to have been dictated by feelings of patriotism; for our greatest military commander had pronounced that to go to war without an army of reserve was a folly. Convinced by the reasoning of such an authority he had given his assent to the measure as one dictated by patriotism and suggested by political wisdom. When the Crimea was to be invaded and Sebastopol attacked, he thought, that if to go to war without a reserve was a folly, to besiege a great fortress which the besiegers could not invest, was an act of unaccountable madness; and such was the opinion in regard to the siege of Dunkirk expressed by Charles James Fox, whose *Memorials and Correspondence* the noble Lord opposite had just published. The right hon. Gentleman said that the trade of Russia had been stopped. So far from that being the case, during the month of October it had been urged in daily discussions in the *Presse*, of Paris, that the policy of the English Government with regard to the trade of Russia had been suicidal. Those articles proved that the rates of exchange were in favour of Russia, and that the quantity of gold in St. Petersburg was greater than ever; the reason being this, that while all the articles which Russia produced were sent through Memel, the importation of articles which Russia had to pay for was prohibited. The *Presse* of Paris contended, moreover, that if the system of our Government was intended to be a system of equivocation they could not have adopted a better policy. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. S. Herbert) in his speech of the previous night had referred to the cavalry. He (Mr. Whiteside) had had it from one of that gallant brigade that after the charge they numbered 400 sabres against 23,000 of the enemy. If they had been ordered to make such another charge the Government would have been relieved of all further trouble with regard to them, for that branch of the service would have been extinguished. Nobody doubted the courage of our troops. He hated the Emperor of Russia because he believed him to be a tyrant—because he attempted to crush freedom by brute force, and his objection to the war was that it had not been carried on with the vigour and diligence which might have characterised it. Those who sat opposite to the Government had never intended to criticise their shortcomings in lint and hospitals; but when the Government said there was a difficulty in getting soldiers, he replied that, for every man cut down in the Enniskilleners, they could get two. The recruiting sergeant at Belfast enlisted 200 men in one day. The Army was a popular service in Ireland. The Irish people desired to share in the perils as well as in the glory of England, and would never be found absent from the fight when honour had to be achieved. The Government could get men; and if any foreign tyrant was calculating on their domestic divisions, he was greatly mistaken, for when their common country was threatened they would forget their intestine quarrels, and be united as one nation. An hon. Gentleman had spoken of Austria. He (Mr. Whiteside) had lately read the history of the partition of Poland. The historian said that Russia and Prussia were about to divide the spoil, when Austria interposed, and obtained all she wanted without striking a blow or spending a single florin. It was not unlikely that something of the kind might occur now. He had also read a paper which had been communicated to the House during the recess by the Government, containing remonstrances of Servia against a proposed occupation of that province by Austria, and speaking of an occupation as the last of human evils on account of the incalculable cupidity and perfidy of that Power. What the Government were chargeable with was want of that political foresight to which they laid so especial a claim. They had not foreseen the possible result of allowing Austria to occupy a country which, according to the opinions of the best friends of the Government in the press, had released a powerful Russian army to fall upon their devoted fellow-countrymen in the Crimea, and expose the British forces to annihilation. Those forces might be annihilated, but they could never be conquered. But was it just to expose them to such overwhelming odds? True they had overcome those odds, and no doubt they would overcome them again. He had no fear of the issue. They had surpassed the heroism and devotion displayed at Thermopylæ, and would yet gain a triumphant victory, because the arms of freedom never could succumb to the barbarous legions of despotism.

Mr. F. SCOTT said, he was convinced that the country would not be satisfied with the explanation of the Government offered by the right hon. Gentleman last night, and would condemn the Government for not bringing forward in the last Session the measure they had now given notice of for sending the militia out of the country. He would not at that moment enter into any criticism upon the war, or upon the conduct of the war, but he thought the country should expect that before Christmas came the conduct of the Government should be more closely scrutinised than hitherto it had been. A paragraph in the Speech had reference to the treaty which had been concluded between Her Majesty, the Emperor of the French, and the Austrian Government, and it was natural to expect that a Minister of the Crown would have adverted to its contents; yet it was the manifest intention of the Government to conclude the debate without any reference whatever to it, had it not been for the able speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire. They were called upon to deliberate with Her Majesty as to the best mode of carrying on the war with effect and vigour, and he would be disposed to say that, in order to do so, Her Majesty should dismiss from Her counsels the Members of the Administration who had been the means of plunging the country into a war, and were likely by their misconduct of its operations to protract that calamity to a great length.

Sir J. TROLLOPE thought that, from all the antecedents of Austria, the House and the country could have little hope of assistance from that powerful State in carrying on the war. He had an opportunity last summer of conversing with natives of Germany, and he had heard remarkable opinions expressed by them. Those opinions were not confined to the subjects of Austria, but were expressed by persons in all parts of Germany. The opinion was expressed with perfect unreserve, that Austria would never draw the sword against Russia. On looking to the conduct of Austria heretofore, it would be found that her aim was self-aggrandisement, and that to effect that object she seized upon the opportunities which were afforded to her by the arms of other countries. He might go back to the partition of Poland. A portion of that country was said to be forced upon Maria Theresa against her will, and it was said also that she shed tears when she was forced to be the unwilling participator in the plunder of that country. They knew that on a recent occasion the greatest atrocities were committed against the nobles of Gallicia. The peasants were encouraged to rise against those in authority over them without the plea of oppression ; but it was a political move to diminish the power of the nobles. His belief was that the Austrians would continue to occupy the Principalities, setting at liberty a large Russian force, which would otherwise be opposed by Omar Pacha and his brave army. He could not help expressing his great distrust as to any treaty with them affording any permanent advantage to this country ; and, therefore, he did regret that Her Majesty's Government should have introduced, prematurely, a congratulatory passage regarding it into the Royal Speech.

Address *agreed to*:—To be presented by Privy Councillors.

MILITIA (SERVICE ABROAD) BILL.

Viscount PALMERSTON said, he rose, according to notice, to move for leave to bring in a Bill to enable Her Majesty to accept offers made by whole regiments, or portions of regiments of militia, for service out of the United Kingdom. Her Majesty's Government had been accused of having entered into the war, and of having undertaken a great and arduous enterprise without having provided any reserve. His answer to that accusation was, that the reserve upon which Her Majesty's Government had counted was the British nation. He was convinced that the expectation which they had formed would not be disappointed, and that by voluntary offers of service, either from the militia or from civil portions of the community, ample means would be afforded of carrying on the war with all that energy and vigour which the circumstances of the case might require. The principal means which Her Majesty's Government proposed for that purpose was that which this Bill was intended to afford. The Bill was framed upon the model of the Act which was passed towards the close of the last war, by which the Government of the day was enabled to accept the services of militia regiments then, for the purpose of more active service than it was the present intention of Her Majesty's Government now to ask them to volunteer for. It would be remembered that, at the close of the last war, after the militia had afforded very large and ample reinforcements to the line by the voluntary transfer of the services from one description of force to the other, an Act was passed by which regiments, or portions of regiments, were enabled to offer their services to join the army then serving under the orders of the Duke of Wellington. Under this Act militia battalions were raised, and proceeded for foreign service, through the influence of the Duke of Buckingham, Sir Watkin Wynn, Colonel Grey, and other persons of distinction. It was not the present intention of Her Majesty's Government to ask the militia to volunteer their services for the purpose of joining the army under Lord Raglan ;—the object which the Government had in view was, that the militia should be invited to volunteer their services to do garrison duty in places in the Mediterranean, thereby setting free such regiments of the line as would otherwise be required for the purpose of those garrisons. Gibraltar, Malta, and the Ionian Islands would probably be the places for which offers of service would be confined. Circumstances might happen which might induce Her Majesty's Government to ask militia regiments to volunteer for garrison duty in some of the North American colonies ; but though the Bill which he should have to present would, for the sake of convenience, enable the Crown to accept the services of militia regiments for any place out of the United Kingdom, and though, of course, the offer which would be made to each regiment would specify the station for which their services were asked, the present intention of the Government was to limit that offer of voluntary services to the stations which he had mentioned in the Mediterranean. He had no doubt that that offer would be freely and amply made. It was impossible to do more than justice to the spirit by which the militia regiments had been actuated. He was happy to say that the reports which had been made by the officers who were appointed to inspect them at their periodical trainings were such as to inspire a conviction that they had made most extraordinary progress in the attainment of military discipline and efficiency, and he was convinced that the regiments of militia which might volunteer for service in any garrison would be as efficient for that purpose, and as creditable to the country to which they belonged, as any regiment of the line whose place they might be sent out to fill. He was happy to say that there had hardly been a single exception—he thought not one exception—to the general offer of militia regiments to be embodied for permanent duty at home, and that circumstance led him to think that they would not be disappointed in their expectations, but that they would receive quite as many offers for garrison duty as the necessities of the case would induce them to accept. He did not know that he need say anything further, as he could not anticipate that there would be any objection to the Motion he had made. He was sure that the militia regiments would think that they were doing no more than was due to their own honour in availing themselves of the opportunity of serving in the places which he had mentioned; and that officers of militia would not only encourage their men to volunteer their services from the militia to the line, but that regiments, and portions of regiments, amply sufficient to meet the wants of the garrisons abroad, would offer themselves for this extended service.

Mr. NEWDEGATE said, that he understood the proposition of the noble Lord to be that the militia regiments would be asked whether they were willing to proceed to Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian Islands, or, perhaps, to some of our North American colonies, in order to replace troops who would thereby be made available for the war, but that those militia regiments themselves would not be called on to reinforce the troops engaged in actual hostilities. He was quite certain that he spoke the general feeling of the militia regiments, when he said he was confident that as many of their numbers as could possibly be spared from their occupations in this country would most willingly accept this service; but he wished to put a question to Her Majesty's Government. It had been admitted by all the Ministerial statements, that the army before Sebastopol had, ever since the expedition had been in the Crimea, been left without an available reserve to meet cases of emergency. He wished, therefore, to know whether this Bill was intended to be subsidiary to the formation of an army of reserve which should be within practical reach of Lord Raglan before Sebastopol? In short, he wanted to know whether the army in the Crimea was to continue to be an army without an available reserve? This question was of so much the more importance, inasmuch as nothing that had passed gave a reason to trust that the co-operation of Austria would prevent the concentration of the Russian forces against our Crimea expedition; and, therefore, it was only due to the gallant men who had been exposed to such fearfully unequal contests as might have been obviated with due preparations, that it should be stated whether or not the present Bill was to be subsidiary to the formation, in the Mediterranean, at Constantinople, or some station in the Black Sea, of some army of reserve upon which Lord Raglan might rely as a basis of his operations?

Mr. S. HERBERT said, that he should, perhaps, be excused for interposing for a moment to state, in answer to the question of the hon. Gentleman, that Her Majesty's Government were as sensible as he was of the necessity of forming, as expeditiously as possible, an efficient reserve force for Lord Raglan's army. The great difficulty, among numerous difficulties in this case, was the distance between this country and the seat of war; but it was the intention of the Government to form additional companies to every regiment under Lord Raglan's command, and place them, as soon as they have passed through their preliminary drill, in that position which would render it most convenient for Lord Raglan to send for them at any moment that he might require their services; these additional companies would, therefore, be stationed as a reserve at Malta. Malta was considered to be the place which would offer the greatest facilities for rapid communication, on the part of Lord Raglan, with the detachments sent thither, and on which he might at any moment lay his hand. The accommodation at Malta was not so large as he could wish, but, as far as it went, it would be made available for the purpose he had stated. He would now only add, that the hon. Gentleman and the House might rest perfectly satisfied that Her Majesty's Government felt the urgent necessity of creating and maintaining an efficient reserve, and that they would spare no pains to carry out that object.

Sir J. PAKINGTON inquired what would be the number of the proposed reserve?

Mr. S. HERBERT replied, that the Government hoped to be able to raise four additional companies to every regiment, but the whole number could not be obtained in a day. The garrison accommodation at Malta would not enable them to place a greater number of companies there, but he repeated that, as far as its capacities went, a reserve corps would be formed there.

Colonel SIBTHORP said, that both the noble Lord and the right hon. Gentleman should be aware of the present denuded state of the militia force, and of the great difficulty of meeting the additional demand that would be created under this Bill. The regiment he had himself the honour to command had sent upwards of 150 fine fellows to the infantry regiments of the line, and he believed that by their conduct in action they would prove a credit to their country. With regard to the noble Lord's present Bill he had but one remark to make. Were the militia regiments to which this Bill referred, to be kept on colonial stations merely to supply the places of other troops, who would be allowed to carry off all the laurels, or were they to be permitted to display their valour in the field and share the glory won by the other forces of the country?

Sir J. WALSH said, that he had little doubt but that the anticipations of the noble Lord the Home Secretary would be realised, and that no objections would be offered to this measure from any quarter, either on its introduction, or during its progress through its future stages in that House. The concurrence of the noble Lord the President of the Council might be inferred from his being a Member of the Cabinet who brought forward this measure; and it was hardly to be expected that the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright) and his friends, however stedfast their objection to a Bill of this kind, would offer any decided opposition to a measure which would meet with the universal assent of the country. But he had one suggestion to make to Ministers, which appeared to him in the light of a necessary complement of this measure. We had sent almost every available soldier we had to the Crimea; but our reinforcements had not been sent out in a manner to achieve any great result. They had been sent out in mere driblets to contend with all the chances of battle and the ravages of disease; and our army was now to be exposed to the rigour of a severe winter in a foreign clime. We must, therefore, before it was too late, prepare those reserves which might be requisite next year. Now, it would only be the necessary complement of this measure, enabling the militia to volunteer, as he believed they would readily do, for foreign service, that we should at the same time embody the whole of our militia. If this was to be an arduous struggle—as no doubt it would—were we to be behind the exertions of the country in former periods of its history? In 1813 we had a regular army of 240,000 men on foot, and then the whole of the militia was embodied; and in the same year we had also a navy with 140,000 seamen and marines. Such were the gigantic armaments with which we engaged in a great contest, at a period when our resources and our population were far inferior to what they were at present. Now, the militia was, in point of fact, our reserve—it was the body from which we were to train and form an army. A militia was available in two ways—first, as being in itself an efficient and disciplined corps; and next, as being an excellent feeder and nursery to the line; and in both of these respects it was absolutely necessary that we should not content ourselves with taking the bare power to enable the militia to volunteer for foreign service, but that we should embody the whole militia force, whether English, Irish, or Scotch; for it did appear to him, in a struggle of this kind, when the people of all parts of the kingdom had shown such zeal and loyalty, that no invidious distinction of nationality should be drawn in respect to this force.

Mr. BANKES said, that as the measure of the Government was intended as an effectual mode of placing at Lord Raglan's disposal a reserve force, it could hardly meet with opposition from the House, although undoubtedly it would be considered a measure of the very greatest importance, dealing as it did with the great constitutional force of the kingdom. But since it was a means of so essential a character for the production of a reserve force, he felt himself entitled to ask Her Majesty's Ministers why it was not resorted to at an earlier period? There were those on that side of the House during the last Session who pressed on Her Majesty's Government the expediency of having an autumnal meeting of Parliament; but, so far from the proposition meeting with a cordial reception, on the contrary, it was received with expressions of a very opposite character. And though at last it had been determined to call Parliament together at an unusual period of the year, it naturally occurred to ask, why had not that step been taken as soon as they knew the hazard to which our brave troops were exposed? Why was not Parliament then called together to have submitted to them this mode of providing a reserve force? That gallant army would thus have been encouraged, and Ministers would have been providing for a contingency which they knew must occur. Had these volunteers been sent out two months earlier it might have made a very essential difference in the position of affairs in the Crimea. Hence, under the circumstances, it was impossible to raise any objection against the scheme, always supposing that the services to be required were entirely voluntary, both as regarded officers and men. No doubt the provisions of the Bill would require some attention, for it must be remembered that these men were engaged for only a limited period of service, of which he believed from two to two years and a half were still unexpired; but, remembering that it was meant for the relief of our gallant countrymen, he could in no other respect offer the measure any opposition.

Lord LOVAINE said, he was very sorry to have to give utterance to the opinion that this measure would very seriously interfere with the means of recruiting our regular army. It was one which had been resorted to during the last war, but not until almost the close of it, when the resources of the country had been already sorely tried; such, however, was not the case at present, for the very regiments from which these volunteers were to be taken had actually not as yet been even embodied. Nor ought it to be forgotten that the system of recruiting for the militia was not what it used to be at a former period, it being now merely voluntary; and the consequence of that would be, that in case the measure of the Government were adopted, the relatives of the class of recruits would throw every obstacle in the way of their enlistment, as it would be made dependent on the will of a majority of any particular regiment whether a man could be compelled to go on foreign service. He should, therefore, feel compelled, most anxious though he was to second any exertion that might be made to improve the military resources of the country, to oppose a measure which he believed would be productive of very serious consequences, and very likely to interfere much with the final results of the war.

Mr. PALK believed that a deep debt of gratitude was due to those who had so efficiently raised and recruited the different militia regiments. It was well for this nation, no matter in whose hands the administration of affairs might be placed, that she could trust with firmness and confidence in the patriotism and firmness of the country gentlemen of England. But when an appeal was made in that direction—when they called on the labouring classes of the country—they must remember that they not only robbed the national industry, but took away the pith and marrow of the agriculturists, of those who raised the crops of the country; and that they thereby threw upon the poor rates of the rural districts the support of the wives and children of these men, who might perish or be disabled. Now, he would beg to express a hope that the noble Lord had in his Bill introduced a provision providing for the support and sustenance of the families of militia soldiers. Hence his great object in rising was simply to ask a question, which he believed could be readily answered. If he was not mistaken, he had heard it stated last night, and stated, too, emphatically, that no winter clothing had been sent out by the *Prince* to the army of the Crimea. On the other hand, he found, on looking into a report of the speech of a Cabinet Minister, made on the same occasion in another place, it was not only asserted that winter clothing had been so sent out, but also there was a list of articles enumerated. Now, he desired to know which of these statements was the correct one?

Viscount PALMERSTON begged to state, in reply to the question which had just been asked, that there was a great quantity of winter clothing sent out by the *Prince*. He spoke under correction, but he should say, from recollection, that there were from sixty to eighty tons of winter clothing on board that unfortunate vessel; and had it not been for the disastrous calamity which befell her, that winter clothing would have been in possession of the troops before any severe weather had set in. His right hon. Friend (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) told him that the value of that winter clothing was from 25,000*l.* to 30,000*l.* Now, he was very glad that the noble Lord the Member for Northumberland (Lord Lovaine) made his objection to the Bill which he now proposed, because it enabled him to state, with more distinctness than, perhaps, he stated at first, that, under the provisions of the Bill, no one man could possibly be sent out of the country without a distinct voluntary offer of his services. It would not be, as the noble Lord supposed, that the majority of a regiment would bind the minority; but there must be, in regard to each officer and private, a distinct offer of his individual services; and under no circumstances—indeed, there was a special proviso to that effect introduced in the Bill; under no circumstances could any man be compelled to serve out of the country without his own distinct offer and consent; and that offer and consent were to be recorded by a fresh engagement to serve during, not only the continuance of the period for which he had been originally engaged, but even during the continuance of the war itself. He wished, therefore, to be understood as saying that no man would be liable to serve unless he was a willing and consenting party to such extension of service. An objection has been made with regard to the time at which this Bill has been proposed. An hon. and learned Member said it ought to have been proposed sooner. Why, every measure might be liable to objection as to point of time; it might be said that it was proposed too soon or too late. The value of such objections must depend altogether upon the circumstances under which the measure was proposed, and upon the character and conduct of those who proposed it. He brought forward the measure now, and whatever objections hon. Members might entertain as to the measure being too soon or too late, he hoped that such objections would not induce them to offer any opposition to it. He should be wanting in fairness if he did not take this opportunity of referring to the great services rendered by the late Government to the country in proposing and carrying the measure by which the militia service was provided for. He was sure that the views of those hon. and right hon. Members who sat opposite were to do justice to each other irrespective of their political opinions; and he was sure that the Members of the late Government, who had the credit of carrying through Parliament that important measure, would feel that the Bill which he proposed to introduce would only tend to give greater effect and more extended efficiency to their measure for the restoration of the militia force—a measure which was due to their own sagacity and prudence.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON said, he only rose for the purpose of settling a question of fact. In his speech of last night he gave the Government credit, upon such information as he possessed, for sending out for the troops in the East a large quantity of warm clothing, which, however, was unfortunately lost in the tempest of the 14th November. From some of the observations just made by the noble Viscount, he was induced again to bring the subject forward. After he had addressed the House last night, he was told that he was mistaken in what he had said upon this subject, and that there was no special warm clothing sent out to the Crimea. His right hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli), in his speech last night, stated—as far as he was informed—that he gave the Government credit for what was not really the truth. Now, he concurred with the noble Viscount opposite that we were always bound to assist each other, as far as it was possible, in giving credit where we feel credit to be due. With that view he stated last night that the Government had sent out warm clothing for the troops in the East. Let, however, the whole truth be known. He therefore hoped that some Member of the Government would answer the question—namely, what was the kind of clothing sent out to the East in the *Prince?* Was it what he (Sir J. Pakington) had believed it to be—namely, warm clothing to meet the special requirements of the Crimean climate—warm clothing sent out on account of the particular position occupied by the troops in the East; or was it only the ordinary winter uniform? A great deal might turn upon the way in which this question was answered. He was sure that the Government would be most unwilling to take credit for an act which they had not performed. The question was this—Whether the Government deserved the credit which he had given them last night, and whether they had really sent out to the East that particular description of clothing which the troops so much required while they occupied so exposed a position in the Crimea?

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON said, the best way of answering the question was by producing the returns of what clothing had been sent out, and that should be done immediately.

MR. E. B. DENISON considered that it was of great importance that they should distinctly understand the nature of the invitation to be sent to the militia. It had been said that an invitation would be sent to each regiment, and the noble Lord had also stated that every man would have an opportunity of volunteering. There was a vast difference between the two propositions; some regiments from the colonel to the men might volunteer, in other regiments only a portion might do so; but he could not help thinking that every man, from the colonel to the drummer, ought to be asked, and that no imputation should be allowed to rest on any portion of a regiment which did not volunteer, as both officers and men, from various reasons, might be unable to allow their services to be transferred even to Malta.

Colonel GILPIN asked whether, after the service of the militia was done with, any of the younger officers would be allowed to transfer to the line; or, as in the case of last war, whether they would receive any half-pay or remuneration for their past services? He thought it was most material to ascertain that point.

Motion *agreed to.*

Bill read 1°.

The House adjourned at a quarter after Three o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Thursday, December 14, 1854.

Minutes.] Public Bills.—1ª Cathedral Appointments Act Continuance.
2ª Enlistment of Foreigners.

WAR WITH RUSSIA—PETITION—REINFORCEMENTS.

The Duke of RICHMOND *presented* a petition from the Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses of Wakefield, praying that the war may be brought to a speedy, successful, and honourable termination. The petitioners expressed the utmost admiration of the undaunted courage displayed by the allied forces at Alma and elsewhere, but regretted that the force in the Crimea was not sufficient to attain the object contemplated by the expedition, the capture of Sebastopol. The petitioners, therefore, prayed that the House would impress on Her Majesty's Government the necessity of bringing all the resources of the country to bear, in order that the war might be brought to a successful and honourable termination. He need not assure their Lordships how fully he concurred in the prayer of the petition, and was glad to find that it was the intention of the Government to prosecute the war vigorously, and send reinforcements as speedily as possible. As he should not be in his place in the House to-morrow, when it was intended to move a Vote of Thanks to the army and navy, because he was about to join his regiment in order to induce as many of them as possible to volunteer, and as in that way he would, perhaps, promote the public service more than by making speeches in the House, he begged to take that opportunity of stating that he joined most cordially in admiration of the conduct of Lord Raglan and the British soldiers under his command, who had justly entitled themselves to the Thanks of Parliament and the country. They had had to contend with difficulties which would have tried severely an army of veterans, and he was sure the House and the country would be unanimous in voting them Thanks for their gallant conduct, and for the perseverance, steadiness, and coolness they had exhibited under fire. Lord Raglan had exhibited perseverance, quickness, and coolness under fire—which was not surprising—and had shown all the abilities of a great general, and he hoped and trusted that Providence would preserve his life, and enable him to come back to England and reap the just reward of his brilliant services. He was anxious also to say a few words respecting their gallant sailors, and he thought the conduct of the officers and seamen in carrying the wounded to the ships, and the hospitality the sick and wounded had received from the captains of those vessels, and the care and attention the medical department of the navy had shown them, really deserved the best thanks of the country. They had been engaged by sea and land, and had done their duty both in the batteries and in the attempt that was made upon the harbour of Sebastopol. He hoped that these officers would not be allowed to suffer any pecuniary loss in consequence of having had so many sick and wounded officers on board. He thought the Government ought to turn its attention to the subject. Many of these officers had not large private fortunes, and should not be allowed to sustain any pecuniary loss. Had the gallant veteran, the Duke of Wellington, been still among them, no doubt he would have risen in his place and said that both the army and navy had done their duty. He hoped the noble Duke (the Duke of Newcastle) would not think he was trenching too much upon the duty of the Government if he said one word about medals. He did not doubt that the Government would give medals for the glorious victories of the Alma and Inkerman; but he must call attention to the fact that hitherto, when medals were given, they were given only to the survivors. The medals, too, should always be given immediately after the actions. How many of the brave fellows who had stormed the heights of the Alma had since fallen at Inkerman? How they would have rejoiced had they known that their relatives would receive the medals their valour had won. But, under the present regulations, their representatives would have no medal to show that their relatives or children had been engaged in those glorious victories. When he introduced the subject of medals before, he was told that the war had so long ceased that it would be difficult to find out the relatives of the gallant fellows entitled to them; but that difficulty did not exist in the present case. He did not mean to say that the widowed mother, in her deep affliction, would be consoled all at once for the loss of her son by receiving the medal he had so gallantly earned, but when time and religion had soothed those feelings of affliction, she would doubtless receive it as some consolation for her loss. He trusted his noble Friend would not think that he was out of order in calling attention to this subject. The time was gone by when it could be said that the private soldier did not care for a medal—they all knew how much he cared for those distinctions he had so gallantly earned. He trusted his noble Friend and the Government would take the matter into their serious consideration, and that those medals would be quickly distributed to the representatives of those who had fallen on the field of battle or died of their wounds, or who had been cut off by those pestilential diseases which unfortunately prevailed in that country.

Petition read, and ordered to lie on the table.

ENLISTMENT OF FOREIGNERS BILL.

Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.

The Duke of NEWCASTLE: My Lords, after the debate which passed in this House two nights ago, and the general opinion which has been expressed both in this and in the other House and by the country, that we have not at the present moment a sufficient body of troops in the Crimea for carrying on the war with efficiency, and that, on the other hand, there is not at this moment in the country a sufficient reserve to support that army in case of emergency, I do not think it likely that the Motion with which I shall conclude will meet with any opposition. The Bill which I now speak of is one which I laid on the table of the House on the first night of the Session to enable Her Majesty to enlist foreigners to serve as officers and soldiers in the Queen's forces. I find that, in former times, this power was considered to exist in the Crown, and it has been exercised by the Crown on frequent occasions—sometimes commented on by Parliament, and at other times acceded to without remark; until the year 1794, when a Motion was made in the House of Commons disapproving of the course which had been taken in that year of introducing foreign troops into the country, to be trained to assist in our war. Although that Motion was lost, yet, in consequence of the feeling then manifested against the subsidising of foreign troops, it was thought desirable to have an Act of Parliament, to enable the Sovereign to enlist foreign troops for the service of the country. The first Act which I find was passed in that very year 1794, and was to enable the King to raise foreign troops, apparently principally French, to assist in carrying on the war in which we were at that time engaged. The next Act was passed in 1804, the object of which was to enable the Sovereign to enlist principally Germans, although under it other foreigners were enlisted. Under that Act, and another passed in the following year, a great number of foreigners were enlisted under various denominations. [The Earl of Derby: The last Act was passed in 1806.] The noble Earl is correct. It was in the 46th of *Geo*. III. The forces so raised were Corsicans, a Greek force, a German Legion, and various forces of other denominations. The Greek force was not entirely composed of Greeks, but included other nationalities. It has always been found desirable to enlist foreigners, especially at the commencement of a war, on account of the difficulty which, in the first instance, must exist in this country, which has no immediate system for bringing into the field a large and trained force. The military systems of other countries give much greater facilities in that respect. We have no Landwehr, as in Prussia, nor any other system by which men are trained for a certain number of years, and then returned into the civil community, always available with a sufficient knowledge of the art of war, and easily to be called together for further training in the event of hostilities occurring. Having no such system here, all that can be done when war breaks out is to raise as many recruits as possible, who are of course completely raw, without any previous training; and, except in cases of emergency, it is not desirable that troops so raised should be sent out of the country without at least six or seven months' training. That is necessary—not because they would not fight well, for I believe that British troops would fight as well on the day they are raised as they would after six months' training—but on account of the advantage of discipline and habits of body requisite to be imparted by drill and the training of military life. I have alluded to the jealousy which has been expressed by Parliament on former occasions in reference to the introduction of foreign troops into this country, and in consequence of that it has been customary to limit the number—not, of course, of the foreign force which might serve the Sovereign, but the number to be brought into the country. By the Act of 1794 the number was limited to 5,000 men. By the Act of 1804 that number was extended to 10,000, and the subsequent Act of 1806 still further increased the number to 16,000, at which it remained until the close of the war in 1815. Before I proceed further, it is desirable that I should state that the Government, acknowledging the constitutional principle involved in this question, and conceiving that it was due to Parliament that its opinion should be asked before any step was taken, have not made any official communication to any foreign Government in reference to any proposed enlistment of any of their subjects, and the Government do not propose to do so until the present Bill has passed into law. We have not thought it right to make any such communication until the opinion of Parliament had been expressed upon the subject; but, having explained it, and not anticipating any opposition to it, I trust your Lordships will not think the Bill requires any very lengthened consideration, but will pass it with all possible rapidity, in order that we may make the necessary communications as soon as possible. Your Lordships are probably aware that until the year 1837, except under the provisions of a special Act of Parliament, it was unlawful to enlist foreign soldiers in English regiments. We do not purpose to violate that law on the present occasion. By the Act of 1837, permission was given to the limited extent of admitting one foreigner to every fifty men in each regiment; and so the law now stands, and so we purpose to leave it. We now purpose that any foreign troops which shall be raised shall be formed in separate battalions apart from the Queen's regiments. Your Lordships may perhaps desire to know from what countries we expect to raise our forces. I do not think it desirable under the circumstances—no communication having been made to foreign Governments—to mention whence these troops are likely to come; but your Lordships will be aware of certain districts of Germany and Switzerland and other countries which are most likely to furnish troops to enlist in the Queen's service, and I do not feel justified in speaking more particularly on that point until the communications I have referred to have been made. As I have said, in the last war the greatest body of foreign troops who served us in those campaigns was the German Legion, not only Hanoverians, but others; and those noble Lords who remember the events of that war will bear me out in saying that throughout those campaigns those troops rivalled our own in bravery and services rendered. From 1807 to the battle of Waterloo, in 1815, there was scarcely a siege or battle of any importance in which the German Legion did not take part. If the measure which I now submit to your Lordships should receive the sanction of Parliament, the force which we should raise under it would not be an army of raw recruits, as in this country, but would consist of trained soldiers, who have gone through, in all probability, at least three years' training, and only require to be brought together and officered to be ready for any service. I say a limit has always been placed upon the number proposed to be raised as a foreign legion. We have thought that in the present aspect of affairs it is desirable to take a considerable number, and we purpose to limit the number to be drilled and trained in this country at any one time to 15,000 men. The Bill is so extremely simple in its character that it hardly requires any further explanation at my hands; but if any noble Lord should entertain any doubts upon the question, I shall be most happy to give any further explanation that may be necessary. I beg to move that the Bill be read a second time.

Moved, That the Bill be now read 2^a.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH: My Lords, when the noble Duke first announced the intention of the Government to introduce a Bill to enable the Government to enlist foreign troops, my impression was that the Government intended to raise a small force, and that all they wanted was the authority of Parliament to retain in this country the depôts of two or three corps—an object for which the intervention of Parliament would be absolutely necessary. I confess I felt the greatest possible repugnance to even the qualified admission of two or three depôts of foreign troops to be permitted to remain in this country; but when I read this Bill this morning I was completely astonished; for, taking this Bill in connection with the Bill brought into the other House to enable Her Majesty to accept the services of certain regiments of militia, for the declared purpose of garrisoning fortresses in the Mediterranean, the practical effect of this measure will be to substitute in this country 15,000 foreigners for 15,000 British militiamen who are to be employed abroad. ["No, no!"] I take a perfectly legitimate, Parliamentary, and constitutional view of the effect of this measure; if the measure gives that power, I am entitled to consider that the power will be exercised. I say, then, to that exercise of the power of substituting in this country 15,000 Germans or Swiss for 15,000 English soldiers I absolutely object. I do not think there has been anything in the conduct of the people of this country since the commencement of the war which would justify the Government in assuming that they are not ready to bear all the sacrifices that may be demanded of them—there is nothing to justify the conclusion that they are either unable or unwilling to maintain their own national interests by their own national arms. On the contrary, the people have submitted with perfect readiness to the sacrifices demanded from them, and are willing to submit to further sacrifices for the prosecution of the war. The circumstances under which the various Acts to which the noble Duke has referred were passed were totally different from the circumstances existing at the present moment. At that time the foreigners whom we recruited to serve in our armies were the subjects of States which had been subjugated or threatened by France, and in our army, in our pay, they were fighting in fact for their own several countries. Many of them were the subjects of the State of Hanover, and might be regarded as the subjects of an allied Power. Circumstances now are totally different; yet at the commencement of this popular and national war we are desired to go back to old times, to hire Hessians, instead of employing the constitutional force of this country; and we are asked to do so without the assertion on the part of the War Minister of one single circumstance to establish the necessity of the measure. The noble Duke should have told us what were the difficulties of recruiting; he should have told us what the demand for men was; he should have told us why he has failed in obtaining the men necessary to fill the ranks. Because he rejected the suggestions which were offered to him, are we therefore to sacrifice a constitutional principle? Are we to substitute foreigners for Englishmen in order to make up for the *laches* of the Government which have led to the difficulty in which we are now placed? From the year 1828 until the year 1841 I had the good fortune of being very much in communication with the late Sir Robert Peel. It is understood that the majority—the influential majority—of the Government now in office represent the feelings, the principles, and the opinions of Sir Robert Peel—that the mantle of Elijah has descended upon my noble Friend now at the head of the Government. I will not pretend that my opportunities of intercourse with Sir Robert Peel were at all to be compared with those of my noble Friend; but at the same time, having been three times in office—having during thirteen years been aware of all the operations of the party which Sir Robert Peel directed—I think I may assume that I am tolerably well acquainted with the character of his mind and with the general view which he took of public affairs; and I say with the most perfect confidence, that to this measure he never would have assented. I am satisfied of that, because I know that, having been for a great length of time Home Secretary in this country, he would primarily have looked to the extreme inconvenience, the extreme difficulty, the extreme danger, which would have arisen had 15,000 troops, or any portion of them, been on any occasion called out—as they might probably have been—for the purpose of preserving the peace among the people of England. My Lords, we have to prevent riots at elections; we cannot prevent disputes between masters and workmen, but they frequently render necessary the intervention of troops. The most serious riots I ever recollect were connected with the measure respecting corn. Last year your Lordships may remember very serious riots took place, in consequence of it being supposed that the bakers did not lower their prices in proportion to the reduced price of corn. On that occasion troops were called out. If this Bill had been the law at that time those troops might have been Germans; and what would have been the consequence? That the whole population would have been fighting against the troops. In every case that would happen, and depend upon it, if such an unfortunate occasion should arise, the result would be that the Government would be called upon and compelled to assent to the extradition of the foreign troops from this country. One of the advantages of the war to which I have always looked forward as compensating in a great measure for many of the sufferings which the people must endure during its continuance was this—that when peace returns, we might have distributed through the country, as officers and as retired soldiers, a vast number of persons accustomed to war —men of military habits, who, during any lengthened periods of peace, would constitute the great source of the security of the country. During the long peace which has existed we have exhausted altogether the admixture of experienced soldiers whom the conclusion of the previous war had thrown among our population, and the number of old soldiers who have returned from the Indian campaigns is, I regret to say, very small. We began this war with very few soldiers indeed who had seen actual service in the field, but from the presence of a number of such persons, distributed throughout the country, the Government derives the greatest possible advantage, strength, and security, and, as far as this Bill goes, in substituting foreigners for Englishmen, no doubt the extent of that security will be diminished. We have been told—and I think a somewhat exaggerated view has been taken of the subject—that there has been a very great improvement in the moral condition and character of Her Majesty's troops; that that improvement has not only not impeded their services in the field, but has materially contributed to their efficiency, and that very few occasions have occurred upon which the interference of the Judge Advocate has been necessary. Now, my Lords, considering that the troops have been acting in a desert where there is no population, where there is no property belonging to anybody, and that the only persons with whom they can by possibility have communicated were their own comrades, I do not think, up to this moment, that any very material argument can be drawn from that circumstance. But I will assume all the advantages which are understood to be derived from the good conduct of the troops, and I ask what security have you for the conduct of the German soldiers or any other foreigners whom we may enlist? Does the recruiting sergeant look to any moral qualifications? No; he only regards the physical qualifications of his recruits. He sees that they are of a certain standard, that they are sound in wind and limb, and he at once accepts them. If, then, you value the moral character of your soldiers, you are to some extent endangering that moral character by placing beside them, and in connection with them, troops for whose moral character you have no security. I am far from being disposed to say anything derogating from the capabilities of Germans or other foreigners as soldiers. Under good discipline and good officers they make, undoubtedly, very respectable soldiers; but they are not equal to the soldiers of England and of France. Had one of these German regiments which it is now proposed to form been placed between two English regiments at the battle of Inkerman, is there any man who can believe that that German regiment would have stood and fought as the British regiments fought and fell? No man would believe they could. Only consider the danger of having a line of battle of unequal strength. If that line be forced in any part, there is danger to the whole. Had a German regiment given way at Inkerman under the Russian assault, the circumstance must have been altogether fatal to the whole army of the Allies. Now, these being my objections to the employment of foreigners under any circumstances, I will mention the suggestions which were offered last Session to the noble Duke (the Duke of Newcastle), and which were rejected by him. At the very commencement of this war I earnestly recommended Her Majesty's Ministers to establish one uniform system of police throughout the whole country, not solely for the purpose of assisting in the general administration of justice and of putting down crime, but because I believe such a force to be in war the best foundation for a good, efficient, and ready military system. I know that, in practice, there are no recruiting officers so useful as policemen. They know all the characters who are most likely to enlist in the militia, and they are induced by the bounty they receive to bring them in. The police thus most materially contribute to obtaining recruits for the militia, and I desired to make this system the foundation of the force. At the same time—that is, nine months ago—I earnestly recommended that the whole militia should be called out. That measure Her Majesty's Government now adopts; but what would have been the condition of the country had my suggestion been acted upon at the time I made it? We should not have required this measure for the introduction of foreigners. We should not be in any difficulty—if we be in difficulty—as to finding German troops for the accomplishment of national purposes; but a full militia would have supplied everywhere all the recruits required for the service of the Army. But my suggestion was repudiated. It was one which the Government did not think it worth while to consider, and it was almost contumeliously rejected. I also recommended that in order to secure recruiting for the militia—which can always be effected when persons of influence will endeavour to exercise their influence for the purpose—a pecuniary fine should be imposed upon the districts in which the requisite number of recruits was not obtained. I know that in practice such fine would hardly ever, if ever, be imposed, because the exertions of individuals, stimulated by the apprehension of a fine, combined with the general distribution of the police, would be sufficient to fill the ranks of the militia at all times. We were told, when the suggestion was made, that the people were coming forward willingly and generously, and that at that time such a measure would be injurious. But what does the noble Duke now propose? Not a pecuniary fine, but that to which every possible objection exists—recourse to the ballot. Her Majesty's Ministers now mention the ballot as a possible resource! I ventured to suggest a pecuniary fine, which I know would never have been levied; but that suggestion was repudiated like all others, because last Session Her Majesty's Ministers were in a dream from which they have since awakened—they had not yet made up their mind to the magnitude of the undertaking upon which they were embarking. I will not on the present occasion go further into this subject. It would be inconvenient if I were now to touch on the general conduct of the war, upon which there will be other opportunities of expressing my opinion, but I will repeat my determination to oppose this measure. I think it totally unnecessary. I think it is injurious and offensive to the people, who have already done so much, and who show such a disposition to submit to any sacrifice for the purpose of carrying on the war. I oppose the measure because I think it will give us an inferior description of force, and that it may lead to very serious consequences in the general administration of this country. It is contrary to all the constitutional principles which obtained in the best times of what was called "Whig Administration." Its origin is to be found in those times when a Ministry succumbed to the German disposition and prejudices of the first George. It is not in accordance with the more recent feelings of the people of this country. I object to it altogether, and it will be my duty throughout to offer to it every opposition.

The Duke of RICHMOND: I do not rise to enter into the merits or demerits of this measure, but I feel bound to reply to one part of the observations of the noble Earl, in which he said that the foreign regiments are not to be compared with English regiments. I hope to Heaven you will not enlist prisoners of war, and I trust to God that you will not admit a deserter into the ranks of your foreign regiments; but I think it only an act of justice to those brave officers who are still alive, and who served in the German Legion during the last war, to state that on no occasion was that Legion second to the British army either in zeal or gallantry. In the Peninsula, the King's 1st German Infantry were attached to the division of the Guards, and were constantly brought out as a reserve when the danger was most imminent. I may mention that just before the peace was concluded, during the investment of Bayonne, a sortie was made by the garrison, and our general commanding was taken prisoner. The action was a bloody one, but the Guards and the German Legion did their duty, the one as well as the other. I felt myself bound to make this statement; and I can also say that the light troops of the King's German Legion, under the command of Sir Colin Halkett, now Governor of Chelsea Hospital, rendered as good service as any of our own light infantry, and certainly the German cavalry were quite worthy of comparison with the British. If we had had a German

Legion at Inkerman, I venture to say that they would have done their duty.

THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, I regret that not one single Member of Her Majesty's Government has thought it due, either to this House or to the country, or to the powerful speech of my noble Friend (the Earl of Ellenborough), even to offer a single observation in answer to his objections to this measure, or in defence of the policy which Her Majesty's Ministers recommend. For myself, in my extreme, and perhaps overweening, anxiety not to interrupt the progress of the public business, more especially with regard to the defence of the country, I engaged, even before I saw this Bill, or knew what were its contents, that, so far as I was concerned, any opposition I might desire to offer to it should be reserved until it went into Committee, in order that not a day might be lost in the progress of the measure. Consequently, if my noble Friend who has objected to the second reading should upon this occasion divide against the Bill, it would be inconsistent with the engagement into which I entered privately with some Members of the Government, were I to give my vote for his Motion, however much I may concur in the arguments he has used. I regret, certainly, that my noble Friend, while desirous to do justice to the bravery and valour of the British troops, should have felt it necessary to draw any comparison disparaging to those gallant men who, as the German Legion, served in the late war with distinction equal to that of our own soldiers, or that he should have thought it impossible that any foreigners should vindicate their claims to similar equality when fighting with the British troops in the hour of common danger. I believe, with my noble Friend who has just sat down, that in the present war, had the old German Legion, with all their common feelings of sympathy and interest—of almost fellow-countrymanship, I may say—been engaged by the side of the British army, they would have fully sustained their ancient reputation, and would have had no cause of shame. But that has nothing to do with the policy and the principle of this measure. The noble Duke opposite (the Duke of Newcastle), in vindicating the measure, passed somewhat lightly over the constitutional objections to which it is open. He has almost raised a doubt whether it is or is not within the prerogative of the Crown, without the consent of Parliament, to raise and engage foreign troops in this country as well as in the service of the Crown beyond this country; but he says it has been thought more convenient in the present instance to take the previous consent of Parliament before such an exercise of the power of the Crown, inasmuch as that this has been the practice in 1794 and 1804. But the noble Duke rather understated the case; because in 1804 not only was it found necessary to take the consent of Parliament for such employment of foreigners, but it was thought necessary to insert in the Act which was then passed a clause of indemnity for those Ministers who had undertaken to enlist foreigners in the service of the Crown without the previous consent of Parliament having been obtained. The constitutional principle—the jealousy of Parliament with regard to the introduction of foreign troops into this country—is therefore evident. But none of these precedents is of the slightest value as affecting the measure now sought to be introduced. I cannot admit for a single moment that the Acts of 1794, 1804, 1806, and 1813 have the slightest analogy to, or form the slightest precedent for, the measure which the noble Duke has brought forward. A fair and reasonable objection is taken by my noble Friend to this Bill, that it will place powers in the hands of the Government of which they may make use in an objectionable manner. Now, what took place in 1804? The noble Duke has stated, that the Act of 1804 provided that the number of these foreigners in the service of the Crown present in this country at any one time should not exceed 10,000, and the number was subsequently increased, in 1806, to 16,000 as a maximum. But who were the foreigners to whom the Acts of that period referred? The Act of 1804 provides that whereas a considerable number of foreigners, driven from their own countries, were at that time residing in England, the Crown should be permitted to avail itself of the services of these men, who were anxious for their restoration to the countries of which they were natives, and the Crown was enabled to embody and to arm a certain number of such foreigners, who were already residing in this country, whose interests and sympathies were identical with our own, and who were anxious to attain the same common object. This was also the case with regard to the German Legion, a very large proportion of which did not consist of foreigners at all. Her

Majesty's Government seem to have forgotten that in 1804 and 1806 the Crowns of England and of Hanover were united, and therefore the Hanoverians were not foreigners, but were subjects of the Sovereign of this country, whose battles they were fighting. I hope they felt an interest in the glory, in the safety, and in the independence of the dominions of that Sovereign; but is there no distinction to be drawn between men in that position, and men who have no sympathies or interest in common with the people of this country?

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL was understood to ask how the noble Earl knew that the foreigners who were to be enlisted did not possess the same sympathies or interest?]

THE EARL OF DERBY: Why, the noble Duke (the Duke of Newcastle) has admitted that his colleagues do not know whence the foreign troops whom they propose to embody are to be drawn. Are they to be obtained from Greece, or from Tunis, or from what quarter of the world?

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: I did not say that Her Majesty's Government did not know from what quarter they would obtain such troops—I said that until communications had been made to the Governments of foreign countries I did not think it would be right for me to make any statement on the subject. I regret that the noble Earl should be so anxious to return to his old habit of misrepresenting the statements of Her Majesty's Ministers.

THE EARL OF DERBY: I was happy to see that the noble Duke, while making his defence last night, was more humble and civil than usual; but I am sorry to see that he is returning to his youthful habits, which are not quite in accordance with the courtesy which is usually exhibited in the House of Peers. A noble Duke opposite (the Duke of Argyll) intimates that there is a sympathy between those foreigners whom it is intended to employ, and the people of this country. He may know that there is such sympathy, but Parliament does not know it. If the noble Duke knows whence he is going to draw these forces, he has not condescended to communicate that knowledge to Parliament, and, until Parliament knows whence they are to be obtained, there is an additional reason for that constitutional jealousy which is entertained to the employment of foreigners in the service of this country, and more especially in a position connected with the maintenance of the peace of the country. I think, then, there are reasonable grounds for apprehension, when a Bill is brought forward and treated by the Government as a matter of course, under which you are to send out your own troops from this country, and to substitute for them on home service, to be placed in charge of your arsenals and your towns, and to be intrusted with the preservation of the public peace, a foreign garrison, provided it does not exceed 15,000 men—I think there is some ground for jealousy on the part of Parliament and the people, and some necessity for a little further information. In 1804, as I have already said, a large portion of the troops you enlisted were subjects of the same Sovereign as your own army, and were enlisted in the same cause. A large portion of them were subjects of a Monarch who had been deposed, and with whom we were in alliance, and whom we were seeking to replace on his throne, and many were subjects of nations which had been overridden and subjugated by the power of France. With all these men we had a common cause; they were fighting for their own nationalities, for their own interests, and for their own countrymen, and thus you had a security that they would fight with gallantry and vigour in the same cause in which your own countrymen were enlisted. But where are you about to draw your forces from now? You refuse to tell us? Are you going to establish a Polish Legion?—there would be something like significance in such a course as that. In that case there would be something like nationality and a common interest involved in the promotion of hostilities against Russia. Whence are you about to draw them? The Government appear to be about to draw their troops from any quarter of the globe who may be ready to come for the sake of their pay alone, and are to be mere mercenary soldiers, enlisted into our service and placed beside British troops. I say, then, that this is a question of grave importance—of great constitutional importance—when we find that the Government at this period of the war, after no less than two years' experience of the immediate prospect of the war, are compelled to come down to Parliament with the humiliating confession that, with more than 28,000,000 of population in England, Ireland, and Scotland, they are unable to send an army of 50,000 men to the scene of hostilities without drawing away the troops from our garrisons abroad and placing themselves in humiliating reliance upon the aid of mercenary foreigners. Talk of giving encouragement to the Emperor of Russia!—I ask what encouragement could be so great as to find that the War Minister of the Crown, in the first year of the war, is obliged to come down to Parliament and declare that our military resources are exhausted, that he cannot draw upon our garrisons without—[The Duke of NEWCASTLE: Hear, hear!] What does the noble Duke mean? I trust that I may argue this matter with somewhat more calmness than the noble Duke, and, I hope, without being personally offensive. I trust, also, that, at any rate, I may submit the observations I may have to make with more calmness than the noble Duke seems disposed to exhibit in listening to them. I take this Bill, my Lords, in conjunction with the whole scheme for augmenting the military forces of the country, which have been submitted to Parliament by the advice of the Crown. Three measures have been propounded, and those three measures it is impossible to separate. We must take them as part of the same plan, and we must compare them as bearing the one upon the other. These three measures announced by the noble Duke the Secretary for War are, first, for increasing the number of companies of regiments on active service, and increasing them in such a manner as to render eight companies out of sixteen available for service in the field; four are to form a sort of advanced guard in the Mediterranean, and the remainder are to remain at depôts at home. To that proposal I not only take no objection, but I say, that so far as I am competent to form an opinion, a better arrangement it would be impossible to make, and I give the Government entire credit for that part of their scheme. Indeed, I believe that this measure alone, followed up by giving encouragement to enlistment, and to reinforcing the line from the militia, would have been, in itself, most effective. But two other measures have been placed upon the paper; and, my Lords, I certainly cannot take the measure I have just referred to as unconnected with the Militia Bill, which is not for the purpose of encouraging recruiting from the militia to the line, but for transferring a portion of the militia from that service for which they were specially raised, and for which they are specially adapted, to another description of service, for which they were not specially raised, and for which they are not specially or peculiarly adapted. When the Government admitted that they had not the means of maintaining our garrisons in the Mediterranean, and, at the same time, of providing for and carrying on the war, I concluded that, if they had the means of supplying our Mediterranean garrisons from other quarters, then, only as a last resource, would they take the militia from their proper and constitutional duties and service in this country. I therefore think I am justified in saying that the Government have confessed their means to be insufficient to do that which they desired to do, namely, to prosecute the war with vigour, and, at the same time, to maintain our garrisons in the Mediterranean, without denuding the country of its constitutional defenders, and substituting in their place the 15,000 foreigners it is proposed to raise. When I compare the Militia Bill now introduced with that which preceded it, and with which Her Majesty's Government have announced this Bill to be in accordance, I confess that I find one or two points which disagree so signally as almost entirely to alter the whole character of the measure. The Bill of 1814, the 54 *Geo.* III. c. i., was to authorise His Majesty to enlist portions of certain regiments of the militia, either as provisional battalions or to supply companies to regiments of the line. That was at the close of the war in 1814, and at that time what number of militia were actually embodied in the country? There were, I believe, from 60,000 to 80,000 men, besides the yeomanry, who had been embodied for a considerable time, and who discharged their duties as disciplined and trained soldiers. But in that Militia Bill there was an important provision, that not more than 30,000 out of the whole number should leave the country, and that not more than three-fourths of any regiment should be permitted to leave the country. There was thus left remaining in the country, at all events, a large embodied force —50,000 or 60,000 men—and together with that force was admitted a body of foreigners, to an amount not exceeding 10,000 at any one time. Now, what is the case at present? I believe the whole number of militia raised is about 54,000, a very small portion of whom have as yet been embodied, and, consequently, it is only a very small portion who can be considered really trained and disciplined. At the former period there was a local militia of 200,000 men, which has no existence at present. Your only force now is the 54,000 militia I have referred to; and, with regard to this force, you are taking by the Militia Bill an unlimited power to withdraw any number of regiments, or portions of them, for service in the Mediterranean. The Bill of 1814 provided—and provided, in my mind, very wisely—that not more than three-fourths of the militia should be permitted to volunteer for foreign service. Now, what was the effect of that provision? The effect of it was, that there was always remaining in the body a nucleus of trained and disciplined men, keeping up their connection with the country to which they belonged, and recruiting their forces from that country. You propose now to do no such thing. You propose to the colonels of militia regiments to volunteer with any portion of their regiments, and you provide that every man should be re-enlisted and receive a bounty for enlistment on foreign service. You have not provided for a single man of a single regiment remaining in the country, if the various regiments be willing to go abroad. And, with regard to the men who do not volunteer to go abroad, what is to become of them? So far as I can make out, their services are altogether lost to the country. They would not be performing any of the duties of their regiments, and there is no provision for making their services available by attaching them to any other companies. You therefore take away the militia from that service for which they are peculiarly adapted, and for which they were specifically raised, by availing yourselves of the voluntary services of an unlimited number of these regiments; and it appears to me that the services of those who do not volunteer are to be altogether dispensed with and lost to the country. It is well to say with regard to the militia that, though their services are voluntary, there is great excitement among the officers and men, and that many regiments are volunteering. I think it very possible that at the present moment a great amount of excitement does exist, and I have no doubt that many would volunteer to go abroad, because they would consider it a sort of slur upon them if they were left behind when their comrades had gone. But what would be the consequences to the permanent interests of the militia if they were thus converted into a totally different force from that for which they were originally intended? I can well understand that a large proportion of the officers and men of the militia are men to whom it would not only be inconvenient, but to whom it would be absolute ruin, to be transferred from this country to foreign service, and yet they would most probably be willing to do their duty abroad by volunteering with the rest of their regiment for foreign service rather than be the only persons to remain here in discharge of the peculiar duties for which they first volunteered. But I would ask, after taking the regiment of a particular county to Malta, Gibraltar, or the Ionian Islands, whether upon a future occasion, when it might be desirable to raise a militia force, many men who might otherwise have been ready to volunteer would not decline rather than submit themselves to the painful alternative of being called on to volunteer for foreign service, contrary to the engagement at first made with them? Now, my Lords, by an indiscriminate enlistment of the militia—to use a vulgar proverb—you are about to "kill the goose for the sake of the golden egg." As a legally constituted force for the service of the army, from its connection with the country gentlemen and the magistrates of every county, with those in authority, with tenant and landlord and landlord and tenant, the militia force is admirable. As a nursery for the army it is invaluable; and if you will only limit your propositions to an enactment for recruiting to any extent from militia regiments into the line for foreign service, you will obtain just as many men as you will by calling upon the militia to volunteer; you will obtain the services of the men in a much more advantageous manner, you will not break up your connection between the militia and the country, and you will not render foreign troops necessary to keep your own country in order. Now, suppose a regiment, after having volunteered, be sent to Malta, from what has happened in this country we know that upon the part of some officers of the line every means of corruption will be used to induce the men to enlist for foreign service. They enlisted in the full belief that they would not be dragged away from their homes and usual avocations, but that for certain months out of five years their services were to be given to the Crown. You now propose to send these men to the Mediterranean, and I presume you will keep them there for the ordinary term of service, and not for five years only. If you were only going to send them out for a few months and bring them back again, there would be no reason why you should take so expensive and onerous a mode of providing for a momentary exigency. But two years of the service of those who were first enlisted have expired, and you are therefore sending out these men, who have only three years to serve according to their original engagement, to serve in a foreign country for the whole duration of the war, which may probably be for the lives of most of them. In my humble opinion it would be much better for the country that the militia should remain at home, and be raised to the highest state of efficiency. You can practise, train, and drill these men here, and then you can encourage them to give their services in a legitimate manner by enlisting into the line. By this means you would not be separating them from their ordinary duties, and from the counties to which they belong. It would, no doubt, be most inconvenient to many of your Lordships to be sent out to Malta or Gibraltar for four or five years; but if you belonged to a militia regiment, where the officers and men volunteered to go out, you would hold yourselves bound to accompany them. Many of the officers of militia regiments are county magistrates and persons in authority, and to send them on foreign service would be to create serious difficulty without increasing the military efficiency of the country. And now, why did I combine the question of the militia, which is not before us, with the question of foreign forces? It was because I hold it part and parcel of the same scheme. You are to pay for sending out a large force of our own subjects from this country, and you are to provide for the introduction of a large force of foreigners to take their place here. If you want foreigners, enlist them for foreign service, to join your army in the field, and, provided they come from unsuspected sources, are well trained, and not mere mercenary troops, I have no objection. But it is a most humiliating confession that, before we have gone through two years of a war entered into in connection with the powerful alliance of France, you are obliged to have recourse to foreign aid and assistance. A British Minister should blush to make such a proposition. We are quite ready to strain our energies to the utmost in defence of our country and for the maintenance of its honour, but we like not to be told that all our efforts are in vain, and that we must rely upon an addition to our forces of from 15,000 to 20,000 foreigners. Depend upon it, such a step will not increase the *morale* of the country, but it will teach the country that Government, at all events, do not rely upon its own forces, but upon foreign armies and foreign aid; and, so far as Government is concerned, this Bill will go far to extinguish that feeling of nationality, that desire to give personal aid to the Government in carrying on this just and necessary war, which animates all classes, and which stimulates every man to the performance of those duties which, if not repressed and kept down by the Government, all are anxious to discharge. I ask, with my noble Friend, why have you not, before now, embodied the whole of the militia? Why you have not called out the Scotch and Irish militia? Why you are again "too late?" Many months ago, in establishing the militia, did you not foresee the deficiency of your forces for foreign service? Did you not foresee the necessity of denuding your foreign garrisons, and that you would have to come to Parliament with this confession of humiliating weakness? Why were you so blind—with the men at hand, the regiments raised, and the men on actual service—why were you so utterly blind as to hesitate to embody the whole militia force in the country? Because, I suppose, it would have cost something more at the present moment; because you were determined—you cannot determine so now—because you were determined to act on that most absurd and preposterous notion of paying the expenses of a war like this out of the taxes of the country year by year. I believe, in my conscience, that it was the timid fear of exceeding the actual estimates voted by Parliament that prevented the Government from doing that which in their consciences they must know ought to have been done; and it was the hope of postponing the day of reckoning to Parliament that led them not to call Parliament together at the time it ought to have been called, in order to enable the Government, with the consent of Parliament, to make proper provision for the exigencies of the country. Not only would Parliament have cheerfully forgiven such a course, but it would not have blamed the Government even if there had been an excess in the supply already voted. As I have stated before, I cannot, in consequence of my engagement, oppose the second reading of this Bill; but, unless I hear from Her Majesty's Government some much better and more effective explanation as connected with the whole military plan for carrying on the war than I have heard from the noble Duke at the head of the War Department, if my noble Friend (the Earl of Ellenborough) carries forward his opposition to-morrow, I will give him my support in opposing the further progress of the Bill.

THE EARL OF ABERDEEN: My Lords, this Bill is one of the first measures which have been introduced by Her Majesty's Government this Session, as an evidence of their intention to carry on this war with determination and efficiency; but the manner in which it has been received is not very consistent with those exhortations which we have heard from noble Lords opposite to follow such a course. The noble Earl (the Earl of Derby), in his representation of this Bill, has descended to a description of the measure which he will hardly admit to be just. He talks of this being a measure to which we are reduced in order to keep your own people in order, and he talks of the militia being dragged into foreign service. In the description which the noble Earl has attempted to give of the foreign troops employed in this country during the last war, and the contrast he has endeavoured to draw between the Germans and Hanoverians then employed, and the Germans now to be employed—if there be such—the noble Earl has said that, in the former period, most of them were subjects of the same Sovereign, that they had sympathies with us, and that, therefore, their condition was entirely different from that of the men now to be employed. But how does that answer the objection made by my noble Friend (the Earl of Ellenborough) who spoke first? Would it be more agreeable to him that Hanoverians should be employed in putting down a bread riot than other Germans? Not a bit; and I therefore consider his position utterly untenable, and that no constitutional jealousy or objection can exist to the employment of such a force; and I must say it was scarcely worthy of the noble Earl to have raised such an objection. The noble Earl seems to think that this is a force which is to be imported into, and to be employed in, this country in the place of English troops sent abroad. That is not the case. The whole object of the Bill is to introduce into this country for a limited time, for the purpose of drill, and for the purpose of drill only, a sufficient number of foreign troops; and as soon as they are drilled, and in a condition to be employed in our service, they will be sent to the seat of war to serve with our other forces there. That, surely, is nothing like planting foreign garrisons in this country, as the noble Earl seems to suppose is the intention of this Bill. The presence of these troops here is merely for a temporary purpose; they will be limited as regards number, and they will be limited also as regards time—until they are fit to be employed on foreign service. The limitation as to numbers is placed at 15,000 men; that is the total number which it has been considered proper to have here under drill at any one time; but when the first 15,000 shall have been drilled, and sent abroad and incorporated with our armies, serving at the seat of war, it will be competent for the Government, if it should be thought necessary, to introduce 15,000 more to be drilled and prepared for active service in the same way. That undoubtedly is the intention, should the exigencies of the service require it. My noble Friend who spoke first in this debate from the opposite benches, took upon himself to say that he was perfectly convinced Sir Robert Peel, had he been now alive, would never have given his consent to such a measure. My Lords, notwithstanding the terms of intimacy which, I am proud to say, subsisted between Sir Robert Peel and myself, I confess that I am not able to take upon myself to declare what Sir Robert Peel would have done under the circumstances—what he would have agreed to, and what he would have refused to agree to, upon this point; but this I am prepared to say, that a very great statesman whom the noble Earl resembles far more than I resemble Sir Robert Peel—Lord Chatham—did, in the year 1756, employ foreign troops in the same way as it is proposed to do by this Bill; and I will add that I am by no means so certain as the noble Earl appears to be, that Sir Robert Peel, had a similar case of necessity occurred during his time, would have refused his assent to such a measure. The whole argument of the noble Earl rests upon a fallacy—the fallacy of supposing that those foreign troops are to be employed here in lieu of British troops or militia regiments sent abroad. That is not the case. Undoubtedly it will be our duty to provide such a force to liberate the troops now serving in our colonial garrisons, and to maintain those garrisons which, however much reduced—and very much reduced they are—are indispensable for the occupation and safety of our important possessions in the

Mediterranean and elsewhere. To supply those garrisons we accept the voluntary services—and they are to be voluntary services—and they are to be voluntary, and not compulsory—they are not to be "dragged" into the service, as the noble Earl said—of such militia regiments as may be thought fit to be employed in this garrison duty, and then we shall obtain a valuable reinforcement to aid our soldiers engaged in the active and important service now going on in the East, without at all interfering with the future recruiting of the regular army from the militia force at home. My Lords, with regard to the enlistment of foreign troops, I think my noble Friend opposite (the Duke of Richmond), who has had an opportunity of seeing and knowing the value of the services of the German troops employed in the last war, has done full justice to them; and I have no doubt whatever that such troops as will be employed under this Bill, and in conjunction with the British forces, will always be found to perform their duty in such a manner as to do credit to the allies with whom they act. My Lords, this measure is a measure which is necessary, or at least advisable, in order to enable the Government to obtain promptly an addition to our available forces serving at the seat of war. You will, no doubt, have volunteers from the militia to a greater or less extent, coming forward still to recruit the regular army; but all that will require time, and those volunteers cannot be made available in the same manner, and to the same extent, as foreign troops raised upon the principle proposed by this Bill. Therefore, not at all admitting the accuracy of the description which has been given of the object of the embodying of this force, which is not, as a noble Earl supposes, to be employed at home, and still less, especially at this time of day, that such a force should not be employed at all; nor recognising this as a constitutional objection that we should raise such a force under the circumstances which I have described, having them in this country merely for the purpose of being drilled before they are sent out upon foreign service. I say I cannot think that there is any good ground for the opposition which the noble Earl opposite has so unexpectedly raised to this, the first measure designed by Her Majesty's Government in order to carry on the war with vigour. This measure, intended to accomplish such an object, has, I must say, been but ill received by noble Lords opposite, although they do profess such extreme anxiety and impatience that Her Majesty's Government should exert every means for vigorously prosecuting the war. As for saying that these troops would be introduced into England to act as garrisons, there is no foundation for such a statement, and it appears to me that it has only been through misrepresentations of the real use of this force that any shadow of an objection can possibly be urged by the noble Earl to this measure. I trust, therefore, your Lordships will see that the objections entertained to this measure are wholly untenable, as represented by noble Lords opposite, and that your Lordships will not refuse to read the Bill a second time.

The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH: I hope I shall be allowed to set right an historical fact adverted to by the noble Earl (the Earl of Aberdeen), by reminding your Lordships that of all the measures of the Earl of Chatham's life, that which most damaged him in public opinion, and in the opinion of his contemporaries, was the very one for the employment of foreign troops in the service of this country, because it was in direct contradiction to his acts during the whole course of his public services in the House of Commons. It was understood to be a most discreditable compliance with the assumed wishes of George II., and to be, perhaps, owing, in a certain degree to his then recent connection with the Duke of Newcastle.

The Earl of MALMESBURY had not the slightest wish to offer a factious opposition to the proposals of the Government, but, on the contrary, wished to give every support to Her Majesty's Ministers, in order to enable them to carry on the war vigorously. He could not, however, but regret that noble Lords opposite, and especially the noble Duke (the Duke of Newcastle), should have shown an impatience of those observations which it was the duty of Members of the Opposition in that House to make whenever the necessity arose; and that they should, on an occasion where they were anxious to assist the Government to the utmost, have so much distrust of noble Lords on that side the House. A word had been introduced into the debate in their Lordships' House by the noble Duke opposite (the Duke of Newcastle) which he had not been accustomed to hear before the noble Duke took his seat in that House. It was the word "misrepresentation," which the noble Duke employed on all occasions, and in the most offensive manner. Now, having no feeling whatever of anger towards the noble Duke, and having not the slightest temper on the subject, he wished to tell the noble Duke that the habitual use by him of that word ought to be avoided. Formerly the term "misapprehension," and not "misrepresentation," was the one employed when it was wished to correct a statement made in that House, and the same word was always used in every society of gentlemen in which he (the Earl of Malmesbury) was accustomed to mix. He begged the noble Duke to recollect that as a Minister, and a constitutional Minister, moreover, in a free country, he must be prepared constantly to be contradicted, and should not allow himself to use towards others terms which he would be highly indignant at if applied to himself. With respect to the Bill before their Lordships, their business was not to examine what its object was, so much as to see what powers it might give to Ministers. It was all very well for the noble Earl at the head of the Government to declare that there was no intention that England should be garrisoned by a foreign army; but what their Lordships should look at was, the power which it confided to Ministers, and to provide against unconstitutional powers placed in the hands either of the present or of future Governments. The noble Earl and the Ministry over which he presided, like all things in this world, must some day have an end; and it was their duty to see that no unconstitutional power was put into the hands either of the noble Earl or of his successors. It was from no feeling of personal jealousy of the noble Earl that noble Lords on his side of the House objected to this Bill. The measure gave the Government power to have at any one time 15,000 foreign troops in this country; but the noble Earl had given them to understand that 15,000 was not the whole number of such troops which he intended and hoped to maintain; the inference to be drawn from his speech, therefore, being, that if he could get more he would have more. Now, he did not mean to maintain that at no time might not the employment of foreign troops be required, or that in all respects such troops were inferior to our own, and therefore not worth having; but what struck him—and he thought the same thing would make a very great impression upon the country when the public heard of this Bill—what struck him with profound astonishment was, that such a step should be thought necessary at this early period of the war—at a moment when the greatest enthusiasm prevailed throughout the country—when in both Houses of Parliament Ministers were boasting, and justly boasting, of the efforts which this country had made, and of the ease with which recruits were obtained for Her Majesty's service. Was England so changed since the last great war? Look at the immense increase of population which had taken place since then. He had just obtained some figures showing the exact amount of force which England was enabled to raise from her own children during the last war. What was the strength of our regular army at that period? It numbered 237,000 men. What was it now? He believed somewhat about 130,000. The militia in the last war amounted to 86,000 men, the volunteers to 267,000, the yeomanry to 65,000, and the sailors to 140,000. So, here were 665,000 Englishmen, besides the sailors, enrolled in arms out of a population infinitely inferior to that we possessed now. This, too, was after a war which had lasted several years. [The Earl of ABERDEEN: Hear!] The noble Earl seemed to look upon this fact as bearing favourably upon the amount of the national exertions. Did he think, then, that the resources of the country were increased by ten years of war? Surely, so strong an advocate for peace could not be of that opinion, but must rather believe that a long interval of peace would have so far developed our resources as to enable us to put out all our strength. If, then, we found ourselves, in the very first year of the war, reduced to such straits as not to be able to raise—he would not say 665,000 men, but half that number—and to be compelled to have recourse to foreign aid, he would ask what had reduced this great country to such a pitch of humiliation? He did not say that this Bill might not be at some time necessary. For example, it might be necessary when the war extended—when we were obliged to occupy several countries at the same time—when we had sent out several expeditions at the same time, as was the case in the last war. But was English spirit exhausted already? Had it even been called upon? Had we invited our Colonies to send home men in aid of their mother country? He was one of those who believed that a system might be established by which a certain number of troops might be raised from our colonial possessions. What was the custom of the which the country was engaged in war. He rose, however, to put a question to the Government which had reference to the militia, a force which it ought to be remembered was raised by the wisdom of the late Government. The Government had power to raise in Scotland a militia force of 10,000 men, and in Ireland of 30,000; but they had only begun to exercise that power within the last few weeks. In England, no doubt, a great deal had been done towards increasing the efficiency of that force, but it was only within a few weeks that it had been resolved to enrol the Irish and Scotch militia, and now he was told that it was not intended to embody more than nine regiments. The fact was, the Government had, up to the battle of Inkerman, been endeavouring to carry on a large war with a small peace establishment. In Ireland it was true that men were not coming forward to enlist as readily as had been hoped; but he thought that if regiments were embodied as soon as they were enrolled the requisite number of men would be obtained. The question he wished to ask the noble Duke at the head of the War Department was, whether it was intended to commence recruiting foreign troops before it was ascertained if the proper quota of 30,000 men to Ireland and 10,000 men to Scotland could be obtained? He wished also to know from what part of the Continent it was intended to procure these men, and he considered that that was a matter of great consequence. In the last war the courage and conduct of the Hanoverians and of the Brunswickers had been displayed, but the same courage could not be expected from all foreign troops, and the British troops would not like fighting by the side of men who would be likely to run away, like the Turks at Balaklava, before the enemy were within 250 yards.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: My Lords, with regard to the question as to whether it would not be desirable to embody the Irish regiments immediately after their enrolment, it may be satisfactory to the noble Earl to know that that suggestion has already been made from Ireland and adopted. Experience has shown that men will not come forward readily to be enrolled unless the regiments are embodied at the same time. With regard to the second question of the noble Earl (the Earl of Glengall), I must reply that the measure now before your Lordships and that before the other House have no sort of connection the one with the other, and if Parliament should pass this measure into a law, it will be carried into effect without reference to the other. With respect to the third question, as to where the Government propose to recruit these foreign troops, I think the noble Earl could hardly have heard the observations which I made in moving the second reading of the Bill—namely, that inasmuch as no communications have yet been made with any foreign Governments, it would not be respectful to any of them to state from which country we propose to derive our supplies. As to what has fallen from the noble Earl on this side of the House (Earl Grey), I can assure him that the Government do not complain of any fair comment on the measures which they may introduce. We do not expect that every one of our measures will meet the unanimous assent either of this or the other House of Parliament. We bring forward such measures as we believe suited to the crisis in which we are engaged, and of course expect that each individual will express his own deliberate judgment, condemning what he believes to be wrong, suggesting alterations in what he believes to be faulty; but we do think we have the right to expect that the comments which may be made shall be delivered in a fair spirit, and free from those party characteristics which are perfectly justifiable under other circumstances than those in which the country is now placed. Of such remarks as those which fell from the noble Earl (Earl Grey), or from the noble Earl the late Secretary for Foreign Affairs, we have no right to complain; but we have a right to complain of the spirit in which this measure has been treated by the noble Earl who spoke first (the Earl of Ellenborough), and by the leader of the party opposite (the Earl of Derby). If the noble Earl the late Secretary for Foreign Affairs objects to the word "misrepresentation," I will use any other term which may be more palatable to him or any other Member of the House; but I must say that the objects of the Bill, the motives of the Government, and the whole circumstances, have been completely misstated by both these noble Earls. The noble Earl the leader of the Opposition chose, for the purpose of damaging both measures, to associate this Bill with the Militia Bill now before the House of Commons. Now, I will ask any candid individual whether there is any connection between the two except so far as both are intended to strengthen the arms of the Government in their efforts to carry on the war with increased efficiency; and whether his remarks are not calculated to raise a spirit of jealousy with regard to the powers which we are taking which will tend to render those measures less effective than they might otherwise be? I appeal to your Lordships whether this is a patriotic spirit in which the noble Earl has dealt with this question—whether it is in harmony and consistency with the speech which he delivered on the opening of the Session—whether he has shown that he is really anxious to strengthen our hands, and enable us to carry on the war with efficiency? I say that the speech of the noble Earl this evening is utterly and entirely at variance with his former declarations. I do not say that he intended them to be so, but that was the spirit of his observations, and that must be their effect. It is impossible that the speech of the noble Earl can go forth to the world without those who look up to him being persuaded that the Government has other objects in view than those which they have avowed. Does the noble Earl think that he is fairly representing the Bill which is about to come to this House, and which I will not now discuss—is he characterising that measure justly and fairly when he talks of "dragging" the militiamen from their homes and sending them to the Colonies?

THE EARL OF DERBY: I said I was aware it was a measure peculiarly of a voluntary character, but that there was a moral screw put upon the men which would lead them to take steps which they would not otherwise do.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: I am not aware in what part of his speech the noble Earl said that, but he used the word "drag," and I appeal to the House whether he did not distinctly say that we were about to drag the militia from their homes and send them to the Colonies, and whether, prompted by the late Secretary for Foreign Affairs, he did not say they were enlisted for five years, and that two were already past, and that it was an increased hardship upon these men to send them out of the country contrary to the terms on which they enlisted? I ask is that a fair representation of the measure? The noble Earl disapproves of the measure, and says he shall comment on it when it comes before the House, and I am sure he will not misstate the objects of the Bill. It is a purely voluntary measure, and when he says it is unfair to place men in that position, I may say that the measure arises from the fact that a great number of the militia regiments have volunteered their services, and if we had had the power by Act of Parliament we might have at once sent several of them to Malta or the Ionian Islands, and thereby have relieved other regular regiments, which might have proceeded to the seat of war. Why does the noble Earl attempt to represent these measures as connected with each other? Why, in order to persuade the public that we are about to embody a foreign force in this country, not for the purpose of carrying on foreign war, but for suppressing domestic tumult, and he says that our object is to send the militia regiments out of the country, and by the Bill before the House to raise troops of foreign mercenaries, and place them in this country, with the view of suppressing domestic tumult, and supplying the place of the militia. Now, I appeal to the noble Earl himself, whether he believes such to be our intention? Such statements might be fair for the purposes of party at other times, but they are not fair towards the country at a moment like this for the purpose of prejudicing the country against an important measure. The noble Earl knows perfectly well that the Government has the power to employ foreign troops abroad; and all we want is the power to bring them here to be organised, and then send them out again to the seat of war. That is the only power we ask from Parliament. I have said our object is to obtain and train soldiers; but it must be remembered that we shall obtain trained individuals, not trained battalions. It is necessary to bring trained individuals to some depôt, for the purpose of forming them into trained battalions. That is the power, and the only power, the Government asks. The two noble Earls who spoke first called it a great constitutional question, and endeavoured to frighten the country with what the Government were going to do; but the noble Earl the late Secretary for Foreign Affairs has dropped the whole constitutional argument. The noble leader of the Opposition says this is a great constitutional question; but the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs says the measure may be right in a short time—in the course of two or three years—when we have exhausted our resources. He, therefore, entirely differs from the noble

Earls who have raised this great constitutional doctrine. But I contend that if it be right to act in this manner at all, it is right at this particular moment. Why, does not the leader of the party opposite know that whatever exertion we may make—that if every man in the militia were to come forward and volunteer—they would not be fit to be sent out for foreign service? The noble Earl knows they are not, and that it must take six, or seven, or eight months to train them effectively for such a service as is required in the Crimea. It is now, at the commencement of the war, that you require this assistance, and when the power given by this Bill is in particular essential. And when the noble Earl says that a blush ought to come upon the cheek of a British Minister who could bring forward such a measure, and says that I have admitted that we have exhausted all our resources, and are obliged to resort to the aid of foreign troops, he puts words into my mouth that I never uttered. I said completely the reverse. I said that our means have not yet arrived at their point—that our means were coming out—and that we required the assistance of these trained troops in preparing them. If the noble Earl the late Foreign Secretary admits the principle, he must admit that it is at the commencement of a war that such a measure is required. The noble Earl the late Postmaster General (the Earl of Hardwicke) last night read a long statement, and the noble Earl opposite has to-night read the same statement, relative to our forces in 1813, and has asked whether we expect such resources again. I do expect it; and, if the country requires it, I expect we shall be able to double those forces. But there are limits to human power, and to suppose that we, at the commencement of a war, are to raise 630,000 men, or half that number, is an absurdity which no man, except for the purpose of faction, would bring forward in a legislative assembly. It is well enough for such purposes to taunt us, but noble Lords know well enough that such a thing is a perfect impossibility. The noble Earl who commenced the debate (the Earl of Ellenborough) said, with a confidence which sometimes characterises his observations in this House, that all this has been rendered necessary because we neglected the warnings and counsels which he gave us. I admit that the counsels of that noble Earl are often exceedingly sound. I respect his judgment. I know that he has paid great attention to military affairs, and knows more on that subject than many other noble Lords. But the noble Earl will be good enough to recollect that, in whatever position we may be at this moment, we have not been placed in that position in consequence of his suggestions having been neglected, much less "contumeliously rejected." Nothing of the kind has taken place. What were those suggestions? First, that we ought to have established an uniform system of police throughout the country, in order that it should be used, not for the purpose of protecting the peace of a country, but as a means of recruiting for the militia. [The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH: No, for both.] Now, without entering into any discussion as to whether that would be a useful or legitimate use of such a body, let me remind the noble Earl that his suggestion was not "contumeliously rejected," but that a measure on the subject was brought into the House of Commons with the view of establishing a uniform system of police, and that it was dropped in consequence of the objections entertained to it by the county Members. But, nevertheless, as certain powers had been given to the Government, means have been taken to establish a system of police under the Act of Lord Normanby, passed twenty years ago, and some progress has already been made in that respect. What was the second suggestion of the noble Earl? Why, that we ought to have embodied the whole of the militia regiments of the country. Now, will the noble Earl have the goodness to recollect this—that at the breaking out of the war the Government had not the power to embody all the militia regiments of the country, or even a single militia regiment. What did we do? We came to Parliament and asked for power to embody the militia, not in case of any foreign invasion merely, but in case of foreign war. The whole of the militia regiments had been enrolled in the faith of being called out in the case of foreign invasion only, and the Government had no power to embody them unless they volunteered for the purpose, and we acted on the principle of embodying those who volunteered. If the Government had attempted to embody the whole of the militia regiments, they would have been guilty of a gross breach of faith to every one of those regiments. So far from the suggestions of the noble Earl having been contumeliously rejected—whether we adopted them on his recommendation or on our own responsibility, I do not recollect; but to every practical extent these ideas were carried out within a short time of the period when they were made, and I believe I told the noble Earl so at the time. The noble Earl, therefore, had no right to say that these suggestions were not fully considered. But I will go further, and say that he has no right to assert that if they had been carried out we should at this moment have been placed in such a position as would have enabled us to send to the Crimea that amount of men which it is now the pleasure of noble Lords opposite, who take a very different view of the case from that which was taken by them a short time ago, to declare ought to be sent. If we had embodied the whole of the militia regiments of the country, does the noble Earl mean to say there would have been a sufficient number of recruits to stengthen our Army to any material extent? Up to the time of the additional encouragement given to militia recruiting, the voluntary offers did not exceed 4,000 or 5,000 men. Now, however, that the spirit of the country has been roused, a different feeling is exhibited; we expect to obtain from the militia regiments a very great number of recruits, for almost every one of them has asked to be embodied, and we are embodying them one after another. The noble Earl talks about embodying the whole of the militia regiments. Will he be so good as to inform me where the barrack accommodation is to be found at this moment for such a force? I do not say that we might not be justified in embodying the militia regiments and billeting them; but that is not the way to make militia regiments effective, for they can never become so efficient in billet as in barracks. The House should bear these things in mind, not for the sake of the Government, but for the sake of the country, and for the state of the efficiency of the Army.

THE EARL OF CLANCARTY: My Lords, I cannot allow this debate to close without rising to protest against the charge made by the noble Duke against noble Lords on this side of the House, that they are actuated by party and factious motives in objecting to this Bill, and that their conduct is inconsistent with their expressed sentiments in the Address in answer to the Queen's Speech. On entering the House I knew nothing of the Bill that was to be introduced by the noble Duke, and the opinion I have formed upon it, after attending to his statement and to the discussion that has taken place, I feel myself at full liberty to act upon. In opposing the Bill I shall act most consistently with the terms of the Address; for I can hardly conceive any measure more calculated to damp the national enthusiasm in the war than that which is now proposed for your Lordships' consideration. I do not conceive, my Lords, that by the terms or spirit of the Address, the House bound itself to a blind adoption of whatever measures Her Majesty's Ministers might propose for carrying on the war. I believe, on the contrary, that it is most important to its successful prosecution, and absolutely essential to the sustainment of public confidence, that Parliament should carefully consider and approve of whatever may be done. The very able speech of the noble Earl who opened this discussion, and who brought forward the main objections to the Bill, so far from having been answered, has, I conceive, been in every essential point established. It might not be intended that the 15,000 foreign troops training in this country should ever be called to the aid of the civil power in repressing internal tumults, but there is nothing in the Bill to prevent them being so used in case of necessity; and as to the objection taken to the noble Earl's remarks upon the character of the proposed Foreign Legion, that they involved a reflection upon the brave foreign soldiers who fought under the banner of England in the late war, I think the circumstances of the case do not warrant such an objection. In the late war the foreigners who gave their services to England were men whose sympathies were as fully, if not more so, than those of our own countrymen, enlisted in the great contest that was then being carried on; whereas in the present war they would be mere mercenaries, interested in prolonging, rather than in terminating, a contest productive to them of profitable employment at the expense of this country. My Lords, I deprecate the proposed measure, as a return to the practice of subsidising foreign Powers; and be assured that public opinion will be altogether opposed to it. Why not augment the national force, which has shown itself so brave and indomitable in the field? Why has not the militia of the United Kingdom been earlier and more fully called out? We have this evening heard that but nine Irish regiments of militia have been ordered to be embodied. Let immediate steps be taken for the training of the whole of the militia force; and let it first be ascertained that English, Scotch, and Irish cannot be obtained for the service of their country before you call to your standards foreigners with whom you can have no common sympathies. There has been, and there will be, no lack of enthusiasm while you rely upon the patriotism of British subjects; but a powerful reaction will not fail to manifest itself if the national character of our armies be given up. If the feelings of the foreigners whose services you would hire are like those of our own troops, earnest and hearty in this great contest, which is undoubtedly European, let them come boldly forward as the soldiers of the States to which they belong, then we should gladly have them side by side with British regiments; but upon other terms we desire not their assistance. My Lords, I should not have risen to make these observations had I not felt called upon to repel the charge the noble Duke thought proper to make of faction and inconsistency against noble Lords on this side of the House for objecting to his Bill. I trust it will be rejected for the reasons I have stated, and feel that in voting against it I shall act most consistently with the pledge included in the Address to the Crown, to give to Her Majesty the utmost support to enable Her to bring this war to a happy and honourable conclusion.

On Question, *Resolved* in the *Affirmative*; Bill read 2^a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the whole House *To-morrow*.

THE QUEEN'S ANSWER TO THE ADDRESS.

THE LORD CHAMBERLAIN (The Marquess of BREADALBANE) stated that he had the honour to report to the House, that in obedience to their orders the Address of their Lordships, in answer to Her Majesty's most gracious Speech from the Throne, had been presented to Her Majesty, that it had been most graciously received, and that Her Majesty had been pleased to return the following answer—

"I THANK you for your loyal and dutiful Address.

"I felt confident that I should receive your cordial Co-operation in the Measures which I consider necessary to the vigorous Prosecution of the War in which we are engaged; and I trust that, under the Blessing of the Almighty, those Measures will lead to the Re-establishment of the Peace of Europe on a secure and lasting Foundation."

POST OFFICE COMMISSION REPORT.

THE EARL OF HARDWICKE rose to call their Lordships' attention to two statements in the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post Office which was not consistent with the facts. It was stated that the Postmasters General under various Governments had neglected their duty in carrying out the business of their office, and he was anxious to show that the statement was not applicable to him while he was Postmaster General. The sentence to which he wished more particularly to call their Lordships' attention had reference to the question of the double secretaryship. The Commissioners said—

> "The first point which challenged their attention was the existence of a double secretaryship held by two officers of equal rank and independent authority—one secretary to the Post Office, and the other secretary to the Postmaster General."

These two secretaries were Colonel Maberly and Mr. Rowland Hill. Mr. Hill had been introduced into the Post Office by the Government of the day for the purpose of carrying out a new system of postage, and he believed that Mr. Hill had been placed there with the view of, some day or other, being appointed chief secretary. With reference to the double secretaryship, the Report stated that these two secretaries were of equal rank and of independent authority. Now, he denied that that was correct. It was impossible Mr. Hill could be considered equal in authority or rank to Colonel Maberly, for his salary was 500*l.* a year less, and his uniform was what was called a uniform of the third class (Civil Service), while that of Captain Maberly was of the second class. The uniform, he apprehended, was the external indication of the rank to which the wearer belonged; and if so, Mr. Hill had no right to state, if he did really state, that he and Colonel Maberly were of equal rank in the Post Office. He had also to object to another part of the Report, which stated that the well-working of the Post Office depended on the perfection of its machinery and the harmony of all its parts; but that the respective functions of these two secretaries had never been clearly defined, and that all attempts at a satisfactory definition had failed. Now, by the regulations which he had laid down, he had perfectly succeeded in having the business of the office carried on with perfect harmony, and in strictly defining the duties of the two secretaries. When he first entered upon his duties, he did find various difficulties in the way of a proper organisation of the business of the office; but after a short time he was able to bring about a proper regulation of the work. He had styled Colonel Maberly "chief secretary," and Mr. Hill "secretary to the Postmaster General." He had given Mr. Hill the charge of the Money-Order Office of the United Kingdom, which, as now conducted, was one of the largest banking establishments in Europe. That was ample employment; but he also gave him other duties connected with improvements in the Post Office. He had also drawn up a minute, that any reports on different branches of the service might be referred to whichever of the two secretaries he thought fit, and he caused a regular statement to be laid before him every week by each of the secretaries. That system, while under his own control, worked most satisfactorily, and afforded a direct contradiction to the statement of the Commissioners, that the functions of the two officers had never been clearly defined. His object was to put himself right with the public, and to show that, while he was Postmaster General, he carefully investigated the state of the office, and endeavoured to carry out, with strict justice, the duties which belonged to it. The noble Earl concluded by moving that the minute made by himself on the 21st of June, 1852, be laid upon the table.

VISCOUNT CANNING said, he had no objection to produce the papers moved for by the noble Earl, but he could not altogether concur in the representation which the noble Earl had given of the system which he had introduced. He believed that the statement contained in the paragraph of the Report to which the noble Earl had drawn attention was practically correct, and that whilst there might be some difference of uniform and official position, the Commissioners were perfectly correct in stating that there were two officers of equal rank and authority. The fact was, that when Mr. Rowland Hill was appointed to his place, there was no indication of his being placed under and made in any degree subordinate to the gentleman who at the time held the office of secretary to the Post Office. Mr. Rowland Hill's functions were entirely apart from those of Colonel Maberly, and it was not therefore a misrepresentation to say that the two secretaries were independent of each other, each being dependent, of course, on the Postmaster General. The noble Earl further said, the Commissioners were incorrect in stating that no definition had been made of these functions, because he had made the attempt, and succeeded in defining them. He could only reply that every attempt of his to improve his noble Friend's definition had signally failed, and that the words of the minute showed that the noble Earl's success had not been very great. It would be apparent from the minute itself that it defined nothing, because it left the Postmaster General to do what he thought fit under the exigency of the moment. No doubt, the noble Earl could describe what he would have the secretaries do, and what abstain from doing, but as to a permanent definition of their functions it was a complete failure. He thought that no reproach to the noble Earl, or to himself, or to any predecessor in the office of Postmaster General, as he believed it was quite impossible with two officers, if not exactly equal, of co-ordinate position and authority, so to separate the business of the department that the functions of the one should not interfere with those of the other. That difficulty became apparent to the Commissioners appointed by the Government, at the close of last year to investigate the affairs of the Post Office, and they recommended the abolition of the separate offices, with which recommendation the Government had no hesitation in complying. He could only say, from the short experience they had had of the change, it was most satisfactory, the business being now done with greater rapidity and less incumbrance to all concerned. There could be no objection to lay the paper on the table, but it was not in his power to admit that the working under the noble Earl's minute had been so satisfactory as he had represented.

Motion *agreed to.*

Return of minute made by the Earl of Hardwicke, when Postmaster General for the regulation of the Post Office, on the 21st June, 1852, ordered to be laid before the House.

House adjourned till To-morrow.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Thursday, December 14, 1854.

MINUTES.] NEW MEMBER SWORN.—For Abingdon, Joseph Haythorne Reed, Esq.

PUBLIC BILLS.—1° Jurors and Juries (Ireland). 2° Militia.

THE LOSS OF THE "PRINCE"—QUESTION.

MR. HILDYARD asked the First Lord of the Admiralty on what day the *Prince* landed the 46th Regiment; whether the *Prince* was in the port of Balaklava when the troops were landed; and whether any, and, if so, what stores were landed in the interval between the disembarkation of the troops and the loss of the vessel?

SIR JAMES GRAHAM said, in answer to the questions put to him by his hon. and learned Friend, he begged leave to state to him and to the House that as yet the Government had received no official information with respect to the loss of the *Prince*, and that the only information which had reached them was that which was in common with what had been made known to the public by means of a letter written by one of the survivors, and which was published in the *Times* newspaper. He was not positive of the fact, but he had reason to believe that the troops were disembarked on the 8th of November; and that they were disembarked, not within the harbour of Balaklava, but outside of it, and his belief was that for some days before the fatal accident occurred a heavy storm came on, and the wind set into the harbour, causing a very considerable surf, which impeded the disembarkation both of the troops and the stores. The troops, he believed, were disembarked, as well as a large portion of stores, by means of smaller steamers going along inside between the *Prince* and the beach. Perhaps the House would permit him, since there had naturally been a strong feeling excited by reason of the loss of that vessel, to state certain facts concerning the loss of that ship. It had been said that she had before the storm lost her bower anchor and her principal cable from the latter not being sufficiently secured before she left England. Now, he was in a condition to inform the House that the fullest inquiry had been made by the Admiralty as to that point, and that they had obtained the very best evidence to enable them to negative that statement. He held in his hand a letter in which the persons who secured the cable before the vessel sailed deposed to the fact of their having so secured the cables The letter had been received from the General Steam Shipping Company, of whom the *Prince* was bought for the public service. The letter had been forwarded to himself, as the First Lord of the Admiralty, by the chairman of the Company, and which he would read to the House—

> "General Screw Steam Shipping Company,
> "27, Cannon Street, London, Dec. 8.
>
> "Sir—As the *Prince* steamer was fitted for sea by the General Screw Steam Shipping Company, the board of directors think it their duty to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that a statement which has appeared in the public papers, that the cables on board that ship were not clinched, is incorrect. I have to annex the copy of a joint statement made to the directors this day by Mr. Isaac Cole, a rigger, and Henry Tucker, his foreman. It will be seen by this statement that Mr. Cole himself saw the cables well and properly lashed with 3½-inch rope to a large ring fitted for that purpose in the chain locker, and that Henry Tucker did the work with the assistance of other hands.
>
> "Other points connected with the ship and her cargo require explanation or contradiction, which will be given as soon as the necessary corroborative evidence as to the facts is obtained. I have, &c.,
>
> "J. U. ELLIS, Chairman."

To that letter was appended the following statement—

> "I, Isaac Cole, am a rigger, and have superintended the fitting out of all the Screw Company's ships. I saw the cables well and properly lashed (not shackled) on board the *Prince* to a large ring fitted for that purpose in the chain locker, sufficiently large to take about twenty turns of a 3½-inch rope. The ends of the two bower cables were securely lashed with about eleven turns of 3½-inch new rope to this ring. Henry Tucker was the foreman employed by me to lash them, with other hands under him; and this was not done to the *Prince* alone, but has been the case with every one of the Company's ships, commencing with the *Queen of the South.* We are both quite sure and will swear the cables of the *Prince* were so lashed. The *Prince* had Lenox's capstan and Lenox's patent stoppers, and she appeared to me to be in every way most efficiently fitted. The ring came up to the top of the chain locker, so that the lashing could be cut, if necessary, to slip.
>
> "ISAAC COLE, Rigger,
> "East India Road, Poplar.
> "HENRY ⋈ TUCKER.
>
> "Given at 27, Cannon Street, City, Dec. 8.
>
> "Witnesses to the signature of Isaac Cole, and mark of Henry Tucker. } F. S. ROWE, A. BAINES."

Another statement had been made, which was quite true, namely, that the loss of the vessel was to be ascribed to the snapping of the cables during the storm. Some doubts were entertained as to the sufficient strength of these cables before the vessel sailed, and, by a happy circumstance, to prevent all doubt upon the subject, they were tested by a machine which was used to test the cables of ships of war. Now, he might stop here in his answer to the questions of the hon. and learned Gentleman, but he thought the House would agree with him that there was an act of justice due to the memory of a man who had filled what certainly was a comparatively humble situation—he meant the late master of the *Prince*, whose memory had been most cruelly assailed. He thought, in justice to that man, who lost his life in the calamity that befell the ship, that he was bound to make the statement which he was about to make. It was quite true that, the *Prince* having been employed in the Baltic, it was stated by a captain of the navy, who was on board of her on that occasion, that the master of the ship was not sufficiently competent to discharge the responsible duties required of him. The Board of Admiralty, on receiving this statement, made the most searching investigation into the competency of that officer. Inquiry was made of Mr. Ellis, the Chairman of the General Steam Shipping Company, as to what was the opinion of that Company of Mr. Goodall, the master of the *Prince*, in reference to his past character and capacity as a naval officer; and the Admiralty received the most satisfactory assurance and proofs that he was a most trustworthy seaman, and that the Company felt satisfied that he was fit to be continued in the command of such a vessel. Being, therefore, satisfied with the result of their inquiries, the Admiralty continued him in command of the vessel after she had been purchased. After the ship was purchased, but before she sailed to the Black Sea, it was thought fit to put on board of her, considering the value of the vessel and her cargo, and the vast importance it was to ensure the safe arrival of the troops on board at the earliest period, both an experienced commander of the navy, and also a lieutenant of the navy. Accordingly, Captain Richards, who was a member of the Board of Admiralty, recommended Commander Baynton to be put on board the *Prince*, to whom specific instructions were given. He might state that Commander Baynton not only shared all the danger, but that he lost his life in that melancholy storm. It so happened, however, that Commander Baynton wrote to Captain Richards from Constantinople on the 5th of November, a few days before the *Prince* sailed from that port for Balaklava, and he conveyed to Captain Richards his opinion of the merits of the master of the *Prince*. The letter itself did not now exist, but Captain Richards made a memorandum of its contents at the time of its being written. The memorandum was in these terms—

> "Under an impression that the disagreement between Captain Chads and the master of the *Prince* had arisen from what might be considered as too much interference on the part of the former with the details of the master's duty, I particularly cautioned Commander Baynton, when placed in the ship as agent, to be careful to avoid such an error, but resolutely to maintain his authority as agent; to be closely observant of the master's proceedings, and not only to correct anything that might appear to require his interference, but also to report without fail any neglect or indifference he might observe in the master. On the arrival of the *Prince* at Constantinople, Commander Baynton wrote me a private note expressive of his entire satisfaction with the conduct of Mr. Goodall, the master, not only in navigating his ship, but also in the good order he had maintained on board throughout the voyage, and the contentment of the officers and men of the 46th Regiment with their treatment on board. Commander Baynton particularly mentioned a heavy gale of wind the *Prince* encountered in the Archipelago, which had obliged her to seek refuge twice under Negropont, and that Mr. Goodall had in that instance proved himself a careful and experienced seaman, and had given the agent the utmost satisfaction. Commander Baynton was selected for the agency of the *Prince* from his known ability and high character in the Royal Navy, and having just returned from the Black Sea. The note has not been preserved, but its contents were communicated by me personally to Mr. Ellis, the Chairman of the Screw Company, previously to the tidings of the disaster of the *Prince* having reached this country. The note was dated on the 5th of November, and received by me on the 17th. Previously to the sailing of the *Prince*, Mr. Ellis informed me that he considered Mr. Goodall the most capable man in the employment of the Company, and one in whom the Company had unbounded confidence."

He hoped the House would pardon him for occupying its attention while doing what he conceived to be an act of justice to the memory of a departed officer. He could assure the House that every possible precaution was taken by the Admiralty to secure the safety both of the ship and of the cargo.

Mr. MILNER GIBSON asked the First Lord of the Admiralty who was responsible for the order to the transports in Balaklava Harbour to leave that harbour and anchor upon an exposed coast and in deep water?

Sir JAMES GRAHAM replied, that the officers commanding transports were subject to the authority and direction of the senior naval officer in the Queen's service in the harbour. His belief was that the transports were moved out of Balaklava Harbour on the 26th of October, when an attack of the enemy was imminent.

JURORS AND JURIES (IRELAND).

SIR JOHN YOUNG moved for leave to bring in a Bill to consolidate and simplify the laws relating to jurors and juries in Ireland. The Bill was mainly founded on the recommendations of the Committee which sat in 1852. It was proposed to have one jury list both for civil and criminal cases. The list would contain the names of all persons who were rated to the poor law valuation at not less than 20*l.* It was considered that in all the counties of Ireland that would include a sufficient number of jurors to satisfy the requirements of justice and to secure respectable and well-qualified persons to act as jurors in that country. It was proposed that special juries should be selected from those persons who possessed a qualification to the amount of 50*l.* With respect to the city of Dublin, it was proposed that all persons who resided within seven miles of the city and were rated at 20*l.* should be liable to serve on juries within the city. After stating some other provisions of the Bill, the right hon. Gentleman expressed his belief that the Bill, if passed, would not in any degree interfere with the administration of justice, or diminish the respect due to the law.

MR. WHITESIDE rejoiced that a measure of this kind had been introduced, and hoped that those Gentlemen who objected to the Bill which he had brought in last Session had listened attentively to the statement of the right hon. Gentleman. The Bill which he (Mr. Whiteside) introduced last Session was carried as far as the second reading, but opposed by the very Gentleman who had now spoken, and who had just moved for leave to bring in the same identical Bill, with this distinction, that he proposed to make the amount of qualification not 30*l.*, but 20*l.* The proposal of the right hon. Gentleman that there should be but one jury panel was already the law, and therefore a Bill for that object was superfluous. As he understood a Bill was to be brought in by the Attorney General, he hoped care would be taken to assimilate the law in the two countries, so as to render future legislation for that purpose unnecessary.

MR. KEOGH said, it was very true that many of the clauses in the hon. and learned Gentleman's Bill were contained in the present Bill; but the hon. and learned Gentleman's Bill was a consolidation Bill, into which thirty-two or thirty-three clauses were introduced from the old statutes. The Bill proposed to be introduced by his right hon. Friend was also a consolidation Bill, and consequently he was obliged to copy those clauses; but he did not copy the clauses from the hon. and learned Gentleman's Bill, but from the original Acts of Parliament from which the hon. and learned Gentleman had himself taken them. If the hon. and learned Gentleman would refer to the Bill, he would find that the objections which had been raised to his Bill were not applicable to the present measure. Hon. Gentlemen would have an opportunity of considering the clauses of it, and he was sure they would give satisfaction to both sides of the House.

Motion *agreed to.*

Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Sir JOHN YOUNG and Mr. SOLICITOR GENERAL for Ireland.

Afterwards Bill *presented,* and read 1°.

PUBLIC BUSINESS.

On the Order of the Day for the Second Reading of the Militia Bill,

MR. DISRAELI said, I gave notice yesterday that I should take this opportunity of making an inquiry of the noble Lord as to the intentions of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the conduct of public business. It would be extremely convenient to Gentlemen on both sides of the House if the noble Lord could give us information this evening as to the possible prospect of the progress of public business during the next week.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL: In answer to the right hon. Gentleman, I beg to say that there are two measures which the Government will think it necessary to bring under the consideration of the House during this period of the Session. One is the Bill which my noble Friend (Viscount Palmerston) is about to propose to the House to read a second time, concerning the militia; another is a Bill which has been introduced in the other House of Parliament, with respect to the employment of foreign troops in the service of Her Majesty. We had entertained hopes that we should be enabled to present a Bill to the House to confirm the treaty that has been lately entered into with the United States of America; but it now appears that that Bill cannot be ready during the present sitting. Of course, the length of this period of the Session will depend upon the time that will be taken in passing the two Bills I have mentioned; but I trust that time will not be long, and that by this day week we may be able to adjourn over the Christmas holidays, when the remainder of the public business will be proceeded with.

NEWSPAPER STAMPS—QUESTION.

Mr. M. GIBSON: I have given notice of putting a question to the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and I will now do so. I wish to make inquiry from the right hon. Gentleman as to what course it is his intention to take with reference to the public press and the newspaper stamp. I may be putting this question at what some may think an inopportune moment; but, in fact, the war has rendered it an urgent question that cannot be delayed, and my object is to ask information from the Government, and to convey my desire, at the same time, that if the Government have a measure prepared they will proceed with it without delay. The extraordinary anxiety of persons amongst the humbler classes of society to obtain intelligence from the seat of war, of relatives, sons, and brothers, has caused to spring up in this country a considerable number of war journals, which are published without a stamp. Those war journals have obtained an extensive circulation, and the proprietors of stamped papers complain, as well they may, of an unfair competition—that they, paying stamp duty, are required to compete with others who do not pay the stamp duty, and who are conveying intelligence of universal interest throughout the country. That is the position in which we now are. The Government, unfortunately, have laid down a rule, through the Board of Inland Revenue, that papers which are confined to one subject, and only deal with one subject, are not liable to the stamp. The consequence is, that numerous papers relating to a particular subject—such as police and sporting matters—are published without stamps; and those persons assert, as they confine themselves to the one subject of war, they also are entitled to publish without stamps. There is extreme difficulty in dealing with this question, for those persons demand that they should have a fair trial in the Court of Exchequer, in order that their legal rights should be ascertained, as to whether they should be entitled to publish without a stamp or not. Therefore, I beg to be excused for intruding at the present moment, but I feel that the war itself has made this a peculiarly urgent question. The Government have threatened the parties with summary proceedings, and have endeavoured to protect the stamped press as best they can against this competition; but I fear that any hope of that kind to give official protection is quite vain, and that those papers, from the enormous interest that is felt in the news from the seat of war, will spring up from day to day. As the Government have got a measure prepared, as I am informed—for I was told a long time ago it was in a state of preparation—I call most emphatically upon the right hon. Gentleman to bring in the Bill, and relieve the press of the country from the competition to which they are subject from the unsatisfactory state of the law. I must remind the right hon. Gentleman that the House of Commons, last Session, by a unanimous Resolution, declared that the law was ill-defined and unequally enforced, and demanded the consideration of Parliament. If it demanded the attention of Parliament, then, in the opinion of the House, it now demands it more; and I ask respectfully the Government to lose no time in settling this important question.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: What I have to say in answer to the question of the right hon. Gentleman shall be said in a very few words. The Government feel as strongly as the right hon. Gentleman can urge the obligation incumbent upon them in consequence of a Resolution which, without a division, was adopted by the House during the summer. A pledge was given by the Government, before the close of the Session, that the subject, which is one of considerable difficulty in detail, should have their best consideration. They have done their best to redeem that pledge, and have likewise thought it to be their duty to avail themselves of the powers conferred on them by the present law for the purpose of preventing infractions and violations of that law, which were likely to interfere with the collection of the revenue. I do not understand the right hon. Gentleman to object to the steps that have been taken, but that he merely refers to them as illustrative of the disadvantages and inconveniences attending the present state of things. There is no dispute between us regarding those disadvantages and inconveniences, and we are endeavouring to frame a measure to meet them in the best way we can. The right hon. Gentleman thinks that measure should be introduced at the present moment; but in that view of the right hon. Gentleman we are not prepared to concur. It is very true that Parliament has met for the performance of certain business, but it is not the intention of the Government to press upon the consideration of the House any measure of importance, with the exception of two measures, to which my noble Friend (Lord John Russell) has referred. It is obvious, with regard to a question of this kind, that we should not lay a Bill upon the table of the House until we have the prospect of being able to pass that Bill through its stages, and take the definite judgment of the House upon it. Our opinion is, that we could not do justice to any such Bill at this moment. The time the House is likely to sit will not enable us to pass the Bill under any circumstances we can contemplate as probable; and it would be inconvenient to introduce the Bill and leave it for consideration until after the recess, when Parliament shall meet after Christmas. I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that, so far as the Government is concerned, they will expect even from him an admission that they have done their best to redeem the pledge they have given.

QUEEN'S SPEECH—SUPPLY.

THE QUEEN'S Speech *considered :*—Motion " That a Supply be granted to Her Majesty,"

Committee thereupon *To-morrow.*

THE MILITIA BILL.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON moved the second reading of the Militia Bill.

COLONEL SIBTHORP said, he would be the last Member of the House, particularly as an old soldier, who would endeavour to raise any impediment or delay to this measure; but having carefully examined the Bill introduced by the noble Lord, and having given it, he hoped, an impartial consideration, the noble Lord must pardon him for saying that, situated as he was, there were certain matters of detail in that Bill to which he thought it was his duty as commanding a regiment of militia to call the attention of the noble Lord, before he gave that sanction and approval to the measure which he desired to give to it. There might be some persons, for instance, who would object to their loss of time if they were sent to Malta or any other place for a lengthened period; and there might be also married men, with large families, who would also object to going abroad under such circumstances. He trusted, therefore, that no imputation would be permitted to rest on these persons, if when asked to volunteer for duty at Malta or Corfu, they preferred to remain as militiamen in this country. He (Colonel Sibthorp) was prepared to do his duty as a soldier and a citizen, and he hoped the noble Lord would, in Committee, or at some other stage of the measure, direct his attention to the points to which he had referred.

LORD LOVAINE said, he should not think of interposing any obstacle in the way of measures intended on behalf of the gallant army now fighting our battles in the East. He, however, entertained great objections to the present measure; and, first, he believed that immediately these militia regiments were sent abroad, the recruiting for that service would be most seriously checked. But his great objection was, that a force meant merely for the internal defence of the country would, according to the provisions of the Bill, be greatly diminished. Indeed, to such an extent was he influenced by the gravity of these considerations that it was his intention to have moved that the second reading of the Bill be postponed until that day six months. Still, if the noble Lord would give an assurance that on volunteers offering for foreign service the militia force at home would be again recruited to its proper standard by the enlistment of fresh recruits, so that the internal defence of the country would be maintained, he would be willing to allow the Bill to pass without any further opposition.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON said, that according to the Bill, either whole regiments, or portions of regiments, which volunteered for service abroad would remain the militia of the counties to which they belonged, and it was not intended to raise another body of men in the respective counties equal to the number so volunteering. These militiamen would still continue part of the militia of the country, and when their services abroad ceased, and they returned, they would fall back to their condition of part of the militia. He wished to make an observation on a point raised by a noble Friend of his on a former day, who desired it to be clearly understood that officers of the militia who might not volunteer their services under the present Bill should not be liable to any imputation of a want of spirit or proper sense of the duty they owed to their country. He quite agreed with his noble Friend, and wished it to be most distinctly understood that the Government were perfectly aware that a great many persons of rank and property, who had duties of a social description to perform in this country, and whose absence from the country would on that account be a very great public inconvenience, had handsomely entered into the militia chiefly for the purposes of giving that service the countenance and support which their local influence and connections might carry with them. Those were not the description of officers whom the Government wished to see serving abroad. They were, many of them, far more usefully engaged in performing those duties which belonged to their situation in this country than they could be by mounting guard or commanding a regiment or portion of a regiment in garrison abroad; and, therefore, it could not be too distinctly understood that, while, on the one hand, no imputation whatever could be cast on officers of that class who should not volunteer their services for garrison duty under the present Bill, so, on the other hand, should any officers of such a class volunteer their services, and, on the comparison of candidates for foreign service, should their services not be accepted by the Government, they must not consider it any disparagement of themselves to see other persons in a different position preferred. He said this because there happened to be in the militia a number of men who had belonged to the Army, and had had great experience as military men. Now, these would evidently be officers most useful with respect to the services which the militia might volunteer to perform abroad; and, therefore, he entirely concurred in the hope expressed by his noble Friend that it might be clearly understood that the present Bill was not meant to extort offers of service from persons who had entered the militia with totally different views, and for purposes purely connected with their position at home. The House would see also that, with respect to privates, it was most distinctly enacted, as part of the Bill, that no man should be forced to serve abroad. If a man should serve abroad, it must be by his own free consent, and for this purpose each individual would make a fresh engagement, so that he could not, against his will, be involved in the necessity of leaving the country with his regiment, even if the greater portion of it should volunteer to serve abroad.

Bill read 2°.

On the Motion that the Bill be committed *To-morrow*,

Mr. DISRAELI, feeling that this was a measure of the very greatest importance, and one which demanded the greatest attention, would appeal to the noble Lord to postpone the committal of the Bill until Monday, in order to allow of colonels of regiments, and others competent to form an opinion, making whatever suggestions they deemed necessary in reference to the provisions of the Bill. He confessed he himself entertained the very gravest apprehensions as to the measure, believing that it would strike a fatal blow against the existence of the militia force; for though the Government might, in the first instance, get a larger supply of men in a short space of time than they could do in the ordinary course of enlistment for the regular army, yet the result, in the long run, would be unfavourable, because it would check, or even terminate, that readiness which prevailed, on the part of the people, to enlist voluntarily into the militia, which had been so great a support to the Government. The measure of the Government, in his opinion, was at present wholly unnecessary, and could not be justified until the Government had fully exhausted the natural resources of the country. In having recourse to such a proceeding it might be said Government was expending its capital instead of its interest; and he would, therefore, earnestly hope that in Committee the Bill would be so amended and modified as might serve to mitigate the evils which he dreaded. If, therefore, the noble Lord—who, it was evident from the not very exuberant programme of public business, as announced that evening, would have ample time for the purpose—would consider the subject, and agree to postpone the further progress of the Bill until Monday, he believed the country would feel no surprise at such a result, while it would be passed in ample time. He knew it might be said that no evil could accrue under this measure, because no individual could be sent abroad except by his concurrence; but although formally and legally that might be the case, all knew that, practically, it was not so; for the appeal would be made to a great body of men, many of whom would not have the strength of mind to refuse it. Now, he knew himself that one of the greatest difficulties experienced in enlisting for the militia arose from the alarm felt by the female relatives of the peasantry at the act of enlistment—they feared that it might lead to the recruits being first carried out of the county, and then sent abroad. That alarm, however, had been in a great degree dissipated by the assurances given to them by persons of influence connected with the force, but he feared it would be revived by the present Bill, and he would venture to warn the Government that if they got the hearth of the cottage against them they would find obstacles thrown in their way that would most severely peril their future operations; and although he was not prepared to oppose any measure brought forward at an emergency like the present, he could not refrain from expressing his regret at the resolution of the Government. But, with regard to this measure for transferring the services of the militia to foreign garrisons, and also with regard to the other measure to which the noble Lord had referred—that for the enlistment of foreigners in Her Majesty's service—he must say he could not but regret that, in the first year of the war, the country should appear to be obliged to have recourse to measures which he believed ought only to be had recourse to when they had approached the last extreme of its resources. He could not think that, with the population of this country, with the high spirit by which it was animated, and with the cheerful feeling with which all classes had clustered round the Throne to support Her Majesty in the great war in which she was engaged —he could not think it was necessary as yet to have recourse to the measure they announced so soon. But, although he entertained strong feelings upon the subject, still, knowing the responsibility which every person must incur by resisting a measure of this kind, he would be content for the present with an assurance from the noble Lord that the Committee on the Bill would be postponed until Monday.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL said, he did not deny the general justice of the right hon. Gentleman's observations as to a volunteer militia, and as to the proposal that men who had volunteered originally for the purpose of defending the United Kingdom should be sent abroad to keep the garrisons of any of our colonial or foreign possessions. But he thought the right hon. Gentleman wrong when he said that, although there might be an emergency which would justify the Government in calling upon them for this service, he should expect that emergency rather to occur at the latter end of the war than at the beginning. The case was directly the reverse. He would not enter into the question whether our peace establishment was too large; at all events, everybody would agree that it was a peace establishment. With that peace establishment we could not have, in the first year of the war, a very great army. It was very easy to say that we had a population of 28,000,000 or 30,000,000; but we could not immediately convert that population into soldiers. They required a certain time to be exercised, trained, and drilled, so as to be efficient soldiers. Besides that, we had not the means possessed by the great nations of the Continent of resorting to a conscription, and raising 100,000 or 150,000 men in a single year. We had a volunteer system of enlisting for the line; and although it was quite true that in the course of last summer Parliament had voted the number of men that Government asked with a readiness and a patriotism to which he had always borne willing testimony, yet it did not follow that the 40,000 extra men voted could be rendered efficient for the purposes of war in the course of a single year. On the contrary, during three or four months of summer the volunteering went on at the rate of 450 or 500 in a week; and that was not more than double the number sufficient to replace the ordinary casualties in time of peace. Therefore, it would be much easier at the end of three years of war to have a large army on foreign service, and at the same time to occupy our garrisons, than in the first year. It was in consequence of the operations that were thought necessary in the first year of the war that our army was found insufficient to perform those operations, and at the same time to furnish all our garrisons. Therefore, the emergency had occurred now. He had no doubt that at the end of no very long time we should find our army so increased that no measure of this kind would be necessary, and the regiments of militia might then return to this country. He begged the right hon. Gentleman to pay attention to this circumstance, that it really was in the first year of the war that the pressure was so great; we should have a sufficient number of men hereafter. He wished the House to remember that we were now attempting to do what we had never done in previous wars. Looking back at the two last great wars, he found that it was not until 1799 or 1800—having been at war from 1793—that we could have a regular force that was at all formidable to an enemy; and in the following war, which commenced in 1803, it was not until 1808 or 1809 that the same thing occurred. We were now attempting to do that which, in fact, had not been done in the first year of any great war. With respect to the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman, if it was the wish of the House rather to take the Committee on Monday than to-morrow, in order to afford time for consideration, he should readily agree to that proposal, provided it were understood that when the House went into Committee and the provisions of the clauses were settled, there should be a readiness to proceed with the Bill in its future stages, so that it might speedily go to the other House.

Mr. ADDERLEY was anxious to know whether it was the intention of Government to send the militia to far distant colonies, such as Canada, the Cape, and Australia? He thought such a step would be looked upon by the Colonies as a mark of distrust on the part of the mother country, especially by Canada, which had an efficient militia of her own. He wished to know whether Her Majesty's Ministers had not received an assurance from the Government of Canada, that not only were the people of that colony willing to occupy their own garrisons, but likewise, that they were willing to contribute reinforcements? For if that was true, he thought the number of men required by our Government was overrated, while the resources of the country were underrated. He hoped, also, the right hon. Baronet the Secretary for the Colonies would inform the House as to the sum of 20,000*l.* recently voted by the Canadian Legislature in aid of the Patriotic Fund; and whether, in connection with that most encouraging and gratifying expression of the willingness of the colonists to co-operate in the present struggle of England, the still more important assurance to which he had just referred had not also been received? In the face of such an assurance, he believed it would be an insult to the people of Canada to attempt to occupy their country with English militia regiments, while they ought never to have recourse to a Foreign Enlistment Bill until it was seen what reinforcements might be sent us from the Colonies, whose loyal attachment to the mother country was well known.

Sir GEORGE GREY said, the hon. Gentleman had totally misapprehended the object and intent of this Bill, if he thought it was founded in the slightest doubt of the loyal feeling that existed throughout the Colonies to the British Crown, and their attachment to this country. He was happy to assure him that that loyalty to the Crown and attachment to this country and its institutions had been manifested in many of the most important British colonies, since the declaration of war with Russia, in a manner the most gratifying. He had only abstained from laying on the table of the House the information received from Canada, because it had not reached him in any official form; and, indeed, a reference to the proceedings of the Legislature of Canada showed that the Council had not yet concurred (though he had no doubt they would do so) with the expression of opinion that had been made by the Assembly. The fact was, an Address had been agreed to by the Assembly and sent up for the concurrence of the Council, and he had no doubt he should soon hear of their concurrence, intimating their readiness to place 20,000*l.* at the disposal of this country, not exactly in aid of the Patriotic Fund, but for the relief of the widows and orphans of the allied forces, English and French, engaged in the war. No distinct offer had been made of men to serve in the British army; but in the course of the debates in the Assembly, an intimation was certainly made by a Member of that House, and though the time might not yet have arrived, they felt that the time might come when their desire to see the country successful in the war might induce them not to limit their offers of assistance of money, but to tender even their lives and services in our support. But no offer of that kind had yet been made. Addresses of the most loyal and gratifying character had also been recently received from Van Diemen's Land and South Australia, accompanied with 2,000*l.* from the former colony, to be applied to the same general objects. In South Australia the subscription, which was yet in progress, amounted to 3,900*l.*; and the Governor intimated that it would be transmitted as soon as it was complete. Other colonies had transmitted messages, expressing their cordial sympathy with this country in the struggle in which it was engaged, and their sincere wish to see our arms successful. With whatever latitude the Bill might be worded, it certainly was not contemplated that the services of militia regiments should be employed in Canada, or any of those distant colonies. It was intended to send them to those possessions of the Crown which might be more strictly denominated garrisons than colonies. Exigencies might arise rendering it necessary to send the militia abroad, but that was not at all in contemplation at present; and, with regard to Canada, there was no necessity at all for sending militia there, as they had taken means for raising a militia of their own, and they were as competent to do that, and to discharge the duties of troops as efficiently as any regiments of the line or militia that might be sent there. He should have great pleasure in laying on the table of the House copies of any Addresses that might be received.

Mr. SMYTH wished to know if the officers of militia regiments thus sent out of the country were to have army rank?

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT said, the Bill did not give army rank to militia officers. The militia regiments certainly deserved all the praise that could be given them for the manner in which they had behaved since they had been embodied; and he was glad to take that opportunity of expressing its thanks to their colonels, who had in the most liberal manner given every assistance to the Government to promote the recruiting of the Army from their ranks. And those who had been in the command of regiments, knowing the trouble which it took to bring men to a state of efficiency, could estimate the sacrifice thus made. But in estimating the services of the militia regiments they must take care not to depreciate those of the regular army. If they were to confer army rank upon all the officers of those militia regiments who might be sent to the Mediterranean, for instance—a service which could not be put in comparison with that at the seat of war—they would be putting militia officers over the heads of those in the regular army—a proceeding which would lead to very great dissatisfaction, founded upon a considerable amount of injustice. He spoke not of what the country might do in a last struggle in order to get men, when an emergency might justify almost any course; but, in the service contemplated by this Bill, it would not be just to the officers of the Army to allow the officers of the militia to obtain rank over their heads. With regard to pensions, by the Bill as at present drawn all officers of militia receiving wounds would receive pensions. The widow of any officer who was killed would

also receive a pension, but it would be better to omit any provision to that effect from the Bill; not, however, in order to deprive the widows of militia officers of their security for their pensions, but simply because the same object could be attained by means of a Queen's warrant. In the Army the pensions were given by warrant, and not by Act of Parliament, and, therefore, to grant pensions in the case of the militia by the machinery of an Act of Parliament would be to give militia officers a vested right in their pensions, which was denied to the Army. The case stood thus:—The widow of an officer in the Army received a pension, but she received it subject to the condition of good conduct; and the widow of an officer who had been repudiated by her husband of gross misconduct during his lifetime would not, under the army regulations, be entitled to a pension. In other ways also pensions were forfeited by misconduct. Now, if such pensions were to be given by Act of Parliament, and not by Queen's warrant, those who received them would enjoy them as a kind of freehold over which no control could be exercised. It would, therefore, be better that militia pensions should be given by Queen's warrant, and not by Act of Parliament. Of course, length of service carried a pension with it in the militia as well as in the regular army, but half-pay followed army rank, and was not given excepting after twenty-one years' service; and, therefore, he thought that the question of half-pay for militia officers could not be entertained.

Lord HOTHAM said, he did not mean to say a word upon the question now put, because he thought it would be more proper to discuss it in Committee. But still, as the question was raised in reference to the rank proposed to be given to militia officers, and as the right hon. Gentleman had given an answer to it, he (Lord Hotham) gave notice when the Bill went into Committee, that he would ask the noble Lord the Secretary for the Home Department or the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War, to state how it was proposed to deal with the case of militia officers now on half-pay sent into large garrisons abroad. He would ask, in the case of officers of militia regiments, what rank Government intended to give to such when placed in the position to which he had referred?

Bill *committed* for *Monday* next.

House adjourned at a quarter before Seven o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Friday, December 15, 1854.

Minutes.] *Took the Oaths.*—The Bishop of Kilmore, Elphin, and Ardagh.

VOTE OF THANKS TO THE ARMY AND NAVY IN THE CRIMEA.

The Duke of NEWCASTLE: My Lords, I rise for the purpose of performing a duty which, though difficult, is, nevertheless, of a most grateful character—to move that your Lordships should agree to Resolutions which can by no possibility excite discordant feelings, but which, on the contrary, must, I am certain, assuage for the time every feeling of party, and must combine in entire unanimity all noble Peers on either side of the House. Fortunately for me in the performance of this task, no eloquence is needed to induce your Lordships to agree to these Resolutions. They must, I am sure, under existing circumstances, appeal directly to the hearts and feelings of all Englishmen—to those without as to those within these walls. My Lords, I feel that any elaborate praises, however adorned with oratorical power and chastened by the purest taste, would be less calculated to influence your Lordships' minds on an occasion like the present than the simplest record of the deeds done and the services rendered which we now seek to reward. On former occasions, when it has been the duty of Ministers of the Crown to move the Thanks of Parliament for the services of the Army and Navy of England, similar to those which I am about to lay before your Lordships, it has been customary to give some lengthened detail of the operations which had taken place, and to lay before the House a statement of the services which had entitled the army or the navy to this favour at your Lordships' hands. On the present occasion, I feel that I should only be uselessly trespassing on your Lordships' time if I were to attempt to enter into any such detail. The circumstances on this occasion are very different from those which existed on former occasions. In the first place, the deeds to which I am about to refer were performed at a time when Parliament was not sitting. Moreover, at the present time, those deeds have been recorded in a manner unknown to us in former days, and in terms so striking and so graphic, through the medium of gentlemen who have been eyewitnesses of them, that it would be the merest affectation in me were I to attempt to say anything new, or to pretend to give your Lordships information upon actions and events which are known in every circle, and are discussed in every cottage throughout the country. My Lords, I have said that on this occasion I believe every feeling of party will for a period be assuaged. Let me only further say, that if noble Lords are still pleased to impute any blame to the Government, for not having assisted Lord Raglan and his army with sufficient means, then, if such be the case, so much more must you accord your praise to that army. I will not say more upon that subject, but your Lordships must feel that to any extent to which you can blame the Government to so much the greater extent must you praise the army. It has always been considered that a Vote of Thanks to our gallant soldiers and sailors is the highest reward which it is in the power of Parliament to bestow. It has always been looked upon as the greatest incentive to the exertions of the officers and the valour of the men. It has always been looked upon by the army as not only a proof of the gratitude of Parliament for the actions performed, but as an expression of the opinion of Parliament that they had the power of rendering still further services—that it had as much a view to the future as it was a record of gratitude for the past.

My Lords, it is not for me, at this moment, to discuss an aphorism which has become so trite and prevalent as to be generally accepted, that England is not a military nation; but in this I am sure your Lordships will agree with me, that the glory acquired by our armies has ever been most dear to the people of England, and has always elicited the warmest expressions of gratitude from the Parliament of the country—from your Lordships as well as from the representatives of the people. But, so far as your Lordships' House is concerned, I feel you must entertain still greater pride and pleasure on this occasion when he who is in command of these armies—he who has won this great renown—is a Member of this House, one whom we have been in the habit of seeing among us, and one whom I am certain your Lordships will all agree with me in heartily wishing that we may again see among us on a future day, safe, in health, and enjoying that increased renown which he has so justly won. My Lords, I consider that Lord Raglan deserves the thanks and approbation of the country, not merely for the military actions he has performed in the Crimea, but for the course of conduct which he has pursued from the first moment of his leaving England. I consider that the proper and judicious arrangements which he made at Constantinople and at Varna—that the preparations he made subsequently for the invasion of the Crimea—are as deserving of approbation as even his great military successes. I believe that a man of weaker mind than Lord Raglan, of less heroic courage, might well, under the circumstances of the moment, have hesitated to undertake that great expedition. I believe that a man of less power of mind, of less moral courage than Lord Raglan, might well have been deterred by the circumstances of the time, by the disease which prevailed in the army, by various events, which might almost have justified him in exercising that discretion which, of course, no Government could avoid placing in a Commander in Chief, and have declined or hesitated to enter upon that great and important expedition. My Lords, I said on a former occasion, that I considered it would be almost an insult to Lord Raglan to speak of his personal courage; but I say now, that if there is any point upon which we should be justified in blaming Lord Raglan, it is the great indifference which on two occasions he has shown for his own personal safety—carried, perhaps, to an improper length. The way in which he on both these occasions exposed himself in the midst of a storm of bullets and under the hottest fire, is undoubtedly a proof of his calm and resolute character, which was certainly most admirable, but which might possibly have deprived us of his valuable services. My Lords, one of the secrets of Lord Raglan's success I believe to be the generous reliance which on all occasions he has placed in his officers, his colleagues, and his soldiers; and, let me add, without disrespect to him, in himself. My Lords, I have been informed—though assuredly not by Lord Raglan himself, for, if there is one characteristic of that eminent man more remarkable than another, it is his singular modesty and avoidance of every topic which might attract fame or reputation to himself—I have heard from others that an event occurred at the battle of the Alma, which, I will not say turned the fate of the day, but had it not been for Lord Raglan's prescience and skill, the result of the battle might have been different. Upon examining the position of the Russian right, he despatched an officer to bring up two guns, which were placed in position to scatter the reserves of the Russians, and this prevented an attack on the left, which might have been attended, had a less skilful general been in command, with disastrous consequences. I say that the modesty which Lord Raglan has evinced in those despatches which have been published, and which have been read by your Lordships, shows him a worthy disciple of that great man whose simplicity and modesty are part of the records of our history. It is not merely the greatness of his military successes which entitles him to the thanks of Parliament, but in no less degree the generous and noble spirit—the moral courage which he has evinced on all occasions, whether on the field or in the camp. Moreover, the parental tenderness manifested towards the officers and men under his command is the invariable characteristic of a great and distinguished man. My Lords, if I say nothing further in reference to Lord Raglan, you will attribute it to the reason I have assigned—that eulogy is as needless from my lips as it is to your ears.

Following the precedents of former occasions, I shall ask your Lordships to vote Thanks to the Generals and Officers under Lord Raglan's command—naming, as is usual, all generals, not merely veterans like Sir John Burgoyne and Sir George Brown, two men whom we all know to have advanced to that period of life which, as the Scripture tells us, is the term of most of us—one of whom has passed that period, and is entitled to that repose from labour which his years in most men would absolutely require. To them I shall ask your Lordships to give your Thanks for their distinguished services. In the next place, to the illustrious Prince, also a Member of this House, who has on this occasion endeared, if it were possible, still more to the people of this country the family to which he belongs, and who has proved that the ancient valour of his race has not degenerated in the present day. I am confident your Lordships will rejoice—as I know Her Majesty does—that a Member of Her House has been entitled to share in the toils, the difficulties, the privations, as well as in the hard-won glory of the British army. My Lords, I will ask you further to vote Thanks to General Sir De Lacy Evans; and here I must allude to what I shall ever feel to be one of the noblest acts of gallantry which ever distinguished a veteran general. My Lords, this officer had been compelled by illness to retire from his command, and was on board ship in the harbour of Balaklava. Your Lordships know how rapidly and suddenly the battle of Inkerman commenced. At the first sound of artillery, he hastened on shore, weak, and scarcely able to sit on his horse. He arrived on the scene of action, where he found his division engaged under the command of his brigadier, and most nobly and gallantly he stayed to assist him, acting, I may say, as his aide-de-camp, remaining at his side, assisting him by his advice rather than that, by assuming his own position at the head of his division, he should prevent General Pennefather from reaping the rewards and the honours of the day. I think your Lordships will agree with me that this is one of the most honourable traits which ever distinguished a British General. I shall further ask you to vote Thanks to all the Generals and Officers, from the highest to the lowest, from the General at the head of a division down to those noble youths, who, not yet arrived at years of maturity, stepped forth one after another to seize the colours riddled with shot from the hands of their fallen brother ensigns, and carried them triumphantly to the heights of Alma.

My Lords, we shall not stop here. We shall, I am sure, with equal unanimity, vote our Thanks to the Non-commissioned Officers and Soldiers of that gallant army. I alluded the other evening to the encouragement which it is proposed to give, by way of promotion, to that portion of the army, and your Lordships appeared to signify your approval of that course. We know how difficult it is, on many occasions, to reward individual private soldiers, but they deserve our warm and hearty thanks. Perhaps in no battles recorded in the history of this country did the private soldiers more justly entitle themselves to the Thanks of Parliament than at those which have recently occurred. Inkerman, especially, may be called, as I have heard it designated, "the soldiers' battle." That was an action in which no great military strategy could be displayed; it was one of those fierce hand-to-hand encounters which remind us of the battles of which we read in classic times; it was a contest in which the individual bravery, perseverance, and fortitude of each single soldier were brought most severely to the test, and right well did they discharge their duty. Whether you look to the individual bravery displayed by our men upon that occasion—whether you look to their collective discipline—whether you look to the power of mind over matter, if I may use the expression, which enabled every man on that day to overcome, by a paramount sense of public duty, almost every human feeling, every regard for self, and even that dread of death which is natural to every human being—in whatever aspect you view the conduct of our troops, it is impossible not to admire and to honour every man who fought at Inkerman. My Lords, whether you contemplate the storming of the heights of Alma, or the defence of Inkerman—two battles which present as remarkable a contrast, perhaps, as any that are recorded in history—you must recollect that the British troops by whom they were fought were men fresh from this country, the greater part of whom, as was said by a noble Earl the other night, had never before heard a shot fired in anger; but I venture to say that, either upon the one occasion or the other, you must admit that no veteran troops, however practised in arms, however enured to contest, ever fought better, ever more distinguished themselves, or maintained the honour of their country. And let me here observe that it was no despicable enemy against whom they had to contend, for undoubtedly, from whatever cause, whether from the excitement of fanaticism, or from some other influence, no men ever fought with greater desperation than did the Russians at Inkerman. I believe, my Lords, that British troops never had to contend against more fearful odds than those which on that day they encountered and overcame.

My Lords, I know that in bringing forward a Motion like the present I am bound to avoid anything like controversy; but I may be pardoned if I express some regret that a noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough) should last night have rather demurred to the opinion I expressed as to the alteration and improvement which had taken place in the conduct of the British troops. I will not enter further into that question upon the present occasion than to say, that I must repeat, in the strongest and most emphatic terms, the praise which I believe to be most justly due to our troops for their moral conduct as well as their distinguished bravery. There is a test of a soldier's moral conduct, not merely in a town which has been captured, but also in encampment in a country not his own; and the conduct of our men in Bulgaria, among a native population, alien to them in religion and in habits, was as creditable to them as their bravery in the field of battle. At one period of my life, I suppose like every one of your Lordships, I took an interest in reading the records of the great battles in which the troops of this country had been engaged, but I cannot bring to mind any one that, in my own judgment, surpassed those which we are now considering. I have the pleasure of stating to your Lordships that these are the sentiments of the Sovereign, as I am confident they are those of your Lordships, and Her Majesty has been pleased to signify Her approval of the conduct of the army by conferring medals upon the whole of the soldiers and officers who were engaged on those eventful days. The medal is to be inscribed with the word "Crimea," and, following what I think your Lordships will agree with me are good precedents in such cases, clasps are also to be bestowed for the two great battles of Alma and Inkerman. Her Majesty has further been pleased to order that the names of those battles shall in future be inscribed upon the colours, which are already crowded with similar records of previous victories, of our regiments which were engaged on those glorious days.

My Lords, it is further my duty to ask you to pass a Vote of Thanks to the naval officers and men, who, as I stated two nights ago, have evinced upon all occasions the greatest devotion, and the frankest and most honourable determination to assist the sister service—the army—to the utmost extent of their ability. I know that none feel more than Lord Raglan and the soldiers under his command, how deeply the army, and, of course, this country, is indebted to the services of the navy during the recent operations. Having touched upon these services on a previous occasion, I will not dwell further upon them, but shall merely say, I propose that to the Officers and Seamen of the Navy, and to the Officers and Men of the Marines, your Lordships shall confer the expression of your Thanks.

My Lords, there are two other services which I believe it has never been usual to include in Votes of Thanks on these occasions; I do not propose to ask your Lordships to depart from precedents, but I cannot forbear from a passing remark upon the exertions of a large body of seamen who, though not engaged in Her Majesty's service, have most zealously performed their duties in this great undertaking—I allude to the officers and men of the large transport service now at the disposal of the army. I can assure your Lordships that their exertions have been indefatigable and of the most valuable description, and they deserve the warmest acknowledgments of Parliament and of the country. The other body of men to whom I allude are the medical officers of the army. I speak not now, of course, of the medical organisation, upon which so much was said the other night; but I must state, in justice to an honourable profession, that never were greater exertions made by any body of men—never was more humanity evinced—never more complete devotedness to their duties, than by the medical officers of the British army in the Crimea. To one of these men I must allude. I will ask your Lordships to consider for one moment the services performed by such a man as Dr. Thomson. He was left, under circumstances of the most painful nature, upon the field of battle of the Alma, with not another person to assist him, not to attend to the wounded of his own army, all of whom had been removed, but to a large number of Russian wounded, many of whom—persuaded that an Englishman was little less than a devil—were prepared to murder any individual who might seek to render them succour and assistance. Among such men was Dr. Thomson left alone; he bound the wounds of some hundreds of these poor Russian soldiers at the great danger of his life, but nevertheless he escaped. He returned to his duties in his own army; but it pleased Providence to remove him from his sphere of usefulness two or three days subsequently. His death was occasioned by the immense exertions he had made and a disease which he had brought on by his extraordinary sacrifices and toils. I must say, my Lords, that if it has not been usual for Parliament to thank such men as these, at least it is not wrong for a Minister of the Crown to stand up in this House and express his admiration at such conduct.

I am about, nevertheless, upon this occasion, to ask your Lordships to depart somewhat from precedent. We are called upon to vote our thanks to the men who have served their country; but I regret to say that a large body of those who left this country, high in expectation and confident of success, are not now within the reach of our mortal thanks. Their names, therefore, are not in the list which I am about to submit to your Lordships, but I am confident that they are not forgotten. With all our triumphs sorrow is inevitably mingled; and when I look round upon your Lordships at this moment, I see that there are some who bear the outward semblance of that grief which preys upon their inmost hearts for the losses they have sustained. I think, then, your Lordships will not deem it unbecoming if, upon this occasion, departing from the dry rule of precedent, we should express our regret at the loss of those noble men, and our condolence with their relatives. I propose merely to ask your Lordships so to do. I shall not in that Resolution include any names; but it is impossible not to recollect the name of one whom, perhaps, above all others, the country most deeply mourns. My Lords, I had the happiness to become acquainted with that gallant and noble man, Sir George Cathcart, by official communications before I ever saw him personally; and from the official correspondence which I held with him for a year and a half, while he was Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, I must say that I never was more struck with the ability, the honour, and the devotedness of any man. In common with the rest of those who were acquainted with him, I confidently looked forward to the time when he would take a position in the British army of the highest value to the country, and to that Sovereign who, as much as any one of us, regrets his death. He and his companions sleep on the bleak hills of a foreign coast, but I am confident their names will live for ever, not unhonoured, in the sad and grateful remembrance of the people as well as in the military records of this country.

I rejoice, my Lords, that upon this occasion we are enabled to extend our Votes of Thanks beyond their usual bounds. We have had during this contest an ally such as it has rarely been our good fortune to possess in any former war, and I propose to your Lordships that we should vote Thanks to that gallant army which has shared with ours its labours and its triumphs. I need scarcely remind your Lordships of that eminent man who undertook the command at the commencement of the operations—though, under the circumstances of the case, of course, I cannot name him in the Vote—or of the distinguished General who so worthily succeeded him in command of the French army. Marshal St. Arnaud, as is well known, left his country to assume the command of the French army with the conviction that he had a mortal malady upon him, and that, in all probability, it was impossible for him to return alive to his own country. He showed the greatest devotion to the service of the army, and I have it repeatedly in private letters from Lord Raglan, that up to the moment of his death the greatest possible harmony and confidence existed between his Lordship and that gallant officer. In fact, Marshal St. Arnaud and Lord Raglan might have been brought up in the same service, and have been serving in the same army, so far as their communications were concerned. Marshal St. Arnaud left Varna with the French and English forces on the 7th of September. In the course of the short voyage to the opposite coast he became so seriously ill, that the officer who had been sent by Lord Raglan to communicate with him, reported that he believed it to be impossible that the Marshal could ever land on the shores of the Crimea. He, nevertheless, rallied for a time; he landed, he mounted his horse, and, though I believe that repeatedly during the battle of the Alma he was obliged from intense suffering to dismount, he gallantly remained at his post, and, as you know, died almost in the hour of victory. He was succeeded in command by General Canrobert, whose frank and noble conduct has as greatly endeared him to the British army as to Lord Raglan and the British officers. They all respect his military abilities—they admire him as a soldier—they regard him as a man. Let me also add, though it may be uncommon to mention in a Vote of Thanks an officer second in command, that to General Bosquet, second in command of the French army, a tribute of admiration is due. General Bosquet has been brought into more especial contact with our troops; he has served with the English forces upon the right, and I can state —from information derived from the most authentic sources—that our troops look upon him almost as if he were a general in their own army, and I believe they would be as ready to follow him to victory as they would be to follow any general who holds the Commission of the Queen. Such has already become the feeling of affection and of concord which subsists between the armies of the two countries. I would also add, that I propose to your Lordships to vote Thanks to the French navy, as I propose to do to our own navy, for the distinguished services they have rendered, and for the assistance they have afforded in all the operations of the war. The French army and the French navy, allied in the same efforts with ourselves, have, I rejoice to know, participated in the same triumphs; and I am confident your Lordships will feel your own emotions of enthusiasm are mingled with theirs, and will as heartily afford your thanks to these allied troops as to your own.

I feel, my Lords, how inadequately I have submitted these Resolutions to your Lordships; but I trust that lengthened remarks upon my part are not necessary upon a subject at once so grateful and so much in accordance with your Lordships' feelings and sympathies. Were it not that I am certain he is prepared to undertake the duty, I should invite the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) to second the Motion which I have had the honour to submit to your Lordships. It has been my fate, during the few years for which I have occupied a seat in this House, to be frequently in collision—*impar congressus*—with the noble Earl; but I feel certain that upon this occasion, we shall be as completely agreed as any two Peers on this side of the House. I invite—with confidence that it will be afforded—his fervid eloquence to strengthen my feeble voice in appealing to your Lordships to give this vote the sanction of your unanimous approval, and I am equally confident that you will, by a generous response, record your approbation and gratitude for the brilliant services rendered by the united armies, which have added fresh lustre to the military fame of England and France. The noble Duke concluded by moving the following Resolutions —

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente—

"That the Thanks of this House be given to Field Marshal The Right Honourable Lord Raglan, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, for the Energy and distinguished Ability with which he has conducted the Operations of Her Majesty's Forces in the Crimea, for the brilliant and decisive Victory obtained over the Enemy's Army on the Alma, and the signal Defeat of a Force of vastly superior Numbers on the Heights of Inkerman."

The Duke of Newcastle

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente—

"That the Thanks of this House be given to—

"Lieutenant-General Sir John Fox Burgoyne, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath;

"Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown, Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath;

"Lieutenant-General His Royal Highness The Duke of Cambridge, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter;

"Lieutenant-General Sir De Lacy Evans, Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath;

"Lieutenant-General Sir Richard England, Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath;

"Lieutenant-General The Earl of Lucan;

"Major-General The Earl of Cardigan;

"Brigadier-General, now Major-General, the Honourable James Yorke Scarlett;

"Major-General Henry John William Bentinck;

"Major-General Sir Colin Campbell, Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath;

"Major-General John Lysaght Pennefather, Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath;

"Major-General William John Codrington;

"Brigadier-General, now Major-General, Henry William Adams, Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath;

"Brigadier-General, now Major-General, Sir John Campbell, Baronet;

"Brigadier-General, now Major-General, George Buller, Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath;

"Brigadier-General, now Major-General, William Eyre, Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath;

"Brigadier-General, now Major-General, Arthur Wellesley Torrens;

"*Brigadier-General, now Major-General, Richard Airey, Quarter-Master-General;

"*Brigader-General, now Major-General, James Bucknall Bucknall Estcourt, Adjutant-General;

"And to the several other Officers, for their Zeal, Intrepidity, and distinguished Exertions in the several Actions in which Her Majesty's Forces have been engaged with the Enemy."

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente—

"That this House doth highly acknowledge the distinguished Discipline, Valour, and Exertions displayed by the Non-commissioned Officers and Soldiers of the Army under the Command of Field Marshal Lord Raglan in all the Operations in the Crimea; and that the same be signified to them by the Commanders of the several Corps, who are desired to thank them for their distinguished and gallant Behaviour."

Ordered—

"That the Lord Chancellor do communicate the said Resolutions to Field Marshal The Right Honourable Lord Raglan; and that he be requested by the Lord Chancellor to signify the same to—

"Lieutenant-General Sir John Fox Burgoyne,

"Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown,

"Lieutenant General His Royal Highness The Duke of Cambridge,

"Lieutenant-General Sir De Lacy Evans,

"Lieutenant-General Sir Richard England,

"Lieutenant-General The Earl of Lucan,

"Major-General The Earl of Cardigan,

"Brigadier-General, now Major-General, The Honourable James Yorke Scarlett,

"Major-General Henry John William Bentinck,

"Major-General Sir Colin Campbell,

"Major-General John Lysaght Pennefather,

"Major-General William John Codrington,

"Brigadier-General, now Major-General, Henry William Adams,

"Brigadier-General, now Major-General, Sir John Campbell, Baronet,

"Brigadier-General, now Major-General, George Buller,

"Brigadier-General, now Major-General, William Eyre,

"Brigadier-General, now Major-General, Arthur Wellesley Torrens,

"*Brigadier-General, now Major-General, Richard Airey,

"*Brigadier-General, now Major-General, James Bucknall Bucknall Estcourt,

"And to the several Officers who served in the Army under his Command."

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente—

"That the Thanks of this House be given to Vice-Admiral James Whitley Deans Dundas, Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, to Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, and to the several Captains and Officers in the Fleet under the Command of the said Vice-Admiral, and also to the Officers of the Navy and Marines employed on Shore in the Siege of Sebastopol, for their indefatigable Activity and Exertions in conveying Her Majesty's Land Forces to the Crimea, in effecting their Disembarkation, and in co-operating with them during the Siege of Sebastopol."

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente—

"That this House doth highly approve of and acknowledge the Services of *Rear-Admiral the Honourable Montague Stopford, Captain of the Fleet, of the Seamen and Marines on board the Ships under the Command of Vice-Admiral Dundas, and also of the Seamen and Marines employed on Shore in the Siege of Sebastopol, in their indefatigable Activity and Exertions in conveying Her Majesty's Land Forces to the Crimea, in effecting their Disembarkation, and in co-operating with them during the Siege of Sebastopol; and that the Captains of the several Ships do signify the same to their respective Crews, and do thank them for their praiseworthy and gallant Conduct."

Ordered—

"That The Lord Chancellor do communicate the said Resolutions to Vice-Admiral Dundas; and that he be requested by the Lord Chancellor to signify the same to Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, to *Rear-Admiral the Honourable Montague Stopford, and to the several Captains and other Officers referred to therein."

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente—

"That this House acknowledges with Admiration the distinguished Valour and Conduct of those who have perished during the present Struggle in the Service of their Country, and feels deep Sympathy with their Relatives and Friends."

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente—

"That the Thanks of this House be given to General Canrobert and the French Army for their gallant and successful Co-operation with Her Majesty's Land Forces in the Attack on the Enemy's Position at Alma, for their energetic and timely Assistance in repelling the Enemy at Inkerman, and for their distinguished Exertions in concert with Her Majesty's Troops in the Siege of Sebastopol; and that Field Marshal Lord Raglan be desired to convey to them the present Resolution."

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente—

"That the Thanks of this House be given to Admiral Hamelin and the French Navy for their cordial co-operation with Her Majesty's Fleet in conveying the Allied Forces to the Crimea, in effecting their Disembarkation, and in the Siege of Sebastopol; and that Vice-Admiral Dundas be desired to convey to them the present Resolution."

[* These names were ordered to be inserted in the Resolutions by Resolutions of the 18th December.]

The Earl of DERBY: My Lords, having upon former occasions taken an opportunity of expressing, feebly and inadequately indeed, but most sincerely and cordially, my deep sense of the debt of gratitude which this country owes to those gallant and distinguished men, of every rank, to whose efforts we have owed the great and brilliant success which has been achieved by our arms, I should not have thought it incumbent upon me to say a single word, nor should I have risen on this occasion, had it not been to give to the noble Duke and to your Lordships the most convincing proof of the entire unanimity of the House, by desiring—politically opposed as I am to Her Majesty's Government—to express on my own part, and for those noble Lords with whom I have the honour of being connected, our entire acquiescence in the Motion which the noble Duke has proposed. The noble Duke, in his appeal to me, has done injustice to the manner in which he has brought this subject under your Lordships' notice, for, in no lengthened address, he has most clearly, most simply, and with the truest eloquence—because it was the eloquence of his heart—enumerated with official authority those services for which he calls upon your Lordships to give, as I am sure you will give, the willing tribute of your Thanks. I feel, therefore, my Lords, that any appeal to me to add to the description and the statements of the noble Duke is one to which I could not respond without exposing myself to the charge of egregious presumption. I cordially concur, and I am sure your Lordships will concur, in the Thanks moved by the noble Duke to the distinguished officers whom he has mentioned, and to those whose names (from the impossibility of enumerating all who have done their best) he has of necessity omitted. I certainly shall not accept the invitation of the noble Duke to contrast the success which has been achieved by the army with the deficiencies that some may think existed in the means and appliances at their command. Their deeds require no such contrast; their achievements require no such adventitious colouring; and this is not an occasion on which, whatever may be my opinions, I should wish to recall the memory of such things. Let us be content on this occasion to do honour to the brilliancy of their achievements, and to record our tribute of sincere admiration and gratitude to those men who, under whatever difficulties, have so nobly maintained the honour of the British flag, and are still sustaining most gallantly the arduous struggle in which they are engaged. It fell naturally to the part of the noble Duke, in the situation which he occupies, to enumerate by name some of the most distinguished commanders and leaders of our army. I can speak with no such authority, and, indeed, it would be an act of invidious presumption on my part were I to refer to the performance of duties in the field, when all, from the highest to the lowest—from that gallant and distinguished officer who had long the honour and advantage of enjoying the intimacy and confidence of that great man the Duke of Wellington, and who has proved himself worthy of the school in which he learned his military duties—from that distinguished Prince of the Blood who has added a fresh title to his Royal birth in the self-sacrifices he has made in the service of his country, who has shared the soldiers' labours, privations, toils, and dangers—the latter even to a degree which may almost be considered imprudent—when all, from men occupying these distinguished stations, these high positions in the army and in social rank, connected even with the Royal family of this country, down to the very humblest individual who serves in the ranks, have been actuated by an equal desire to perform that which is the first object in the mind of every Englishman—to perform, unostentatiously indeed, but perseveringly, unhesitatingly, unflinchingly, their duty; all these, I doubt not, have been sustained and cheered in the hour of their greatest peril and privation, by the idea that those perils and privations would not be lost upon a grateful country, and that the admiration, at all events, if not the Thanks of their Sovereign, of Parliament, and of the country, would be freely accorded to men who had made such sacrifices and endured such privations. The navy, it is true, on this occasion have not had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves upon their own element by such active service as the army; but whatever it has been in their power to accomplish has been accomplished with a zeal, an activity, and an energy which will bear comparison with any former achievements of that gallant service. And when I speak of the achievements of the navy on their own element, I must not forget to mention, and to mention with satisfaction and with respect, the voluntary exertions of those gallant seamen and marines, not upon the sea, but in assisting their fellow-labourers and fellow-heroes of the army, by sustaining the toils and dangers of the land service. I believe the army will not be slow to acknowledge the debt of gratitude they owe to the marine artillery, and to our gallant seamen and marines, for the efficient aid which they have rendered. My Lords, the noble Duke has said that he thought he was about to take a somewhat unusual course in expressing the condolence and sympathy this House must feel with the surviving friends and relatives of those who have fallen gallantly in the service of their country. My Lords, in looking back upon the lamentable losses we have sustained, and the many melancholy gaps which have been made in our list of officers—many coming within our own observation—your Lordships cannot but feel that if it be an irregular course in such a case to mingle with our thanks and honours to the living our regret, our admiration, and our respect for the dead—surely, if that be a deviation from common practice, there is not a Member of your Lordships' House who will blame Her Majesty's Government for having given, in a matter in which our hearts are deeply engaged—perhaps more deeply even than in rendering honours to those who are still living to enjoy them—the expression of our sympathy to the relations of those who have fallen. My Lords, I am sure it will not be doubted that I concur most cordially with the noble Duke in the expression he has given to the feelings with which Her Majesty's Government have viewed and appreciated the honourable and noble support which has been given to the arms of this country by the troops, both military and naval, of our faithful Ally. I believe, my Lords, that we have had full reason, as we have had full reason before, and under very different circumstances, to appreciate the valour of the French troops and French seamen. We have never had an opportunity in which we were made more conscious of that valour, and more sensible of the importance and advantages of their services, than when, side by side, these two great nations have been carrying forward the operations of their arms in the prosecution of a just and honourable war to, I trust, an ultimate and glorious success. I rejoice that the noble Duke has taken this opportunity of doing justice not only to the memory of the late Commander in Chief of the French army —not only to that distinguished man who has succeeded to the command of the army, but to that General of the French army who has been brought into more immediate co-operation with the English troops, and whose gallant conduct and invaluable assistance, both at the Alma and Inkerman, have been so well and worthily appreciated by the British Army. In dealing with a Vote of Thanks to the French army and navy, and participating most cordially in honouring the services rendered by those forces, I cannot help expressing a doubt—I do it not as a matter of reproach, and, least of all, would I move or even suggest an Amendment—but I should be glad to hear from Her Majesty's Government if they have themselves considered whether there was any precedent in the history of this country for returning thanks to the troops of a foreign Prince. [The Duke of NEWCASTLE was understood to intimate that there was such a precedent.] It had occurred to me that the most becoming course would have been, in proposing the Vote of Thanks to the British Army, that we should recognise, on the part of Parliament and on the part of the country, the obligations we are under to our foreign allies; yet I felt that it might, perhaps, have the appearance of taking upon ourselves a position which did not properly belong to us, and of passing over the Sovereign, to whom those troops, both naval and military, owe their allegiance—the Vote of Parliament conveying Thanks to troops which owe allegiance to another Sovereign might appear to be an interference with the internal duty and allegiance of these troops to their own Sovereign, which, I am sure, would be the last thing Her Majesty's Government would wish. But I rejoice to find, whatever may have been my doubts, that there is any precedent for a course which I must, nevertheless, say appears to me somewhat anomalous and somewhat inconsistent in the relations between the two Powers—I rejoice to find that there have been precedents for such a course; and, that being the case, even the slight hesitation I might have felt, not as to the substance, but as to the form of the Motion, is removed, and I can cordially join in the Vote proposed to be given. I trust your Lordships and Her Majesty's Government will not think that my having noticed this point of form exhibits any desire to be captious. I should have felt most unwilling to introduce anything on which there might be a difference of opinion in a question in which it is most important that all should be united. My Lords, to all—to the British Generals and to the British soldiers, to the British Admirals, to the British navy, and to the army and navy of France as well, this country owes for this campaign a debt of gratitude which it is not easy to discharge. It is easy, my Lords, for you to vote the Thanks of Parliament, although I think that those Thanks ought to be reserved for great and signal occasions, because, if made too frequent, they may lose some portion of their value—it is easy, my Lords, for you to return those Thanks, but depend upon it, in the services of this country, and if one may judge from one's own reasoning, in the services of other countries also, these Thanks, this expression of the obligation you owe, will be doubly appreciated by all those gallant men whom we are united in honouring. They will consider it a glorious and honourable compensation for all they have undergone, for all they have suffered, and for all they have achieved; they will consider it—and I trust that the Vote of Parliament embodying the thanks and gratitude of the country always will be so considered by those who bear in a foreign land the flag of the British nation—they will consider it not only an honourable compensation for the past, but an honourable incentive to endeavour for the future even to eclipse their former deeds by deeds of greater valour and greater daring.

THE EARL OF HARDWICKE: My Lords, I am happy to find by the proposed Vote of Thanks that the naval service is included, and by the remarks that have been made both by the noble Duke and the noble Earl, that all objections on the ground of the inefficient conduct of the Commander in Chief, and of the service in the Black Sea, are at once and for ever put an end to. It is now, I presume, shown that the services of Admiral Dundas have been successful in blockading the Straits of Kertch, that he has thoroughly prevented all communication between Odessa and the Crimea by sea, and that those services are appreciated, and that every word which has been stated in the public prints, and talked in the clubs, and in various parts of the country, is pronounced in the most undoubted language as false; and that not only had the blockade been most effectually supported and maintained, but that the whole service in the Black Sea had been conducted in the most exemplary manner. Under the peculiar circumstances of the war, our naval forces have been completely divided in the public service in the Baltic and in the Black Sea; and although you have, by what appears to me the necessity of the case, found it your duty to confine your Thanks for the naval service in the Black Sea, still I feel that your Lordships will all join in the sentiment that in the Baltic the services have been of the most arduous description, and that the officers of the navy in that sea have fulfilled the duty which they had to perform with admirable ability, and that in voting Thanks to the fleet in the Black Sea we are not unmindful of the services which have been equally as arduous in the Baltic. When we consider the character of the climate, the nature of the navigation, the absence of lights, the withdrawal of landmarks, the difficulty of navigating ships of such enormous size as have been sent to the Baltic—every ship of which will be brought back to your island in safety—we should see that the service presented vast difficulties, and the manner in which they have been overcome reflects as great credit upon the seamen in the Baltic as any conduct of our navy in any part of the world. But in addition to this, there are also a great number of officers in the Baltic who have had opportunities of distinguishing themselves in action, who have been before the enemy and have then distinguished themselves by their coolness, their steadiness, and in the conduct of their ships. Indeed, mention was made the other night by my noble Friend opposite of the taking of Bomarsund as being an important act in the operations of the war. This was accomplished certainly with the assistance of a large French force; but, as we know from the despatches of Sir Charles Napier, the naval branch of the service, whenever it has been called on to act, has conducted itself with the greatest possible efficiency. I have been induced to take part in this discussion simply for the sake of doing justice to the services of the Baltic fleet; and I am sure Her Majesty's Government will join with me when I state that, though the naval service has been separated into two distinct branches, and your Lordships have now thought fit to return their Thanks to one, you were not unmindful of the valuable services performed by the other.

VISCOUNT HARDINGE: My Lords, I had no wish to take part in the discussion of this Vote, which has already been so ably proposed and seconded, but I feel that I should be doing great injustice to my own feelings if I were to omit upon this occasion to express the great sense I entertain—indeed, I may say, the unbounded admiration and gratitude I feel—towards my noble Friend (Lord Raglan) and the army which he has the honour to command, and which he has proved himself so worthy to lead to victory. My noble Friend, when he undertook the command of this expedition, cheerfully obeyed the instructions of Her Majesty's Ministers. Men of less energy and determination might have hesitated before they undertook an enterprise of such magnitude and difficulty; but my noble Friend did no such thing, but at once undertook to do Her Majesty's bidding, and entered fully and completely into the views of Her Majesty's Government. In the outset of the expedition he carried through most successfully that most difficult of all military operations, the landing of a numerous army from a fleet on an enemy's shore. Before the men embarked my noble Friend displayed the greatest possible ability in the instructions he issued, both for the embarkation and the landing of the troops; and whenever the operation of landing an army from a fleet shall be required, these instructions will remain a perfect and complete code of instructions on the subject. My noble Friend knew it was a task full of difficulty, but he never flinched from undertaking it, because, as he said, with troops like those under his command, and with officers such as those who were at the head of the divisions, he could accomplish anything which he took in hand. I know, my Lords, that, upon this occasion, Lord Raglan will experience all the happiness and pride which a great commander can and ought to expect; but I feel that one thing is wanting to confer complete happiness upon Lord Raglan in connection with this Vote of your Lordships, and that is that we have not present on this occasion that great master under whom he studied the art of war to express his approval of his gallant conduct. I should have been happy to express to your Lordships sentiments of admiration towards the army similar to those which have been used by my noble Friend behind me; but the noble Duke has discharged that duty so well that I feel I should be unnecessarily occupying the time of your Lordships were I to do so. Of every officer in command I should be happy to express the same sentiments as those of the noble Duke who proposed the Resolution, but as it would only occupy your time in vain, I shall not attempt to enter upon a description of the merits of various individuals. I may, perhaps, be permitted to state that the discipline of the army, and its indomitable courage, both in defence and attack, have never been surpassed. At the Alma, everything was achieved by the bravery and courage of our troops, marching boldly up to the attack, and showing what their valour could accomplish. On the second occasion, at Inkerman, the army showed by its power of defence what the British troops are capable of accomplishing. I feel I can do no more, after the very able speeches of the mover and seconder of the Resolution, than to express my extreme satisfaction that a young army, of which two-thirds at least may be said to have been recruits, should have distinguished themselves so well and so nobly as they have done. It also gives me great satisfaction to know that there does exist in the minds of the troops in the Crimea the greatest possible courage and determination to make the best of all the difficulties to which they may be exposed.

The Earl of MALMESBURY said, that on a former occasion, when he rose to address their Lordships, he gave way to a noble Earl who rose with him, and whom they were at all times pleased to hear. He rose on that occasion because he felt he could not remain silent with regard to the merits of our gallant army; but being disappointed, he resolved upon a future occasion to trespass again on the indulgence of the House. That day was one of those of which they ought to be proud. It was a day that long would be remembered in their Lordships' House. It was one of those days that made Englishmen proud of the land they lived in, proud of their countrymen, and proud of seeing those deeds of daring performed again which they had read of in history, but which the present generation had not had the happiness to behold. When their Lordships recollected that many of these gallant men who had distinguished themselves were their personal friends, that degree of pleasure and pride must be greatly augmented. Rejoicing as they must in the honours which our Sovereign had bestowed on Lord Raglan, they were the less surprised when they remembered that the conqueror of Alma and of Inkerman was a pupil of the Great Duke, and that Fitzroy Somerset was his favourite soldier. He (the Earl of Malmesbury) could give proofs of the estimation in which th noble and gallant Commander was held by the French troops, and of the affection he had inspired amongst the troops of his own army. With respect to the illustrious Prince whose name had been so worthily referred to that evening, he had exhibited all the hereditary valour of his illustrious race, and added a new claim to the affection and respect of all ranks and classes of his countrymen by the humanity and consideration he had shown towards his troops. He felt certain that if their Lordships rejoiced in the achievements of their army in general, they must rejoice particularly in the deeds performed by Members of that House. Their Lordships would therefore excuse him if he referred to one noble Earl, a personal friend of his, and well known to many of their Lordships, whose name had not yet been mentioned in the discussion, he alluded to the Earl of Cardigan. He begged to remind their Lordships of the extraordinary deed of arms performed at Balaklava in that memorable charge, which—whatever its results, and whatever the opinion of its wisdom or expediency, made no difference as to the nature of the exploit itself—and will for ever redound to the bravery of those who shared in its disasters and glory. Their Lordships all knew the military ardour with which their gallant Friend burned; but his highest aspiration never could have led him to expect to be placed in so distinguished a position, and where he so worthily evinced the chivalry of his nature. He (the Earl of Malmesbury) was not about to go into details of the deeds of those gallant officers who had been wounded or who had fallen. It was a melancholy list, no less than 308 commissioned officers having fallen, wounded or killed. Many, very many of those gallant officers belonged to the class called, rightly or wrongly, the aristocracy of the country—men who had often been accused of monopolising to themselves the commissions of Her Majesty's service, as though they enjoyed a sinecure which was all pleasure and pay. Such were the assertions; but after the noble manner in which they had acquitted themselves, he hoped the country would hear no more of such imputations. It could not be said in future that these men were only fit to be sent on parade. They had shown themselves worthy of the important trust reposed in them, and in discharge of that trust they nobly performed their duty—even to the death—and illustrated the French proverb, "*Noblesse oblige.*" One word about our gallant sailors. It would be useless to discriminate or particularise on the present occasion. In peace or war gallantry had ever been the leading characteristic of our soldiers and sailors; and the present war had not only elicited that quality, but also more favourable characteristics. It was impossible to admire too highly the gentle affection towards their mothers and wives, and the patriotic and religious sentiments manifested by our soldiers in letters written by many of them red-handed from the field of battle, and after the display of unsurpassed bravery in face of the enemy. Before he resumed his seat, he felt it his duty to allude to another and less agreeable subject. He wished to direct the attention of the noble Duke (the Duke of Newcastle) more especially to a letter which had been published in all the newspapers, but which he (the Earl of Malmesbury) had not brought to the House with him, lest he might be tempted to read any portion of it to their Lordships. It was a letter written by the assistant chaplain to the Second Division of Her Majesty's army in the East. He did not wish to drag that gentleman as a culprit before their Lordships, but he felt that a man who disregarded the feelings of others could not complain if he himself was summoned to the bar of public opinion. It appeared that Mr. Lawless had not thought it inconsistent with his sacred office, after he had attended the death-beds of several of our mortally-wounded officers on the field of Inkerman, to communicate in a letter to a friend details of what had passed, with the names of these dying men, which ought never to have passed the most secret recesses of his mind, and that that friend had been guilty of the still greater indiscretion of publishing the letter. He (the Earl of Malmesbury) could state that the publication of that letter had occasioned a great aggravation of the sorrow of their relations in this country; and he believed that nothing could justify the conduct of its author. He had felt that no private reprimand could sufficiently mark the universal sense entertained of such an act on the part of the Rev. George Lawless—for that was the name of the rev. gentleman to whom he alluded; and he felt persuaded, too, that their Lordships would unanimously concur in that view of the matter. He had but one more observation to make. He and the party with whom he co-operated were prepared, as his noble Friend behind him (the Earl of Derby) had already stated, to afford Her Majesty's Government their best aid towards the vigorous prosecution of the war; and he had no doubt but that, with such an army as that of the Allies, our efforts must ultimately be brought to a triumphant conclusion. But he would address an earnest entreaty to the Members of Her Majesty's Government: if any one of those Members should feel that he was deficient in experience, let him not be ashamed to ask for advice; and if any one of them should be ignorant of any facts of importance, let him not hesitate to look for knowledge even beyond the precincts of his office. Let them avoid a rash reliance on their own personal resources, and let them not destroy, from a vain desire to maintain the supposed dignity of their position, the chance of success in that momentous contest.

VISCOUNT GOUGH: I rise, my Lords, with a considerable degree of diffidence, to claim the indulgence of your Lordships; but I quite conceive that I should not be justified in preserving silence upon the Motion now before your Lordships. I am proud, my Lords, to say that the position I now hold is attributable, and solely attributable, to the deeds of the army of England; and I cannot therefore pass by without remark, a Vote of Thanks to that army, now serving in the Crimea, many of whom assisted—nobly assisted—me in another part of the globe. It is for this reason that I join—most cordially join—in the Vote of Thanks to the noble individual who now happily holds the command of that army, as well as to the officers and soldiers of whom it is composed. My Lords, with the sister service it has been my good fortune at various times to have been associated, and therefore I most cordially join in the Vote of Thanks to the officers and sailors of Her Majesty's Navy. Having, too, lately returned from the Continent, where I have passed some time, associating much with the officers of the French army, and being thus enabled to form an opinion as to the officers now commanding in the Crimea, I most cordially join in a Vote of Thanks to the gallant and distinguished individuals at the head of the French army, and to that noble army itself, which is so well led, and which has so cordially and so gallantly supported the army of Her Majesty. My Lords, I thank you sincerely for having attended to the observations which on the present occasion I have thought myself called upon to make in the discharge of my duty as a soldier.

Lord COLCHESTER, while joining cordially in thanking the survivors of that gallant army which had fought at Alma and Inkerman, hoped the public gratitude would not stop here. The survivors would receive honours and decorations, but he trusted that those who had fallen would not be allowed to sleep in unhonoured graves. He thought that public monuments should be voted by Parliament to the successful commanders who had died in the public service. Some public monument, in whatever form it might be thought best to have it—some public mark of the nation's gratitude—would not, he thought, be too much to give to those who had sacrificed their lives in the service of the country.

Resolutions *agreed to, Nemine Dissentiente.*

THE TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND THE ALLIES—QUESTION.

The Marquess of CLANRICARDE rose, pursuant to notice, to ask,

"When it is likely that the Treaty lately concluded between the Allied Powers and Austria may be produced, and whether Her Majesty's Government will object to lay before Parliament Copies or Extracts of the Correspondence of our Diplomatic or Consular Agents in Turkey, descriptive of or relating to the military and political Occurrences which have taken place in the Danubian Principalities since the Occupation of those Provinces by the Austrian Force?"

With regard to the first part of the question of which I have given notice—I mean the production of the treaty between Austria and the Allies—I can anticipate to some extent the answer which will be given to it. Undoubtedly that treaty cannot be produced until after the ratifications have been exchanged; but I hope my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will go a step beyond that answer, and will let us know, if he can, how soon the ratification is likely to be accomplished and when we are likely to see this treaty. I say this because, whatever may be our anticipations of the contents of that treaty, we must all be anxious to examine the details of a treaty which we have been encouraged, by the reference to it in the Speech from the Throne, to expect is fraught with advantages, and important advantages, to the Allied Powers. My Lords, it is true that something like a modification of these expectations has been given to the public by a leading Minister of the Crown. I apprehend, however, that in all probability the treaty will be found to be of this character:—That while Austria repeats her assurances of concurrence in our opinion, her sympathy, and perhaps to a certain degree her good wishes for the cause of the Allies, it will be found that she will not have engaged to take any one step for the prosecution of the war, and, in point of fact, that we shall still be left only with that moral support which we were told we possessed long ago. If this turns out to be the purport of the treaty, as I think it will, in point of fact we are, in respect to the German Powers, just where we were at the opening of the last Session of Parliament. At the same time, I am ready to admit that the mere signature by Austria of any treaty with the Powers at this moment engaged in hostilities with Russia may be looked upon, if not as a step in advance, at least as riveting and nailing Austria to the point to which she has advanced; and it would certainly make it more difficult (not to say impossible) that that Power should take any retrograde step—any step, I would almost say, derogatory to the personal character of the governing classes of that country, and which would prevent Austria from advancing and actively engaging in hostilities on the side of those allies with whom she is signing at present these in themselves comparatively insignificant treaties. What I wish to say upon this matter, however, has reference more to the second part of the question which I am about to ask, because, if the treaty be unfortunately of the character which I have stated I expect it is, I have no doubt the country and the Parliament of this country will go into a very close examination of all we have borne and all we have forborne for the sake of this alliance, such as it is; and if, when Parliament shall reassemble after Christmas, it is seen that Austria has taken no positive step in the way of hostilities with Russia—if we find that then, as now, her friendly and diplomatic relations with the Court of St. Petersburg continue, I say I have not the slightest doubt that there will be demanded a very rigorous examination into the negotiations going on, and into all the transactions in which Austria has been engaged, with our concurrence, during the last few months. In respect of these transactions—I mean the transactions which have been going on in the Danubian Principalities—I look upon them as the most important that have taken place in Europe, save the actual battles that have been fought, and they are closely connected with these battles, and, indeed, with the whole plan and arrangements of our expedition to the Crimea. I say that the entire position of that expedition has depended upon the transactions in the Danubian Principalities, because I defy the Government, or any man, to show me that our army would have been exposed to the hardships, the perils, and privations to which it has been exposed, if it had not been for the transactions that occurred subsequently to, if not in consequence of, the Austrian occupation of the Principalities. The dates distinctly show that to these transactions is attributable much of that flow of British blood which has taken place in the Crimea. If we doubted it before, we have it now, with the exact dates delivered to us—on official authority. We have been told that it was upon the raising of the siege of Silistria that it was finally determined to send an army to the Crimea. If I recollect rightly, it was early in June—on the 14th of June—that the Convention was signed between Austria and Turkey—and on the 23rd of June the siege of Silistria was raised. Early in July the Russians began their retreat from the Principalities, and on the 25th of that month they evacuated Bucharest. Austrian authority soon afterwards was asserted in that country, and I think it was on the 20th of August that Austrian troops marched into the Principalities, while our expedition landed in the Crimea on the 14th of September. Is it not clear that before we ventured on such an expedition at all we expected the Russians would be fully occupied in Bessarabia? Would any man in his senses have gone to attack the whole force of the enemy in the south of Russia—for that is what has happened—with such a small army as we landed in the Crimea, unless we had looked for a diversion of the enemy in some other part of the country? It is perfectly clear that the Government of this country, and the country itself, depended upon active occupation being found for the army of Prince Gortschakoff in or near Bessarabia. I say, then, that we have an account with Austria, which, if Austria still holds back, must be settled one way or another before long. I am sure that this Parliament, and this country, looking at the great military force at the command of the Austrian Government, will be most happy to see any concerted action between us and that Government, provided it act with good faith towards us. But it is not good faith to debar us from means which are in our power, to hold out to us and lure us with hopes and expectations that she will take steps which, somehow or other, she never appears ready to take. To such a course of proceeding there must come a termination; and, as the Parliament and the country must, at an early date, demand an account of this matter from Her Majesty's Government, I have taken the liberty now, not to make any substantive Motion, or to give notice of such a one, but to ask the Government if they are prepared to lay upon the table of the House the documents which will put us in possession of all the transactions, military and political, which have taken place in the Principalities.

The Earl of CLARENDON: My Lords, my noble Friend says he can anticipate the answer I should give with respect to the first part of this question; but I am happy in being able to give to that portion of the question a more satisfactory answer than he has anticipated, because I have this afternoon received news from Vienna that the treaty which has been entered into with Austria has been ratified, and I hold that treaty in my hand, and I beg to lay it at once on your Lordships' table. Having done so, I feel that it will be unnecessary for me to enter into any discussion at present upon that treaty, as a more fitting opportunity will be found when your Lordships have made yourselves acquainted with its contents. With regard to the papers referred to by the noble Marquess, I am sorry to say that since he gave notice of his Motion last night, I have not had time to look through those papers, and to see which of them can be laid before your Lordships without detriment to the public service. I can assure your Lordships that the Government are perfectly ready to give every information as to all that has taken place with reference to the occupation of the Principalities; but your Lordships will feel, and I have no doubt admit, that at the present moment there would be some inconvenience in producing the whole of the papers which bear reference to that occupation. During the recess those papers shall be looked through, and such selected and laid upon the table as I trust will give every information on the subject. My Lords, I am not about to enter into any defence of the conduct of the Austrian Government throughout the period to which the noble Marquess has alluded; but it will, perhaps, be in the recollection of the House that, during the last few days of the last Session of Parliament, in addressing your Lordships, I stated that the course which the honour, and dignity, and interests of Austria pointed out was clear, and that I saw no reason to doubt that that course would be adopted. Large voluntary contributions had been poured into the Austrian exchequer, and there was no reason to expect that the means at the disposal of that nation would not be used, or that the opportunity which existed would be lost. That such, however, has been the case to a certain extent, I am not prepared to deny; but no blame can on that account be attached to Her Majesty's Government. Your Lordships are well aware that it is out of the power of the Government to dictate to an independent State like Austria, or to compel her at any moment to declare war against a powerful enemy, who had been assembling a large force on her undefended frontier. With respect to what fell from the noble Marquess in reference to the assistance to be expected from Austria at the time of the expedition to the Crimea, I must beg to observe that the Austrian Government had proposed to Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud to undertake and concert together operations in the Principalities, and that Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud in reply, informed the Austrian Government that they already had it in contemplation to send an expedition to the Crimea, and that they must therefore decline the proposal. The Austrian Government, of course, readily admitting the right of this country to undertake any expedition it pleased, at the same time declared that by that determination they were placed in a different position, and that, as under such circumstances, they could no longer reckon on the support of the English and French armies they could not undertake to fight Russia single-handed, and that more particularly at a time when the neutrality of Prussia and the rest of Germany could not be perfectly relied on. The Austrian Government then resolved to augment their forces, and a *corps d'armée* occupied a position in Transylvania, and the Russians were obliged to evacuate the Principalities. I will not now go into the question of the Austrian occupation of the Principalities, because papers connected with that subject will be laid on the table, but I wish to say a few words on a topic to which the noble Marquess has alluded, as I think it right that I should state what has really been the course pursued by the Government. Before the Austrian troops entered the Principalities, it was proposed that when the convention entered into with the Porte should be signed, the Principalities should be occupied by Austrian troops. At that time the siege of Silistria was being conducted with great vigour, the issue was very doubtful, and it appeared as if there was no probability of the Turks being able to cross the Danube. The treaty was signed on the 14th June, and the siege was raised on the 24th, and then the circumstances were changed. The Turks crossed the Danube and occupied Bucharest, and Her Majesty's Government then considered that Austria had no right whatever to require the Turkish troops to evacuate Wallachia, and they consequently recommended the Turkish Government, if such a demand should be made, not to accede to it. Despatches were also sent to Lord Westmoreland and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, stating that Her Majesty's Government did not wish to see any portion of the Turkish territory occupied by any foreign force, except by the free will and consent of the Sultan, and that, in their opinion, it should be left to the Sultan to decide whether or not it was advisable that an Austrian force should occupy the Principalities, and that all arrangements, whether of a civil or military nature, should be made by him. The Government received the fullest assurances from the Austrian Government that no exclusive occupation was intended, nor was it intended to throw any hindrance in the way of the Allies or of the Turkish forces, or in any way to prevent them pursuing the Russian troops. Notwithstanding this, it is true that hindrances have been thrown in the way of Omar Pacha. Upon that fact coming to the ears of the Government, the strongest and most energetic remonstrances were made both by the English and French Governments and by the Porte, and I am bound to admit that those remonstrances were received by the Austrian Government in a most proper spirit; and it appears that these hindrances complained of were not known to the Austrian Government until they received information of them from us. In reply to those remonstrances, we were informed that the Austrian generals in the Principalities were not acting in accordance with their instructions, but that they were acting either contrary to them or in excess of them, and fresh orders were immediately sent to them by telegraph. I believe, my Lords, that in the course of these affairs there have been faults on both sides. I believe that the Austrian generals were occupying certain districts and villages in a territory where accommodation was scarce, and where they had some difficulty in procuring provisions for their own troops. On the other hand, it seems that Omar Pacha had no fixed plan of operations, and the Commissioners do not appear to have been men well adapted to smooth and settle a difficulty. When complaints were made upon the subject, Count Buol, to give a proof of the sincerity of the Austrian Government, proposed a mixed Commission at Vienna, to consist of himself, the Turkish Ambassador, and the English and French Ministers, which should receive reports from Omar Pacha, the English and French Consuls and the generals, and decide upon anything that might thus be brought to their notice. Her Majesty's Government agreed to the formation of such a Commission, and, indeed, they considered it so necessary that such a body should exist, to exercise a control with reference to what should occur in the Principalities during their occupation, that the maintenance of that Commission is one of the articles of the treaty which I have this evening laid on your Lordships' table. I have only to add, that one or two questions have already been referred to that Commission, and have been most properly and satisfactorily decided.

ENLISTMENT OF FOREIGNERS BILL.

Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE said, that he would not trouble their Lordships with any lengthened statement with reference to the Bill; but he had been greatly surprised to ascertain from various quarters, in the course of the day, that there existed an impression out of doors that what the noble Earl who commenced the opposition to this Bill on the previous evening (the Earl of Ellenborough) said might be, really was the intention of the Government, namely, that the Government intended that the militia and the British forces generally should be removed from this country for foreign service; and that their object in asking for power to enlist foreign troops was to use such troops in place of English ones for garrison duty in this country. He was quite certain that no noble Lord, whatever might be his opinion as to what might be done under the Bill, would for a moment imagine that it was the intention of the Government so to use the power to be intrusted to them. He would readily and at once admit that if there was a possibility of such an event, it was the bounden duty of Parliament to take precautions against it. He was also ready to admit that, looking to the Bill as drawn, it might by possibility be converted to such a purpose; and as, though he did not think it possible that it could be so used by any Government that could hold the reins of power in this country, he thought it desirable that the Bill should be so altered as that the intention of the Government and of Parliament should be clearly manifested, and he was, therefore, prepared to strike out of the first clause the words which seemed to bear this construction, and to insert in the second words which should specially prohibit any such use of the measure. So far from there being any desire on the part of the Government to quarter foreign troops on this country because we were parting with our own, he could only say that he believed the state of the country was such that we might, if necessary, part with every armed man in these realms without substituting for them any other force. Still less would it be likely that, under such circumstances, the Government, instead of raising an additional militia or other English force, would seek foreign troops to protect our shores and to keep the peace here. Had he supposed that such an impression could for a moment have existed in the minds of any class of the community, he would not only have removed it in the speech which he made on the previous day, but would have taken care that the prohibition which he now proposed should be inserted in the Bill. That prohibition he proposed to insert in order to show that the sole object of obtaining power to bring foreign troops into this country was, that, as we could not, of course, have a depôt in a foreign country, men enlisted abroad should be brought here and formed into battalions, and, as soon as they were ready for service, should be conveyed to the Crimea, or to whatever country might then be the theatre of war, to fight against our foreign enemies. The number of men who were to be in this country at one time had been limited at 15,000, because that was about the limit fixed by the similar statute passed in the year 1806—in which the limit was 16,000—and because it was thought that the impossibility of transporting men to the seat of the war immediately upon the conclusion of their training, owing either to its being an unfavourable time of the year or to a scarcity of the means of conveyance, might at times render it necessary to keep that body of foreign troops in this country. If, however, any noble Lord preferred the lower limit of 10,000 men, he should not object to such an alteration being made in the Bill.

Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee on the said Bill.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH: My Lords, my noble Friends who took objection to this Bill on a previous occasion were, it now appears from the statement of the noble Duke, perfectly justified in taking the course which they adopted. I objected on constitutional grounds to a Bill which gave a power to the Crown which the noble Duke is now willing to abandon, and which I considered not merely dangerous, but wholly unnecessary. It is, my Lords, another and a strong proof of the careless manner in which the Government consider great measures affecting the military strength of the country, that it is now stated by the noble Duke to be a matter of indifference to the Government whether the number of the men to be at one time in this country be 15,000 or 10,000—a difference which, taking the usual proportion of men actually serving, and those undergoing training, would be an actual difference in the military force of the country of 20,000 men. If the number to be at one time under drill are to bear to those employed on active service the same proportion which the companies of Her Majesty's regiments left in England bear to those employed elsewhere—namely, one-fourth—this Bill, as originally framed, is a Bill for ultimately embodying 60,000 foreigners. I think the best course to pursue would be to withdraw the present Bill altogether, and at once to lay on the table an amended Bill, which might be taken into consideration on Monday next. To do so would be a more Parliamentary method of proceeding, and only one day would be lost. But if the noble Duke does not acquiesce in that suggestion, I must proceed as I originally intended. My Lords, since last I addressed you on this subject, it has been my duty to reconsider in the interval the reasons for which I then objected to the Bill, and also to consider the arguments which were adduced in its favour; and I must say that that further consideration has only tended to confirm me in the opinion that this is a Bill, the principle of which ought not to receive the sanction of your Lordships. Of its overwhelming and commanding necessity, no proof whatever has been advanced; and, in the absence of such proof, I think it most proper to adhere to constitutional principle. I was rejoiced, my Lords, the other night, to hear a noble Earl, who sits upon the cross-benches (Earl Grey), notice an expression which fell from the noble Duke in reference to the conduct of those on this side of the House who objected to this Bill—I mean that it indicated almost—indeed, I am not sure that the word "almost" was used—a want of patriotism on our part that we should thus impede a measure intended to meet the necessities of the country. I have read, and indeed, unfortunately, I can recollect, that at the commencement of the present century, measures for the defence of the country, brought forward by successive Governments, were the constant theme upon which persons of all parties expressed their opinions with the utmost freedom in Parliament. All men were then united for the defence of the country against foreign invasion, as they are now for the prosecution of this war; yet Mr. Pitt, the late Lord Grey, Mr. Windham, Lord Grenville, and all the first men of that day—giants in comparison with many of those who hold office in these days—men of unsuspected patriotism, never hesitated to state, and to press with the utmost freedom of Parliamentary language, objections to the several measures successively brought forward. I humbly, and at a great distance, presume to follow in their steps. I am not prepared to compliment away any portion of those constitutional principles to which I have always adhered, and to which I shall continue to adhere for the rest of my life. I am aware of the imputations upon my patriotism and my motives to which I shall be subjected, but I shall not permit them to have the smallest influence upon my conduct, and shall strictly adhere to that course which, in my own opinion, is the most proper one. Noble Lords who have hitherto expressed their intention of supporting the war are considered to be inconsistent if they refuse absolute confidence to Her Majesty's Government with respect to the measures which they bring forward as the best adapted, in their opinion, to the furtherance of that object. My Lords, between supporting the war and supporting the Ministers, there is the greatest difference which can possibly exist between any two things of the most dissimilar kind. I am the oldest supporter of this war—I supported it long before my noble Friend at the head of the Government. I mentioned to one of Her Majesty's Ministers as far back as April, 1853, that I was confident this war was coming; that I was quite sure the Emperor of Russia never would depart from the position he had taken in sending Prince Menchikoff to Constantinople, or from the demands he had then made. During the Session of 1853, I earnestly entreated your Lordships not to delay proceeding with a Bill for altering the Government of India, on the special ground that we were threatened with danger in the East, and of the necessity of putting our house in order. There was a provision in that Bill, as introduced into the other House, enabling the Government of India to add three regiments to their force. I objected to that; but so urgent did I think the necessity of strengthening Her Majesty's Government, that I laid upon your Lordships' table a Bill containing these clauses, entreating your Lordships to pass it, that we might thereby gain three months in adding to that force. But, my Lords, I went much further; I went to the utmost limit of Parliamentary privilege, and I asked you, towards the end of that Session, to delay a Bill for the repeal of a tax, thinking it the most impressive manner in which you could indicate to foreign Powers your determination to adhere to the course you had adopted, and to put a stop, if you could, to the ambition of Russia. That again was rejected; but it shows my support of the war. From the beginning of the last Session I fatigued your Lordships by my constant reference to it. I entreated you to make the country strong everywhere. I entreated you to add to the naval as well as to the military force, and I expressed my conviction that what had been done was utterly insufficient, and you now ask us to pass this Bill, interfering with constitutional principles, because you have adopted no such measures. Your own weakness, the consequence of your rejection of the advice which was offered to you, is made the ground upon which we are to supersede the constitutional principles of this country. My Lords, I went further; I said, "Be secret," for secrecy is one of the great foundations of success in war; and yet the object of the expedition to Bomarsund, and the expedition to the Crimea, are, weeks before those expeditions can sail, made public in the newspapers. Information is given to your enemies of the most valuable description, and given, through the newspapers, by Ministers, whom I entreated to consider the importance of secrecy. ["No, no!"—"The *Times!*"] I am not speaking of the *Times*, I am speaking of the Cabinet, and I say that the secrets of the Cabinet are sacred. The object of those expeditions never should have been named by any Member of the Government; but named it must have been by some one, because there it was, a Cabinet secret, and it became, somehow or other, public, and public to the great injury of the public service. Again, my Lords, I said, "Timely preparation in war is everything." With timely preparation you might accomplish almost any object; and without it you might fail in all; or succeeding, you might succeed only with a great sacrifice of treasure and blood. That too was neglected. No timely preparation was made, and it is because no timely preparation was made that we are again asked to make a humiliating confession of our weakness by passing this Bill. This is the support which I throughout have given to this war. I admitted it to be from the first a just, a necessary, and a politic war, but I told you at the same time that it was a statesman's war. I said that it was a far-seeing war in its object, and that, though popular at first, I feared greatly that, unless you had a constant succession of successes calculated to captivate the public mind, the objects of the war were so thoroughly statesmanlike that it would be extremely difficult to maintain throughout the steady and constant support of the public. You have that support now; but when I look to the losses which we have sustained, and to the extreme ignorance, as I think, of Her Majesty's Ministers, and when I consider that their rejection of the advice which has been offered to them has led to those losses, I confess that I do not look forward with confidence to the long continuance of the popularity of the war, which the measure now proposed is more than anything else calculated to destroy. Well, my Lords, now as to confidence in Her Majesty's Ministers. I never professed any confidence in them as a war Government, and I stated my reasons for entertaining a contrary opinion. I admitted their great civil abilities and their great knowledge of political economy; I admitted that it was probable that on most subjects connected with civil administration I might see reason to acquiesce in their views; but I did think that the very character of their minds had a bias—by leading them constantly to look only to the progress of national questions, to the improvement of the country, and matters altogether of a civil character—was to a certain degree calculated to prevent them from being very energetic prosecutors of a war which must necessarily tend very much to depreciate and undermine these advantages; and, without any disrespect to my noble Friend at the head of the Government, I did venture to say that I did not think it extremely probable that he would succeed in doing well a thing which he so thoroughly hated as carrying on a war. I confess that Her Majesty's Ministers are extremely clever gentlemen, and that they all possess abilities far above mediocrity, but very few of them possess the great abilities which we have seen in the former times to which I have referred. With one exception, they possess, too, the most extraordinary character for making good speeches, of an extraordinary length, which was ever at any time possessed by any Cabinet. The only person who apparently is not possessed of that extraordinary faculty is my noble Friend at the head of the Government; or, if he does possess that faculty, in mercy to us he spares us; and I must say that in that respect, if not in any other, he is the best Minister who ever sat upon those benches. What is the great public mischief, however, is the very equality of ability which pervades Her Majesty's Cabinet. It is the absence of any great and commanding ability—the presence of ability I admit far above mediocrity—but the presence of so many very nearly equal persons, and in great numbers in the same Cabinet, which I am convinced impedes, instead of facilitating, the transaction of public business. I believe that among them what is called the Ballot is an open question. I strongly recommend them to introduce it for their own internal improvement; for there is no measure which would so much tend to strengthen them—against whom personally I have no animosity—and to strengthen them especially for the transaction of public business, as the expulsion by ballot of one-third of their number. It is a matter of perfect indifference who go. I do not think that it signifies one rush to the public, so equal are they; but I am quite sure that the remaining two-thirds would conduct the business of the country a very great deal better than it is conducted at present. Now, give me leave to say that, in those distant times, when we had great statesmen in the possession of great offices, they condescended to assign reasons for great public measures; and when they produced measures for the national defence, they went, as I can recollect, into most elaborate details, showing what was the strength of the Army, the strength of each corps, the manner in which recruiting had been successful, the extent to which, in successive years, recruits had been added, and from what sources they had been derived. Every fact which was known to themselves was made known to Parliament, and upon those data Parliament was asked to proceed in framing measures for the purpose of improving the national defences. But the noble Duke has given us no information whatever. If we are to look to the newspapers for information, as we do now with more confidence than in former times, we are told, day after day, of the extraordinary success of the recruiting — in this week so many hundreds, in that more than 1,000 recruits have been obtained. If that be true, so far from its being a reason for this Bill, it is the very reason why we should not think of it, because if, by the ordinary process, we can thus add to our forces, why adopt a measure which is in contravention of constitutional principles? But, my Lords, I say, and always have said—and I speak from the experience of past times—that by far the most efficient mode of strengthening your army by recruits is to maintain at all times a militia full up to its complement, and popular with the country. Get a man, no matter how, into the militia; your chance of obtaining him afterwards as a soldier in the regular army is vastly increased, and you at the same time obtain a soldier perfectly qualified for service, and infinitely better for your purpose than one who has never been instructed at all. I say, therefore, strengthen the militia; do everything you can by every means to increase it to its full complement; make it the foundation of your military system, and, doing that, depend upon it you will be able to maintain national interests by the national arms, and will not be compelled to go begging in the antechambers of every petty Prince on the Continent for recruits to Her Majesty's forces. Who are those foreigners whom the noble Duke proposes to Her Majesty to bring to this country? We are told that it would be indecorous to mention the names of those German Princes or others until the Bill has passed, as no regular communications can be made with them until that time. But, I ask, is there any understanding with any of those Princes, or is there not? Can we not be told what understanding there is, and what reasonable anticipations Ministers have? Are they going to take this leap in the dark? The noble Duke may take a leap in the dark; but it is rather a serious thing to leap in the dark when you drag an army behind you; and it will not do to ask the country to violate a constitutional principle for a great object, and then, when you have done it, to find that you have not attained that object. Her Majesty's Ministers ought to have made the fullest inquiry, and to be thoroughly satisfied that the measure will be successful, before they proposed it. I can imagine a state of things under which neither I nor any one could object to the temporary passage through this country of a limited German force. I can imagine that there may remain those feelings of friendship on the part of the King of Hanover to the Queen and people of this country which actuated that Sovereign in former times. I can imagine that the King of Hanover may entertain those feelings, but that he may be unable to give us assistance with his forces, owing to pecuniary difficulties. In that event, I should have no hesitation to accept of his assistance, by placing under Lord Raglan 5,000 or 6,000 of his magnificent troops, who rendered such good service in the last war. Under those circumstances, to admit for a short time the disciplined forces of a foreign Power, I should not object; but we are not told to expect that. We are told to expect formed men, but not formed battalions. Well, what sort of men will they be? They must either be, in those countries in which there is a conscription, men who have been discharged from duty by the lapse of time, and with respect to whose enlistment it is impossible that Her Majesty's Government can have any assurance, because they must be scattered through the whole of Germany or the Continent; or they must be persons now in the service of different German Princes. Will any one of those German Princes dare to join with the Allies, and declare against Russia? No; they dare do no such thing; and if they will not join you openly, they must have recourse to the petty disgraceful course of conniving at the desertion of their own troops. I can see no other mode in which the assistance of foreign soldiers can be obtained. But, suppose those soldiers to be brought here, give me leave to ask the noble Duke where he means to put them? We were told last night that there was this objection to embodying at once the militia of the country—that there were not sufficient barracks. Are these foreigners to occupy the barracks which might otherwise be given to the militia; and on that account are the militia not to be embodied, or are the militia to occupy barracks, and are the foreigners to be billeted upon our families? Why, the noble Duke knows that it is impossible — that it would not be borne; and that if we get men it will be impossible to keep them in this country, unless you put them under canvas. There is another question which I wish to ask. I beg to inquire, if these men are to be engaged in Her Majesty's service and are to be formed into battalions, why they are to come here? This is not the straight way to the Crimea; and why send every Swiss rifleman who may wish to discharge his gun at the Russians in the Crimea round by London and the Bay of Biscay? Is that the way that any of those aspirants to military glory and British pay should go from the banks of the Maine and the Weser to the Crimea? The noble Duke is following precedent, no doubt; but in the last war, when Austria wanted all her subjects, when half Germany was against us, and no rivers were open to us but the Elbe and Weser, it was absolutely necessary that those men should come through this country and be formed into battalions; but that is not the case now. All the railways are open; their shortest way is by Trieste, and not by Hamburg. The best place for the formation of their depôt is the Ionian Islands. There they can look after "those worthy Greeks," "that noble people"—refresh their recollections of antiquity, and alter the opinion, perhaps, which they originally entertained of that "great people." However that may be, that is the place to form the depôt. The depôt becomes a reserve. It is near the Crimea; the road is shorter, and you avoid all the difficulties of this Bill. Take your foreigners, if you please, to the Crimea, but don't take them through England—don't offend us with their presence—don't give them our barracks or our billets. Why come down to Parliament for this measure to enable them to shoulder the militia out of England into the Mediterranean, and out of their barracks into the street? Send them by railway to Trieste, and from Trieste to the Ionian Islands. There you will have them ready for service, and no one will greatly object to it. I say this with the greatest confidence—the more facilities Parliament gives the Government for the formation of foreign regiments, the less trouble the Government will take to raise English regiments. The whole is a question of standard and bounty. Raise your bounty and lower your standard, and you have your men. Keep your standard as it is and lower your bounty, follow the principles of political economy, go to the cheapest market, get the worst article, come and tell us that you have so many Germans now fighting our battles—do that, and add that you have expelled the Englishman from your army and have substituted the foreigner for him. My Lords, I must say that it appears to me, that of all the measures which I recollect, under any circumstances, produced at any time, by any Government, this is the most ungracious towards a generous and a confiding people.

Amendment *moved*, to leave out "now," and insert "this day Six Months."

LORD BERNERS said, that the House had not been favoured with any arguments from the Government in support of this measure, and, notwithstanding any imputation of want of patriotism to which he might subject himself, he should oppose it. He believed the proposal of the Government to be highly objectionable, and calculated to repress, and not to encourage, that spirit of noble enthusiasm which had hitherto animated the population of this country; and he was confident it would prove to be not only unconstitutional, but unpopular, for it amounted to a confession that our constitutional means were exhausted. He must protest against the assumption that any Peer on that side the House, who might be venturesome enough to oppose any proposition of the Government, was either factious or unpatriotic. He was himself engaged to no man, and there were many other Members of their Lordships' House whose conduct was influenced by an entire devotion to the honour and glory of the country, and by an anxious desire to carry out in the most effective manner all measures that might be necessary to bring the present war to a favourable termination.

LORD WODEHOUSE said, he apprehended that the argument used by his noble Friend (the Duke of Newcastle) was, not that the measure proposed by Her Majesty's Government should not be discussed—for that was the clear duty of Parliament—but that noble Lords opposite should take into consideration the great difficulties which must be met by Government in carrying on a great war, and should approach the discussion of their measures with a desire to consider them calmly, with the view of ascertaining whether they were required by the necessities of the times, and not for the purpose of making them a handle to appeal to the passions of the people, the result of which must only be to embarrass Government. It appeared to him that there had been, both in that House and out of doors, a most singular misapprehension of the intentions of Government in bringing forward this Bill, and also with respect to the object and principles of the Bill itself. He imagined that Her Majesty's Government disapproved as much as noble Lords opposite the principle of generally employing foreign troops; and he was convinced that every Peer in that House, and every man throughout the country, would always prefer that its battles should be fought by Englishmen. It was not, however, because Englishmen were not ready or able to fight the battles of their country—it was because a policy, which might or might not have been right, had so reduced the military establishment of the country n time of peace that on the sudden outbreak of a war with a great military Power, and when it had become necessary to send out reinforcements commensurate with the interests at stake, it was necessary to have recourse to a measure of this kind for a temporary purpose. It must also be borne in mind that Government had no compulsory means of enlistment, and he believed that no Government would ever be able to employ compulsory measures with effect. It would be a warning to the country and to future Governments not to reduce their military establishments too low in time of peace, and also a warning to calmly consider, in time of peace, the best means of raising their military establishment in cases of sudden emergency. It might be disagreeable to have recourse to foreign troops, but the question was, whether it was not expedient under present circumstances. The objection which the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Ellenborough) so enlarged upon in the conclusion of his speech was, he apprehended, at once disposed of by the Amendment suggested by the noble Duke the Secretary of War. There would, therefore, be no question on the point of constitutional doctrine, and he thought that any mention of the constitution had been most unfortunately introduced by the noble Earl opposite. He (Lord Wodehouse) understood the object of the Bill to be this—that whereas it required some months to make men trained soldiers, there were a number of the troops of other countries, who had been enlisted for a certain time, and were now on the point of being discharged, and who were both at liberty and willing to enter into the service of other countries, and in this case Government would be able to collect a number of soldiers already trained, and send them to the seat of the war as quickly as possible. If the Government were unable to continue to reinforce Lord Raglan's army with a number of trained soldiers, this expedient was surely one which they ought to adopt. Under these circumstances, he trusted the House would take a dispassionate view of the case, and, looking on the measure as one of public necessity, would consent to the Bill as proposed by Government.

THE EARL OF HARDWICKE said: A speech of a more depressing character to the feelings of the country than the one just delivered by the noble Lord I have never heard. He has stated that we are going to raise foreign troops from the necessity of the case. He has stated that we are obliged to have recourse to this expedient for the purpose of fighting the enemies of our country. Expressions more degrading, I think, were never uttered in the British House of Parliament, or more likely to urge the Emperor of Russia to prosecute the war, and to depress the spirit of this country. I could not believe it possible that any British Peer in this House, at this moment, could have uttered so cringing, so debasing, and so degrading an expression——

LORD WODEHOUSE: I must protest against the expressions of the noble Earl as far too strong—really what I have said does not deserve such epithets, and the noble Earl must be under entire misapprehension of what I did say. The noble Earl has used expressions so extremely strong that I trust the House will allow me to explain. When I say the necessities of the case oblige us to have recourse to foreign soldiers, because we have not a sufficient number of soldiers of our own, I state the main reason why we want foreign soldiers. If we have enough of our own, why employ foreign troops? Having reduced our Army too low in time of peace, we must for a time have recourse to trained foreign soldiers. That, I apprehend, is stating a fact as a good reason for this measure. I maintain that my words are such as any British Peer may use; that the argument I used with the best and fairest intention, in defence of the Government proposition, ought not to be characterised in terms not often applied to the language of any gentleman.

THE EARL OF HARDWICKE: I assure your Lordships I strictly adhere to the expressions I used. I will not retract any of those expressions in the smallest degree. My opinion is, that the idea expressed by the words of the noble Lord conveys sentiments degrading to the people of this country, and will convey to the Emperor of Russia an idea that the military affairs of this country are in an exhausted condition. The noble Lord must know that, in using the expressions I did, I used them in their strict sense as a Member of Parliament, not stating that his idea is degrading to himself personally. The effect produced on the minds of every one is, that the idea is itself degrading—the people of England are reduced to the necessity of employing foreign legions to carry on a war which has been designated by the Ministers themselves as a war for freedom and for the protection of the free interests of the people of Europe.

LORD WODEHOUSE: I rise merely for the purpose of saying that, although the noble Earl has used expressions not usually used by one gentleman towards another, if I understand what he now says, I may be satisfied with his explanation. The noble Earl commenced by saying he would not retract the expressions, but he afterwards said he did not intend them to apply personally to me, but merely to an argument of the kind.

THE EARL OF HARDWICKE: I shall make no use of any expressions of the kind. I am not called upon to make any apology to the noble Lord. The expressions I used were of that character and that open nature which I am entitled to use in Parliament as a Member of Parliament, not meaning them in any way or in any sense whatever but the sense in which a Member of Parliament is entitled to discuss a great question. The noble Lord has stated truly that the reason this country is reduced to this lamentable condition is because, during a long period of peace, so necessitous seemed to be the wants of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or so desirous were the people to cut down the expenditure for the national defences, that when suddenly, as he states, we are called upon to go to war, we have not the means of carrying it on. I should like to ask the noble Lord opposite, which party in this House has been most accustomed to call for great reductions of the national forces? I should like to know where the call for these great reductions spring from—if not from too great a concession to the feelings of the commercial interests, backed up by those hon. and noble Gentlemen who now carry on the Government? It cannot be fixed on any on this side of the House; the charge, if it be a charge at all, falls with greater force on noble Lords opposite than on us. I conceive it to be one of the most important features in war that the taxes raised for carrying it on, taken out of the pockets of the rich, should be put into the pockets of our own poor; and if we are to raise taxes to pay troops, for God's sake pay troops of your own nation, and do not pay troops of foreigners; let the taxes be for the purpose of at least giving assistance and support to the families of your own soldiers. I can conceive nothing more thoroughly disagreeable to the feelings of this country, or more detrimental to its best interests, than the proposition now before us. I think the first effect of it will be to repress the national ardour, and the next effect to interfere with the recruiting of the militia. If it is believed that foreign troops are to be employed to carry on the war, there will be found a great disinclination on the part of the people to enlist, and those who have been anxiously and earnestly at work in raising English troops will not continue in the same disposition. I am confident there is no need for this mode of raising troops, and that this measure will be one of the greatest dampers on the hearts and minds of the people, who are now eager to enter the service of the Crown and meet the exigency of the time. I can understand how such a measure may be necessary at some future period. It might be found necessary to raise troops among what are called the "oppressed nationalities," to raise Poland and other nations connected with the Government of Russia against that Power; then I can perfectly well conceive the necessity for such a Bill as this; but at present I trust neither the Government nor the people are ready to carry on war in this manner. The time may come when the necessities of the case may make it perfectly justifiable to raise the oppressed nations, and to call upon those people to join us in operations of a military character against the forces of Russia; but to make the proposition so early in the war is to me a subject of depressing character, and I could not have believed that any statesman would have called upon us to put our hands to such a work, at the present moment. I, for my part, repudiate the notion of enlisting those disaffected people against their own Sovereign, convinced as I am that the power of the country, the readiness of the people, and our great resources, if brought into play under good guidance, will be amply sufficient to meet the emergency, and that this mode—so depressing and so degrading in itself—is perfectly unnecessary.

Earl GRANVILLE said, he thought the noble Earl would feel that the line he had taken was not the most judicious or advisable, when discussing a cause in which all classes were united. He thought that it was no very great spectacle, either for our Allies or our enemies, to see in that House one noble Lord bandying unworthy epithets with respect to the argument of another, and that, when all classes were so singularly unanimous, it was a dangerous mode of conducting argument to make an uncalled-for attack on the commercial part of the community. Nor did he think the observation upon "peace establishments" fell with a good grace from the noble Earl, when the Government to which he belonged only added 5,000 men to the Army and 2,000 men to the Navy, and then declared that everything had been done which could possibly be expected. Sometimes, in cases such as these, it was worth while to look back to what had been done on former occasions, and this morning he looked over the debates of 1804, and he found, with one exception, exactly the same arguments used against the Bill of that year as were used now. It was said to be unconstitutional. That point had been much dwelt upon, and he must say, judging from the degree of danger to the constitution from the presence of 16,000 foreign troops during the period of the last war, we need not very much fear their presence here now. He believed it was mere talk to apprehend any such danger, and that they might have double the number of foreigners in this country without risk of any harm to the constitution. The noble Earl seemed to think there would be really more danger in having foreign troops in this country than if they were sent to our Mediterranean colonies. He thought there might be some danger in filling our Mediterranean colonies with foreign troops, but he was perfectly sure there would be no danger in organising them here. The intention of the Government was now made clear by the alteration of the words adopted from the two preceding Acts, and he was perfectly sure that the misrepresentations which had been attempted would fail in creating any alarm in the minds of the people of England. The other argument was, that foreign troops were not so efficient as English troops; but any one who had read the history of the Peninsular war would know that the Duke of Wellington entertained a very high opinion of the services of the Portuguese, and the noble Duke (the Duke of Richmond) had the other evening borne the strongest testimony to the extreme efficiency of the German troops during that war. The only difference in the arguments was this: the noble Earl said, "It may be quite right to have foreign troops, but not in the beginning of the war;" and the opponents of the previous Bills said, "You have already 100,000 Englishmen in arms, what is the use of adding some few thousands of foreigners to them?" The noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough) made a very proper distinction when he said, he supported the war, but he did not support the Ministry. That was perfectly intelligible; but if he thought the Ministers were not the persons to carry on the war, that ought to be brought to an issue, and the question decided whether the present Government was to carry on the war or not. According to the description of the noble Earl, a War Ministry should have at its head one giant, and the more idiotical the rest of his companions the better. As he had just observed, if it were thought the Ministers were not fitted for war, let it be decided whether they should continue in office or not; but he entreated them not to come back, after making patriotic and conciliatory speeches at the beginning of the Session, and upon every measure introduced with the disinterested and single-minded purpose of carrying on the war with vigour, endeavour to create unfounded prejudice against those measures. If they took that course he had no hesitation in saying for himself, and he was sure he might say for his colleagues also, that it would be utterly impossible to carry on the war with any real vigour or efficiency.

Lord VIVIAN did not see why we should rely upon foreign mercenaries when there was such a readiness on the part of the people of this country to come forward and enlist. His noble father commanded certain German troops, and he could, therefore, bear the best testimony to the gallantry of the Hanoverians, Brunswickers, and others who served with the British army during the late war. But circumstances now were widely different, because, during the late war, Germany and England were engaged together in a war upon a common enemy. All the Germans, except Saxony, were with us in that contest, and it was then well to enlist the Germans and Hanoverians under the rule of the Sovereigns of the respective countries. If Germany were now fighting with us against the common enemy, he should support the present Bill, but, under existing circumstances, he considered it so dangerous and unnecessary that he should be compelled to record his vote against it.

THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDE said, that he felt obliged to vote in favour of the Bill, to which, however, he saw great objections. Two reasons would guide his vote. The Government came forward and told the House that they were in want of men, and that this measure would enable them to obtain them. He was not, in such a case, inclined to take upon himself the responsibility of opposing them. He believed that, in the present state of their forces, there was an immediate want of men ready trained for action, and Government had said that this measure would give them men who would be immediately serviceable, and he could not, consequently, incur the responsibility of refusing. He agreed with the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Ellenborough) that they had had a very meagre explanation, and that they had no means of ascertaining what had been done in the way of enlistment in this country, and what was the number of recruits which had lately been obtained. Although the Army at the time of the former war was much greater than it was now, with an increased population, and although he believed that the recruiting for the regular army had not at any time been greater than it had been during the present year, and the military spirit of the country might have been appealed to with still greater effect, still, if Government said that they wanted men ready trained for war, and could obtain them thus, he was willing to take the measure on their responsibility. For, if Parliament were to refuse the first measure so proposed and so offered to them at the early part of the Session, it would have a dangerous effect upon the country, and abroad. However loud they might be in the denunciations of Russia, and however zealous in their professions for the glory and interest of their own country, if, when called on in such a manner by Government, they were to hesitate, even on what he agreed were sound principles, he thought that such hesitation would be most mischievous. With regard to the measure he should hold himself perfectly blameless, for the responsibility must rest with the Government; but, looking to the pressure upon Government, and to the effect which an adverse vote that night would have upon foreign nations, he could not bring himself to vote for the rejection of the Bill. When, however, the noble Duke (the Duke of Newcastle) expressed his surprise that it should be thought that it was part of his intention to employ these foreign troops at home, he fell into an error. One of his (the Marquess of Clanricarde's) earliest recollections was the remembrance of the German troops which were quartered in Ireland during the late war, and it was natural, when the precedent of those days was cited, and when it was proposed that foreign troops should again be introduced into this country, to suppose that they would be quartered in the country as formerly—it might be, for the purpose of again resisting foreign invasion or of quelling disturbances—but it was natural to suppose that they would be used in every case in which the native troops were used. On this ground he thought the Bill should not have been introduced without the most positive necessity. Whether such a necessity existed he did not know; but he took it on the authority of Government, who said that by this Bill they would get ready and serviceable troops which were urgently required at the moment, and he threw the responsibility on them.

THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, I concur, almost from the beginning to the end, in what has fallen from my noble Friend who has just sat down, but I cannot concur in his conclusion, because it appears to me to be contrary to the whole tenor and argument of his speech. He admits the force of the objections that have been raised to this Bill on constitutional grounds, and the inconvenience and danger of adopting the course proposed by the Government. He admits that the Government have shown a very meagre case with regard to the plea of necessity that they have put forward; but he says, as long as the Government asks for troops to carry on the war, so long is the House bound to grant the troops that the Government ask. Now, my Lords, so long as the Government, acting in the discharge of their Government duties, and more especially so long as they are prosecuting a war of this consequence and magnitude, I hold that very great latitude should be given to them, and that they should be supported so far as support can possibly be given to them consistently with constitutional principle, even at some sacrifice of private feelings. But, in the discussion which has taken place to-night, the powerful speech of my noble Friend (the Earl of Ellenborough), delivered with more than his usual eloquence, ability, and power, has completely disposed of every part of this question, and that speech has never been attempted to be grappled with by one Member of Her Majesty's Government. The noble Lord the Under Secretary for the Foreign Department (Lord Wodehouse) has taken exception to the terms in which my noble and gallant Friend (the Earl of Hardwicke) has characterised the arguments he used. But, without intending anything disrespectful to the noble Lord opposite, I entirely concur with my noble Friend in thinking that the arguments on which he rested his case—the plea of necessity that he put forward in such piteous tones to the House of Lords for the purpose of inducing them to adopt a measure bad and unconstitutional in itself—is one degrading to the Government to bring forward, and humiliating to the country to accept. That plea of necessity—of so-called, but not proved necessity—is the only reason that induces my noble Friend (the Marquess of Clanricarde), contrary to his own judgment, to give to the Government the support of his vote, while to us (the Opposition) he gives the benefit and support of his speech. I hope, after what has passed this evening—after the alterations the Government have at once consented to introduce, the moment that feeling had been excited out of doors by this Bill—but alterations which they ought not to have been ready to make if they had really had in view those momentous considerations involved in the measure—a measure not even brought forward on the sole plea of necessity, as an objectionable, but as a last and unavoidable remedy—I say, my Lords, if the measure had been brought forward in that character and under such circumstances, the Government ought to have been prepared to adhere to and vindicate every syllable of it; but because it is not a well-considered Bill, and because they did not themselves care to say whether the number of hired foreign troops in this country was to be 10,000 or 15,000—seeing that they had not considered the objects and calculated the effects the Bill would produce—for these reasons, in the first moment of a cry out of doors, to alter, even to modify, and, I admit, to improve the measure—I hope that these alterations, so made under the circumstances, and that submission to opinion out of doors, will speak for themselves, and that they will furnish a complete answer to any charge made against noble Lords on this side of the House of unfairly harassing the Government. My Lords, so far as the great question is concerned, we have carried forbearance to the utmost. [The Duke of ARGYLL: Hear, hear.] The noble Duke cheers in a very ironical manner; but I ask him whether he does not consider it to be a matter of forbearance when, upon a question involving the deepest interests of the country and great constitutional principles, we are satisfied that Government should call Parliament together to discuss such a measure not ten days before the necessary breaking up of Parliament; and when, in consequence of the short space of time which we have left us for the discussion of the public business of the country, we not only permit them to introduce that measure and read it a second time without opposition and without discussion, without even having it printed on the morning on which the discussion should have taken place, but allow them to proceed to the next stage on the very following day? When was a Bill of so much consequence, on which there was a material difference of opinion in the House, and a difference of opinion (which the Government have been obliged to admit) out of doors—when was a Bill of that kind permitted to pass with so much haste and so little consideration? Now I hope I have sufficiently answered the taunting cheer on the part of the noble Duke opposite with reference to the forbearance manifested by this side of the House. My Lords, I say, if this Bill be justified on the plea of necessity, that is a necessity for which Her Majesty's Government ought to be responsible. The noble Earl the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Earl Granville), in reply to some observations which had fallen from my noble and gallant Friend behind me (the Earl of Hardwicke) on the reduction of the military establishments in time of peace, thought it necessary to advert to the little progress which was made during the short time my noble Friend and myself held office, in raising those military establishments. During the ten months for which we held office, I will venture to say that, although we were by no means satisfied we had done everything which might have been required towards the increase of the naval and military establishments, yet that a greater increase was made in the number, amount, and efficiency, both of the naval and military departments than had been made for the space of ten or twelve years previously. It was not only that we added 5,000 men to the army and 2,000 to the navy; I should like to know what Her Majesty's Government would have done at the present moment if, in 1852, we had not raised and organised, in spite of much opposition, the militia of the kingdom? It is very convenient for noble Lords now to laud the militia as an invaluable corps and a supplementary army; but did we not meet with opposition in attempting to institute that corps?—what predictions of failure and of inability to carry out our plans—what predictions of a want of public spirit in the nation, of the necessity of having recourse to the ballot, and of all the other elements that could tend to defeat our object? Yet we triumphed over all that opposition in the House; we found no opposition out of the House. At the end of that time, when we had raised the militia to an amount beyond which you have not attempted to carry it since, we are told now, forsooth, that we did nothing in 1852 towards remedying the deficiency of a peace establishment! Is that all? I ask the noble Earl opposite to consult the noble Lord the Commander in Chief of the Forces if he is of that opinion. I ask the noble Earl to inquire of him what was the state of the artillery, of the guns and gun carriages, and what were the means of carrying on a war, if it had come upon us within a twelvemonth of 1852. I ask the noble Earl to inquire of the noble Commander in Chief where Her Majesty's Government would have been at this moment but for the provision of guns and carriages made in 1852. I might go further. I will ask the noble Earl to go to the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty, and to inquire of him what he thinks of the introduction, in the course of those ten months, of no less than nine screw line-of-battle ships, which never would have been afloat at this moment but for the exertions —to which justice has never been done—of my noble Friend (the Duke of Northumberland). From no feeling of pride on my own part, but from a feeling of the justice that is due to my colleagues in that Administration, I will say that in those ten months more was done for strengthening the army and navy in time of peace and securing efficiency in case of war, for the administration of the military and naval services and the increase of our naval force, than had been done in many years previous, or than, I believe, has been done since, until the immediate pressure of the moment began to be felt. But now we are told that this is a case of necessity, and that the war has come upon us all of a sudden. But the war has not come all of a sudden upon any single person, except upon Her Majesty's Ministers. The whole of the rest of the world anticipated the war for the last two years—or for the last eighteen months at all events. And for the last eighteen months you ought to have been levying forces and increasing by every means both the regular army and the militia, so as to relieve you from this degrading necessity, as I will continue to call it, to come to Parliament before the first year of the war is well over, and to say that you have not the means of carrying it on without the aid of foreign troops. I will not go through all the arguments that have been used with regard to the means you have of raising these German troops; from what quarters you are likely to derive them, and whether with or against the consent, or with the contrivance, of their respective Sovereigns—I will not ask whether, under those circumstances, you are likely to obtain the best and most valuable troops; but this I will say, that the preamble of the Bill of 1804, to which the noble Duke has made reference—the preamble of that Bill thought it necessary to recite that, "whereas there was a large number of foreigners ready and anxious to take arms in our cause, and to join with us in combating the common enemy, but cannot be admitted into the Royal service without the consent of Parliament," therefore it had been thought fit to make an application to Parliament for leave to take them into our pay.

The Duke of NEWCASTLE: The recital is the same as ours.

The Earl of DERBY: Have you recited that there are a large number of foreigners partaking of your sentiments, involved in the same interests, having the same objects in view with yourselves? Can you recite that?

The Duke of NEWCASTLE: No; but the other recites what we do.

The Earl of DERBY: If the other recites only what Her Majesty's Government do, it recites very little indeed. The other recited that there was a very large body of men anxious and willing to enter our service. The Government knew from whence they were to come, on what kinds of service they could be employed, and for what reasons and to what extent they could be relied upon; for those reasons the Government demanded the permission of Parliament to incorporate them in our army. But you, where are you going to get your large body of men? You will not say. I do not believe you know. I think it is extremely doubtful whether you are likely to get them at all, either with or without the consent of the petty Sovereigns of Europe whose subjects they would most likely be. But you say you must have them. How many do you require? What is the amount of your necessities? What number will you seek of those indispensable German troops without whom you cannot carry on the war.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: the Emperor of Russia would be extremely obliged to me if I would tell him.

THE EARL OF DERBY: You have already told the Emperor of Russia that without German troops you are unable to maintain the honour of your country. The noble Duke thinks he has said something exceedingly smart; but when he comes to ask the House of Commons for leave to incorporate them, and for a sum of money to pay them, he will be obliged to state the real number, whether five or fifty thousand, for whom he makes the demand. Therefore, really, do not tell me that the amount of your requisition upon Germany is kept a secret from the Emperor of Russia. But I think it is as great a secret to Her Majesty's Government, both the number wanted and the number you are likely to obtain. But let the amount be what it may, you have declared it a matter of paramount and overwhelming necessity that you should have those German troops. I think it was stated on the other side of the House that, so far as Parliament is concerned, the Government might engage those troops on their own authority, but that they could not introduce them into the country. I cannot subscribe to any such proposition. My noble Friend has shown quite conclusively what would be the shortest way to pass these troops into the Crimea. You yourselves say you do not want to keep them in this country, and in that you only speak the opinion of the country, who do not want ever to see them, or have anything to do with them at all. But if it is absolutely necessary that you should have those troops, and if you have the power of employing them without the sanction of Parliament, you have not the power of bringing them into England. Yet if you choose to take upon yourselves the responsibility of intrusting to such hands the honour and the safety of the country—for nothing short of a question of the safety of the country can justify your course—then I say, take that responsibility upon yourselves alone, ask the House of Commons, if you will, to pay them, but do not ask Parliament to sanction that course, nor to put their fiat, which I am sure I for one never can do, to the assertion that the necessities and the honour of the country demand the employment of a mercenary band. It has been from the earliest times—from the period of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire down to the period at which Alfieri penned those memorable words,

> "Del non suo ferro cinta,
> Pugnar con braccia di streniere genti"—

from all times, and in all countries, the hiring of mercenaries has been the surest mark of the weakness of a nation, and the certain sign of approaching decay. I do not believe that England is in that state. I do not believe that, if proper measures were taken to raise a proper amount of troops, you would have any difficulty in finding as many soldiers as you desired. I am told that at the present moment, although you have somewhat lowered the standard, yet you might with safety lower it considerably further. I believe that lowering the standard, and increasing the bounty, would soon bring a considerable addition of men to your ranks. But I am also told that even at present you refuse a man who has reached the age of thirty years. Now, you want this particular increase at this particular moment. You want it for an immediate occasion, and for a period of some three or four years. Now, I want the Government to tell me, upon that question, whether the men of thirty years of age, in the full power of manhood, and in the greatest activity both of body and mind, are not for four or five years' service infinitely preferable to the lads of seventeen or eighteen whom you are sending out to the Crimea, to a pestilential climate, and to all the toils, hardships, and difficulties in which our troops are now engaged? Lower your standard, increase, if need be, the bounty, increase the age at which you will admit soldiers into the army, and depend upon it you will have no difficulty. If you will tell the country what number you want, a sufficient number will be found to maintain the honour of the country; but I tell you this—if you tell the country that her means are exhausted, and that we must have recourse to foreign troops, because British troops cannot be found or will not come forward, or are too raw and undisciplined to be trusted, then you extinguish the feeling of the country and damp the whole national spirit, which is now entirely and altogether with you. Encourage that spirit, for God's sake, for it is the safeguard of the country; it is the bulwark to which you have to trust; it is, under Providence, your main prospect of carrying this war to a successful and honourable issue. But if you wish to damp that spirit and run counter to the feelings—perhaps I might call them the prejudices—of the country, you check that national ardour which is at this moment of critical importance to the nation's fate—if you intend that to be the result of your legislation, then and not unless, you will press this Bill.

The Duke of ARGYLL: The noble Earl who had just sat down referred, in a tone of considerable harshness, to a word—which escaped from me in comment upon one of his observations. I do not wish for a single moment to continue any tone of asperity in this debate. I will tell the noble Earl opposite exactly what I meant. I cannot doubt for a single moment that the noble Earl and his Friends are anxious to support any measure which they believe to be absolutely essential for the interests of this country; but I do protest against the noble Earl assuming to himself the merit of extraordinary magnanimity. I do not believe that the noble Earl would oppose the Government in any measure he thought absolutely essential for the safety of the country, but the noble Earl takes every opportunity, whether a real or supposed one, of detracting from the merits of the Government, and importing party spirit into the debate. But what I most complain of in the noble Earl is, that, after the only valid objection which could possibly be alleged to this Bill, founded on ambiguous wording, has been removed, he has continued to speak of this Bill as an unconstitutional measure. I freely admit it would be an unconstitutional measure, if the Government had ever dreamed of bringing in foreign troops to supply the place of the militia of this country, and to use them for the purposes of internal regulation. No such intention ever existed for a single moment in the mind of the Government. They followed the words of the Act of 1804; but as soon as it was pointed out by the noble Earl, in this discussion, that it was capable of bearing such an interpretation, my noble Friend the Minister of War came forward voluntarily, and said that, if the words could possibly bear such a meaning, he was willing other words should be used expressly to exclude such signification. There is another point on which I complain, not of intentional, but of unintentional unfairness on the part of the noble Earl opposite. He goes on to talk—and all the arguments of the noble Earl, which almost pass the fair limits of debate, are founded on this—he goes on to talk of the damping character of this measure, as a confession of weakness—a declaration that we are reduced to it as a last necessity. He asks us, what is the "absolute necessity" of the Bill. Really, my Lords, there are degrees of necessity and of expediency. We do not say Britain will absolutely sink if we do not get foreign soldiers. All we say is, that going into this war, after many years of peace, after a peaceful policy tending much to reduce the standing army of this country, we now find ourselves engaged in a great operation, for which we require an immediate addition to our forces, and that, although we have perfect and absolute reliance fully as great as that which noble Lords can place on the spirit and energies of this country—although my noble Friend behind me has himself told me that the volunteering for the militia and the recruiting for the line are going on at an increasing ratio (God grant they may long continue to do so!)—nevertheless, upon an immediate emergency, we thought it our duty to be prepared for all possible contingencies; and, although we do not say that it is an absolute and indispensable necessity, such as the noble Earl describes it to be, we do say that it may probably be most important to have the aid of some foreign troops. I say we do not come to Parliament in a cringing spirit. We do not represent before the Emperor of Russia this country as having exhausted its resources. We say we are but beginning to draw upon our resources—we are confident they will be sufficient; but we say we are engaged in a great and important operation; and I will ask the noble Lords how they will reconcile with their consciences all their appeals to passion—which I will say partake more of the character of claptrap than anything I have ever heard in this House. Talk about the hire of mercenaries, when the noble Earl knows himself that the noblest victories won under the Duke of Wellington were won partly by the assistance of those whom the noble Earl degrades as hirelings! Ay, and the noble Duke, a colleague of the noble Earl, who is intentionally absent on this occasion because he cannot agree in the noble Earl's objections to the Bill—that noble Duke came forward the other night and told you that a nobler part was never played than that of those whom you are now stigmatising as mercenaries. But it is pretended that there are distinctions between the cases. Not only was there no distinction in respect to their being mercenaries; they were many of them not subjects of the same Sovereign. But the noble Earl goes on and points out another distinction. He argues as if there were no common interest. We believe that there are bodies of men who will be willing to assist the troops of England in this war, because it is a European war. We believe the analogy is precise. We believe the German Legion took part in the victories of Wellington, because they believed that there was being fought on the plains of Spain a contest not national, but European, and that every fortress taken and every victory gained was a fortress surrendered by tyranny, and a battle won in the cause of freedom. We believe this legion will go with precisely the same feeling. Do not misrepresent our language; do not tell us we say that the resources of England are exhausted. We deny it—we say they are not only not exhausted, but that we are only beginning to draw upon them; but we say that Lord Raglan and his gallant army are engaged in a great and possibly a perilous undertaking. How will you reconcile it with your consciences if by your rejection of this measure you prevent the Government placing at Lord Raglan's disposal, for immediate operations, some 10,000 or 15,000 gallant, possibly German troops, interested as you are in repulsing the power of Russia, and in reducing his great stronghold in the Euxine? Although I do not believe that noble Lords opposite are guided by unpatriotic motives, I believe they have allowed themselves to be led away by the claptrap language I have just spoken of, which ought to have no weight at all in deciding your Lordships' opinions.

The Earl of DERBY hoped, although the noble Duke had unfortunately revealed the secret whence these troops were to be raised, that the Emperor of Russia would not hear of it. But the noble Duke had fallen into a mistake with regard to his noble Friend (the Duke of Richmond), who, in making a few observations upon presenting a petition yesterday, stated that he made them then because he should be unable to be present at this debate, as he was going down to-day to take the command of his regiment.

On Question that "now" stand part of the Motion, their Lordships *divided*:—Content 55; Not Content 43: Majority 12.

Resolved in the *Affirmative*. House in Committee accordingly.

Amendments made: the Report thereof to be received *To-morrow*.

House adjourned till To-morrow.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Friday, December 15, 1854.

Minutes.] Public Bills.—1° Judgments Execution, &c.

ST. PAUL'S CATHEDRAL—QUESTION.

Mr. LABOUCHERE wished to put a question to his right hon. Friend the Chief Commissioner of Works on a subject of considerable interest to the metropolis. Hon. Members were aware that there was now a vacant space on the south side of St. Paul's Cathedral, occasioned by the recent destruction of premises, and from which the only unobstructed view of that noble pile could be obtained. He thought it would be disgraceful alike to the country and the metropolis if that vacant space were allowed to be covered again; it was understood it might be purchased for about a sum of 60,000*l.*, and he thought that ought to be done. He was quite aware of the difficulties which beset a question of this sort; but he would ask his right hon. Friend to state to the House whether his attention had been directed to the subject, with a view of preventing the space in question being again covered with buildings?

Sir W. MOLESWORTH replied, that his attention had been called to the subject some months ago; and, while he entirely agreed with his right hon. Friend that the open ground to which he had alluded ought not to be again covered—it being the only place from which an unobstructed view of St. Paul's could be obtained — they must remember that land belonged, not to the Government, but to the City of London, and, as his right hon. Friend had stated, was valued at the sum of 60,000*l.*; now, although, he might be of opinion that it would be a gross act of Vandalism on the part of the City authorities to build upon it, he as Commissioner of Works had no power to prevent it, nor had he any funds at his disposal for the purchase of the ground in question; indeed, he did not think if he had, that Parliament ought to give 60,000*l.* to the City of London for the purpose of inducing them to do their duty. He would willingly second any plan that would prevent the land alluded to being built over, provided it did not involve the outlay of the public funds, and he promised to bring the matter to the attention of the City authorities.

AUDITORSHIP OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER—APPOINTMENT OF MR. BERTOLACCI—QUESTION.

MR. WISE, seeing the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Nottingham (Mr. Strutt) in his place, would venture to put a question to him with reference to an appointment to what had hitherto been considered a sinecure office. He wished to know what were the circumstances under which the appointment of Mr. Bertolacci to the office of Auditor of the Duchy of Lancaster took place?

MR. STRUTT said, he was very glad to be able to give the hon. Member the information he desired, the more especially as there had been an erroneous impression that the appointment was altogether of a sinecure character. When he held the office of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster his attention was directed to the state of the accounts of the duchy, which, although kept with perfect accuracy, were not kept in accordance with a system which afforded that clear, intelligible, and full information which such accounts ought to give when laid before Parliament and the country. Being, therefore, most anxious that those accounts should be placed before the country in an improved condition, the gentleman to whom he most naturally looked to effect this object was the auditor of the duchy, which office was at that time held by the late Mr. Lockhart. Nothing could be further from his (Mr. Strutt's) intention than to disparage the memory of that gentleman; he was a man distinguished in literature, and who was originally appointed in consequence of his literary eminence, and who performed his duties with punctuality and ability; but it would be perfectly obvious that a gentleman who throughout the whole of his life had been devoted to the pursuits of literature could not be expected to be perfectly conversant with public accounts, and it would have been unreasonable and unfair to assign to him such a task. As, however, it appeared to him (Mr. Strutt) that it was his duty to take care that the opportunity should not be lost of placing the office of auditor upon a new footing, with a view to efficiency, economy, and improvement, and as it appeared to him that the duties were not very laborious, and might be discharged during his leisure hours by some gentleman holding another official appointment, he thought that he could not do better than follow the example set with great advantage in the Duchy of Cornwall, where a gentleman had been appointed auditor who had great experience in public accounts, and who held another office in the public service. He therefore applied to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to recommend him some gentleman well qualified for the appointment, then filling some public office, whose vocations would allow him to undertake the duties of this also; and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, after making inquiries, recommended Mr. Bertolacci, a gentleman holding an appointment under the Board of Ordnance, as a person well qualified in every respect for the duty. The right hon. Gentleman had informed him that Mr. Bertolacci had had great experience in the public accounts, and had on more than one occasion done much service in disentangling accounts of great perplexity and difficulty, and was a gentleman of strict integrity and the highest character. The Chancellor of the Exchequer recommended that he should also consult those gentlemen under whom Mr. Bertolacci had more immediately served in Government departments. He did so, and they all concurred in giving him the highest character, and testifying as to his fitness for the vacant office. Under those circumstances he made the appointment; not, however, at the previous salary of 400*l.* a year, but at the reduced stipend of 200*l.*, which he considered a fair remuneration for the services performed. He would only add, that he had no personal acquaintance with Mr. Bertolacci whatever, and he believed it was not until he was recommended to him by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that he had ever heard his name. His only object in making the appointment was to secure efficiency and economy in the conduct of that department of the service.

AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS—QUESTION.

Mr. J. B. SMITH inquired of the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade what measures had been taken to collect agricultural statistics throughout the United Kingdom?

Mr. CARDWELL said, it would be in the recollection of the House, that in the last Session of Parliament a Report had been laid on the table of the House of the results of the experiment tried in three counties in Scotland, and two in England, and the House was so well satisfied with the returns that it voted the sum of 13,000*l.* for further experiments in the same direction; namely, for the continuance of the system already in use in Ireland, the collection of agricultural statistics for the whole of Scotland, and for eleven counties in England. The abstracts of the returns for Ireland had already been sent in, those for Scotland had been nearly completed, and the result of the experiment for the eleven counties in England, he believed, would be returned in the course of the month of January, and probably laid before Parliament about the ordinary time of meeting.

Mr. J. B. SMITH inquired whether it was the intention of the Government to extend the inquiry to the whole of the country?

Mr. CARDWELL believed, if the present experiment turned out satisfactory, it would be further extended.

THE COAL MINES OF HERACLIA—QUESTION.

Mr. EWART inquired of the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty, whether there would be any objection to lay before the House such information as might have been received respecting the quantity and quality of the coal available in the mines of Heraclia, on the southern coast of the Euxine, and its probable utility for steam navigation and for fuel for our army?

Sir J. GRAHAM stated, that an arrangement had been made with the Turkish Government, by which the coal mines of Heraclia were to be worked conjointly for the benefit of the forces of England and France in the Black Sea. The coal was of very good quality, and useful for the purposes of steam navigation when mixed with coal of superior quality. The Government hoped that about 30,000 tons annually would be raised, which would be divided equally between the forces of the two countries, and, as the working would be placed under the control of the Commissariat, there would be no difficulty about any portion that was suitable being used for fuel.

THE HOSPITALS AT SCUTARI—SCRIPTURE READERS—QUESTION.

Mr. HAMILTON said, the Secretary at War was aware that several Scripture readers had been sent out from this country by benevolent individuals for the purpose of reading the Holy Scriptures to any of our wounded soldiers who might be desirous of their services. It had been reported that these Scripture readers had been refused admission into the hospitals, while other persons, Sisters of Charity, and members of religious orders, whose duty and object it was to promulgate their own religious opinions, were admitted into the hospitals. Considering that the majority of our soldiers were Protestants, he wished to know whether this report was well founded, and, likewise, whether any and what regulations were made by which members of religious orders, when admitted into the hospitals, were prevented from impressing their own peculiar religious opinions upon any but those of their own communion?

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT said, he would endeavour to explain to the hon. Gentleman what were the regulations laid down for the admission of nurses, of Sisters of Charity, and members of religious orders to the wounded troops in the hospital at Scutari. The Sisters of Charity, to whom the hon. Member alluded, stood upon a different footing from the person sent out by authority of the Government to minister in a religious capacity to the troops. When it was deemed advisable to send out female nurses to Scutari, regulations were laid down that they should be admitted to the hospitals without reference to their religious creed, but at the same time that they should be under the orders of one person, and that one person was a Protestant. A certain portion of nurses were accordingly selected from different training institutions, who were all Protestants; and when the ladies belonging to the Sisters of Charity proposed to go, we told them that we were willing to accept their services; but at the same time observed, that we could make no difference between them and persons of any other religious denomination in regard to the regulations that had been laid down; and he was bound to say that the Sisters of Charity made not the slightest objection. As the question of the hon. Gentleman included what regulations were made for securing practical acquiescence in this, he would read an extract from the instructions addressed to Miss Nightingale—

> "I feel confident that, with a view to the fulfilment of the arduous task you have undertaken, you will impress upon those acting under your orders the necessity of the strictest attention to the regulations of the hospital, and the preservation of that subordination which is indispensable in every military establishment; and I rely on your discretion and vigilance carefully to guard against any attempts being made among those under your authority, selected as they are with a view to fitness and without any reference to creed, to make use of their position in the hospitals to tamper with or disturb the religious opinions of the patients of any denomination whatever, and at once to check any such tendency, and to take, if necessary, severe measures to prevent its repetition."

The Sisters of Charity assented to those regulations, and entered into an engagement that they would on no account make any attempt to enter into religious controversy with the wounded. The Scripture readers stood upon a different footing. It was not true that no provision had been made for the reading of the Scriptures to the wounded and the sick. Chaplains of different denominations had been appointed to administer religious consolation to the troops. It was, however, impossible to admit of an indiscriminate admission of persons professing to be ministers of every denomination into the hospitals. The army might be said to be divided, religiously speaking, into members of the Church of England, Presbyterians, and Roman Catholics. He trusted he need not say that he considered all to be equally good Christians; and though soldiers were not theologians, at the same time it was most important that every precaution should be taken to prevent the introduction of religious controversy among them. There were sent out to the army in the East and to the hospitals at Scutari chaplains being members of the Church of England, Presbyterian chaplains, and Roman Catholic chaplains, in nearly equal proportions to the requirements of the numbers of the army of each denomination. But, in addition to these, there had also been a number of Scripture readers employed, who were selected from among a body of deserving men, and placed under the orders of the chaplains. He had seen a statement in the newspapers that certain persons described as Scripture readers had been denied admission into the hospital at Scutari. This he understood had arisen; but he spoke under reservation, because he judged only from one or two private accounts he had seen; but he apprehended the fact was, that certain persons acting as Scripture readers had gone out of their way, and, without any authority from home, had been admitted to the hospital, and had distributed tracts of a controversial character. That was evidently in violation of the rules of the hospital, and the proceedings which had consequently been taken, he felt bound to say, were absolutely necessary for the purpose of carrying out the regulations of the hospital, the objects of which were solely these, that every effort should be made to afford religious consolation to the troops, but at the same time to prevent the introduction of religious controversy among them.

VOTE OF THANKS TO THE ALLIED FORCES IN THE CRIMEA.

Lord JOHN RUSSELL: Sir, in rising to perform the task which I have undertaken, I have the satisfaction of knowing that, however feebly or incompletely that task may be performed, I shall have the sympathy of this House. I cannot doubt that all those who are concerned in, and who approve, the expedition that has been sent to the Crimea, will cordially join in acknowledging the deeds of valour, constancy, and fortitude which have been, and which they had a right to expect would be, performed; and I should say, still more strongly, that those who thought that the expedition was unwise, that it was undertaken with inadequate means, and that our army was exposed to duties for which it was unequal, will still more be inclined to admire the superhuman efforts that have been made by that army. I therefore, Sir, proceed with this task in full confidence that the House will heartily approve of the Motions which I am about to submit to them.

In performing that task, I may, perhaps, say at the outset that I shall endeavour, as far as possible, to avoid repeating the details of actions, a narrative of which has been given by Lord Raglan in his own clear and admirable language. I shall also endeavour to avoid entering into any question of tactics, or of military criticism. I hold that we are none of us well qualified to perform that task—one which can only be adequately performed by those who are not only practically familiar with the art of war, but who also know all the circumstances of the operations which have been undertaken, and of the manner in which those operations have been conducted. If I were to give an illustration of my meaning, I would mention that in a *History of the French Empire* the historian, in recounting the operations which occurred at the battle of Wagram, states that the first Napoleon, having carried the battle to a certain extent, and seeing the victory incline in his favour, ordered certain manœuvres to be performed; but that he said afterwards that there was another manœuvre which would have been far more decisive, and would have led to far more splendid results, but that, as his army was not at that time composed of those veterans who were accustomed to war—as many of his troops were young and inexperienced—he could not rely upon their steadiness for the manœuvre, which was of a difficult and delicate nature. Now, Sir, a military critic, having discovered that such a manœuvre might have been performed, might have easily blamed that great commander for not having undertaken it; but he, knowing all the circumstances, and being aware of his position, the ground on which he was to operate, and the temper and disposition of his troops, was no doubt very correct in the tactics which he adopted. So, likewise, in regard to every military operation; unless you know exactly the nature of the ground on which the general is to operate, and unless you can count exactly upon the force which he has at command, and likewise upon the state and temper of his army, it is impossible for you to judge accurately with respect to the operations that are by him performed. Now, I say this, because it is my intention only to state what are the operations which have been performed, without making any comment upon them. I have no doubt that they were performed with very great ability. I have no doubt they were performed according to the best judgment that could be arrived at under the circumstances. But I do not intend, on this occasion, to meet any objections which may be made as to any particular course of conduct taken by our army on any particular day.

Now, Sir, let me proceed to state the position of Lord Raglan. Lord Raglan was chosen by Her Majesty to command the expedition which was sent to the East. That choice was dictated by the reflection of the services which he had already performed both in the army and in other capacities. Lord Raglan, when he was a young man, might, under the influence of a very powerful family connection, have obtained any position he might have aspired to; but the only thing he asked of the Government of that day was to be attached to the staff of Sir Arthur Wellesley. He was attached to that staff; and from that time every step that he has gained in rank in the army has been due to his merit, and to his merit alone. I remember him perfectly well upon several occasions when I had the honour of being at the head-quarters of the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsula, performing all the duties of military secretary to that great captain, at a time when he had not only to conduct the military correspondence of the army, but also the correspondence with the Government at home, with the Secretary of State, with the Secretary at War, and with the Portuguese and Spanish Governments. This was business amply sufficient to employ any office in this country which has the most business to perform, and yet it was all performed by Lord Raglan, owing to the clear head and facility of despatch which he possessed, amid the hurry of arms; and that without for a moment allowing his attention to be diverted from his duties in the field. After accompanying the Duke of Wellington in his long career, and being severely wounded, he was at length appointed to a position in the service in which he was called upon to perform other and more important duties to his country. And if the character of the army of this country has been in any degree exalted, and if the selection for promotion that has been made shows how much desert has been attended to, it is in a great degree to Lord Raglan that the country has been indebted for these results. Such was the man, therefore, who was appointed by Her Majesty to command the army in the East; and let me say, further, that having been so appointed, he at once commanded the confidence and affection of the British army, and in a very short time he obtained the entire confidence and the hearty co-operation of the generals of our Ally, the Emperor of the French. When we have to consider that our operations were to be conducted in common, and that they were to be conducted in common with the forces of an ally with whom we had not been at all events accustomed to co-operate in the field, however intimate the alliance between the two Governments might have been during a period of peace, the House and the country will see that it was not only by his decision and valour in the field—and greater valour was never displayed—but that it was likewise by other and no less necessary qualities, that Lord Raglan has been of so much service to his country.

And now, Sir, I will proceed to that expedition and those contests in which some of the best blood of this country has been shed; and when I say the best blood of this country, I by no means intend to refer to any particular rank, military or social; for I feel that among the best blood of this country is the blood of those sons of labour who, having entered the military profession, have devoted their whole hearts to their duties—men who have stood in the field of battle without the hope or expectation of being distinguished by those rewards by which men in higher stations are often swayed, but who have performed their duty nobly, reckless even of their lives, at the same time with a feeling of religious obligation that all must admire; for while they have endured with the greatest firmness the assaults of their enemies, they have shrunk with the utmost avoidance from committing the slightest outrage upon any one. I am confident that these children of the peasantry of England are of no less worth in blood and courage than the sons of the highest and the noblest of the land. The embarkation of the British troops took place towards the end of August. In a despatch of the 29th of that month Lord Raglan mentions the acknowledgments that he thinks are due to the officers of the British navy (of which I shall take notice hereafter, when I come to that part of the Vote) for the assistance they had given in order to effect the embarkation of so great a number of troops. The expedition proceeded to the Crimea. There was some question with respect to the place of disembarkation. Lord Raglan himself preceded the fleet in a swift steamer, surveyed the coast, and found that some points which had been thought of as landing-places for the troops were guarded by numerous redoubts and fortifications, and at length fixed upon a place for disembarkation, to which he obtained the assent of Marshal St. Arnaud, the commander of the French army. This selection was so judicious that the whole army was disembarked without opposition, and the important operation was effected safely and completely in the course of two days. Here was already a proof of the skill of Lord Raglan, which was calculated to give great satisfaction to this country. Having landed on the 14th of September, the army proceeded, and effected a march of considerable length on the 19th. On the 20th of the month they marched two miles further, and, finding the Russian army intrenched on the heights above the Alma, they attacked it, and in the course of two hours made themselves masters of those heights, the Russian army making no further attempt to retake and occupy that position. It was a position well chosen and of great natural strength—so strong that the right of the Russian position was quite unassailable from the precipitous nature of the ground; and it is generally believed that Prince Menchikoff, who there commanded, said it was a position in which the allied army might be kept at bay for three weeks, and be thereby prevented from proceeding to the siege of Sebastopol. Yet such was the brilliant valour of the British and French troops that they carried those heights. The Light Division of the British army having encountered a heavy shower of musketry and grape which, for a time, thinned their ranks, the brigade of the Guards and the Highlanders came up and attacked the position with such vigour and determination that the Russians yielded the heights, never again to attempt their occupation. I have already said that, with regard to the details of this action, Lord Raglan has told them in the clearest and fullest manner. I may mention, however, some circumstances relating to that noble Lord himself. Marshal St. Arnaud carried at the same time the left of the Russian position. The charge of the French was so impetuous and so vigorous that the Russians yielded the ground, and the French army was established on the heights which they had occupied. On the British side great masses of troops were collected. Lord Raglan, seeing the great force with which he had to contend, desired an officer of his staff to go to a height which he pointed out, and see if there was any chance of approaching it with our guns. The officer returned and said he thought it was possible, and Lord Raglan immediately directed two guns to be carried to the height. The Russian artillery was so powerful and so incessant that many of the artillerymen who manned those guns were killed in ascending the height; but the guns were placed where Lord Raglan had desired, and an officer of his own staff fired the first shots that were discharged from them. They were not effective; but presently they got the range, and other shots were so well directed against the masses of the Russian infantry, and made such chasms in their ranks, that after a time the whole mass began to move, the columns were shaken, and the Russians compelled to retreat. This was a proof, as I think, conclusive of his skill as a general—his seeing with so much accuracy in what point the enemy could be assailed, and directing, with that coolness which belonged to him, and with that decision which is likewise his characteristic, the mode in which the vast forces of the enemy might be most successfully opposed. While I speak of the coolness of Lord Raglan, I may, perhaps, be permitted to mention what has been named by an officer of his own staff—that, thinking he exposed himself too much—that he had gone too far in advance, a place where the Russian fire was exceedingly hot, and that the life of a commander ought not to be so risked—one of his staff said to him that he thought he was exposing himself too much; when Lord Raglan's answer was, "Don't speak to me now; I am busy." There is nothing of epigrammatic wit, there is nothing, perhaps, of heroic sentiment in these words, but they were the words of an English gentleman attentive to his duty, and quite regardless of any danger while he was discharging it. After the battle of the Alma the army halted for a time, while both the military and the seamen of the fleet were employed in assisting the wounded, in carrying the wounded to the ships, and in burying the dead. The English and French army then proceeded, and the river Katcha was crossed without any difficulty, the Russians having abandoned all defence of that river; but when they came to the Belbek they found on the course of that river certain works of defence which the Russians had constructed to prevent the disembarkation of the military stores of the allied forces. Great consultation was accordingly necessary, when it was considered whether those works should be attacked—whether the army should proceed, as had been originally intended, to attack the north side of Sebastopol, or whether some other course should not be taken? It was decided that, instead of occupying themselves in reducing these works, the army should at once and at all risks, march across the woods to the south of Sebastopol and endeavour to make themselves masters of Balaklava. That march was accomplished on the 25th of September with great skill, the army being exposed, of course, to the dangers of a flank attack while they were performing it; but it was most successfully performed. They seem to have surprised the Russian commander, for the rearguard of the Russian force was met on the right of Sebastopol, between Bakshiserai and that place. The English and French army proceeded without difficulty to make themselves masters of the heights and the country between Balaklava and Sebastopol—an operation which was performed with great skill and success. But immediately after this operation Lord Raglan had to lament that the officer with whom he had co-operated, with whom he had consulted both as to the original decision upon the undertaking of the expedition, the means of embarkation and disembarkation, and the fight of the Alma, was so reduced by illness that he could no longer continue the command. Marshal St. Arnaud, with that heroic spirit which distinguished him, determined to persevere to the last in performing his duty to his Sovereign and his country. He was determined that, though in a few weeks, perhaps in a few days, nothing but his cold dust might remain, that dust should not be without its laurels. He retired from the field, went on board the fleet, and in a day afterwards expired. We must all lament an officer who had shown so much gallantry and so much heroism, and with whom our own army had so much reason to be satisfied; and we shall always acknowledge him as an officer who, to the last day of his life, had performed his duty. I cannot omit here the words in which Marshal St. Arnaud spoke of the conduct of Lord Raglan at the battle of the Alma, because they are words coming from the chief of the army of another nation, and which, while they show the generosity of the writer, at the same time worthily show the character of him who was the object of them, "The bravery of Lord Raglan," writes (Marshal St. Arnaud) "rivals that of antiquity. In the midst of cannon and musket shot he displayed a calmness which never left him." The command of the French army then fell into the hands of General Canrobert; and it is with great satisfaction I can state that, both in previous concert and ever since he has had that command, Lord Raglan and General Canrobert have acted together with the rivalry only who should best serve the common cause—with no other rivalry, with no species of jealousy, but each admiring and applauding the character and actions of the other. On the 28th of September the army occupied the heights in the neighbourhood of Sebastopol. About ten days had elapsed when, after a full examination of the ground, the impression of Sir John Burgoyne and other eminent officers—but I mention Sir John Burgoyne because he was best qualified to give an opinion on the subject—their impression was, that the task would be far more difficult than had been supposed. It had been imagined that, the regular fortifications of Sebastopol on the land side never having been perfected, the allied armies might have begun operations close to the town, and destroyed those defences—they considered that with such artillery as they had, the capture of the town might have been readily effected. When I look back to the letters that were written at that time by various officers and transmitted to us by our Ambassador at Constantinople, I find a confident anticipation that Sebastopol would soon fall. Sir John Burgoyne, however, on examining the ground, found that, as the hills where they parted and fell towards Sebastopol opened into wide ravines separated from each other, the troops that were placed on one part of a hill could not co-operate with those on the other: he therefore found that it would be very difficult to carry on the operations in the way originally intended, and that it would be dangerous, above all, to leave any part of the English forces unsupported on such ground as I have described this part of the neighbourhood of Sebastopol to be. It was accordingly resolved to bring as much heavy artillery into the batteries as could be brought, and our soldiers, day after day and night after night, laboured with singular perseverance in order to place in position a sufficiently large amount of heavy guns to destroy the defences of the place. But it was obvious that, from the moment that determination—that necessary determination—was taken, the prospect became one of a very distant kind; for the Russians, having a great quantity of heavy artillery in Sebastopol, having likewise all the guns of their large fleet which lay in the harbour, and having a considerable garrison, besides the crews of the ships, and without counting the population of Sebastopol, would have a force equal to, if not superior to that of the allies. From that moment, therefore, the task became one of very great labour and difficulty; but both on the French side and on the side of the British nothing was left undone in order to hasten on the works, and to open a formidable fire on the Russian fortifications. On the 17th of October that fire was opened, and produced very considerable effect. Many of the guns in the Russian batteries were dismounted, and some of their works were for a time nearly destroyed. At the same time the fleets, both English and French, came near the forts towards the seaside, and opened a most formidable fire for some hours against those defences; but, that fire not having produced the effect of leaving the place open to the immediate assault of the allies, the Russians occupied the night always in repairing the defences which had been destroyed, and in replacing other guns as substitutes for those which had been dismounted. In this manner, therefore, the siege went on till the 25th of October; when the Russians, coming round by the valley of the Tchernaya, made an attack on our outposts at Balaklava. These redoubts were occupied by Turks, and the Russians succeeded in making themselves masters of them. They advanced a great force of cavalry; but the heavy cavalry of the British, not regarding their superiority of numbers, attacked them with great gallantry, and forced them to retire. On the same day, by the misconstruction of an order that had been given by Lord Raglan, an attack was made by the light cavalry upon the line of the Russians, comprehending their batteries of artillery, which were guarded by other batteries in flank, and by large bodies of infantry and cavalry. Nothing could be more distinguished than the bravery of the British troops on this occasion. I believe at no time in the annals of the British army has courage been more signally displayed. We may lament the misconstruction that occurred—we may lament the fruitless result of the action, and that it did not produce the effect which, under different circumstances, it might have caused; but that cannot be the least disparagement to the valour of these men, who were ready, at any risk, and with these immense odds against them, to charge the enemy they saw before them and whom they were directed to attack. The works of the siege continued, those works being in themselves very laborious, occupying a far more than ordinary proportion of the besieging force, and the more fatiguing because a great portion of the men had been taken away by sickness—cholera having not yet ceased in the camp of the allies. It was in this state of things that an immense effort was made by the commanders of the Russian forces—perhaps I should rather say, by the Emperor ot Russia himself, for two of his sons were present—in order to overwhelm the forces of the allies, which remained on the one side, besieging a great fortified place with a numerous garrison and intrenchments defended by a prodigious artillery, and, on the other, confronted by a Russian army. That attempt was made, it has been said, by 60,000 men; but I think it probable that the number was not less than 80,000. They were troops who had not been present at the battle of the Alma—troops did not know the enemy they had to encounter. These troops, raised to the utmost pitch of fanaticism, and, it is said, their courage animated by other means, came in vast columns to the attack of the British position on the heights of Inkerman on the 5th of November. Lord Raglan has related the events of that battle. He has stated how, in the darkness of the night and in the fog of the morning, the Russians were able to place a very large artillery force—not less than ninety pieces—and to advance vast columns close to the English position. In that darkness and thickness of the fog it was impossible to exercise the powers and the discrimination of a commander. It was impossible to survey the field or to direct operations. There were only about 8,000 British soldiers in that field; but though their numbers were few—though they had been weakened by sickness and battle—though they presented themselves ragged from the labours and privations they had gone through—though, amid the darkness, they could hardly recognise the companions and comrades of their own regiments—though a great portion of them came after twenty-four hours' hard work in the trenches—though they had not time even to take a scanty meal before they met this powerful enemy, yet they retained unquenched and unquenchable the spirit of British soldiers, and that spirit bore them on to victory. It was, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary at War truly said the other night, the battle of the soldiers. But yet that band of heroes, exposed as they were to an artillery against which nothing for a very long time could have stood, might have been—not driven from the field or defeated—but might at last have been forced to lay down their lives on the heights, which the enemy, in consequence of their overwhelming numbers, might then have occupied, had there not at this very moment arrived, after the English had for hours withstood a most determined attack, a reinforcement of our French Allies, commanded by General Bosquet, one of the most distinguished chiefs in the French Army, who directed with great skill and valour the troops he led to the spot. The French soldiers rushed on with such impetuosity that they saved the day, and preserved both armies from disasters which might otherwise have overwhelmed them had the Russians gained any part of the position, and from that had been able to continue the attack against the Allied forces. Still, including these French troops, there were but 14,000 men of the Allies engaged in this famous action; and I believe, in respect to the destruction of the enemy, scarcely any battle has been equal to it. More than 5,000 dead were left on the field of battle by the Russians, and it would be a moderate estimate to say that three times as many must have been wounded; so that these 14,000 Allied troops caused a loss to the enemy of far more than their own number. I believe, Sir, that no modern annals contain the history of a battle which redounds more to the honour of those who gained it than the one I am now alluding to. It has cost, indeed, the loss of many a gallant man—it has caused desolation and misery to many families, but I am persuaded that the renown of that battle will last and its effects will be appreciated for generations to come. We have seen that in the course of that battle, there were many vicissitudes of success; but we have seen that the heroism of those brave troops prevailed; and they who had to meet such troops—they who have to give an account of what it is to attack such troops—will be slow to think that Russia can ever gain the advantage in the war she is now waging against soldiers so indomitable. I will now advert only to the general operations of the siege, and to the assistance we have received from the Navy. The general operations of the siege, as I have stated, have been conducted by officers of great experience, and have been of the most laborious kind. The sufferings and privations of our troops have been such as never before were equalled; and, in alluding to the losses we have sustained, I cannot omit mentioning one name—the name of a general who fell at the battle of Inkerman—because, from his character, his talents, and his former services, the country had every reason to expect to see in him a complete military commander. I allude to Sir George Cathcart. Possessed of great ability and of a high spirit, he was so universally esteemed that, when the question of sending out a Governor to the Cape upon some emergency arose, that great military authority the Duke of Wellington concurred in thinking that no more skilful commander and no wiser chief could be selected than Sir George Cathcart. I remember witnessing last year, after he had just returned to this country from that important mission in which he had fulfilled the expectations of his Sovereign and his country, the joy and exultation with which he hailed his good fortune in being at once appointed to a command in the Crimea. To the last hour of his life—to the last moment of his life—according to those who saw him, that feeling of joy and exultation seems to have continued, and he appears to have had no other ambition and no other wish than to devote his life to his country, and to spend the last drop of his blood in her service. Such are the men who do honour to this country, and by this country the name of Sir George Cathcart never will be forgotten.

Sir, having said thus much with respect to the Army, I now have to state that it will also be my duty to propose a Vote of Thanks to the Navy for their co-operation. I have mentioned that Lord Raglan, at the commencement of the operations, said that the zeal and efficiency of the Navy in performing the service of embarking and landing the troops was beyond all praise, and that from Admiral Dundas down to the lowest sailor there were exhibited the same zeal and the same eagerness to discharge the duty efficiently. He notices especially the conduct of Sir E. Lyons. In relating the Battle of the Alma, and after expressing his deep feeling of gratitude to the officers and men of the Royal Navy, he says, in words which I think I ought to quote—

> "They watched the progress of the day with the most intense anxiety; and, as the best way of evincing their participation in our success, and their sympathy in the sufferings of the wounded, they never ceased from the close of the battle till we left the ground this morning to provide for the sick and wounded, and to carry them down to the beach, a labour in which some of the officers even volunteered to participate—an act which I shall never cease to recollect with the warmest thankfulness. I mention no names, fearing I might omit some who ought to be spoken of; but none who were associated with us spared any exertion they could apply to so sacred a duty. Sir Edmund Lyons, who had charge of the whole, was, as always, most prominent in rendering assistance and providing for emergencies."

Thus it is that he speaks of that distinguished officer, who, together with those men who so acted, is an honour to the profession to which he belongs, and from whom, I trust, we may expect, in the course of the war in which we are now engaged, great and brilliant services. A man of greater ability, in whatever duty he may be employed, I scarcely ever met with, and his meritorious conduct is well known to his country. After this operation, Sir Edmund Lyons was again most forward in the operations at Balaklava, entering the harbour at the same time that Lord Raglan was descending upon that place, and from that moment to the present he has been most prominent in rendering every assistance to the army. After the fire against Sebastopol had commenced, Lord Raglan and General Canrobert asked Admiral Dundas and Hamelin to co-operate with the fire of their ships on the batteries on the sea side. This service was willingly undertaken. The injury, as I have said, to the land batteries was not such as to justify the troops in attempting an immediate assault, and therefore the fire of the ships did not produce effect, except for the time; but had the army been able by their batteries on shore to lay open the place, as seemed to have been expected, then the diversion caused by the navy would have been most useful. I believe that every officer engaged on that service performed his duty most excellently, and to the perfect satisfaction of his superiors.

After moving these votes, I shall next venture to propose one of an unusual character—one, perhaps, without precedent—but, considering the feeling of the country, one to which this House will no doubt readily agree. I mean to propose a

Vote of Thanks to General Canrobert, and to the French officers and men who have co-operated with Her Majesty's forces. Sir, such has been the feeling created by the gallant acts performed by Englishmen and Frenchmen conjointly—two manly nations that have always respected each other—that I believe the bonds of friendship thus formed between two nations will not be easily dissevered. These two nations, the most enlightened, the most intelligent, and the most spirited of Europe, may well act in alliance together, and give an example to the world of duties resolutely performed and of high principles adequately maintained.

Sir, I likewise mean to propose a Vote lamenting the fate of those who have perished in these actions; and offering the expression of our condolence to the families of those brave men who have died in the service of the country. I wish there was not a part of the task I have to perform which, though I think I cannot omit it, I cannot approach without some feeling of repugnance. All the accounts we have received from those who witnessed the battle of Inkerman—and there are some similar accounts with respect to the battle of the Alma; but all those relating to the battle of Inkerman state, that when the officers and soldiers of the allied army fell wounded on the field of battle, the Russians, instead of taking them prisoners, bayoneted these unfortunate men on the field. Lord Raglan and General Canrobert, deeming the introduction of such a practice so abhorrent from humanity, and a departure from the usages of civilised warfare, were of opinion that it ought not to pass unnoticed; and consequently Lord Raglan ordered evidence to be taken by the Judge Advocate on the spot. Twenty-four witnesses, officers and soldiers, were examined, and they deposed to having witnessed those acts of barbarity on the part of the Russian soldiers, instigated, as they thought, in some instances by Russian officers. The commander of the allies sent an officer with a flag of truce to Prince Menchikoff, to represent the circumstances to him, and to state that he felt quite convinced that such acts must have been committed against the Prince's orders, and to express a hope that the Russian commander would take measures to prevent such barbarities in future. I wish I could state that the answer of Prince Menchikoff expressed that horror which might have been expected from an officer in his position at such inhuman acts. He stated that it was not the custom of the Russian army to give no quarter; but he added, that the Russian troops might have been excited, because a church had been sacked by some detachment of the allied forces. It is said—whether truly or not I do not know—that a church had been entered by some of the allied soldiers, and had been sacked; but that that circumstance should be mentioned as any palliation of acts so barbarous as I have alluded to, is, I must say, not to the credit of the Russian commander. We all know what was the conduct of the French and English soldiers towards each other, when they met in conflict on the battle-fields of the last war. We all know that in the Peninsula, after a battle was over, they would meet on the banks of the same stream, with their cross-belts off, as the Duke of Richmond said, help one another, and converse together in the most friendly manner, showing that they mutually respected each other. We all know that when a vidette was seen by the advancing army, whether English or French, the troops approaching scorned to fire on or capture a man standing alone, but, helping him on with his knapsack, they told him to fall back on his own comrades. Such actions, Sir, are characteristic of civilised nations, and in such a spirit one would have hoped that this war in the nineteenth century would have been conducted. The atrocities I have alluded to show, not certainly that any Russian General would order such cruel acts to be committed—not certainly that the great Sovereign of the Russian empire would countenance them—but that the enemy we have to deal with, if they should ever obtain a dominion over any great part of Europe, would, instead of civilising and improving, not only destroy the arts of peace, but barbarise the practices of war. I therefore trust for this, among other reasons, that the cause of England and France may be triumphant, believing that it is connected with all the best interests of civilisation, with the progress of humanity, and with the spread of real religion. Men who had been thus excited by fanaticism, as we know the Russians were previously to the Battle of Inkerman, who were called upon in the name of the Christian religion to take up arms and go into the field of battle, were guilty, within a few hours, of acts such as I have stated. Let us trust that the Government of Russia, ashamed of these deeds, will take some means to prevent their repetition.

Sir, there is one thing further I have to say, and that of a more agreeable nature to myself, and with respect to which I trust I shall have the concurrence of this House. It was said, in reference to one of the victories gained in the course of the last war, by Mr. Wyndham, that, for his part, he would rather have to celebrate a gallant feat of arms performed by the British army, than the conquest of a whole archipelago of sugar islands. I am convinced that that saying of his was as spirited and wise as it was forcible and pointed. It is in these things that the life of a nation is seen; it is by actions such as we have to commemorate to-day, that the spirit of a nation is maintained from age to age. It is by battles and victories such as we have the glory to record in our history—by battles such as the French have likewise to record in their annals—it is by battles and victories such as those to which I have had to call the attention of the House to-day, that each nation owes its separate existence; and it is such exploits that make each country ready to defend its independence at any cost. We have been for years, all of us, the Parliament, the people, every class, engaged in speculations and practices connected with the progress of wealth, the arts, machinery, and improvements of peace; and we have shown that these studies and that devotion to these pursuits have not in the least abated the courage which belongs to the entire nation. We have shown, whether English, Scotch, or Irish, that a similar spirit animates the whole United Kingdom, and that we are ready to peril in a just cause all that is most dear to men. I say again, Sir, that the victories which have been gained in such a cause as the present, and with such a spirit as the nation has shown, must not only redound to the fame and glory of the country for future generations, but enable it to present itself to all aftertime as an object of regard, respect, and admiration to the whole world. The noble Lord concluded by moving the several Votes of Thanks, which are identical with those moved by the Duke of Newcastle in the House of Lords—*see* p. 323.

Mr. DISRAELI: Sir, there have been occasions in the history of this country, when Votes similar to these have been proposed to the House, when Members have entered into criticisms upon the conduct of commanders and the policy of Ministers; but I am sure that however much we may venerate Parliamentary precedents, the House must have sympathised with the noble Lord, when he said that to-night there would be no difference of opinion upon the Motion which he was about to submit to our notice. Sir, the noble Lord has treated the theme which he has introduced in a manner so entirely worthy of its interest, that it would be unnecessary and unbecoming in me to enter into any detail of those actions which recently commanded the admiration of the world. But, Sir, I feel that I am expressing the opinion of all present when I say that this is no common war, that will some day be covered with the mere dust of history. I feel, Sir, that this is a war which will rank with those great struggles that produce not only historians, but in time poets even, to celebrate their lasting achievements; like those famous deeds of the Crusades, handed down to the wonder and admiration of men —and many of which have been accomplished in the memorable region where these great exploits are occurring. If I may for a moment allude to what seems to me a characteristic feature, there is a singular completeness in this the first campaign of the allied armies which has scarcely attracted observation. The campaign commences by the allied troops taking by storm one of the most difficult positions in the world, an almost impregnable position; and it concludes virtually two months after by the same force defending a similar position from a similar attack by an immense force. Thus we see, both in assault and in defence, the same troops, exhibiting the same admirable and unequalled qualities. Between these almost epic events, I ought not to forget there is a brilliant episode—the fight of Balaklava—that was a feat of chivalry, fiery with consummate courage, and bright with flashing valour; and though I cannot presume, with the authority of the noble Lord, to single out the names of great commanders for the applause of the House of Commons—I cannot forget, I cannot refrain from calling to your recollection, that the two commanders on that memorable occasion almost recently sat amongst us on these benches, and that they, I am sure, will peculiarly value the sympathy of the colleagues whom they have quitted. Sir, the noble Lord has very properly said that it is not for us to criticise the tactics and the strategy of campaigns; but it is open to us to draw some moral conclusions from the great events which are occurring around us; and we may at least draw this conclusion from the war which has broken out. I think what has occurred has shown that the arts of peace, practised by a free people, are not enervating. I think that the deeds to which the noble Lord has referred, both of the commanders and the common soldiers, have shown that education has not a tendency to diminish, but to refine and raise, the standard of the martial character. In these we may proudly recognise the might and prowess of a free and ancient people, led by their natural and traditionary chiefs. These are all circumstances and conditions which are favourable to our confidence in the progress of civilisation, and flattering, I hope, to the consciousness of every Englishman. Sir, there is one point on which I could have wished that the noble Lord had also touched—I know there were so many subjects which he could not avoid touching, that I share the admiration of the House at the completeness with which he appeared to have mastered all his themes; but when the noble Lord recalled to our recollection the deeds of admirable valour and of heroic conduct that have been achieved on the heights of Alma, Balaklava, and Inkerman, I could have wished that the noble Lord had also publicly recognised that the deeds of heroism in this campaign have not been merely confined to the field of battle. We ought to remember the precious lives given to the pestilence of Varna, and to the inhospitable shores of the Black Sea; these men, in my opinion, were animated by as heroic a spirit as those who have yielded up their lives amid the flash of artillery and the triumphant sound of trumpets. No, Sir, language cannot do justice to the endurance of our troops under the extreme and terrible privations which circumstances have obliged them to endure. The high spirit of an English gentleman might have sustained him under circumstances which he could not have anticipated to encounter; but the same proud patience has been found amongst the rank and file; and it is these moral qualities which have contributed as much as others apparently more brilliant, to those great victories which we are now acknowledging. Sir, the noble Lord has taken a wise and gracious course in combining with the Thanks which he is about to propose tonight to the British Army and Navy, the Thanks also of the House of Commons to the army of our ally. Sir, that alliance, which has now for some time prevailed between the two great nations of France and England, has in peace been productive of advantage; but it is the test to which it has been put by recent circumstances which, in my opinion, will tend more than any other cause to confirm and consolidate that intimate union. That alliance, Sir, is one which does not depend on dynasties and diplomacy. It is one which has been sanctioned by names to which we all look up with respect, or with feelings even of a higher character. The alliance between France and England was inaugurated by the imperial mind of Elizabeth, and sanctioned by the profound sagacity of Cromwell. It exists not more from feelings of mutual interest than from feelings of mutual respect, and I believe that it will be maintained by a noble spirit of emulation. Sir, there is still another point upon which, although with hesitation, I will advert for a moment. I am distrustful of my own ability to deal becomingly with a theme on which the noble Lord so well touched; but nevertheless I feel that I must refer to it. I was glad to hear from the noble Lord that he intends to propose a vote of condolence with the relatives of those who have fallen in this contest. Sir, we have already felt even in this chamber of public assembly how bitter have been the consequences of this war. We cannot throw our eyes over the accustomed benches where we miss many gallant and genial faces without feeling our hearts ache, our spirits sadden, and even our eyes moisten. But if that be our feeling here, when we miss the long companions of our public lives and labours, what must be the anguish and desolation which now darken so many hearths? Never, Sir, has the youthful blood of the country been so profusely lavished as it has been in this cause —never has a greater sacrifice been made, and for ends which more fully sanctify the sacrifice—but we can hardly hope now, in the greenness of the wound, that even these recollections can serve as a source of solace. Young women, who have become widows almost as soon as they had become wives—mothers, who have lost not only their sons, but the brethren of those sons—heads of families, who have seen abruptly closed all their hopes of an hereditary line — these are pangs which even the consciousness of duty performed, which even the lustre of glory won, cannot easily or speedily alleviate and assuage. But let us indulge, at least, in the hope—in the conviction—that the time will come when the proceedings of this evening may be to such persons a source of consolation—and when the memory of those who are departed may be mitigated by the recollection that their death is, at least, associated with imperishable deeds—with a noble cause—and with a nation's gratitude. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by seconding the Motion of the noble Lord.

The first Resolution having been put—

Lord HOTHAM said, unwilling as he was at all times to trespass upon the House, he could not reconcile it to his feelings to refrain from expressing how cordially he was prepared to concur in the Motion which the noble Lord the President of the Council had made. The noble Lord had alluded to the time when he happened to be at the head-quarters of the Duke of Wellington during the Peninsular war, and to the opportunity which he had then of seeing how completely our present Commander in Chief in the Crimea performed all the various duties of the office which he then held. He was sorry to say, for one reason at least, that he but too well remembered that time also; but having, also, constantly seen Lord Raglan by the side of his illustrious chief, he rejoiced to find that he had turned the lessons in the art of war which he had then received to such good account. He, therefore, hoped it might be permitted to him, as one who had long known the noble Lord, though not with any degree of intimacy as to induce a feeling of partiality in his mind, but simply having learned to respect him for the manner in which he had discharged his public duties—he hoped it might be permitted him to express the satisfaction which he felt at seeing the noble Lord placed in a position of such eminence, and that he had been enabled to render services to the country of such a nature as to merit the Thanks of both Houses of Parliament. It would ill become him, after the speech of the noble Lord—a speech which, indeed, comprehended everything necessary to be said on such an occasion—to enter into any details of the various matters to which the noble Lord had referred. He was confident, however numerous and however brilliant may have been the services which the armies of this country had heretofore been called upon to perform, there had been no British troops ever exposed to greater difficulties, to greater privations, to greater dangers than those to which they were now about to vote the Thanks of the House. He was anxious, also, to say that he thought the House of Commons had good reason to be proud when it recollected how many of its own Members had shared in the triumphs which they were now acknowledging. They had unfortunately lost some of those whom they had been in the habit of seeing on those benches; while others were still preserved to them whom it was hoped would long be able to continue their important services. According to the rules of the House there could be but one hon. Member, who, from his situation, would be mentioned by name, in this Vote—he meant the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster (Sir De Lacy Evans). The hon. and gallant Member might be assured that whatever differences of opinion may exist in that House between the party sitting opposite to him, and himself, they were not disposed less readily than those sitting on the other side of the House to appreciate his distinguished services, and that the proposal now before the House would be concurred in by those on the Opposition benches with the same cordiality as it would be agreed to by his nearest and dearest friends. But he must not forget that they were about to vote their Thanks likewise to the sister profession. It would be presumptuous in him, having no connection with the navy, to say more than that it fully deserved their Thanks. The British navy had done what it had always done—rendered ready and efficient co-operation and support to the British army. And quite sure he was, that if the British army was ever engaged in any operation, however difficult, the success of which depended on the efficient assistance of the sister service, that that assistance would be rendered in the most ready, zealous, and meritorious manner. He would only add one word in allusion to another vote which the noble Lord intended to propose—that to the army of His Majesty the Emperor of the French. Whether that Vote was usual or unusual—whether it were sanctioned by precedent or not, he was of opinion that the occasion fully justified the course which the Government proposed to take, and he should as fully and cordially concur in that Vote as in the other Votes which the noble Lord proposed.

Mr. LAYARD said, that it had hitherto

always been his misfortune to act in opposition to Her Majesty's Government, and therefore it was now some consolation to be able to rise and join his voice in that of the general expression of gratitude and admiration for our army. As it had been his good fortune to be an eye-witness of the heroic conduct and sufferings of the army, he should feel that he was almost neglecting a duty if he did not express his cordial concurrence in this Vote. The noble Lord had given the House a detailed account of the campaign from the time of the landing in the Crimea to the battle of Inkerman; and he trusted that he (Mr. Layard) might now be allowed to mention to the House some few instances of individual heroism which had occurred in the course of that campaign, and which deserved especial notice. No sooner had our troops set foot on the shores of the Crimea, than, spite of the difficulties and discouragements to which they had before been exposed, they showed that they were made of the old British mettle. They wished but for one thing—to be led against the enemy. In the cavalry skirmish which took place on the day of the advance previous to the battle of the Alma, Captain Maude, of the Horse Artillery, greatly distinguished himself, and by the skilful management of his guns, completely drove back the Russian cavalry. On the following morning, a sight which had scarcely been ever before witnessed by most of those there, was presented to the British army. Those who reflected that the greater number of the men who were about to be engaged had never seen war before, trembled for the result. The storming and capture of the nearly impregnable position of the Alma was an achievement of unexampled valour. The combat on that day was worthily commenced by the French troops, and it was then that General Bosquet first displayed those great military qualities which had given him so high a reputation with both armies. The French soldiers under the command of that gallant officer scaled the almost inaccessible cliffs on the left flank of the Russians, and while they did so, the left of the British advanced on the centre and right flank. These gallant men carried everything before them, and in less than three hours the enemy was completely defeated and the position occupied. While they paid a just tribute to the valour of the British and French troops, he could not forget the services rendered by the British navy. The representatives of those who fought under Nelson united, like their predecessors, the two great elements of heroism—the greatest courage combined with the greatest tenderness. On the memorable day of the Alma, though our sailors took no part in the action, they did all in their power to succour and sympathise with those who fought and bled in the common cause. On the day following the battle, the ships of the inshore squadron sent on shore their crews with hammocks, and before nightfall a large number of our wounded men were taken on board the fleet. After the celebrated flank march to Balaklava—on which, he would not dwell—the siege commenced, and then the conduct of men who from morn to night passed their time in the trenches without food or shelter, under a severe climate, and at the same time exposed to the heavy fire of the enemy, exhibited instances of the noblest fortitude and heroism. He was sorry the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) had not alluded to the first battle of Inkerman, that of the 26th October, because it was a remarkable example of a small number of men defeating, with great loss, a very large force entirely on account of the admirable mode in which they were handled. This feat was due to the ability of General Sir De Lacy Evans, who had thereby increased the high reputation which he previously enjoyed in the British army. On the opening of the attack upon Sebastopol on the 17th October, the army and navy displayed equal courage; but his noble Friend having already spoken of the gallant actions of the army, he would mention two signal instances of heroism which had occurred in the navy. It would be recollected that that gallant commander, Sir Edmund Lyons, brought his ship, the *Agamemnon*, within 800 yards of such a mass of guns as was, perhaps, never before brought to bear upon any vessel, and, with only two feet of water under his vessel's keel, he received, from twelve o'clock in the day till nearly sunset, almost the entire fire of the Russian batteries. The depth of water in front of the batteries not being known, it was most important that soundings should be taken, in order to ascertain how near the *Agamemnon* could go to the shore. Admiral Lyons, therefore, sent for a young man named Ball, in command of a small vessel, used for transport and towing purposes, and addressing him said, "Will you go in before me and sound, and, if you come out, you shall have your commission?" The young man, without hesitating a moment, went on board of his ship, and with the utmost calmness advanced before the *Agamemnon* under the most terrific fire, and, having performed the service required of him with the utmost coolness, escaped untouched and reported the result to the Admiral. A feat of intrepid daring like this was scarcely excelled in the annals of warfare, and showed that our navy was still a nursery of heroes; and he noticed it in that House because it was an instance of the display of courage by an inferior officer which did not find its way into any official despatch. Again, during the action, at one time Admiral Lyons thought it necessary that some other ship should come in and take off part of the fire which was directed against the *Agamemnon*, and with this object he made signals, which unfortunately were not seen by the fleet. The Admiral having expressed his wish on the quarterdeck to communicate with some vessel of war, his own nephew—and this made the incident a more touching trait of heroism—his own nephew at once volunteered to proceed in a small open boat to the *Bellerophon*. Having obtained his uncle's consent, he went to that vessel, amidst a most terrible fire, and brought her to the side of the *Agamemnon:* this gallant officer was Lieutenant Coles. Examples of this description showed how the old spirit of the British Navy still survived; and in further corroboration of this fact he would relate an anecdote which he thought peculiarly characteristic of the British seamen, and which was illustrative of the feelings with which Sir Edmund Lyons was regarded by the men under his command. Before the attack of the 17th a report prevailed that the *Agamemnon*, being at Balaklava, would not go into action, but that her commander was to take the charge of another steamer, and lead the attack. One day, therefore, Admiral Lyons was summoned to the quarterdeck, where he found the whole of his ship's company assembled. The man whom they had chosen as their spokesman then advanced and said, that the ship's company had mustered together because they had heard that the Admiral was about to take the command of the squadron which was to attack the batteries of Sebastopol, but intended to lead in another ship; and, said this man, speaking for the ship's company, "We think it very hard, sir, that having had all the work we should have none of the sport." The gallant Admiral at once assured them that, wherever he went, there his ship's company should go too. The noble President of the Council, in describing the affair of Balaklava, had omitted an incident which was worthy of notice. The House was aware that our light cavalry charged between two flanking batteries—the one on its right and the other on its left; and that before them was drawn up, he might almost say, the Russian army—cavalry, artillery, and infantry. Our light cavalry fought their way under this terrific fire with a heroism and a courage that were hardly paralleled, but were terribly cut up by the batteries on each flank, and in especial by one on the left. It should be remembered that at this critical period a squadron of Chasseurs d'Afrique were ordered to attack the battery on the left, and with an indomitable valour, only equalled by that of our own troops, this small body of forty men advanced against it under the deadliest fire, carrying it, and enabled the survivors of our devoted band to come out of action and return to their tents. Out of the forty Chasseurs who performed this service two officers and fourteen men were left dead on the field. And, while upon the subject of the battle of Balaklava, he must touch upon a topic on which he would appeal to the House's sense of justice to listen to him for an instant. He alluded to the conduct of the Turkish troops, which had been most severely reflected on. It was easy to cast blame upon others when we perhaps deserved it in some degree ourselves; and, although he admitted the possibility of British troops being able to hold the redoubts which were occupied by the Turks for a longer period than those troops did, yet, in order to correct the misrepresentations that had been made relative to this matter, he begged leave to quote a passage from Lord Raglan's despatch describing the action at Balaklava, in which his Lordship seemed to justify the abandonment of these redoubts by the Turks. Lord Raglan wrote—

"The low range of heights that runs across the plain at the bottom of which the town is placed was protected by four small redoubts hastily constructed. Three of these had guns in them; and on a higher hill, in front of the village of Camara, in advance of our right flank, was established a work of somewhat more importance. These several redoubts were garrisoned by Turkish troops, no other force being at my disposal for their occupation. . . . . The means of defending the extensive position which had been occupied by the Turkish troops in the morning having proved

> wholly inadequate, I deemed it necessary, in concurrence with General Canrobert, to withdraw from the lower range of heights, and to concentrate our force, which will be increased by a considerable body of seamen to be landed from the ships under the authority of Admiral Dundas, immediately in front of the narrow valley leading into Balaklava, and upon the precipitous heights on our right, thus affording a narrower line of defence."

In fact, these redoubts were so hastily constructed as to have been untenable. The Cossacks jumped their horses over them, yet the Turks, though unsupported, did for some time defend them; and although, as he had said, they might perhaps have been defended some short time longer, no military authorities would be of opinion that they could have been successfully held for any considerable period. He had felt it only due to the Turkish troops to make that explanation to the House. He came now to the battle of Inkerman, which was indeed, as it had been described, one of the most glorious victories ever recorded. It would be recollected that General Sir De Lacy Evans mentioned in his despatch the names of three officers, among whom was Lieutenant Conolly, who bravely, at the head of their pickets, held their ground against an overwhelming mass of the enemy for nearly half an hour; and that he also commended the bravery displayed by a sergeant named Sullivan. Now, in Lord Raglan's despatch the names of the officers were specified, but that of the sergeant was omitted. He knew that this omission occurred by reason of a rule in the service, but he sincerely hoped that there would be some relaxation of the strict usage in this respect in future. At the second battle of Inkerman the Russians advanced against our position at daybreak in enormous masses. Our Second Division at first had almost alone to resist this overwhelming force, and yet regiment after regiment and company after company entered the field and remained there fighting incessantly until their ammunition was exhausted and they were almost borne down by force of numbers; at length General Bosquet came to their assistance; and he (Mr. Layard) could not refrain from bearing his testimony to the coolness and calm decision exhibited by that officer during this eventful day. Halting his division at first out of fire, he advanced with his staff to examine the position of the enemy, and then he sent his troops quickly into action to the assistance of our men in a manner which decided the fortunes of the fight. The French troops then distinguished themselves beyond all praise. He could not, before he concluded, help referring to one other point. In the vessel which conveyed him homewards there was a large number of Frenchmen who had been wounded in the battles of the Crimea. Among them he saw many privates and non-commissioned officers, bearing on their breasts the order of the Legion of Honour and other orders of merit which had been conferred on them for their bravery. As these men stood before him, showing the pride with which they regarded the honours bestowed on them, he could not help feeling a deep regret that we had not some similar mode of testifying the country's approval of such services. It occurred to him that there were men in our army who, though but its rank and file, would feel as proud of orders of merit, if given to them, as the officers who commanded them could be. It occurred to him that men who returned wounded or disabled to this country, with orders of merit on their breasts, would be more likely to have their future course in life beneficially shaped, and influenced by sentiments of honour and of a just pride, than men who were hastily or indiscriminately rewarded in the field by small pecuniary donations and gifts of that kind; and he therefore earnestly hoped that some higher mode would be adopted by the Government for acknowledging the prowess of our soldiery. In conclusion, allow him to say, that he was one of those few who thought the time had come when, without questioning its political necessity, and however great might be the sacrifices imposed by a struggle of this character, war was almost necessary for our national safety and our national honour. There had been many who believed that the people of this country had relapsed into a state of effeminacy—that a long peace of fifty years' duration had destroyed that British spirit to which we owed our liberties and our high position in the scale of nations. The recent events in the Crimea must, however, have dissipated all such gloomy apprehensions—the troops who fought at Alma, though they had never seen a battle before, showed that they possessed the true British spirit. Would that that great Captain who had been the noblest exemple to the true British soldier had been permitted to tarry a little while longer among us, that he might have seen that the British soldier had not degenerated! The feelings with which he joined in the Vote of that evening were greatly increased by the recollection that, united with the vote to the British army, was a vote to the brave troops of our French ally, and he trusted that that friendship which had been cemented between the two armies in the field of battle might be still further fostered by sentiments of mutual admiration, confidence, and respect, and prove of lasting benefit to the civilised world.

Mr. MONCKTON MILNES said, he wished to call the attention of the House to a practical point. This was a commemoration, not only of the living, but of the dead. It was impossible to forget how many eyes had been closed in death in the region of the Crimea. He wished, therefore, to suggest to Her Majesty's Government that they should take into their immediate consideration the position of the families of those British officers who had died in the battle-field. When we asked the British officer to sacrifice his life for his country, we made upon him a just demand. But when by our army regulations we asked him to go forth for the defence of his country's interests, and to leave his family in a reduced position, and in many cases in absolute penury, we asked more than a nation had a right to demand of any man. He (Mr. Milnes) was aware of the difficulties with which cases of the kind to which he referred were surrounded —he knew how the organisation of our army was mixed up with our social position —but he was sure that Her Majesty's Government would only be carrying into effect the desire of the country if they at least repaid to the family of those officers who had fallen, or might fall, in this war, the regulation price of their commissions. His right hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) had stated that more than one case had occurred of brothers having fallen in the present war. He (Mr. Milnes) begged to call the attention of the House to a case in which two brothers had fallen at Inkerman. Those brothers were officers in the same regiment, and both of them there sacrificed their lives for the honour of their country. One of them had left a widow with several children. Those brothers had invested the whole of their fortunes, and the one the greater part of his wife's fortune, in the purchase of their commissions; so that this family, to whom the nation was now returning thanks, was left with no other inheritance, and no other means of support, but the contributions of the benevolent and the glory of the name which they bore. This should not be. He could assure his right hon. Friend the Secretary at War that he could not do better than direct his attention to the cases to which he had referred. He trusted that this country would not, when next it had to return thanks to the officers of the British army, be troubled with the disgraceful reflection that no effectual requital had been made to those families, who had been ruined by the fall of their relatives in the battle-field.

Mr. H. DRUMMOND: Sir, I was very glad to hear the tacit and well-deserved rebuke communicated by the noble Lord in his admirable speech to those *dilettanti* civilians who become critics upon subjects and upon men, being totally incompetent to form any opinion. I can, of my own experience, give another illustration similar to that given by the noble Lord. I remember at the close of the last war dining one day with Sir George Murray. Colonel Nugent and some other celebrated men were present. Marshal Soult had sent the plan of the battle of Toulouse to Sir George Murray, and he said—"I don't think that we have got it right; I wish you would correct it, if it be not; but it seems to me that the Duke of Wellington would never have made so false a move as he appears to have done." I asked Sir George Murray whether he was right, and in reply, he said—"Yes; but he did not know the moral character of the troops with which he had to deal. The whole depends upon that, and unless a general be informed of the circumstances which sway a commander's mind, he is incompetent to form a correct opinion upon the matter." Now, Sir, I am glad to find something like a return to penitence upon the part of the hon. Gentleman behind me who has just sat down; for he thinks it necessary to vindicate the character of the calumniated Turks, who were not only charged with running away from the enemy's fire, but also of helping themselves to the dinners of the British officers and men. I hope that the hon. Member will go on in the spirit of justice. I can only say to him—

"Macte nova virtute, puer."

I hope, Sir, that we shall hear no more of his imputations upon admirals. I hope that we shall have no more imputations cast upon the personal courage of our admirals. I hope, Sir, that we shall hear of no more instances of violated hospitality in a gentleman who took advantage of the kindness and the hospitality shown him, to write home anonymous attacks upon the conduct of Admiral Dundas. ["Go on!"] No, I am not going on. I shall wait to hear spoken in this House what has been written anonymously—then I shall go on. We have much, Sir, for which to thank our commanders and men both in our army and navy. We have, above all, to thank Admiral Dundas, who, despising the critiques of men who are incompetent to form an opinion upon his conduct—despising the bad advice of ignorant men — despising "Our own Special Reporters," has preserved his fleet in such a condition that, even though we are no longer the besiegers, but the besieged, it is nevertheless in a position which is both safe and honourable.

MR. LAYARD: Sir, I hope I shall be allowed to defend myself from the attack that has just been made upon me. ["Order!"] I know that I am out of order; but still, I think, after the language that has fallen from the hon. Member near me (Mr. Drummond), that I may appeal to the indulgence of the House. Sir, no person regrets more than I do myself the unfortunate circumstance that has occurred. I wrote a private letter—a letter which I had not the remotest idea would be published. Unfortunately, however, that letter was published; and its publication has caused me very great pain. The letter was written on board of the ship of a gallant officer who received me, as he receives everybody, with a kindness I shall never forget. I went to that gallant officer and told him that my letter had unfortunately been made public, and that, if he were called upon, as I conjectured he would be, to ascertain the writer, he was at liberty to give my name to Admiral Dundas. Unfortunately, in that letter I had referred to a private letter from Admiral Dundas which had been shown to me by a gallant captain in the service of Her Majesty. I addressed myself to that gallant captain and said—

> "As I have been guilty towards you of a breach of confidence in so far that part of the letter which you read in my presence has been published in a letter to a friend of mine, any reparation that you may ask and that is in my power to give, I am willing to afford."

With regard to Admiral Dundas, I further said—

> "Express to him also the deep regret I feel that a private letter should have been published containing a charge which I would only have made in the House of Commons, and not in a newspaper anonymously; but that as the charge has been made, the only reparation I can give him, if he insists upon it, is to reiterate that charge publicly, giving him the opportunity of meeting it, and that I am ready to do."

I had hoped that Admiral Dundas's friends would not have been indiscreet enough to accept this challenge. Accusations such as that made by the hon. Gentleman on my left (Mr. Drummond) have been heaped on me, but I have held my peace—I have said nothing; but as the hon. Gentleman has challenged me this evening, I am ready in my place in this House, if called upon to do so, to substantiate the charges which my letter makes — to substantiate them from the despatches written by Members of the Government, and on the evidence of those who have served under Admiral Dundas and have witnessed his conduct in this campaign. I say this with deep regret, because I feel that the character of a British admiral is at stake; yet the character of England and of the fleet of England is at stake likewise; and as this insinuation of anonymous slander had now been thrown out, if Admiral Dundas's friends dare me to do it, I am ready to support the charges that I have made.

Resolutions agreed to, *Nemine Contradicente*.

On the fourth Resolution being read,

CAPTAIN DUNCOMBE said, that after what had taken place he had expected that some Member of the Government would have risen to vindicate the honour and character of Admiral Dundas. He feared, after what had transpired, unless something were said to the contrary, the present Vote might, perhaps, be taken as merely a formal one. He regretted that the First Lord of the Admiralty had thought it consistent with his duty not to say a single word in vindication of that distinguished Admiral, who was now maintaining the honour of his country; and he (Captain Duncombe) could not, on the present occasion, refrain from bearing his testimony to the zeal, ability, and discretion that had, in his opinion, distinguished the conduct of that gallant Admiral.

SIR JAMES GRAHAM: Sir, I regret that the hon. and gallant Member who has just spoken could suppose that we have shown the slightest indifference to the charges made against Admiral Dundas. The opinion of the Government upon the conduct of the gallant Admiral may be fairly drawn from the Resolution that has been proposed by my noble Friend the Lord President of the Council. That Resolution contains an expression of thanks to Admiral Dundas for his efficient services in the war. I do not think it at all necessary, in the face of such a Resolution, for any Member of the Government, least of all myself, to state in his place here, and upon his own responsibility, that he is of opinion the thanks of Parliament are due to that officer. I am very sorry that any difference of opinion should have arisen between two hon. Members in respect to the peculiar merits of that officer. I can only say that if the hon. Member for Aylesbury should think it his duty to bring on the charge he has made against Admiral Dundas, I shall take care to be in my place in this House to vindicate the character of that gallant officer. I think the present moment a most unseemly one for interrupting the harmony of our proceedings by any such discussion.

SIR F. BARING: Having been at one time at the head of the Admiralty, and after the observations made by the gallant officer, I beg to express a hope that the hon. Member for Aylesbury will, on better consideration, not consider it necessary to proceed further in this matter; but should he do so, I am satisfied that any investigation into the conduct of the gallant Admiral will prove most honourable to him. I cannot omit this opportunity to point out to the House the painful position in which a man in command is placed at the present time. The hon. Member for Aylesbury has stated, and I have no doubt correctly, that his letter was published without his sanction or by accident. I have seen other letters, also, which should never have been published, and which, he feared, had come through officers who ought to have known better. But when one finds that an officer in command, serving his country at a distance, is liable every moment to have the tittle-tattle that is running about — the small stories current in a fleet, sent home and published, and taken by the good people of England as the opinion of the whole service—when the officer charged is at a great distance, and utterly unable to defend himself, and who, if present, would be by his duty prevented from doing so, I think it is becoming on this House at least to show that the party aggrieved must not suppose that he is at all prejudiced by those stories. Sir, I think that published comments upon the conduct of our leading men at the seat of war have been carried to a great extent upon late occasions—and, indeed, I am afraid to a most mischievous extent. I am far from wishing to have any check placed upon these publications; but, if they are to be admitted, I must appeal to the justice of the House on behalf of our gallant officers, and remind them that the greatest caution should be observed in commenting upon the actions of those who are serving their country abroad.

MR. LAYARD: After what has fallen from the right hon. Baronet at the head of the Board of Admiralty, I must express my regret at what has taken place. But, with reference to what he had said of Admiral Dundas, he would read a passage from a despatch of the Duke of Newcastle to Lord Raglan, and see what is the language used by the Government themselves. This is a question involving the reputation of Admiral Dundas, but the question lies between him and the Government. Now, what is the sentence in the despatch?

> "Your Lordships' cordial acknowledgment of the invaluable services rendered by Sir E. Lyons and the officers and seamen of the Royal Navy."

So that in acknowledging, after a great battle, the services of the British Navy, the Government omit the name of the man in the chief command, and mention the name of the second in command. In the face of such evidence, what right have you to say that I should never have made the charge? The question is one that rests between the Admiral and the Government. As I have already said, I am ready to support the charges I have made. I am, indeed, compelled to do so; for I have no other way of removing any charge that may be made against my honour than by substantiating the allegations I have made. If the right hon. Gentleman will press it, I will attend in my place to make good the charge.

SIR J. GRAHAM: Though it is not very regular, I think it necessary to offer an explanation, which I hope will be satisfactory to the House, though it may not be to the hon. Member for Aylesbury. The hon. Member has alluded to a dispatch of the Duke of Newcastle, in which special thanks are given to Sir E. Lyons and the officers of the navy. Now, those thanks have reference only to the landing of the troops at Eupatoria. There are many traits in the character of Admiral Dundas which are honourable and praiseworthy; but if I should be called upon to mention a single trait for which he is peculiarly remarkable, I should say it is the generosity with which Admiral Dundas, while commanding the fleet, has delegated the largest powers to Sir E. Lyons, the second in command, and has joined in the fullest approbation of his distinguished conduct. With reference to the present question, Sir Edmund Lyons was selected by Admiral Dundas to superintend the landing in the Crimea, who conceded to him the largest powers, and it was to the trust so frankly confided that the success of the operation was mainly owing. Lord Raglan especially bestowed his commendation upon the operations of the fleet in connection with the landing, and mentioned particularly the name of Sir E. Lyons. And therefore it was that the special mention of Sir Edmund Lyons was made in the dispatch. Without adopting the language of Lord Raglan, I can only say I think it is somewhat hard for Admiral Dundas to be thus treated. Having entrusted to an officer the performance of this important duty, I say I think it is somewhat hard that the thanks earned by Sir Edmund Lyons, under such circumstances, should be turned against Admiral Dundas. An officer having been selected to whom the gallant Admiral trusted the performance of a certain duty, the Government in speaking of that operation would not have been justified in mentioning the chief in command.

ADMIRAL WALCOT: Sir, I trust I may be pardoned if I offer a few observations at the present moment. I am a naval officer, and I must say I never felt more wounded in my life than at hearing charges made against a gallant Admiral at a time when this House is assembled to record their thanks to the army and navy in the East, being the highest honour that could be conferred upon the United Service for the heroic actions they had performed. Sir, this honour is considered so great that it is handed down as a triumphant heirloom to the families of those concerned. Good God! I am wounded to the quick at having lived to hear such a charge against a gallant member of my profession—a profession that has ever been my glory. It would ill become me to stand up in defence of Admiral Dundas without the power of refuting the charges made against him; but I rejoice that the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty has had the manliness and proper spirit to avow his readiness, when suitably preferred in this House, to meet them, and vindicate the character of the gallant Admiral. With regard to the observations of the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard), upon the letters written by the Admiralty in commendation of the services of Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, and of the officers and men under his orders, I will not allow that their Lordships meant for an instant to detract from the merits of Admiral Dundas, but that they had in view at the time they wrote it, the particular matter with reference to which they felt themselves called upon to pronounce that commendation. As an act of justice to my dear relation, Sir Edmund Lyons, it is right I should state that I received a letter from him about six weeks ago, in which, after addressing me merely in terms of affecttionate love, he adds these words, "I am indebted to my Commander in Chief for the perfect responsibility he has vested in my hands, and I cannot but ever feel, in the performance of my duties, that I carry with me that encouragement and support." For Sir Edmund Lyons, furthermore, I can say that he would scorn to encircle his brow with a laurel at the cost of a brother officer. I again assure the House that I am really distressed and wounded at having lived to see the hour that I should hear an Admiral of the British Navy stigmatised as a coward, and I hope the House will pardon the warmth of the few words I have addressed to it.

CAPTAIN SCOBELL: Perhaps the House will allow me to state that I received a letter from my gallant friend Admiral Dundas, just before the publication of the "Letters from the maintop of the *Agamemnon.*" Even at that time my gallant friend was perfectly sensible of the unfair comments that were made upon him, and in so expressing himself stated that it was impossible for him to notice them. He felt them deeply, however; and I have no doubt whatever that they were undeserved; and I do say that it is cruel in the extreme at the present stage of our proceedings—when we are about to vote our Thanks to the Army and Navy—to pull in such a subject as this for the purpose of traducing the character of a gallant man—as

I believe him to be—who is still absent on service. If such comments as all our Admirals have been subjected to during the recent naval campaign continue to be indulged in, it is my firm opinion that the service of the navy will be greatly impaired and sustain irreparable injury. I have no doubt they will be able to vindicate themselves in the most satisfactory way, when the opportunity occurs, against all these comments. But with respect to the instance cited by the hon. Member for Aylesbury, that Sir Edmund Lyons and the officers and men under him only were mentioned in the despatch from the Admiralty, why nothing can be more obvious than that Admiral Dundas could not have been properly alluded to on the occasion. No commander in chief ever takes upon himself a subordinate duty. It was not Admiral Dundas's duty, therefore, to go and land troops. He would have been totally out of his place had he done so; and you might as well ask Lord Raglan to take a detachment of his troops for the purpose of executing some special service which it is the duty of some other gallant officer under his orders to perform. It is always the custom of the service—and right and proper it is that it should be so—that the commander in chief should take some officer who is under his command, send him on special service, which, though important, is small as compared with the superintendence of the whole fleet. Why was Lord Nelson detached from Lord St. Vincent's fleet when he gained the battle of the Nile? Because he was one of the acting admirals under Lord St. Vincent, and was, therefore, sent on that particular service. I can mention many other instances in which officers, detached on a given duty, have succeeded in reaping a rich harvest of reputation, in which, however, the commander in chief could not participate by reason of the very position he occupied; and this I believe to be the case with my gallant friend the Commander in Chief of the Black Sea fleet.

Mr. OTWAY: I deeply regret this interruption to the unanimity of the Vote we have now before us, and it is only just to recall to the recollection of the House the circumstances under which it occurred. Admiral Dundas's name was not mentioned until the hon. Member for Surrey (Mr. Drummond) rose in his place, and brought an accusation of a most serious nature against my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury, to which my hon. Friend subsequently replied. It was not the hon. Member for Aylesbury, therefore, who first introduced the name of Admiral Dundas into this discussion.

Resolutions *agreed to, Nemine contradicente.*

House Adjourned at half after Seven o'clock till *Monday* next.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Saturday, Dec. 16, 1854.

THE OLD PATRIOTIC FUND—ENLISTMENT OF FOREIGNERS BILL.

The Duke of GRAFTON having given notice that it was his intention to move, on Tuesday next, for a return of any sums of money which remained in hand from the Patriotic Fund established during the last war, and also for a return of the sums collected and received for the Patriotic Fund during the present war, and paid to the Commissioners appointed by Her Majesty, setting forth the places whence the subscriptions had come, and the names of the persons who had contributed.

The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH begged to suggest to the noble Duke that the Patriotic Fund established during the last war was a private fund, over which their Lordships' House could have no control whatever, and so no return could be ordered. In fact, the House had no official cognizance of it.

The Duke of GRAFTON thought the noble Earl might be right in his observation respecting the old fund; but the House had certainly a control over the Patriotic Fund for the present war.

The Duke of NEWCASTLE said, it was undoubtedly true that the old Patriotic Fund was a private fund, over which Parliament had no control. With respect to the present Patriotic Fund, there might be no objection to part of the return asked for; but there were lists published weekly giving an account of all the sums collected and received, and the names of the contributors, and the return which the noble Duke indicated would only be a repetition of the sums and names which appeared in these weekly lists. With respect to the Patriotic Fund of the former war, the balance remaining vested in private trustees. That fund, unlike the present, was not collected under the authority of a Royal Commission; and was not under the control of Commissioners? but if the noble Duke liked, he (the Duke of Newcastle) would undertake to make a communication to the trustees of that Fund, and would perhaps be able to ascertain the amount in hand. But of course he could not answer for the result of his application.

THE DUKE OF GRAFTON said, that under these circumstances, he would withdraw his notice altogether.

ENLISTMENT OF FOREIGNERS BILL.

Order of the Day for receiving the Report of the Amendments read.

Moved, That the said Report be now received.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH said, he really thought he was entitled to complain that any stage of so important a Bill as this—a Bill, too, which had been strenuously opposed on all previous stages—should have been fixed for a Saturday, when it was out of the question to expect any attendance of Peers beyond the noble Earl (the Earl of Aberdeen) and his colleagues, who came to support their own measure. At all events, he had come down himself to discharge what he felt to be a duty—to continue that opposition to the Bill which he had hitherto offered on its previous stages. He would not, on the present occasion, add any arguments to those he had previously endeavoured to lay before their Lordships; but he had now had an opportunity of reading over the Bill, as amended by the noble Duke, and would address a few observations upon it in its present shape. There were one or two points in the amended Bill to which he wished to call the attention of the House, but especially of the noble and learned Lord on the woolsack. It had been stated in the course of the former debates—and that statement had not been impugned—that the Crown had in its prerogative the right to enlist foreigners to serve in our armies abroad. By the Bill, as it originally stood, it was made lawful for the Crown to enlist foreigners, but no doubt the intention was that the power of the Crown should be extended by being permitted to raise foreigners to serve not only abroad, but in this country. By the Bill, as amended, the last provision was omitted altogether, and therefore, as the Bill now stood, it gave the Crown a Parliamentary authority to do that which it had been stated the Crown, by its prerogative, already possessed the right to do. He apprehended that a Parliamentary sanction of the Royal prerogative would practically, to a great extent, impair the prerogative itself. He was not disposed to question either the prerogative of the Crown to enlist foreigners, or to impair its present or future exercise, but, on the contrary, he conceived it might be used upon many occasions with great advantage, as in an instance which had been referred to already—the enlistment of the Sultan's subjects in our service. Upon that subject he would take another opportunity of entering. He now appealed to the noble and learned Lord on the woolsack whether, in point of fact, when Parliamentary sanction was given to the Crown, and it was made lawful by Act of Parliament for the Crown to do that which the Crown claimed the right to do by its prerogative, that prerogative was not practically impaired; and whether, on any future occasion, the Crown could exercise its prerogative without the authority of Parliament, after one instance of Parliamentary sanction being given? As to the other amendments introduced by the noble Duke, he must say that they did not in the slightest degree tend to mitigate his objection to the Bill. The noble Duke had offered, in the course of the debate, to reduce the number of foreign troops to be employed in this country from 15,000 to 10,000. That, however, had not been done, and the number remained, as at first, 15,000 men. Indeed, there was no practical limitation of the power originally granted by the terms in which the Amendment was conceived. Under the amended Bill, foreigners were to be permitted to remain in this country to be trained, arrayed, and formed into battalions, troops, and regiments; but they might also be retained here as a body of reserve, to supply vacancies occurring in corps serving abroad. There was no distinct and fixed proportion between the reserve and a main army in the field, and there was nothing in the Bill, as it now stood, to prevent the Crown, if employing 20,000 or 30,000 foreigners abroad, from retaining some 12,000 or 13,000 more in this country as a reserve. That proportion would not be more than was reasonable, as in Her Majesty's regiments serving abroad the reserve at home was usually one-third of the total number. With respect to the presence of those foreigners in this country, all the objections which he had originally stated applied still with undiminished force. Wherever those troops were stationed, if they were near any place where disturbance occurred, they, in the absence of British troops, might be called upon to preserve the public peace; the magistrates would be compelled, in the discharge of their duty, to call in the aid of these German soldiers. There was no general understanding—no expression of any intention on the part of the Government—to do anything to prevent that exercise of magisterial authority, or to interfere with the proper obedience of military authorities to the law. The Bill, therefore, still remained liable to all the objections he had made on the second reading; and, moreover, it had acquired in its progress the further objection, to his mind, that it impaired, very materially, a most valuable prerogative of the Crown.

The LORD CHANCELLOR thought that, whatever might be the merits or demerits of the Bill on other grounds, he could satisfy the noble Earl that it in no respect tended to impair the prerogative of the Crown. What was the prerogative? It was to employ abroad all foreigners who chose to serve Her Majesty, and whom She had the means of employing. How did this Bill impair that power? All that the Bill did was to enable Her Majesty to enlist foreigners, and to form them into battalions in this country for service abroad. It was idle to read the Bill by taking two or three lines, and then to stop short and declare that it impaired the Royal prerogative because it gave it the Parliamentary sanction. The Bill must be read altogether, and, so reading it, he (the Lord Chancellor) said, the Bill gave the Sovereign the right to enlist foreigners as She might enlist natural-born subjects, keeping and training them in this country, subject to the qualification that those foreign troops should be employed in this country only for the purposes of training, and as a reserve to feed the corps employed on foreign service. He could not imagine that it was possible for any one who read the Bill to say that it at all tended to impair the prerogative of the Crown. It only enabled Her Majesty to do something which She could not do without the sanction of Parliament, and it might be also that it included something which the Crown could do without the sanction of Parliament:—but reading the Bill as a whole, it was clearly hypercritical to say that the Royal prerogative was at all impaired by it, and for some time he had found it difficult to comprehend the objection of the noble Earl. His noble Friend, he supposed, referred to the first clause, which gave authority to Her Majesty to enlist persons not natural-born subjects. Certainly, under restrictions, that could be done now, but not as this Bill permitted—to be brought into this country and here trained.

The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH said, that in the first clause the Crown was permitted to enlist foreigners and to keep them in this country, but the second provision was no longer in the Bill. The first clause, as he understood it, made it lawful for the Crown to do that which it could do before, and therefore he was of opinion that it impaired the prerogative, as hereafter it would be inferred that the Crown could not do that particular act without the sanction of Parliament. In the second clause Parliament said, that in conferring the right to enlist foreigners, it was only on condition that a certain number should be brought into this country. It therefore limited the power of the Crown.

The Duke of ARGYLL said, that if the argument of the noble Earl was good for anything, it would apply equally to the Acts of 1794 and 1804, which must equally have impaired the prerogative of the Crown. ["No!"] He ventured to appeal to his noble and learned Friend on the woolsack whether it was not fair to contend that, if the Acts of 1804 and 1806 involved exactly the same provisions as the Bill now before the House, the argument of the noble Earl fell to the ground? The truth was, as far as he (the Duke of Argyll) could understand the matter, that the preamble and the first clause of the Act of 1804 went almost further than this Bill towards impairing the prerogative of the Crown, if they were spelt out as the noble Earl was disposed to spell out the provisions now under their Lordships' consideration. The Act of 1804 recited that the Crown had already enlisted a certain number of foreigners—of course in virtue of the Royal prerogative—but it went on to say that Parliament recognised such enlistment, and enacted that the men so enlisted should be held to be legally engaged in the service of the Crown. If the noble Earl would read the preamble and the first clause of the Act of 1804, he would see that the same construction might be put upon them which he (the Earl of Ellenborough) had put upon the present Bill. As the noble and learned Lord (the Lord Chancellor) had said, however, they must take this measure as a whole, and not spell out particular clauses or portions of clauses.

The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH said, his impression was, that in 1804 the Crown might have enlisted foreigners, though not lawfully, in this country, and that the object of the Act passed in that year was to render legal the enlistment of foreigners in this country as well as abroad.

Lord REDESDALE read the preamble of the Act of 1804, which stated the object of the Act to be, to permit certain foreigners then in Great Britain to enlist in the Royal service. It appeared, therefore, that such enlistment was illegal, before the passing of that Act of Parliament.

The LORD CHANCELLOR thought it was quite clear that the first clause gave to the Crown a power which it did not possess by prerogative, because it enabled the Sovereign to enlist foreigners in the same manner as if they were natural-born subjects. The Sovereign might enlist natural-born subjects in this country, and the clause empowered the Sovereign to enlist foreigners in the same manner. The truth was, the whole of the Bill should be read and construed together, and it was as plain as possible that its object was simply to give authority to the Crown to enlist foreigners for certain purposes, but for those purposes only, and to keep them embodied in this country.

The Duke of GRAFTON, although he did not approve of the Bill, suggested that foreigners enlisted under its provisions might be employed in the Colonies, but he objected to their employment in this country.

The Duke of NEWCASTLE said, the noble Duke might not be aware that he had on a previous occasion expressly stated to the House, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, that it was not intended to employ the troops to be raised under the authority of the present Bill in this country at all. He had stated that power was sought to admit foreign troops into this country, not for the purpose of employing them here, but solely in order to embody and train them with a view to rendering their services available in the Crimea. With respect to the employment of foreign troops in the Colonies, he should object to take any power to employ them there—and the Colonies did not want them. All that the present Bill purported to do was, to enable the Crown to raise foreign troops, to bring them into this country to receive a training, and to keep them as a reserve to be sent as required to the seat of war. He wished to say one word with regard to the observations which had fallen from the noble Earl opposite. The noble Earl had found fault with him for having brought on the Motion for the reception of the report on that day; but he (the Duke of Newcastle) believed it would be convenient to noble Lords on both sides of the House that the debates upon this measure should not be protracted so as to delay the passing of the measure over the period of Christmas. He had acted last night, as he conceived, in consonance with the feelings of all parties, when he gave notice in the presence of a large number of Peers of his intention to bring up the report on the Bill to-day. He could not conceive, therefore, that upon that ground the noble Earl had any cause of complaint. The noble Earl had remarked, that he (the Duke of Newcastle) had offered to substitute the numbers 10,000 for 15,000 in this Bill, and that he had not done so. Most unquestionably he had made such an offer, but no intimation was given to him that the proposal met the views of noble Lords opposite. The noble Earl, instead of accepting the offer with his usual grace of manner, found reasons for objecting to the employment of 10,000 foreign troops, as he did to the employment of 15,000. The noble Earl brought his military knowledge to bear upon the subject, and pointed out the proportion which a reserve ought to bear to the troops employed upon active service. As he had stated, the object of this Bill was merely to provide for the training of soldiers, and therefore the question of the proportion which a reserve ought to bear to a main army on service was wholly irrelevant, and it was still his (the Duke of Newcastle's) intention to make the alteration. He (the Duke of Newcastle) had yesterday put into the hands of the Chairman of Committee an Amendment substituting the numbers 10,000 for 15,000, and he was not aware, until he saw the Bill to-day, that that Amendment had not been made. He was, however, ready now to reduce the numbers mentioned in the Bill from 15,000 to 10,000.

The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH observed, that the noble Duke and the House must recollect that the law was what was declared by Act of Parliament, and that the noble Duke's explanation of the intentions of the Government was no part of the law or of the Act of Parliament. If everything that had fallen from the noble Duke and from Her Majesty's Ministers upon this subject were bodily inserted in the Bill, then, no doubt, to a certain degree, the objections to the measure might be removed. That, however, was not the case, and, constitutionally speaking, they were bound to look to the law as it was declared by Acts of Parliament.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE had no doubt the noble Earl's legal acquirements were almost as great as his military knowledge; but he could only say that, in reading the words of the Bill as a matter of common English, they appeared to him to carry out as completely as any words could do the views and intentions of the Government. He had already stated that it was not the desire or intention of Her Majesty's Government to employ the troops to be raised under the Bill in this realm, and the Bill provided that the troops to be embodied under its provisions should not be employed in the United Kingdom, except for the purpose of being trained and formed into battalions, corps, and regiments for foreign service.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH said, the Bill went on to except "such bodies of reserve as might be kept in the United Kingdom for training and arraying recruits," which might be merely a body of subalterns and non-commissioned officers; but it also excepted the men who might be required "for supplying vacancies in such regiments, battalions, and corps." Now, this might include a reserve equal to one-third of the whole force embodied under the Bill.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: It is unimportant what proportion they may bear; they cannot be employed in this country for any purpose except that specified.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH remarked, that so long as they were in this realm, no matter for what purpose, they were here as troops. If they were here as a reserve to 24,000 men in the Mediterranean, and were gradually sent out to keep that corps up to its complement, what did it signify? What he objected to was the presence in this country of 12,000 or 15,000 foreign troops.

Resolved in the *Affirmative:* Amendments *reported* accordingly.

An Amendment (that 10,000 be substituted for 15,000) made; Bill to be read 3ª on *Monday* next.

House adjourned to Monday next.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Monday, December 18, 1854.

MINUTES.] PUBLIC BILLS.—3ª Enlistment of Foreigners.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE—THE ADDRESS—OBSERVATIONS.

LORD BROUGHAM, in presenting a Petition of John Gilmour, Secretary of the London Committee of Merchants associated for the Assimilation of the Commercial Laws of the United Kingdom, praying that a similar measure to the Bills of Exchange Bill of last Session may be passed, said, I hope your Lordships will suffer me on this occasion to express my regret at having been unavoidably absent on the opening of the Session —not that there was any reason to apprehend a struggle in Parliament upon the great matters which caused its assembling, unless the struggle who should render most effectual assistance to the Government in carrying on the war, there being in every quarter an entire abnegation of all factious views and feelings—nor that it was necessary to join my voice with more eloquent tongues in the chorus chanted to the immortal glories of the Allied arms, or to mingle my tears with those which unhappily bedewed their laurels. It is, indeed, a bitter cup of which we have now to taste, when, at the close of a long life, devoted, according to the measure of my humble means, to the cause of peace, the furtherance of improvement in knowledge and in freedom, in all that constitutes civility and refinement, I find the world plunged in war such as has never before been waged— the war of enlightened government against benighted despotism—of civilisation itself against barbarism—barbarism armed with the weapons which civilisation puts into its hands, and with the superadded, the unhallowed force that it derives from a savage nature's execrable resources, to which its humaner antagonists would blush and shudder to resort. That in this conflict the right may prevail, and our arms be crowned with victory, all good men, all rational men, must pray, and the happy union which binds the Western Powers together is the best earnest of it. But I would fain be permitted to remark the unreflecting injustice with which, in our anxious desire of success, we are apt to regard another great Power, Austria, forgetting how very different is her position and ours in relation to the common enemy. She touches on his territory, is in part surrounded by it, while we have all Europe between. Yet let me add, that the combat is now raging at our cost for her even more than for ourselves; that the contest is not more for the Ottoman than for the Austrian empire; that, if it ends unfavourably, our Ottoman Ally will be less injured than our Austrian, by the reverse of fortune. To ward off so fatal a result from her by all means, is the most imperative duty which Austria owes to her own States; and, let me further say, she is grievously, most grievously, deceived, if she imagines that any effort she may make to ensure the success of the Allied arms, can possibly increase the hatred of her felt by Russia, or quicken the desire of vengeance for what Austria has already done. With her aid, or without it, we may look for a successful result of the present operations; and then let us hope that he who broke the blessed peace of thirty-nine years with which Providence had crowned the glorious, the equally glorious, efforts of the Allies in twenty years of war—he who had once earned so high a character, probably for moderation, possibly for self-denial, certainly as the enemy of anarchy and the defender of order, a character in later times, I will not say forfeited, but in abeyance—not confiscated, but sequestered—may be disposed to regain the possession of it, as he easily may, for the honour of his arms, in a military view, is untarnished, and he may cause the past to be forgotten by once more listening to counsels of justice and moderation, and allowing the peace of the world, which he broke, to be restored.

THE VOTE OF THANKS—INSERTION OF NAMES.

LORD COLCHESTER called the attention of the noble Duke the Secretary of War, to the fact that the name of Rear Admiral Stopford had been omitted from the Vote of Thanks. Admiral Stopford had rendered the most important services as Captain of the Fleet, and he wished to know whether the question had been brought before the Secretary of War with a view to insert the name omitted?

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE said, that his attention had been called to the omission; he had consulted precedents on the matter, and, although he found the cases were not precisely alike, there was sufficient similarity between them to enable him to supply the omission. The noble Duke was also understood to say, that the names of Major General Airey and Major General Estcourt had been also accidentally omitted. Under those circumstances, he had handed their names to his noble and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor, and proposed that they should be inserted in the previous Resolutions by Resolution of the House.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH was extremely glad this would be done, but, at the same time, he was sure their Lordships would feel that, unless there was, on that particular point, a distinct precedent by the insertion of the names of officers on a former occasion, nothing could be more dangerous than the course now proposed—namely, to insert words of alteration in a Resolution passed on a previous day. It was contrary to all the regulations of the House, and might lead to the most pernicious results. It must be, therefore, understood as a precedent confined to the particular point of the insertion of the names of officers accidentally omitted.

LORD COLCHESTER said, he believed there were two precedents for the course proposed.

Moved, That the First and Second Resolutions of the House on Friday last be now read: The same were accordingly read:—

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente,

"That the Names of Brigadier General, now Major General, Richard Airey, Quartermaster General, and Brigadier General, now Major General, James Bucknall Bucknall Estcourt, Adjutant General, be inserted in the said Resolution, and in the Order for communicating the same."

Moved, That the Fourth Resolution of the House of Friday last be now read: The same was accordingly read:—

Resolved, Nemine Dissentiente,

"That the Name of Rear Admiral the Honourable Montagu Stopford, Captain of the Fleet, be inserted in the said Resolution, and in the Order for communicating the same."

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

EARL GREY moved for Copies of any Orders made by Her Majesty in Council with respect to the appointment of a Fourth Secretary of State, and the Division of the Colonial and War Departments; also of any Correspondence which has taken place between the different Departments of Her Majesty's Government with reference to the Changes which may have been made in the arrangements for transacting the Business of the Army in consequence of the above Division. His Lordship said, that in the last Session of Parliament he had brought under the notice of the House the constitution of the Colonial and War Department; and the noble Duke the now Secretary of State for the War Department then was of opinion, that it was not necessary to make any new arrangement. Subsequently, however, it appeared it was found necessary to make a change, and Her Majesty was advised that the former Colonial and War Departments should be re-arranged, and that a fourth Secretary of State for War should be appointed. He presumed that there had been an Order in Council authorising the establishment of a fourth Secretary of State, and the arrangement of the business, performed by the two former departments, in the single office; and he presumed that that had led to correspondence between the Offices. He had no wish that any correspondence of a confidential character should be produced; but he presumed there could be no objection to the production of the papers he asked for. After the recess, he thought the whole question of the War Department should be brought under the notice of their Lordships.

The Duke of NEWCASTLE said, there was not the slightest objection to lay before the House any papers on the matter. The noble Earl was wrong in supposing that there had been any Order in Council on the subject; the alteration had been effected by a somewhat similar document, a declaration in Council, which would be laid on the table. His noble Friend was correct in saying, that the alterations proposed in a department were generally made by personal communication and private correspondence; but the only document of any material importance in regard to them, was the Treasury Minute by which the arrangement was effected, transferring the Commissariat Department from the Treasury to the Secretary of War. There was also another document embodying the provisional arrangement between the Colonial Secretary and the Secretary of War, which it was necessary to make, because the House was aware that until within the last fortnight no office had been provided for the Secretary of War, and he had been in the occupation of some rooms lent by his noble Friend the First Minister of the Crown, and several of the officers of the new department continued to occupy offices in the department of the Colonial Secretary. Under these circumstances, several of the arrangements under the new department were merely provisional, and the final arrangements had not been made. He could not, therefore, name the precise documents which would be laid before the House, but, at the same time, such as could give the information asked for by the noble Earl should be produced without delay.

THE IRISH AND SCOTCH MILITIA.

The Earl of GLENGALL wished to ask the noble Duke the Secretary of War a question with regard to the embodiment of the Irish and Scotch militia. By the powers which the Government now possessed, they could enrol and embody no less than 40,000 of those Scotch and Irish troops; he very much regretted that they had not thought it right to do so in March or April last, for, if they had, in all probability they would now have got 30,000 out of these 40,000 men together, and he did not think it was too much to suppose that, had they been embodied at that early period, one-half at least would have volunteered into the line, and thus they would have been able to add 15,000 trained men to our army in the Crimea. However, that was not done; and now, at the eleventh hour, when they had received news of the losses sustained by our army both by pestilence and in action, it was found necessary to send to Scotland and Ireland to raise soldiers to fight for their country. He did not think it was too late to embody those men at present, so as to form a strong reserve, ready in a short time for active service. They knew how rapidly the English militia had been embodied and disciplined, and what a fine soldierlike appearance they presented; and he was convinced, that if the whole of the Irish and Scotch militia was embodied, we should in three months have a large body of men trained, and prepared, and ready to volunteer into the line. In 1814, when we were at war with France, the battalions were constantly recruited by fresh militiamen; and, at Waterloo, a great part of the veteran troops known as Wellingtonians were in America and other parts of the world, and the English army, recruited by militiamen, was considered only an indifferent army; but those militiamen behaved with a courage and daring which were worthy of their more experienced brethren. He, therefore, hoped to see that, instead of the Government looking to foreign countries for soldiers, the Irish and Scotch militia would be called out and trained at once, so that, on the resumption of hostilities, such as volunteered might be ready to go out. He was of opinion that our soldiers already in the Crimea would a great deal rather have these sturdy young militiamen drafted into their battalions than trust to the aid of foreign troops enlisted in a mercenary spirit. The militia had always stood their ground when they had been engaged, but it was not certain whether foreign mercenaries would exhibit the same firmness. The sturdy militiamen would be good hands at the sort of work which our troops had to perform in the Crimea; but nearly all our soldiers knew from a work which, he hoped, was a school-book in the regimental schools —the Rev. Mr. Gleig's *Battle of Waterloo* —that, although 13,000 Hanoverians behaved as nobly as our own men, the Belgian cavalry could not be induced to stand for any time under fire. The Government made a great secret of whence it expected to get those foreigners, lest the Emperor of Russia should interfere to prevent our getting them. He did not think the Emperor of Russia cared one pin where we got them from, and that, as a man of good sense, he would prefer meeting foreign mercenaries rather than our own sturdy militiamen. He therefore wished to know how many of the Irish and Scotch militia regiments had been ordered to be embodied, and how many more were afterwards to be embodied?

The Duke of NEWCASTLE said, he did not think it right or necessary to enter now into a discussion with the noble Earl upon the subject of a Bill which stood for a third reading that night, or whether it was necessary, in addition to the militia, to have the aid of foreign troops. As to the noble Earl's question, he begged to remind him that when he said the Government ought to have embodied the Irish militia in March or April, he seemed to forget that there was then no Act of Parliament constituting the Irish militia, either for enrolment or embodiment. The difficulty was, that the Government had not done what it had not the power to do. The Bill was afterwards passed on the proposition of the Government for the enrolment of the militia in Ireland and Scotland; and so far the Government deserved the credit for their prescience of the necessity rather than blame for not having done in the spring that which Parliament only enabled it to do in the summer. The noble Earl, however, had extended his complaint against the Government. On a former evening he only said that the Government should have enrolled and embodied the militia sooner. The noble Earl informed the House the other night that no one knew as much of the Irish militia as he did; and, if that were so, he must be aware that there were reasons connected with the measure which had prevented the Government from enrolling the militia in Ireland and Scotland until five or six weeks ago. Preparations absolutely necessary as to the officers and other preliminaries rendered it impossible for the enrolment of the Irish militia to take place at an earlier period. In answer to the question of the noble Earl, he (the Duke of Newcastle) had informed him the other night that nine regiments of militia had been ordered to be embodied, for it had been found in Ireland that regiments were enrolled with greater facility when they were to be embodied immediately than when embodiment was to take place at a more distant period. Thus nine regiments, numbering about 6,000 or 7,000 men, had been embodied. The whole Irish militia to be enrolled amounted to about 27,000 men, and other nine regiments would be embodied almost immediately; but he was not prepared to assure the noble Earl that the whole militia would be embodied. It was desirable to embody those regiments first which were in the most forward condition as regarded officers and the readiness of obtaining men, but he had reason to hope that ere long all the Irish regiments would be embodied. He might make the same remarks with respect to Scotland; and, as to England, he stated the other evening that it was intended to embody a very large proportion, if not the whole, of the militia; but there were considerable difficulties in the way arising from the want of sufficient barrack accommodation.

The Earl of DESART rejoiced to hear that it was intended to embody the constitutional force of the country, and felt certain that the appeal to the Irish people would be responded to by every class. Never was the service more popular, whether in the ranks of the Army or in the best school for reinforcing the regular forces—the militia. The measure to which the House gave its assent last Friday (the Enlistment of Foreigners Bill) was most discreditable to its propounders, and most disparaging both of the resources of the country and the spirit of the people. What would the Emperor of Russia think when he found that he had only to redouble his efforts to drive into the sea the heroes of Inkerman, and that henceforth we could offer no resistance to his ambitious designs, save through a body of paid foreigners? He very much feared that our gallant force would gain less by the assistance of these foreign troops than they would lose by the conviction which would be forced upon the Emperor of Russia's mind that it only needed one blow to destroy all the resources of England. He warned the Government that, if the measure was passed, it would be universally disliked by the people, who considered that Englishmen were able to fight their own battles, and to guard the honour of their country without the aid of foreigners, and he would remind the Government that, whatever might have been the conduct of the German troops in the 18th century, yet now there were some German Governments which did not stand very high in the estimation of this country.

ENLISTMENT OF FOREIGNERS BILL.

Order of the Day for the Third Reading read.

Moved, That the Bill be now read 3^a.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH said, that as the noble Duke (the Duke of Newcastle) had not intimated his intention of proposing any Amendment, it was to be presumed that the Government intended that the Bill should go to the House of Commons as it now stood. That being the case, and as few of their Lordships were present on Saturday, and could not have been expected to be present, it was but right that he should restate what material alterations had been made in the Bill. Those alterations were entirely confined to the substitution of 10,000 for 15,000 men, and that, no doubt, was a material and valuable concession on the part of the Government; but it was not one which did much credit to the forethought or mature consideration which ought to have characterised the concoction of a Bill of such very great importance—for it appeared to be indifferent to them whether the number of foreigners to be enlisted was to be 10,000 or 15,000. However, so far as that alteration went, it was a great improvement of the Bill—but it was the only one. There could be no doubt that, under the second clause as now worded, under the designation of "body of reserve," it was possible for the Ministry to retain in this country a very large portion of the 10,000 men whom the Crown was to be permitted to have in England. It was a remarkable circumstance that, while it was declared to be the intention of the Government that the reserves of British regiments employed in the Crimea should be established at Malta, or some such station conveniently near to the Crimea, it was also intended that the reserves of the German battalions should be retained in England. That being so, the only reason why such an arrangement was proposed—why English reserves were sent to the Mediterranean garrisons, while the German reserves were kept in this country—must be that the Government mistrusted those German troops, and would not venture to place them in a Mediterranean garrison. How, then, could they with any degree of security employ those troops in the Crimea against the enemy? Would there not be, he would not say the probability, but a risk, that, having been armed, disciplined, and clothed by this Government, they might transfer their services to the enemy whom they were paid to combat? The noble Duke had just observed that there was insufficient barrack accommodation in this country for the militia—and, if so, where were these German troops to be placed? Were they to be placed in the existing barracks, to the exclusion of the militia, and thus defer the embodiment of the militia till the German troops were sent off to their regiments abroad? He also wished to draw their Lordships' attention to a point to which he had not previously adverted—the fifth clause. By that clause Her Majesty was empowered to make Supplemental Articles of War, varying from the Articles of War which were applicable to Her Majesty's native forces, and those varied Articles of War were to apply specially to the German or other foreign legion which might be engaged. By the Mutiny Act the Articles of War were transmitted to the Judges of the superior courts, and they were bound to take judicial notice of them. The Judges would be thus compelled to take judicial notice of two different sets of Articles of War, applicable to two distinct bodies of men. But that inconvenience was nothing compared with that of having in the same army foreign and English troops subject to different Articles of War. The greatest inconvenience would arise in the administration of punishment for offences. The same offence, committed at the same time, by the same persons in company and conspiracy—by a foreigner and an Englishman—would, under different Articles of War, be punished in different modes. It was hardly necessary to say how prejudicially such a circumstance would operate on the troops. He saw the Commander in Chief (Viscount Hardinge) was present, and would like to ask that noble and gallant Lord whether this clause had been submitted to him before being laid before the House? He asked that question because he knew that his noble and gallant Friend, when in India, had perceived the strong inconvenience, if not danger, arising from having different Articles of War for the Native and British troops, and he altered the Articles of War relating to Natives so as to make them in conformity with the articles which governed the Queen's troops. It was true the practice of flogging, retained in our Army, though rarely employed, did not prevail in the German service, which had different punishments, such as the "stick;" but in this country no punishment could be inflicted except by the authority of law, and it was a serious matter if our Articles of War were to be altered, so as to be acceptable to these German troops, and to place them in a different position from Her Majesty's troops. Another question of great importance was, whence were these foreign troops to be obtained? He should rejoice if by any arrangement the King of Hanover might place at the disposal of Her Majesty—becoming a party to the war—those magnificent troops whose assistance in the Peninsular war was admitted by all to be of the greatest possible advantage to us. But, though he entertained that opinion with regard to those troops, it was not the same with respect to some of the other German States. Unless he was mistaken, he believed it was the general opinion of officers who had served in the Peninsular war, and were acquainted with the relative qualities of foreign troops, that, however favourably they might regard the conduct of the German Legion composed of subjects of the Sovereign of this country, that favourable opinion by no means extended to the introduction into Her Majesty's service of German and other foreign troops, obtained anyhow, in any place, and from any country, over whom we should have no control beyond the authority exercised under the Articles of War. His opinion of the Bill remained unaltered by anything which he had heard in the course of the debate. He still adhered to the opinion that no troops in the world were equal to British troops. Whatever might be the merits of foreigners or Germans under ordinary circumstances, he did not believe that any German troops could equal British troops under circumstances like those which existed at Inkerman, and which might again exist in the prosecution of the war. A chain cable might be made partly of wrought iron and partly of cast iron, and when painted all its parts look equally well, and it might answer its purpose sufficiently under ordinary circumstances; but when the strain of the storm came, the cable would yield where the links were weakest, and the ship would be lost. So it would be with an unequal line of battle, when equal confidence could not be placed in all the regiments forming it. If one part of the line gave way the position would be endangered, and the greatest possible calamity might ensue. He wished to have the whole British Army formed of wrought iron, and that no part of it should be likely, under any circumstances, to prove weak or unsafe. Every man opposed to the enemy should be one in whom entire confidence could be placed. After all, the great difference which existed between the British and every foreign soldier was one which, he believed, he might allude to without exaggerating the advantages of our constitution—the sentiment of personal dignity which it imparted to every man, however lowly, and which was a sentiment not to be obtained under any other Government of Europe. The British soldier was proud to be an Englishman—he would consider any shrinking from his duty to be dishonour—he felt that he should be hooted by his fellow-townsmen—would be scorned by the women. Those feelings it was which made them fight so well, and enabled them to beat their enemy. But how different would it be with the foreigners whom they might enlist. Whose opinions would they regard if they disgraced their service? We knew nothing of their history or their feelings. They might desert with impunity in the hour of danger, might disgrace the army to which they were attached, and, returning to their own country, be as much respected as they ever were on the banks of the Oder, the Weser, and the Danube. He had asked, the other night, whether there was an understanding with German Powers? He received no answer; but one ought to be given, and he wished to know the fact. There were but two classes of men from whom recruits could possibly be drawn—because they were to be all trained troops—those who had been discharged from the service and those who were in actual service. Those who had been discharged from the army were absorbed in agriculture and trade, and the chances of our success in recruiting among them were very uncertain. We did not know how we were to appeal to those men. But it was different with the soldiers now serving, and he wished to know what consideration was to be given to German Princes for selling the services of their subjects? Could any one believe that little German Princes would put themselves to the inconvenience of allowing their subjects to leave their ranks and enlist in foreign armies in preference to their own without some consideration? There must be a "consideration;" and he wished to know what it was. He wished to know, in common sense and common truth, whether there was any difference in fact between the "consideration" we were to give to the little German Princes for selling to us the services of their subjects and the consideration which the buyer of slaves gave to the King of Dahomey for the bodies of his subjects? He did not see how, if they repudiated the detestable practice of slave dealing, the principle could be different on the banks of the Elbe from that which took place on the banks of the Congo. After having insisted upon the abolition of the "detestable traffic," as it had been called, conducted on the coast of Africa, was it to be endured that Parliament should be asked to assent to a Bill for establishing such a traffic in the interior of Germany? If the Princes of Germany joined our alliance, well and good; then we might fairly and honestly assist them with pecuniary aid in bringing their troops into action; but if, on the contrary, they sold the blood of their subjects for money, he saw no difference between them and the lowest and most debased princes on the African coast. He had not devoted his attention to those studies which had distinguished Her Majesty's Ministers—studies solely devoted to the object of extending the wealth and industrial resources of the country. Admitting the value of those objects, and that it was most desirable, in time of peace, that a very large portion of the attention of Parliament should be bestowed upon them, he had given his attention to what appeared to him an object of greater importance — that of maintaining in security the country of which he was proud to be a citizen, of preserving its strength, and giving it that material security against foreign States which was essential to the conservation of its liberties. One of the wisest of mankind had declared that one of the most material points in the greatness of a State was the maintenance in it of a body of military men. To the extent to which the present Bill went, it would impair the advantages which, in that respect, this country already possessed. To the extent to which they paid and trained German soldiers instead of Englishmen, and formed them into regiments, they were depriving themselves of the incalculable advantage of having, when peace was concluded—if that should ever be—in every village throughout the country men who had been trained to, and who had been engaged in war, and who, under the present regulations of the service, would be liable to be called out if the State required their aid. He was satisfied that Her Majesty's Ministers could not have adopted a more imprudent course than that of introducing the principle of employing foreign instead of British soldiers in the prosecution of the war. He said, "instead of British soldiers," because he felt perfectly satisfied that the more easily they obtained foreign recruits, the less trouble would they take to obtain English recruits. He wished to force Her Majesty's Government to place reliance upon the people of England. They had attempted to carry on a war without a reserve, and a campaign without animals, that is, without the means of moving the army—an attempt which necessarily doomed our troops to bloody and fruitless victories, and rendered the honourable and safe peace which had been talked of a thing almost impossible, because, if they continued to act upon these principles, it was contrary to all the theory of war, it was contrary to all the military experience of ages, it was contrary to common sense, to suppose that they would ever obtain that decisive success which could alone lead to a safe and honourable peace. It had been said, however, by a noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) that their reserve was the people of England. He knew not what military knowledge that noble Lord might have acquired, although he was aware that some of the noble Lord's admirers had represented him as a person who was best fitted, by his antecedents and his previous long-acquired knowledge, to conduct the hostilities in which this country was engaged; but he (the Earl of Ellenborough) knew that a reserve in war meant a body of disciplined soldiers, ready at any time to give their assistance to the army in the field. To talk of a reserve existing "in the people of England" was really to treat with contempt the reasoning powers of that people. If that was, however, the feeling of the noble Lord, let him appeal to the people of England, and not to the people of Germany. Now was the time to make that appeal, when the country was represented to be in a condition of great difficulty, entirely owing to the *laches* of the Government, and to their having neglected the necessary precautions and preparations by which only success in war could be obtained. There was one point upon which he was most anxious to address some observations to their Lordships, and he should not discharge his duty unless he took the earliest convenient opportunity of doing so. He referred to the general conduct of the war. He considered that every military principle had been disregarded in the course of our operations, and that nothing which we had the means of doing had been done for the purpose of oppressing and coercing the enemy; but he did not think the present occasion was one when it would be convenient to enter upon such a discussion, but he would deem it his duty, at the earliest possible period, to state to their Lordships his sense of what had been done, his opinion as to what ought to be done, and his deep apprehension that, unless the war was conducted upon military principles, the failure would be most fatal, and the result would be, not only to disappoint the just expectations of the people, but to bring the greatest calamities upon the country.

The Marquess of LANSDOWNE said, that, having taken no part in the previous discussion upon this Bill, he might be allowed, now that it had reached almost its last stage in their Lordships' House, to state the grounds on which he would give it his support. He thought that, although the measure was undoubtedly of considerable importance, very undue importance had, in one sense, been attached to it in consequence of the incredibly exaggerated apprehensions which had been expressed by some noble Lords as to its effect. The noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough) had conjured up phantoms which disappeared before the light of investigation, and the more the grounds of those apprehensions which had been expressed were sifted and examined, the more unfounded and absurd would they be found; and when that phantom of fear which he had conjured up came to be analysed—when the light was held to that spectre which the imagination of the noble Earl had created—it would be found to vanish into the air, in the same way in which less accredited spectres usually disappeared. He (the Marquess of Lansdowne) was anxious to express his opinions upon the measure with regard especially to those points which had elicited the criticism of the noble Earl. In the first speech made by the noble Earl in opposition to the Bill, he dwelt upon a point on which he had said little to-night—the constitutional objections to which the Bill was open. They had heard somewhat less from the noble Earl to-night as to the constitutional question than they had been accustomed to hear from him on previous occasions. The constitution, he thought, was a horse which the noble Earl found he could not ride, for it had fairly broken down with him. The Bill had unquestionably excited a good deal of apprehension out of doors, because the people did not know the precise nature of the measure, nor what its practical operation would be. But the opponents of the Bill in that House were not similarly ignorant of its real character. He honoured and respected the public out of doors for the jealousy of the measure which they had, not unnaturally, exhibited; but he could not say the same for noble Lords in the House, for they ought to know better. When the people out of doors were told that this was a Bill in the prosecution of the principles of which they would be called upon to part with that constitution for which they were fighting, and told so upon the authority of the noble Earl opposite, and that the duty of carrying out the plans of the Government was to be carried out by Germans engaged for that purpose, they naturally thought the Government were about to do something very dreadful. The noble Earl and the other opponents of the measure seemed, however, to forget that there had been scarcely any period in English history at which great efforts were made when the constitution had not been violated in some manner or other, but violated with precautions which prevented any mischievous results; that there had been no period, from the wars of the Duke of Marlborough to those of the Duke of Wellington, at which they had not been indebted for their success in every brilliant action and in every successful campaign to the employment of the very means which the noble Earl now so strongly deprecated. Did the Duke of Wellington deprecate the employment of such means? Was he an authority on the subject? Did the Duke of Marlborough deprecate the employment of such means, and was he an authority? It stood to reason that when this country was compelled to take a more prominent part in a great military struggle than its own resources, in some respects, enabled it to support—for, thank God! this never had been a warlike country so far as the maintenance of a great standing army was concerned—the Government should have recourse to those means by which we could best match the power which our adversary could bring against us. He agreed with many of the opinions which had been expressed by the noble Earl on the subject of the war. The noble Earl had, upon various occasions during the last Session, expressed to the House with great eloquence the sense he entertained of the magnitude, the importance, the difficulties, and the possible duration of the war, and he (the Marquess of Lansdowne) had on one of such occasions taken the opportunity of stating that upon every one of those points he entirely concurred with the noble Earl. Whatever might have been the case some months ago, the whole world was now agreed, Parliament was agreed, the public was agreed as to the immense difficulties attending the war and the power of the enemy—too much overlooked at first—with whom this country was contending. They had to cope with an enemy determined in his objects, and having extensive resources at his disposal, and they had to consider how they could meet all the efforts of that enemy for the accomplishment of his ambitious projects. This country had the good fortune to possess a navy which was capable of engaging successfully in a contest with the fleets of its adversary, and by an admirable arrangement our naval forces had, during the last year, been stationed both in the Baltic and the Black Sea so as to command and entirely to defeat all the efforts of the enemy, compelling him to let his ships rot in port or to be himself the instrument of their destruction by sinking them in front of the forts erected to protect them. He (the Marquess of Lansdowne) considered that these successes on the part of the navy were highly creditable to the Board of Admiralty. This country had the advantage of a public credit which enabled it to command to any extent "the sinews of war;" and, although the noble Earl had spoken of commercial pursuits with some contempt, he might remind the noble Earl that it was by the successful pursuit of commerce and a sound political economy that the country was enabled to provide the means for carrying on this great conflict for the maintenance of the national honour. In those respects which he (the Marquess of Lansdowne) had mentioned, this country was more than equal to Russia; but in one respect, as all the world knew, and as Russia herself knew, we were not on an equality with her. Russia possessed a population infinitely larger than that of this country, and she had therefore the means of raising numerous armies without difficulty. Was it not, then, the duty of the Government to direct their attention to this point, and to have recourse to every means by which they might be able to oppose Russia with numbers against numbers? If he were asked by what means they ought to oppose the great warlike Potentate with whom they were contending, he would reply, by all means and every means. They must oppose the enemy by their army, which had been justly described by the noble Earl as almost incomparable for gallantry; but did that army possess numbers equal to the conflict? Would the noble Earl affirm that it did, or did he think that we could at once in this country turn out a body of accomplished soldiers capable of meeting the whole power of Russia? This country had, in every war, shown that it could not pretend to send out an army equal to the armies of some foreign Powers, and it had sought to supply the deficiency in the number of its troops by the best auxiliaries that could be obtained. That course had been taken on former occasions, when the greatest success had attended the British arms, and when no inconvenience had been experienced. But they were now told that, although they thus had in their hands the means of supplying the deficiency which was admitted, it would, in the first place, be highly unconstitutional to avail themselves of such means, and secondly, that it was highly inexpedient to do so. Now, assuming for a moment that it was desirable that they should add to their disposable force some 10,000, or 20,000, or 30,000 efficiently trained troops, what was the objection by which they were to be deterred from availing themselves of such assistance? The objection, when it came to be sifted, had no reference to what these troops were to do abroad, but was founded on the apprehension that Her Majesty Queen Victoria, who was deeply interested in the success of the war against Russia, might, by the advice of Her Ministers, who were also deeply interested in the success of the war, divert those troops from the object for which they were raised, and, making use of certain depôts which in the machinery of the transaction it was necessary to have in different parts of England, might launch them against the population of England, establish some new form of arbitrary and unconstitutional government, and that neither the yeomanry force, nor the people of England, would be able to resist this mighty power, and the liberties of England would be for ever extinguished. This was the apprehension which had alarmed not only the noble Earl, but some others—the apprehension that these foreign troops might be employed to extinguish the liberties of the English people! Why, if such fears were expressed out of doors by any country barber or farmer, he would be laughed at for his apprehensions. He (the Marquess of Lansdowne) would be sorry to see the principle of this Bill carried to the extent of employing foreign troops, not only in foreign wars, but also on service at home. There might have been periods of our history when it was necessary to do so; but in these days it would be not only unjustifiable, but outrageous. To show how little constitutional principle had to do with such employment of foreign troops, he might remind their Lordships that in the reign of William III., when no little jealousy of constitutional rights had been excited, the Dutch Guards were retained and paid in England in time of war without any objection. There was certainly jealousy of the employment of such troops during peace; but when they were required during the war the public were very glad to have their services, and no one proposed that they should be dismissed. Apprehension of the employment of foreign troops seemed to have first arisen, not unnaturally, soon after the succession of the House of Hanover, from the suspicion that the German views and sympathies of the Sovereign might induce him to endeavour to enforce principles of government alien to the constitution of this country, and subsequently the employment of foreign troops was prohibited by Parliament. Very shortly afterwards, however, the country was involved in war, when it was engaged in contests which required great military efforts, the necessity of employing foreign troops was felt, the prohibitive enactments were relaxed, and Parliament hastened to sanction the enlistment of foreign auxiliaries. But who, he would ask, adopted the principle of the employment of foreign troops to a greater extent than any other statesman? It was Lord Chatham, the great war Minister; one of those giants—as the noble Earl had described him—who stepped in among a set of ordinary men, and assumed the direction and management of the war. He was aware that the noble Earl had intimated that Chatham had only acted in the matter under the guidance of the Duke of Newcastle of that day, or, at least, had merely adopted the plan in order to please him—it was the Duke of Newcastle who dragged in Lord Chatham, and not Lord Chatham who dragged in the Duke of Newcastle. But what was the result of employing those foreigners in those times? Why, in the brightest pages of the military history of England in the last century every success was obtained with the assistance of foreigners more or less in the pay of England. And what was the great boast of that Minister, Lord Chatham, who was so reverenced by the noble Earl? Why, that he had conquered America in Germany. And how? Why, by the very men whom the noble Earl would now push aside. If they were to adopt the principles now advocated by the noble Earl, and trust to themselves alone, they would expose the inferior force they now possessed to the most cruel, the most intolerable, and the most arduous conflict, and would endanger the character of the British troops by compelling an army not wanting in courage, valour, or discipline, to carry on a contest with an infinitely inferior numerical force. The noble Earl had used another argument which appeared to him (the Marquess of Lansdowne) to be equally fallacious. The Government were desirous of placing in the field, in addition to the army now engaged, a force which would render their troops more equal in point of numbers to those of the enemy; but the noble Earl stepped forward and said the employment of this additional force would only tend to degrade the British soldier. He (the Marquess of Lansdowne) could not understand the meaning of that observation. He should object as strongly as the noble Earl to the permanent incorporation of these troops into the British army; but he could not see how it would be a degradation to the British army to have a well-trained and disciplined force, whether of Germans, Italians, Spanish, or Dutch, fighting gallantly by their side. At this very moment had they not the co-operation of the Turks? Perhaps the auxiliary force employed might be, as remarked by the noble Earl, somewhat inferior to the British troops; but there was no reason why the employment of a somewhat inferior force would be degrading to the British army. [The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH: I never said it would.] The remark had been made in the course of these debates, though perhaps he was in error in attributing it to the noble Earl. But could it be supposed that the employment of foreigners would prevent our soldiers from fighting with satisfaction and confidence in themselves? To go back to one of the most interesting scenes of British history—the battle of Minden, where the valour of our troops raised the British name to the very highest position—they would find that the actual English army engaged was extremely inferior in number to the "mercenaries" as they were now called, who fought side by side with them. But when at the battle of Minden the Enniskillens, the Blues, and the Scotch Greys, and other gallant regiments of cavalry, were permitted to advance—too late perhaps—but when they were permitted to advance at last, not under a pusillanimous but under a brave and talented leader, did they make their celebrated charge in that great conflict with less hope, with less confidence, and with less satisfaction, because they saw associated with them regiments of Germans, Hanoverians, of Hessians, and of other troops? Would the British soldier lose the *prestige* of his profession, because he saw engaged in the conflict men of other nations? He (the Marquess of Lansdowne) showed no such apprehensions. Her Majesty's Government were now called upon to act in every possible manner and in every possible shape. They felt the importance of bringing every well-trained Englishman into the field, and they also felt the expediency of annexing to our army and placing at the disposal of Her Majesty some of those regiments of other nations whose services might be procured, and who would not object individually or collectively to engage in the war. Was there any reason why such a force should not be engaged? The noble Lord opposite had asked if there was a manufacturer who would admit cast-iron into a work which required to be constructed of wrought iron. That would be perfectly well so long as they could get all they required of wrought iron; but what would be the ingenuity of the manufacturer who, having a vast national machine to bring into play, and to whom it was of the utmost importance to bring it into play at a given moment—what would be his ingenuity when, having first used all the wrought iron he could lay his hands upon, he should hesitate to avail himself of a somewhat inferior material? With respect to the alteration of the Articles of War, he should be glad for their Lordships to hear the opinion of some noble Lord who was more of a military authority than himself. He would, however, remind the noble Earl, that the Act of 1806 expressly enabled His Majesty to do that which Her Majesty would be enabled to do by this Act—namely, to shape the regulations of war in such a manner as to adapt them to the altered circumstances of the case. He trusted that he had now answered all the objections which had been raised to this Bill. Its object was merely to give to Her Majesty a small extension of the prerogative she now enjoyed; it would be of immediate benefit to the service of the country, and would enable the Government in a short time to bring into action against the Emperor of Russia a body of well-disciplined troops, who would, he had no doubt, fight for the cause of England as gallantly and as successfully as the warriors and victors of Alma and Inkerman.

THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, but for the remarks which have fallen from the noble Marquess I should not have thought it necessary again to trouble your Lordships upon this matter. I must, however, be permitted to say that, notwithstanding the great respect I entertain for the noble Marquess, I cannot but think on the present occasion, in commenting upon the speeches which have been delivered now and upon former occasions by my noble Friend (the Earl of Ellenborough), the noble Marquess has somewhat departed from that courtesy which has generally characterised him. He talks of arguments used in this House by my noble Friend as being positively absurd:—he says my noble Friend has been raising up before the country an idle phantom, and he says that he should entertain respect for an opinion such as that advanced by my noble Friend, were it entertained out of doors; but he can entertain no respect whatever for the expression of such an opinion in this House. Now, my Lords, I must be permitted to say that the noble Marquess, in holding such language—in characterising as absurd the arguments of his opponents, and in declaring that he has no respect for their opinions, because the persons expressing them ought to know better—has somewhat departed from that position which the high character of the noble Marquess has always maintained with those who are Members of this House. Nor do I think the noble Marquess has been exceedingly happy in the ridicule he has sought to throw upon the "constitutional" argument of my noble Friend. He made it a sort of charge against my noble Friend, in the first instance, that upon this occasion we had heard little of the "constitutional" argument; and then he said, that such was the paucity of objections to this Bill, that my noble Friend was unable to make two speeches upon it without of necessity entering into the same arguments and objections. Having first complained that my noble Friend did not lay any stress upon the constitutional argument, he proceeded at once to cast the whole power of his ridicule upon a constitutional argument and a constitutional objection—but which was not in the least like that raised by my noble Friend. Now, with regard to the constitutional objection, my noble Friend did lay considerable stress upon it on former occasions, and, though not repeating them now, I apprehend he would be disposed to lay considerable stress again upon those constitutional grounds of objection—upon the employment of foreign troops in England, and in substitution for and to the exclusion of the troops of this country itself. It was to the employment of a foreign force in this country that the constitutional argument of my noble Friend was altogether addressed. It was not that he apprehended that 8,000 or 10,000 foreigners introduced into England could destroy the liberties of the people or make themselves masters of the country; but what he said was, that it was contrary to the principles upon which this country had proceeded to give to any Government the power of placing any portion of the guardianship of England in Germans, or in the hands of other foreign troops, in substitution or exclusion of the troops of the country itself. And, my Lords, if that be the constitutional doctrine characterised by the noble Marquess as based on absurdity, I humbly beg to take my full share of the absurdity cast upon my noble Friend. It cannot be forgotten—for it has been asserted over and over again—that you did not embody your militia because you had not sufficient barrack accommodation for them; and yet this Bill enacts that you are to embody, and lodge in this country—I presume in barracks—a large body of foreign troops, for the purpose of drilling and training, and for the purpose also, this Bill now tells us, of forming a permanent depôt of reserve:—in other words, you are to have permanently established in this country, or so long as the present war lasts, a considerable body of foreign troops, occupying those barracks which are not sufficiently extensive to enable you to accommodate your own troops, and which, it has been remarked, does away with the argument of embodying and raising troops of your own. My Lords, the constitutional argument of my noble Friend was against the establishment of these troops in the country in substitution for the troops of this country itself; but my noble Friend used another argument with regard to the inexpediency of the adoption or incorporation into the British Army of these foreigners at all. My noble Friend was first of all charged with having said that it was degrading to have these foreign troops serving by the side of British troops; but my noble Friend never made such a remark, nor did any other Member of your Lordships' House. What was said, was a statement made by a noble Friend of mine who is not now in the House, that it was a humiliating and degrading idea to the people of this country that the home forces, at the very outset of war, should be found insufficient to carry it on. And I think that it is a humiliation and degradation to this country to be placed in such a situation. Nobody ever said that it was degrading to the British troops to fight by the side of foreigners, but it is degrading to this country to be obliged to confess that it can only fight its battles with the assistance of foreigners. But, if it be necessary to have these foreign troops—if we are to endure that humiliation—there was no occasion for this Bill, for the purpose of raising these troops—not the least in the world. The necessity that arises for this Bill is that you must drill and train these troops in England; and the necessity of training and drilling them in England arises from the fact that you are now about to levy them, not, as in former times, by the consent and under the authority of their own Sovereigns and as regular forces, but that you are about to levy and bring up from all quarters of the world the refuse of other countries, whom you are to introduce into this country to train and drill by the side of your own army. The noble Marquess says, that in all our wars, from the time of Marlborough downwards, we have been indebted for our successes to the co-operation of the troops of foreign countries; but, I think, if the noble Marquess had followed up the investigation he commenced, he would have found that in almost every instance the troops which we had co-operating with and assisting us fought under the banners or with the sanction of their respective Sovereigns, or they were fighting in a national cause, or in a cause which was to them of national interest. At the battle of Minden, to which the noble Marquess referred, we might be considered not so much the principals as auxiliaries, and the battle of Minden was fought much more as a German than an English cause. We were there associated with German troops, acting under the authority of German Sovereigns or the representatives of German States; but that is not the case of a body of mercenaries collected from various quarters, acting neither with the authority nor under the control of their own Sovereigns, and fighting for a mere pecuniary reward, with no inducement of allegiance or patriotism. I agree with my noble Friend (the Earl of Ellenborough), that those are not the materials which I should like to see placed beside the British soldier. The noble Marquess says he has all along been impressed with the importance and magnitude of the war. I wish he could have impressed the same opinions upon his Colleagues, for then we should have had abundance of the "wrought-iron," without being obliged, at the last moment, to avail ourselves of the services of an inferior material. My noble Friend complains of your employing foreign troops as mere mercenaries in a cause in which they have no national interest. What has been the case in former instances? Take the wars of the Duke of Wellington. No doubt we employed the Spaniards in Spain, the Portuguese in Portugal, and the Germans and Hanoverians for the liberation of Germany; but can any man say that those troops were not acting under the sanction of their own Sovereigns and that they were not fighting for a national cause? In point of fact, with regard to Spain and Portugal, it was the Spanish and Portuguese armies in whose cause we were fighting; and strange, indeed, it would have been if the Duke of Wellington had refused to allow the natives of countries for whom we were fighting to fight upon our side in a cause in which they were most concerned. My Lords, there have been two objections raised to this Bill which I have not yet heard satisfactorily answered. The first is, that it is a non-constitutional principle to admit the drilling and training of foreign bodies in England with a view to their permanently remaining in the country; and the second is that, as a matter of expediency, it is unwise to introduce these foreign troops—first, because, from the manner in which you propose to raise them, the country can have no just confidence in them, because they might betray the trust reposed in them, or not answer your expectations; and next, because, for the paltry purpose of paying a body of some 10,000 or 20,000 Germans, you make a declaration in the face of Parliament and the country which cannot but give the greatest possible discouragement to those efforts which have been making upon the part of the country, which are being made now, and which will continue to be made without stint if you do not discourage them by your own conduct and your own powers. The noble Marquess has left all explanation as to the alteration of the regulations of the army to other and military authorities, and I should follow his example did I not think that a question of considerable importance has been raised by my noble Friend as to the difference in the Articles of War and in the regulations under which different portions of the same army are to be called upon to serve. We have not heard from my noble Friend the Commander in Chief in what respect he conceives it necessary to introduce a difference of practice here, which difference of practice his own experience) when in India, must tell him proved to be so detrimental to the character of the army as to render it necessary for him to take, with regard to the Indian troops, a course which was most unpopular, which went contrary to all their prejudices and feelings, but which course he found it necessary to take, notwithstanding that he ran counter to those feelings and prejudices, rather than have a different treatment, more especially in the case of punishment, between the European and Native forces. By this Act the British army will still be subject to corporal punishment; but it is admitted that the German troops will not be subjected to corporal punishment, or, at any rate, not to the same corporal punishment as the British soldier. Now, my Lords, can there by possibility be a subject on which the feelings of the army, in England and out of England—and not only of the army but of the whole population—could be more strongly excited than that there should be such a distinction drawn between the troops? My Lords, I cannot conceive—I was going to say, anything more dangerous—but I cannot conceive anything more objectionable than that such a distinction should be drawn, and drawn, mind you, not by the authority of Parliament directly given, but by the authority of the military departments, act ing under a general power given them by Parliament, to vary the Articles of War and the regulations of the Army. My Lords, there is another matter I wish to mention, which I do not bring forward as an objection to the Bill, but which is, I think, deserving of the very serious consideration of Her Majesty's Government. You are looking to every quarter from which you can draw troops for the service of the country. You do not want money—you have abundance of money—but you want men. You may have any amount of money provided you choose to avail yourselves of the means at your disposal without adhering to any preposterous principle in reference to obtaining it—but what you most want is men. And have you not a large Native force in India? I believe, as many persons believe, that in this war, especially in the case of irregular cavalry, the services of these troops would be exceedingly efficient, and that we might raise, at no distant period, an almost unlimited force of trained soldiers, who would at the present time be most serviceable. These troops have always fought gallantly, side by side with your own soldiers; and I think it a matter of great importance, and that it would be most valuable for you to obtain the means of introducing into the war a portion of these Indian troops, and of teaching them that the Russians, in the presence of British soldiers, are not to be feared; you will give them a feeling anything but friendly towards the Russians in India, and you will have a force, fighting with your own troops, which will be inspired with something akin to a consciousness of fighting for a national cause. I think from that quarter you might derive, and without much delay, very valuable military assistance. Leaving that subject, however, I now wish to ask Her Majesty's Government whether, in the course of the war, we are to look for any assistance, any co-operation in men or money, from our great colonial possessions? I have lately read, with very great satisfaction, that the Legislature of Canada have spontaneously voted 20,000*l.*, to be applied in mitigation of the hardships and privations sustained by the troops in the East. I look upon that as an indication of friendly feeling most valuable under present circumstances; but you will observe that it is only an indication of friendly feeling; it is only an indication of sympathy with the cause; it has nothing whatever to do with the feelings of loyalty, allegiance, or of obligation derived from affinity. That sum of 20,000*l.* (and I do not complain that it was so) was to be divided in equal proportions between ourselves and our allies. I repeat, that I do not at all complain of this;—all I say is, that it is a mere indication of sympathy with the cause, and not of allegiance to the Crown. Now, the North American colonies are at this moment, by the course recently pursued, by the course of legislation which has been adopted towards them in the Imperial Parliament—these provinces, I say, are to all intents and purposes just as independent of this country as Ireland was previous to the Union. They are under the same Sovereign, indeed, but their affairs are conducted by Ministers of their own; they have responsible Government; they are not liable to British debt; they are not liable to the overriding of British law; they are, in point of fact, left wholly and absolutely to administer their own affairs as a friendly country rather than as a colony—as united to this country by the ties of the Crown alone. The same may be said to have been the case with regard to Ireland before the Union, and yet was there ever a war in which England was engaged at that time to which Ireland was not ready to contribute her money and her men for the purpose of carrying on the war in conjunction with this country? I do not say that we can make any such claim upon the colonies of England; and, with regard to many of them, I am ready to admit that the character of the population, and the busy nature of their occupation, render it not very probable that they could render us any support in men. But I do not think that argument applies to the British possessions in North America. I believe that those colonies are enjoying a state of unparalleled prosperity and of great wealth, and that they contain a very considerable amount of, to a certain extent, unabsorbed population. I would, then, willingly entertain the belief that, towards carrying on this war, the North American colonies would gladly contribute in men from their own means and without payment; but if you have the money ready, I am convinced of this, that you would have no difficulty whatever in raising in the North American colonies—and the point, I think, is well worth the consideration of the Government—a certain amount of force to be incorporated in your army, to be commanded by officers now resident in Canada, to be joined to your army—though not as a local corps, for I deprecate the establishment and appointment of local corps as a very inefficient mode of giving reinforcements to your army. It is my firm belief that there is nothing which would gratify these provinces more than to be enabled, I do not say whether wholly at their own expense, or at the expense of this country, to raise some three or four regiments, or possibly more, to be incorporated with the British army, to share in all the services of the British army, and to be in every respect placed upon the footing of the British army. Such regiments, however, should, I think, be subject to this simple difference, which I would leave for the consideration of the Commander in Chief; that that period of service allotted generally to the British army, to be passed within this country, should, as a general course, be assigned to the North American contingent, to be passed by them within the North American provinces; so that, as our troops go to Canada and to New Brunswick, counting this as part of the five years out of fifteen (or whatever the proper term may be of foreign service) so the North American regiments should have their tour of service so arranged that their casual service in this country should reckon as foreign service, and that, keeping up their connection with Canada, they should be permitted to return to Canada for the usual period of home service; but, in all other respects, they should be part and parcel of the British army, united together in British feelings and sympathies, and yet kept closely in connection, not only with our army, but with their own population in the North American colonies. I throw this out for the consideration of the Government, not knowing whether they have taken any steps to act upon it, but deeming it very likely that if they did the result would be satisfactory. Looking to the position of the North American provinces, to their prosperity, to their practical independence, to their entire immunity from the debts and obligations of this country, I think it is not too much to expect that, advanced as they are to this practical independence, they should still be ready to testify their allegiance to the mother country by joining you in carrying on the war—remembering besides that one consequence of that, as of every war, may be that you may be called on to use a large numerical force in defence of your own possessions. I do not bring forward this as a claim upon our colonies; but, I believe, a principle which they will be glad to recognise is that they should be put upon such a footing of military equality with you as that their army should be incorporated with yours; and in that manner—possibly without expense to this country, but certainly if we supply the necessary funds—a valuable body of men may be raised, not only for this occasion but for future service; men who would not be foreigners, inasmuch as they are the subjects of the same Sovereign, and who would be happy to have the opportunity of manifesting their sympathy with this nation and their allegiance to their Sovereign. I have only thrown this subject out for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, for, of course, the passing of this Bill affords no opportunity of incorporating within it any provision of the kind. In regard to this Bill, I have only to say that, retaining all my objections to it—retaining them notwithstanding the speech of the noble Marquess opposite, and, indeed, feeling them confirmed by the line of argument he has taken, which affords, in my opinion, a wholly insufficient answer to the arguments of my noble Friend near me (the Earl of Ellenborough) — I shall content myself, when called upon to say "Aye" or "No" to the third reading of this Bill, with saying "No." Your Lordships have thought fit, though by a narrow majority, to affirm the principle of this Bill, and the Bill is almost wholly one of principle. As far as I am concerned, therefore, I will not give your Lordships the trouble of dividing against the third reading, although, if a division be taken, I must certainly, acting in conformity with my views upon the subject, again say "Not Content."

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE explained that he had not used the expression "absurd" with reference to any arguments that had fallen from any noble Lord in that House during the discussion of this Bill; and that all he meant to say was, that some of the objections taken to the measure out of doors, by persons not well informed of the reasons which had led the Government to propose it, and of the grounds on which it was proposed, appeared to him absurd.

VISCOUNT HARDINGE said, the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) having appealed to him as to the effect of a difference of the regulations of war contemplated by this Bill with regard to the men who would be enlisted under it, he begged to say the cases which the noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough) had put were not quite parallel. The case to which his noble Friend had alluded, was to an alteration made in the mode by which discipline was maintained among the Sepoys, as compared with the Queen's army. Formerly both the armies had been on the same footing, corporal punishment being inflicted in both cases; but, at a time when it was found that inconvenience resulted from attempting to maintain discipline in the Indian army by corporal punishment, this mode of punishment was suspended by Lord William Bentinck, and offenders ordered to work in the chains on the high road. That was carried into effect for some years; but in time it was found to be so detrimental to the public service, the Sepoys losing caste by this mode of punishment, while corporal punishment entailed no loss of caste, that the Indian authorities were of opinion that the system required alteration. During his service in India the old system was reverted to, the two armies were again put upon the same footing, and the change was found to work advantageously for the whole force. With regard to the employment of a German or other foreign force with a British force, under different systems of punishment, he had to observe that Her Majesty had the power of making any Articles of War She might please without having recourse to Parliament, provided the rules so laid down did not exceed the punishments laid down by the Mutiny Act. Her Majesty could mitigate the severity of the Articles of War, but She could not, without legislative authority, add to their severity. In the Peninsular war, to which repeated reference had been made, the Portuguese troops were under our immediate control; they were subsidised by us, but they were placed under a distinct command and were subject to our Articles of War. The German Legion, on the contrary, formed a portion of our army, and in their case there had been a suspension, and not an abolition, of our system of corporal punishment. With respect to the alleged inconvenience of such an arrangement, he should confess that, in his opinion, that inconvenience might to some extent arise, but he did not anticipate that it could operate prejudicially. The German Legion during the last war was not subject to corporal punishment, and he did not think that punishment would be more required in the new force which might be constituted under this Bill. He confidently hoped that the Militia Bill introduced by his noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Derby) in 1852 would answer and would ultimately provide us with sufficient soldiers; but he believed that the present Bill would be found the readiest mode of attaining an object which they must all desire to secure. He trusted, therefore, that the House would offer no opposition to its immediate enactment.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH said, that he did not think his noble and gallant Friend had answered his question. He wanted to know whether a system could be expected to work satisfactorily under which two regiments, the one composed of Englishmen and the other of Germans, but both serving under the same general, should be subject for the same offence to different punishments?

VISCOUNT HARDINGE said, that there were instances in which a foreign force had served with our own, subject to a different system regarding punishments, and yet no practical inconvenience was found to result.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH: Serving under the same general? The German troops would not submit to the punishment inflicted upon English soldiers. They submitted to one which was very likely more severe, but still there was a difference.

VISCOUNT HARDINGE said, that, when a very young man, he had the command of a Portuguese regiment, which was brigaded with British regiments. On that occasion the British officers punished their men according to the Mutiny Act, and he (Viscount Hardinge) punished the Portuguese under his command by blows with the stick or sword; and yet he had not found that that difference of punishment had been productive of any great inconvenience.

EARL GREY thought the case of the Portuguese soldiers was totally different. Those soldiers in the Peninsular war were in the service of the Portuguese Sovereign; but in the present instance we were to have men in the service of the Queen of England, receiving the Queen's pay, serving under the authority of the Mutiny Act (for they were expressly put under that authority), and yet for these men special Articles of War were to be provided under this clause. The difference was very great. The case was much more analogous to that of the Indian army; and inconvenience having resulted in India from a distinction in the system of punishments there, he thought we had every reason to anticipate a similar inconvenience in this case. But was there any necessity for this clause? He inferred that the clause was introduced, merely copying the old Act of Parliament, and as a mere adherence to custom. Now, he need not inform their Lordships how entirely changed things were since those days; and he would ask, was it likely that any real inconvenience would arise from subjecting Germans, or Swiss, or any other foreign soldiers, to the same Articles of War, administered in the same spirit as those to which the British soldier was subject? Unless some inconvenience from such a course were pointed out, he thought it would be far wiser to omit this fifth clause; it should not be retained in the Bill for the sake of a mere adherence to bygone custom. He would now add a few words with reference to the Bill itself. On a former evening he had expressed his opinion that the Bill was one which was open to some objection, but, at the same time, he must say it appeared to him that those objections had been greatly exaggerated, and that a tone had been taken upon this subject which showed that noble Lords had allowed their own passions to be excited, and had thus used language tending to excite the passions of others; otherwise he thought that much which had fallen from noble Lords under the influence of excitement would not have been heard; for example, the noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough) had to-night declared that he saw no difference between the conduct of a German Prince who allowed his men to fight under foreign banners, and that of an African Prince who sold his subjects into slavery.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH: I beg pardon. I said those Princes who took money for the service—who received a consideration for it.

EARL GREY would suppose even that the German Princes received "a consideration." Would any man tell him that it was the same thing to take "a consideration" and give permission to your subjects voluntarily, from their own free will, to enlist in an army where they would be well treated—that this was for one moment to be compared with the conduct of an African Prince, who kidnapped his subjects, bound them in chains, and sold them to a foreign slaver with the perfect conviction that they would be carried across the sea and worked to death in four or five years far from their own homes? Could the noble Earl have wished any longer to address himself to the reason of their Lordships or of the country when he used arguments of that kind? He (Earl Grey), at all events, would leave it to their Lordships' reason to compare the two cases. Then, with regard to the constitutional argument, a great deal had been made of that; and, as the Bill was originally drawn, he was bound to admit there was some force in this objection. It was contrary to the spirit of the constitution, that foreign troops should be employed in this country for the sake of maintaining order, and for this obvious reason, that, should the Crown desire to exceed its reasonable powers and enforce its decrees by a military force, we all knew that the British army, formed of our own fellow subjects, would not support or enforce any such acts; whereas it was perfectly conceivable that a foreign force might do so. There was, therefore, originally an objection in principle to the Bill, though practically it was an objection of almost inconceivably small weight, because nobody could believe that the occasion was ever likely to arise. Now, however, that the clause had been so altered as that the keeping of foreign troops in this country was simply limited to the object of disciplining them and forming depôts for service abroad, when the Crown was entirely restricted from making any other use of these troops than that of engaging them in foreign service, this objection—small as it was in the first instance—was now gone altogether, and to speak of this Bill in its present form as unconstitutional, was merely a repetition of that sort of vague language which was so often heard in either House of Parliament, where, if there was a measure to which you wished to give a bad name, while you had no clear or tangible objection to it, you called it "unconstitutional." Then, again, he could not help thinking that the noble Earl opposite had been led away by his eagerness into another very untenable proposition. He had objected to the employment of cast iron in the middle of a chain, declaring that the strength of a chain was the strength of its weakest link; and, therefore, he seemed to deprecate the employment of foreign with British troops, because, he said, "I object to an unequal line of battle." An unequal line of battle! Why, he believed there never yet was any army employed upon any field of battle, on the face of the earth, with regard to which the general did not feel that some regiments were entitled to higher confidence than others. Even among the British forces, some regiments were to be trusted more than others. The Old Guard of Napoleon was only to be employed as a last resource, and that General considered one battalion of those troops equal to three battalions of any others. The noble Earl himself had not stated from his Indian experience that the Sepoys were equal to the British troops, and although, indeed, they were entitled to great credit, still every one was aware that they were far from being equal; but that was not found to be sufficient reason for not employing Native regiments. Again, did the Duke of Wellington exclude all but British troops from his army either in Spain or at Waterloo, lest he should have "an unequal line of battle?" That great man, in one of the last speeches he ever made in their Lordships' House, when he spoke on the Militia Bill, stated that in the Peninsular war he seldom had under his command an army more than one-third of which was composed of British troops upon whom he could firmly rely. It appeared to him, therefore, that the objections to this Bill had been much exaggerated. The noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) said that he wished an earlier provision had been made of "wrought iron." He (Earl Grey) quite concurred in the opinion of the noble Earl that more effectual means ought to have been taken to increase the regular British army at an earlier period, and that if that had been done this measure would probably not have been necessary; and he should have been very glad that it should not have been necessary. But, granting that such was the case, were their Lordships, because a mistake might possibly have been made by Her Majesty's Government, to refuse to adopt any means which might be within their power for increasing the army? The noble Earl who began the debate (the Earl of Ellenborough) had dwelt a great deal upon the arduous character of the struggle in which we were engaged:—was not that a reason why we should avail ourselves of assistance from any quarter from which it might be obtainable? He thought that the Government would probably be able under the provisions of that Bill to obtain very useful troops; and he did say that, after such an application had been made to them by Her Majesty's Government, knowing of what character this struggle was likely to be, that that House or the other House would indeed be taking upon itself a most fearful responsibility if it were to refuse to the Government at such a moment, and in such a crisis of the national interests, those means which they conceived necessary to carry out this struggle to the safety and glory of the country. He therefore rejoiced to collect from what had fallen from the noble Earl opposite, that it was not intended again to divide the House upon this Bill, and he trusted it might successfully pass into law.

The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH wished to say one word in reference to what had fallen from the noble Earl. The noble Earl had, in speaking of the troops employed in India, expressed his opinion generally that the Native regiments were inferior to the Queen's troops; but it was his (the Earl of Ellenborough's) opinion that if Native troops were brigaded with English regiments and engaged with them for any considerable period under fire, and officered by English officers in whom they had confidence, and who showed confidence in them, to the extent of their physical strength, the Native regiments would show themselves equal to the Queen's regiments. The 35th Native Regiment served with the 13th Queen's Regiment at Jellalabad, and proved themselves equal to that regiment in courage and devotion, and there were many other instances; and not only that, but in one case a Native regiment marched to an attack, in which it was true they failed, when the European troops had been repulsed.

Earl GRANVILLE said, that, as his Friend the noble Marquess near him (the Marquess of Lansdowne) had been charged by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) with discourtesy for having applied the epithet "absurd" to an argument against which he had been contending, he should like to know whether a similar charge might not be brought, with at least equal justice, against the noble Earl himself, who had characterised the opinion held by the Government upon a certain subject as "debasing" and "degrading." But he had risen principally for the purpose of adverting to another topic. The noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Ellenborough) had overpowered them all the other night by what he said would have been the opinion of the late Sir Robert Peel on this subject. Now, he (Earl Granville) could not help thinking that that was a somewhat strange statement from a noble Earl who had stated, in the course of his evidence before a Committee of that House, that he had made it a point never to consult Sir Robert Peel on any matter connected with the business of his department. It appeared to him (Earl Granville) injudicious in the noble Earl not to hear what his colleague and leader might have to say upon such subjects; but perhaps it was owing to the noble Earl's knowing by intuition what Sir Robert Peel would say that he spared him the trouble of personal communication. But the noble Earl had on the same occasion stated that on every important subject which came under his consideration he took care to consult the Duke of Wellington, and the noble Earl had expressed in eloquent and striking language his high opinion of the character and the intellect of that truly great man. He (Earl Granville) wished, therefore, to read a passage from the speech of the Duke of Wellington on the Militia Bill, in the month of June, 1852, which would, he believed, go far to show that the noble Duke would have given his support to such a measure as that then under their Lordships' consideration. That passage was as follows—

> "Everything has its beginning, and this is a commencement of an organisation of a disciplined militia; in the same way as if you are to have a corps of reserve, you must have a commencement, involving some months for disciplining them before you could have your corps of reserve ready. You must make a beginning here, and see that it will take some months before you can form reserve regiments. The armies of England, who have served the country so well, are your Lordships so mistaken as to suppose that they were ever composed of more than one-third of real British subjects—of natives of this island? No such thing. Look to all your great services. Look at the East Indies. Not more than one-third of the soldiers there are such British soldiers. Look at the Peninsula; not one-third of the men employed there were ever British soldiers. Yet I beg your Lordships to observe what services those soldiers performed. They fought great battles against the finest troops in the world; they went prepared to face everything—aye, and to be successful against everything, or this country would not have borne with them. Not one-third of those armies were British troops, but they were brave troops, and not merely brave—for I believe every man is brave—but well organised troops. Take the battle of Waterloo; look at the number of British troops at that battle. I can tell your Lordships that in that battle there were sixteen battalions of Hanoverian militia, just formed, under the command of a nobleman, late the Hanoverian Ambassador here—Count Kielmansegge—who behaved most admirably; and there were many other foreign troops who nobly aided us in that battle, avowedly the battle of giants; whose operations helped to bring about the victory which was followed by the peace of Europe, that has now lasted for thirty-two or thirty-four years. I say, my Lords, that however much I admire highly-disciplined troops, and most especially British disciplined troops, I tell you you must not suppose that others cannot become so too."—[3 *Hansard*, cxxij. 730.]

He hoped he was not presumptuous in thinking that that extract would afford a better means of judging what the Duke of Wellington would have thought of that Bill than any statement of the noble Earl would serve to show what would have been the opinion of Sir Robert Peel upon the same subject.

The Earl of MALMESBURY said, that there was no kind of analogy between the position of the force which was to be raised under that Bill and the position of the Hanoverian Legion which we had employed during the last war. The Hanoverian Legion was composed of subjects of the British Crown, and they fought in a national cause; and in the case of the Brunswickers and the Dutch troops they fought under the actual command of their own Sovereigns, who were in alliance with us. Again, there was no analogy between the proposed new force and the Portuguese or Spanish troops which had co-operated with our army in the Peninsula, while serving under their own Governments. The foreigners whom we might enlist under this Bill could only be regarded—he did not wish to use the word offensively—as mercenaries and as a sort of *condottieri*. The Members of that (the Opposition) side of the House had been charged with using exaggerated language in combatting the measure, and with spreading abroad exaggerated terrors as to its probable consequences. But if any such exaggeration had been indulged in, either in that House or out of it, the fault was solely attributable to the course which had been pursued by Her Majesty's Government. They had introduced the Bill suddenly, and without the slightest notice, and they wished to pass it through Parliament with a hurry which would leave no opportunity for its mature consideration. The manner in which the Bill had been brought before Parliament was therefore calculated to awaken that suspicion of foreigners which was so deeply seated in the English character, and which, even if it were a prejudice, was calculated, like other national prejudices, to ensure our national strength and promote our national safety. Unless the Government were so unacquainted with the feelings and prejudices of the people of England as to be unfit to govern, they must have known that such a measure as this would excite much opposition; and, surely, if the measure were one of such urgency as Her Majesty's Government believed it to be, they ought to have called Parliament together a month earlier to consider its provisions — for the same necessity which was supposed to exist at the present moment for its enactment must have equally existed a month ago. The Bill had been brought forward not only in a great hurry, but also with a good deal of mystery; and Her Majesty's Ministers had as yet given no reason why they had kept their intentions on the subject so complete a secret, and had not stated who were the soldiers whom they meant to employ under the powers with which they were to be vested. Unless the House of Commons were treated with much more candour, the fears to which reference had been made would be greatly increased. Before he concluded he wished to say a few words with respect to the articles of war. The noble and gallant Commander in Chief (Viscount Hardinge) had alluded to the case of other armies serving with our own, and subject to a wholly different discipline. But those other armies, such, for instance, as the French army in the Crimea, were the subjects of another Sovereign, and were placed under commanders of their own. It appeared to him that the passage from the speech of the Duke of Wellington, quoted by the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville), offered no argument in favour of that Bill, for that passage merely went to show the advantage of a militia force; and his (the Earl of Malmesbury's complaint against Her Majesty's Ministers was that they had not sufficiently relied on the enlargement of a national force of that character.

Lord REDESDALE said, he thought that there was one serious consideration involved in that matter to which no reference had yet been made. It was a question of most serious importance how these troops were to be officered. In the main they must be officered by their own countrymen; and as it was not proposed to give them any half-pay after the conclusion of the war, he was afraid that the advantages offered would not induce any respectable officers to come and command these troops. In the cases of foreign troops employed by us on former occasions they had always been officered by the gentlemen of the countries from which they were drawn. Such would not, he was afraid, be the case in the present instance, and he thought there was danger that the inferiority of the character of the officers might render such a corps as it was proposed to raise rather unmanageable. He believed that they would act wisely if, instead of adopting the policy which it was the object of that measure to carry into effect, they were to follow the advice of the Duke of Wellington, and to strengthen our own militia force.

The Earl of GLENGALL said, he wished to remind their Lordships that there would be no analogy between the position of the force which would be raised under that Bill and that of the foreigners who had served with the Duke of Wellington, because the latter were either men who continued under the command of their own Sovereigns, or were absolutely incorporated with the British Army. Some of these miscellaneous foreigners formed two battalions of the old 60th Regiment.

Resolved in the *affirmative.*

Bill read 3^a accordingly.

On Question that this Bill do pass,

The Duke of NEWCASTLE said, he had no objection to strike out, in accordance with the suggestion of noble Lords opposite, the 5th clause of the Bill. By doing so all question as to the Queen's prerogative in respect to foreign troops would be removed.

Clause struck out; Bill *passed*, and sent to the Commons.

House adjourned till To-morrow.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Monday, December 18, 1854.

Minutes.] Public Bills.—1° Jurors and Juries (Ireland) (No. 2); Enlistment of Foreigners.

OFFICERS IN THE CRIMEA—THE INCOME TAX.

Mr. **JOHN O'CONNELL** begged to ask the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, if Her Majesty's Government would consider the propriety of bringing in a Bill to exonerate from liability to income tax on their pay, officers of every branch of Her Majesty's service in employment at the seat of war, while there employed?

The **CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER**: It is exceedingly disagreeable to me, and I am sure I may say the same for my colleagues, to give an answer in the negative to any question which purports to have in view—as I am quite certain the hon. Member has in view—the benefit and advantage of the army in the Crimea, and which is intended as an expression of grateful feeling to that army. I agree with the hon. Gentleman in thinking that no expression of grateful feeling on the part of this House, or of the other branch of the Legislature, to that army could be too strong; but I am sorry to say it is not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to bring in any Bill of that kind, and simply for these reasons—first, I don't know that the time has arrived to consider any arrangements with respect to rewards for the army in the Crimea; and, in the next place, if the hon. Member directs his eyes to the *Gazette*, he may be satisfied that the attention of the proper department of the Government has been already directed to that subject. But I must point out to him two grounds affording paramount reasons for objecting to a proposal of this kind. The first of them is, that where the Government think fit to give a reward to a public servant they ought to give it as a reward, and not by way of exemption from a tax. The creation of exemptions is so mischievous, so delusive, and so sure of being productive of future embarrassment, that I trust the House will take every opportunity of getting rid of such exemptions, and will do nothing to create them afresh. And, lastly, I should be sorry to adopt a form of reward for the army in the Crimea which would only apply to a comparatively small and wealthy portion of those of whom that army is composed; whereas I think that whatever we do we should recognise no distinction between the officers and the men, but should acknowledge equally the merits of every man belonging to that noble army.

EXCHANGE OF VESSELS WITH PRUSSIA.

Admiral **WALCOTT**: Jealousy for the efficiency of the Navy alone induces me, otherwise most unwillingly at this time, to put a question respecting an Act which impeaches the resources and capabilities of our Royal Arsenals and private yards, and apparently betrays great improvidence on the part of Government in neglecting to prepare vessels adapted for a known and special service, when every delay, omission, and error, and appearance of dependence on any aid but our own, is of serious import in such matters. The question he had to ask of the First Lord of the Admiralty was, on what grounds an exchange had been effected with the King of Prussia of the *Thetis* frigate for two gun-boats?

Sir **JAMES GRAHAM**: The exchange to which the hon. and gallant Officer refers has not been completed, but it has been contemplated, and is still contemplated. The circumstances are these:—In the month of June the Prussian Government applied to Her Majesty's Government to know if they were willing to exchange for two gun-boats, made in this country by Mr. Russell, of peculiar construction, light draught of water, carrying heavy guns, and capable of being steered fore and aft—two old corvettes. Her Majesty's Government said they had no objection to such an exchange on principle, but it was necessary to inspect the vessels before they agreed to the proposal. They made inquiry respecting them; Mr. Scott Russell went to Dantzic for the purpose of inspecting them; and reported as his opinion that they were perfectly well suited for the Baltic service, and that it was well worth their while to make trial of the new construction in active war. On that ground the Prussian Government were told that there was no objection at that time to the exchange. That was, I think, in the month of June. Some delay took place, and it was not until the month of September that the Prussian Government acceded to the proposal we made, that instead of two corvettes, one old frigate should be given in exchange for the two vessels in question. In the month of September there was no great anxiety on our part to effect the exchange for those two vessels, because they were not applicable to the Baltic service for this year; but the Prussian Government intimated that they thought the honour of the British Crown was involved in the exchange, and it was not thought proper by us to involve a question of good faith in the matter. Accordingly it has been arranged that, if the two vessels shall be sent to us by the Prussian Government towards the close of the year, the British Government shall take them in exchange for the frigate; but the exchange has not yet been completed. [An hon. MEMBER: What is the draught of the two gun-boats?] I am not quite certain, but I believe about eleven feet.

THE VOTE OF THANKS—INSERTION OF NAMES.

The Resolutions of the 15th December, giving the thanks of this House to the officers and men engaged in the military and naval operations in the Crimea and the Black Sea, having been read,

LORD JOHN RUSSELL moved that the names of Major General Airey, Major General Estcourt, and Rear Admiral Stopford, be inserted.

Resolved, Nemine Contradicente—

"That the like Thanks be given to Brigadier General, now Major General, Richard Airey, Quartermaster General, and to Brigadier General, now Major General, James Bucknall Bucknall Estcourt, Adjutant General."

And—

"That the like Thanks be given to Rear Admiral the Honourable Montagu Stopford, Companion of the Most honourable Order of the Bath, and Captain of the Fleet."

MILITIA SURGEONS.

On Motion that the House do go into Committee on the Militia Bill,

MR. BRADY begged to call the attention of the House to the circumstances in which medical officers of the militia are placed at the present moment. The Militia Bill was similar to that which had been passed during the last war; but circumstances were changed, and that which in former times might have been perfectly just, might, under present circumstances, be the reverse. It was well known to the Members of the House that the surgeons acting under the present Militia Bill were men of the highest character in their profession. They were men holding a local position, and many of them were rendering essential service to the localities in which they resided. It was proposed that those men should be taken away to perform active duty in the Colonies, or in different portions of the kingdom, and there kept on active service for two or three years, and then disbanded without a penny of compensation, saving the daily pay they had received during the time. It was a well-known fact, and should be remembered, that at the present time the standard of education in the College of Surgeons was reduced in order to make up the deficiency existing, and that the army and naval medical boards had not got a single candidate upon their lists. Under these circumstances, the Bill was to be passed, and the Government would be doing great injustice to the men they were collecting into the militia force, unless the medical officers were placed on the permanent staff. He hoped his observations would not be allowed to pass idly by; that they would be weighed and considered, and that justice would be done to those men by improving their position. Something should be secured to them for coming forward at that time to render essential service to the country.

MILITIA BILL.

Bill *considered* in Committee.

Clause 1 (Empowering Her Majesty to accept the voluntary offers of the Militia to serve out of the United Kingdom).

MR. BANKES said, he had an Amendment to move, which would qualify its terms. It was proposed that it should be lawful for Her Majesty to accept the services, and to employ in any parts or places out of the United Kingdom, under the regulations and restrictions specified in the Act, such part of the militia as it might be deemed advisable so to employ; and to that proposition he desired to add the following words "not exceeding in any case three-fourths of the number actually serving in any regiment, battalion, or corps of any such militia." They had to consider at the present moment, not merely the provisions of the Act which the Government proposed to pass, but also to consider the effect of the Act as it might operate in future times as a precedent which would be referred to in future exigencies of a public nature like the present. The Bill at present offered to them was founded upon a measure which was passed towards the close of the last great war, and which was considered of very great importance, because it gave to the Crown a power over the militia which it had never possessed before. At present, no doubt, there was another great exigency, but it was to be distinguished from that which had formerly occurred. In the year 1813, the powers given by the former Act were demanded and willingly given by the then existing House of Commons. At that period the great enemy of this country, Napoleon, was engaged in the great struggle which was then taking place before his first deposition or abdication ; and it was a crisis of vast importance, because there was little doubt that in the event of that great Emperor succeeding, his attention would be again turned towards the destruction of this country, and if he had been again established in the plenitude of power on his throne, they had every reason to expect a reiteration of those threats of invasion which for so many years had engaged the attention of this country. It was a question, then, at that time, whether it was better that they should defend the soil of this country by meeting him with their forces in France, than that they should await the possibility of battles and combats on their own shores. It was, therefore, a very fair and reasonable proposition with regard to that view of the question, that even the constitutional force of the country should be sent abroad to effect the object to which he referred. The House of Commons readily accepted the proposition, and when the Act was proposed it was cheerfully accepted. There was contained in that Act of Parliament a provision, the omission of which in the present Bill he now proposed to supply. It was then considered that, however earnest and desirous the militia of that time were to go abroad on this service, good policy did not permit that the country should be entirely stripped of defensive force ; and it was therefore enacted as a positive proviso in the Bill that one-fourth of each regiment should be retained at home. That proviso was not introduced into the former Act without very mature consideration, and he could not but think that it must be owing to haste in the councils of the existing Cabinet that it should have been omitted from the present measure, he found that, a Motion having been made to reduce the amount of the proportion which should be retained at home, Lord Castlereagh resisted the proposition, on the ground that any such alteration would tend to destroy the militia itself—a result which, if probable, would have deterred him from proposing or proceeding with the measure—and that he wished to consult at once the fair freedom of the service and the preservation of the militia, which, he believed, was interwoven with the fundamental security of the country. It was, therefore, the opinion of the Ministers of that day, that if the whole of a militia regiment, or any larger proportion than that fixed by their Bill, were permitted to go abroad, it would prove the destruction of the militia. He was aware that there were many officers to whom it must be very inconvenient to go abroad, and who were, in fact, disqualified from active or foreign service by age or other circumstances; though, should the whole of the regiment volunteer, many would be induced to go at great personal sacrifice, whose presence would be of little actual advantage to the service. By the proposed provision, he thought they would guard at once the public interest and private feelings. The same observation applied to the privates. If the whole of a regiment were permitted to volunteer, he believed they would find that, in the enthusiasm of the moment, many men would shrink from declining to accompany their comrades who could ill be spared from their homes. He urged this as a social question of great importance; for although the difference might not be great as to the numbers actually obtained, the result would be very different in reference to the feelings of those concerned, whilst the proviso would offer no obstacle to the salutary working of the Bill, and would have the effect of rendering it popular throughout the kingdom. As they were now proposing not merely a measure for the present, but a precedent for the future, he should be happy to see the measure passed in a shape, which might be safely recommended for the adoption of posterity, if, after an interval of some forty years, the services of the militia should again be required. The present exigency was not of exactly the same character with that to meet which the former measure was passed. At the present moment we had no risk of invasion to anticipate, and the alternative was not proposed to them of fighting our battles on the shores of France or England. He contended that the efficiency of the measure would in no way be better promoted than by keeping at home an effective reserve. As we had now a Militia Bill universally recognised as efficient for its purpose, and popular throughout the kingdom, it would be a matter of great regret that its working should be impaired, and the *prestige* it had acquired be destroyed. He hoped the noble Viscount (Viscount Palmerston) would have no difficulty in acceding to a proposition giving to the militia regiments the power of volunteering in very large numbers if they thought fit, but preventing a majority from overwhelming a minority. He should be sorry to see the slightest impediment in the way of increasing our resources, but he believed that the proviso would in fact operate favourably for that end.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON felt bound to say that the hon. and learned Gentleman had made his proposal in a spirit of perfect fairness, and in a manner showing that his object was by no means to frustrate or impair the efficiency of the measure, but, according to his own view, to improve it and make it more acceptable and better calculated to work. He (Viscount Palmerston) would endeavour to meet the proposition in the same spirit. He must, however, beg leave to say, that he did not admit that the circumstances of the present moment were parallel to those to which the hon. and learned Gentleman referred during the latter period of the last war. There was, as indeed the hon. and learned Gentleman himself indicated, a material difference between them. Though the country was at that period carrying on operations on a great scale upon the Continent, still it was also by no means secure from the risk of having to defend itself on its own shores. But at the present time the country was carrying on extensive and important military operations at a distance from its shores, and in the present state of things there was no likelihood—indeed he might almost say there was no possibility—of the country having to defend itself from foreign invasion. Therefore there existed not the same reason as formerly for maintaining a large force at home. So far, therefore, as the argument, on which the reservation with respect to the number of militiamen to be sent abroad was inserted in the former Bill, consisted in the belief that circumstances might possibly arise, from unforeseen events, rendering it necessary to employ the militia for home defence, so far that argument did not apply to the present moment. However, he entirely subscribed to the sentiments expressed in that passage from Lord Castlereagh's speech which the hon. and learned Gentleman had quoted, because no man in the country could entertain a stronger sense than himself of the great value of a militia force and of the great importance of continuing it as a permanent element of the military arrangements, and, he would say, also, of the civil and social arrangements of the country. Not only was it a most important ingredient in the means the country might possess to repel foreign aggression at any time when it might be suddenly called on so to do, but he regarded the militia likewise as a most valuable social element, inasmuch as it brought the gentry of the country in contact with the lower and working classes of the community, and cemented the bond of union, which should always unite them, by common pursuits, common associations, and common objects; and he was convinced that, in a political and social point of view, the militia was just as valuable as it was in a military point of view as part of the defensive force of the kingdom. It was, therefore, needless for him to say, that he should be the last man to propose anything likely to be injurious to the militia system, or to refuse his consent to anything obviously calculated to render that system more permanent, useful, and practicable in its operation. Consequently, he was not disposed to object to the principle of the hon. and learned Gentleman's proposal. Indeed, though the Bill at present contained no restriction of the kind, he was sure that the hon. and learned Gentleman would allow that, in the exercise of the large discretion which the Bill, as framed, would confer on the Government, it was of all things unlikely that, in regulating the number for service abroad of any given regiment of militia, whose offer for such service might be accepted, they would not provide that a certain portion of the regiment should remain at home for the purpose of relieving and supplying any deficiency which might arise in respect to the part of the regiment employed abroad. The hon. and learned Gentleman had put his Motion on another ground, which he (Viscount Palmerston) should be the last person to question; he had put it on the ground of personal feeling. Now, undoubtedly, if any class of men were entitled to expect that the Government, in any arrangements they might make, should show the utmost deference and consideration for their feelings, the officers of militia had the strongest possible claim on this account; because no class of men had more cheerfully and more effectively devoted themselves to that public service which they had to perform than the gentlemen and others connected with the militia. Both officers and privates had behaved so well that they were fully entitled to expect from the Government and from Parliament full deference and allowance for any personal feelings by which they might be actuated. The only objection which he should have to the hon. and learned Gentleman's Amendment would be, that it proposed to define the proportion of those to be sent abroad in reference to the numbers actually serving in the regiment. This was a very vague and indefinite standard of comparison, for the numbers actually serving in a regiment varied from time to time. He should have no objection to the hon. and learned Member's proposition if, instead of the numbers actually serving in a regiment, the actual establishment of the regiment or battalion in question were substituted as the standard of proportion. This was a fixed amount, and there would consequently never be any difficulty in ascertaining the numbers to be sent abroad; while, on the other hand, the number actually serving varied from week to week, so that it would always be almost impossible to say that any given number of men should exactly constitute three-fourths of the number actually serving in a regiment. If the hon. and learned Gentleman could agree to this modification of his proposal, he (Viscount Palmerston) should offer no objection to it.

Mr. DISRAELI said, that as the noble Lord had substantially accepted his right hon. Friend's proposition, he had only to express his satisfaction at the spirit of concession manifested by the Government.

Amendment *agreed to.*

On the Question that the Clause stand part of the Bill,

Sir H. WILLOUGHBY asked whether it was clear by this clause that a regiment volunteering to go to one garrison would not find itself carried to another, and also if the clause contemplated any other garrisons than the places in the Mediterranean?

Viscount PALMERSTON said, that the mode in which the Bill would work would be this:—A communication would be made to certain regiments of militia, askin gthem to volunteer for certain places named in that communication. They would be asked, for instance, to serve in any part of the Mediterranean, and in the attestation which each man who engaged would make, the places named in the communication would be mentioned; and of course no man could be held liable to serve in any other places than those mentioned in the attestation.

Lord LOVAINE wished to know whether the head-quarters would go with the three-fourths sent abroad, or remain with the one-fourth left at home?

Viscount PALMERSTON said that, of course, if a whole regiment were to go abroad, the regiment would go in a body, and the head-quarters would go with them. It was contemplated that portions only of regiments should go; and, as it would be inconvenient to have small portions of regiments acting as separate battalions, power was taken in the Bill to add portions of different regiments together, and to make provisional battalions of them, as was done in 1804.

Lord LOVAINE thought the noble Lord had not fully answered his question. Would the three-quarters sent abroad be joined to part of any other regiment to form a provisional battalion; or would it go out as a separate regiment, leaving the other quarter at home as a sort of depôt company?

Viscount PALMERSTON said, that would depend very much upon the strength of the regiment volunteering. Suppose a regiment of 1,200 men, for instance, volunteered, if three-quarters of them were sent abroad they would be sufficient to form a separate battalion; but in the case of a regiment of 600 strong only volunteering, three-quarters of that regiment would be too small a number to form a separate battalion, and they would have to be added to portions of other regiments.

Colonel DUNNE wished to know what objection there would be to regiments of militia volunteering for actual service in the field?

Viscount PALMERSTON said, Her Majesty's Government had no wish to ask the militia for more sacrifices than were actually required by the public service. All that it was thought necessary to ask the militia for was to do duty in certain garrisons in the Mediterranean, thus setting free regular regiments, which, of course, were more fitted from their nature to take the field than the best militia regiments could be.

Mr. BENTINCK wished to know whether it were intended that the portions of regiments remaining at home, whether they included or not the head-quarters, would be embodied together to serve in this country as provisional battalions. [Viscount Palmerston: No.] He understood then that it was intended they should remain in their respective counties for the purpose of continuing the duties of their service as usual.

Colonel SIBTHORP wished to know, in the case of three detachments on a foreign station forming a provisional battalion, who was to command them? He had the honour, worthy or unworthy, of being a full colonel, and should decidedly object to serving under a lieutenant colonel, hoping that he had done nothing to merit degradation. Until he was condemned or found incompetent, he could not submit to be placed in a lower rank than he had hitherto held.

Lord LOVAINE thought his original question had not yet been fairly answered. Suppose a large regiment of 1,200 men were to volunteer, 800 of them would be sent abroad, and 400 would remain at home—would the head quarters go abroad with the 800, or remain at home with the 400?

Viscount PALMERSTON must ask the noble Lord to say what he meant by head quarters?

Lord LOVAINE said, he meant the staff of the regiment.

Viscount PALMERSTON said, that such portion of the staff would go with the regiment as was necessary for the performance of the regimental duties.

Lord LOVAINE: Supposing the lieutenant colonel declined to volunteer, would the regiment be commanded by the major?

Mr. S. HERBERT said, that so many regiments had volunteered that there would be no difficulty in getting regiments in which the lieutenant colonel had volunteered.

Colonel NORTH asked a question in respect to detachments of regiments going out. Suppose 300 from one, and 400 from another, would the adjutant accompany such a detachment? He thought that the Bill before the Committee placed the country gentlemen of England in rather a disagreeable position, and more especially as to those who, like himself, had passed a great number of years in Her Majesty's service. He was sure that in private matters there was no person in the country whose opinion he would sooner take than that of the noble Viscount; but upon a measure of this importance he thought that the country gentlemen should clearly understand the peculiar pressure which required their services. He had no hesitation in saying, that if he were merely called upon to reside in Corfu or Malta, for three or four years, the inconvenience would be so serious that he would, if possible, avoid it—but if the pressure be such that every English gentleman would be expected to come to the assistance of the country, he felt he was speaking the feelings of others as well as his own, when he said that no loss or inconvenience would prevent them going to any part of the world where their services could be of use. He had served a great number of years in the Army, and he was anxious and ready to offer his services if occasion required. If, however, there were no such pressure, he thought that those who were younger, and who had fewer ties to bind them to this country, should be selected for foreign service. While they had the Bill before them they ought to make the phraseology of it so plain as to protect the country gentlemen from the snarling cry that might be raised, that they had not done their duty.

Sir J. PAKINGTON said, he was sure that when an hon. Gentleman put a question of this importance he was entitled to a more satisfactory answer than his noble Friend near him had received from the Secretary at War. It was not the sort of answer which an hon. Gentleman on that (the Opposition) side of the House ought to receive from the right hon. Gentleman. The observations of the right hon. Gentleman were no answer to the question of the noble Lord. His noble Friend referred to matters of considerable importance as to the clauses of an Act of Parliament. The question was — what the effect of this clause would be? He was rather surprised to hear the noble Viscount ask his noble Friend what he meant by the head quarters of a regiment. They wanted to know what would be the effect of the alteration now made in the Bill? What would be the position of the head quarters, the field officers and the superior officers of the regiments? He would take the case which his noble Friend had himself suggested—that of 800 volunteering to go abroad, and 400 remaining at home. The fourth section provides that in the event of 500 men having volunteered, and the proper proportion of officers not volunteering with them, it would be then open to the Crown to resort to promotion, and to take other steps to fill up the vacancies so created. He apprehended the question of his noble Friend to be this—what was to be the position of the field officers in the case supposed? Were they to be superseded?

Viscount PALMERSTON was understood to reply in the negative.

Sir J. PAKINGTON: Well, then, he thought that they required some explanation as to the position of field officers not being able to go out with the regiment.

Viscount PALMERSTON said, that their position in such case would be precisely the same as it was at the present moment. They might remain at home, or go abroad if they pleased.

Lord LOVAINE said, it appeared to him that the portion of the regiment which remained at home would be thrown upon the shelf, or disembodied.

Mr. S. HERBERT said, that in the answer which he had given to the noble Lord he did not mean the slightest discourtesy. He wished to observe, that the case which the noble Lord had so ingeniously raised was never likely to occur. The number of regiments volunteering *en masse*, with their lieutenant colonels at their head, was so great, that the only difficulty was, to determine which offers to select. It was clear, therefore, that no difficulty would arise from want of field officers.

Mr. BENTINCK said, he understood that it was proposed to disembody that portion of the militia regiments which remained at home. If the Government proposition—as he understood it—be adopted, he was at a loss to know how the recruiting process was to go on—how they were to fill up the blanks occurring in consequence of the number of volunteers from the militia regiments to the line.

Viscount PALMERSTON said, that the hon. and gallant Member would recollect that almost the whole of the militia force had been raised while it was yet disembodied, and before it was called out for training. The portions now disembodied would have the same means as before of obtaining recruits.

Mr. PALK thought there was one point of some importance, because it appeared to him that the Government were throwing a veil of mystery over that which involved nothing but a simple statement of fact. There was a power taken in the Bill to appoint field officers in her Majesty's service. He begged to ask the noble Lord whether it was the intention of the Government to appoint field officers who had served in the regular army to command those detachments of regiments intended to serve in garrison duty abroad?

Viscount PALMERSTON said, that he believed it would not be necessary to do so, as the Government had already received ample offers from militia officers to afford the Government the means of completely officering all the militia regiments which went abroad.

Mr. HENLEY wished to know how this Bill would work in the event of its being desirable hereafter to extend the service of the regiments sent abroad with their own consent? Could the system of volunteering go on *toties quoties*—in other words, if a number of officers and men who were sworn in to proceed to a Mediterranean station should, after a while, get tired of being cooped up in a state of inactivity at Gibraltar or Malta, and would like to go to the seat of war in the Crimea, would it be in the power of the Government to give them an opportunity of gratifying this wish? This was a point of some importance, because we might before long be in want of forces. So little foresight had been shown by the Government, that they were not aware six months ago that they would want the militia to perform even garrison duty abroad; and, therefore, it was desirable that they should at once determine beforehand whether, supposing more troops were wanted, proposals would be entertained from militia regiments who were near the seat of war, and who would like to see a little actual fighting.

Viscount PALMERSTON said, that the regiments who offered, and whose offers were accepted, to serve on any station in the Mediterranean, would be limited under such an offer and attestation to service in that particular quarter of the globe. With regard to any further extension of service, they would stand exactly in the same position as regiments at home. Their service could only be extended under a fresh offer, accepted spontaneously by them, and under a fresh engagement and attestation; but they would stand, with regard to this matter, precisely on the same footing as if they had not volunteered at all.

Clause, as amended, *agreed to.*

On Clause 2, relating to the bounty to be given under the Bill.

COLONEL SIBTHORP objected to the part of the clause which provided that the amount of the bounty should be fixed from time to time by the Secretary at War. He wished it to be distinctly defined how much bounty was to be given to every non-commissioned officer, drummer, or private who was disposed to volunteer; and he had given notice of an Amendment in this clause to that effect. The Government ought to deal liberally in the matter of the bounty, and if they did so he believed they might easily obtain a large force of most efficient men. He also hoped that the period of service for which the militia were to engage themselves should be clearly specified in the clause, as the words "during the war" were very unsatisfactory and indefinite, and would seriously interfere with the attainment of the object of the measure.

MR. S. HERBERT said, that the effect of the gallant officer's Amendment was, not to fix the amount of the bounty in the Act of Parliament, but merely to direct that a specified bounty should be fixed. Of course, this would be done, and it would be the business of the Secretary at War to do it. It would not do to insert the amount in the Act, because it must obviously vary according to the circumstances of the time. It was, therefore, obviously better that it should be left to the discretion of some one to fix the amount of the bounty.

MR. DISRAELI believed that the amount was fixed in the old Act.

MR. S. HERBERT admitted that it was; but said that there was this difference between the two cases, that the former Act was passed under an immediate pressure and to meet peculiar circumstances, and the result could be judged of at the moment. It would be far preferable to leave the amount of the bounty in the hands of the militia officers, because the difficulty or facility of obtaining men varied considerably.

MR. HILDYARD took the opportunity of the discussion upon this clause to throw out to the Government, and particularly to the President of the Poor Law Board, a suggestion which, if adopted, would act as a very effective bounty in aid of this Bill. His suggestion was, that the wife and family of no militiaman should be removable during the period of his voluntary service. The effect of this would be, in the first place, to prevent a very great deal of the expense incurred in removal; and secondly, it would only be just to married men volunteering, because such persons did not at all apprehend that the step they took would render their families any more liable to become chargeable to the parish. If this inducement were held out, he believed that many married men would be willing to go abroad. There was a great difference between the case of such men and those who enlisted in the regular army, and he thought a much larger proportion of the militia were married men than was the case in the regular army. He believed that, in fact, many had volunteered into the militia under the belief that they would not be required to leave their wives and families. Of course, if they now volunteered for foreign service under the influence of that patriotic spirit which so happily pervaded the nation, they ought to be encouraged in every possible way to do so. He would recommend that the sum necessary for the maintenance of the families of the militiamen to whom he referred should be taken from the Consolidated Fund, as the advantage to be gained by the measure would be a national one. He would not make any motion on this subject, but he hoped that the President of the Poor Law Board would give this suggestion his consideration.

MR. HENLEY saw nothing in the Bill to make it clear whether the men who volunteered for this particular service were still to be entitled to receive the annual sums in the shape of bounty which the Government had originally contracted to pay them when they enlisted for the militia. That was a point which he thought ought to be placed beyond all doubt by the clause.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON said, that of course the new bounty paid would include any arrears of the former periodical bounty that might remain payable for services still to be performed in the militia at home. Of course, the fresh engagements contemplated by this Bill would cancel the former bargains made with the men as to the sum of 1*l.* which they were annually to have received. With regard to the suggestion made by the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Mr. Hildyard), he thought that that hon Member was under a mistake in supposing that a larger proportion of militiamen than of men belonging to the line were married. He believed that the case was quite the contrary, and that a very small proportion of the militia were married; and, in accepting offers to go abroad, the preference would naturally be given to single men.

Mr. HENLEY said, that he understood the noble Lord to state that the previous bargains with the men volunteering for this service were to be cancelled, and that they would not receive the annual payment that had been guaranteed to them for a given number of years. Therefore, in the case of a man who volunteered for a specified service, would all claims for future annual payments be put an end to?

Mr. S. HERBERT said, that all must admit that, whatever arrangements were made with men belonging to the class of these volunteers, the most scrupulous good faith must be kept with them. This was the spirit in which the Government desired to deal with them, and care would be taken that the men would not be losers by any bargain into which they might enter. He hoped that the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Henley) would be satisfied with this assurance.

Mr. HENLEY was sure the Government desired to act with good faith towards these persons, but this point ought to be made clear by the Bill, because the men might wish to know the provisions of the measure in this respect before they volunteered.

Viscount PALMERSTON said, that he understood objections were entertained to engaging the men to serve abroad "during the war," as provided by this clause. Some persons imagined that the war would last ten years, though he hoped it would not. Yet, to get rid of this difficulty, he was ready to substitute words making the service one that should continue for a period of five years, instead of during the war. The five years' engagement would be strictly limited to service in the particular place or places specified in the offers made, and would not be a general engagement to serve in any station out of the United Kingdom.

Amendment *agreed to.*

Colonel SIBTHORP moved to leave out the words, "that such bounties as shall from time to time be fixed by the Secretary at War," in order to substitute the following—

> "That it should be distinctly and definitively fixed as to the full amount of bounties to be given to each non-commissioned officer, drummer, or private soldier who shall be disposed to volunteer his services."

Mr. S. HERBERT hoped the gallant Colonel would not press his Motion, as it would obviously be unwise to fix either the minimum or maximum of the bounties. That was a matter which ought to be left to the discretion of the Government, who could then vary the bounty according to the circumstances of the moment.

Mr. DISRAELI said, his opinion was, that upon this point the Government should be as unfettered as possible. At some subsequent period the Government might be obliged to call for the presence of the militia at other garrisions than those which were now contemplated, and, therefore, any bounty which might be fixed at the present moment might not suit all the circumstances which probably would arise in the future. The Government had already conceded a very important improvement in this clause, and he, therefore, hoped his hon. and gallant Friend would not press his Amendment.

Amendment *negatived.*

Clause as amended to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3 *agreed to.*

On Clause 4,

Mr. FITZROY moved the insertion of words to the effect that it should be lawful for Her Majesty to accept the services of one field officer of any regiment of militia in which 300 private men, "or any smaller number, not being less than three-fourths," of the number of private men actually serving in such regiment, shall offer to extend their services under this Act.

Motion *agreed to;* Clause, thus amended, to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5 and 6 *agreed to.*

Colonel SIBTHORP moved the omission of Clause 7, which provides that no militia officer should rank higher than lieutenant colonel, and that the following clause should be inserted instead—

> "That every rank which each officer in the militia held heretofore shall continue to be held by him, and that he shall continue to hold and to exercise all the powers and functions of command appertaining to his rank which he did, and during the whole of the period he may be employed in service out of the United Kingdom."

Viscount PALMERSTON was sorry that he could not agree to the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Member. These things must be done according to general rules and principles, and the inconvenience of having officers of militia with the rank of colonel, liable to be found in garrison with officers of the line in command of a battalion with only the rank of lieutenant colonel, was felt so strongly that, in the arrangements which it became his (Viscount Palmerston's) duty to make for the militia about to be raised, he determined that in future no officer should be appointed to the command of a militia regiment with the rank of a full colonel, and that in future militia regiments should be commanded, like regiments of the line, by lieutenant colonels. The same reason which led him to think that that was a proper arrangement for a regiment of militia at home, would naturally apply to those provisional battalions that had to go abroad; and Her Majesty's Government thinking that, in the organisation of the militia at home, it was desirable that all future appointments of officers in the command of regiments should be made with the rank of lieutenant colonel only, it would be inconsistent on their part to send provisional battalions abroad, where they would be liable to be mixed up with regiments of the line in garrison duty, and allow them to be commanded by full colonels. It was, therefore, following out the principles upon which the militia organisation had been based that Government had determined that the provisional battalions should not be commanded by officers holding a higher rank than that of lieutenant colonel. Everybody knew—and no one better than the gallant Colonel himself—that regiments of the line were always commanded by lieutenant colonels, and that it would be attended with great practical inconvenience if a militia battalion going abroad were commanded by a full colonel, whilst the regiment of the line was commanded by a lieutenant colonel.

Colonel SIBTHORP: Then, I ask the noble Lord what position I am to be in?

Viscount PALMERSTON: The gallant officer is one of those persons of rank, position, fortune, and social connection in this country whom—with great deference I may be allowed to say—I should wish to see employed in exercising their beneficial influence at home, rather than in the command of regiments of militia abroad. And though I should have the greatest confidence in a regiment going into action commanded by the gallant officer, nevertheless he must be conscious that his influence in his own circle at home might be attended with greater advantage to the nation.

Colonel SIBTHORP: In reply to the facetious observations of the noble Lord, all I have to say is, that the sooner he and his colleagues vacate the Treasury bench, give up their salaries, and repair to the seat of war, the better it will be for the country.

Amendment *negatived.*

Lord HOTHAM: As it was now the avowed intention of the Government to send militia regiments to garrisons abroad, he would ask them how they proposed to deal with officers who might hold commissions in the Army at the same time that they served in militia regiments stationed in foreign garrisons. In the case of regimental duties of every description the senior officer in the regiment necessarily took the command. It was, however, a very common thing for the major or majors of the regiments to have superior rank in the army to the lieutenant colonel of the regiment, and the rule of the service was, therefore, that whilst in regimental duties only the senior officer in the regiment took the command, in duties of a general nature, that was to say, when one regiment was brigaded with another, or discharging garrison duties with another, the command then fell, not upon the senior officer of the regiment, but upon the senior officer in the army. In the case of two regiments brigaded together, the major, whatever his seniority in the army, served under the lieutenant colonel of his regiment; but if the officer commanding the brigade happened to be disabled the command was then taken, not by the lieutenant colonel of the regiment, but by the major, because his rank was superior in the army. Now the Government had encouraged the entrance into the militia of half-pay officers in the army. It seemed to him, therefore, that if, after encouraging old officers of this description to serve in the militia, the regiment of militia was sent to a foreign garrison, it would be dealing unjustly with those officers to ask them to serve in respect of garrison duties in an inferior position to that in which they would be entitled to serve if they had remained in the regular army. Take the case of the garrison of Gibraltar. There might be several regiments of militia and regiments of the line in that garrison at the same time, and in those militia regiments officers of a rank in the army, but upon half-pay, superior to any of the commanding officers in the garrison. Indeed, an officer might find in command of the garrison a person who had previously been one of his subalterns. It would be a matter of great hardship, therefore, to old officers, whose presence in the militia Government was anxious to encourage, if officers of this rank were ordered to attend a general court martial without having the same rank there that they would have enjoyed had they remained on full pay in regiments of the line. In some cases, the question might concern the command itself. If he mistook not, it was only within the last two or three years that the garrison of Bermuda was afflicted with a pestilence of a dreadful description, and the officer in command of that garrison was twice or three times changed in consequence of the person exercising the command being struck down by death or sickness. It might happen that in a garrison the officer succeeding to the command might be disabled; and, according to the rule as now laid down, unless the noble Lord consented to its modification, the command of that garrison might devolve on a purely militia officer, whilst there might be serving in that or another militia regiment an officer of twenty or thirty years' standing, who, he (Lord Hotham) supposed, would be a more competent person to assume the command of the garrison. In making these remarks he did not mean to reflect upon any of the officers of militia; they were entitled to every possible amount of consideration which Parliament could extend to them; but he was greatly mistaken if these officers on being appealed to would not say that, in such an emergency as he had described, they would infinitely rather see the garrison in which they were stationed under the command of an officer of twenty or thirty years' experience than their own. It was on these grounds that he (Lord Hotham) ventured to submit, that, inasmuch as they were about to alter the service of the militia regiments, and place them in garrisons with regiments of the line, they should recognise the station of the officers holding Her Majesty's commission, although serving in a militia regiment, and, as regarded garrison duty, put them in the same position as if in full pay in Her Majesty's Army; and he begged to move the insertion of a proviso to that effect.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON opposed the Amendment as inconsistent with the established law and practice of the army. All officers of militia who had been in the regular army must be upon half-pay—they could not accept a commission in the militia unless they were on half-pay, or had retired from their particular rank in the army; but no officers on half-pay could exercise military authority under the Mutiny Act. It was impossible for them, therefore, being in a foreign garrison upon half-pay of the army, and only upon full pay as a militia officer, to exercise under the Mutiny Act any military authority over any portion of the regular army stationed in the same garrison. No officer on half-pay could exercise military authority unless he was placed upon the staff; and that he conceived was a sufficient reason why the proposal of the noble Lord could not be adopted. To say, therefore, that they should rank according to their position in the army would be an empty enactment, unless they were also empowered to exercise military authority over regiments of the line, and unless any soldier disobeying their orders were made liable to be tried by a court-martial for such disobedience. But such a departure from the ordinary rules of the service would involve such a change in the fundamental principles of military organisation as to be liable to serious objections, and those objections would not be counterbalanced by any advantages which, in one case or another, might possibly arise on that proposal. It was not at all likely that in Gibraltar, Malta, or the Ionian Islands, such a circumstance could occur as that which had taken place in the Bermudas, and the garrison be left without some officer of rank, who would entirely override any regimental officer who might be in command of a militia regiment.

LORD HOTHAM: It was perfectly true that no officer on half-pay could exercise command unless he was put upon the staff, and, according to the terms of the Mutiny Act, no officer on half-pay could exercise military authority; but, in point of fact, this very Bill gave to officers in the militia service power to act under the Mutiny Act, for, by Clause 11, they were to serve indiscriminately with officers of the regular army upon courts-martial. The question, then, was, in what capacity they were to serve upon these courts-martial? And was it not just that they should take their place at the table of the court-martial according to the superior rank they held in the regular army, and not according to the inferior rank they held in the militia? Then, in regard to staff duties, were they or were they not to take the ordinary duties of the garrison, and were field officers of militia to act as field officers of the garrison or were they not? His position was that they ought to be on the roll of field officers in the garrison, according to their rank in the army, and not according to their rank in the militia. And, in asking this, he asked no more than was due to their services and what they had a right to expect from the Government, who had avowed that the service of those men was just what they required.

COLONEL NORTH thought the proposition of the noble Lord was but fair to those officers of the line who had joined the militia service, and should, therefore, give it his support.

COLONEL DUNNE did not apprehend that many officers of the line would suffer by the measure of the Government as it stood, because he knew that officers of the line would not accept commissions in the militia of a rank inferior to that which they held in the regular army. The only thing worthy of consideration was, whether the time served by those officers in the militia should be counted as part of their regular service. In his opinion it ought.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON said, that militia officers were brought under the Mutiny Act was undoubtedly true; but that was in virtue of the commissions under which they received their pay.

Amendment *negatived;* clause to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 8 and 9 *agreed to;* Clause 10 *struck out;* Clauses 11 to 15 *agreed to;* Clause 16 *struck out;* remaining clauses *agreed to.*

LORD LOVAINE desired to add a clause to the Bill by which it should be put on record that, in the case of a certain portion of a regiment volunteering to go abroad, the remaining portion at home should be kept on duty to add vigour to the regiment that had been sent abroad.

MR. S. HERBERT did not exactly see the effect of this clause, and thought it doubtful as to whether it was necessary to insert in the Act a clause stating that the portion of the regiment remaining at home should be embodied or disembodied, as this would be done according to the circumstances and the requirements of the time.

Clause *withdrawn.*

MR. BANKES moved the insertion of the following proviso, namely—"Provided always, and be it further enacted, that the total number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and private men to be raised by this Act, by extending their services as hereinbefore mentioned, shall not exceed 15,000."

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON said, in point of fact it was not at all likely that Government would want so many as 15,000. They had followed the precedent of the former Act, which did not fix any particular limit, and it seemed to him it would be creating an unfounded apprehension that the whole militia were to be sent abroad if they inserted this proviso.

MR. BANKES said, the former Act did limit the number; the number was 30,000; but then the militia were wanted for the field, which was not the case here, and 15,000 would be sufficient. However, he would not press the proviso.

Motion *withdrawn.*

MR. FITZROY moved the insertion of a clause making subalterns of militia, of five years' standing, eligible to the rank of captain without property qualification.

MR. HENRY HERBERT suggested that subalterns who had served three years should be entitled to that privilege.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON said, it should be remembered that the five years included a period during which the regiment had been disembodied, and when the subaltern could only have served twenty-eight days in the year. He thought, therefore, the five years ought not to be considered too long.

MR. FRESHFIELD said, Mr. Bouverie, my objection to the clause is, that its tendency is not, as fully as I could wish, to promote the efficiency of the militia. In my opinion whatever can be offered in the form of reward, should be to those officers who manifest zeal and patriotism in our present struggle—I mean to those officers who join their more humble neighbours in the several counties to volunteer for any duty by which the soldiers of the line are set free for foreign service. I think that every officer who has accepted rank in his own county in the militia force ought in inclination, at least, to be ready to volunteer for the more extended duty which may be desirable. I say in inclination, because I am aware that many noblemen and gentlemen holding commissions in the militia have civil duties to discharge which are important to the public, and would render their volunteering for remote service not only inconvenient but prejudicial; and as to those noblemen and gentlemen, I would relieve them from any unfavourable impression which their not volunteering might otherwise warrant, by taking from them all choice, and disqualifying them from such service; but, on the other hand, officers not so rendered ineligible, but remaining at home as matter of choice and personal convenience, should reap no advantage beyond that conferred by the indulgence of such inconvenience. They have in that indulgence all to which they can be entitled. They do not equally with those who volunteer support the character of their county militia, and encourage the privates of the regiment, and to them, therefore, no peculiar advantages should be extended; and I should have been glad if Government had taken that view of the subject, which, in my opinion, is not carried out by the clause now under consideration. It is not, however, my intention to oppose the Clause, or in any way to impede the passing of the Bill.

Clause read 3° and added to the Bill.

Mr. J. G. SMYTH wished to draw the noble Lord's attention to the claims of subaltern officers in the militia to a retiring allowance. Certainly, they were entitled to it.

Mr. BANKES said, it would be a great convenience to embodied militia regiments if they were permitted to use the ordinary military barracks of the country when they were not occupied by regular troops.

Viscount PALMERSTON was quite aware of the necessity of such accommodation being afforded, and knew that a desire existed in the Quartermaster General's department to make arrangements for suitable quarters for the militia; but, unfortunately, at the conclusion of the last war, it not being apprehended that the country would have any occasion for barracks at any very early period, a great portion of them were sold or given up, and the present barrack accommodation was comparatively small. The first object of the Government had been to put into the barracks those persons who were employed in raising troops for the public service. After that, the militia were quartered in such barracks as were available. When there were but few regiments of militia embodied, care was taken to afford them accommodation in the barracks, but now that a great number of regiments were embodied it was impossible to find barrack room for them. With regard to Dorchester and Weymouth, with which district the right hon. and learned Gentleman was connected, those places were chiefly garrison towns for cavalry, and to put a regiment of infantry into a cavalry barracks required changes to be made which would afterwards render those barracks wholly disqualified for cavalry barracks. He could assure the right hon. and learned Gentleman that it was the wish of Government to put the militia into barracks, as it was obvious that such a mode of quartering the men would greatly improve their discipline.

Colonel ARCHDALL asked if county officers in Ireland would be eligible to hold commissions in the militia?

Viscount PALMERSTON said, that there was an objection to appoint any person to a commission in the militia who had other public duties to perform which were incompatible with the duties imposed by such a commission.

Colonel SIBTHORP considered that the allowance to the assistant surgeons ought to be considerably increased; those allowances were at present wholly inadequate to the station held by those persons. He also wished to know whether the colonels or lieutenant colonels of militia who preferred serving their country at home would be liable to be superseded by their juniors of similar rank on their return from foreign service?

Viscount PALMERSTON said, that with regard to those officers who now held a rank of command in the militia, their rank would be wholly untouched by their regiments going abroad. They would remain full colonels of their regiment, and on the return of the troops from abroad would resume their command. All those who were in the position of the hon. and gallant colonel would continue to hold the rank and power they at present possessed.

Bill *reported.*

Bill, as amended, *considered.*

House resumed.

Mr. FITZROY moved a clause respecting notices for drawing out and embodying the militia regiments, which was *agreed to.*

Preamble *agreed to.*

Bill to be read 3ª *To-morrow.*

QUEEN'S SPEECH—ANSWER TO THE ADDRESS.

Viscount DRUMLANRIG *reported* Her Majesty's Answer to the Address of the Commons, as follows:—

"Your loyal and dutiful Address has afforded Me much satisfaction.

"I thank you for the assurance of your support in the measures which I consider to be necessary for the vigorous prosecution of the War in which We are engaged. And I trust that the result of your exertions and sacrifices may, under the Blessing of the Almighty, be the establishment of the Peace of Europe on a secure and lasting foundation."

MOTION FOR SUPPLY.

Committee on Motion, "That a Supply be granted to Her Majesty."

Queen's Speech *referred*:—Motion *considered.*

(In the Committee.)

Queen's Speech read.

Resolved, "That a Supply be granted to Her Majesty."

Resolution to be reported *To-morrow.*

SLIGO ELECTION.

MR. WHITESIDE *moved,* "that there be laid before this House, a Copy of the Indictment found at the last Assizes for the county of Sligo against Michael Gethin, Henry Simpson, and James Simpson, directed by this House to be prosecuted for certain grave offences by the Attorney General for Ireland." He was told that it was impossible to obtain a conviction against these men from a common jury of Sligo and he therefore recommended that the case should be removed by *certiorari* into the Queen's Bench.

SIR JOHN YOUNG said, it was unusual to ask for the production of such a document as this, but still less was it usual for a Member of the House to give the Government advice as to the course which a law officer of the Crown ought to take. The observations of the hon. and learned Gentleman betrayed a want of courtesy from one Member of the bar to another.

MR. WHITESIDE said, he was at a loss to understand the latter remark of the right hon. Baronet, because, when the privileges of the House had been so shamefully violated as to induce a Select Committee unanimously to recommend that the parties should be prosecuted, he had a right, as a Member of the House, to make the observation he did, and to warn the right hon. Baronet of the fact, that it was in the power of the Attorney General to have an impartial trial by removing the matter into the Queen's Bench. He made that observation in no invidious sense, nor did he intend to make the least reflection upon the mode in which the former prosecution had been conducted.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL said, it was not intended to have a second trial, and he should be glad to know if the hon. and learned Gentleman intended to press the Address for a copy of the indictment?

MR. WHITESIDE replied in the negative.

Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

ENLISTMENT OF FOREIGNERS BILL.

Message from *The Lords*—That they have *passed* a Bill, intituled "An Act to permit Foreigners to be enlisted, and to serve as Officers and Soldiers in Her Majesty's Forces."

LORD JOHN RUSSELL *moved,* that this Bill be now read a first time.

Bill read 1° ; to be read 2° *To-morrow.*

MR. DISRAELI: I conclude the Bill will be in the hands of hon. Members to-morrow morning. For the sake of facilitating public business, I do not object to the second reading of the Bill to-morrow; but I should be sorry if the noble Lord would conclude from that that I do not object to the passing of this measure, for I shall offer it my most uncompromising opposition.

Adjourned at half after Eight o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Tuesday, December 19, 1854.

MINUTES.] PUBLIC BILLS.—1ª Militia; Bills of Exchange.

NATIONAL PRAYER AND THANKSGIVING.

THE DUKE OF GRAFTON rose to ask the noble Earl at the head of the Government whether it was the intention of Her Majesty to appoint some especial Day to be kept holy for the Purpose of returning Thanks to God for His Divine Protection during the Prosecution of the war, or whether it was the intention of Her Majesty to order an especial Service on some Sabbath Day for the same Purpose? Without the blessing of God all our preparations will be vain; and how could we expect to obtain that blessing if we did not pray for it? In a Christian country like this it should not be necessary to say that it is only by prayer the blessing of God can be obtained. It is said, my Lords, that it is too soon. Too soon, my Lords! Why we have thanked our fellow-countrymen in arms for the victories of the Alma and Inkerman, and more decisive victories never were obtained; and is it too soon to thank God for them? Too soon to pray, my Lords! Who dares to say it is either too soon or too late to pray? My Lords, we cannot expect blessings as a nation, unless as a nation we pray. We are an old nation, and have proved the value of prayer many a time, and ought not now to neglect it. It is said we are at war with a barbarous nation. Certainly it is a nation not so far advanced in civilisation as ourselves; but it is a powerful nation, and a united nation, a nation most devoted in loyalty to their Sovereign. And they are a Christian nation; let us recollect that we are not fighting with heathens, but Christians, and that ought to make us doubly careful to pray to God for the success of our arms. [Lord CAMPBELL made an observation which was inaudible.] He was sorry to hear the noble and learned Lord make a remark which appeared to denote that he thought the question premature. He did not think the country would be of that opinion, and he begged to address to the noble Earl at the head of the Government the inquiry of which he had given notice.

THE EARL OF ABERDEEN: My Lords, the question of the noble Duke refers to a subject upon which I have received frequent communications. Undoubtedly those communications deserve the greatest consideration; but I fear it will not be in my power to give an answer to the noble Duke which he will consider satisfactory. Your Lordships must recollect that early in the last Session of Parliament, immediately after the declaration of war, Her Majesty was advised to issue an Order in Council, by which the most rev. metropolitan was directed to prepare a special form of prayer and service imploring the blessing of Almighty God upon our undertaking. That was done, and I believe a more universal or a more humble and devout observance of the day throughout the kingdom could not have been. Now, I cannot say at this time—I do not deny that occasions may occur on which it might be proper to give to Her Majesty similar advice—but at this moment I do not see that circumstances require such advice. Your Lordships will remember that you have already provided in the Liturgy a form of prayer which answers all occasions of this kind. You think, perhaps, you may improve that form of prayer — or that you may have another and a better one. Let me caution your Lordships how you tamper with the Liturgy. I believe it is of essential importance to preserve the integrity of the Liturgy; and unnecessarily to invite such exercise of the Queen's prerogative as may raise questions highly injurious to the peace of the Church is unwise. I do not deny, my Lords, that it is perfectly within the competence of the Crown to order a special form of prayer upon any such occasion on which Her Majesty may be advised to do so; but it is doubtful how far a form of prayer for an indefinite duration may be such as will meet with the same universal feeling as the special service ordered by Her Majesty at the commencement of the war. I think, therefore, it is unwise to stir any such questions as will invite doubts of such proceeding being according to the Act of Uniformity. Now, my Lords, that will be a reason for objecting to any form of prayer of an indefinite duration; the same objection does not apply to a special form of prayer for a special purpose. But, my Lords, the question of the noble Duke refers to some such proceeding being applicable to the present state of affairs. Now, I entirely agree with him, that whether in victory or defeat, or in whatever position we may stand, no doubt our whole conduct, all our views, ought to be in subjection to the will of God, and should be all referred to His glory. My Lords, I must say at this moment we are not called upon to advise Her Majesty specially to interfere in the observance of those prayers which are already provided for your use in the Liturgy of the Church; and I therefore, with all possible respect for the noble Duke, and sympathising entirely in a similar desire which has reached me from so many quarters—I am bound to say I cannot think it consistent with my duty to recommend to Her Majesty the course proposed by the noble Duke.

THE EARL OF RODEN said, there were circumstances which indisposed him to address their Lordships; but he could not remain silent on this occasion, and felt bound to say that he thought the country deeply indebted to the noble Duke for having mentioned this subject, and that he deeply regretted that the noble Earl did not think the present circumstances of the country and the position of our brave officers and men fighting for us in the Crimea did not loudly call at the present time for special thanks to Almighty God for the wonderful victories given to them in the course of this most horrible war. He was certain that the army itself would concur in this feeling, and that the great majority of the people would, when they learned what had passed in their Lordships' House. When he reflected on the sufferings which were being endured by our army he felt this most strongly. Only that day he had received a letter from an officer, dated December 1, stating that he had not changed his clothes since September 16; that his shoes were so worn that he was nearly barefoot, that the officers were lying in their tents in pools of water, and that every day their ranks were thinned by disease, proceeding from their dreadful mode of life. Nevertheless there were great numbers who, amidst all their hardships, preserved their health, and this surely called loudly for thanksgiving to God. No one who had read the letters from officers or men serving in the Crimea could have failed to observe how remarkably they evinced a sense of the source whence their preservation had been derived, and how they ascribed their successes to God, who had given them strength and courage to support their struggles; and he was sorry to hear from the First Minister of this great Christian country that he did not consider this a time for public recognition of these great mercies. He should think that such an opinion would cause a great sensation, at least among the religious portion of the nation, and it might be the cause of great calamities that otherwise could have been averted. The noble Earl had referred to a former occasion on which a day of prayer had been observed with great devotion. He (the Earl of Roden) asked what had been the result?—the victories of the Alma and of Inkerman, and the wonderful success which had hitherto attended our arms. He could not help feeling strongly on this subject. He believed it to be of national importance, and he hoped that the noble Earl would be led to alter his mind upon it; and to advise Her Majesty to order a day of thanksgiving for the mercies vouchsafed to our arms, and of prayer for further successes. He trusted that the country would at all events, even if the Government did not agree to it, see that in the House of Lords there was a recognition of Him in whom was the source of our power and to whom all power was due.

Lord CAMPBELL, in consequence of the allusion made by the noble Duke to a private observation which he had addressed to him, felt it necessary to make a few remarks lest it should be thought he was disposed to treat such a subject with levity. There was no Member of their Lordships' House, or of the community, who could be more sensible of the blessings bestowed by the Supreme Ruler, or of the gratitude due to us for the mercies He vouchsafed to us. He deeply felt the favours he had showered on us since the commencement of the war. But he must say that he entirely concurred in the sentiments expressed by his noble Friend the Prime Minister. Those feelings of gratitude which all entertained should be expressed in the closet, in family prayer, and in public worship. The proposal made by his noble Friend at that moment was, that there should be a Royal Proclamation ordering a day to be devoted to religion, and to the observance of a prayer of thanksgiving. He (Lord Campbell) felt most deeply what we owed to Almighty God for having inspired our army with resolution; but he thought such a proceeding as that suggested would not tend to the promotion of the cause of religion. It was only on rare occasions, and after a decisive crisis in the national affairs, that such a solemn thanksgiving should be ordered. Should a day of thanksgiving be appointed, before it actually arrived, it might please Providence to visit us with reverses. It would be better then to wait until peace should be restored by the decisive victory of our arms. Then should we all kneel before the Almighty God, and return Him our universal and fervent thanks.

The Earl of ELLESMERE said, he had a repugnance to say anything which might appear to assume or imply that he had any deeper feelings of religion than any other noble Lords, or any other of his countrymen; but he could not conceal from their Lordships that he had feelings on the subject very different from those which had been expressed by the noble Earl at the head of the Government, or the noble and learned Lord who had just sat down. The noble and learned Lord said that a day of prayer or thanksgiving should not be appointed except on rare occasions. He, however (the Earl of Ellesmere), could not consider that the battle of Inkerman was a light affair. It had been termed, indeed, a fatal battle; but he could not admit that it was so in any other sense than as a very bloody battle, and he considered it not only as one of the most brilliant, but one of the most fruitful victories achieved by the British arms. He said that not with any presumptuous prophecy as to what the consequence might be, but in disregard of those results; for if it were given to him to raise the mystic veil of futurity, and read there that, whether by the preponderance of numbers or through other causes, the nature of the climate, or calamities and contingencies with which it might please God to chastise this country, Sebastopol should be rescued from the iron grasp which now inclosed it, he should still say that the battle of Inkerman deserved the epithet of a fruitful as well as a brilliant victory; and that the blood shed so profusely there had not been shed in vain. It had cemented the alliance with a great and generous nation, which formed the best security human wisdom could devise for the peace and happiness of Europe and the civilisation of the world. And it had, moreover, cemented the union between every gradation of rank in the army, from the most exalted to the most humble; and had proved the capacity of the scions of the aristocracy to lead their gallant countrymen who fought what was truly called the "soldiers' battle" of Inkerman. On this ground he placed a great and solid value on the exploits of those young men who, though they had never before been under fire, carried their colours up the heights of Alma, or maintained them on the field of Inkerman; and he felt that the youngest stripling of the Guards who staggered under the weight of his colours across that glorious field, and never quailed or flinched amidst the storm of bullets which were piercing their folds and shattering their stands—and faltered not until they were firmly planted on the gory soil of the Russian redoubts—contributed substantially to the security of their country and the stability of their Lordships' House. These gallant soldiers were entitled to the approbation and gratitude of the country, and he for one took that opportunity of expressing the weight of his gratitude to their army. If they had nothing to refer to but the battle of Inkerman alone, there were abundant grounds on which to rest the propriety of the suggestion.

The Earl of MAYO was extremely sorry to have to trouble their Lordships on this occasion, but he could not sit silent when the noble Earl at the head of the Government refused altogether to recommend the appointment of a day of prayer and thanksgiving for the victories obtained by our armies. He should certainly renew the subject after the recess.

MILITIA BILL.

Bill brought from the Commons.

The Duke of NEWCASTLE moved that the Bill be now read a First Time, and said that, in accordance with the intimation previously given, he should move the second reading on Thursday, and that the Standing Orders be suspended in order that they might take the Committee on the same day. He had proposed that the House should sit to-morrow; but he understood that it would be more convenient to noble Lords to take the second reading and Committee on Thursday.

Earl GREY was quite aware that it was desirable the Bill should pass before the recess. At the same time being one of those entertaining considerable objections to the Bill, he would take the opportunity of impressing on the noble Duke, that when he moved the second reading, he would explain to the House the grounds of the necessity for this Bill. As the noble Earl opposite had said, in former wars, when the country was in great danger, as they were told, it was the business and the duty of the Government to explain fully and completely what measures were taken for bringing up the regular army to its full strength, and maintaining a sufficient reserve. He hoped, as there would be only one discussion instead of two, that they should know precisely what had been done by the Government to encourage recruiting in the regular army.

Bill read 1^a, and to be read 2^a on Thursday next.

Standing Orders Nos. 37 and 38 to be considered, in order to their being dispensed with on the said Bill.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE BILL.

Lord BROUGHAM *presented* a Bill to permit the registration of dishonoured bills of exchange and promissory notes in England, and to allow execution thereon. The noble and learned Lord said the object of the Bill was to assimilate the law of England to that of Scotland in respect of bills of exchange by giving to the creditor upon bills of exchange and promissory notes the relief of summary execution instead of, as at present, driving him into a court of law to prove his claim. The principle of the measure had always obtained in most countries on the Continent of Europe, in France, Holland, Belgium, the Italian States, and it had received the sanction of the practice of the sister kingdom of Scotland for the last 150 years. He had introduced a measure for the same purpose into that House in the last Session of Parliament, which had received their Lordships' unanimous approbation in all its stages; and the principle had also been approved of by the other House, but it had been sent down at too late a period of the Session to be passed into law. He might, therefore, be asked why he had not reintroduced the same measure in the present Session. He had opposed the Bill of his noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) by which it was proposed to enable either House of Parliament to take up any measure which had passed through one House, but had failed to pass into law, owing to the advanced period of the Session or other accidental interruptions, at the stage where it was dropped, without the necessity of again discussing it through all its stages. He had thought that proposition objectionable, inasmuch as circumstances might have changed since the preceding Session; because it was legislating upon the Standing Orders, and because it was unnecessary, since the advantage would be equally obtained in cases of urgency by a suspension of the Standing Orders. But in a published letter he had addressed to his venerated Friend now no more, Lord Denman, he had suggested that considerable advantage would be gained by the two Houses so far making their Standing Orders give way as at once, and with a single reading, to pass any Bill in either House which had gone through all its stages in that House the Session before; though, should circumstances have altered, the Bill might be suffered to follow the ordinary course: and he instanced the Bills of Exchange Bill as an illustration; because he had thought that thus passing the Bill might be made into a useful precedent, since the principle of the measure had received the cordial assent of his noble and learned Friend on the woolsack, and of the Lord Chief Justice, as well as of their Lordships generally. But, during its progress through the other House, the Bill had received some alterations and amendments, of which he fully approved, and which had been embodied in the present measure. As, therefore, the Bill was no longer in the same state as when it left their Lordships' House, he had thought it expedient to introduce it as an entirely new Bill, and he hoped the measure would meet with the same approbation from their Lordships, would be passed speedily through their Lordships' House, and be sent down to the Commons in order to become the law of the land with as little delay as possible.

Lord CAMPBELL said, he could assure their Lordships that this Bill would be a striking improvement in our mercantile law. No one had had so good an opportunity as himself of seeing the monstrous mischief that arose from the existing law; by which the acceptor of a bill, who had put his name to it for value received, might oblige his creditor, when the date arrived of its falling due, to bring an action upon it, and might then plead, either that he never accepted the bill, or that he had paid it, or that the holder had given no value for it, or that a release had been given; or he might put in all manner of other pleas, equally false and groundless; and when, a few months afterwards, the trial came on, the cause might not be defended at all. He (Lord Campbell) had a paper before him, on the first day of every sitting, with ten or fifteen such undefended causes on it; and so the creditor was defrauded, because it was with the creditor's money that expensive litigation was carried on. Now, according to this bill, if the party who was sued on a bill of exchange had any reasonable ground of defence he need only go before a Judge, and give security—or, in certain circumstances, that security would be waived—and he would then have ample opportunity of making his defence. He hoped this Bill would, at an early period of the Session, pass into law.

The LORD CHANCELLOR also expressed his cordial approval of the measure, which he had considered attentively last Session. He was not yet aware what were the alterations made in the other House; he would therefore now only express his concurrence with what had been said on the general principle. As to Bills of this nature, upon matters of legal reform, which had been once considered in that House, and had gone down to the other House, and, from some delays in the previous Session, had not become law, he did not see why they should be discussed over again in their Lordships' House, as if they had not been discussed before. Practical good sense would dictate, that a Bill, which had once received their Lordships' sanction, should pass without any further discussion in another Session; of course any noble Lord might ask any questions, or make any observations on it, and a discussion might arise out of any matter subsequently introduced.

Lord BROUGHAM said, nothing could be more gratifying to the great mercantile community, who felt a deep interest in this matter, than the reception this Bill had from their Lordships, and from his noble and learned Friend the Lord Chief Justice. We were obliged to proceed sometimes far more slowly than might be wished in our legal improvements. He would remind the House that an important Bill introduced by him, which he believed had the unanimous assent of their Lordships, enabling persons to give evidence who were parties to a suit, had been first brought in by him ten years ago, in 1845, and again a year or two afterwards, and at last only in 1851, it was again brought in and happily passed, and was now, most happily, the law of the land, all Judges agreeing in confessing the benefits which it had bestowed upon the administration of justice. So it was with the present measure as to its past history, and so he trusted would it be as to its beneficial operation. Deferred one Session, he did hope and trust that it would not run the risk of so long a delay in becoming law as had attended the former Bill.

Bill read 1^a.

House adjourned to Thursday next.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Tuesday, Dec. 19, 1854.

Minutes.] Public Bills. — 2° Enlistment of Foreigners.
3° Militia.

CANADA CLERGY RESERVES.

Sir GEORGE GREY, seeing the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Napier) in his place, would say a few words respecting an order that had been made on the preceding night, on the motion of the right hon. Gentleman, whereby it was directed that the copy of a Bill now pending in the Colonial Legislature of Canada touching the future appropriation of the funds arising from the clergy reserves should be laid before the House. He had to offer an apology to the right hon. Gentleman for not having attended to his notice, but he had been in the House within a few minutes before the motion was made; and he would now state the grounds on which, if he were present, he would have opposed the motion. The principal ground was that which he had already stated to the right hon. Gentleman, namely, that no copy of such Bill affecting the clergy reserves, and said to be passing through the Legislature of Canada, was in the possession of Her Majesty's Government. Consequently the return to the order for the production of it must be *nil.* He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would consent to have the order discharged, because it would be a bad precedent for the House to make an order for the production of a document not in the possession of the Government. And if the Government should write to the Colony for a copy of it, it would look like interference on their part with a measure pending before the Colonial Legislature; and he hoped on that ground, also, the right hon. Gentleman would consent to have the order discharged.

Mr. NAPIER wished, by having the order now made, to secure the certainty of having the Bill laid upon the table of the House by the time of the meeting of Parliament after the recess. He really thought the Colonial Office ought to have a copy of it before this time; but all he wanted was to have a copy of it on the table on the re-assembling of Parliament.

Sir GEORGE GREY promised to take the earliest opportunity to lay the Bill on the table of the House.

Mr. NAPIER would, under these circumstances, consent to have the order discharged.

Order accordingly *discharged.*

THE WAR—EMPLOYMENT OF FRENCH TROOPS—QUESTION.

Mr. MUNTZ wished to ask the noble Lord the President of the Council a question, the answer to which might very much influence the Vote which he and other hon. Members might give on the Enlistment of Foreigners Bill, which stood for a second reading that night. The question he wished to ask was whether, before introducing the Foreigners Enlistment Bill, Her Majesty's Government had endeavoured to induce the Emperor of the French to send out an increased number of troops to the Crimea, and whether such troops were to be partly or wholly paid by this country?

Lord J. RUSSELL said that the Emperor of the French had at all times shown a willingness to send out troops to the East, and that, when an occasion arose lately for an additional supply of troops, he displayed the greatest readiness to send out as many as he could possibly get together. In point of fact, the only limit to the number of troops despatched by the Emperor of the French was the means of transporting them to the Crimea. But the British Government had never proposed to the Emperor of the French, neither should they think it advisable to propose to him that he should receive any payment for the services of any French troops to be employed against Russia in the present war.

CONSOLIDATION OF ARMY DEPARTMENT —QUESTION.

MR. V. SMITH asked the President of the Council what steps had been taken to consolidate the departments of the army since the vote for a Secretary of State for the War Department in the last Session; and whether he would lay any official correspondence relating to the subject upon the table of the House?

LORD JOHN RUSSELL said, one change had taken place, and that was the transfer of the Commissariat from the Treasury to the War Department. He did not think there was any other great change that had occurred; but, as he had stated at the period to which the right hon. Gentleman referred, changes would be introduced from time to time. He did not think there was any correspondence that would throw light on the subject, but, if there was, he was quite willing to produce it.

SUCCESSION AND LEGACY DUTIES—THE ARMY IN THE CRIMEA.

MR. BERESFORD *moved* for leave to bring in a Bill to relieve the property and effects of Officers, non-commissioned Officers, and Privates killed in the Crimea, or who have died or may die during the present campaign from wounds, disease, or fatigue, from the payment of the Succession and Legacy Duties." In making this proposition to the House he was actuated by no party spirit, and would confine himself to the justice and policy of the proposal he had to make. The Legislature had been pleased to enact that when any man, by the visitation of Providence or the lapse of time, should die, a tax should be paid by his heir on his accession to his

property. But the case which he (Mr. Beresford) begged to urge upon the consideration of the House was of a totally different character. It was an exceptional case, and as such he asked with respect to it the adoption of an exceptional rule. It was not by the visitation of Providence, or by the lapse of time, or in the ordinary course of nature, that casualties occurred in war. The state or the Executive sent these officers and soldiers abroad, and placed them in danger, whereby their lives were lost; was it, then, right that the successors to their property should be liable to duty in the same way as if the death had taken place in the ordinary course of nature? The soldier went forth at the command of the State, and lost his life in the discharge of his duty to the country, and he thought the infliction of this tax in such a case was a very serious grievance, and involved a large amount of injustice. The country and the Legislature could not exhibit too strongly their desire to raise the military profession, and to show in what estimation it was held by the country at large. The whole scope of discipline in the army of late years had been to raise the military profession and elevate the character of the soldier. They had endeavoured to add to his comforts and respectability, to improve his education, to alter the punishments, and to maintain his character. They held out, by extra pay and other incentives, motives for good conduct; and what had been the effect of that admirable policy? They had raised the character of the British army, and they were now proud to acknowledge that they possess a force of superior quality and character. He thought they must all acknowledge that the conduct of the present army in the Crimea afforded a proof of what he stated. In the brightest and palmiest days of chivalry, never had there been a band of heroes leagued together who were more worthy of praise than the army in the Crimea;—it was conspicuous for its valour and endurance, and, above all, for its good conduct. All those advantages had been extended to the living, and now let them show what they would do with regard to the dead. They should let the world know and the country understand that after his death the services of the soldier were still appreciated, and that their appreciation of them would be shown by an act of generosity to his successors. Perhaps hon. Gentlemen did not reflect that officers in the army purchased their commissions. Nearly every officer, especially the higher ranks, had purchased their commission. A battle ensued—

"Concurritur, horæ
Momento cita mors venit."

And what became of the price of those commissions? It was lost upon the bloody heights of Alma, or buried on the field of Inkerman. Such losses were exceptional in their character, and asked for exceptional consideration. He was not sure, indeed, that it would not be just that Parliament should pass an Act to return to the unfortunate widows and orphans some part of the large sums that had been paid for those commissions. It had been said that they were not a military nation; and he had endeavoured on all occasions to rebut the calumny, and the events of the past year showed that he was right in so doing; the events of the year 1854 showed that they were a military people; and why should not Parliament legislate for them as a military people, and grant this boon to their brave soldiers. But supposing that they preferred to be called a nation of shopkeepers; let them look at the matter in a mercantile point of view, and they would see the impropriety of sending men into imminent danger, and then raising a revenue from their indiscriminate slaughter. It should be recollected that officers in the army are not in a position to make money as others did, and that they could not avail themselves of many of the means of providing for those they left behind, that were open to other classes of the community. For instance, officers going on military service could not insure their lives like men in any other profession. The old insurance offices would not take an insurance *de novo* on these occasions, and if an insurance had been made in these offices, they demanded the largest premium for continuing them. That made their case an exceptional one at once. He did not consider that was an appropriate moment to review the conduct of the Government in carrying on the war; but there was one remark which he had a right to make, and it was this—that they had been tardy in the sending forth of reinforcements to the Crimea after the army had landed there. Had those reinforcements been sent in September or October, which were sent late in November, no man can say that so many valuable lives would have been lost at the battle of Inkerman. Therefore the Government should not resist the motion, but, on the contrary, extend the greater kindness and generosity to the friends of those that fell at Alma and Inkerman, for the army in the Crimea had supplied the place and fought the battles of a much larger force, and did the duty of a larger army. It might be said, these duties would not be paid by the soldiers, but by those who succeeded to their property; and the assertion was answered by the fact, that nearly all the successions ran to the widows and children, or brothers and sisters, of those who had fallen. And, he would add, that if they had no compassion for the relatives of those who fell, they ought, at least, to relieve the fond anxieties of those brave men who were exposing themselves to battle and to death. In a general point of view, they could not do better than make the concession which he now asked for. It was possible that in some cases two or three brothers might fall one after the other. Some families were much given to the military profession, as witness the gallant family of the Napiers—and any gentleman could call up instances for himself. Take the case of Sir W. Young, who fell at Alma, and was succeeded by his brother, Sir G. Young, who died a few weeks afterwards. There was also Major Wynne, who had been left a legacy a few weeks before he was killed, and whose successor would be called on to pay double duty. He hoped it would not be said that the boon he asked was one which would not extend to the privates, for he believed there was not a private who would not feel the kindness as much as his officer—such was the respect and affection entertained by the men towards their superiors, and such the *esprit de corps* by which the British army was characterised. He believed that if anything on earth could make that army braver than it was, it would be the knowledge that they might trust to the generosity and kindness of the English people. He looked, therefore, to the honour and generosity of that House to grant this boon to the British soldier.

Question *proposed*, that leave be given to bring in the said Bill.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: The hon. and gallant Gentleman who had just sat down commenced his speech by saying that this was not the occasion for discussing the conduct of the Government, and that he would not carry into the motion he was about to make any factious or party motives. I give the hon. and gallant Gentleman full and entire credit for the sincerity of that declaration; and if I advert to it at all, it is only to excuse myself for not taking notice of a subsequent part of his remarks, that I thought was hardly consistent with it, in which he assailed the conduct of Her Majesty's Government with respect to sending reinforcements to the army. We have had and shall have much better occasions for discussing the question than on the point which has been raised by the hon. and gallant Gentleman. As to the motion before us, we are not now discussing a question as to whether rewards are to be granted to the army of the Crimea, or what ought to be the amount of those rewards or the nature of them. In my opinion, the time is not yet come when that question can fairly be taken into consideration by this House. But we are now discussing the question whether at the present moment, on the motion of the hon. and gallant Gentleman, we shall confer a particular description of reward on the army in the Crimea, and also that that description of reward shall be limited to the present campaign. If the hon. and gallant Gentleman had well considered the terms of his motion, he would perceive that it is liable, from the mode in which it is framed, to more objections than could be easily enumerated. But I own it is better to grapple with the hon. and gallant Gentleman on this principle—a principle which, if I mistake not, will command the general assent of the House—that it is the office, not of a private Member of Parliament, but of the Crown, to consider and devise the modes and degrees of rewarding the army. It is the office and the function of the Crown to make proposals to this House on the subject—it is the office of this House, if it should think fit, to accept, reject, or modify those proposals, or to quicken them by an address to the Crown if the occasion should arise when the House thinks that the Crown has failed in its duty. But I put it to the House with confidence, and to the hon. and gallant Gentleman himself—for he must feel with me that this is a subject on which it would be exceedingly painful to us that anything like a difference of opinion should arise—that they cannot but feel with me that I am justified in saying that this is a duty of the Crown, and that they should give the Crown time and opportunity for the performance of that duty.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer

With respect to the particular motion itself, I will point out in a very few words—acting upon the same principle of brevity which the hon. and gallant Gentleman judiciously observed—that it would create inequality, and, without disrespect, I must say that the measure would be so unequal as to be absurd. As to the way in which this motion, if adopted, would operate, the hon. and gallant Gentleman says, "do not object to my motion because it draws a distinction between officer and man." I wish I could accede to that request of the hon. and gallant Gentleman; but I confess I should consider it to be a most serious objection to the motion if there were none other. He might as well almost frame a motion for rewarding officers and excluding the men, as to submit to the House the motion he has made—not that that is his intention, but that would be the practical effect of it. There is probably not one officer in ten who would not come within the scope of the legacy duty; but there is not one private in twenty or fifty who would come within the scope of or derive the smallest benefit from the hon. and gallant Gentleman's proposal. That inequality is a very great objection, indeed, to it. I will not go into such questions as considering what are the claims of those who have lost their lives in the service of the country, not in the Crimea, but in other places—in Sierra Leone, the West Indies, from the yellow fever, in the war with the Kafirs, and in New Zealand, where no glory was to be had, but where wounds and death are as grievous a calamity as in the Crimea. But observe the extraordinary manner in which this measure would operate. The hon. and gallant Gentleman says we should have regard to the representatives of those officers, and proposes to confer a great boon, as he says, on their representatives. Let us see who are the representatives for whom we ought to have regard. The first persons who are to be considered as the representatives of the officers who have perished in battle are their widows. Is not that so? The hon. and gallant Gentleman does for them absolutely nothing, for as the law now stands they pay no legacy or succession duty. Next to the widow, the first object of regard ought manifestly to be the children; and what is their case? It certainly is not true that they pay no legacy or succession duty, but they pay only one per cent, and, consequently, the remission of this impost would be a very small and miserable boon indeed in their case. I will next take the case of an officer who had neither wife nor child, but whose property would go to his second cousin. In that case the succession would be liable to a very heavy mulct—he must pay ten per cent. The hon. Gentleman, therefore, proposed to distribute relief and reward in a manner and from a source which he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) deemed inappropriate and inexpedient. To those persons who had the first claim—to the widow, he gave nothing, to the children only one per cent, whilst to the second cousin or the stranger, who had absolutely no personal claim, he gave 10 per cent. I have, I hope, said enough, both with respect to the principle and details to induce the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his Motion. The Government were actuated by the common and, indeed, universal feeling on this subject, and will feel it their duty to keep the subject in mind, and to advise the Crown respecting it. If they failed in this duty, I trust the hon. Gentleman will stand up in his place and expose their neglect.

Mr. BERESFORD said, as the right hon. Gentleman had stated that the Government would not fail to bear the subject in mind, he should willingly consent to withdraw the Motion.

Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

"ORDER OF MERIT" FOR THE ARMY AND NAVY—

MEDAL FOR THE ARMY IN THE CRIMEA.

Captain SCOBELL rose to move—

> "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty praying that she would be graciously pleased to institute an 'Order of Merit,' to be bestowed upon persons serving in the Army or Navy for distinguished and prominent personal gallantry during the present war, and to which every grade and individual, from the highest to the lowest, in the United Services, may be admissible."

The hon. and gallant Member said, that if he received any intimation from the Government that they would take this subject into favourable consideration he should be content to leave it in their hands. He was convinced that if some such an Order as that referred to in his Motion were immediately instituted it would be tantamount to reinforcing our army of the Crimea, so great would be its effect on the spirits and temper of the troops. The real question before the House was whether the medals and orders at present distributable were sufficient for the purposes of the great war such as that in which the country was now involved. Now the Order of the Bath was entirely confined to the upper ranks of the Army and Navy, for no one under the rank of major in the Army, or captain in the Navy, could partake of the distinctions of that Order. That showed it must be vastly too exclusive, and that its regulations demanded immediate alteration. Then, again, a custom prevailed of giving medals to the Army and Navy for certain battles, which applied as well to those actually in action as those out of it; but that custom had no reference to individual bravery, and many ships taking no part in an action would get the medal equally with those obliged to bear the brunt of the fight. He thought, therefore, since the grant of medals under existing rules did not sufficiently distinguish personal merit, some change was imperatively required. At the present moment the country was engaged in a war which demanded the putting forth all its strength; but it was a question whether there were those incentives and inducements to the display of courage and endurance on the part of our soldiers and sailors which there ought to be. The soldiers of the Crimea were fighting side by side with the army of France, which possessed an Order which extended down to the meanest drummer-boy in the ranks. He thought, therefore, that the present was a most appropriate juncture for the institution in this country of an Order similar in its character. If, however, he should receive the assurance of the Government that the matter would be taken up by them, and that the objects of his Motion met their cordial assent, he was quite willing not to press the matter further—but under no other circumstances would he consent to committing the subject to their hands.

Lord JOHN RUSSELL thought that a proposition of this kind ought properly to come from the Crown. He could, however, assure the hon. and gallant Gentleman that the whole question was under consideration; while he was at the same time quite willing to admit that the Order of the Bath did not appear to him to comprehend all the persons who ought to receive it.

Mr. H. HERBERT would take the opportunity of calling attention to a fact which had reached him a short time ago—namely, that the French soldiers had already received their medals for the battle of the Alma, whilst our soldiers had not as yet received theirs. It seemed rather hard that one set of soldiers should be decorated for their services in that battle, and that another set, who had taken as honourable a part in the action, should not yet have received their decorations. If he might venture to express an opinion to that effect, he earnestly hoped that as little delay as possible should take place before that defect was remedied.

Sir J. WALSH: And may I, Sir, at the same time, be permitted to ask the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (Captain Scobell) whether he means to include those foreign mercenaries whom it is proposed to enlist in our service within the scope of this Order of Merit which he calls on Her Majesty's Government to establish?

Mr. S. HERBERT would beg to state, in reply to the question of his hon. Friend the Member for Kerry (Mr. H. Herbert), that the die for the medal to commemorate the battle of Alma had been prepared, and that as soon as the medals had been struck, they would be sent out to the army.

Captain SCOBELL said, although no distinct promise was given on the subject, he was content for the present to withdraw his Motion. But he would do so subject to the hope that Her Majesty's Government would not try to supply the want so universally felt by making a partial change in reference to the Order of the Bath; it was better to make no change at all than that it should be a partial one. The only way of dealing with the subject was to institute an Order that would comprehend every individual in both services, Navy and Army.

Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

ENLISTMENT OF FOREIGNERS BILL.

Order for Second Reading read,

Lord JOHN RUSSELL: Sir, in rising to move the second reading of this Bill, I have to state to the House that as so much prejudice has been excited against it, as so much exaggeration has been used to defeat it, I shall think it necessary to go somewhat at large into the scope of the measure, and also into the general question to which it refers. It would appear, from what has lately happened, as if many persons had completely forgotten during the long peace the objects for which the wars of this country have been undertaken, and the mode in which they have been carried on. I shall therefore think it necessary to call the attention of the House to that which has been the general policy of this country in the great wars which she has undertaken, and the manner in which those wars have been carried, in many instances at least, to a successful issue. With regard to the first question, I should say that, if we examine the history of this country, we shall perceive, that her general course has been, whenever any Power has attained a preponderant force in Europe so as to threaten the independence of smaller States, to use her influence in the first place, and her force in the second place, in order to obtain the adjustment of the balance; or, in other words, to maintain the independence of the smaller States of Europe. Reference was made the other evening to Elizabeth and to Cromwell; and I wish only to recur to those times to show that they afford an illustration of the proposition I have laid down, because in those days the power of Spain having threatened the liberties of Europe, Elizabeth, as a wise Sovereign, and Cromwell, as a sagacious and bold ruler, formed alliances with the French at one time, and with the Dutch at another, in order to check the exorbitant preponderance of Spain. Passing over the disgraceful reign of Charles II., and coming to the period immediaately after the Revolution, we find that William III., adopting the same policy—which, indeed, he had pursued as Stadtholder of Holland—and perceiving the power and preponderance of Louis XIV. to be dangerous to the independence of Europe, engaged every Power with whom he could form ties of connection in one grand alliance in order to check that power and predominance. The time, however, was scarcely ripe for that confederacy which he had framed; but the then Earl of Marlborough, who obtained the confidence of the succeeding Sovereign, was a worthy representative of William III., and addressing himself to the same political objects, but with far greater military ability, he fought the cause of the liberties of Europe on the Continent. In so doing he followed that which, coming to the second question which I have raised, was the obvious policy of this country. I will not say that we are not a military nation, for I think that would be an untrue assertion. I believe, indeed, there is no nation whose people have more of the hardy and brave qualities of soldiers than the united nations of England, Scotland, and Ireland; but we are not naturally a military Power. It is our boast in history, in speech, and in song, that our power is chiefly founded on our naval means; and whenever, therefore, we have carried on a continental war for such objects as I have stated, we have had recourse to other nations to assist us in the field. Did the Earl of Marlborough rely upon the English alone as the forces which should be brought into the field in his campaign? So far from it, that, having inquired into the proportion of the English soldiers who served in those great campaigns upon the Continent—in those great battles which have so much redounded to the fame of that great commander and to the reputation of the English nation, I find that it having been stipulated, in order to carry out the objects of the grand Alliance, that 60,000 men should form the army usually under his command, not more than 40,000 were contributed by this country, and of these 40,000 men only 18,000 consisted of British soldiers. I have here an exact account of the component parts of these 40,000 men, and I find that the number of the English troops was 18,328, and of foreigners in the English pay, 21,672. Of the foreign troops, the Danes were 16,136; the Prussians, 2,522; and the Hessians, 3,014. Such was the composition of the army with which Marlborough gained his great battles; and accordingly, in the accounts of the life of that great man you see, in relating, for instance, the battle of Ramilies, that the Danish horse distinguished themselves in the commencement of the engagement; that the Dutch horse distinguished themselves in the middle; and that towards the end the English horse came up and performed great deeds of valour. Such was the notion in those days with respect to battles—battles fought by a great commander—fought in the cause of Europe—and fought with conspicuous success. Was there, then, any of these feelings that foreigners were not to be employed—that they were not to fight by the side of Englishmen in the cause of Europe? No such idea seems to have entered into the minds of the great men who swayed the destinies of England at that time. Well, Sir, other wars succeeded, wars, perhaps, without so great an object; but in the battles which we fought in those wars, wherever we obtained distinction, foreigners likewise were employed in our armies. I do not intend to vindicate the employment of German troops during the American war; that was an unjustifiable use of foreign troops; but when again we undertook the cause of Europe, when we were of opinion that the power of France was too great for the independence of other nations, then again we had no difficulty in having recourse to foreigners, in order to fight, not our battles, but battles in the front of which we were engaged, but which were, in fact, European battles. In 1804 an Act was introduced for the purpose of allowing the service of German troops, or what was afterwards called the German Legion; and I observe that, though there was some debate upon that Bill, no person except Sir Philip Francis and Mr. Peter Moore took part in opposition to it. Mr. Fox spoke, indeed, on the subject of the Hanoverian troops, but he spoke simply for the purpose of imputing some blame to Mr. Pitt for not having sent over transports in order to bring the Hanoverian troops over to serve in this country and to take part in the war—so far was he from stating that he found it impossible to assent to the employment of foreign troops. It is quite true that Mr. Fox at a previous time—in 1794—found fault with the introduction of foreign troops into this country; but the ground of his complaint was, that they were introduced without the consent of Parliament, that being introduced without the assent of Parliament they might be numerically increased to an unlimited extent, and thereby become dangerous to the liberties of the country. Well, Sir, what were the deeds of that German Legion? I find them repeatedly adverted to by the Duke of Wellington in his despatches. I will not trouble the House with reading the passages; but with regard to Albuera he says, "the conduct of the German Legion was in every point conspicuously good;" and at Salamanca he speaks in terms of praise of the gallant charge of the heavy cavalry brigade of the Legion, and so on in other instances. I believe it is generally admitted that the conduct of that German Legion was deserving of the highest praise, and I am sure every one in those days testified to their gallantry and valour. No one then thought of saying, "True, they have fought in your cause and in the cause of Europe; but, at the same time, they are foreigners, and therefore they ought not to be in your pay, and they ought not to be allowed to fight your battles." Nobody mentioned such an argument. But, Sir, it was said at that time by a person of great distinction and of great wit—it was Madame de Stäel who said it—"that we were fighting the cause of Europe, and that, in fact, the Tories of England were the Whigs of Europe." They were, indeed, engaged in fighting against a preponderating force, and so far resembled the English Opposition, who were contending against an overwhelming Ministerial majority.

But, such having been the case with regard to the general object of our wars, and with regard to the employment of foreigners in our service, I come now to the contest in which we are at present engaged, and I ask you, why are we to debar ourselves from our ancient policy, and from our established practice which has always been attended with success; and why are we to discover that every war which we carry on is in future to be carried on by the British Army? We are now again engaged in a war against a preponderant Power; in the present case it is not the power of Spain—it is not the power of France—but it is the preponderance of Russia that we have to encounter. But is there any reason because it is Russia, and not Spain or France, that we are not to adopt the same means as we have always adopted, and if we do not adopt the same means, are we likely to have the same success? I have heard, indeed, that it has been said, "Are we so soon exhausted at the beginning of the war?" Have we not means even now to carry on that war? But, in fact, it is at the commencement of a war that the greatest pressure will exist. Let us look to the facts—facts known, not only to this country, but to all Europe; and, therefore, facts which we need not hesitate to discuss. Whether our military system were wise or unwise—whether the numbers of our regular troops were sufficient or insufficient—whether it was expedient or not to rely so much as we have done on the militia—the fact has been that we have had a very inconsiderable regular army—not amounting until the last year to more than 120,000 men; and that these men have been employed on every service that we required over the whole face of the globe; having at one time to secure and guard 12,000 miles of frontier in India, at another time to put down a formidable insurrection in Canada, and at another spread over a difficult country, to contend with every device of savage warfare at the Cape of Good Hope. Wherever they were called to perform those duties, they were expected by the country, and justly expected, to be equal to the occasion and to accomplish the service which they were called upon to undertake. That certainly they have done; but when you attempt suddenly to increase this force of 120,000 men, when you have raised them, on paper, to 170,000, but, in fact, to the number only of 150,000, can you expect that they can furnish regiment after regiment, army after army, without any extraneous assistance or support? It was stated the other day by my right hon. Friend the Secretary at War that we had already sent to the East no less than 53,000 men. That appeared to the House, as it well might, a very considerable number of men; but the enemy with whom we have to contend would consider 53,000 men as only one of his *corps d'armée*, and I have no doubt that he has sixteen or eighteen of these *corps d'armée* which he can oppose at the different points of his frontier to the attacks of an invading force. Let us next consider what the points are which we have to guard. We have to guard Turkey at various points. We have to guard her frontier in the Principalities, a frontier which at present is not attacked, but which may be at some future time; and we have to guard her against that immense force which has been accumulating in the Crimea, and which was at all times—and which will, if some curb be not now put upon it, be still more so in future—a perpetual threat to the Turkish Government, menacing the very existence of the capital of the empire. But, thirdly, it is necessary to see that there is a sufficient force of Turkish or other troops on the Asiatic frontiers of Turkey, so that, while provision is made for her defence, either in the Principalities or in the Crimea, there may not be so considerable a hostile force on those Asiatic frontiers as that there will be no adequate opposing force to meet it. Well, but if you say that you will have none but British regiments—that for the first time in the history of this country you will rely upon British regiments alone, you then run the greatest danger that, while you are recruiting those regiments, and furnishing their depôts with young men who enter your army, you may be called upon, in order to preserve the force that you have already sent out, to order these young men to follow them before they are properly trained, and thus expose them to destruction, instead of allowing them to remain here for a time to qualify them to act with that vigour and efficiency which should distinguish British troops in the field. I remember perfectly well having the honour to take a ride with the Duke of Wellington some ten miles from his head quarters to see a regiment that presented a splendid appearance—the 10th Hussars—which had just come out to the Peninsula. They seemed to be exceedingly well-appointed —everything they did was performed with regularity and precision, and any civilian could not fail to be struck with the brilliancy of the spectacle. I, however, remember that afterwards, while at dinner, the Duke remarked, "The regiment that we have seen to-day will, after a year or so, make a very good regiment;" thus showing that, in that great captain's opinion, a considerable training in the field was required, even after the training they had had at home, in order to make a regiment fully equal to its duty. Well, it is proposed by this Bill to enable the Crown to have a certain number of troops, of whom a part shall be trained in this country. That number will not be above 10,000 at any one time; but they will of course form a means for maintaining a larger force; and this force can be used in the field for the assistance of British troops, in preference, I should say—not to raising recruits in this country—but in preference to sending out raw levies newly raised which have not been sufficiently trained for the purposes of war. Now, I may be told, that this is a degrading practice—that it is unfit that we should have any foreigners serving in our ranks; but when this is said, I must take leave to refer to the high authority of whom I have already spoken, and quote a declaration which he made in the House of Lords. I allude to the speech of the Duke of Wellington on the second reading of the existing Militia Act, in the course of which his Grace said—

> "Everything has its beginning, and this is a commencement of an organisation of a disciplined militia; in the same way as if you are to have a corps of reserve you must have a commencement, involving some months for disciplining them before you could have your corps of reserve ready. You must make a beginning here, and see that it will take some months before you can form reserve regiments. The armies of England, who have served the country so well—are your Lordships so mistaken as to suppose that they were ever composed of more than one-third of real British subjects—of natives of this island? No such thing. Look to all your great services. Look at the East Indies; not more than one-third of the soldiers there are such British soldiers. Look at the Peninsula; not one-third of the men employed there were ever British soldiers. Yet I beg your Lordships to observe what services these soldiers performed. They fought great battles against the finest troops in the world; they went prepared to face everything—ay, and to be successful against everything, or this country would not have borne with them. Not one-third of those armies were British troops, but they were brave troops, and not merely brave—for I believe every man is brave —but well-organised troops. Take the battle of Waterloo; look at the number of British troops at that battle. I can tell your Lordships that in that battle there were sixteen battalions of Hanoverian militia, just formed, under the command of a nobleman, late the Hanoverian Ambassador here, Count Kielmansegge, who behaved most admirably; and there were many other foreign troops who nobly aided us in that battle, avowedly the battle of giants; whose operations helped to bring about the victory which was followed by the peace of Europe, that has now lasted for thirty-two or thirty-four years. I say, my Lords, that however much I admire highly-disciplined troops, and most especially British disciplined troops, I tell you you must not suppose that others cannot become so too."—[3 *Hansard*, cxxii. 730.]

That is the testimony of the Duke of Wellington, and I do not think that we could have a higher authority on this point, with regard to the troops he commanded and the battles that they fought. Am I to be told then, after this, that it is a degradation and disgrace to do what the Duke of Wellington did, to have similar troops to those which he commanded, and to have them assisted in the field by foreign soldiers.

Sir, I come next to the objections that have been offered to this Bill. The first of those objections, which I think has been somewhat dispelled by a mere statement of fact, is this—that the measure proposes an unconstitutional employment of foreigners, that those foreigners are intended to be put in the place of British troops in this country, and to perform the duty which would otherwise be performed by our own regulars or by the militia. The answer to this on the part of the Ministers was, that no such intention ever existed; that their intention was to allow them to come to this country only for the purpose of being drilled and trained; that it was never meant to employ them in any duty which our own troops and the militia discharged in this country; and that this should be made plain in the Bill itself. This has been since made plain in the Bill, and no one can now aver, by any possibility, that these troops are to be employed for any other purpose than being drilled and trained in order to proceed on that foreign service for which they are to be engaged. It is said, indeed, "Do not let them offend our eyes by coming here; let them go to

Corfu, or somewhere else, to be trained there." But, with regard to a large proportion of Europe, and particularly the northern part of it, you could hardly expect the troops obtained there to go off thence to Corfu. There are many foreigners—and no less, I believe, than 30,000 Germans alone—who pass through this country in the course of the year. They come to ports in this country, and they are to be found here; and to desire them to proceed to Corfu before they were trained would be such a discouragement to them that they could scarcely be expected to undergo it. To tell men whom you are about to engage in your service to fight your battles, that you will be offended by the sight of their presence, would really be such an insult as would effectually prevent them from coming to your assistance. But then I am told—and it is the great argument which is relied upon after so many *ad captandum* arguments have been swept away—I am told that these men will not be fighting, as the Hanoverians and as some other foreign troops were during the late great war, in their own cause, or in the cause of their own Sovereign, although they will be in British pay, but that they will be fighting as mere hirelings or mercenaries. Why, Sir, I say, if you use this argument, that you give up your whole cause of war; if you use this argument you say, in effect, that you are engaged in a purely British quarrel, and not, as we have maintained, in the cause of Europe. What we have always contended for in this House, and what I believe this House concurred in—as I am sure it is concurred in by the country—is, that we have embarked in a great European quarrel for the sake of the liberties of Europe. It is a quarrel in which France and England have had the manliness to stand forward and proclaim that they will not be intimidated by the power of Russia; that neither will they be seduced by the cajoleries of Russia; but that they will stedfastly fight this European battle. We have never said that there is any purely British interest, or, any purely French interests involved in this quarrel; but we have said, it is a cause in which every German, every Swiss, and every other inhabitant of Europe ought to take as great an interest as any Englishman. Why, what were the names of the legions that we employed during the last war? Were they all regiments of the King of Hanover, and therefore employed by him? There were among them the Wallenstein infantry, the Dutch Artillery, the Royal Emigrants, the Royal Foreigners, and several contingents of Hessians and other troops, which, from the names they bore, could none of them have been British. Such were the troops paid by us during the last war. No doubt they felt that the cause was one in which they could take a part; but in the present struggle, likewise, the cause is equally one in which every European can sympathise. And though some of the Sovereigns of Europe—some of the Sovereigns, I regret to say, of the great States of Europe, and even of the great States of Germany—have each a stake in the momentous question at issue, and have, nevertheless, left to us the brunt of a battle which they ought to fight along with us; still that is no reason why the subjects of these and other princes should not take a part with us, and, entering into the service of Her Majesty, uphold side by side with the English troops what I have termed the general cause of European liberty, but which is not the cause of European liberty alone, but also of European civilisation. But it has been argued that this service will be so degrading that officers will hardly be induced to consent to enter into it, as they will not be serving immediately under their own Sovereign, and are not engaged by his special order in the service. Yet some of the men whom we have employed in the course of this year to fight our battles—our own countrymen—have not disdained to take up arms in the service of a foreign Sovereign. Sir De Lacy Evans, who is respected by every one of us, and whose name was mentioned a few nights ago by a right hon. Gentleman opposite with such due honour, and whom I trust soon to see here in restored health, receiving from you, Sir, the thanks of this House for his great valour and skill—Sir De Lacy Evans did not scruple, when the throne of an ally of this country was in danger, to proceed to the aid of that monarch, and went to Spain, to head what was now characterised as a band of foreign mercenaries. Another eminent British officer — Sir Charles Napier—once engaged in a similar service—in the service of the Queen of Portugal, at a time when this country did not take a part in the contest in which she was engaged.

Sir, having now touched upon most of the objections made to this measure, I may be asked, why it is necessary in order to the carrying on of the war? I will answer to that, that if you thought it advisable utterly to drain your male adult population—if you thought it advisable, by offering bounties of from 30*l.* to 40*l.*, or even 50*l.* a head, to obtain every man that you could possibly procure, and send them out without training or experience in order to fight your battles, no doubt you might raise a number of men sufficient to carry on this war for the present. But, Sir, I am looking to the necessities of a protracted war. I am looking to the policy which this country ought to pursue in the face of a prolonged struggle; and, in that case, supposing you had 150,000 or 180,000 British soldiers, I say that there would be a great advantage in having an additional force of 30,000 foreigners in order to aid your own army. If you had 200,000 British soldiers you could extend this foreign legion to 40,000, or even upwards of that number; and I say it is a gross misrepresentation to say that, if you had an army of 200,000 Englishmen well trained, and 40,000 foreigners, you are thereby dispensing with the services of British troops—that you are relying solely on foreign swords—and that you can fairly quote against us those animadversions, in poetry or in prose, which have cast a brand upon those nations that depend entirely on foreign forces for their defence. I say again, that, though you are a military nation, you are not a military Power. I think it would be most unwise for this country to change the policy which all its great men have sanctioned—which has been approved by Cromwell, by Chatham, by Marlborough, and by Wellington—which has carried you through many a European struggle triumphantly to its close. I believe that whatever difficulties you may have to encounter during the war, the proclamation of such a principle would involve you in still greater difficulties in time of peace. We might think at the present moment that the maintenance of an immense standing army at all times would be desirable; but, depend upon it, peace would hardly have been restored two years before you would find so strong a popular feeling roused against the keeping up of so large a military force, that you would be obliged to renounce any such project. Well, if that be so, and you are not about to adopt new principles and new maxims, I ask you to rely upon your old principles and your old maxims, and to take into your service—in addition to 200,000 British soldiers, whom you will no doubt be able to raise, and to have well trained in the course of a year or two—a certain amount of foreign force, which I am persuaded, under gallant leaders, will stand faithfully by your side, and bravely fight your battles with you. The Duke of Wellington has borne testimony that such was the case in a former war; the Duke of Marlborough's example is to the same purport; and I have no doubt that in the present war the result of the measure would be the same. Her Majesty's Ministers having recommended this as one of the means of carrying on the present war, of course, they could not, with the loss of the confidence of this House, attempt to conduct the contest any further if this Bill is rejected. This is one of the measures which, for no such reasons as have been assigned by others, but from a consideration of the amount of force which you will be able to raise at the present stage of the war, and in the beginning of the contest, we have thought to be necessary for carrying on the struggle vigorously and successfully. Its consideration is one of the purposes for which we advised Her Majesty to call Her Parliament together. If the Bill is adopted, I have no doubt it will lead to a most useful addition to your military force; and I own that I am surprised that any person should have imputed to those Ministers who have sent a British army into a country which, as I have already said, maintained such an immense force—who have relied upon their courage and fortitude to sustain them amid the difficulties they had to encounter, and whose confidence has been so amply justified in the heights of Alma and at Inkerman—I say, I do wonder that these Ministers should be supposed by any one to entertain any distrust of a British army. But, relying on a British army, we wish also to carry on this war most effectually; and any legitimate means by which the power of the Emperor of Russia can be crippled—any means by which his advances can be checked, appears to me to be a measure which the House of Commons ought to adopt. There is a man—nay, I would say every man—in our army ready to echo the words of him whom the Spaniards call the Great Captain, and who, when asked to retire from a post that he had taken, nobly replied, "No, I would rather have the grave by stepping a foot forward, than safety with a foot backward." There are many men in the British army who are inspired by that sentiment—indeed, I believe that this is the spirit which animates every soldier in it; but give them every support, every addition to their numbers that you can. That is the object which Her Majesty's Ministers have in view; and they look thereby to a glorious termination of the war. I beg now to move the second reading of this Bill.

Motion made and Question proposed; "That the Bill be now read a second time."

SIR E. B. LYTTON:* Sir, in rising to oppose the second reading of this Bill, I feel, indeed, that I require more than the ordinary indulgence of the House; for if even upon trivial occasions it would be with great diffidence that I would offer any comment or reply to a speech from the noble Lord, that diffidence must be painfully increased upon an occasion so important, and when the task I have undertaken compels me to rise immediately after so eminent an authority and so consummate a debater. But I trust at least that it will not be necessary for me, or for any Gentleman on this side of the House, or indeed on either, to declare our readiness to support the Crown in the resolute prosecution of a war in which the honour of England is pledged to a cause which we believe to be identified with the interests of civilisation itself. But if the honour of England be pledged to this quarrel, I am not willing that other nations and posterity should receive our confession that, at its very onset, our own native spirit, nay, even our own military training, were incompetent to encounter the struggle. The noble Lord has carried us back to former wars, on which he has expatiated with complacency on the aid we derived from the employment of foreign mercenaries. I shall follow him, as I proceed, through the precedents he advances, and I trust to prove that they have served less to advance his argument than to divert the House from the question that is really at issue. Meanwhile, he cannot deny that in this war, at least, up to the present moment, with inadequate numbers, and at every disadvantage, we have sufficed to fight our own battles and earn our own laurels; and the noble Lord has vouchsafed not one reason to show why we should henceforth prefer to win our victories by proxy. That expression may seem exaggerated, considering the small proportion of foreign force to be employed; but honour is not so intolerable a burden that we should fee foreign soldiers to ease ourselves of the slightest portion of that load. My objections to this Bill are very broad but very few, and I shall endeavour to state them in as few words as possible. What is it on which you now mainly rely to continue this war with vigour, no matter at what sacrifice and cost? Not so much on the extent of our territory, the amount of our population, the wealth of our resources, as on the ardour of the people; on that spirit of nationality which, we are told by the Minister of War, rises against every danger, and augments in proportion to the demand on its energies. It is that ardour you are about to damp—it is that spirit of nationality to which this Bill administers both discouragement and affront. The noble Lord says our difficulty is at the commencement. What is the commencement? One burst of popular enthusiasm! And in the midst of that enthusiasm, at a time when we are told by the Secretary at War that you get recruits faster than you can form them into regiments—you say to the people of this empire, "Your rude and untutored valour does not suffice for the prowess of England, and we must apply to the petty principalities of Europe for the co-operation of their more skilful and warlike subjects." I say that this is an unwise and, I maintain it to be, an unnecessary blow upon the vital principle that now sustains your cause, and brings to your army more men than you know how to employ. And if anything could make this war unpopular, it would be the sight of foreign soldiers quartered and drilled in any part of these kingdoms, paid by the taxes extorted from this people, and occupying barracks of which the paucity is your excuse for not having embodied more of the militia of our native land. Do you mean to say it will not make a difference in the temper of the middle and working classes, now nobly prepared for any pecuniary sacrifice, whether they pay the cost of an army of their own countrymen, who repay them by deeds which make us more proud of the English name, or whether they are to pay foreigners, who may be equally brave, may perform equal service, but whose glory will only compliment our wealth at the expense of our manhood—only prove that we were rich enough to consign to foreign hirelings that standard which a handful of English soldiers had planted on the heights of Alma, and rescued from barbarian numbers on the plains of Inkerman? What, Sir, is the reason assigned for this Bill besides that learned array of historical precedents to which I shall come afterwards—that, whatever the ardour of our people, it requires time to drill them, to convert raw recruits into disciplined soldiers? Sir, there is some force in that argument, but it confers a grave censure on the Government; it proves all that has been said of their want of activity and foresight, that during the eighteen months in which war—this great, this "protracted war"—was foreseen by all England, except its chief Minister—that, during the nine months or so in which we have been actually engaged in hostilities, the Government should not already have raised and drilled a sufficient number of reserve to dispense at least with this first instalment of 10,000 foreigners. Why, if you will compute the time elapsed even since the battle of the Alma—the time devoted in preparing this thoughtful and deliberate Bill—in corresponding with foreign princes (if the Bill pass), in enlisting your foreign soldiers, bringing them hither, and then, it seems, fitting them for service—if you would compute all this time, from first to last, employed in getting together these foreign troops, you would have leisure to drill and send out double the number of your own countrymen. I ask you this question—I press for a reply—you say you require these foreign soldiers for an immediate emergency—that you want them to send out in the interval which you employ in drilling English recruits; that is your main argument—tell me then, plainly, in how short a time do you calculate that they will be raised, imported, organised, despatched to the Crimea? You are bound to show that it will be within a shorter time than you can raise, drill, and send out an equal number of native troops. Can you show this? I might defy you to do it; but until you have shown it, your argument has no ground on which to stand. But it seems to me strange that these practised warriors—so superior to ourselves in all military craft and discipline—are first to be imported to England, and finish their martial education upon English ground. As it has been pertinently said elsewhere, "this is not the shortest road to the Crimea"—you can send these troops from the Continent without coming to Parliament at all; why, then, not send them at once to the Crimea from whatever place abroad you collect them? Make your depôt anywhere you please out of the British dominions. There is this advantage in that course—you have reasons of your own to draw these mercenaries from quarters which you do not think it discreet to state openly to Parliament. Well, then, you should have sufficient confidence in those reasons to act entirely on your own official responsibility; thus you will neither openly exhibit to the public that spectacle of foreign hirelings within these realms, always so intolerable to the national feelings, nor call upon the House of Commons to sanction, for reasons not plainly before it, a degradation to the spirit of the people we represent. Sir, now look to the extraordinary want of consideration, and, I must say, to the slovenly haste with which the provisions of this Bill are devised and matured. Its first introduction led at once to the alarm that these foreigners were intended to supply the place of the native defenders, not only of English honour abroad, but of English security at home; that, in short, they should supply the place of the militia and the British forces removed from this country. That supposition was indignantly denied. In spite of such denial, the Minister charged with the conduct of the Bill finds the public persist in that alarm, for he says that "he hears with surprise from several quarters that such an impression unquestionably prevails out of doors," and then he condescends to look into the Bill itself and is bound to confess that, by the wording of it, it might be perverted to such a purpose. What! in a Bill embracing such delicate questions, so nearly touching the keystone of all free institutions, surely the wording ought to have been so deliberately concocted that it should not harbour a phrase which a people jealous of freedom could misinterpret, and which some future Ministers, of more dangerous character than these, might distort into a precedent that would jeopardise the liberties of the country or risk the security of the throne. And then, even as to the number of men required, so little calculation was made, although the noble Lord tells us that this is a main reason why we are now summoned, and we might presume that your calculations would be somewhat carefully prepared, that it is an object of indifference whether it be 15,000 or 10,000, and the latter number is at once exchanged for the former. How, then, can you blame us if we presume to doubt your prudence, your deliberate foresight, your practical ability to conduct this war, when even in this Bill which you have had such leisure to prepare we see all this blundering in the terms that involve a momentous constitutional principle, and all this careless indecision as to the amount of the force you require? And still more may we doubt your prudence, when, for the sake of so miserable a succour as 10,000 foreign bayonets, or rather for the object of landing and drilling them within these dominions, you, who tell us of the advantage of unanimity, resolve to force on a measure which you were blind indeed if you did not foresee would be unpopular out of doors—which at once necessitates the strongest opposition—which you carried by a petty majority through one House of Parliament—and which, if you carry it through the other, will be such a thorn in your side that I venture to doubt whether you will ever have the courage to use the power you now ask at your hands. Nay, Sir, so little had the Minister who introduced elsewhere the measure even examined the constitutional principles which it involves, that he prefaced the Bill by observing that the power to enlist and introduce into this country foreign soldiers, without application to Parliament, was formerly considered to be vested in the Crown. I am sure that the Lord President of the Council would warmly deny that our great constitutional authorities have admitted that this was ever, at any period of our history, the acknowledged prerogative of the Sovereigns of this country. We all know that William III. sent a message to this House, requesting, in somewhat humble terms, that his Dutch troops should be allowed to remain, and that the House of Commons refused the request. You may say, that was in time of peace; but I know that Lord Camden held the doctrine that, neither in peace nor in war, could foreign troops be admitted into this country without the sanction of an Act of Parliament. I know that Mr. Fox declared that, if the Crown ever did possess such a power, we had a constitution in words and not in reality. I can well conceive the indignation with which the Whigs of the last age, who are authorities so high with the Lord President of the Council, would have heard, if now living, such a doctrine—such a remark emanating from a Minister of War who sits in the same Cabinet with the leader of the Whigs. Sir, I could not pass over that rash assertion of a great officer of the Crown on a point essential to the vindication of the freedom of our ancestors and the principles of our ancient constitution. But your Bill is amended—the more obnoxious clause is removed; I grant now that all constitutional forms are complied with; I find no fault with you there. But I say that, while adhering to all constitutional forms, you ought not to tamper with something so hostile to the constitutional spirit as the introduction of foreign troops, unless you can establish the closest precedent in parallel cases or make out a plea of paramount and urgent necessity. Now, first, as to the precedents cited by the noble Lord. I am almost ashamed to repeat what every one knows—namely, that the precedent you would draw from the enlistment of Germans in 1804 and 1806 is wholly inapplicable to the present case. Look to the period of the great French war. Our Sovereign was not only King of Great-Britain—he was Elector of Hanover. His interests and ours were identified with the German Powers, except, indeed, Prussia, which at that time, influenced, first, by her guilty designs on the partition of Poland, and afterwards by the hope of obtaining Hanover as a reward for neutrality, did, in the opinion of all dispassionate historians, by her selfish inertness and procrastination, paralyse the arms of the other allies, and give to the common foe that gigantic power of which Prussia was afterwards the most signal victim. I trust that Prussia is wiser now; that she will not again amuse other and nobler confederacies by her tortuous diplomacy, cripple their energies by dissimulating lethargy, nor require, at the last, the assistance of their arms to free herself from the ruin in which selfish indifference to the common cause once involved her very existence as a nation. But at that time the enlistment of German soldiers in this country was, at least, natural enough, though even the memory of their gallantry in the field, which deserves all we can say of it, has not, you see, sufficed to render that enlistment popular. The noble Lord refers to the debate of 1804, in which Mr. Francis, afterwards Sir Philip, took part. Ay, but he did not tell you the excuse which the then Secretary at War made to the objections Mr. Francis indignantly urged. The excuse was this:—"The enlistment of German soldiers was only a measure of providing for a certain number of men who were subjects of the same Sovereign, and had been forced to leave their country." Who can say that this is a parallel instance? It is true that other foreigners were enlisted, but they were chiefly from those German nations which had the most cordial sympathy with the English cause. But now, indeed, although we should be proud to have a sincere and hearty alliance with the German courts, it is at least premature to believe that their interests, their objects in the war, are cordially and permanently identified with our own. And if we would render the Germans as popular in England as I hope they may yet be, we could not more defeat that object than by exhibiting German soldiers as substitutes for English valour upon English ground. But the noble Lord goes back to the time of Marlborough, nay, he says that in all our former wars foreign troops have been employed. Yes; but when they were employed with honour, they were the auxiliary forces of our open allies, and officered by the rank, the chivalry, the military renown of nations in the closest sympathy with ourselves, and were not mere free lances, under unknown and mercenary captains. I say, when they have been employed with honour. For where, indeed, an aid, similar to that which you now demand, has been obtained, wherever foreign princes have been subsidised, and their subjects hired by English gold to take part in the struggles with which they had no English sympathies—there the historian pauses to vent his scorn on the princes who thus sell the blood of their subjects, and his grief at the degradation of England in the blood-money she pays to the hirelings—these are not precedents to follow, but examples to shun. The noble Lord reads to us the speech of the Duke of Wellington, and, by a most ingenious perversion of logic, wishes us to believe that, when the Duke said only one-third of our army was British, the rest were mercenaries, like those whom your Bill would enlist. Why, Sir, they were the Spanish and Portuguese, fighting in defence of their native soil. Who rejects the assistance of worthy allies? who maintains that England should fight for the world single-handed? Can the noble Lord not comprehend the distinction involved? Here, armies of various states combine in a course dear to all. There one state contributes to the general standard, not its own native valour and zeal, but a mercenary band whose valour gives it no glory, whose zeal has no motive but pay. This is what I meant when I said "Honour was not so intolerable a burden that we should fee foreign soldiers to ease ourselves of its load." We are proud to share honour with the Frenchman, with the Turk, with any people that co-operate in our cause and participate our feelings. That is to share honour with others. Here you ask us to sell a part of that honour which were otherwise our share. The noble Lord has stated the advantages conferred on our own Army by the German troops in the French war. I grant them fully. I have heard great military authorities say that the German cavalry—especially under the command of the consummate officers it then possessed, such as Arranschild and Victor Alten—taught us how to charge and when to pull up. But the times are changed. Surely since then we have learnt all that they could teach us. How could German officers improve the charge of the Greys and Enniskillens at Balaklava, or that wondrous and stedfast gallantry of the Light Brigade, which brought 200 out of 600 men from the midst of the Russian cavalry, and squares of infantry supported by cross batteries of twenty pieces of cannon? Sir, we have learned more from the Germans than instruction in the art of war. We have been indebted to them for noble lessons in the arts of peace. Every cultivator of literature and science must cherish a deep and grateful affection for the German people, and a warm hope in their ultimate coalition with ourselves. Of this initiatory treaty with Austria I will say nothing at present; but if it does lead to an earnest and binding alliance, no man but must welcome a Power which can bring to the common cause from 300,000 to 500,000 men, and which—always assuming it to be sincere—would be our most convenient and our strongest guarantee for the maintenance of those territorial conditions on which any future peace must be based. I should rejoice yet more to learn that Prussia adopts the example of Austria — an example alleged, but still prospective—and contrasts, by her future sincerity, the guileful policy her Court espoused at the commencement of the French war. Between ourselves and the German people, of which Prussia is one of the great representatives, there is so kindred a community of race, of commercial interests, of all that belongs to intellectual interchange, that it would seem to me something monstrous, something out of the course of nature, if Prussia, the great centre of Germanic intelligence—Prussia, with that glorious capital of Berlin, in which philosophy and science have ripened every thought that could most ridicule and abhor the fanatic pretences with which a mock crusader would mask usurpation—that Prussia should sink from the rank among civilised States to which she was raised by the genius of Frederick the Great, and affect to have no vital interest in a war that would roll back from the borders of Europe the tide of a Tartar inundation—the supposition is preposterous! And I will not yet believe that a people which boasts universal education could be induced by any King, however able or beloved, to desert the ramparts which now protect from Attilas and Timours the destinies of the human race. But if we are to bring about a cordial friendship with the families of the German people, in heaven's name let it be in a mode worthy of them and us. Let us have nations openly for our allies, and not this contraband levy from the surplus forces of their petty Princes. Sir, indeed, no one has yet told us where these troops are to come from, and, what is still more important, where, after all, these foreign soldiers have really learned anything more than the holiday part of war—where have been the recent campaigns and wars in which they have exhibited their prowess and acquired their military experience? To hear what is said of the superior merits and seasoned hardihood of these foreigners, one might suppose they were the identical 10,000 who accomplished the retreat of Xenophon, instead of being merely, I suppose, men who have gone through the formal routine of the Landwehr, and seen no more of actual service, nor encountered any greater trial to the nerves, than the stout labourers you enlist in Kilkenny or Yorkshire. But are you sure you will get even trained soldiers—even the men who have gone through the drill of the Landwehr? I doubt it. From all I hear of the composition of that body I suspect you will obtain only raw recruits—recruits as raw as you can raise in England at less cost and in a shorter time. But it has been sought to gain some sort of popular favour to this measure—sought not, indeed, by Ministers, for they will not condescend to court popularity, but by their friends out of doors—by implying that the furtive and ulterior object of the Bill is to enlist men who are actuated by a nobler motive than that of ordinary soldiers, and first among all unfortunate refugees, the exiled Poles. But this idea has been so completely scouted by the First Minister of the Crown—it has been so expressly declared that the consent of foreign Sovereigns for the enlistment of their subjects is to be obtained—that I shall not waste the time of the House in arguing that supposition. I know not, indeed, what Sovereigns now sharing among them the ancient kingdom of Poland you could apply to for permission to form Polish recruits into separate battalions, with all the hopes that Polish recruits would entertain. But on this point I would only say, that if in spite of the present intention of Ministers—seeing that their intentions are more liable to change than those of ordinary mortals—if you do hereafter establish a legion of Polish or other refugees, at least beforehand make up your mind what are to be the definite objects of the war. If, indeed, among those objects, as the war proceeds, you do see your way to the restitution of Poland among the free states of Europe, say so manfully, and there are few Englishmen who would not rejoice at the possibility of such a barrier to Russian encroachment, and such a reparation to the fraud and violence of a former age. Then, indeed, Poles would be more than our soldiers—they would become our allies, and they would be as welcome to our country, as they would be to our brothers in the field. But, if you have no idea of such an enterprise, or if you would indolently trust the resuscitation of Poland in the pages of European history to that chapter in human fate with which you appear most familiar—the chapter of accidents—then I say, beware how you wilfully lend yourselves to false hopes, or incur the stain of insincerity with all whom you invite to your standard, not for the sake of pay, but from the expectation of freedom. It would be in vain to say you did not deliberately sanction such hopes; that the Poles must silence their beating hearts, and be but the unreasoning machines of your military drill. That idea is against the first law of human nature. Every Pole whom you form into regiments would say that you had led him to unavailing slaughter, unless you had made it one object of your war to plant your standard on the citadel of Warsaw. And, do let the House remember that the number of these foreign soldiers, from first to last, is unlimited. It is the peculiarity of this Bill that, while for the commencement of the war, in which you say they are alone required, the force is most paltry and inadequate, yet hereafter, when you say they will not be wanted, the number swells and increases, and is altogether undefined; it is 10,000 men at a time; but the Bill establishes a perpetual depôt of reserve, and, as soon as one set are despatched to the field, another may be prepared here to succeed them; so that we can form no conceivable guess as to the number you will employ and ultimately disband. Suppose, then, hereafter, you do form Polish battalions; and peace comes, and the Poles have still no country, what is to become of the large bands of armed malcontents you will leave on the surface of Europe, and who cannot quietly melt, like your own soldiers, into the ranks of peaceful citizens? Whatever you do, then, I implore you, for the sake of justice to Poland—for the honour of English sincerity and plain dealing—and for the cause of social order throughout Europe—to decide before you may enlist battalions of exiled patriots, how far you will venture to extend the definite objects of this war. Sir, it may be quite competent to hon. Gentlemen to extend the discussion of this Bill, which is one cause that now brings us together, into a survey of the general conduct of the war, of which you call this an essential measure. I have no such intention. I do not desire to reiterate former charges, nor set into adroit display every casual detail of inexperience or omission; on the contrary, I heard with pleasure the eloquent speech the other night of the Secretary at War—a pleasure, not only at his eloquence, but caused by a feeling more worthy of him and me, because he seemed to me satisfactorily to dispose of many charges connected with his own department, not, indeed, made in this House, but which had excited a painful impression out of doors. I cheerfully recognise in the Cabinet many who have won those high names in the service of their country which give them the noblest stake in its honour and its welfare: nor is there, indeed, one in the Cabinet—I might say in all the Government—of whom I would speak in other terms than those of personal respect. But still, it is not always a motley, and, possibly, sometimes a discordant, combination of able and worthy men which suffices to constitute an able and worthy Cabinet, even in times of peace; and for the fitting and spirited conduct of war it does require a promptitude, a decision, a rapid and comprehensive foresight, which can only come from an unity of purpose and of object; and that unity the conflicting speeches of Ministers have already notoriously belied. Take but a single instance—take the last—compare the sanguine terms in which the Treaty with Austria is paraded by one Minister elsewhere with the cautious scepticism as to its actual value, "its important results," which has been expressed by the organ of the Government in this House. And here I must make one observation in connection both with all that this treaty may lead to, and also with the conduct of the war. It has been assumed, on a recent occasion, by the First Minister of the Crown, that Government was blamed for its reluctance to go to war, as exhibited in preliminary negotiations. This is not strictly the fact. What we presume to regret, if not to blame, is that, in those preliminary negotiations, the sentiment of the people, which so deeply resented the first disguised aggression on Turkish independence, was never fairly represented to the Russian Emperor, and that, if the language held by our Ministers at the first, without being at all more threatening, had been more frank and plain spoken, you would have had a better chance of preserving peace than you could have by complimenting the Russian Czar on his moderation and sincerity, after he had openly proposed the subdivision of the Turkish dominions, and after he had deceived your credulity by representing large military preparations as an innocent mode of moral coercion. It may be well to remember this, should a treaty with Austria lead to new overtures for peace. If so, Government are sure of success. They have only carefully to remember the spirit with which they conducted former negotiations, and to conduct the future in a spirit diametrically the reverse. It is not true that we blame the Ministers for not going to war till all parties were prepared to support it; but what we regret, if we dare not blame—is, that the only persons unprepared for the war are the very Ministers charged with its conduct, and so unprepared were they, that the best excuse for all deficiencies is, that they engaged in an indefinite war against a formidable enemy, with military preparations so little raised above the ordinary establishments of peace, and on the niggard hypothesis that its cost could be defrayed out of our annual income. And now, when the public are perhaps indulgently disposed to receive your tardy assumption of energy, braced up at the last moment, at the commencement of winter, as a partial indemnity for your, at least, comparative indolence during the precious months of summer and autumn—who could foresee that one of the gigantic efforts of your collective patriotism, reserved as a surprise, so pleasing and prodigious that, although we are now told by the noble Lord it is the main reason why we meet, it is not even alluded to in the Speech from the Throne—who could foresee that this gigantic effort—this grand surprise—was to be this begging petition to petty potentates for 10,000 soldiers? What, has it come to this? In an empire on which we are told that the sun never sets, the national Council is hastily summoned to prepare and parade all its military power. One Minister tells us his recruits are more than he can manage; another says we could bring a million soldiers in the field—some day or other; and, then, when all the world is breathless to know what you are about to bring forth, *nascetur ridiculus mus*—out creeps this proposal to borrow or crimp from the foreigner 10,000 troops to be drilled in these realms. This grand profession of redundant strength, and this curious confession of absolute want, remind me of the adventurer, who boasted to an acquaintance he picked up at a coffee house of the immense wealth he possessed at a distance—his castles in the north, and his lands in the west, and his shares in the copper mines of Cornwall and the gold mines of Peru—and when he had worked up his listener to the highest point of prospective gratitude as to what he might expect from the munificence of a friend of such boundless resources, suddenly clapped his hand to his pocket and said, "By the by, I have a little bill to pay at the bar, you don't happen to have such a thing as tenpence halfpenny about you?" Whatever way I look at this proposed Bill I can see nothing to justify and excuse it. I have said that there is no parallel case of precedent. Now, let us ask, what is your plea of necessity? And here, Sir, I find my own opinions so lucidly and moderately stated by a great man whose authority must have the utmost weight with Gentlemen opposite, that I will read what was said in this House by the late Lord Grey, then Mr. Grey. He said—

> "On urgent occasions it may be proper to introduce foreign troops into this country, but it should never be done except in cases of extreme and proved necessity, and never should be suffered to be done without being watched with that constitutional jealousy which is the best part of the character of this House, and the best security for the rights and liberties of the people."

Now, let me pause, and appeal to the generous candour of hon. Gentlemen opposite, if these words from one of the greatest statesmen who ever adorned your opinions, do not justify the jealousy with which we regard this Bill, and whether we are right or wrong in that jealousy, if they do not amply vindicate us from the unworthy charge of wishing to obstruct the general preparations for the war, because we cavil at the introduction of foreign soldiers. Mr. Grey went on to observe that—

> "Though he was not ready to deny that for the purpose of our own defence we should sometimes employ foreign troops, yet he could not help thinking that the wisest course for us would be to rely on what had been emphatically called the energy of an armed nation."

So, then, where is this case of urgent and proved necessity—necessity for our own defence? You have not argued it as a necessity; the noble Lord has not done so: he is too much of an Englishman for that. It is only argued at most as a question of convenience—the convenience of drilling or organising the troops in this country; and I say that it does not seem to me a convenience that is worth the purchase. Sir, it was not unreasonably asked elsewhere, "How will this proposition be regarded by the enemy?" What a pretext do you give to the Emperor of Russia to represent to his subjects the correctness of his estimate of the shopkeeping spirit of Great Britain. "Compare," he will say, "their braggart talk in their Houses of Parliament, their boast of the popular enthusiasm, their willingness to contribute their best blood to the cause for which they fight, with the simple fact that before the first year is out they are compelled to apply to the fifth-rate Powers of Europe for 10,000 foreign soldiers, on the pretence—nay, on the confession, that they are not a military nation; that they have not had time since this war began to drill a sufficient number of recruits for an army, which, at the battle of Inkerman, could only bring 8,000 men fit for service into the field." I do not desire to stand thus either before the enemy or before our allies, and I say that this is not the best mode to remove the hesitation of Austria and Prussia. I am convinced that we have men of our own, even at this moment, in spite of all previous delays, prepared to fight our own battle. You tell us you have already sent large reinforcements to the Crimea. You sent them weeks and months ago. Of course, ever since you have been raising and drilling more. You have had ample leisure. You have leisure still to drill into active service the recruits you obtain from a population so brave, so robust, and so proverbially quick of comprehension as that of Great Britain and Ireland. I deny, altogether, that the drafts you will take from our labouring population will derange the channels of agricultural or other industry. We have plenty to spare from a population of nearly thirty millions. The suspension of many industrial occupations on railways and elsewhere, caused by the war, releases a large number of the stoutest portion of our labourers. You may find employment in the army for many more of the marines now idle at a distance; you may make use of the native forces in India; above all, you have only to rely on our militia—to give fair play to that magnificent nursery of soldiers. I do not presume to offer you advice in details—I say only, go into the market of war with the best spirit of trade. Your best and nearest market is at home. Get there the best article you can, it is the cheapest in the long run. I remember that in 1779, when the ports of France and Spain bristled with hostile ships, when American privateers were seen with impunity in the Channel, that Lord Harcourt offered to Ireland 4,000 foreign troops in lieu of a greater number sent to America. What was the answer of the Irish Parliament? Sir, they rejected the proposal; they declared "that they were competent to defend themselves, or that they were not worth defending." That noble answer which became the representatives of Ireland may equally become the united Parliament of the three kingdoms; and what was the practical result of that refusal? Why, the result of refusing 4,000 foreign soldiers was, that 50,000 volunteers immediately presented themselves. Talk of our men being raw recruits: why, how many of those who dashed through the Russian armaments, who braved with equal fortitude unparalleled sufferings, of disease, of climate, of a defective Commissariat, were the new recruits you affect to depreciate? That material which a British army has so successfully tested is the material on which a British Parliament may be content to rely. Those labourers and sons of labourers whom the leader of this House eulogised in terms of such just and such noble eloquence; those men—those raw recruits, equally daring in the charge, and calm as veterans under the attack; those men so patient in their sufferings, and so humane to the foe; those are the material for your army. You have tried it, keep to it. Without disparagement to the soldiers you may collect from Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, anywhere abroad, I say we have proved sufficiently that this is not the moment in which we need tax our countrymen in order to arm the foreigner for our defence. Do you ask me what proof? Alma, Balaklava, Inkerman? I say that any deficiencies in the mere mechanism of the drill are quickly got over with officers so skilful as ours; I say that even the raw recruits, before they have joined your standard, have already gone through a more precious discipline than three years of lifeless ceremonials can give to the soldiers of a despotic conscription. They have gone, from their cradles, through the discipline of hardy habits, of patient endurance, of indomitable conviction in the strength of their own right arms—that is the discipline with which armies soon learn to be invincible, and without which men may be faultless in the drill, but valueless in the field. Sir, with these views, and trusting they may not be altogether distasteful to the patriotism of the House, I move that this Bill be read a second time this day six months.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words, "upon this day six months."

Question proposed, "That the word "now" stand part of the Question."

Mr. MONCKTON MILNES was glad to be able to avail himself of that opportunity to offer some remarks in reply to the speech which had just excited so much admiration, and to arguments which were as sincerely offered as they were ably delivered. In dealing with this Bill, the hon. Baronet had gone into the whole policy of the war, but it would ill become him to follow the example of the hon. Baronet, and he should simply confine himself to offering a few reasons why he thought the House ought to adopt the original Motion in preference to the Amendment. During the whole speech, the hon. Baronet, although he had spoken of the German, Swiss, and Swede, had never once alluded to our gallant Ally, and a stranger in the gallery, hearing the hon. Baronet, and ignorant of the fact, might suppose that the war was a single duel between Russia and England, instead of being a great European contest. The hon. Baronet seemed to forget that we were in alliance with the greatest military Power in the world, who had rendered us all the assistance in its power, and to whom we were not ashamed to own that we owed the salvation of our army on the great day of Inkerman. Those who remembered that circumstance, and bore in mind that the contest was an European one, must come to a different conclusion with regard to this Bill to that which the hon. Baronet had arrived at. It was only because we were not engaged alone in the war that the present measure was in any respect justifiable. This was an European war, and all Europe ought to be engaged in it. Not only were the German States, whose frontiers were most exposed to the power of Russia most deeply interested in this war, but every German must feel that the cause of the Allies was the cause of national independence, and that we were fighting on the hills of the Crimea, not only for the independence of Turkey, but for the independence of Germany also. Under these circumstances, he willingly accepted the Bill now before the House—he considered it, in fact, the fit complement of the Militia Bill—the one called upon the volunteers of England, while the other called upon the volunteers of Europe, to support the Allies. It had been said, however, by some that this Bill was averse to the principles and spirit of the British constitution, and that it would summon all the revolutionists throughout the world to the service of the British Crown. These were the two main objections urged against the Government, and there would be nothing averse to the English constitution in our asking foreigners to aid us in a struggle of civilisation and liberty, in which they were at least as much interested as ourselves. Nor did it follow that because Government were inviting the assistance of the volunteers of Europe that they were necessarily raising the standard of revolution throughout Europe. The hon. Baronet said, "If you want to do anything with Poland, proclaim Poland to be independent;" but could he seriously be earnest when he gave that advice, considering that we had already entered into an intimate alliance with Austria for the purposes of the war. Why there was not a single Pole in this country who would not be ashamed to owe the restoration of his country to such a step; it was a different thing, however, for us to say, as we did by this Bill, that we would give to every Pole who felt a just indignation against the common enemy the means of sharing in the struggle. This we might well do without giving any offence either to Austria or Prussia. France had a foreign legion containing many Poles, and he did not believe the mere fact of their incorporation had tended in any degree to weaken the union between France and Austria. But it was said, why not trust entirely to our own people? So we did, but although he did not distrust the valour and energy of our troops, he would not be guilty of lavishing the blood of one Englishman unnecessarily for the want of reinforcements, which it was the object of this Bill to provide. He had felt no national pride at being told that at one period the English army in the East was more numerous than the French, for he thought that instead of the French having 100,000 men in the camp at Boulogne, there ought to have been more in the Crimea, and in such a contest as this it would indicate no want of patriotism to avail ourselves of the assistance of the foreigner in order to make the number of our troops equal to that of our Ally. The Government were blamed for attaching too much importance to this measure, and making their very existence depend upon its fate; but for his part he thought the Government did nothing but what was just, reasonable, and patriotic in saying that they would accept the services of the volunteers of liberty throughout Europe to assist us in the contest with Russia. They were also right in staking their existence as a Government upon the passing of this measure, for, if Parliament could not place confidence in the Government as to the principles on which the war should be conducted, it was much better that they should not retain the government of the country. England and France were fighting for the independence of the world, and not for any selfish aggrandisement, and therefore he thought an opportunity should be given to those natives of foreign countries who sympathised with them to give their aid in fighting against Russia.

Mr. ADDERLEY said, he had no wish to call in question the necessity of the present war; he only questioned the fact that the period had arrived when it had become necessary for England to resort to foreign mercenaries. He did not at all mean to deny that in a protracted stage of this war it might be advisable for this country to enlist foreign mercenaries in her service; but the question was, ought they to be called in in the first year of the war? He doubted the cogency of the noble Lord's reason for proposing the Bill, namely, that it was always at the commencement of a war that assistance was required by this country, though it by no means followed that the whole means of the country were exhausted in the first year of the war. He, however, differed with the noble Lord, while he thought prudence dictated that we should make use of all our national resources that were possibly available at the very first commencement of war, otherwise the enemy would be apt to form an inadequate notion of our power. We were not yet reduced to the necessity of having recourse to foreigners, and he wanted to know why the Government preferred hiring foreign mercenaries to using the national resources? Why should we have recourse to foreigners while the British Colonies were offering to reinforce the army in the Crimea? They were assured by the Colonial Secretary the other night that there was no intention whatever by this Bill to express distrust in the loyalty and attachment of the Colonies; but surely, after the Canadian Parliament had made an offer of its assistance, it was, to say the least of it, ungracious to accept this measure in preference to their offer. He was assured upon excellent authority that a letter had recently been received from a Canadian gentleman, stating his readiness, in conjunction with other gentlemen, not only to raise a Canadian regiment, but to maintain that regiment during the time it served with the British army. While such offers as these were being made, coming as they did from Canada, which could furnish the best troops in the world, did it not convey a feeling of distrust to reject them in favour of German mercenaries? It seemed to him to be a downright insult to the Colonies to refuse their aid under such circumstances, and most impolitic to do so, it being the policy and duty of the Government to fan by every possible means the flame of loyalty thus manifested, for the purpose of cementing more closely their connection with this country, and retaining that respect and good feeling which such offers prove at the present time to exist between the Colonies and the mother country. He (Mr. Adderley) recollected the other day the noble Lord the President of the Council, at a Meeting at Bedford, whilst addressing the Mechanics' Institution established there, telling them that there was no subject more worthy their consideration than the cause of a nation's decline; and as one of the symptoms of such decline, he said that there was none more sure than a nation being numerically less than the country with which she was to deal. Now, if the noble Lord was correct in that view, as no doubt he was, it would almost seem from this Bill that England was in the decline; but he denied that she was numerically inferior to the Power with which she had to deal, or that she had exhibited the symptoms of a declining Power. If this country was to look only within the limits of this island for support, its numerical force would indeed be inferior to that of Russia, and it would be manifesting the symptoms pointed out by the noble Lord as that of a nation in its decline. Nothing could be more unjust, not only to this country, but also to those nations whom she had planted in a wider hemisphere, and who were animated, like ourselves, with the feelings and spirit of Englishmen, by thus confining the resources of England, to allow her to exhibit the symptoms of a declining power, whilst the offers of assistance from her colonial possessions were refused, and the expression of their sympathies treated with neglect. Those offers, doubtless, were strengthened, if they did not originate in the accession of freedom, by removal of disabilities which our colonial possessions have lately obtained;—from that moment the Colonies had begun to feel a warmer attachment towards the mother country, and it would be the height of folly to weaken that feeling, by rejecting their offers of assistance in the present war; rather let them encourage it now when they could do so with so much advantage to our nationality, or a golden opportunity for still further cementing the Colonies to the British Throne would be lost to us for ever. Better troops than could have been sent from the Colonies could not, he believed, be found. What troops could excel the Canadian Rifles? Why, then, should foreign mercenaries be pressed into our armies when the services of more valuable troops were freely offered? The noble Lord who opened the debate wished to make it appear that there were numerous precedents in history for such a proceeding, and that if we rejected the present Bill it would be a deviation from the teachings of history; but, in point of fact, there was not the least appositeness in the two cases which the noble Lord had quoted; the most apposite of the two, perhaps, was that of Spain; but did the noble Lord think England was reduced to the same state as Spain when she called in the assistance of the British Legion? Were the Colonies of England in the same position as those of Spain? Certainly not; and it would be most humiliating to the country, and crushing to her feelings of self-reliance, if the Ministers on this occasion were allowed to accept the services of foreign mercenaries in preference to the noble offers of the Colonies. Such a measure as this could be only justifiable in the mosturgent case of necessity; no such case had been made out, and therefore, without trespassing longer upon the House, he thought he had said quite enough to justify his voting for the Amendment.

MR. WATSON said, he believed he spoke the opinions of the large constituency which he had the honour to represent when he said it was in favour of supporting the Government in a strong and vigorous exercise of their power for maintaining the present war; he believed, indeed, there was hardly a man in England who was not prepared to say, at this moment, he would give his support to the Government for the energetic prosecution of the war. He must say he had great doubts as to the wisdom originally of sending the army into the Crimea. He had no doubts that there had been shortcomings in the matter, not so much on the part of the Government, as on the part of certain departments of the Government. Whether it was the fault of the gentlemen at Woolwich or those at the Horse Guards, he thought the war might have been waged much more energetically. Those departments were not equal to the exigencies of the occasion. He must be allowed, however, to say that never in the history of this country had more energy been exercised than had been displayed in bringing forth the Navy of this country; in bringing forward and in manning our ships; and the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty was entitled to the highest possible praise for the energy with which the Navy had been manned and completed for the war. He gave his support to the present Bill. Whatever doubts he might entertain of the wisdom of the original measure of sending an army to the Crimea, practically he was bound to look to the state of affairs at the present time. A war had been undertaken, an army had been sent to the Crimea, that army was now in front of Sebastopol, subject to all sorts of privations and dangers, both from the climate and from the enemy; and if the Ministry of the day, whether Whig or Tory, came forward in the House and told him that they considered it necessary that support should be given, either in the shape of militia or of foreign troops to be enlisted, he felt bound as an Englishman to support that Government under those circumstances, without regard either to political distinctions or to party spirit. Supposing that, by reason of any want of support of the Government, any great disaster should befall our army now before Sebastopol —supposing it should be by any vote of the House of Commons that night, refusing the Government the support of 10,000 or 15,000, or any number of foreign troops, our brave and noble soldiers should be sacrificed—the names of the persons who should be the cause of that disaster would go down with execration to all posterity. As an Englishman, and a friend of his country, he declared that they ought at that moment to abandon all party distinctions and political feelings, and unite on one point, and one alone—namely, to ascertain how were they best to maintain the war and support the army in the Crimea? There were many modes in which the army might be reinforced. Every means ought to be adopted for that purpose. He supposed the Government had come forward with the consent of the general commanding in chief to say that it was necessary that we should have the support of foreign troops. As a citizen of this country he would not stop to inquire whether he liked foreign troops, or what kind of troops he liked best. What he said was, that if the Government told him on their responsibility, sanctioned by the Commander in Chief, that the army required the support of foreign troops, not by substitution, but as auxiliaries, he would at once give that Government his support, and he felt sure that he should be backed by the whole people of England in so doing. He must suppose the Government had had some communication from which they learned when and where they could raise foreign troops; and they knew, judging from the existence of the *Landwehr* and other modes of military organisation on the Continent, that troops ready formed for the purposes of war were much more likely to be got abroad than by enrolling men in England. But he gave his support to the

Government, not only because he thought that troops taken from Germany would be much sooner efficient troops than levies of English lads of eighteen or twenty, but because he thought this a most wise and judicious measure. He spoke from some experience in these matters. It was suggested on the opposite side of the House that the Government might recruit from this country, that the people of this country were all enthusiasm at the present moment; but how long would that enthusiasm continue? At the outbreak of a war, when we had gained two or three victories, everybody was anxious to enlist; after a time it would be difficult to get recruits, it was well known that towards the end of the last war, it was most difficult to get men particularly for the cavalry, but by recruiting up to a certain extent you pressed on the population. The population of a country could only bear a certain number of recruits to be sent to the army; generally speaking, he believed ten in 1,000 to be as many as the population could bear. If more were taken, you would press upon the productive industry of the country, the effect of which would be a rise in the price of labour and consequently commodities of every kind would become dear, and general distress in the country at large would follow. He did not want to check the enthusiasm of the people to enlist; but who were the people who were enthusiastic to enlist? Young men of eighteen or twenty, who would only go out to be destroyed. He had a letter in his hand from one who was now and had been from the commencement of the siege, under the fire of Sebastopol, but who never complained, in which he stated that in his company of artillery they could only muster eighty men out of 150; that the drafts that came out could not stand the weather at all. The truth was, that young soldiers would sink under the labour and exposure, and only old-seasoned soldiers could stand. They must have seasoned troops. This was a maxim of the Duke of Wellington as might be seen through his despatches. He presumed the Government had some definite nation from which they were to obtain these foreign troops. They could not get them from Spain, nor yet from Italy, nor from the greater States of Germany, and certainly not from Russia. Whence, then, were they to get them? From the small German Principalities, which would furnish soldiers as good as any to be got in the world—brave, seasoned, obedient to command, and led by experienced officers. He could speak from some experience in these matters. He was a lawyer now, but he had been a soldier once, and had seen service. He had seen the German Legion, of the Chasseurs Britanniques and other foreign troops in the field, and better troops than some of those were never commanded by the Duke of Wellington. He had the honour to have served with the German Legion. He was quartered at Canterbury, in 1812, with the 3rd regiment of German Hussars who did duty in that garrison, and on the coast, and no regiment could behave better, and they discharged their duties without the slightest jealousy on the part of the British soldier or of the people. It had been said that there would be jealousy on the part of our soldiers against these foreigners. The British soldier was jealous of none but cowards, and always liked a rivalry with brave men in the field. In these days gentlemen would sit at their tables and discuss the impossibility of squares being charged by cavalry. That problem had been solved by the German heavy dragoons, who cut through French squares at the Ford at La Serna, and with the approval of the whole British army; and with the assent of the nation, for this charge the whole German Legion obtained permanent rank in the British army. Besides that, they had all heard of the glorious Light Division, the Tenth Legion of the Duke of Wellington. Who commanded it in the Peninsula, after the death of General Robert Crawford at Ciudad Rodrigo, until the end of the war? General Charles Baron Alten—a German mercenary, if you please. They had also all heard of General Darnberg, another German "mercenary," if they pleased. They were told that the British soldiery could not bear the idea of fighting with mercenaries; but when those troops were doing their duty in the Peninsula and at Waterloo, where could they point to any jealousy? Every person acquainted with the old Peninsular war, recollected that noble regiment the 1st Hussars, led by the fine old soldier Colonel Arranschild, who entertained any feelings but admiration of such soldiers. He was told that at the beginning of a war it was dishonourable to this country to say that we were unable to carry it on without the assistance of mercenaries. He would answer, that there was no case so good as the case of truth. They had emerged from a state of peace with an army on a very long peace establishment—they now required to have an army in the field—but troops could not be raised in a moment, and he took it that the foreign troops that might be obtained would be much more trained to the use of arms, and be sooner ready for the field, than any young Englishmen that could be brought forward. Look what it was to train a soldier. The British infantry man, the easiest trained soldier in the world, required months and years before he would be a good soldier. When first caught, the raw material was as unlike the article ultimately produced as could possibly be. You had to teach him the use of his weapon—you had to drill him, to accustom him to act as platoons and in companies, next in battalions, and, lastly, in brigades; you had to season him on guard; you had to season him by night and season him by day; and it was only by that long-continued and necessary process, you made him a part of that great and powerful machine, a body of British infantry; and you gave him that combination and steadiness in action so well expressed by General Canrobert by the word *solidité.* And if you had all that trouble with your infantry men, how much more was necessary to produce a cavalry soldier? He must be taught to take care of and ride his horse, as well as the use of his weapon. And then the artilleryman, above all—he had to be taught everything belonging to an infantry soldier's training, and much of that of a cavalry soldier; he had to be taught gunnery, and the repair and movement of his guns. No doubt our artillery proved to be excellent in this war, but certainly, all our artillery was so far short in point of numbers, that a great accession of strength would be required. The best thing that could be done was to drill a portion of our infantry as artillerymen, for they had to meet not a small Power, but the whole power of Russia and the largest artillery in the world. Every one who knew anything of Eylau and Friedland, and the battle of the Moskowa, must know that the great force of Russia lay in her artillery; and, instead of our having but six weak companies to begin the attack on Sebastopol, we ought to have had six times that number in order to produce the slightest effect. The same with our cavalry. If we had had 3,000 good cavalry, with five troops of light artillery, mortal man would never have seen Sebastopol on the day of Alma to tell the tale of the defeat. It was from the weakness of our force established on a peace basis that we are now emerging. You cannot bring young men into the field; you require time to season and drill them; but it was as auxiliaries, and not by substitution, that you should have those foreign troops. Whether your army consisted of 30,000, 50,000, or 60,000, your 10,000 or 20,000 auxiliary foreign troops would be of immense service against the Russian masses. It had been said that those forces would be excellent troops, but that they would not win for us such battles as Alma or Inkerman; but, on the contrary, it had always been found that there could be no more valuable soldiers than well-drilled auxiliary troops, acting in concert with the best of all troops—for, he was proud to say, we had shown that no nation excelled us in war at the present time in the quality of our infantry and cavalry, and also in our engineers and our artillery—but we wanted numbers, and it was an axiom in war that numbers must at last prevail. It had also been said that the employment of foreign troops was unconstitutional. That was a very vague and general term. All standing armies had been considered unconstitutional. They had become necessary standing evils—they must be kept up; and though, no doubt, there would be less sympathy shown by foreign than by native troops for the liberties of the country; and it would be more unconstitutional to maintain them in this country, the Government, as he understood, did not intend to maintain those troops in England; they only meant to maintain depôts for the purpose of collecting and drilling them for foreign service. If the Government, under any mask, should employ foreign troops to coerce public opinion in the country, they had in the House of Commons power and public spirit enough to know how to deal with a Ministry that should be foolish enough to attempt such a wicked design. There was not the least danger in bringing those troops here to be drilled; the old German Legion, and other foreign troops, were drilled here in the last war. The only instance in which he knew foreign troops to act here was at the siege of Carlisle, in 1745; the town surrendered on the very day on which the Hessians opened their batteries against it; and well it was that that surrender took place; but he would not now speak as to the wisdom of their having been employed on such a service. There was one real objection to foreign troops that he knew of: in the foreign corps in the last war the men were given to desertion, particularly in the Brunswick corps and in the Chasseurs Britanniques. The reason was, that they were recruited from sources from which they ought not to have been recruited—namely, from deserters and prisoners. What he would impress on the Government was, never to recruit their foreign legions either from one of these classes or the other. Deserters, generally speaking, came over under a great semblance of detestation of the war, or something of that kind; but the men who deserted to you to-day would desert from you to-morrow. They were, generally speaking, skulking cowards, afraid to face the dangers of war, who placed themselves in the hands of the enemy in order to escape those perils. Then, again, men in the urgency of a prison would give you the idea that they would fight in your ranks; but they would only enlist in order to desert and to return to their own army—therefore it was worse than useless to enlist them. But he counselled the refusal to receive a deserter into the foreign legion for a still higher reason—one of humanity; it was well known that, if taken by the army from whom he deserted, he would certainly be put ignominiously to death. It had also been said that there was a great difficulty arising from a different scale of punishment for the auxiliary and for the regular troops; that an Englishman might be flogged, but not a foreigner. He had a remedy for that state of things—flog neither. Treat a soldier as a man, and depend upon it he would do his duty as a man. They might depend upon it there were no truer or better men than good soldiers when properly treated. He had now stated the grounds on which he based the course he intended to take. He could not, consistently with his duty, do otherwise than support the Government under the present circumstances, seeing that it had been stated that the forces in question were necessary for the support and maintenance of the war. He acted from a conviction that this was the best measure that could be brought forward for a vigorous and energetic prosecution of the war, and for securing a speedy return of the blessings of peace, which they all most devoutly hoped shortly to obtain. They had to meet a strong Power—strong in men and in territory. The fortress they were now under was not in itself a strong one. Its strength lay in the army which it sheltered within its fortifications; for we were not properly besieging Sebastopol, but fighting a large army protected by its walls. Had it had but an ordinary garrison, the place might have been reduced very easily. With its immense forces and reinforcements of men and material, it might hold out some time; but, depend upon it, it would fall before a French and English army. We should drive the Russians from the Crimea, and relieve Europe from their domination in the Black Sea; we should deprive them of the great arsenal whereby they maintained their conquests in Circassia and Georgia; till that had been done, Turkey was at every moment at the mercy of the Czar. This attack on Sebastopol was a most arduous undertaking, the object was great, and he trusted the result would be glorious to our arms; but we required an increase to our army to enable us to succeed—he hoped this might be obtained by the enlistment of foreigners under this Bill. For the reasons he had stated, he should give his most cordial support to the Government.

Mr. E. BALL said, the hon. and learned Gentleman who had just sat down, seemed to think that, wherever he went, there was the strongest determination to support the Government in all their measures for the carrying on of the war; but wherever he (Mr. E. Ball) went, he found that all classes, whatever might be their opinions as to the merits of the war, universally condemned the manner in which the Government had carried it on, and especially the Bill then under the consideration of the House. There was a clear distinction between the feeling which we, as Englishmen, entertained as to the necessity of carrying on the war now that it had been commenced, and as to the plan of the Government for carrying it on by means of mercenaries who were willing to murder for hire any party against whom you might employ them. He regretted that, disastrous as the war had already been, the Government had thought fit to add to the evils already existing, by introducing this new element as to the mode of carrying it on, and by proposing that we should have resort for succour to those who had no sympathy, feeling, or interest with us in the war. All war was dreadful, but none so much so as that which was waged by mercenaries perfectly regardless to which side they sold their swords. It was impossible for any hon. Member to speak on this subject without feeling great embarrassment. One could not express his feelings of abhorrence of all war, without, at the same time, saying something that might be calculated to diminish that sympathy which the country was entitled to in carrying on the war with all possible vigour, now that it had been commenced —for it was one thing to justify a war, and another to push it vigorously when we are once in it. There was no man in the country who regretted more than himself that the war had been commenced, but at the same time there was no man in the country who was prepared—now that we had entered upon it—to make greater sacrifices than himself in carrying it on with unflinching courage, with indomitable perseverance, and without any regard to cost, danger, or difficulty. He was only sorry to hear the noble Lord say, at the commencement of his speech, that although we were prepared to resort to the services of foreign mercenaries, yet there had been no applications for assistance to the Emperor of France—and that, if such application had been made, he (Lord John Russell) was quite sure it would not have been successful. He (Mr. E. Ball) was very glad that so noble and gallant a people as the French were not to be hired, and that when they fight, they fight from principle; but if any foreign troops were to be employed, he should have been more glad to have had French assistance than any other, because they would have been fighting in a cause in which they had a sympathy with us, and because they were a gallant people who were worthy to fight side by side with the men of England. Such troops would have felt that they were engaged in a contest in which their own nation and that of England had a common interest, and it was one happy consequence of this war, that it had secured the kindly feelings of the two greatest nations on the earth. He thought it was very lamentable that, at the very outset of this war, we should be obliged to avail ourselves of mercenary troops. The proposition which had been made by the noble Lord for the hire of such services must be very encouraging to the Czar, who would treat it as an acknowledgment, on the part of this country, that, at the very outbreak of this war, she was so poor in soldiers, and so destitute of the elements of warfare, that the 50,000 soldiers whom she had sent out to the Crimea had exhausted her military strength, and that she was obliged to obtain the subsidiary assistance of foreigners to enable her to carry on the war. But he (Mr. E. Ball) was afraid that Austria would not receive intelligence of this proposition of the Government with the gratification that would be felt by the Czar on this subject. Austria might imagine that there was some intention on the part of the British Government to employ certain Hungarians, of revolutionary principles, who might be ready for any acts of murder, and she might therefore feel great jealousy as to our inviting those persons to enlist under our standards. But he was the more surprised that such a proposal as that under the consideration of the House should be made, because the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Home Department had said the other night, in answer to a question, that the Government had the nation to resort to as a reserve for the army. If that were so, why had the noble Lord the President of the Council that night asked the House to consent to the Government resorting to foreign mercenaries for a reserve? The Government need not fear that the nation would not always be willing to support them in the carrying on of the present war, for it was a popular war—the nation, in fact, had urged the Government to commence it. He had even heard ministers of religion urge war. He had heard the war advocated at that place where our most sacred meetings were held—Exeter Hall. He had heard men do their utmost to sanctify the war, if that were possible, and urge its prosecution with the utmost vigour. He was afraid that from Government as now constituted the country must not expect much vigour in the conduct of the war. He believed there were many clever Gentlemen in the Cabinet, who, in their individual capacities, were fitted for almost any pursuit, who had destroyed their usefulness by their amalgamation with other elements. In the same way as he believed there were substances containing properties valuable in themselves, which became neutralised as soon as brought into contact with others; so the diverse and varied opinions of the Gentlemen opposite had so tended to diminish their mutual influence, that, collectively, they were one of the weakest Administrations that had ever sat on the Ministerial benches.

Mr. MILNER GIBSON said, that the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) had concluded his speech to the House with a very important announcement, to the effect that if the Bill were defeated, the Government would feel it necessary to resign their offices. He felt, after that announcement, they approached the question under considerable difficulty; and he did take upon himself to protest against the system of overawing the deliberations of the representatives of the people of this country, by telling them that if they did not, after a few hours' notice, make up their minds to support a measure of this character, the Government would feel at liberty to retire from office. He could not understand why resignation was to be the consequence of the defeat of this Bill. Had they not seen, during the last Session of Parliament, important measures of domestic policy, involving the principles of a great party, proposed by the Government, and yet defeated; but at the same time the Government considering that they could honourably continue to administer public affairs? He said then, that it was not fair, upon a measure of this character, which was, after all, but a minor part of the proposals that had been made for the carrying on of this war, that the rejection by the House of this legislative proposal was to necessitate the resignation of the Government. He, in voting, whichever way he might think proper to vote on the measure, should vote in reference to its merits and his own conscientious convictions. He felt there was a great principle at stake in the Bill—a principle that he valued more even than the stability of a Government. What was the measure they had before them? They were invited to pass a measure to enable Her Majesty to enlist foreigners into the British army to fight the battles of the country, and to become the enemies of Russia. Now, he wanted to know whether it was consistent with a sound view of public law that Parliament should make provisions for the Government of this country to communicate with the individual subjects of foreign States? Are not Governments to communicate with Governments? He would appeal to any hon. Member in the House, whether in the law of nations it was a sound principle to separate peoples from their Sovereigns, and to give power to the Crown to negotiate with individual subjects of Powers without saying one word as to the recognition of their Governments? Had we not a law upon our statute-book that made it a misdemeanor for any one to come here, and, without the consent of the Queen, to enlist troops to serve in foreign countries and in a foreign war? He said it was not consistent with sound principles that private subjects of a State should make war against a country when their own Government was at peace with that country; and it appeared to him that they could not give their sanction to such a doctrine. The House could not recognise such a principle. Not a word had been said about any treaties having been entered into with any foreign Government; not a syllable had been said about any alliance or understanding—but Her Majesty was merely to be empowered by this Bill to throw her recruiting officers into any foreign country or any neutral State, to enlist forces to carry on the war with Russia. Now this was either to be done with the consent of those neutral Governments or against their consent or without their knowledge. If it was to be done with the consent of those foreign Governments, then he maintained that those Governments would forfeit their neutrality, and there would be no necessity for the Bill; for these Governments would be belligerents against Russia, and they were bound to declare war openly, and in the face of Europe. They would then be bound to enter into an alliance with this country, and to send their forces as their contingent in support of the common war. Such a course of proceeding would be straightforward, and would, moreover, be consistent with the public law of Europe. If, on the other hand, it was to be done without the consent of those Governments, or against their wishes, then he maintained that the British Parliament ought not to sanction any such course of public policy. The Government of Switzerland, and other Governments throughout Europe, had already passed laws—municipal laws—to prevent the enlistment of their subjects as mercenaries. The noble Lord the President of the Council might quote the precedents of past times in favour of it, go back to the Middle Ages, and tell the House of precedents of Indians with their scalping knives and tomakawks; but as civilisation advanced, nations and Governments were endeavouring to improve the customs under which war was carried on; and he (Mr. M. Gibson) maintained that the whole course of public treaties and municipal law in particular States had been to utterly condemn the system of carrying on war by hireling mercenaries, who would serve any side, and could not be said to have any interests or sympathy in the war beyond the payment which they received. If it was pointed out that some Power, or some foreign nation, was willing to allow its subjects to be enlisted by this country for the purpose of making war with Russia, and yet maintain its neutrality—which was a principle contended for by some—then he asserted that it was a dangerous principle to lay down. If this were the principle of the Bill, what could we say—if Russia were to hire privateers from the United States? Should they not be told that any country might "let out" its men and forces without breaking its neutrality, and that we had ourselves laid down that principle by a deliberate Act of the British Parliament? He had heard it said that a country may lend its troops to carry on war with another country without forfeiting its neutrality, provided there was some existing treaty antecedent to hostilities, and which had not been made with reference to the particular war then pending. If this was the case, where was the country with which this nation had such a treaty that it was entitled to go into that country and raise troops for the war with Russia? That country ought to be named, for it could be no secret. It ought not to be difficult to be found, for we had only to search our collection of treaties with a little diligence to discover it. He said that either Government had no treaty with any such country which entitled them to enlist its subjects to carry on the war with Russia, or if there were no such country with which treaties of this kind were in existence, they were about, by this Bill, to embark on a course of policy most dangerous to the future interests of England—to multiply wars beyond all precedent, and to involve persons who desired to be neutral, in spite of themselves, in existing hostilities. They might involve some small neutral State in a war with Russia, and if we did that we should incur obligations to send troops to defend that small country, and have other duties besides those of defending the Ottoman Empire; or they would have to leave that country to take care of itself, which had brought on it the indignation of the Czar by lending its troops to carry on the war. A case of necessity, no doubt, was endeavoured to be made out by the noble Lord who moved the second reading of the Bill. He told the House that this country was engaged in a war with a great military Power, and that it had with it a just cause and the sympathy of the world, but that it wanted numbers. This country, the noble Lord said, was not a great military Power, which had, as it were, inexhaustible armies, and must avail itself of every mode to carry on the war. The noble Lord appeared to forget that they had a great military Ally. The noble Lord forgot to mention the Ottoman Power, with its immense forces. He (Mr. Milner Gibson) could not believe that two great countries like England and France, with the forces of Turkey, were reduced to such a state that they were dependent upon the importation of a diminutive supply of German mercenaries. The case spoke for itself; it was so mysterious that it could not be explained, and he must leave it to the imagination of hon. Members to supply the real explanation. No Member of Government had given a sufficient explanation to the House to justify him (Mr. M. Gibson) in giving his support to the Bill. He believed that the measure was unsound in principle, and calculated to be injurious to the permanent interests of the country. He had asked himself if he should be justified in abstaining from voting, and he was inclined from a desire to do nothing which might be embarrassing to Government, in the present state of affairs, not to vote; but he had come to the deliberate conclusion that it was his duty to record his vote against this Bill, and to use every Parliamentary means in his power to prevent its passing into law.

MR. J. G. PHILLIMORE said, he was anxious to explain the reasons which influenced him in giving his vote against the second reading of the Bill, which he looked upon as an extremely pusillanimous expedient at the very commencement of hostilities; but if it were true that the Bill was necessary, what a picture did it give of the condition to which the country was reduced by the way in which the war had been administered. He could conceive no severer censure on the conduct of the war than to say that a war in which every heart and every hand in the country was engaged—a war supported with the utmost enthusiasm—to say that, in spite of that enthusiasm, in spite of a just cause, in spite of the support of the armies of a great nation, in spite of the boundless confidence of the House of Commons, the country was so reduced that 10,000 Germans could alone stand between us and destruction. Where were they to come from? If it had been proposed to enrol a Hungarian legion instead of making that miserable treaty with Austria, about which he took the same view with the noble Lord the President of the Council, that it was not worth the paper on which it was written, he could have understood it. If we had taken a bold and manly line, and had intended to enlist a Polish Legion, he should not have opposed it; for we might have said to them, as Marshal Schomberg said to the French Huguenots at the battle of the Boyne, when opposed to the soldiers of Louis XIV., "Gentlemen, there are your persecutors before you." But when they were told—when we proposed to enlist German soldiers—that the interests of the German States were identical with our own, they must know that that was a mere pretext of debate. The only thing which could induce them to join us was the hope of the pay which they were to receive from this country; and, instead of hiring those mercenaries to shed their blood, would it not have been better to have availed ourselves of the willing services of the injured and oppressed nations which would have joined heart and hand in the cause? The Dutch Guards of William the Third had been disbanded by a vote of that House, although those troops had fought side by side with us in the great war which was terminated for a short time by the peace of Ryswick. The hon. Member might say the gallant Member for Hull had attempted to throw some ridicule upon the objections which had been taken to the present measure upon constitutional grounds. Now, he did not say that in a case of urgent necessity such a measure might not be desirable; but he agreed with the opinion of Mr. Grey, referred to by the hon. Baronet opposite, that it was only desirable in cases of extreme necessity; and unless such necessity could be shown to exist, no constitutional statesman would, in his opinion, be justified in bringing forward a measure to bring foreigners into this country to be drilled and trained, who did not possess one sympathy towards, or one feeling in common with the people among whom they would be placed. It was no doubt true that 10,000 foreigners could not overthrow the constitution of the country; but was the precedent which would be established to be entirely disregarded? What abuse had ever exhibited itself at first in all its deformity? All precedents, which had ended dangerously, had, when established, appeared to be of slight importance; and, although this measure might be at present only a scratch on the political system of the country, that scratch might end in fester. It would not be safe to abandon constitutional principles, and allow a Bill like the present to pass into a law as a matter of course, and until the necessity was made out he did not think the House of Commons would abandon that constitutional jealousy which always characterised it. There was another point which he thought was worthy of the consideration of the House. No reason had been assigned why German recruits should be better drilled than English recruits. Why should not this country be as capable as Germany of producing well-trained soldiers? The population was abundant, and there had been no hesitation in coming forward; and, to recruit foreigners when there was no real necessity, would be to return to an old system, which had, he believed, brought discredit on the country—the system under which Hessians were sent to support the cause of this country in America. It was vain to imagine that German Princes would allow their subjects to enlist without its being made a source of profit to themselves; and, if that were the case, they would be selling the lives of the subjects that they were bound to protect, and this country would be taking part in an action so scandalous. It was impossible to describe the deep scorn and loathing which this system had excited in Germany—every one acquainted with German literature knew the eloquent passages in which great writers had held it up to the contempt and abhorrence of mankind. In the very last volume of Marten's *History of France*, a most excellent and instructive work, a letter is cited from a German Prince to the commander of his mercenaries, begging him not, from a false humanity, to prolong the lives of those who were wounded, and to recollect that every death was so much clear gain to his Sovereign. If this was the system which we were about to revive, a system which made the army what Johnson had described London—

"The needy villain's common home"—

for what could be baser than the trade of a mercenary soldier, without one feeling that could embellish his calling, or "make ambition virtue?" There was no real difficulty in obtaining recruits in this country, and as many could be obtained as were required if the service were made more eligible. The English soldier shared the sentiment expressed by a great Grecian warrior of old, who said, "Let me fight in the light;" and, if the cold shade which prevented him from aspiring to the highest honours of his profession were removed, the ranks would soon be filled without the mercenary zeal of Germans, and the ancient vital principle which had been efficacious in every other Government, and had made England what it was, should be applied to the army. He had spoken with regret, as he was aware that what he had said might seem intended to harass those whose good opinion he did not affect to undervalue; but he had spoken in the sincerity of his heart against a measure which its advocates admitted to be an evil, and which he considered degradation.

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT: Sir, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Manchester (Mr. Milner Gibson) in the speech we have this evening heard, has complained that Her Majesty's Government, in the speech of the noble Lord the President of the Council, acting as the mouthpiece of the Government, have assumed a tone which is not justifiable, inasmuch as he had, by a threat of resignation, endeavoured to influence the decision of Members of this House in a manner contrary to their own opinions and convictions. Sir, I am one of those who hold at its highest value the right of individual Members of this House to hold their own opinions. I consider that every Member of this House has a perfect right to act in each case on his own opinion of its merits, in whatever way he may choose, without any regard to ulterior consequences; and I have that confidence in the merits of the measure which we are now bringing forward, that I ask, nay challenge, every Member of this House to give his decision upon it in accordance with his convictions as to the necessity of the case. But, Sir, it is equally true that in this assembly, consisting of men free to take what course they may think fit, there should be no exception to this rule, and, least of all, such an exception as that Her Majesty's Government should be compelled to forego a measure which they consider of vital importance to the public interest, that they should be compelled to abandon that which they feel to be essential towards carrying on the conflict in which we are engaged, or be compelled to do that which they think to be fatal to the public interest, because other Members of this House entertain different opinions and different convictions as to what course it is best to adopt for the public good. Let me attempt to discuss this measure in perfect fairness. I do not wish to tell any Gentleman who differs from the views taken by the Government, that his motives are factious, or that he is acting out of hostility to the Government, or even that his objections are founded upon prejudice or misinterpretation of the measure. I believe that this House—as I believe this country—is willing to its utmost to give effect to proper measures for carrying on the war. I will believe this, and I will make every allowance for all differences of opinion; but I ask you to listen to the arguments which I shall endeavour to lay before you in support of this Bill, and which to my mind appear conclusive—first, as to the danger which it is supposed will threaten the constitution; and secondly, as to the danger which it is supposed will threaten the British army from the intermixture of foreign troops. First, then, I would point out the non-existence of those dangers which are supposed to threaten the constitution of the country, of those dangers which are supposed to threaten the British army by the admittance of any foreign troops into their ranks, and of those dangers which are supposed to threaten our social system if we appeal to foreign aid in the prosecution of a war, which is not simply an English war, but which is pre-eminently a European war. The hon. Baronet who has moved the Amendment made great use of some arguments with respect to the precedents which exist for the enlistment of such troops. I will not delay the House by going at any length into that subject; but the hon. Baronet, in referring to the precedents adduced by the noble Lord the President of the Council, said that the persons in those cases were subjects of countries with whom we were connected by treaties of alliance, and to pay the subjects of those countries with whom we were in alliance was a different thing; and he also said that the quarrel, then, was one affecting German interests, and therefore there was some reason for employing German troops. Now, as far as that question is concerned, I want to know if ever there was a case in which an European quarrel was entered into which could be more a German cause than the cause in which we are now engaged? Take the English interests and the French interests—[Mr. BRIGHT: Hear, hear!] I know what the hon. Member for Manchester means by that cheer; he means to say, why are you going to meddle in a quarrel in which you are not concerned? [Mr. BRIGHT: Let them fight their battles with their own soldiers.] But has England no interest in this quarrel, she being one of the principal members of the European family? Do you mean to lay down the principle that if the law of nations be broken through, that if some crying injustice be committed by a strong State towards a weaker one, nations like England and France, professing to be at the head of civilisation, and who profess to be in some degree the arbitrators of the conduct of other Powers, should abrogate their high functions, should see injustice committed, and should stand idly by while that act of injustice is committed, and allow that Power to make such inroads over Europe, that at last, when their turn comes, and they are themselves subjected to aggression, they will be utterly unable to resist it? I tell you that throughout Germany you have sympathy with you in the war; and is this sympathy of Germany to pass away and bear no fruit whatever? The right hon. Gentleman says, we have no instance of raising an army in countries not in strict alliance with us. "We went to Hanover, for Hanover was then like Hampshire. You went to Prussia, because Prussia was in alliance with you." These, however, are not all the precedents. In the year 1813 an Act of Parliament was passed which appears to me not to be so chary of alliances. You, who think that no precedent exists for asking for power to enlist foreigners who are not subjects of a State with which we were in alliance, what do you say to an Act which was passed in 1813 to enable His Majesty to augment the 60th Regiment to ten battalions by the enlistment of foreigners? Under that Act the 8th, 9th, and 10th battalions were added to the 60th Regiment, and they were commanded by foreign officers, to whom letters of service were issued, telling them to try to obtain recruits in Hanover, in Prussia, or in Russia, but, if they could not obtain a sufficient number, to obtain them wherever they could. If, therefore, you want a precedent, you have a precedent. For my own part, I think that in civil affairs precedents are of value; but I confess that I think that, in time of war, in the consideration of a question affecting the public good, we ought not to stand on mere questions of precedent, but we should do what is far better—exercise our own common sense, and if we see the means of getting assistance—if we see the means of obtaining ready-trained troops—in God's name let us do it, and not talk about precedents. The hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Watson) has asked what advantage is there in taking foreign instead of English recruits, and I will tell him the advantage. The English recruit makes the best soldier in the world; such is my thorough conviction, and late experience has shown how much more readily a recruit can be converted into a soldier than was formely supposed. It was formerly supposed that it took about six months to drill and train an English recruit, but recent experience has shown that it may be done in three months. [*Loud cheers from the Opposition.*] Hon. Gentlemen opposite cheer, but I repeat the statement—that you can make an English recruit in three months; but the real question is, can you convert a boy into a man in three months? I would refer those persons who have studied this subject, and every one ought to do so before expressing an opinion, to a letter written by the greatest military commander that, in my opinion, the world has ever seen; I mean Napoleon. In that letter, written by that great master of organisation, writing for reinforcements, he said, "Pick me out from the soldiers the older men; do not send me boys, who consume my rations, impede my marches, and incumber my hospitals." I think that we have had experience of this. I think that I shall be fairly stating the facts of the case, if I admit that we have committed an error in the reinforcements we have sent out. The House will see that in operations of this description errors will always be committed; after a long peace, our armies suddenly require to be rapidly recruited. The great difficulty to be overcome is the general age of those who enlist. The great mass of them are, comparatively speaking, boys. The lowest age for entering the service is fixed at eighteen, and not only do not the great majority exceed that age, but many even assert themselves to be eighteen years of age, when, in fact, they are considerably younger. It is no doubt true that in the higher and middle classes, young men of the age of eighteen, who have been well fed and well cared for, are more advanced in strength than raw lads taken from the plough who have been poorly fed, and perhaps not eaten meat above once or twice a week; but it is from the latter class that recruits are taken; and how can they be expected to stand the fatigues of a campaign? Recruits have, no doubt, on the defensive, behaved in the most creditable manner, and, well fed and well lodged, so long as he is kept in the same position, the recruit will be as good a soldier as any one else. But when you send out lads of this age, whose constitutions are not fixed and settled, you find that, under the constant exposure to the weather, your reinforcements, man by man, melt away, your rations are consumed, your marches impeded, and your hospitals incumbered. Then you recognise the truth which the Emperor Napoleon uttered, who well knew what he was talking about? I have stated without reserve the difficulty under which we labour. It is asked, what is the magic by which the German is excepted from these conditions? I think I can easily explain that matter. In Germany all the peasantry are subject to military conscription or military service in some shape or other. Military service expires, generally speaking—I am not alluding to any State in particular—but in most German States military service expires when the peasant has approached the age of twenty-six or twenty-seven. The German Governments will not give the peasant permission to emigrate until he has completed the period of his military service, and he, therefore, cannot leave the country until he is twenty-six or twenty-seven years of age. Every year there pass through England German emigrants to the United States, to Canada, and to Australia, to the number of 30,000 souls, who proceed generally to Liverpool for embarkation. Throughout Germany, there is at times great social distress; provisions are high; and there exists in those countries, as we know there exists in Ireland, an intense desire to emigrate to another hemisphere. The amount of emigration to the English colonies is very great; and it would be greater but for this reason—that as the emigrants are for the most part persons of little property and with small funds at their disposal, they are obliged to take that voyage which costs the least. The great mass of the emigrants, therefore, goes to Canada and the United States, the latter, being the larger of the two, naturally absorbing the larger portion; but if these persons had the means, I have no doubt, judging from the course taken by those Germans who possess the necessary funds, that a large proportion of them would give the preference to Australia instead of to the United States. Then, again, recollect that the German Government gives to these peasants a passport, a permission to emigrate, so soon as they have completed their term of military service. That permission is, in addition, an act of denaturalisation. In this country we have no process of denaturalisation, and the English citizen does not become denaturalised by foreign residence—he cannot get rid of his nationality. That, however, is not the case in Germany. A German can, and does get rid of his nationality. Well, but it has been said that the Government does not know where they will get these German soldiers, or how many they can get; and never was anything more truly said. ["Hear hear!"] Well, I am glad we are agreed upon that matter. At last we have come to a point upon which we are agreed. I think the Government must be endowed with wonderful powers of prophecy if they can tell how a measure will work with regard to which they have to procure the sanction of Parliament before they could even broach the subject in any quarter, and which they were not justified in putting in any shape before the persons who might by possibility accept their offer. It is obvious, therefore, that the Government cannot pretend to say how many men they can raise, or where they are to come from. We may have reasons for thinking what may possibly be the result, from statements made to us by those accustomed to deal with the German peasantry and who know their wishes; but we cannot pretend now to say in what numbers or whence they will present themselves. I say this frankly, because it would be absurd for the Government to declare that they could raise 20,000 or 30,000, or any other number. The number, indeed, is left very much to the option of the hon. Gentlemen opposite. The hon. Baronet, in his speech to-night, took the case both ways. First he spoke of our raising in this way some 8,000 or 10,000 men—a force so insignificant as not to be worth the trouble of going out of our way to procure; but afterwards, when it was his object to conjure up the most fatal results from this measure, the number was magnified to 30,000 or 40,000, and the hon. Baronet said that the worst of the measure was that there was no limit to the numbers. Well, there is no limit in one sense, but there is a Parliamentary limit to it. I apprehend that year by year the Estimates must be submitted to Parliament, and that these Estimates must contain a maximum number which the Government will have no power to exceed. Therefore, there is a Parliamentary limit, which is in your own hands; but there is no other limit, except the willingness of the people to come forward and accept our offer, upon which depends the whole success of the measure. What we say, therefore, is, "Give us the means to try this plan, which we believe to be of the utmost value for the efficiency of our military forces." I repeat frankly what I said the other day, and my words have been quite correctly quoted upon the point. We do get recruits faster than we can make them into soldiers. I hope we shall continue to do so. But this I know, that if we had the means at our hands to enable us to spare these men until they are fitted for service, we should then make of them soldiers who, not only if they had the good fortune to meet the enemy within the first few days of their being sent out, would fight and conquer as at Alma and at Inkerman, but we should make of them men who would stand the fatigues of the campaign; who would be able, besides fighting the first battle, to undergo all the fatigues and privations which intervene before they can meet the enemy in a second encounter. Recollect, that even when you have made a man able to conquer in battle, you have not made him a soldier. Battles are, after all, of rare occurrence. What you have to do is to overcome the difficulties which you meet with in order to enable you to fight battles. Well, then, I say, that if any Government, knowing the nature of the British troops, knowing their extreme youth, knowing the probability—nay the certainty—to which they are exposed of being before long laid up by fever and dysentery in consequence of their inability to stand the fatigues and changes of climate to which they are exposed—if any Government, knowing these difficulties, yielded to what may be general prejudice, and, endeavouring to catch a vote of the House of Commons, should neglect the means of providing another and an auxiliary force, whose services would give these men of ours time to recruit and strengthen themselves, and in the meantime have the services of this seasoned and acclimatised force—I say, any Government who, knowing those things, neglected to secure such a force, must be considered as deeply culpable. Well, now, I ask, will it degrade the British army to send out to them these foreigners to combine with them in any operations which our service requires? I can imagine the feeling that might be entertained towards a man who places his sword at the service of any country who will bid the highest for him, and who is equally willing to fight for England or for Russia. But I wish the hon. and learned Gentleman would make himself the recruiting agent of the Emperor of Russia for a few days and would carry about to Germany offers of service in the army of the Czar. Do you think that the men of Germany would flock to such a standard? Do you think their feelings are swayed entirely by pecuniary motives? No, they would not come to those who pay the most. They have sympathies as well as other people; and if you talk about the ardour of our own countrymen in this war—and justly talk about it—are you going to deny to the inhabitants of all other countries a share in those honest feelings of indignation against the encroachments of Russia? Are you going to assert for Englishmen a monopoly of public virtue? Would our army be degraded, then, by the companionship of such men, having their sympathies in favour of liberty as well as ourselves? Did the British army feel degraded in former times by the companionship of such men in arms? We have heard much of that German Legion, which shared the glorious deeds of our army in the last war. You say that their companionship was not degrading to our soldiers, because you say that the State from which you took them was in alliance with England. Do you suppose that the privates in our ranks took much pains to enter into an examination of the question, whether such an alliance existed? Do you suppose that Sir Colin Halkett, now in honourable retirement at Chelsea, felt degraded when he was identified with these men, who, under the greatest difficulties and in the face of the greatest dangers, rendered such service to the cause of this country and were of such assistance to our arms? I need not allude to the services of the German Legion in the last war, but will just remind the House that it was not composed entirely of Hanoverians. But it is said, that since 1804 there has been a great advance in knowledge and in civilisation, and that the precedent afforded at that period cannot be accepted now. Well, I confess that I think it is a great humiliation, that after all our boasted progress since then, the identical arguments brought forward then are now reproduced, and not one single step in advance has been made. Look at all the alarm which found expression then and now as to danger to the constitution. There was another cry raised at that time—a cry that the Church was in danger from this measure. We certainly do not hear that cry now; but then the hon. Baronet (Sir E. B. Lytton) always comes back to this argument, that we were then in alliance with those German States from whom we derived our men. Well, what can be said of the Sicilian Regiment, of the Corsican Rangers, of the Greek Light Infantry, which we had then in our service? Why ours was the most motley army that ever was seen, composed of the subjects of almost every nation; and our fleets were the same. Was there any degradation to our soldiers then in fighting by the side of these troops, and will there be any now? But it has been said, "Why supersede the British soldiers by the employment of foreigners?" Well, if you show me where there is to be found an army of British soldiers consisting of seasoned men whom you may safely send to foreign countries to encounter there the dangers and privations which inevitably await them, that will be something in aid of your argument. But you do not attempt to show anything of the kind. You content yourselves with employing epigrammatical sentences about the inexpediency of superseding British soldiers; you assume—I wish you could assume with truth—that British soldiers of confirmed stamina and established constitution are at once forthcoming, and that the German forces whom we wish to employ are without these qualifications. I hope, however, I have satisfactorily shown you that in this respect you are in error. With regard to the English recruit, I have endeavoured to show you that the difficulty is not to convert him into a soldier, but into a man, while the German soldier is not a boy, but both a soldier and a man ready to your hand. There is no doubt that, enlisting at the rate we do, you may in two or three years raise a very large army. I say you may get up this army in the course of some four or five years; but if you do so, you must stand upon the defensive for four or five years; but we want to operate immediately. Are you prepared to wait for three or four years until these boys become men? No. Well, then, we want you to do now that which you will put off until too late, if you do not adopt some such measure as this. That is what we ask you to do by this Bill. I do not pretend to state how many men will gather round your standard if you adopt this measure; but this I say, that you will be highly culpable if you neglect the opportunity of getting every man you can. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Milner Gibson) says you have no cause to do this, because you have for an ally one of the most powerful military nations in Europe, and that therefore you need not make any great effort to secure men to be produced at the shortest notice, and may leave our battles to be fought by France. Well, France is a very powerful military nation. It is not the most powerful military nation in Europe in point of numbers, because that State with which we are at war is, as far as numbers can make it, the most powerful in Christendom. But still I take France to be the most powerful military nation in Europe, taking into consideration not numbers only, but likewise the quality, the skill, the genius, the military aptitude of a people who seem to become soldiers almost by intuition. The French can muster a nominal force of 400,000 bayonets. Do they think foreign legions are quite unnecessary things? Do they think they are making an acknowledgment of weakness if they say that a foreign legion would be of great advantage to them? Why, from the earliest times they have been in the habit of employing foreign troops—and in the days of Turenne and Condé, the French had an Irish, a Scotch, a Swiss corps, and at this day they have in their service a legion composed entirely of foreigners. This great nation, therefore, whose strength, according to the right hon. Gentleman, is so great that it dispenses us from the necessity of all effort—this nation herself maintains in her pay a foreign legion as an auxiliary to her own French troops. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the march of civilisation, and said, that we are going back to 1804, to the Middle Ages, and are reverting from that state of civilisation which has distinguished the present century. Now, I confess that my views of the march of civilisation, and of the progress which has been made in the present century, are not compatible with the system proposed, of neglecting these or any means of effectually carrying out the war against that Power which, by its proceedings, attempts to impede the march of civilisation. But I ask hon. Gentlemen who have difficulties about this subject which their forefathers never had—who seem to think that we are superseding English troops—who have this firm conviction that you can raise any number of recruits in a moment in this country, and can make them men in a moment—I ask these hon. Gentlemen, assenting for a minute to these propositions as laid down by them, to answer this question—What is the number of English troops, be they 150,000, be they 170,000 (which was the number we took last year), be they 200,000 or more, which would not be the stronger and the better for the addition of 30,000, 20,000, or even 10,000 foreign troops? Success in war, after all, is, to a great degree, after skill and material is considered, a question of numbers. It has been irreverently said that Providence is always on the side of the strongest battalions. If, therefore, you wish for success in this war, you must not neglect any means at your disposal for swelling your battalions, and bringing them against the foe. I do not care what the operation was, but never since the world begun did a general ever say his troops were too many. It is said that the Turks are at our disposal. I know they are, and the Turks are troops who fight extremely well under certain circumstances. The Turks fought very gallantly at Silistria. And here I wish those hon. Gentlemen who think that the use of mere mercenaries is so discreditable, and that we ought not to employ men who go with us from perfect sympathy with our cause and a thorough conviction that it is just—I wish those hon. Gentlemen would consider how many Germans—German mercenaries—have aided the Turks in their struggle. Who was it that organised the Turkish artillery at Silistria? A Prussian officer named Gratz. Who superintended the organisation of the whole Turkish artillery force? Again, a Prussian officer. What has become of them? Have the neutral Governments of Germany recalled these and other officers in the employ of the Turks? Not at all. They remain in Turkish pay with the full permission of their Governments. Who is Omar Pacha himself? Omar Pacha is, I believe, a man of Austrian extraction, but is certainly not a Turk. Those are a few instances. I could mention similar ones in the Russian army. Thus General Schilders, an engineer officer of great distinction, who was killed before Silistria, was by birth a German, and his brother, a small artificer, is, I believe, still living in his native place in Germany. The Russian army is full of officers of this description. These instances I mention to show that you are not introducing for the first time, or newly reviving now, a system which existed in 1804 and the Middle Ages, but that the system is one which exists at this very moment, and has been already adopted by other nations in the very war in which you are now engaged. But I was remarking upon the behaviour of the Turks in action. They certainly behaved admirably at Silistria, and it is said the Turkish army always fights well behind stone walls. What is the meaning of that phrase? It seems to be only a milder and more courteous way of saying that they will not fight except behind stone walls. If, therefore, you want to strengthen your army by auxiliaries, it is evident you must take care that you strengthen it with men upon whose firmness and gallantry you can, under all circumstances, depend. Now, I have a thorough confidence in the firmness and gallantry of German troops, and I must say I regretted to hear them spoken of by the hon. Baronet opposite (Sir E. B. Lytton) as the scum of Europe, or some expression of that kind. Now, these are not terms which ought to be used in this House with regard to a nation who are manifesting the strongest sympathy with us, and to whose assistance we must ultimately look. Depend upon it, that, whether with or without the assistance of their Governments, this great European quarrel cannot be ended without the intervention of the German people. I say, then, we must be careful, in discussing the merits of a measure upon which unhappily, much of prejudice seems to have been excited, how we use language and express opinions which may serve to prevent other nations from coming to our assistance. This is an European quarrel, and those who talk about this not being a German question must forget that the Danube is a German river—must forget that Germany is in such close proximity to Russia that her liberties must be endangered by any encroachment of that Power. We may have taken the most generous course—we may have been first in the field, but, depend upon it, their cause is one which must ultimately force them into the field too; and it is not for us, by any language used within this House, to disparage them. I have now endeavoured to show the House why we want this Bill; I have endeavoured to show that, although we can get men, we cannot produce a sufficient number in an effective state for some time to come; I have endeavoured to show, that the assistance of these ready-made soldiers would be invaluable—invaluable to us even when we have got men of our own. Let the House vote on this question upon its merits. I am not afraid of its decision. I quite agree with the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Milner Gibson) that each Member of Parliament has a right to vote upon the measure according to his own impression of its merits. All I claim for the Government is this—that if you intrust us with the duties of carrying on this war, you will not censure us if we use our best efforts to do so effectually—that you will not say to us, "Even if we refuse our assent to the measure you propose, we chain you to the oar; we do not care what your opinion may be as to what is required; we are the best and the only judges of that; and it is for you to follow our behests with obedience." That is an arrangement to which no Government can consent. It is a position which, if any Government accepted it, would rightly entail the forfeiture of public confidence in that Government. We think this Bill is necessary. If passed, it may fail in its object; but, if it does fail, we cannot reproach ourselves, and you cannot reproach us, with having neglected means which might have been applied to attain the object in view. On the other hand, if it succeeds, this measure will be of incalculable assistance to us; and, believing that, we urge it upon the acceptance of the House as a measure which is necessary to the public interest.

Lord STANLEY: Sir, I am generally unwilling to address the House, and to-night I should be glad to leave the question under our consideration in the hands of the hon. Baronet near me, whose speech was at once worthy of his literary eminence, and of the cause which he undertook to advocate. I came up to attend this meeting of Parliament, as I believe almost every Gentleman upon this side of the House did, with the sincere hope that we should separate for the Christmas holidays without once having to walk into the division-lobby, without the occurrence of any circumstance which could tend to disturb the unanimity which at the present moment it is so desirable should prevail. No man who has the interest of the country at heart, or who possesses one particle of public spirit, can desire, at a period of great public emergency such as this, to throw any impediment in the way of the Government. Such a course would be the reverse of patriotic, and, looking at it in a lower point of view, would even be the reverse of prudent. It is obvious that, whoever, in such a crisis, finds fault with any measure of a military character, whether offensive or defensive, which Her Majesty's Ministers may propose, does not merely expose himself to the customary and inevitable attacks of those who are the supporters of Government, but, what is of infinitely more importance, runs no slight risk of being misapprehended and misunderstood by the public at large. There is, therefore, good reason why we should enter into this discussion with every feeling of reluctance and of regret. For myself, at all events, I may say that there is scarcely any measure connected with the conduct of the war, except that under our notice, which I should not have been most willing to allow to pass in silence. Measures might have been brought forward by Her Majesty's Government which I and those with whom I act might not have thought judicious — which we might not have thought the best calculated to secure the objects for which they had been framed; but under ordinary circumstances we should have been willing to content ourselves with protesting against such measures, with fixing the responsibility of their adoption on the Government, and under such protest we might have suffered them to pass without any further opposition. But in this instance it is the act of the Government which precludes that Parliamentary unanimity which we desire. It would seem as if, after all their professions of the necessity of union in the great struggle in which we are now engaged, they wished to secure, not so much an administrative success as a party triumph over their political opponents, by compelling us to what they hope may prove an unsuccessful contest. There is only one hypothesis on which I can explain the policy which Her Majesty's Ministers here have thought proper to pursue. They have been taunted with weakness, and they are resolved to show that they have such a superabundance of strength as to be able to afford to provoke the universal opposition and hostility of the whole kingdom. They have been accused of implicitly following the dictation of the press, and they refute the charge by bringing forward a measure which, among the multitude of military projects discussed in the course of this year, has never, I believe, been suggested in any quarter—a measure of which, we must all confess, that the originality is beyond dispute. But what are the circumstances under which this Bill is brought before us? It is certainly somewhat singular that, summoned as we were to consider measures connected with the war, and summoned as we were for that purpose only, we did not receive in the Speech from the Throne the slightest intimation of an intention on the part of the Government to bring forward such a proposition as this. Yet that Speech was not filled with allusions to a variety of topics; to one subject, and to one subject alone, did it contain any reference; and Her Majesty's Ministers have introduced two Bills only for our consideration before we separate for the Christmas recess. One of these measures, which has already been discussed and assented to by this House, was alluded to in the Speech from the Throne; the other, and not the less important, was passed over in absolute silence—or, at the utmost, with an incidental allusion. When one recollects the by no means insignificant character of the measure, and the mode in which it has been brought under the notice of Parliament—considering also that there has been no sudden emergency, and that the Bill is one which the country were by no means likely to deem unimportant—one is tempted to entertain a suspicion—just or unjust—founded or unfounded—that your object was to smuggle the Bill hastily through the Legislature before the country at large could have had time to take it into consideration, and so to extort from Parliament in a moment—I will not say of panic, but in a moment of exigency—a sanction to its provisions, which the deliberate judgment of the nation would have refused. But what is the reasoning by which this measure is defended? I listened to the noble Lord who introduced it to the consideration of the House, with that respectful attention which he is always sure to command, and I certainly thought—and I was not, I believe, the only person who thought—that he argued like one who was performing a distasteful duty. But what are the grounds on which this Bill is defended? Is it that you have not men enough in this country to supply the necessary reinforcements to our army?—is it that their services cannot be obtained without considerable delay?—is it that men cannot be obtained of an age which would fit them to encounter the toils and hardships of a campaign?—or is it that, all these considerations apart, you consider the measure necessary on some general grounds of policy? The noble Lord says that there is now a pressure on this country, and that that pressure is always felt by us at the commencement of a war. I have no doubt that such a pressure must exist whenever, in the midst of profound peace, a nation is called upon without warning to engage in a great war. But what was your case? Had you no warning? For upwards of a year—I will not say before any hostilities broke out—but for upwards of a year before any hostilities broke out in which England was engaged, was it not—I will not say certain—but was it not more than probable that the English army would have to enter the field? And if that were the case—if you were not taken by surprise—if the severe pressure of which we hear so much ought to have been mitigated by more than a year allowed for preparation, and if of that time for preparation you did not adequately avail yourselves—there are but two possible explanations of your policy—either—which I believe to be the case—either the Government voluntarily neglected to employ the resources which the public placed, or were ready to place, at their disposal; or else (that which no one asserts—that which no one contends for) there was a deficiency of zeal on the part of the country. Has there been the slightest backwardness manifested by the public to prosecute the war with vigour—has there been the slightest indication of a want of enthusiasm on their parts? I think that to that question there will be no difficulty in finding at once a most sufficient and satisfactory answer. We were all aware—what I never for a moment doubted to be the case—that there was in this country a vast amount of latent public spirit ready to be called forth whenever the emergency of the moment might require it; but I confess I did not anticipate the general—the more than general—the universal—enthusiasm with which this war has been taken up by every class of the British nation. When we read such stories as that which I saw only the other day in the newspapers—when we read of poor labouring men coming forward and contributing the carefully-hoarded savings of years to the Patriotic Fund—when we know, as I know of my own personal knowledge, that operatives in Lancashire—a portion of our people certainly not the most disposed to warlike pursuits, not boys, but men earning 25*s.* or 30*s.* a week in the manufacturing towns of that county—have left their homes to share in the ill-requited perils and fatigues of a soldier's life in the Crimea—I think we have sufficient evidence—if evidence were wanted—that the country is willing and ready to devote its best energies to the successful prosecution of this momentous contest. And if we wish for documentary testimony upon the subject, we have only to look at the statement made by the noble Duke the Secretary of War in another place. According to that statement, as soon as it appeared evident that the siege of Sebastopol was likely to be protracted, and that the undertaking was likely to be one of greater hazard than had at first been supposed—from that moment the zeal and readiness of the young men of this country had been manifested more and more—the number of our recruits had gone on increasing week by week until the last week, when it had more than doubled that of any preceding week since the commencement of the war, and when we had enrolled six or seven fold the number of men we had enrolled six or seven weeks ago. That is the evidence we have with regard to the state of public feeling upon this subject. I say, that, looking at these facts, you need not fear but that you will be able, in the long run, to obtain in this country ample supplies of men for your armies. The noble Lord spoke of the drain on the population caused by the war—a drain on a population of 28,000,000 to keep up an army of 200,000 men! I believe there are not at this moment in the United Kingdom less than 6,000,000 or 7,000,000 of male adults—that is to say, of men above 21 years of age. But will it be said that, large as that number is, you are withdrawing men from other occupations in which they might be more advantageously employed. Well, I meet that argument by a reference to a simple and notorious fact which the noble Lord—not accidentally, I think—overlooked. I meet it by a reference to the Reports of the Emigration Commissioners. You tell me of German emigrants—I tell you of English emigrants. It is argued that there are many thousands of able-bodied persons passing through this country every year whom it is desirable that we should employ in prosecuting the war; but I say, on the other hand, that this very year, and up to this very time, you have had not thousands, but hundreds of thousand of able-bodied Englishmen and Irishmen emigrating from our shores. I deny, then, that we have any insufficiency of men, or that by recruiting among our own labouring population you would necessarily be diverting to military pursuits men who would otherwise be more advantageously employed. But then it is said, that although we do not want a sufficient number of men, it is impossible for us to render the services of recruits raised in this country available by the time they would be required. Now, upon that subject there is, I think, a little discrepancy in the various statements we have heard from the supporters of this measure. We first heard from an hon. and gallant Member opposite a good deal about the time necessary to make a soldier. But the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War set aside that argument, and told us that it was an antiquated superstition to suppose that one year or two years were required to make a soldier; according to the right hon. Gentleman three or four months are sufficient for that purpose. We have here a high authority upon such a point. But that authority does not stand alone. Two years ago our militia were embodied, and before the regiments were embodied they were drilled for twenty-eight days; and at the expiration of that period of drilling a military instructor, who went about to examine and report on the state of the militia regiments, complimented them on being almost equal in efficiency to troops of the line. Here we must, no doubt, make some allowance for the language of compliment; but even allowing largely for such complimentary exaggeration, it is impossible not to suppose that the men so praised must have acquired a considerable amount of military discipline. But I am informed, on good authority, that if you bring your soldiers from abroad you will not save as much time as you seem to anticipate. I pass over that question of the enlistment of intending emigrants passing through this country, because, after all, the depth of winter is not the precise time which emigrants choose to cross the Atlantic with their families. I am much mistaken if, at this particular period, we have among us any very large number of foreigners who propose to emigrate to some more distant land. I assume, then, that you will have to send over to the Continent for the foreigners whom you propose to employ in Her Majesty's service. You will have to recruit these men; you will have to bring them here, and large bodies are not to be so brought in a day; and even when all that shall have been done, it is evident that the Government do not rely on securing the services of trained soldiers, because they insist on having a further period—a period unlimited in point of time—during which they are to drill and train those men in this country. The question then arises, whether the rawness of the English labourer, unfamiliarised as he has been with the use of arms, will be productive of more delay in preparing him for foreign service than the delay which you must incur in the case of a foreigner, who must be enlisted in his own country, who must be brought over from Germany, and who, after having been brought here, must undergo a certain amount of drilling and training. That brings me to the next argument employed by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War, when he said that the question was not so much as to the number of men whom you could obtain, or the length of time that would be required for preparing them to take the field, as the amount of hardihood which they might possess for enduring the fatigues and hardships of a campaign. Now, I speak with diffidence on military matters; but it does not seem a very recondite solution of the problem thus put before us, if your rules for enlisting are such that you cannot take men beyond a certain age—it does not seem a very recondite solution of the problem that you should for the moment relax those rules. Why should you not admit men into your army of somewhat more advanced age?—why should you not admit men who, I quite agree with the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War, will gain in point of endurance more than they can lose in point of activity? Relax your rule, and the difficulty of which you now complain will disappear—the number of men eligible for service in the army will be materially increased, and the difficulty on the score of insufficiency of age will be in a great measure removed. There is another statement of the right hon. Gentleman which I venture to dispute, although I must dispute it with some distrust in my own knowledge. He spoke of the *Landwehr* system, with which we are all acquainted; and I understood him to state, that the foreigners whom the Government proposed to employ were men, who, having gone through the term of service, exacted from them by their own Government, are no longer liable to be called into the field, but are henceforth exempt from ordinary service, and only liable to be called upon to act as a reserve in case of invasion or on some such special exigency; that is to say, you are to select as recruits, expressly on the ground of superior eligibility, the very class whom their own Government reject—not absolutely, but as less fitted than younger men for military service—not as unfit for service—I do not wish to indulge in any exaggeration—but as being past that age at which men are considered to make the most efficient soldiers. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the age of those men as being about 26 or 27; but I can state on high authority—I may say on high diplomatic authority—that instead of 26 or 27, the average age of those men is about 33 or 34, or very nearly the age at which the English soldier retires from active service. It has been carefully impressed on us that this was merely a provisional measure, intended to guard against a temporary emergency. But if you want to meet such an emergency, I think you have resources at home of which you have not yet availed yourself. I do not admire the system of subsidies. I can very well understand that it would be very unpleasant—that it would be injurious to our national honour—to be permanently subsidising the troops of France to fight our battle; but if this is really a question of 10,000 men for a few months, I ask what possible objection can you have to call for that number of troops from the French Government, which, by your own admission, will be perfectly ready to grant them? It may, perhaps, be urged that the French Government is not able to spare that number of men, or would refuse to send them; but the noble Lord himself said that the only difficulty which the Allies experienced was the difficulty of conveying men out to the seat of war. If that is the case, however, I would ask whether it would be less difficult to send out Germans than to send out

Frenchmen? And I would further ask Her Majesty's Government why they had not long since applied to that great Ally who has, with so much cordiality and sincerity, supported us throughout the whole of those proceedings? Why have they not applied to him for temporary assistance in order to meet a temporary emergency? Why have they not addressed to him a demand which would have been granted without the slightest injury to our national honour, and which it would be perfectly easy for them to repay at some future time in one form or another? This question has not been argued as a question of cheapness, for no one asserts that the employment of foreign troops would be more economical than the employment of our own troops. I believe we are all prepared to admit that in a great undertaking, of whatever nature, whether of peace or war, there is never any real economy in employing second-rate materials. After all, the pay which you give to your own soldiers is hardly more than sufficient to supply them with the necessaries of life; and you could not offer a lower sum to foreigners, to whom even that sum could afford no great inducement to enter your service, and whom it would be your interest to place as much as possible on an equality with the troops of this country. Nothing, therefore, can be gained by this measure in the way of pecuniary saving. Then comes the question of the military capacity of the foreigners whom you would enlist in the Queen's service. Upon that point we are still at a loss to arrive at any very definite conclusion, notwithstanding the admissions of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War. Her Majesty's Ministers were asked in another place where the new troops were to come from, and to that question the only answer which they gave was, that the Emperor of Russia would be very much obliged to any one who would furnish him with that information. Well, Sir, that was a reply well calculated to draw a cheer in debate; but, as an answer, it is wholly unsatisfactory. Government may preserve the secrecy of their measure long enough to serve the purposes of this debate; but it cannot last much longer; disguise their proceedings as they may, their purpose will soon transpire through the medium of the recruiting sergeant, and the quarter whence they propose to draw their recruits must be known. The raising of 10,000 troops, and their introduction into England is not a thing that can be done secretly. I speak from conjecture, but, judging from the relations which exist between Continental Governments and their subjects, I must suppose that you are in treaty, not with individuals, but with some foreign Government. In considering that question it is impossible wholly to lose sight of the Polish question; but that question is a very grave one, and I perceive that no Member of Her Majesty's Government has shown any inclination to introduce it into this discussion. I believe that to expect that we could afford any effectual aid to Poland by employing in our service Poles who have for the last twenty years been exiles from their native country, would be one of the wildest dreams that ever entered into the head of man. If you propose to restore the nationality of Poland, that will be, no doubt, a bold policy—a policy full of glory, but, also, full of hazard—a policy in which you cannot expect the sympathy of some of your most powerful allies; but, on the contrary, must be prepared to incur their hostility; above all, it is a policy from which, once adopted, there is no receding, and which involves you in a pledge permanently to guarantee and maintain the independence which you create. These are momentous considerations; and I confess I am glad that the Polish question has not been introduced as an element in this debate. But, after all, if Poland is to be assisted, it must be on the spot—among the people of that country—and not here. I set aside, then, the question of a Polish Legion. But is it Swiss or Germans whom you mean to employ? I am given to understand that in Switzerland you will not at present find any large supply of men prepared to enter your service, for there is at present a considerable demand for labourers in that country; and I believe, besides, that the Swiss Government has of late years passed a law, not prohibiting altogether, but in many ways restricting the enlistment of their people in foreign armies. With respect to Germany I must observe that I do not wish to enter into a discussion of that most invidious topic—the military character of the people of that country. I fully admit the services which were rendered by the German troops during the last continental war; but this I must observe, that forty years have elapsed since the Germans have had any practical experience of war, and that the events of the years 1813, 1814, 1815, can hardly afford a fair trial of their military capacity. Throughout that period they unquestionably displayed great national enthusiasm in the prosecution of the war which they waged against the Emperor Napoleon; but in that war they had to fight, for the most part, against raw levies (for the French veterans, the men of Austerlitz and Jena, had mostly perished in the Russian campaign): they were fighting, moreover, in a national cause, for the defence of their country against invasion; and besides all this, they possessed in general an immense superiority in numbers over the enemy. And yet, notwithstanding these advantages, they were not uniformly, or even generally successful; and nothing can be more striking than the contrast afforded by their chequered fortunes and the splendid career of the Duke of Wellington throughout the same period at the head of the English and Spanish army. I do not disparage these German soldiers; I have no means of judging of their value; all I say is, that you cannot answer for their conduct in the field with the same certainty as you rely on the troops of our own allied armies. But another question arises, what will be the moral effect of this measure on the public opinion of Europe? The noble Lord at the beginning of the debate said, no doubt it would be a lamentable thing if we depended wholly on foreign mercenary troops; but he added that so small a proportion as 40,000 foreign soldiers in an army of 200,000 could not be attended with any very injurious consequences. The best way to judge what will be said of us, is to consider what we ourselves should say if our opponent were to resort to a similar procedure. Put the case in this form. Ask yourselves, what effect would it have on the public mind here? What would be the feeling of Englishmen if they were to hear that the Emperor of Russia was advertising for soldiers in every European city? Why, there would be a shout of triumph from one end of the country to the other. Every newspaper would be saying—"Oh! the Emperor is beaten; his cause is unpopular; his own subjects will not fight for him; he is driven to the last resource of a feeble Government and an unwarlike people, that of seeking aid from foreigners." So also, if this measure should pass, will the same language be used by Russia in respect to us. The courage of our troops will not be denied; it will be admitted that they are capable of doing their duty manfully in the field; but it will be argued, that by great care and at great cost we keep a small standing army in a state of high discipline; that that army is small in numbers, and cannot easily be replaced; and that the feelings of the people at large are so unwarlike that in order to carry on with proper energy and effect the war in which we are engaged, we are compelled to call in the aid of foreign mercenaries. That will be the inevitable inference from the enactment of such a measure as that now before the House. But there is still a third ground on which I oppose the Bill. I say that its whole spirit and tenor are contrary to that in which you have hitherto carried on this war. You have put down privateering; you have declared that war ought to be carried on with the least possible injury to commerce or to private rights. It is even possible that you have pushed that principle too far; that relying on the justice of our cause, you have forgotten that something more than a just cause is required to ensure success, and that you have thrown aside a weapon which you might have used with effect. But be that as it may, you have affirmed in the face of Europe, that war is now to be waged on higher and more humane principles than have hitherto prevailed. This is a step in the contrary direction. This is to resort to a practice which for the last 100 years the opinion of European statesmen has not hesitated to condemn. Not only is it an injury to the national reputation—it is an insult to the national army. War may be the noblest of all professions—but practised as a trade, it is the meanest of all trades. The acts and the sufferings of a campaign would deserve all that has ever been said of them by any member of the Peace Society, were they not ennobled by the display of disinterested self-devotion, and by the voluntary sacrifice of life in a good cause. But in employing a hired foreigner who fights only for his pay, you strip war of these ennobling and compensating attributes, and reduce it to a mere butchery. I say, then, that this is a retrograde step; that instead of setting to the world the promised example, you are actually falling below that which at the present day is the recognised standard of public morality among European nations. I grant that an exception may be taken to this argument, and I do not press it beyond a certain point. I allow that the necessity of self-defence is paramount; and in the acknowledged impossibility of carrying on by any other means a war to which the honour of the country stands pledged, I should not quarrel with the employment of mercenary troops. But this impossibility does not exist; it has not even been pleaded; and it is without cause or excuse that you are about to restore a system which Europe had all but abandoned. Then comes the question as to German neutrality. What is proposed by the measure? Will the German States permit us to recruit our army within their territories? Suppose some German Sovereign should be opposed to such a scheme; I doubt very much whether you would, in the dominions of such Sovereign, obtain any large number of men, of whatever class. But suppose you do, under such circumstances, obtain recruits—of what class or condition in society will they be? Either they will be men of such a character that the police of their own country is glad to connive at their departure—or if they do escape from its supervision, they have by that act rendered their own return impossible, having become offenders against the law of the land. In neither case will you have the most steady, the soberest, the best conducted part of the people. I doubt whether a force, composed of such elements, will be formidable to the Emperor, or, indeed, to any one except its own employers. Again, suppose the case of a small State, who may sympathise with us, and who may at the same time be afraid of the power of Russia—what will become of its neutrality? If there is any hazard in incurring the hostility of Russia, why that hostility will be incurred as much by allowing the enlistment of soldiers as by declaring war against Russia. The Czar will declare the permission to enlist to be in itself a breach of neutrality, and in that declaration the law of nations will back him. Mind, when I say that we do not want any Foreign Enlistment Bill—that we can do without it—I am not contending that we ought to refuse the proffered aid of foreign troops. If independent States, thinking and feeling with us in this contest, come forward with voluntary offers of aid, by all means accept them; but let such States pay the cost of maintaining their own troops—let them share with us the expense and the danger, and we will freely admit them to their share of the glory, and of any advantages which success may open to the Allies. But nothing of the kind is proposed in this measure. It is simply a revival of the disgraceful practice of the American war, when German troops were hired to cut the throats of our colonists. No friendship will be formed—no alliance cemented—by such a bargain as is here proposed; and if, as without shame to them may very well happen, the troops thus hired by us should prove inferior to their French and English comrades, the contempt which will be felt for their comparative inefficiency will be added to the contempt with which the profession of a mercenary is regarded. I deny, therefore, that this measure has any tendency to secure us the support, alliance, or friendship of the German Powers. I object to it on many grounds. I object to it because no sufficient necessity has been proved—because its success is doubtful—because it is calculated to injure us in the opinion of Europe—because it is a retrograde step in public morality—and because it will do nothing to secure us alliance or friendship on the Continent. We have heard something like a threat of resignation if this measure is not carried. I have a word to say on that. I do not doubt the noble Lord's sincerity; nor is my Parliamentary experience long: but since I have sat in this House I never recollect any Ministerial measure of importance being threatened with defeat, when that menace has not met with a counter threat either of resignation or of dissolution. Now, I do not think this is a question on which Ministers will appeal to the country; and, as to resignation, we need not go back very far to see that defeats, even on the most important measures, do not necessarily bring about that result. Recall to mind the events of last Session. We had, in the Queen's Speech, a promise of Parliamentary reform, of national education, and I know not how many reforms besides. Not one of these was carried. In every single instance Ministers were unable to redeem their pledge; yet they have not resigned! They can postpone an Education Bill indefinitely—they can sacrifice a Reform Bill—these things are trifles; but if they cannot induce Parliament to sanction the introduction of 10,000 mercenaries, they will hold it inconsistent with their honour to retain power. I repeat it, I have no wish to embarrass Government by the vote I shall give—they are the authors of this war—they are responsible for its conduct—the plan of operations is theirs; on all accounts it is infinitely better that they should be left to work out those plans undisturbed, and that the responsibility of their execution should not be divided. But when the Secretary at War claims the right to resign, if defeated, I must say one word to the right hon. Gentleman on that point. I do not doubt or dispute the right of any man to do that which he thinks needful for the protection of his own honour, but I ask him and the House—is it patriotic—is it a public-spirited course for a Minister to say, "If you assert that we have made a mistake; if you do not admit our infallibility in every respect; if you attempt to interfere with any one, the most insignificant, of our plans, we will take advantage of the urgency of the occasion to embarrass the country by resigning, no matter at what hazard of impeding the course of public business?" I recollect to have heard something of the circumstances under which that party now at the head of affairs first came into independent political existence. The distinguishing principle which they laid down—one maintained by them with great energy and eloquence, and which gained them no little applause, was this, that the national interest, the pressure of a public exigency, not only sanctioned, but justified and required a sacrifice of personal feeling and of consistency on the part of individual statesmen, even approaching to the verge of that which was a sacrifice of public character. I will not now enter into the question, how far that is a safe and admissible doctrine. All I say is, you have laid down this principle—if you are sincere, if you were ever in earnest in its advocacy, now is the time to act upon it. Not much is asked at your hands. No great sacrifice of principle or of policy is demanded. You have made a mistake. Your own organs in the press say so: the supporters who sit behind you on those benches—nay, your very subordinates in the Government, admit as much in private. Persevere, and you will rouse a feeling fatal to your own tenure of power, and at this moment most dangerous to the community. Take a wiser course, abandon your Bill, admit for once that you have been in the wrong, and, in the frankness and honesty of that atonement, England will forget the folly of the design.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: Sir, I confess I was never more disappointed—I may say surprised—than I have been at the course which the party opposite have thought it their duty to pursue in regard to the present measure. We have heard from them the most unreserved, and, I will do them the justice to believe, the most sincere declarations that they admit to the fullest extent, not only the importance of the objects for which the present war was begun, but the justice and necessity of that war. The Government has been reproached by their organs, and, I think, frequently by Members of the party, for not having conducted the war with sufficient energy and vigour—with not having employed all those means which they might have applied for that purpose; and then, Sir, when the Government comes to this House, and asks this House to relieve them from a legal difficulty which prevents the Government from applying means of vigour to which they attach great importance, then, forsooth, we are met with disquisitions on constitutional principles, with the reproduction of antiquated arguments belonging to ages gone by, and we are refused the power of employing an instrument which we think, and with reason and justice think, would be conducive to carrying on the war with vigour and success. Now, Sir, if what we ask were something altogether new and unheard of—if the method we propose for the purpose of adding vigour to the conduct of the war were a method which had never been practised by the Government or nation before—I could understand that objections might be raised by Gentlemen astonished, for the first time, at something which was likely to serve the purposes of their opponents, and that they might then, with some show of plausibility, object as to a novelty to that which we proposed. But, so far from this measure which we are now proposing to Parliament being a novelty, it is a method which has been practised by all former Governments in this country in periods of war, and by almost every other nation that has been engaged in a great and arduous contest. With regard to the conduct of this country, why, it is a matter of public notoriety—if it had not been in the utmost detail explained by my noble Friend (Lord John Russell) and my right hon. Friend (Mr. S. Herbert), who have spoken to-night—that the Government of England, with the consent of Parliament, in the great war in which we were engaged with France, employed a great number and variety of foreign troops as aids and auxiliaries to the British Army. Why, we had the German Legion—we had Hanoverians, and Brunswickers, and Portuguese, and Swiss, and Greeks—we had the Corsican Rangers, a Sicilian Regiment, Chasseurs Britanniques, and I know not how many more fighting on our side. I myself saw men in the British uniform descending the southern slopes of the Alps, on the conclusion of the peace, on their way to their Italian homes, who had served with distinction and credit to themselves, in conjunction with British troops, and whose services had been acknowledged by the Government in whose cause they had fought. The French at this moment have a foreign force in their service. And what was the practice of that great general, Napoleon, who had at his command all the resources of the great French nation devoted to his cause, and ever ready to support and do battle for him in all the wars in which he was engaged with all the powers of the conscription which enabled him to draw from every province of France as many men as he might require? Why, his army was full of foreigners serving side by side with his own French legions; and did those legions ever think they were degraded by that companionship? There is a special reason, however, why England should adopt this system, and especially in the beginning of a war. Foreign Governments differ in their practice from us in two important matters in regard to this subject. In the first place, they maintain large military establishments in time of peace, and they are, therefore, prepared, when war breaks out, with adequate forces to meet the first exigencies of the conflict. In England, on the contrary, Parliament insists at the conclusion of a war, that we should reduce our military forces to the lowest amount consistent with the duties and exigencies of peace. War, therefore, finds us with a peace establishment, and not, like continental countries, with establishments calculated on the chances of war. But then we are told by the noble Lord who has spoken on the other side (Lord Stanley), "You have foreseen this war, and you ought to have been prepared to meet it." But, I ask, while negotiations were going on which might have led to an amicable settlement, would you have had Government come down to Parliament and propose a large augmentation of the Army. What, I ask, would Parliament have said to such a proposal? I say, Sir, that it would not have been wise to have pursued such a course. In another respect, also, foreign Governments stand in a different situation from us. They have the power of conscription. They can issue an edict for any given number of recruits, who must come to their post within a specified period, and those recruits must be of an age and description which their Governments choose to determine. Thus foreign Governments have the power of making large augmentations to their armies within a short period of time. We, on the other hand, wisely, I think, and advantageously, because it makes our army an army of infinitely better stuff than an army formed in a different manner—we, I say, trust to voluntary enlistment. But this advantage must be obtained at a certain sacrifice—a sacrifice of time in order to obtain a better quality. We go into the market of labour to compete against the industry of the country. We have been told just now that we have a population of 26,000,000 or 28,000,000, and that, according to statistical calculations, the males fit and able to bear arms amount to 6,000,000 or 7,000,000, and that, therefore, we can at once send to the Crimea any number of men we may want for the service. The answer to that statement is, that these men, who are of an age fit for military service, are employed in all the various branches of the industry of the country. We have to go into the market and to compete with that industry, and every man taken out of the market raises the price of labour to those that remain, because the demand is virtually increased by the diminution of the supply. Therefore it is obvious that the process of voluntary enlistment, while it furnishes an infinitely better soldier when you get him, must necessarily render more slow and more costly any great and sudden augmentation in the forces of this country, than is the case with the system of Conscription pursued by foreign Governments.

Well, then, I say, the practice of employing foreign troops in conjunction with our own is a practice consecrated, I may say, by the example of all former Governments in this country, and adopted by the Governments of other countries. But we are told that this may be a very good thing, but we should keep it for the end of the war. Now, if ever there was an instance of putting the cart before the horse, this would be one. It is at the beginning of a war, when we start with a peace establishment, and have at the same time to provide for the exigencies of a great and arduous campaign—it is when we are suddenly in want of a large force that this should be done, and not after the lapse of a certain number of years, when we have by voluntary enlistment augmented our ranks, and are able to furnish an army of our own equal to the demands of the service to be performed. It is true, that at a former occasion one of these Acts which have been quoted was passed at a late period of the war, but that was because the war, at that time, assumed a new development, and required a sudden and great augmentation of the means of carrying it on. But it is said that this proposition is only the mountain bringing forth the mouse—that we make a great parade of the measure—and yet, after all, only ask for 10,000 men, and seem willing to take even a smaller number. That is a perfect misrepresentation of the measure. A man need not be deeply read in the constitutional laws of the country to be aware that the Crown requires no authority from Parliament to employ any number of foreigners out of the United Kingdom as troops; the Crown has already the power to do that without the passing of any new law whatever. That which we ask from Parliament is that which by the constitution cannot be done without the sanction of Parliament, namely, the introduction of foreign troops into this kingdom, it is undoubtedly contrary to the law and the constitution to introduce them without the consent of Parliament. Well, but hon. Gentlemen opposite, by a most extraordinary confusion of mind, run to this conclusion, that because it is contrary to the constitution that foreign troops should be introduced into this kingdom without the consent of Parliament, therefore it is unconstitutional that they should be introduced with the consent of Parliament. And thus, according to their argument, this Bill, which is a deference to the constitution, is represented as in itself a violation of the constitution. My right hon. Friend the Secretary at War has shown the great value of the recruits who might be obtained from Germany in consequence of their being trained men, whose constitution would render them more capable of supporting those fatigues and exposures necessarily incidental to the carrying on of a great war. But, then, hon. Gentlemen turn round and say, "If these men are such as you describe, and are trained soldiers, why do you want the power of bringing them into this country to train them—they have been trained already?" That is a very good civilian argument; but military men, like my hon. and gallant Friend who has just spoken (Sir John Fitz Gerald), and my learned and gallant Friend behind me, who combines a knowledge of law and military tactics (Mr. Watson), know full well that, though you may get a great number of trained men, they would still require to be organised—to be formed into regiments—to be made acquainted with their officers—to be clothed, equipped, and armed; and to convert a number of men, however trained they may individually be, into regiments and corps fit for service, is a process requiring time, which must be performed somewhere, and it is a matter of impossibility to perform it anywhere else than in this country. It is, therefore, for the purpose of organising these regiments, to form these recruits into battalions fit for service, that we require the power of having, for a time, a certain number within the kingdom. But do we limit the number to be engaged and employed to 10,000 men? No; the number will only be limited by the amount of the Estimates which my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer will present to the House for the maintenance of the troops, and which the House may choose to sanction. There is no limit in this Bill as to the number to be employed, but only as to the number to be at one and the same time in the United Kingdom. I repeat, the limit as to the total number to be employed is the limit which this House may impose when my right hon. Friend proposes the Estimates providing for the expense of the troops to be so engaged. But then it is said, "You do not tell us where you mean to get them. We have a great curiosity to know, and there is some deep mystery about the matter." Why, my right hon. Friend has very well said that until the Government knew that Parliament would permit them to get these troops it would have been improper to engage in negotiations for the purpose. I should like to know what those great constitution reverencers would have said had they been able to get up in this House, and extract from the Government that we were entering into negotiations for the purpose of raising foreign troops without the sanction of Parliament previously obtained? They would have had a good right to denounce us as violating the principles of the constitution, but I doubt whether they would have chosen to adopt the doctrine of the noble Lord, and to have punished us, as he proposes to punish us, in the way, I think, Voltaire desired to see some delinquent Ministers punished, in reference to whom he said, "If Divine justice wishes adequately to visit their offences, let it not sentence them to the infernal regions, but condemn them to remain at their post." Such, too, is the opinion of the noble Lord with respect to the present Government, and the proposition now before the House is one, in his opinion, deserving of the severest condemnation, but while he urges the condemnation, he would deny the Government the right to resign. I, however, say that we had no other course to pursue, and as to mystery there is none, except that mystery which I am unable to solve—namely, how it happens that hon. Gentlemen who have taunted the Government with inefficient measures should object to a measure proposed to give the Government ampler powers for carrying on the war. That is a mystery which must be unravelled, not by this side of the House, but by the other, and, therefore, the question with respect to mystery must be handed over by us to the Opposition.

I say, then, with respect to this proposed addition of troops—whether they be Germans, or of whatever other nation they may be (for I wish to preserve the mystery and to leave the Government at perfect freedom to get good soldiers wherever they can), it is obvious to all persons who dispassionately apply their mind to the matter that the acquisition of 10,000, or 20,000, or 30,000, or 40,000 well-disciplined and trained troops — whichever number Parliament on the Estimates may choose to sanction—would be of the utmost value to our fellow-countrymen now engaged in arduous warfare. I think it is due to them to give them this assistance if we can. Sir, the deeds performed not only by our own troops, but by both armies—for I speak of the French in common with our own soldiers—there is no distinction to be drawn between them, both have rushed to assist each other, and to fight together—the gallantry, I say, and brave achievements of the allied army surpass anything we read of, either in history or in romance. But then, I say, these brave men deserve something at our hands. They have shown, as was well stated by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) on a former occasion, that the increasing progress of civilisation and the augmentation of wealth in this country during a long-continued period of peace have not enervated the British nation, but, on the contrary, have only rendered them like a field in fallow, more fruitful in all those qualities which distinguish a nation when engaged in the arduous struggle of a war. We have seen men of the highest rank and the most ample wealth unaffected by those inducements which might have led them to remain at home in the enjoyment of all those advantages which their birth, condition, and fortune, enabled them to possess—we have seen them, from a sense of duty, "scorn repose, when Britain sought the field," and go to the contest, and distinguish themselves by the greatest acts of bravery. We have also seen our soldiers, men of the humbler classes, rivalling the chivalry of those who led them; and we have seen the valour and emulation of both to be such as to render it impossible to say whether the leader or the led was most deserving of the applause and gratitude of his country. Well, then, I say again, these brave men deserve that we should do whatever we can to assist them. And who is the enemy with whom we have to contend? It is a Sovereign who has, comparatively speaking, unlimited means of filling the ranks of his army. We have seen and are seeing him bringing down division after division to the field of operations—

> "Host impelling host,
> The blue-eyed myriads of the Baltic Coast;"

and reinforcements from other parts of his extensive empire; and are we to allow the comparatively limited means of England and France to be pitted against those progressively increasing numbers, and refrain, when we are able to give the allied army assistance, from doing so? Sir, I say it would be a cruel mockery of the constitution, a cruel abandonment of our duty, a cruel violation of what we owe to the country, if we were to restrict the hands of Government, and prevent them from furnishing to our men engaged in the war the means by which their services could be rendered more effectual. Therefore, if there be in this House any men who have friends and relations now exposed to the dangers and fatigues of this war, let them not refuse to those friends and relations that help which may give them victory in the day of battle—if there be men who mourn friends and relations who have fallen victims to their duty—let them not allow those friends and relatives to have shed their blood in vain, or to have sacrificed their lives as a fruitless offering on the altar of duty. If the House of Commons does—

as I believe, am sure, it does—entertain a proper sense of what is due to the national interests and the national honour, let it not refuse its sanction to a measure calculated to enable Her Majesty's Government to carry on the war with additional vigour and with greater chance of success. We are asked why we went to Sebastopol? We went to Sebastopol because it is the very centre and heart of the power of Russia in that quarter; and, had we not gone to Sebastopol, we should have had to meet her armies on the plains of the Pruth—the greatest military mistake we could commit. We were told, "You might have waited until you had got your army up to its war establishment, which might have been accomplished in a couple of years." Why, if you had waited a year you never would have taken Sebastopol; for the delay of a year would have entirely defeated the object you had in view. If the blow is to be struck effectually—if the work is to be done efficiently—it must be done at once; and one of the means for effecting the object is that which we are now asking. Sir, we have engaged in a great war against a great Power, with great exertions, and for great objects; and it does not become this country—it is not either to the interest of this country or the honour of this country—that we should end that war by small and ineffectual results, we ought to have a result adequate to the sacrifices we have made, and in conformity with the interest and dignity of this country. But to attain that result recourse must be had to great efforts. Do not let the House deceive itself in that respect; it is not by small detachments or inefficient forces that we shall accomplish that result. [*Cheers from the Opposition.*] I hope that cheer will be followed by a vote, and that the vote will be in conformity with the cheer. [*Cheers from the Ministerial benches.*] I say, Sir, then, that the results which alone will befit the circumstances in which this country is placed require great and continued efforts. We are making these efforts at home; we have sent out to our brave army in the East every reinforcement which the national reserve affords. The nation, Sir, is our reserve, and we shall send out every reinforcement which that noble reserve, the British nation, may afford us, in sufficient numbers and sufficient condition to be useful and effectual in the field. But in a case of this sort every method should be employed necessary to increase our force, and we ought to seek every addition that can be made available. It is the duty of the Government to ask of Parliament at once to give them the power of making that increase; and I should be sorry, indeed, in the condition in which the country stands, and the circumstances in which we are now placed, if the Government had shrunk from asking from Parliament, on their responsibility, such means as they think will enable them to give additional vigour and effect to the operations of the war. But, sorry as I should be to belong to a Government who had shrunk from performing such a duty, I should be still more sorry to be one of a majority who had refused, under those circumstances, to carry out the very principles which they themselves had unjustly recommended.

Mr. DISRAELI: Sir, the noble Lord the Secretary of State, with that airy self-complacency which he knows how to assume when he has a very bad cause, commenced a reply to the grave and well-considered argument of my noble Friend the Member for Lynn in terms of good-tempered abuse. According to the Secretary of State the arguments offered by my noble Friend are antiquated arguments; I am surprised the noble Lord did not call them "antiquated imbecility." Sir, I agree with the Secretary of State that the country is in a position of extreme difficulty and danger, and that it is necessary that we should make exertions commensurate with that position. The noble Lord for a considerable time has reiterated that sentiment, in phrases of sounding rhetoric; but I have not yet heard any Gentleman on either side dispute the truth of the position which the noble Lord makes out with so much pains. What we have to decide to-night is, not whether England shall make efforts equal to the exigency, but whether the measure proposed by the Government can come into that category. Now, Sir, the noble Lord, as well as the President of the Council, have, I think unwisely and unnecessarily, to-night entered into the general conduct of the war. The noble Lord told us that England is a great naval Power, and that her efforts must be devoted principally to maintaining the supremacy of the country upon the ocean. Of course he alluded to the important services of the Baltic fleet. The Secretary of State having to defend the proposal of Ministers for the levying of foreign troops and the enlistment of what I call foreign mercenaries, vindicates the conduct of the Government in attacking Sebastopol. It is perfectly open to me, of course, to refer to such circumstances connected with that operation as I may wish to deal with; and if at the present moment I decline from dwelling upon this topic, neither the noble Lord nor his colleague the Lord President will, I hope, misapprehend me, or suppose I shrink from that discussion. What may be the cause, what may be the necessity, which has occasioned the Administration, suddenly I think, to appeal to the feeling of the country and of Parliament, I am free to refer to, but at present I wish to speak upon the merits of the measure which they have proposed.

Well now, Sir, we are at war with a Power which the Ministry have discovered at last to be a military Power of the greatest importance. I am bound to say that if that conviction has only recently reached their mind, with a spirit of liberal candour they lose no opportunity of imparting the result of their deliberation to the country. I believe the great fault of their conduct hitherto has been that there has been no desire on their part to discover it, and I think that on all occasions they have conducted the affairs of the country as if they were in total ignorance of the circumstances with which they had to contend. I will say very little, Sir, about the constitution, further than to remark that the noble Lord the President of the Council seems to me to have spoken of the constitution with much less of reverence than is usual with him. Certainly there is no constitutional objection to the Bill that is now on the table of the House, in consequence of the salutary amendment which it received in another place. Whether it is agreeable to the feelings of this country, that foreign troops should be enlisted, drilled, and disciplined, and that a large depôt amounting to thousands should be reserved in this country, is a question which really must be left, not to constitutional lawyers to decide, but to the nation. The country—whatever may be the alterations which have been made in another place in the Bill that has been so suddenly introduced by the Minister of War—will not look on such an arrangement certainly with favour, but I hope always with jealousy, and even with suspicion. I do not suppose that the noble Lords wish that the time should arrive when the people of this country would witness arrangements such as are contemplated by this Bill with exultation and satisfaction. They are not circumstances that are calculated in a free country like this to excite such emotions. I shall not, therefore, dwell upon that topic. But when the Secretary of State, who is conscious of the great office which has fallen to the Government of which he is a Member—namely, that they are to conduct a contest with the greatest of military Powers—much greater in point of numbers, as the Secretary at War has impressed carefully upon us to-night, than France—that military and gallant France of which we have heard so much, and from an alliance with whom we are supposed to obtain so much support and strength—when the noble Lord and his colleague have impressed this upon the House, I have a right to ask myself, are the means they propose adequate to that great emergency on which they so frequently dilate? The noble Lord says, I cannot tell you, and I will leave in mystery whence we are to obtain those foreign auxiliaries which we are proposing to raise. The noble Lord says, "I cannot go into that; all we ask you for is to allow Her Majesty to have the power of raising these foreign soldiers and enlisting them in Her service, and we have by this Bill provided that you, as representatives of the people, may take upon yourselves the power and the responsibility of limiting the amount of those auxiliaries that shall be left in this country." But, Sir, when the noble Lord impresses upon us the importance of this measure as the only one which, after deep meditation, the Government deem adequate to the occasion with which they have to contend, namely, to carry on a war with a Power of unrivalled military resources, I cannot agree with the noble Lord that all great commanders have adopted this system, and that the plan proposed by the Government is one which has received the sanction of the highest authorities. It is not necessary for me now to take up that part of the subject which has been ably and completely treated to-night—namely, the distinction between these auxiliaries and the foreign troops that have been formerly levied from nations with which we were either in alliance or connected. That particular point has been brought before the House with great clearness to-night with reference to the German Legion and the troops of Hessians which were employed in the reign of a late King and to other circumstances of the same kind. It is admitted that, generally speaking, all those foreign troops enlisted in the service of the Sovereign of England were, in fact, the subjects of allies, or the natives of foreign countries peculiarly circumstanced, where, by revolution or otherwise, they were brought into intimate sympathy with the people of this country. When the noble Lord read the names of the regiments that at the time of the French Revolution were paid by the Treasury of England, he read names which clearly indicated that they were regiments formed by the French emigration; and, with very rare instances, the whole of the foreign troops that were during the late great war in the service of His Majesty were, virtually speaking, allies, and not mercenaries. Why, Sir, I have no objection, and no one that has any sense or spirit in him has any objection, that our troops should fight by the side of foreigners who are bound together by sympathy in the same cause. That is not the objection that we have urged against the enlistment of those unknown and mysterious individuals, the source and origin of whom the Secretary of State would throw no light upon. But throughout the speech of the Lord President to-night—a speech to which I listened, I must say, with great disappointment—though I think it was a theme which of all others he could do justice to—there was a great and pervading fallacy; the noble Lord argued the case to the House as if there was an objection by the Opposition to their fellow-countrymen fighting in the same field by the side of foreigners. "Why," says the noble Lord, "this is the most absurd of errors! There was the Earl of Marlborough, who succeeded as the principal patron and promoter of the policy of William III. against the Grand Monarque. The Earl of Marlborough was the author of the Grand Alliance; he won the great battles of Blenheim, Ramillies, and Malplaquet, not merely by British troops, but with an army of 60,000 men, a third of whom were foreigners. How ignorant and prejudiced of you, therefore, to urge such objections against the Government measure!" Now, of course the Earl of Marlborough, who was the author of the Grand Alliance, naturally reaped the fruits of it, and he went into the field with the grand allies, and we have not the slightest objection that any English general of the present day, placed in similar circumstances at the head of a great coalition, should again display the same brilliant military skill and prowess—should win victories of equal magnitude, followed by results of equal importance, gained by the same legitimate means, which we should all honour and respect. The whole argument of the noble Lord, from the beginning onwards, was founded on this misconception—that we are objecting to the measure of the Government, because we have a prejudice against Englishmen fighting by the side of foreigners. But this fallacy of the noble Lord is of trivial importance, compared with the gross, and I may say dangerous error that pervaded the rest of his argument. The noble Lord imputes to us that we object to Englishmen fighting by the side of foreigners. Our objection is, that our countrymen should be fighting by the side of foreigners who are *condottieri* and mercenaries, but we do not object to their fighting by the side of foreigners who are allies. We honour, admire, and respect the achievements of the Earl of Marlborough, the conqueror of Blenheim and Ramillies, as much as if his troops had been entirely British. For this is the great error which pervaded the noble Lord's speech—he argued throughout the whole of it as if there were no such nation as the French nation, as if there were no such army as the French army, and as if that intimate alliance between the troops and that cordial friendship between the Generals on which he dilated a few nights ago with so much feeling and eloquence, were in fact dreams forgotten with the Thanks of the House of Commons which he proposed to those united armies. Why, if it be true, as the noble Lord tried to maintain to-night by his accumulated instances, that there is on the part of a large section of this House — the Gentlemen who sit opposite to him—and also a large portion of the country, a great prejudice against Englishmen fighting along with foreigners, how can he account for, not the cordiality merely, not the sympathy merely, but the enthusiasm, with which the French and English alliance is now viewed, not merely in this House, but in this country? The noble Lord says, "Do Gentlemen think that, because 50,000 troops have been sent from this country to the seat of war, we can sustain that effort, and that that force is sufficient to resist the power of the great Emperor of Russia." Why, I am very glad to hear, as I heard the other night, that we have been able in the first year of the war to send out 54,000 British troops on the expedition to the East. But we did not send out 54,000 British troops to the Crimea to carry on a single-handed contest with the Emperor of Russia; we sent them to be the companions in arms and comrades in glory of our great and warlike ally, whom we all love and esteem, and who is a first-rate military Power. Surely the noble Lord, when he is making a calculation of the means of this country to carry on the war against Russia, is not —to use a word not very classical or English, but which a little while ago was very prevalent in this House—is not to "ignore" the existence of the French nation and army. He seemed to forget that we have the most powerful military ally in the world; he argued throughout his remarks that there was, on the part of the Opposition and the country, a great prejudice against Englishmen fighting with foreigners; and then he said, "If that prejudice is encouraged, how can you maintain so large a force as 54,000 soldiers to fight against the power of the Emperor of Russia?" I maintain that the noble Lord, in taking that view of the case, misrepresented the spirit of the measure he was bringing before the country, and conveyed to the House a totally false idea of the position we occupy as a State, in estimating our resources to carry on this great war in which we are now involved. Having vindicated the claim of our French allies to be remembered by the Minister who has brought forward this measure, I will make an admission to him and to his noble Colleague the Secretary of State, who supposed he would carry this Bill by that sort of good-natured bluster which he knows so well how to employ—I will admit that in in the course of the last war there were instances—a few instances—in which foreign troops were enlisted in the service of the Sovereign of this country, but enlisted under circumstances which cannot be vindicated by those legitimate principles which have been referred to in the course of this debate. I grant that in the late war there were instances in which the conduct of 1777, when the Hessians were engaged and sent to America, was imitated. I need not dilate on what happened in 1777; I am sure the circumstances are fresh in the historic memory of every Gentleman in this House. It is a shameful page in the History of England, and the words of Frederick the Great, when he heard how the Elector of Hesse and some other petty German Princes were bartering the blood of their subjects, that when they were passing through his dominions he would levy a toll upon them as so many cattle, were as just as they were severe. I will admit that in the late war there were instances which the noble Lord and his colleagues may refer to as of a parallel character, though insignificant, with the enlistment of the Hessians. This leads me to the observation of the Home Secretary to which I before referred, to the effect that the greatest commanders, the Emperor Napoleon amongst others, had had recourse to this method of sustaining their military strength, and had always approved of the expedient. Now, I will quote on this subject the opinion of a commander not second even to the first Napoleon—that of the Duke of Wellington. Here is a passage from a letter of the Duke of Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool, dated January 19, 1811, which shows the value of those troops who do not join our standard from sympathy of political character or political conviction. The Duke of Wellington says—

> "I am sorry to give you bad accounts of the Brunswick Legion. They continue to desert in large numbers, and on the night before last fourteen deserted to go to the enemy. Eleven were caught, one shot whilst making the attempt, and only two got off."

Again, on the 23rd of April of the same year, the Duke writes to General Graham, afterwards Lord Lynedoch—and I beg the House to remark that these extracts from that great man's recorded opinions on such a point must be of the greatest service in guiding its opinion—

> "I attribute the disposition of all foreign troops to desert from our armies to the regularity of system and the strictness of discipline which characterises it, and which must be upheld in order to keep a British army in the field in a state of efficiency, and their desertion is frequently very inconvenient as affording to the enemy the only information which he can acquire. Under these circumstances I am not desirous of increasing the number of foreign troops serving with this army."

Now, I recommend that passage to the consideration of the Secretary at War, who said that no general whom he ever heard of was not desirous of increasing the number of his troops, and he will allow me, therefore, to give him this opinion; and perhaps I shall be able, when I finish, to quote him another of equal importance. In June of the same year I find the Duke writing to Lord Liverpool—

> "Since the commencement of the siege of Badajoz, 52 men of the Chasseurs Britanniques have deserted, though we had with the army

> only a selection of that corps, 686, who are suspected, being left at Lisbon."

I am sure the House will excuse me for reading these passages from a work from which, upon a subject like this, every one wishes his memory to be refreshed ; it is equivalent to having the advantage of the advice and counsel of the Duke himself in the present debate, and therefore perhaps the House will allow me to read another letter of the Duke to General Craufurd, in the year 1812—

> "In regard to General Ross's complaints of the inclination of Watteville's regiment to desert, all general officers who have foreign troops under their command have the same cause to complain. In the part of the army under my command called British, there are between 6,000 and 7,000 of them, who desert whenever they can get an opportunity."

Now, these are the "free lances" whom the Government would have us have recourse to. I was determined to meet the objections of those well-informed Gentlemen who got up and told me, "All those fine statements about foreign troops employed under the Crown being bound to us by common feelings of sympathy and intimacy are all nonsense, for we have had a great many free lances in our service." I will take the free lances that served in our Peninsular army—and, as regards the German Legion, I can only say I wish to speak of it with all that honour it deserves, and which it has earned in so many passages of our history. I will say nothing of those brethren in arms who served us really because the interests of their country were bound up with those of our own —who were the subjects of the same Sovereign, or of Sovereigns for whose cause we fought, and who, I believe, behaved throughout the great war that ended in 1815, with admirable fidelity, courage, and discipline. I confine myself entirely to those free lances, those mercenaries, those *condottieri,* who were engaged in the cheapest market, who had no political convictions or unison of sentiments to animate them in the cause, who were purchased by the power that paid them most, and whose achievements are immortalised in the passages I have read to you from the pen of their illustrious commander. I have taken passages from the Duke's letters in 1811 and 1812, and I may be allowed also to read an extract from a despatch written in 1813. The Duke writes thus to General Campbell at Alicant—

> "Sir, I have received your letter of the 12th, regarding the conduct of the 2nd Italian Regiment. I entirely concur in all the measures you have adopted, and I applaud the decision and firmness of your conduct. The foreign troops are so much addicted to desertion that they are very unfit for our army, of which they necessarily form too large a proportion to the native troops. The evil is aggravated by the practice which prevails of enlisting prisoners, although deserters are nearly as bad. The consequence is, therefore, that a foreign regiment cannot be placed in a situation in which the soldiers can desert, that they do not go off in numbers, and in the Peninsula they carry to the enemy the only intelligence which he can procure. With this knowlege I seldom, if ever, use the foreign British troops on the duty of outposts, and whatever you may determine regarding the 2nd Italian Regiment, I recommend the same practice to your consideration."

But, says the noble Lord to-night in the address he has made to us, by which he was to put an end to all these antiquated arguments, "This is a most absurd opposition that has suddenly been raised to the plan of the Government ; this cannot for a moment be tolerated ; it is against the spirit of the age ; a Government, which enlightened and practical men value, will not carry on the war without calling in assistance from every quarter. Every nation—even the French nation—at the present moment is employing foreign troops, and has a foreign legion." Well, now, I am going to quote a French newspaper, from memory, but I pledge myself that my statement of its contents is accurate, if not perfect. I would not, of course, quote a French newspaper had not those exploits been performed in France with regard to the press which only one of Her Majesty's Ministers can do justice to; but I shall attempt to convey to the House briefly the semi-official statement in the *Constitutionnel,* a paper which appears under the highest authority, and may, therefore, be received with confidence. It is a statement of the cause of the surprise of the allied armies at the battle of Inkerman—that surprise which, to use the language of the *Constitutionnel,* "cost so much of the best blood of the finest armies in the world." What was the cause of the surprise at the battle of Inkerman, according to the semi-official *Constitutionnel?* It was a member of the Foreign Legion of France who had deserted to the enemy, and who gave to that enemy—to the generals of the Emperor of Russia—accurate information of all our weak points where our position could be attacked, and where our fortifications had been, unfortunately, but, perhaps, inevitably neglected. The *Constitutionnel* deplores this. It says there is not a braver body of men than the Foreign Legion in the service of France—their courage undaunted—their achievements of the most desperate valour —but being foreigners, and not animated by the same feelings as Frenchmen and Englishmen, they took the first opportunity of giving information to the enemy, which has spread desolation through every home in this country. And here, perhaps, I may remind the Secretary at War, who said just now that there never was a general who complained of having too many troops—I am surprised that he cannot recall one of the most interesting despatches from the Duke of Wellington, written after the failure of the expedition to Walcheren. The Duke was then in a position of immense difficulty, at the head of a force of only 20,000 men in the Peninsula, and a magnificent army, in consequence of an ill-conceived scheme by the English Ministry of the day, had been destroyed and wasted, notwithstanding their valour and discipline, in the expedition to Walcheren. When 40,000 men had been put *hors de combat*, and when every one felt what immense advantage they would have been if sent to Wellesley, in the Peninsula, he wrote, I think, to Lord Bathurst, saying,

> "Let me give you some consolation for the deplorable consequences of Walcheren, for if these troops had been sent to me, I could not have received them; 20,000 men was all that I could have managed in this country, with imperfect supplies and the immense difficulties I have to meet."

That despatch the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War may think it necessary to read before he makes a similar statement to one which he made to-night.

Sir, I do not meddle with the constitutional objections to this plan proposed by the Government. That is an affair of sentiment for the people of England, and all we, as their representatives, have to do is to take care not to assent to anything that is illegal in the measure submitted to us. I think I have now stated facts which will make the House hesitate before they adopt the Foreign Legion at the value placed on them by the noble Lord. I do not think that the noble Lord the Secretary of State is a very high authority on the subject of Foreign Legions. I think his authority on the British militia is far more important than his opinion on the subject of the enlistment of foreign troops. The noble Lord greatly patronised the Foreign Legion which was sent to Spain. I do not think it operated very advantageously as regards British feeling, or the throne of Spain; and when the noble Lord rises to eulogise the British militia, he does himself more credit than when he bestows praise on foreign mercenaries.

Sir, I will now refer to the policy of the present proposition, and I say that, under the present circumstances, looking merely to the merits of the proposition, it will prove totally ineffectual, and fruitless and barren of the results Government expect from it. Look at that policy. You are engaging in a very great war. You lose no opportunity of assuring us of the magnitude of the peril, and of the difficulty of meeting it adequately. The country has watched, during four months, with deep anxiety, the conduct of your expedition and of your army three thousand miles off. Parliament has been suddenly called together—so suddenly that Ministers must have changed their opinions on the necessity of summoning it. The attention of Europe has been directed to that sudden summons, as indicative of something extraordinary. It is announced that we were to be assembled together that Her Majesty's Ministers may communicate to the great council of the nation, for its adoption and sanction, those measures which they consider adequate for the exigencies of the occasion. The noble Lord the Secretary of State has taunted this side of the House with always pressing on the Government to pass measures equal to the exigencies of the crisis, yet, when the first of these measures is proposed, with having received it solely with the view to cavil at it. That is not a generous taunt on the part of the noble Lord. Generosity may not be much valued in the House of Commons at present, but I hope truth has not yet quite taken its departure from amongst us. But that was not a just taunt on the part of the noble Lord, for the Government, I venture to assert, has received no obstacle whatever from us in the conduct of the war. There is not a Vote that has been proposed that has not been cheerfully conceded. The Ministers might have had any amount of money and of men that they thought proper to demand. The noble Lord and his colleagues knew that they might count on having the cordial and constant support of this side of the House for their policy; and they had it. It is not just, therefore, for the Secretary of State to rise now, and having failed entirely in defending a measure—which I am bound to say I am not surprised at his having failed to defend, for even his talents must be sometimes baffled — to attempt to cover his retreat by casting reproaches in the faces of the people of England and of the Opposition. The noble Lord has attempted to convey that he and his colleagues have experienced from us a factious opposition; that we have cavilled at their policy, taunted them into action, and at the moment when they demand our support we refuse it. It is a notorious fact—and no misrepresentation can disguise it from the people of this country—that, instead of taking advantage of the difficulties of the Government—as Oppositions before now have done—instead of throwing obstacles in their way, we have said from the first, "Act with frankness and firmness, and you may count on the same support from us that you would expect from the adherents you most trust." From that line of conduct we have never deviated. I say, then, under these circumstances, I can conceive nothing more impolitic than a Minister coming down to Parliament, not asking to embody the national force, or for very large Votes, or for the grant of a great number of men, or for any other measure which shows a consciousness that they are embarked in an almost internecine struggle; but coming forward with one only measure, which I have shown from the records of experience to be of so imperfect and paltry a character. I want to know what effect the noble Lord supposes it will have on European Cabinets and public opinion abroad? I read to-day in an organ which exercises great influence in Europe—an organ not unfriendly to the Western Powers, I believe, though it takes a moderate and mitigated view of these important transactions—a great continental authority—I read an article on the policy of the Government of this country; and what was the conclusion it drew from all that could be learnt of it? This influential continental journal summed up its review with this declaration, "All we can deduce from the policy of the English Ministry is, that the recruiting powers of England are exhausted." I ask the noble Lord, and the President of the Council, or any Gentleman in the House, is not that a fair inference and the only one to draw? Can any one doubt that that opinion so circulated and so founded will affect the conduct of public men and nations? It will affect the conduct of these German Powers of which we have heard so much. Do you think that the results of the Austrian treaty, which we are called upon to congratulate the Throne for—do you think the results of that are likely to be more important because of the impression that the recruiting power of the country is exhausted? But, Sir, if that is the effect upon foreign countries, is it possible to shut our eyes to what the effect may be on our own country? Does anybody believe that the tendency of this measure will be any other than to damp the readiness of the people of this country to rally round the standard of the Sovereign? I believe, Sir, that that is the universal impression and the conviction which prevails in every class of the community. Well, I say, is this the policy—is this the conduct that wise, experienced, and responsible statesmen, the Ministers of a country like England, should pursue at this moment? You tell us that we can only enlist boys, when the experience of every Gentleman in this House convinces him of the fallacy of that observation; and, if it be not fallacious, the observation is only more unwise and injurious. Statements of this kind are not to be decided by individual experience but by statistical documents and that body of information as to the resources of the country which is in the possession of every well-informed person. Why, the returns of the Census contradict you—every public document of your own officers contradicts your assertion. The state of the population of the country is not such as that it can only furnish for recruits those who are mere boys. It is not the truth in theory—it is not the fact in practice; and it is impossible that the noble Lord can rise and tell us in sober sadness that it is not in his power to-morrow, if he appeals to Parliament, to raise 100,000 men who are not boys, if the exigencies of the State require it? It is impossible that he can make that statement and receive for it the sanction of the House. Well, if that be so, ought it to have been made? and is not the making of such statements as those of the noble Lord and his colleagues calculated at this moment to paralyse the Government, and to palsy the spirit of the country; and instead of bringing about a successful and triumphant issue, rather to—I will not say consummate the catastrophes that may be impending—but to prepare a future full of anxiety and gloom to this country? We have been told in the course of this debate, and not for the first time, that the cause of our inconvenient and injurious position as a military Power in a state of war is, that the country has resolved always to maintain a peace establishment. Now, Sir, is that true? Is that accusation against the House of Commons made by Ministers to-night and on other occasions founded on fact? I have had some experience in this House, and many hon. Gentlemen around and before me have had longer experience, and I do not remember any appeal made on the responsibility of Government in time of peace to the House of Commons for the increase of our establishment which has not been responded to with a hearty and generous confidence. Why, what took place under the Administration of Sir Robert Peel? There were many circumstances at that time of an alarming and perplexing character in our foreign relations, yet not such as could be placed before the country to raise its enthusiasm or to excite its public spirit so as to raise for the support of the Ministry that immense fund of public feeling and sentiment which you have now the advantage to command, but still they were grave and serious matters, causing to the distinguished Cabinet of which Sir Robert Peel was chief the utmost anxiety. They had in consequence considerably to increase the naval and military establishments of the country. Did this House then refuse to support Sir Robert Peel, though he asked for an increased expenditure of several millions? What happened in 1852, when you had a Government not supported by a majority of the House of Commons, and not only not supported by such a majority, but which was met on every occasion by factious combination and sinister intrigue? What occurred then? There were circumstances which made it our duty, even under such a state of things, to appeal to the House of Commons for an increase of our forces. Did that House of Commons, anxious and ready as it was to throw every impediment in our way—did it, when the Ministry seriously appealed to it, refuse its assent to the proposition? No. The Secretary at War, who, on this and another occasion, has dilated with much eagerness on the difficulties of the position of the Government from the imperfect establishments which they had at their command, has never had the generosity to admit that, weak as our Government was, we increased the forces of the Army, and also of the Navy; that we created a Channel fleet, and put our artillery in an efficient state. I am not saying this in any spirit of boastfulness, but in answer to the charge that has been made against this House. I say, both at the period of Sir Robert Peel's Administration, and at the period of the Administration of which I had the honour to be a Member, appeals were made to the House of Commons, from the nature of affairs without any communication of causes—appeals were made to the confidence and patriotism of this House, and those appeals were responded to. Well, if that be true, I say great is the responsibility of those Ministers who, suddenly acceding to office at the beginning of the year 1853—who, before a month had elapsed, were aware that the Emperor of Russia had proposed the partition of Turkey—did not, under these circumstances, make the preparations that were necessary. "But," says the Secretary of State, "make preparations in time of peace—make preparations when negotiations were going on—the Minister must be mad who would propose such a thing!" Why, when is a Government to make preparation but under such circumstances, and in such a position? All the preparations made by your predecessors for the last fifty years, preliminary to war or in confirmation of peace, were preparations made in this same manner. You had your militia called out, and there was no declaration of war. There was no declaration of war when it was developed to a greater extent. It was no impediment to your negotiations if you had increased your forces very largely, instead of very slightly. I have spoken of the year 1853; but what did you do in 1854, when you must have been conscious for a year that war was inevitable?—when you were on the point, under certain contingencies, of even declaring war, which ultimately you did declare—when, even in the previous autumn, the indignant nation was absolutely calling on you to take decided measures, and you did even order your fleet to enter the Black Sea—what was your conduct then? I ask you why, when you declared war, did you not take those measures which would have placed you in a very different position—which would have prevented great national calamities—which would have prevented the necessity of calling Parliament together to pass this Bill?

And, Sir, that leads me to the conduct of the war, which the noble Lord the Lord President of the Council, I think unnecessarily, brought under our consideration, and which the Secretary at War has industriously brought under the consideration of the House. I leave the noble Lord to his eulogium on the peculiar naval power of England, and on the magnificent achievements which, under the well-considered schemes and expeditions of the Government, we have accomplished in the Baltic. But, says the noble Lord the Secretary of State, "We are asked why did we go to Sebastopol?" Well, I do not know that anybody has asked the noble Lord why he went to Sebastopol. I expect that the noble Lord will some day tell us. I expect that the time will come when Her Majesty's Ministers will give us ample information on the subject; but I have not heard any one so presumptuous as to enter into any criticism upon the scheme and conduct of this campaign. I did, indeed, hear a Minister the other night, and a Minister, too, who is called a Secretary at War, offer an ingenious reason in vindication of the Government of which he is a Member, for the military exploits and campaigns which they had recommended and schemed. He said that the country insisted upon their going to Sebastopol—certainly a most extraordinary statement. I always thought that Ministers were men of superior minds, with the advantage of peculiar and exclusive information; and that, by that combination of intellect, of experience, and of knowledge, they did, upon all grave matters, follow that course which was for the most advantage to the community whose affairs they were called upon by their Sovereign to guide, and who acted under a responsibility, not merely to the present, but to the future. Are we, then, to believe that the present Ministers are men who undertake expeditions of such great importance as an invasion of a province of the enemy only because public opinion insists upon their undertaking it? That, though they might think it rash—though they might be in complete ignorance of all those circumstances which should guide opinion—though it was a leap in the dark—they were prepared to take it, because public opinion goaded them to the attempt? Why, Sir, if that be the state of affairs, if these are the rules that regulate the conduct of prudent men like the Ministers of the Queen, I say, why are they Ministers? Why do they exist? Why have they duties? Why should they be responsible, if public opinion is to be the sole impulse of their actions, and they are to undertake the most precipitate conduct against their own convictions, in violation of the knowledge they possess, merely because public opinion calls on them to achieve that which is rash, and to accomplish that which is impossible. But the Secretary at War said something else the other night. He seemed to say that not merely the public out-of-doors, but the public in-doors—that Gentlemen on this side of the House—Members of Parliament, at least—had urged the Government to take a decided course and invade the Crimea. Now, I do not say that Members of Parliament have not upon this subject given much, and, perhaps, very foolish advice to Her Majesty's Ministers; but if they gave it, that was no reason why Her Majesty's Ministers should follow it. This, however, I will say, that no Gentleman on this side of the House ever gave that advice to Her Majesty's Ministers. No one on these benches said, "Why do not you strike at the heart of the Russian Empire and attack Sebastopol." On the contrary, Sebastopol was only mentioned once on this side of the House, and that by myself. It was in answer to a most strange and startling speech of the Lord President, from which I, in company with hundreds, did understand, in the month of July, that he announced to Europe and to Asia, that the British Government had resolved upon invading the Crimea and besieging Sebastopol. Then I did say—speaking, I am sure, the opinions of my Friends around me—that I had heard that declaration not only with surprise, but with consternation; and I do not think that the noble Lord or the Secretary at War will at any rate pervert that speech into an encouragement to undertake the siege of Sebastopol. That there were, no doubt, appeals made to the Government by Members of Parliament, their right faithful and trusty Friends, I do not deny. I am not responsible for the observations of those Gentlemen. You share their confidence, and they share yours. But if there must be a responsibility for your conduct, which I am not now at all entering into—if you persist in this habit of shuffling off the responsibility of your conduct upon what is called the public, or Members of Parliament—let it be clearly understood that it was not the Conservative Opposition that urged you to that course, and that we reserve to ourselves the right particularly to examine into your policy when the noble Lord and yourselves will condescend to give us the reasons for the course you have adopted. Sir, I feel myself that this is a subject upon which we should touch with the utmost delicacy. I am not going—in spite of the boastful speech of the Secretary of State, or the assertions of the noble Lord the President of the Council—I am not going to be drawn into any discussion as to the conduct of the war, as planned and schemed by the Government. I feel persuaded that the time will come when this House will expect that upon the policy of the Government there shall be a full and complete discussion. The country knows now that one of the greatest expeditions ever sent out by the energies of this nation, was ordered by Her Majesty's Ministers to invade the Crimea and besiege Sebastopol. Since the expedition against Sicily by the Athenians, I do not know that there ever was an expedition from which so much was expected or upon which so much was staked. There is, unhappily, in the commencement of both these expeditions, too much similarity. The schemers were arrogant, boastful, and over-sanguine. There were too many generals in the Sicilian expedition — there was too little cavalry; there was a winter campaign, and there was no reserve. When Gentlemen go into the country in a few days—I understand we are to be absent a month—there may be moments when the *battue* is exhausted, and when there may be a frost. I recommend Gentlemen to refresh their memory by turning to the pages of Thucydides. I recommend them to read the despatch of Nicias to the Athenian Assembly, when he says, "Men of Athens, I know that you do not like to hear the truth; but understand this—you sent me out to be a besieger, but, lo! I am besieged." Now, Sir, we know what was the end of the Sicilian expedition. May that Divine Providence that has watched over the inviolate island of the sage and the free save us from a similar conclusion! But, at least, let us do now what the Athenians did even in their proud despair. They sacrificed to the gods, and appealed to the energies of their countrymen. We, at a moment, not, I believe, of equal danger, in a situation which I pray may end in triumph, but still a situation of doubt, of terrible anxiety, even of anguish—we bring in a Bill in order to enlist foreign mercenaries to vindicate the fortunes of England!

Mr. MUNTZ said, that he would not have detained the House at that late hour of the night; but as he had all along supported the carrying on of the war, and did not wish it to be supposed that, in voting against the Motion now before the House he had changed his mind as to the propriety of carrying on the war, he felt called upon to give his reasons for opposing the Bill. The opinions which he now entertained were precisely similar to those which he had formerly expressed; but he could not help thinking, that if at the outset the Government had presented a more warlike attitude, the war might have been avoided. He was as much prepared as any hon. Gentleman to support this or any other Government in carrying on the war with energy and vigour, but he would ask the House if this was a motion of vigour and energy? Was it not a motion more likely to defeat the exertions of our own countrymen, by bringing them into the field with men upon whom they could not depend? The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire had given them a good account from first-rate authority of what the foreign troops were in the Peninsula, and he could corroborate the statements of the right hon. Gentleman from the accounts which he had received from friends who had served in the Peninsular campaign. This should be the last and not the first resource which the Government should fall back upon. Had they exhausted all the means of the country and done all they could to obtain men? Was it not possible to obtain more men by increasing the age, taking a smaller stature, and giving a larger bounty? Did the Government mean to say that that would be throwing away money? He was decidedly of opinion that it would be far preferable to employing foreigners, to give a larger bounty and procure Englishmen. It had been asked, what would have been the fate of the battle of Inkerman if we had had these foreigners instead of our unfortunate Guards, who had melted away in the miserable manner they had, where thousands of the best soldiers in the world had been lost to the country for ever and for nothing? Why, the whole army would have been driven into the sea. It was very gratifying to him and to the country to find that Englishmen were still Englishmen; but it was lamentable to think that such men men should have been so wasted. If they were not prepared to do anything towards obtaining men in their own country, then let them take the next best step, and go to their ally. His noble Friend said, such a proposal would be an insult to the Emperor of France, but he (Mr. Muntz) could not view it in any such light. The Emperor of France had 400,000 men under arms, and an army of 100,000 men at Boulogne doing nothing, and why should their services not be made really useful at Sebastopol? Were any such foreigners to be found? Did Her Majesty's Government really believe in the sincerity of the Emperor of France or not? If they did not, they had better give up the war, for they could not carry it on without him; but if they did believe him to be sincere, then it was their bounden duty to make such an application to him. One Frenchman was worth half a dozen of the Germans and foreigners it was proposed to obtain from the petty Principalities of Germany and other places, without any nationality of their own to support them. It appeared, then, very clear to him, that he could not vote for this Bill. He could not vote in a party spirit when the interests of the nation were at stake; and, if no one else voted in any other way than he did, there would be no majority for them that night. He was quite certain from what hon. Members had said to him by scores, that they were as much opposed to the Bill as he was, but they must swallow the nauseous dose. With the Ministers it was the old story, "If you don't carry the Bill we must resign." Then he would resign. From what he knew of the feeling out-of-doors, the country said, "Resign." It was quite clear somebody was in fault: and he would ask if it was possible, looking at the last six months, to find any Government which had ever committed a greater number of blunders? He did not say whom the fault was with; it might be the English Government; it might be the French Government; it might be the English general; it might be the French general; but some one was in great fault, and the Government had not corrected them. The noble Lord (Lord Palmerston said, "We are asked why we went to Sebastopol?" He did not ask the noble Lord that, for he knew they went there because they were afraid of saying they had done nothing. But he asked the noble Lord why did they go at such a season, to such a climate, and with such an inferior force? The noble Lord, the President of the Council had referred them to the campaigns of the Duke of Marlborough to show that he used mercenary troops, but it had since been truly shown that Marlborough fought with allied troops and not with any mercenaries. He (Mr. Muntz) supposed that most hon. Members were conversant with Marlborough's campaigns, he had lately refreshed his memory with respect to them, and he now asked the noble Lord if he ever heard of Marlborough besieging a town on one side, leaving the other side open for the enemy to obtain reinforcement, ammunition, and provisions to any extent? When Marlborough besieged Lille, he invested the city entirely with a besieging army, and held the French general, Villeroy, at bay with an army of observation of equal force to his own. There was one thing more important, and worse in its consequences than any other, and he should like to know how the treaty was effected with Austria, by which that Power was allowed to take possession of the provinces, or who connived at it. The Russians were by this enabled to send their reinforcements to Sebastopol, while the Allies would have been better situated without this interposition on the part of the Austrians. There were Generals Luders, Gortchakoff, and Liprandi, with the troops who had been fighting on the Danube, all released, and afterwards found fighting against our poor fellows at Sebastopol. He doubted whether any good would come from the present Austrian treaty. In conclusion he would repeat, that he was anxious to give encouragement to this or any Government that would carry on the war with that vigour and efficiency due to the honour of the country, but he could not vote for the present measure, which he believed would be worse than useless, and only deceive both the army and the nation.

Mr. DEEDES said, he was anxious to answer one appeal which had been made by the noble Lord the President of the Council to those hon. Members who, like himself, had many near and dear to him now engaged in the war, and enduring great hardships and privations. How, asked the noble Lord, could they vote against a measure calculated to give relief to the persons so engaged? In putting the appeal in that way, the noble Lord begged the question altogether. If there were no other means of affording relief, it might then be a question whether the private feelings of hon. Members would justify them in giving a vote contrary to their public opinion. He contended, however, that this was not the only measure to which recourse could be had. He would not speak of it as being unconstitutional, as that point had been already discussed; but it was constitutionally objectionable, and if it was not proved to be of paramount necessity they were not bound to vote for it. He would give his vote to-night from a conviction that if he gave it otherwise it would not be consistent with the best interests of the country—that it would not be in accordance with the feelings of his constituents, and would not justify himself to his conscience when he laid his head upon his pillow.

SIR JOHN FITZGERALD: Sir, I shall support this Bill, considering it one of the most vital importance to the Government that it should be carried, to enable them to carry on this war with the energy it requires.

Sir, I consider the objections made to this Bill as chimerical and delusive, founded on a supposition that a prejudice exists in the minds of the people of this country of incorporating foreigners in our Army; but those feelings, if they ever did exist, are now completely extinguished; a long peace, together with the frequent intercourse that has taken place between the several countries of Europe, has in a manner fraternised the people of different nations, and there is now but one common sentiment that unites them—hatred to oppression.

In conjunction with France, we have assailed the enemy at a point on which the hopes and ambitious views of Russia have been fixed against Turkey, from the days of Catherine; and we have to expect that Russia, containing a population of 70,000,000 inhabitants, under the absolute sway of the Emperor, will defend the Crimea with the whole force of his empire.

This being the case, and also the present position of our forces in that quarter, let me ask if we are doing justice to our army so employed, to refuse our support to a measure brought forward by the Government, solely for the purpose of bringing the war to an honourable and speedy conclusion.

Every State in Europe has adopted means to recruit its army, and to replace those losses which war inevitably causes.

Prussia has her landwehr, France her conscription; but let me remark that France—the first military Power in Europe, and allowed to be the most conversant in military questions—does France consider, even with her numerous population, the conscription to keep up her army effective in the field of action sufficient? No. France has resorted to a foreign legion, in addition to the conscription.

Every person who has read the history of the Peninsular war must appreciate the services of the German Legion, and in consequence of the Confederation of the Rhine, under the protection of the Emperor Napoleon, they often fought, under most trying circumstances, German against German being often opposed to each other in the field of battle; but this is not happily the case at present; all through Germany the people are ready, heart and hand, to join to overthrow despotism wherever it may be established; and as this war, on our part, is to protect a weaker Power against a stronger that wishes to subdue it, there can be but one opinion that the Germans who offer us their services will do their duty with faithfulness and hearty good will.

I myself have served during the last war for eleven years in a German rifle regiment, and for the chief part of that time in command of it, the late 5th battalion of the 60th Regiment. At the siege of Badajos, who formed the covering party to the troops employed in the trenches at the storming of Badajos?—Who went in front of the forlorn hope to escalade the castle?—the 5th battalion 60th Regiment. Can any one read the orders of the late Duke of Wellington, relating to the services of this battalion in the Peninsula, and not agree with me that most valuable assistance can be obtained by the enlistment of foreigners?

I therefore entreat hon. Members now present to ponder well in their minds before they give their vote on this question. If rejected, I much fear the hands of Government will be so shackled as to impede their plans of action, for in the position the country is placed, with regard to the keeping up an effective force in the Crimea, I maintain it is impossible to do so without the aid of a Foreign Enlistment Bill.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL: Sir, the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire has said that we have endeavoured to throw off from our own shoulders the responsibility of the expedition to the Crimea, and to attribute it to public opinion and to the statements of some Members of this House. I beg leave to say, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, that they wish to throw off no part of the responsibility; as the Executive Government, it belonged to them to decide whether such an expedition should be undertaken—they considered the question very deeply, and in their opinion it was a measure calculated to promote the success of the war. But with regard to the measure now before the House, the responsibility will not be that alone of the Executive Government; they have brought it forward conceiving that it would tend to the success of the war, and let us see what has been said in opposition. The noble Lord opposite (Lord Stanley) said that he with great reluctance came forward to oppose that which the Government thought necessary to the conduct of the war; other hon. Gentlemen have stated the same reluctance;—but no hon. Member appeared to have fairly considered the present situation of affairs, nor the remedies to be applied. Now, the state of affairs is this; you have voted—and frankly and liberally voted—a large number of men, but you have not by that vote obtained the number of men you wished to recruit, for no less than 20,000 men have fallen short of the vote; besides this, many of those who were recruited were so young as to be called, as they were — and properly so — by my noble Friend, mere boys. [" Hear, hear!"] The right hon. Gentleman says that is not a fair statement, and that hon. Members know that it is not so; but I will tell you that my Lord Raglan, writing from the Crimea, complains that those sent out to him as drafts to join the regiments were so young, being below eighteen years of age, that soon after landing many were obliged to be sent into the hospital, and could not be introduced into his ranks. Then we are told in reply, that the whole country is for carrying on the war with vigour, and we are asked, why not rely on the country? These are grave but very vague terms. No doubt there are many landowners and merchants and others who declare in favour of the war, who support the Patriotic Fund, and who will make great sacrifices in order to promote a vigorous prosecution of the war;—but if the country wants soldiers, they are not of the station or age to enlist, and, therefore, all this enthusiasm, though good, does not give the 10,000 men you are in want of. Some hon. Gentleman had said—why not ask for more men? It would have had a very great appearance to have come and asked for 50,000 men. We should have been much applauded for our vigour; but to have asked for additional men, with 20,000 short of the number already voted, would have been absurd. Well, then, it is said, lower the standard and increase the bounty, and extend the age. The standard has been lowered, the bounty has been increased, men have been allowed to enlist up to thirty years of age. You might say, allow men to enlist at thirty-five years of age; but the number of men who would come forward between thirty and thirty-five years of age would be very small, for the number between those ages is not near so great as between other periods. Such being the case, with these very doubtful expedients only suggested, we have ventured to propose, conforming to the precedent of the last war, that we should be enabled to get men from foreign countries. It is said, " You may rely on the enthusiasm of the country, and men will be forthcoming." You might just as well say, " Do not go to Liege for Minié rifles, for there is plenty of ore and coal in the country, and in time we may obtain the rifles." No doubt this would be the case if sufficient time were afforded, and just in the same manner these men would be converted into soldiers if sufficient time were given; but the question is whether, within the next four months, we could obtain an additional supply. It has also been asked what would have been the effect if we had had some of these Germans at Inkerman? Why, if we had had there some 10,000 such men as fought under the Duke of Wellington in various battles, I should say that we should have had an addition to our brave infantry which would have been of great service, and that the bloodshed on the part of our army would have been much less. The right hon. Gentleman mentions various occasions in which desertions of German soldiers have taken place; but there was one thing he omitted, and a very important one—namely, that there was a custom that the German prisoners who were brought to this country were allowed to go back and enter the German regiments; these German prisoners having served in the French army, finding the discipline of our army irksome to them, went back again to the French. It is not such a force that we propose to collect. The right hon. Gentleman read instances, from the Duke of Wellington's Despatches, of fourteen deserters, eleven of whom were caught, one shot, and two escaped, and there he ended; but the letter to which he referred goes on to say, that they were men who had only joined the regiment two days; that they were prisoners who had been enlisted, but it was desirable not to have in that army enlisted deserters. The right hon. Gentleman found it convenient to omit these passages. Here is another passage which, likewise, the right hon. Gentleman took care not to quote—

> "The desertion is terrible, and is quite inconceivable, particularly among the British troops. I am not astonished that the foreigners should go, as those who enlisted the foreigners for Government have taken them in general from the prisons."

Such was the ingenious way in which the right hon. Gentleman read extracts from these despatches; but we know very well that the Duke of Wellington said, not only in 1852, but also in repeated despatches, that he admired the courage of the German troops. In one place he says, "I wish I had 3,000 cavalry, either British or German;" and he placed, in fact, the greatest reliance on these troops; and then the right hon. Gentleman gets up some case where German prisoners had been enlisted, and chooses that as a fair sample of the Duke's opinions. We were told, not very long ago, in the public papers, upon the authority of the hon. Baronet the Member for Lincolnshire (Sir John Trollope), that there was great enthusiasm in Germany against the Russians, and in behalf of the Western Powers, and the Government thought it was possible, seeing that such enthusiasm existed, to find a considerable body of men who, having been already trained to arms, would be of use as an addition to the force which is now serving in the Crimea. The hon. Gentleman who spoke last referred to the French. Undoubtedly, the Emperor of the French has said that whatever troops he had ready to go he should be ready to send to the Crimea, but would it be just if we were to say—"Knowing how cordial an ally you are, we will make no exertions, but we will rely entirely on the French army in order to reinforce the forces in the Crimea." The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire has accused me of having avoided any reference to the campaign. Now, I do not wish to go into details respecting what has occurred since the beginning of the war; but I think, if hon. Gentlemen will look for a moment to results, they will find that there have been few occasions in which, this country having been only nine months at war, the results were so considerable as those which have now been obtained. At the end of the last war, after various combats, we were exceedingly satisfied and proud because we found ourselves complete masters of the sea and because the enemy could not come out of their ports. Lord Nelson and Lord Collingwood did not think of going in and destroying Cadiz; it was never thought necessary that the gallant fleet which was always in the Channel should destroy Brest and other ports of the French; but now it seems that that which was a triumph at the end of the last war—that we have obtained the complete mastership of the sea, and succeeded in inclosing the enemy in his harbours—is rather a matter of reproach. I beg to submit to you the present position of the Emperor of Russia. What is the situation of his fleets? He has a great marine force, a fleet of some twenty-seven sail of the line in one place, and another fleet of eighteen sail of the line in another place; in time of peace sailing about with great show and splendour; but the moment war is declared, these fleets are shut up in their harbours. Is that a very honourable or creditable position? Is it not rather a very humiliating position for a naval Power? You speak of long negotiations; but let us remember what were the pretensions of the Emperor of Russia at the commencement. The Emperor of Russia then pretended to get the signature of a note from the Sultan, which the Sultan's Ministers declared was entirely subversive of his independence. Does he require that now? He has entirely given up any pretensions to it. The Emperor of Russia said, "Yes, I will occupy the Principalities as a material guarantee." But does he occupy them now? There were certain terms laid down in protocols at Vienna. The Emperor of Russia said, "I will not accept them." A few months afterwards he declared himself ready to assent to them. The allies have gone on, and they agreed upon certain conditions with Austria, to which they also obtained the assent of Prussia, unwilling as Prussia is to do anything unpalatable at St. Petersburg, before they were sent to the Emperor of Russia. The Emperor of Austria then sent these conditions to St. Petersburg. What was the reply of the Emperor of Russia? He sent, through Count Nesselrode, a haughty and indignant reply, that these conditions were destructive to the power of Russia, that they were such conditions as could only be accepted after a long and disastrous war, and that it would be humiliating in Russia to agree to them. But what is the language of Russia now? The Russian Minister declared at Vienna, only the other day, that the Emperor is willing to accept unreservedly, in the words in which they are expressed, these propositions as the basis of the conditions, which in August last he had indignantly rejected. Well, Sir, is that a triumphant position for Russia, or one that is humiliating for us? We are carrying on, no doubt, military operations of great hazard. The Government undertook it believing, as many naval and military men in France and England believed, that the facilities of attacking Sebastopol were greater than they have turned out to be, and, in consequence, there has been a degree of privation and hardship among our troops, and, at the same time, the necessity for displaying a degree of courage which has hardly ever been paralleled in the history of the world. I am quite ready to admit that they were mistaken in their estimate, and that high military and naval authorities, both of England and France, were also mistaken in their estimate of the strength of Sebastopol. Sir, the right hon. Gentleman gloats over the prospect of disaster, and he falls to the pages of his *Thucydides* for omens of the calamities that happened to the Athenian Army. I do not envy him his satisfaction. I still trust that the British army will remain to be victorious—that the flags of England and France will float in triumph over the walls of Sebastopol—and that these two great nations fighting in the cause of the liberties of Europe and of European civilisation, will still triumph over every obstacle that numbers and barbarism can oppose to them.

Colonel SIBTHORP rose to protest against the Bill. Whilst bearing testimony to the gallantry of the German Legion in the last war, he still thought the measure now proposed was a gross insult to the people of this country, at the same time that it displayed our weakness to Russia. England did not require the aid of foreign mercenaries in this war. She might safely trust her cause to the gallantry and courage of her own population; and he firmly believed that in one fortnight as many as 40,000 good and true Englishmen might be raised ready to fight the battles of the country in any part of the world. The noble Lord was unfortunately no soldier, and consequently had no feeling with the soldier. The measure was an underhanded measure—a low, dirty, mean, paltry, cowardly measure—a measure unworthy of an English Government. He had no confidence whatever in any of the Members of that Government, with the single exception of the noble Lord the Home Secretary. With that exception, the Lord have mercy on such a set!

The Marquess of BLANDFORD said, he wished before the House divided to make an appeal to the Government on a subject of importance. No one who had heard the debate could help feeling the deep solemnity and uncertainty of the position in which they were placed. He had no intention to diminish the responsibility of Government in this measure. Theirs was the responsibility, and on them let it rest. He wished to make one appeal to the noble Lord, connected with the Motion on the notice paper of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin. He would suggest that Government should take into its serious consideration the propriety of preparing a public form of prayer in the present emergency.

Question put.

The House *divided*:—Ayes 241; Noes 202: Majority 39.

[The List of the Ayes and Noes will be found in the Appendix at the end of this Volume.]

Main Question put, and *agreed to*.

Bill read 2°.

Lord JOHN RUSSELL proposed going into Committee upon the Bill this day (Wednesday), but he thought it would be convenient if the right hon. Gentleman opposite would state what course he intended to pursue with regard to the future stages of the Bill.

Mr. DISRAELI said, that the course he should prefer would be that the noble Lord should postpone the Committee until after Christmas. The measure had not been long enough before the country, and had been very quickly hurried through a second reading. With regard to the course he should pursue, he could only say that he should be in his place, and would offer every opposition to the further progress of the Bill.

Bill *committed* for *this day* (Wednesday).

Adjourned at a quarter before Two o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Wednesday, December 20, 1854.

Minutes.] New Writ—For Norwich *v.* Samuel Morton Peto, Esq., Steward of Hempholme.

New Member Sworn—For Marylebone, Viscount Ebrington.

Public Bills.—1° Episcopal and Capitular Estates; Spirits (Ireland) Act Amendment; Public Libraries and Museums.

CONSOLIDATED FUND.—SAVINGS-BANKS.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER moved that the House should go into Committee to consider the following Resolution, which stood on the paper:—

> "That it is expedient to create a charge on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in respect of the sums due to Savings Banks and Friendly Societies, and to provide for the payment of interest thereon to the Commissioners of the National Debt at 3 per centum per annum; and, also, to make provision out of the said Consolidated Fund, or by Exchequer Bills or Exchequer Bonds, for any difference which may now or hereafter exist between the assets in the hands of the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt in respect of Savings Banks and Friendly Societies, and the liabilities thereon; and, also, for the interest no such Exchequer Bills or Exchequer Bonds."

MR. HENLEY said, he must put it to the right hon. Gentleman whether it was decent at that particular period of the Session, and under the present circumstances, to make a motion of this kind, from the terms of which it was not very clearly to be ascertained what were the scope and object of the right hon. Gentleman's intentions. It was a Resolution which affected many thousands, nay, he might truly say, millions of the people of this country, and he (Mr. Henley) considered it by no means fair to bring on a motion like the one now before the House without due notice to that the Opposition side of the House. The right hon. Gentleman proposed to deal with the important circumstances of the Savings Banks when Parliament was supposed to have come together for an object entirely different. He must therefore beg to ask the right hon. Gentleman, before Mr. Speaker left the Chair, to state to the House what was the urgent necessity or the reason at all that should induce him to bring on at such a time and in such a mode, such a question. They had heard a great deal, at former times and in former years, of tampering with Savings Banks money, and of Stock-jobbing with those funds; and really and truly, if they were to have this kind of motion thrust upon the country in that way, it was difficult to suppose that there must not be some object of the kind in view. He put it to the right hon. Gentleman, if he chose to persist in the motion, whether he should not give some statement to the House before Mr. Speaker was called upon to leave the Chair, in explanation of what his object was, and what was the necessity that the matter should be brought on at that period of the Session of Parliament, when it was impossible that it could receive the consideration which it ought to receive, and when it was impossible for any Member of Parliament—however anxious he might be to do so—to communicate with the parties who were immediately interested in the matter.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I believe, Sir, that in moving that you should leave the Chair without any statement from myself, I pursue the course which is uniformly taken on all questions of Finance. The principle on which the House provides that on matters of Finance there shall be a preliminary Committee rests upon the very same maxim of good sense which dictates that the first statement on a question of Finance should be made in that Committee, because, if the Minister should make a statement before Mr. Speaker leaves the Chair he might as well introduce a Bill; and the object of the preliminary Committee is that there should be the freest possible discussion on the first stage of that measure of Finance. For that reason I made the motion; and you must perceive that it is more convenient to the House to make the statement before the Committee that commits the House to nothing, and where I can make any explanation that is necessary, than that I should make the statement, contrary to all rules of precedent, and to the convenience of the House. To me it is the same thing which course I pursue; of course, when Mr. Speaker leaves the Chair I shall explain to the Committee the measure I mean to propose.

After a short discussion, in which Sir H. Willoughby and Mr. Spooner objected to the necessity for then bringing forward the question,

MR. HENLEY said, that if they were not called upon to vote on the Resolution he could have no possible objection to Mr. Speaker leaving the Chair.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: The motive I have in view is, simply and singly, the convenience of the House, and when we go into Committee it will be for hon. Members to judge whether they shall take any Vote now or go into a discussion. If it should then be the sentiment of the Committee that I should postpone the Vote, I shall have no objection to do so.

House then went into Committee, Mr. Bouverie in the Chair.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER; Mr. Bouverie, the step which I have proposed to the House that it should take to-day is one which, as I have said, appeared to me to be dictated by a consideration for the convenience of the House, by that test alone I wish it to be tried. It is perfectly true that no financial statement is about to be made on the part of the Government; the statement I am about to make is not a financial statement in the ordinary sense of the term. It is purely a statement with regard to a system of regulation; it has nothing to do with taxes, either with their imposition or alteration; and it has nothing whatever to do with Supply or with the Ways or Means of the Government; it is a matter relating to the administrative department to which I anticipate the ready assent of Parliament, and therefore, so far it is not a financial statement. Now, with respect to the question of bringing it on at the present moment. They had heard much of late years on the subject of the arrangement of business. They had all felt that there were great defects in the mode of carrying on the business, so far as the arrangement and distribution of it are concerned, and different Governments at different times have come under much censure for not contributing, themselves, sufficiently to the expedition and due distribution of business. Now one of the greatest flaws and faults in our mode of proceeding is, that at the commencement of the Session, when we meet for the transaction of business, we are not usually prepared for it, and that many weeks elapse before we come to the discussion of it. What is done in consequence in this short Session? Several hon. Gentlemen have got leave to lay Bills on the table, and not many minutes have elapsed since an individual Member of this House was permitted to lay on the table, on his own responsibility, and to have read a first time a Bill of importance infinitely transcending anything you can attach to this Resolution. My noble Friend the Member for Woodstock (the Marquess of Blandford) has presented a Bill for the entire reconstruction of the episcopal and capitular system, and that Bill has been now placed on the paper for a second reading after the recess. I will now come to the question before us. It is one of those questions that require, under the forms of the House, a preliminary Resolution, but the forms of the House do not permit me to place with regularity or propriety in that preliminary Resolution the explanatory matter and the accompanying enactments which it is absolutely necessary should be before the House in order that it should understand them; and therefore my hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Spooner) said, with very great justice, that he could not understand this Resolution. I am not surprised at that declaration; and if my hon. Friend had any experience in legislation relating to matters of finance, and regarding the custody and care of public money, he would know that the technical language in which these Resolutions are framed is language extremely difficult to make explanatory in itself. My object is to give that explanation, if it be according to the view of the House; but if it be not according to the view of the House, then I have nothing to say, for the House is the best judge of what is for its own convenience. My whole purpose is to have the measure printed, and considered during the recess, so that hon. Gentlemen may be in a full condition to consider its principle with advantage when we meet after the recess. That is my intention; but if the House be of a different opinion, it is the best judge of its own business. Observe what the Resolution is, and it will be made clear to you that this is not a financial statement. The Resolution is simply a Resolution which is necessary by the rules of this House as the foundation of one or more clauses of a Bill which I shall propose to introduce, but which will contain a number of other clauses, a view of which it is absolutely necessary for the House to have to comprehend the whole scope of the measure. The object of the Bill is to meet various difficulties and objections that have often been felt with regard to the money—commonly called the savings banks money—that at present is held by the Government. That which concerns the management of the savings banks, and the regulation of the rate of interest to be paid to depositors and the nature of the guarantee to be given to depositors, is a most important subject, in which I think Gentlemen in this House feel a deep interest; and it is a subject on which I propose to present another Bill to the House, but that is entirely a distinct matter from the present Resolution, and from that which the present Resolution contemplates. With the interests of savings bank depositors I have now nothing to do, except in this indirect form, that I hope by the Bill to make the title of the depositors in law—(I will not say better in substance, for it could not be better in substance)—but to make it in law more perfect, and to give them a better remedy for asserting their rights. The present Bill has reference to the custody of the money of the savings-banks. The Committee must bear in mind that at the present time there are two modes by which you might receive and manage the moneys of the savings-bank depositors, and of the depositors of friendly societies. You might receive them as their agent, invest them on their account, transact their business for them, and leave to them the risk of loss and the chance of gain on those investments. That would be one mode of proceeding, and unfortunately, from the present state of the law, so much anxiety has been introduced into the subject that a great number of people, and even Members of this House, are still under the impression that that is the mode of proceeding adopted by the law; but the fact is, that the principle of the law, though the application of it is imperfect, is founded upon an opposite mode of proceeding—namely, this, that when you have received the money of a savings-bank depositor you have made a contract with him, not to act as his agent, not to invest the money on his account, and leave him to the risk of loss or chance of gain on such investment, but you have contracted with him to keep his money for him, to repay his money when he wants it, and to allow him a certain amount of interest. That is to say, you profess to manage the deposits as managers or bankers, and while it is in the hands of the State it is the money of the State; but what the savings-bank depositor has a right to expect is, that his money should be rendered back to him when called for, and with a legal rate of interest. Now, the real object of this Resolution is this—to reduce that obligation and that contract of the State with the savings-bank depositor to that simple form which is adopted by every banker. Anybody who has money in a bank understands perfectly well the conditions on which it is held. It is held as money payable on call, with or without interest, as the case may be. What I propose is, that as respects the bulk of the funds received from savings-bank depositors, they shall be held in this country as they are held in other countries, not in the complicated form of stock and other public securities—though it may be necessary to retain a portion of them in that form—but in a state in which every man will understand what he has given, and what he has a right to—that is, in the state of a deposit with the public. In assimilating the practice to that of other banking establishments, I do not say the Resolution proposes the adoption of the precise conditions on which money is given to them, but I speak merely of the form, and I thus seek to get rid of the very great and mischievous misapprehension which pervades the country, that savings-bank depositors are liable to suffer by the fluctuation of the public stocks, that being a misapprehension which I may anticipate with confidence is a very great evil. It is exceedingly to be desired that we should give to the savings-bank depositor, not only the best title, but the clearest and most effectual title in law that in practice we can devise. That is the object I have in view, and that object will be promoted if, instead of taking the money of the savings-bank depositor and putting it into the form of stock, which he confusedly thinks is attended with risks, we make him understand that the money he gives he has a right to get back, with a certain—that is a legal rate of interest. It is impossible for me to convey to the Committee the same view that I could convey to the House if I had the Bill on the table, but I point out the main objects of it, which are to bring into a clear and desirable form the obligations of the State to the savings-bank depositors. I shall venture now to refer to another point. I have stated on former occasions that powers unnecessarily large over this great mass of public securities have been vested in the Commissioners of the National Debt—that is, practically, in the hands of the Chancellor of the Exchequer—and I now propose by this Bill to limit the exercise of those powers. Those powers will continue in force with regard to so much of stock and public securities as the National Debt Commissioners may continue to hold, but so far as regards the great mass of the assets, that will be represented by an open asset credit, and the movement of those funds up and down will cease to be dependent on the will of the Finance Minister. They will then move upwards and downwards entirely according to the money received from the depositors or the money drawn by them, but the will of the Chancellor of the Exchequer will have nothing whatever to do with them. I hope, therefore, that the views of the hon. Baronet opposite (Sir H. Willoughby) will be met by the measure I propose to submit to the House. One effect of the Bill will be this, there will be this advantage—and not a slight advantage—which will be obtained by the substitution of a simple charge on the Consolidated Fund for a great mass of public securities—there will be a considerable saving of public money, and there will be the further advantage that we shall thereby do something towards relieving the exceedingly great accumulations of payments on the quarter days. One of the objects of the measure is, that the interest payable on those deposits, instead of being paid on the four quarter days as at present, will be paid, on the contrary, at a more convenient period, namely, the 20th of November, the middle of the quarter, the best time to pay it, and thus relieve the pressure on the quarter day. Another point is this—at present, unfortunately, the statement of your National Debt account is not a true and accurate statement, because in that National Debt account you appear to be indebted in respect of savings banks only in respect to the amount of stock that happens to be held by the Commissioners; but that is not the real amount of the debt—the real amount of the debt is their liability to the savings bank trustees, which consists of the whole money received, with the legal interest that has accrued. It is a great public object that we should make the statement of that debt veracious and accurate, and by the Bill that I propose to introduce, founded upon this Resolution in its most important parts, I shall provide for the statement of the balance of the assets and liabilities of the National Debt Commissioners once a year, which will be immediately after the 20th of November, so that when I give a statement it will be a statement, as nearly as may be, accurate and conclusive. I have stated to the Committee how much I desire them to understand the nature of my object at the present moment. My object has been to present to the House a measure for which I most confidently anticipate their full and most unqualified approval in its general scope and object. I wish to be able to put this measure into the hands of Members at once, that they may have an opportunity of considering it during the recess. I shall, in addition, move this Bill in the House, and ask the opinion of the House on the principle of it, at the most convenient time after the recess, namely, at a period before the financial statement is made, and when you will have the best opportunity of considering its merits. But you are the best judge of what will be for your own convenience, and I leave the matter in the hands of the Committee. The right hon. Gentleman then placed the Resolution in the hands of the Chairman.

Sir HENRY WILLOUGHBY: If it be intended to report progress without coming to any discussion upon the Resolution, my observations will be very short.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Without a preliminary Resolution I cannot bring in a Bill. My desire is to lay the measure before the Committee, and to give the hon. Baronet and others the most convenient opportunity of considering the measure during the recess, so that they shall be fully able to discuss the principle of it after the recess. Of course, I cannot do that without the Resolution, and whether the Committee shall think fit to negative the Resolution, and to thrust over the further consideration of the question until it is jostled by a hundred other subjects, at a later period of the Session, is a matter for their consideration.

Mr. DISRAELI: I trust that the Committee will assent to the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is quite impossible that we can have before us the scheme of the Government without this preliminary operation. I am glad to find that the right hon. Gentleman has directed his mind to the subject of savings banks, and I think the step he is taking is of great importance. Without pledging ourselves to support the measure, I will say that I think it must be for the interest of the public, and agreeable to the Committee, that the Resolution should be passed.

Mr. HENLEY said, that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had stated what he had never heard stated before, either in that House or out of it, namely, that there was a difficulty in the law as to the claim of depositors in savings banks, which would prevent them from getting their money back in full tale and weight, with interest. The right hon. Gentleman, it was true, added that the depositor would have no difficulty in that House in recovering his money, because the depositor might rely on the good faith of Parliament.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, he had not intended to make the statement ascribed to him.

Mr. HENLEY: He would, then, say not another word on that subject. With respect to the question before the Committee he might be excused for not having a very clear understanding of what was intended, because the right hon. Gentleman himself said, he did not intend, on the present occasion, to make a full explanation of his proposal, and it certainly would be very desirable for the House to have the project in black and white before it. He hoped the measure would have the effect of preventing for the future that tampering which, from time to time, if it had not actually taken place, had, at any rate, apparently occurred on the part of various Gentlemen in charge of the public finances, in consequence of the shifting and shuffling of funded property or some other of the public securities; by which, he believed, the property itself had always been diminished, though the depositor was not affected by that operation, because to him the public faith was pledged. He should not object to the passing of the Resolution at the present time, upon the clear understanding that the House was by no means pledged to any principle, before having an opportunity of considering the Bill.

Mr. H. HERBERT: The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer said he intended to introduce two measures, one relating to the management of savings banks, and the other to the custody of deposits. Are we to have two Bills; and, if so, will both those Bills be laid upon the table of the House immediately, to enable us to have an opportunity of judging of both schemes during the recess?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: I propose to lay the first Bill on the table of the House to-morrow or next day; but as to the Bill for the management of the savings banks, I do not propose to introduce it until after the recess; but ample time will be given for the consideration of it.

Sir HENRY WILLOUGHBY said, he thought the right hon. Gentleman had hardly done justice to the annual accounts of the national debt that were presented to the House, for in them the liability of the country was clearly stated. The right hon. Gentleman said it was limited to the quantity of stock held, but there was a distinct column which stated the existing deficiency at the present moment. There were about 36,000,000*l.* sterling belonging to the savings banks and friendly societies; and on the 20th of November, 1853, taking the stock at the price of the day, there was a deficiency of 2,723,000, and the Committee must be perfectly aware that the public would have to pay the deficiency, whatever it might be. With regard to the principle that had been laid down as to savings banks; he was perfectly aware of the nature of the contract, but then he thought that the right hon. Gentleman must see there was a very important question for the consideration of the depositors, and that was that the amount of the interest depended upon the state of the account. ["No, no!"] Why it was quite clear, and if they referred to the earlier accounts of the savings banks they would see that a much higher rate of interest was then paid, and that now the rate of interest is much lower. The right hon. Gentleman proposed to deal with the money as if it were placed in a bank on call, but in all those cases the interest varied with the interest on money, and they were now called upon to reduce the rate of interest payable to depositors in savings banks from 3*l.* 5*s.* to 3*l.* [The Chancellor of the Exchequer: "No, no!"] The right hon. Gentleman had also omitted one important view of the case. It was intended that the savings banks money should be held by certain Gentlemen upon a solemn trust, but all of them, except the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had ceased to watch over this fund, and it had become an engine of state finance. The trust consequently had been grossly abused. They could not confide in the financial Minister a large sum of money, except under the most complete control of the House, and the strongest provision of the law, and any enactment that would prevent the possibility of abuse would meet his support. What that House should do was, to place the capital of the savings banks in safe hands, in order that it should be looked after. He would ask, why there was any deficiency at all, and why was the right hon. Gentleman obliged to bring in a Bill? How came it that the balance in the account was on the wrong side? Let them take the account from 1817 to 1853, and he would ask why should it be a losing account? The investments were all on a favourable scale; and let them ask any bill-broker what was the state of his account. But the truth was that the deficiency had arisen from the mishandling of the money by the financial officers, who put their hands into a fund that should be considered a sacred trust. He must again complain that the right hon. Gentleman proposed by this Resolution to reduce the interest to 3 per cent.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER. I again say, no, no.

Lord JOHN RUSSELL said he begged to be allowed to interpose a word. If this Resolution were to be made a matter of discussion they had better report progress; but if the Committee would consent to allow the Bill to be brought in, they could then consider it when the measure was fairly before them. That he thought would be the more convenient course.

Resolution *agreed to:* House resumed.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said he might perhaps be allowed one word of explanation, as the hon. Baronet (Sir H. Willoughby) seemed to be under some misapprehension as to the effect of what had fallen from him. He wished it to be distinctly understood that the interest payable to savings banks depositors would not be affected in the slightest degree, one way or the other, by this resolution.

ENLISTMENT OF FOREIGNERS BILL.

Order for Committee read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

Mr. H. T. LIDDELL said, he had been extremely anxious, at a time when the attention of the whole country was so deeply fixed upon the conduct of this war, and on the policy of Her Majesty's Government, to offer some observations upon the measure before the House. But, in the previous debates which had taken place, he had felt so strongly what was due to the feelings of hon. Gentlemen — many of whom had been brought up from a great distance to give their vote—as well as what was due to the Government, who would be naturally desirous that no unnecessary delay should be interposed in arriving at a decision as to the great result that was pending, that he had hitherto abstained from addressing the House, with a view to expedite public business. But since the principle of the Bill had now been affirmed, and as it was unlikely that much time would be consumed in quarrelling about its details, he conceived the time had come when, as the representative of a most important constituency, he might with propriety venture to offer some observations to the House. And first, he must observe, that although he scarcely ever listened to the noble Lord opposite (Lord J. Russell) without great pleasure, and seldom without much instruction, he was compelled to say he had never listened to a speech of a less conclusive character than that in which the Lord President of the Council had introduced the measure now before the House. The noble Lord seemed to argue, that because in all former wars foreigners had been employed in conjunction with the forces of this country, as a natural consequence they must now also be employed to co-operate with us in the present war. Now, it appeared to him that a confusion had been made, but very improperly made, on the opposite side of the House, between two species of foreign auxiliaries in themselves as different from each other as light from darkness—namely, confederates and mercenaries. He would say, in God's name, let the country have all the confederates possible in carrying on this war; but it had not been yet made clear to the House how it was to gain strength or influence by means of these mercenaries, whom it would be attempted to enlist under this Bill. If the Government had come forward and said, "Lord Raglan is in want of disciplined and drilled soldiers—if you give us this Bill we will be in a condition to supply that want, though we are not at liberty to say where these troops are to come from," that would have been a strong case, and would, in a great measure, have tended to remove the objections he could not help entertaining against the measure. But had the Government said anything of the kind? What did the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War state, and what were the sources to which he looked for the prospects of success in this measure? The right hon. Gentleman pointed to the fact that some 30,000 Germans landed annually on the shores of this country on their way to the United States or Australia. Well, last year he (Mr. Liddell) had had the honour of serving upon a Committee appointed to investigate the question of emigrant ships, when a great deal of information was elicited relative to the condition of persons reaching this country on their way to the United States; and amongst them much was said of the German emigrants in particular, as to whose state Mr. Murdock the Emigration Commissioner gave some valuable evidence. Indeed, he knew of his own knowledge that the first case of cholera occurring at Liverpool came by a party of German emigrants who had traversed the country in a state of the utmost destitution from Hull, on the east coast, to

Liverpool on the west, bringing in their train that horrid pestilence. Now, he would ask, was that a body of men to look to for the formation of a corps of drilled and disciplined soldiers fit to reinforce our army, when, as the noble Lord the Home Secretary of State proudly assured the country, it had the whole of the population of the United Kingdom to fall back upon as a reserve? He believed there was a very small prospect indeed of success in that direction. But great names had been introduced into the debate, and great authorities had been alluded to by the noble Lord opposite, and by the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Home Department, to show that no great military operation had ever been carried on by this or other countries without the aid of foreigners; and the noble Lord the Secretary of State adduced the instance of the Emperor Napoleon's incorporating foreigners with his armies, and to the successful issue to which his campaigns were brought. The noble Lord, however, omitted to refer to the real position of Napoleon relative to these foreign troops. What was the position of the Emperor Napoleon—what was the style and title assumed by him? He was styled Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Rhenish Confederacy, Mediator of the Helvetic Confederacy! And were these mere empty titles? and was that all? No. Napoleon was a second Charlemagne, aspiring to universal dominion, which indeed he had acquired in Europe. His brother Jerome was King of Westphalia; his brother Joseph was titular King of Spain; Louis was King of Holland; his brother-in-law, Murat, was King of Naples; his step-son, Eugene Beauharnois, was Viceroy of Italy, having under his rule the fertile plains of Lombardy; while another brother-in-law, the Prince Borghese, held sway over other of the Italian provinces. Napoleon, therefore, stood in respect of all these States in the light of a suzerain, demanding from them contingencies in men and money. Was it wonderful, therefore, to find that soldiers from all countries of the world crowded beneath the banners of that great man? But was a spectacle of that nature to be compared with the miserable plan for enlisting the ragged outcasts of Germany to fight the battles of England—battles in a cause in which they were no ways concerned? He maintained it was simply throwing dust in the eyes of the country to attempt to justify the measure of the Government by such pleas. And, again, if they looked back to the wars of Marlborough, they would find that the foreign contingents in his army were employed rather in the light of confederates than as mere mercenaries. But, on this part of the case, he would only say, that, as the Government had succeeded in carrying their Bill, he trusted it would be attended with all the success they seemed to anticipate. Still he could not refrain from expressing his deep disappointment—disappointment which he knew would be shared in by his constituents as well as by a very great part of the community throughout the kingdom—that the Government, having called Parliament together, for the purpose of relieving the over-taxed energies of our brave soldiers in the East, this should be considered an effective measure for that purpose. He hoped now he might be permitted to say a few words as to the general conduct and probable consequences of this disastrous and unhappy war. It had been remarked in more than one quarter that the country was carrying on war upon a new footing, and the hon. Gentleman the Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) had told them that the war was being carried on with too much reference to commercial principles and commercial interests. And he would add, that they were carrying on the war without taking means to ensure that secrecy and promptitude so essential for the proper prosecution of all wars. With regard to the conduct of the war in reference to the interests of commerce, that was a point of extreme delicacy for him to touch upon, and it could scarcely be imagined that he (the representative of the great port of Liverpool) should desire to throw any obstacles in the way of commercial intercourse. Still he must say the mode in which the trade with Russia was now carried on gave to Russia all the advantages—perhaps greater adantages—than she received from a free, unrestricted intercourse; for Russia had received all the benefits of enhanced prices, while, by warning the merchants of England from her ports by your assertion of blockade, the trade had been thrown into the hands of neutrals. Such he understood to be the case with the Baltic trade, and such also, undoubtedly, was the case with the important trade of the Black Sea. He had seen that the hon. and learned Member for Plymouth (Mr. Collier) had given notice of his intention to direct the notice of the House to the trade with Russia. That notice, however, had been postponed; still he hoped the Government would take some steps to secure to British ships some of the advantages accruing from that trade, or at least that the blockade of the enemy's ports should be more decisively and determinedly established. There was another question, of the greatest importance to the country, which he should venture to allude to, because he deemed it of essential importance that our position should be thoroughly understood in the present war—what advantages England possessed on one side, and what were the advantages possessed by her enemy on the other. He had said that promptitude and secrecy were most material elements of success in war. The contest in which the country had embarked was a war of free institutions on the one hand—of absolute freedom of debate in Parliament and public assemblies out of doors of an unrestricted freedom of the press—of a civilised nation and representative Government on the one side, against despotic authority and centralised power on the other. It was indeed true that there were great advantages to be derived from this freedom of institutions; it was indeed true that to the civilisation of the Western Powers—to that high moral feeling and national pride that characterised the soldiers and officers of France and England—was to be ascribed that display of valour, and that determined resolution and endurance which carried our troops through dangers and distresses, which those of no other nation would be found equal to encounter and endure. On the other hand, as far as secrecy was concerned, no one could deny that this country was practically debarred from the exercise of it in carrying on the war. Not a regiment was raised—not a supply of money asked for from Parliament—not an expedition contemplated—without the Emperor of Russia having the intelligence laid almost simultaneously upon the table of his cabinet. By means of his unlimited resources and authority, the Emperor of Russia had established a system of communication with the seat of war, as well as with all the capitals of Europe, which kept him constantly informed of the intentions of his friends as well as of his enemies. And could we expect to derive all the advantages of our immense resources in carrying on this war opposed by such a system? Let him remind the House of a few instances to prove the value of secrecy in war. And first he would adduce an instance, which, considering the intimate and close alliance now happily subsisting between the two nations, he could do without reserve—an instance taken from one of the most brilliant pages in the history of the battles of the Emperor Napoleon. In the year 1805 that great Potentate found himself reduced to a state of inaction in his camp at Boulogne, after having successively postponed his plan, which he had sincerely at heart, for the invasion of England, and seemed to be threatened with a new continental coalition more formidable than any which he had previously encountered. Armed at all points, he was nevertheless at that moment placed in a situation of great difficulty, and found all the might of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, prepared against him. Four different attacks were contemplated against the French Empire; the first, through Pomerania and Hanover, by the Swedes, Prussians, and Russians; the second, on the Danube, by the combined forces of Russia and Austria; the third, in Lombardy, by the Austrians alone; and the fourth, in the south of Italy, by a combined force of English and Russians. Napoleon, in the rapidity of his execution, and the success of his combinations and movements when developed, was, perhaps, the most extraordinary leader ever presented to the eyes of the world, and he determined to strike the Austrians before they could possibly effect a junction with the Russians, carrying out that object, so easy in theory and so difficult in practice,—namely, to meet and defeat his enemies one after the other. That plan, however, hinged upon an impenetrable secrecy, but it enabled him to move three great armies—the first under Bernadotte, the second under Marmont, the third under his own immediate command, and converge them all at the same moment upon the battlefield in the neighbourhood of Wurzburg in Franconia. The result was, that almost before the Austrian Government was aware of his having marched from Boulogne, the Austrian army was surrounded, and nearly 60,000 men, under General Mack, were made prisoners at Ulm. Yes, it was owing to the impenetrable secrecy observed by the French Emperor, that in fifteen days the great events of that campaign were accomplished. And what was the language used by the historian of the "French Consulate and Empire," in reference to that campaign—

> "Never had any captain in ancient or modern times conceived or executed plans upon an equal scale. Since never a mind more powerful, a will more free, disposing of means more vast, had to operate upon so great an extent of country. What, in fact, do we usually see? Irresolute Governments, who deliberate when they ought to act—Governments without foresight, who are busy in organising their forces when already they ought to be in the field of battle, and below them subordinate generals who can scarcely move upon the circumscribed theatre assigned to their operations. Here, on the contrary, genius, will, foresight, absolute liberty of action, all concurred in the same man to the same object. It is rare that such circumstances all meet together, but when they are combined the world has its master."

Now, if that language of M. Thiers applied at all to Her Majesty's present advisers, he would only say, if the cap fitted, let them wear it. But the same secrecy was observed in the campaign of Marlborough, when he brought his army from Maestricht to almost the very same battle-ground of Ulm, and gained the immortal victories of Schallenberg and Blenheim. Well, the moral which he would draw from all this was—that if the Government of this country was debarred from the exercise of this great element of success in war, they must endeavour to make up for their deficiency by increased foresight, and by the most unremitting attention to all the wants and requirements of an army engaged in an arduous campaign. Having thus attempted to illustrate the effect of secrecy and promptitude in the operations of war, he would beg for a moment to contrast our position with that of our great opponent, the Czar of Russia. In the Czar of Russia they had a second Napoleon to deal with—not, of course, as respected military genius, though he felt sure no contemptible military genius had been displayed in the operations and defence of Sebastopol; but as far as regarded impenetrable secrecy, as far as regarded the concentration of immense masses of men, as far as regarded their being admirably organised, and provided with all the munitions suggested by modern improvements in war—in all those respects he might be considered as rivalling the power of the Emperor Napoleon. In some respects, indeed, he was superior to him; for, during his occupation of the throne of France, to some extent the French Emperor was held to be a usurper; whilst the Czar of Russia was, in the eyes of his people, almost an object of worship, as was evinced by their fanatical devotion and enthusiasm towards him during the progress of the war. Nevertheless, he must feel that the free government of a free people would be found to prevail against barbarism, though the country expected that no efforts would be wanting on the part of the Executive to bring about so noble a termination to the struggle. He was sure, however, that the country was disappointed by the proposal of this measure; while there was still more reason to dread that it would be disappointed yet more at its results. He had thus endeavoured to explain his views with reference to the policy of Her Majesty's Government; in doing so he believed he had declared the feelings of the great majority of the country with regard to the measure now under consideration. Certain he was that he had endeavoured to re-echo the sentiments of his constituents.

Mr. RICH said, that, although he had given his vote in favour of the Bill, he must guard himself against being supposed to have supported the measure itself, if it was framed for the engagement of mere mercenaries. He was well aware of the military difficulty in which Government was placed, and he would not object, therefore, to the employment of foreign soldiers, on conditions honourable alike to themselves and to this country. But were he to accept the explanation of the measure that was given by the Secretary at War, he would hardly have been prepared to vote in its favour. The source designated by the right hon. Gentleman as that from whence the expected supply of troops was to be derived was from some 20,000 to 30,000 Germans, who in the course of every year passed through this country, after having completed their appointed national military training, and who being desirous of settling in the United States, or some of our colonies, brought with them their wives and families, together with letters of denaturalisation from their own Sovereigns. Now, he fully admitted the value of foreign auxiliaries, but emigrants, such as these, would be the merest mercenaries. There could evidently be in them no sentiment of patriotic enthusiasm or sympathy for the great cause in which Europe, they were then quitting, was now engaged; encumbered with their families, and starting from their German homes as colonial settlers, he could not believe they would be likely to enlist, or that, if they did, they would be animated with that military ardour which was the heart and soul of a soldier. He believed there must be reasons of an official and diplomatic nature which had tongue-tied the right hon. Gentleman from explaining the full scope of the measure, and he was confirmed in this supposition by finding allusions only were made to the quarter whence the troops to be enlisted were to be derived. The language, too, of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston) necessarily implied that some negotiations would be entered into in consequence of this Bill. He had voted last night for it, and was prepared to do so again, in the confident expectation that Her Majesty's Government did see their way to a practical application of the measure by the enlistment of valuable auxiliary troops, animated with a spirit similar to that which actuated this country and France in opposing Russia in her schemes of unjustifiable aggrandisement. He had, therefore, supported this measure as a mark, thus far, of his trust and confidence in Her Majesty's Government. If it should prove, however, that it was to be carried out by bringing over cargoes of discontented, disunited wanderers, destitute alike of all home and all allegiance, and forming them into bands of mercenaries, he should be unable, when the money vote came on, to continue the support which he now gave. He could not disguise from himself, that although, in conducting the operations of a war, especially at the outset, many mistakes must necessarily be made, arising from want of preparation and organisation, yet on this occasion there had evidently been more than was defensible, and, he might add, almost conceivable. He was willing to make every allowance for the difficulties in which Government were involved, but there was one source of weakness, paralysing and impeding the due employment of their energies, which might readily be corrected. In the observations he was about to make he might be considered as prejudiced, having always acted with one well-known party, but he made them in the hope that they might conduce to the remedy of the evil. He held that in conducting this war, which now absorbed nearly all other State considerations, it was essential that those Members of Her Majesty's Government who had the largest portion of support in that House and the country should, whilst they were responsible for the operations of the war, have the greatest amount of authority in directing it. He did not know whether it was accidental, or from what causes it had arisen, but it so happened that every Member of the Government in any way connected with the department of military administration belonged to a party, or rather a section of public men, who, although of much ability and high private integrity, yet had no very large body of supporters either in or out of Parliament. Personally, he had reason to speak of them with all possible respect, and to desire to give them his support. But he would not, therefore, conceal the fact that it did so happen that the Commander in Chief belonged to that party; the Prime Minister belonged to that party; the First Lord of the Admiralty belonged to that party; the Minister for War belonged to that party; the Secretary at War belonged to that party; whatsoever remained of the Ordnance belonged to that party; and the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who furnished the sinews of war, also belonged to that party. Now, such a monopoly of the active direction of the war by a compact section of men who are not considered by the public to entertain very energetic opinions regarding its conduct, is an arrangement contrary to the public interests, and adverse to a determined unity of action, seeing that their colleagues in the Government, men of still greater ministerial and official experience, and at least equal intellect, are thus shut out from giving the full benefit of their abilities to the prosecution of the war. The Government, from its formation, and from other circumstances to which he might allude, but on which it was not necessary to dwell, was a Government of departments. The active superintendence and direction of it did not rest on a single head, as in Mr. Pitt's Administration. And now, while one section thus assumed the sole conduct of the war, who were the principal defenders of the present measure? Who came forward most zealously to lend their aid in explaining and vindicating the policy of the Administration? Why, strange to say, the very Ministers who were excluded from its management. In another place they saw a nobleman, venerable for his years, though still young and powerful in his mental vigour and ability (the Marquess of Lansdowne). In that House, also, last night, the brunt of the onset was borne by the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston) and the noble Lord the Member for London (Lord J. Russell), with the resolution and firmness they always showed. He had heard it stated by many Members, in private conversation, that they were willing and desirous to support the present Government, believing it to be the best that could be formed under existing circumstances. But as they had seen last year changes made in the internal arrangements of Government, so they trusted that before the reassembling of Parliament they should see other changes which would provide a better distribution of force, combining all the energies of all the Ministers in the prosecution of the war. Thus, he believed, the country would be essentially benefited, and the prospects of a successful termination of the contest materially improved. If he regarded the present measure merely such as the Secretary at War had sketched, rather than described it, he should hesitate to give it his support; but, believing the Government had ulterior views in regard to it, not communicated to Parliament, he was ready again to support it by his vote.

Mr. DRUMMOND: I think, Sir, perhaps it is an act of charity for some person to rise and protect Her Majesty's Government from their own supporters, for really, Sir, no bomb that ever arrived at Sebastopol can have made a greater explosion than this shot from behind, informing Her Majesty's Government that upon this vital question of the war, every single department in it, from the Ordnance to the Commander in Chief, is in the hands of that part of the Ministry in which it ought not to be. [Mr. Rich said, he had made no such observation.] Well, well, Sir, Her Majesty's Government have got the numbers on their side, and they are wise enough to care very little about the arguments. I was exceedingly sorry, Sir, to vote as I did last night. I think Her Majesty's Ministers have done themselves wrong. The fact is, that the country look upon this Bill as very much like what they call at Newmarket a "dark horse." There is a suspicion, Sir, that all is not fair and proper aboveboard. I have heard insinuations—some were made last night by the hon. Gentleman who moved the Amendment, but I will not repeat them, for I really do not know, and, indeed, I can't know whether they are well founded or not, but of this I am certain, from the language used to myself by every person to whom I have spoken on the subject, and I may say chiefly by friends of Her Majesty's Government, that there is an idea that some ulterior measure is concealed behind the present project. ["Hear, hear!"] Why that is the very sense of the expression used by the hon. Member who spoke last, and this, I say, is not fair dealing. The country has been taken entirely by surprise by this measure. There are meetings holding, I know, at this moment, and others in contemplation in different parts of the country, and I believe from what I gathered last night from the very contradictory speeches which were made, that there is great jealousy existing on the subject. But the country has a right to know, freely and fairly, what you are going to do. Now, I think all that has been said about its being unconstitutional to employ foreign troops is downright trash. If this be a *bonâ fide* measure for taking into our pay 30,000—or any number of thousands you please—of lawful troops, it will have my most cordial support. Suppose, for instance, the King of Bavaria were to say, "Here, I have got 30,000 men; I cannot pay them, but you may;" if you like to confederate with him, and send them to Sebastopol, then I say, send them by all means. But, Sir, from what I collected, this is a totally different description of agent which you are going to employ, and one about which I have a strong and very conscientious objection. The profession of arms is a most honourable profession, and, I believe, brings out the best qualities, moral and physical, which characterise man, better than any other profession. Regular soldiers never go into action, never are they carried to deeds of violence, except at the bidding of their Sovereign, in defence of the weak and oppressed or for the protection of their country; but when you come to hire mercenaries, who have no Sovereign over them, no country to protect, and no one ennobling sentiment in them, that is what degrades the military profession. These men are nothing but men-butchers; they fight and murder for 1*s.* a day, and, of course, if anybody will give them 2*s.* a day they will turn round and murder you in turn. And why should they not? I see that, by this Bill, you propose that these men should take an oath, not of allegiance exactly, but of fidelity. Fidelity to what?—to 1*s.* a day. But is not fidelity to 2*s.* a day a very much better thing?

> "A saint in crape is twice a saint in lawn."

I say this proposal is a most dishonourable mode of warfare. It was because I could not make out, from the contradictory speeches of the Members of the Government, which of these two forces it is they intend to employ, that I voted against the Bill last night. I am not against the employment of foreign troops, but I think it was exceedingly unfair to say that, if we do not swallow this measure before the country has time to form an opinion upon it, we are to be threatened with the withdrawal of the great Duke of Newcastle. Why, Sir, it 's something like the old maiden lady in the comedy who lived with the poor gentleman, and who pretty nearly bored him to death by perpetually threatening him, "If you do not do as I bid you, I will withdraw from you the protection of the Hon. Lucretia M'Tab." There are certain Members of Her Majesty's Government whom I should be exceedingly sorry to lose, but I confess I should not greatly grieve if the Duke of Newcastle were to take his departure. I should not think they would go into mourning for the event in our camp before Sebastopol, though, possibly, the Emperor of Russia might receive the news with sincere sorrow. Somebody else, I should think, might be found who would have taken care that our horses should not have kicked one another to death in the transports; who would have seen that the officers should have had a change of linen before this time; that officers and men should not have had their clothes rotting off their backs; and that some means or another should have been discovered by which the things which were sent out from this country with a liberal spirit should have got some time or other into the hands of the persons for whom they were intended. But this wonderful problem, of how to get a thing from one place to another, is evidently far beyond the comprehension of the Duke of Newcastle. I do not think there can be any such hurry as has been represented, and, therefore, I am inclined to hope that the Government will not press the measure, but will postpone it—I will not dispute about the day —but, at least, postpone it until the country has had time to become somewhat better acquainted with it.

Sir WILLIAM VERNER said, that he did not rise for the purpose of replying to the observations of any of the hon. Members who had preceded him; but, from having served in the army for many years, both at home and abroad, and aware of the sentiments entertained by our army on the subject before the House—the enlistment of foreigners into our service—he wished to say a few words with regard to facts which had come within his knowledge, and for the correctness of which he could vouch. During the last war it was frequently the practice to buy foreigners into our service, and he could assure the House that great dissatisfaction was felt in consequence by our army. He would mention an instance of this which occurred in the regiment to which he (Sir W. Verner) belonged. When stationed at Ipswich a foreigner was appointed to a commission in the regiment. He remained with us for some weeks, during which time he associated very little with the other officers, and his conduct was altogether so strange that it created a strong suspicion in the regiment that he had joined it from some secret and not very creditable motive. These suspicions proved to be well-founded. After a time he obtained leave of absence to come up to town, and never returned to the regiment; in short, he was a spy, and was published as a deserter in the *Hue and Cry*, and a reward offered for his apprehension; but he never was again heard of. He (Sir W. Verner) would now proceed to relate what happened when serving with the army in Spain and France. There was in the brigade in which he was serving a foreign regiment of cavalry, and when stationed close to the enemy's lines the desertions upon the part of the men belonging to this regiment were so frequent, particularly when on piquet, that the Duke of Wellington issued an order, that when a soldier of this (foreign) corps was placed as a vidette, a British dragoon was to be placed with him, in order to watch him, and if he had reason to believe he intended to desert he would be justified to shoot him. The difference between foreign and British soldiers is very great; independent of the disinclination on the part of the English soldier to desert to the enemy, he is obliged, from his ignorance of languages, to return to his own country, where he is almost sure to be detected. All countries were alike to foreign soldiers, and the temptation to desert was very great. A cavalry soldier, who took with him his horse and appointments, was handsomely rewarded; this was well known to the foreigners in our service. There was another circumstance, he would mention, as having also come within his (Sir W. Verner's) knowledge, which occurred at Waterloo, and is recorded in the events of that memorable day. Late, during the action, a foreign regiment of cavalry, in the service of England, came upon the ground near where he (Sir W. Verner) was with his regiment. By this time the regiment was greatly reduced, and the appearance of fresh forces was so welcome that he (Sir W. Verner) remarked to an officer near him, that it was a "timely relief." Having been engaged for a short time at some distance from his regiment, he (Sir W. Verner) was surprised, on his return, to find the foreign regiment gone. It, however, appeared afterwards that the Marquess of Anglesey had sent an aide-de-camp to the officer commanding to desire he would charge with his regiment. The officer replied that his was a young regiment, that it was the first time it had been under fire, and the men had behaved so well, he was going to take it off the field, and he accordingly marched it off to Brussels. Speaking as an old officer, recollecting what the feelings of the army was on this subject, and judging from the conduct of the foreign troops in our service, he saw no reason for supposing the new levy, if raised, would not follow their example; and, as he believed it was completely at variance with the feelings of British subjects, and wholly uncalled for, he would give the measure his decided opposition.

Mr. OTWAY said, that, having on a previous occasion voted against the second reading of this Bill, he wished to state the reasons why he opposed the measure. He should be sorry to impede the sending out of reinforcements to our gallant army in the Crimea, but he believed that we had other sources in important parts of our own empire that could be made earlier available for affording help to that army than the means offered by this Bill. He had seen from the newspapers that the Sikh and Ghoorka regiments in India, who were especially adapted for this service, were ready to volunteer for the Crimea. The East India Company obtained powers last Session for largely increasing their force of Europeans, and he believed that they were now carrying those powers into effect. Intelligence had also been received that a treaty of peace had been entered into with the Sovereign of Burmah; and, India being now in a state of perfect tranquillity, we might obtain effective reinforcements from that quarter before the foreign troops to be raised under this Bill could be organised and sent out to the seat of war. He likewise objected to the class of men contemplated by this measure. Having had the good fortune to witness the efficiency of many German regiments in the field, he would be the last man to underrate their capabilities. He believed that German troops, led by their own officers, fighting under their own standard, and animated by the traditions of their military history, would perform feats of arms second to none in the annals of the world. It was no longer a secret what was the character of the force proposed to be employed. It was to be recruited, they were given to understand, largely from German emigrants. But he had no confidence in German emigrants as a military force. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War told them that these emigrants would be trained soldiers, but Prussia was the only State where every man was of necessity a soldier; and of his own knowledge he could state that in some of the minor principalities and small duchies this was not the case; so that we could not really have that security as to the quality of these men that had been held out to us. It was quite true that foreign troops had served with our army in the last war, but it should be remembered that among those foreign troops there was only one regiment which did not sympathise with the cause in which we were engaged. He alluded to the Greek regiment; and what was its conduct? Being stationed at Malta, it revolted and seized possession of one of the forts, from which it cost us a great deal of trouble to dislodge it. If the Government had declared it to be their intention to form a Polish Legion with its own officers, he would gladly have supported them. If we landed a body of Poles to-morrow in the Crimea, with their own officers, he believed that great numbers would desert from the Russian ranks, and a great moral effect would be produced from which this country would derive much benefit. He understood that a letter had been written containing an offer from certain Polish prisoners that were detained in our ports to enlist in our service as soldiers and sailors to oppose our enemy, instead of remaining inactive and a burden upon the people of this country. If this story were true, it showed what was the spirit of the Poles, and how we might make them of use in this war. He was convinced that the great question at issue in this contest would never be solved until the cause of Poland was brought before that House, and with that subject he was sure the Government would have sooner or later to deal. There was another point to which he wished to call the attention of the House, namely, where were these foreign troops to be stationed? Were they to be billeted on the inhabitants of this country or stationed in our dockyards? Supposing them not to be encamped, but to be sent to our strong fortified places, to Portsmouth, Plymouth, Sheerness, or Chatham, for these were the only places containing barracks for large bodies of men, would not such a step be attended with danger? Look at the class of men of whom they were speaking? They had no feeling or enthusiasm in the cause, but came here, as the hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond) had said, to undertake to murder for a shilling per day. Now, with the numerous Russian agents that were in this country and at the Courts of all the petty German Princes, nothing could be easier than for these Russian agents to get twenty or thirty of these men for a certain sum of money, and send them over to England as emigrants to enlist in the proposed mercenary legion. And what would be the result? Why, they might do irreparable damage in our dockyards and arsenals. This, therefore, was a point worthy of attention, and the House should require information from the Government upon it. It was impossible to separate this measure from the conduct of the war hitherto. He admitted that we could not expect to enter into a great war with a peace establishment without making many mistakes of detail, but he could not refrain from noticing the want of ordinary precaution shown by some departments of the public service. At this time last year Ministers must have known that there was every probability of a war with Russia. Hurried attempts were being made at our dockyards to fit out our fleets for service; and when hon. Members asked why a particular class of vessels was not sent to a particular quarter, the answer of the First Lord of the Admiralty was, that we had not the men nor the gunboats that were required. Well, but at that particular conjuncture, twelve months ago, when preparations were so urgent, we actually turned our own vessels out of dock and admitted two Russian ships, which were there armed and sent to sea. This was surely bad enough, but what followed he should think must have caused some remorse to the First Lord of the Admiralty. The *Aurora* having taken refuge in the harbour of Petropaulovski, in the unfortunate action which took place there a short time ago, he found that the damage done to a portion of our navy was done by that very Russian ship which we allowed to escape from our hands in the way he had stated. The right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) referred last night to Thucydides; but England had produced a historian not second to that classic writer, whose name was immortalised by his history of the decline and fall of a great empire. Some of the pages of that philosophic writer he would commend to the attention of Her Majesty's Ministers, and more especially those in which, speaking of the statesmen who by their pusillanimity accelerated the fall of the Roman Empire, he said that crafty Ministers substituted temporary expedients for salutary counsels. He could not but view the present Bill as a mere temporary expedient. Why were the Government not prepared to mention the name of Poland, and to rally round them those who were ready to assist in the struggle? But if the Government were not prepared to accept, or if they objected to such aid, why did they not appeal to the national spirit? Why did they not call upon all men above thirty years of age, and tell them of the need for their exertions? Let them increase the bounty, and lower the standard for enlistment; let them open all grades of their profession, to those soldiers who had shown themselves so worthy of them; then no doubt we should obtain a British army which would win other victories equal (for it was impossible to surpass) those of Alma and Inkerman, which would lead to an honourable and lasting peace.

Mr. WHITESIDE said, he had listened with some attention to the speech of the hon. Member for Richmond (Mr. Rich), who appeared to him to belong to a rising party in this country, who were given to speak one way and who almost invariably vote the other. As well as he understood the hon. Gentleman's arguments, the hon. Member was of opinion that the Ministry might be reconstructed with advantage, and possibly the hon. Member himself might be induced to assist in the work of reconstruction. He trusted that the sound views expressed by the hon. Gentleman would prove satisfactory to his own conscience as well as to his constituents. Three distinguished individuals had addressed the House on the part of the Government. They had heard the speeches of the noble Lord the Member for London, the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for the Home Department, and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War. He hoped he would be permitted to make a few observations, not upon their words—for words were but the vehicle of thought—but upon their thoughts. Those three statesmen have submitted their opinions to Parliament upon this measure—to a Parliament that had been summoned together at an unseasonable period of the year for the consideration of what was called a great and important question. The noble Lord the President of the Council had given the House a disquisition upon the balance of power, to the threatened derangement of which he ascribed the commencement of the present war. Now that, he considered, was a very ticklish and delicate ground upon which to place the question of war. The doctrine of the balance of power is one that is subject to many limitations, when understood not by mere writers and thinkers, but by the common sense of mankind. It is subject to this limitation, that at the earliest moment the existence or authority of one Power is threatened by the ambitious views of another, it is our duty to express ourselves in opposition to the aggressor with decision and firmness, and in unmistakeable language, against the policy of disturbing this balance of power, before we have recourse to the last alternative of a declaration of war. Was that the course taken by the Government over which Lord Aberdeen presides—a Government that had in its possession a remarkable and important document, to which the same noble Lord was a party in 1844? That was a document which clearly intimated to the then Government the intentions of Russia, and from the time of its execution a system of negotiation not very creditable to our diplomacy had been going on. Now the doctrine of the balance of power had once received a great shock in the partition of Poland. The great Edmund Burke said that if an English Administration possessed of capacity and courage had then spoken out the sense of England upon that horrible transaction, the dreadful crime might have been averted. When the English Government permitted such a transaction to take place, the argument of the balance of power was most dangerous. If they put the question upon the ground of self-interest, the argument would be intelligible to all. Then they might say that, finding that the policy of the Emperor of Russia interfered with our interests, the Government thought that they would be taking the wisest course in adopting every means possible calculated to check him. The hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond) had spoken that day with his usual ability as to this highly objectionable measure. He (Mr. Whiteside) now asked hon. Members as Englishmen, whether those Gentlemen who spoke against the Bill at the outset were wrong in the objections which they had made. The Bill, as it was originally framed, was as mischievous a measure as could be introduced by a weak and improvident Ministry. What did the Bill propose to do when it was first introduced? The Bill would have enabled Government to employ in the country a body of foreigners who would have had the power of taking to prison any hon. Gentleman who sits in that House. Let them look to Italy for examples. Were there any States in Italy which availed themselves of the system of hiring foreign troops? What was the practice in Naples? When he (Mr. Whiteside) was there, he was informed that the number of Swiss troops employed was 11,000. He saw them in review, and they appeared to be a most effective body of men, who evidently, however, cared nothing for the people of the country—who were hired and employed by a foreign Power to crush their liberties, and who were ready to perform at command, the task for which they were paid, by trampling down the liberties of the people, if they had any liberties left them—but that people have none. What had been perpetrated under that system was powerfully described and justly stigmatised by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his pamphlets on Naples, which would be remembered long after his Budgets were forgotten. There is another country—Rome. What is the system there? His Holiness the Pope required the presence of a strong force of foreign troops to keep him on his throne. When Massimo Azeglio wrote his Reflections on Italy, he drew attention to the evils consequent upon the employment of mercenaries, and in the best chapter of his work proved that whenever rulers condescended to the adoption of such a system, they had invariably corrupted their own subjects, destroyed liberty, and sown the seeds of anarchy and rebellion. But it is said, what a silly thing it is to object to the introduction of foreign troops into this country. Why! Onslow, the Speaker of that House about a century ago—in 1756—on presenting the Money Bills to the King, addressed His Majesty on a similar occasion to the present, in these words—

> "They beg leave most humbly to say, they hope the sword you have so bravely drawn, and they so effectually supported, will be intrusted only in brave, capable, and honest hands, that so the naval, the natural strength of England, will make a figure, will do service, as much greater as it is exalted higher than ever before. . . . Though ever attached to Your Majesty's person, they cannot forbear taking notice of some circumstances in the present situation of affairs which nothing but the confidence in your justice, your love to the people devoted to you, could hinder from alarming their most serious apprehensions. An army of foreign troops—a thing unprecedented, unheard of, unknown—brought into England, causes but alarm. They hope their fears may be removed as soon as possible, and, in the meantime, that the sword of these foreigners should not be intrusted a moment out of your own hand to any other person whatsoever."

But he (Mr. Whiteside) was told that by the law of this country the king or Sovereign might employ any number of foreign troops out of the kingdom. It was true that the Sovereign was armed with such a prerogative. But who was to pay for them? Parliament possessed the power of checking the abuse of that prerogative by refusing to pay for them. Now he would ask, were there any precedents for this Bill? There were three Acts of Parliament referred to as authorities upon the subject. But he denied that there were any precedents for the present measure. The Act of 1794 was a remarkable example of the jealous care with which their predecessors watched over the liberties of the country while aiding the Crown in its difficulties. The Act of the 34 *Geo.* III. c. 42, sec. 43, was entitled—

> "An Act to enable subjects of France to enlist as soldiers in regiments to serve on the continent of Europe and in certain other places, and to enable His Majesty to grant commissions," &c.

And it recited that—

> "Whereas, during the present war between Great Britain and France, it may be expedient to raise regiments to serve on the continent of Europe, or in the dominions of His late Most Christian Majesty, and to enlist as soldiers in such regiments such persons, who were subjects of His late Most Christian Majesty, as shall be willing to enlist themselves in His Majesty's service; and to enable a certain number of them to serve and receive pay as officers in such regiments, and as engineers, under restrictions: Be it enacted, that it shall be lawful for such persons, who were subjects of His late Most Christian Majesty, as shall be willing to serve His Majesty, to enlist as soldiers and to accept commissions from His Majesty (which commissions it shall be lawful for His Majesty to grant) to serve as officers, or as engineers, in any part of the continent of Europe, or in the islands of Guernsey, &c. or in any part of the dominions of His late Most Christian Majesty. Provided, that no such officer or soldier shall be enabled by this Act to serve as an officer, or engineer, or soldier in any place except on the continent of Europe, or in any of the islands of Guernsey, &c. or in any part of the dominions of His late Most Christian Majesty. Provided further, that, in case it shall be deemed necessary or expedient to bring any such troops as aforesaid to any port or place in Great Britain for the purpose of rendezvous, or with a view to operations abroad, and it shall be deemed necessary or expedient to land such troops in any part of Great Britain for health or exercise, it shall be lawful so to do. Provided, that such troops, so landed, shall not be marched into the country to any distance greater than five miles from the sea-coast. Provided also, that notice of landing such troops shall within fourteen days after such landing be given to both Houses of Parliament, if Parliament shall be then assembled; and, if not, within fourteen days after the then next meeting of Parliament. Provided also, that there never shall be at any one time within this kingdom a greater number of persons who shall have been enlisted under the authority of this Act than 5,000 men."

The second Act which had been referred to as a precedent was the 44 *Geo.* III. c. 75, which recited—

> "Whereas it hath been deemed expedient by His Majesty, in order to provide in the speediest manner for the better defence and greater security of the United Kingdom in the present important juncture of affairs, to permit certain foreigners now in Great Britain to enlist as soldiers into His Majesty's service, and, for the better disciplining such soldiers, to form them into regiments, and to grant commissions to certain foreign officers acquainted with their manners and language; and it was provided that there should never be more than 10,000 men in the kingdom."

But these foreigners were in fact emigrants, who proved themselves to be brave and patriotic men in this country, and who were accustomed to our laws and system of government. The remaining Act was the 54 *Geo.* III.; and he defied the Secretary at War to show that it authorised the Government to bring into this country foreign troops to be drilled and instructed, and kept here as long as the Government thought fit before being sent abroad, and then to have their places supplied by others. The Act of 1813 gave no power whatever to drill these troops in England. These were all the statutes referred to, and he therefore felt he was justified in saying that there were no precedents for this Bill.

He admitted, indeed, that that would be no valid argument against a recurrence to such a measure if pressing necessity for its adoption were shown, but that the Government had failed to do. Well, then, was there any principle for it in the constitution of this country? The principle of our constitution was that our army should consist of our own people, in order that they might be animated by the same spirit as the people. This had been over and over again laid down as the principle of our constitution. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War had taunted the opponents of the measure with having brought forward no new arguments, but simply repeated the arguments of Charles James Fox in 1794. He (Mr. Whiteside) confessed that he had read with an humble and reverential spirit the immortal orations of the very man whom the right hon. Gentleman had thought fit to deride. They stated the principle that actuated the Whigs, when they were a great party. Mr. Grey, and every authority upon the subject, said, that when an unprecedented thing was sought to be done, it was the duty of Parliament and the country to watch it closely, for the smallest encroachments upon the constitution should be resisted when they were first attempted, lest that which was in the beginning only a partial inconvenience, might in the end become a permanent mischief, and what was merely practice to-day might become precedent to-morrow. But we have a great English writer who has spoken upon the character of mercenary troops, in contradistinction to the native militia, and who has pointed out the true source of the greatness of empires and drew the following distinction between mercenary forces and the true support of a country—Lord Bacon; and he hoped there was a copy of his writings in the War Office. Lord Bacon said—

> "Therefore, let any Prince or State think soberly of his forces, except his militia of natives be of good and valiant soldiers; and let Princes on the other side, that have subjects of martial disposition, know their own strength, unless they be otherwise wanting to themselves. As for mercenary forces (which is the help in this case), all examples show that, whatsoever estate or Prince doth rest upon them, he may spread his feathers for a time, but he will mew them soon after."

When Marius had enlisted the rabble at Rome, he did two things: he destroyed the liberties of Rome, and laid the foundation of military tyranny throughout the world. He contended that the principle involved in this Bill was immoral, unjust, destructive to the liberties of England, and of the political character of the men who made such a proposition. The proposal of the Government was not a repetition of the policy pursued in the late war. It was not the case of the Portuguese fighting for Portugal—it was not the case of the emigrant French fighting for France, nor that of the Spaniards fighting for Spain—it was the mendicant policy of a Minister, who sets out upon a tour through Europe to beg for troops wherever he can find them, and offers to pay them for cutting the throats of men with whom they have no cause of war. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War had given the House his reasons for this measure. He (Mr. Whiteside) did not mean in the slightest degree to impeach his humanity—he did not believe that the right hon. Gentleman was capable of any act of unkindness. He believed that if the right hon. Gentleman could relieve the wounds of our suffering brethren in the Crimea by any act of his, he would willingly do so. He never meant to attack the right hon. Gentleman on the score of want of humanity and good feeling. He only sought to dispute the arguments by which he had attempted to support this Bill. He denied some of his facts, and the applicability of his reasoning. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War told the House that the Government had been asked why they had not the requisite troops, and he then proceeded to give the reason. He told them that they had first to get the recruits, and then to train and drill them, and that a very considerable time was consumed in this. Well, what he (Mr. Whiteside) complained of was, that they had gone to war with the greatest military Power in the world without having obtained the requisite troops, or having done what they might have done to obtain them. The Guards were sent to Malta in February last, and war was declared on the 26th of March. When did the Government ask for a Militia Bill for Ireland? Why, on the 11th of August. If ever any gentlemen were placed in a peculiarly unfortunate position, they were Her Majesty's Ministers. No act which common sense could point out, or which any statesman would have foreseen to be necessary, was performed by them. Why, when they declared war, did they not embody the militia? Why did they not do that which Lord Hardinge, and every other authority, said ought to have been done? Although they passed a Bill in the month of August to raise 30,000 militiamen in Ireland, it was not until Parliament was summoned together that the Privy Council issued their order to fix the quotas for each county in Ireland. Those indefatigable and patriotic men, who feel so much for the sufferings of their countrymen in the Crimea, knew very well that everything they could ask for from the House of Commons for the carrying on of the war would be unhesitatingly granted them. He heard the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty thank the House for the vote of millions for the service. Was it, then, too much to ask the Government what they had done with the powers they had obtained, and what had been their conduct? They had the power of raising 30,000 men in Ireland, and they failed to exercise it up to the last moment. He (Mr. Whiteside) wrote to a noble and gallant Friend of his, the colonel of a militia regiment in Ireland which was ordered to be embodied, as he was anxious to hear what they were really doing in respect to the militia. What was the answer which he received? His noble Friend, in reply, stated that he had never yet got the order to embody his regiment; and that if he had got the order three or four months ago, he would have had them ready for service long since. He (Mr. Whiteside) was speaking of the county Fermanagh, and of his noble Friend the Earl of Enniskillen. The difficulty now was this: These militiamen were generally farm servants; but since the Bill had passed for their embodiment they were thrown out of employment, in consequence of the apprehension entertained by the farmers that from day to day they would be in danger of losing their services. There was no want of men willing to enter the militia, but what they said was, "No pay, no militia; if you choose to embody me, put me in barracks, and I am ready to fight." The Government had, however, not issued the order for their embodiment yet, but they say, "for the sake of our suffering brethren in the Crimea, and for those who are to fight our battles, give us this Bill," which really means nothing. He heard the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston) make a speech upon this great and solemn occasion—one in which our feelings are deeply interested, because our friends and brethren are at this moment fighting in support of the noblest cause in which a nation could be engaged—fighting, not for the Holy Alliance or the re-establishment of tyranny, but, as he understood, for the establishment of reason over brute force, and for the advancement of civilisation. And what was the character of that speech of the noble Lord? Stripping it of its words and of its jaunty manner, it asked, was it possible that they would not pass this Bill for the relief of our brethren in the Crimea? Yes; they did feel for the sufferings and the losses of that gallant army; for there were many in that House whose nearest and dearest friends had already suffered and bled and died. There sat behind him his hon. Friend the Member for Donegal (Mr. Conolly), whose two brothers had been shot down—one of them mortally, and the other tortured by wounds. There sat near him the hon. Member for Monaghan (Mr. Leslie), whose brother also lay wounded. Where is the gallant Member for the county of Antrim (Colonel Pakenham), who ought to be sitting in that House? He was transfixed by a bayonet at Inkerman, where the gallant Member for Cavan was wounded likewise. The noble Lord says, "I do not know where we are to get the men, but when we do find them we must bring them to England. But I do not know how long it will require to drill and teach them before we send them to the Crimea in order to relieve our friends, and to put an end to the conflict which they wage with the elements as well as with their human enemies." He appealed to the understandings of those whom he addressed as to whether this was not a mockery? I do not know, said the noble Lord, where we are to get the men, or whether we shall ever get them—but pass the Bill before the House. He did not know whether there were any petty States in Germany that would hire out their men; but, even if there were, why, he asked, should they be brought over to England to be drilled before they were sent out to the Crimea? Our troops had suffered severely—they had fought and conquered an enemy of infinitely numerical superiority—they had been absolutely starved; and, as Lord Raglan said in one of his despatches, they were at this time employed in gathering up stones to raise a shelter for themselves from the weather. All this was true; and they wanted, of course, assistance and relief. But what were the prompt, vigorous, and splendid measures of relief proposed by Her Majesty's Ministers? Simply this Bill, the advantages of which were wholly prospective, for getting men they did not know where or how, or in what condition they might be in, bringing them back to England, drilling them here, and twelve months hence, he supposed, sending them to the Crimea to gather up the bones of our slaughtered countrymen, upon whose tomb they might then inscribe as an epitaph, "These brave men perished through the negligence, the imbecility, and the incompetency of an English administration." The Bill was not a reality, and if there was one thing more than another that Englishmen disliked, it was to have a measure submitted to them that was not the real thing to accomplish the end in view. It might be said that this was an easy mode of answering the question, and was there nothing that he could suggest to remedy the evils he complaimed of? There was nothing effectual that he would not give or vote to accomplish the end they had in view. They had 11,000 or 12,000 constabulary in Ireland, the greater part of whom, from the altered condition of the country, were engaged in fishing—they were trained men, they were armed men, they were moral men, and an honour to the country they served. If he were asked, eager as he was to secure the services of these men at home, yet he would vote that the greater part of the constabulary should be sent to Malta or Gibraltar, which they could hold against the world. He would consent that these men, if the Government would give them the pay to which they were entitled, should quit the country and fight for the good cause. If asked, he would vote that 30,000 of Irish militia should be raised, and he would tell the noble Lord that the recruits were more ready than the Ministers who were in want of them, and, to give a single instance, the recruiting officer at Belfast enlisted 200 men in one day. They could have got the men, therefore, and might have drilled them; but to this hour they had not performed their duty. They called upon Parliament to pass the present Bill, which they represented as a great and an effectual measure, but at the same time they, smiling, said, "We will give you no information nor tell you anything about it. We will not say whether these men are to come from Germany, Italy, Portugal, or Spain." They asked for this measure to strike terror into the heart of the Emperor of Russia, and to put spirit into the people of England, forsooth! In his (Mr. Whiteside's) opinion its effect would be the direct reverse, and that it was rather calculated to depress the spirit of our people, and elevate the hopes of that despotic power, by showing that though we did not fail in heart or courage, we had failed in men. He looked upon it, therefore, as one of the most impolitic and inexpedient measures that was ever proposed for the adoption of a House of Commons. The best defence of it was pronounced in another place on a previous night by an eminent person who belonged to that class of characters who sometimes spoke one way and voted another. The argument he used was a fair one. "A mistake," said he, "had been committed by the Administration—a great mistake; but would Parliament punish the country for that mistake?" He (Mr. Whiteside) had pondered over that argument since. He quite admitted that where, in matters of lint, rags, and other details, a mistake had been committed by the Secretary at War, which the right hon. Gentleman had frankly avowed, no generous mind in or out of the House would take advantage of the circumstance to comment upon it. But when men were appointed to great offices, who aspired to be peculiarly the statesmen of the age—when such men had the direction of the affairs of the country, and influenced the fate of empires and the destinies of millions of the human race—when such men made mistakes, then he had a right to demand, were they competent to the offices they filled? "[Hear, hear!"] What, were they appointed to those offices to make mistakes? If it only affected themselves, it would be a matter of small consequence and little importance; but where the mistake was a vital and fundamental one, calculated to bring down ruin upon our brave army and dishonour upon our country, then he held that the defence resorted to by the eminent Whig to whom he alluded was the strongest and severest condemnation that could be pronounced upon the Ministry. Well, they were about to support this Bill. But there were two powers in this country—the power of a Parliamentary majority, and the power of public opinion. To that public opinion—he did not mean the opinion of an ignorant, or an absurd, or a violent people; but the opinion of this great people of England, expressed after due thought, reflection, and consideration—to that public opinion they must ultimately bow, for by it Ministers existed and Parliaments ruled; and that opinion was, without question, against this Bill. Instinctively the English nation had discovered its true character—he said instinctively, because Ministers, conscious themselves of what it really was, would not allow them time and opportunity to give it full consideration. Stealthily introduced, it had been hurried through the other House of Parliament with almost indecent haste, though in that House the eloquence, the logic, and the reason were all opposed to it. It was now before the House of Commons, and he asked them seriously, did they believe that the people were in favour of the measure? True, they might carry the Bill, but they might rely upon it that they would not carry with them the conviction of the country. And did they think they could maintain the war against the Russian tyrant, save by the enthusiasm, the union, and the energy of an unconquered and unconquerable people? In what condition did the Government stand? Did ever Ministry hold office or make war under such favourable circumstances? They had a Treasury filled with money. England prosperous; Scotland wealthy; Ireland, what it had not been before for centuries, profoundly tranquil; and Protestant and Catholic agreed in this, that they would together fight the good cause against the common enemy. Millions of people in our Colonies, bound to the government of this country, not by cruel laws, but by the adamantine links which united the hearts of freemen, gave their sympathies and feelings in aid of the war; yet the best thing the united wisdom of a Coalition Cabinet could suggest was this Bill to enable them to go a-begging for soldiers amongst the kings of Europe. And upon what ground? Why the enthusiasm of Germany! "Germany," said the Secretary at War, "had a great number of hungry people in it." That he (Mr. Whiteside) could easily believe. "Germany had men," said the right hon. Gentleman, "who wished to quit their country." What would be the consequence? Why, that if we once bought them we must keep them for all time. The right hon. Gentleman then came to his best argument, and said—

> "Will you refuse us your aid to carry on the war?—not that I think or know that we shall be able to get the men in Germany or anywhere else; but I rely upon one thing—you cannot dispute that the enthusiastic feelings of the German nation are in accord with yours in this great struggle."

Now he (Mr. Whiteside) would like our friends to evince their sympathy, not in words, but in actions. He liked to have an ally such as France, because that was an alliance he could understand. It was an alliance with a courageous and a chivalrous people, actuated by disinterested principles, and desirous of assisting this country in making war upon a despotic tyrant. He understood all that; but what was he to understand by the sympathy of the German people? How the right hon. Gentleman could have mustered gravity enough to address such an argument as that to the House was to him, he confessed, the subject of astonishment. Had they not read the blue books? Had they not read the diplomatic documents which were laid upon the table of the House? And after all our diplomacy and negotiations with the German Powers, had we not seen that when we thought we were most near the attainment of our object we suddenly found ourselves as far off from that result as ever? But it was said the enthusiasm of Germany was satisfactorily proved; that we had effected a treaty with Austria which everybody could understand and which had been received with acclamation; that Prussia was now adopting a distinct and decided policy; that Bavaria had become our confederate; and that all were ready —"for a consideration"—to come to our assistance against the common foe. He appealed to the good sense and reason of the House whether it was possible for a more impotent argument to be addressed to a rational assembly of men? No fact or document was adduced to prove these assertions; but it was said that Germany was enthusiastic, and possibly in some perty German States we might find men willing to become our mercenaries, headed by some Dugald Dalgetty it might be, to aid us in carrying on the war against Russia. But had not the petty Princes of Germany need of care how they provoked the wrath of the Czar? Might they not run the risk of having their States blotted out of the map of Europe? whilst their subjects who had hired themselves to fight our battles would inevitably be hanged whenever he caught them. It was said that none but mistaken and wrong-headed men could speak or write against the employment of mercenaries. He (Mr. Whiteside) had the honour of the acquaintance of that gallant soldier, the late Sir Charles Napier, and the friendship of some of the most distinguished officers in the Crimea.

The historian of the Peninsular War was still alive—a scholar, an historian, and a man of unexampled courage, and the gallant veteran had lately written his opinion concerning this matter. Civilians, he might be told, were incompetent to judge. We must go, therefore, to high military authorities, and this was what Sir William Napier said—

> "Shall a mere mercenary band, picked up for gold, without national feeling—poor miserable hirelings, selling their limbs and lives, aye, their very souls, for lucre—ready, without a cause, if paid, to murder, to slay or be slain, and, of course, ready to change sides for higher pay if good occasion offer—shall such varlets stand in line beside our noble soldiers, who fight shouting 'England! England!' and, dying, murmur, 'We have done our duty!'"

He trusted there was so much of patriotic feeling, so much of self-reliance, so much of that lofty courage which had distinguished our forefathers, as would enable us now, or whenever the opportunity occurred, to get rid of this bad Bill, and to avert the disgrace that would otherwise, according to the words of this distinguished soldier, tarnish the hitherto unsullied arms of a free and a gallant people.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT: Sir, I cannot allow the speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman who has just sat down to remain without some answer on my part, inasmuch as he particularly alluded to statements I have made, and, I must say, grossly perverted them for the purposes of debate. The hon. and learned Gentleman has said that in the debate on this measure in the other House the eloquence, reason, and logic were all on the same side. Sir, I must say that I could not listen to the speech we have just heard without making the reflection, that both reason and logic might be divorced at times from acknowledged eloquence. But I wish to call the attention of the House to that which I think I am entitled to call a perversion of views, with the purpose of misrepresenting arguments, used by the hon. and learned Gentleman. When, after he had admitted that the Bill was cleared from every complaint on a constitutional ground, he quoted from the letters of Lord Bacon, that princes ought not to receive assistance from mercenaries to support them against their own subjects, does he mean to insinuate that, of all the Sovereigns of this country, or of any country in the world, the Sovereign who now sits on this throne is about to have recourse to foreign mercenaries, or to any troops, be they domestic or foreign, for the security of that throne which rests on the only security on which a throne can rest—the affection and devotion of our countrymen, and not on the assistance of any foreigners or mercenaries? Does the hon. and learned Gentleman believe, or does he think that he can persuade the House that he believes, that the troops to be raised under this Bill are to be engaged for some domestic purpose altogether apart from the war? He says that I have spoken of the enthusiasm of Germany in words not justified by the facts. Then he quotes precedents—but he dealt very lightly with the precedent I quoted last night of the Bill of 1813, I think—and asks where I find any Bill by which it was permitted that foreigners might be arrayed and drilled in this country. But I can show that foreigners were so arrayed into battalions and drilled in this country; and the noble Lord sitting near me signed letters authorising this. [Mr. WHITESIDE here made an observation that was inaudible.] But there was another Act by which the Government was indemnified, and no restriction was placed on the amount of the battalions that were raised under the Act, and they were afterwards employed to the satisfaction of their leaders and of the country. He says that I have spoken of the enthusiasm of Germany, and will not believe that any such feeling exists; but, though the German Diet has been tardy in the recognition of its duty, yet the Governments of some of those States of which the hon. and learned Member speaks so contemptuously have declared that the objects of the war are just, and that the means employed to attain them are justifiable. Will the hon. and learned Gentleman take the evidence of the press of Germany? There cannot be a greater mistake than to confound the people with the Governments of Germany; and no one who has taken the trouble to make inquiries upon the subject will venture to deny the existence of a feeling of sympathy with France and England among the great mass of the people in Germany. But the hon. and learned Gentleman says that no reliance can be placed upon foreign troops, and that the precedent of the last war, in which our French and Dutch auxiliaries fought for their own liberties and independence, does not apply to the present contest. The hon. and learned Gentleman, however, must recollect that at the time we were engaged in that war there was a Government existing in France against which the French Legion was contending, and if desertions did take place it was only what might be expected when men found themselves fighting against the armies of their own country, speaking their own language, and having to a certain extent the same feelings and aspirations with themselves. So in the case of the Dutch. In the last war the Dutch did not fight for Holland, for Holland was at that time in close alliance with France. But the Government are not going to enlist Russians to fight against Russia; and I ask whether, when a strong public opinion undoubtedly does exist in Germany in favour of the Western Powers, it will not be prudent to take advantage of that circumstance in order to send reinforcements to our brave soldiers in the Crimea. The hon. and learned Gentleman quoted what had been written by Sir William Napier on these mercenaries; but what were the observations of that distinguished soldier on these troops at the battle of Salamanca? He describes their charge as one of the most brilliant, and how, though falling by ones, twos, and threes, they still pressed on; and the Duke of Wellington bears similar testimony. Do not, then, come with garbled passages from Sir William Napier, and quote them against gallant troops who were employed with such signal advantage, and whom I hope to see so employed again. The hon. and learned Gentleman likewise says, why have you summoned Parliament for one measure by which you seek to relieve the army in the Crimea, and by which you go begging throughout Europe for the scum and refuse of their subjects to come and fight under your banner? But this is one of his misrepresentations of which I have a right to complain; he thinks he has a right to assume that if the Government bring in a measure, it is the only one they are taking for the prosecution of the war. He talks also of this Bill not only as if it were brought in for the purpose of enlisting foreigners, but also for that of displacing British troops. The hon. and learned Gentleman apparently thinks that the Government are making no exertions to get British soldiers, and asks why we do not lower the standard? We have lowered the standard. He asks why we do not extend the age to which men may enlist? We have extended the age to thirty, and even to thirty-five years, in the case of men who have served. While upon this point I may observe that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) last night met a statement of mine by a very simple mode when an argument is not convenient —he said my statement was not true. ["Hear, hear!"] I shall be very glad if I misunderstood the right hon. Gentleman, for it was painful for me to see a discussion in this House carried on in that spirit, for when a Gentleman in this House makes a statement I place implicit credence in it. On another occasion the right hon. Gentleman said there was no truth in the statement of the Secretary at War that warm clothing had been sent to the Crimea, for that which was sent out in the *Prince* was only the ordinary clothing. Well it was true that the ordinary clothing was sent out, but there was also a quantity of extra clothing submerged with it when the *Prince* was unfortunately wrecked. As my statement with respect to the age of the men was denied, I took the opportunity this morning of asking the officer at the head of the recruiting service to tell me the age at which the majority of the men were engaged. He said that he could not do this at once, but he would get me the return if it would be of service. I then asked him to tell me in the rough what had been the effect of extending the age to thirty? He said that, though men were enlisted between twenty-five and thirty years, yet that the mass were boys. I asked whether it was better in the militia? He replied, that it was better, but that great numbers in the militia were extremely young. I do not know whether hon. Gentlemen have had an opportunity of seeing the militia, but, if they have, they may apply a very simple test on this point, by observing, now that the troops are allowed to wear moustaches, how many among the militia succeed in doing so, and I think they will then be satisfied as to their age. I say, then, that the efforts being made are put entirely out of sight by the hon. and learned Gentleman, who is skilled in forensic argument, and knows best how to put a case so as to make a momentary impression. He has made merry at my expense as to the uncertainty of where we are to obtain these troops from; it is quite true that this is not stated in the Bill, but if the hon. and learned Gentleman will apply his infallible powers to a question nearer home I shall be greatly obliged to him. If he can produce recruits as fast as he says they were obtained at Belfast—200 in one day—I know what is the amount of money paid to those who bring in recruits, but I do not know how large, and deservedly so, may be the professional practice of the hon. and learned Gentleman—but if he can produce recruits as fast as he has said, I will venture to say that the military will be almost a better profession than his own, which he has followed with so much distinction and success. My hon. Friend the Member for North Staffordshire (Mr. Adderley) asked why we did not get a legion of Canadians and of our colonists. I say, certainly, and what is to prevent your getting them if you have likewise a German Legion? and the object of the Government in carrying on this war is to neglect no means. [Mr. ADDERLEY: Hear, hear!] I am glad the hon. Gentleman agrees with me. You may say that you do not think that this measure will succeed, but you cannot tell until you have tried; if you fail, you fail; but if you do not attempt it, then I say that you are guilty of culpable negligence in not attempting the utmost. You say that this will prevent enlistment. I do not believe a word of that, for enlistment is going on as rapidly as ever, but this cannot continue to all time. It is not fair to say that hon. Gentlemen are, to a certain extent, obliged to accept this measure because it is the only one Government produces. We heard the same objections to another measure, which, though small, still assists in the great object, and enables us to remove the militia to the garrisons in the Mediterranean, and to take thence the regiments of the line; and it might as well be said of that measure that it was the only means by which we think we are going to conquer the Emperor of Russia. It is not, certainly, an encouraging prospect to have our efforts met with such opposition or treated with such indifference and misrepresentations. I do not complain of hon. Gentlemen—many of whom spoke last night with perfect fairness—for criticising or picking holes; they have a right to object to what they think objectionable, but what I do object to is misrepresentations of the objects and intentions of the Government. What I do object to is, that these means should be described as the only means the Government have resorted to in order to carry on the war with vigour. The hon. and learned Gentleman says, we must bow to public opinion. I know we must, and that public opinion which he thinks so omnipotent in England, he says is so impotent in Germany—there it has no power, while here it is supreme. There is a distinction in favour of our own country in this matter, but the hon. and learned Gentleman knows little of Germany if he thinks it has no effect there. He says we must bow to public opinion, and I am willing to stand that test with respect to this measure, for though you may, by a perversion of facts and by ingenious arguments founded on data which do not exist, influence public opinion and misdirect it from those channels in which it ought to flow, yet before long this will be recognised, and the unpopularity of the measure will disappear as soon as it is seen that none of those sinister projects and nefarious intentions attributed to it are to be carried into effect by it, and that these troops are to be used only for the legitimate purposes of the war, and they will then entertain no scruples as to whether the trigger of the gun by which a Russian is slain be pulled by an Englishman or by a German. I do not think the country will refuse the assistance of foreign people whose heart and sympathy is with them, nor do I think, when they see the result of this measure, that their opinion will be different from that which was entertained, not before, but after, the formation of the German legions, that had so direct a tendency to strengthen the attachment between England and Germany, for England saw the result of using those troops that stood by us in the hour of our greatest need, and enabled the British troops to achieve some of their most glorious victories. I trust the House will not be led away by statements—for God knows our difficulties are great, and we have enough to encounter; but do not let us augment our difficulties by publishing statements which have no foundation except in the imaginations of the speakers. Do not let it go forth that we are going to replace English troops because we could not get them, or because we were unable to meet the enemy. What we said was this—"We have an English army; we will enlarge and strengthen that army to the utmost of our power; we will likewise secure the assistance of every auxiliary force which we can employ with confidence; and we will give the advantage of that assistance to our own brave men."

Mr. NAPIER said he had listened with pride and pleasure to the able and eloquent speech of his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Whiteside), but he would not take the object of the Government from the statement of his hon. and learned Friend, but refer them for it to the language of the Bill itself. It would there be seen, that whilst, on the one hand, they assumed that they were only going to enlist troops which were animated by right motives, power was asked to enlist any foreigner in the service of Her Majesty. They talked confidently about Germany, its loyalty, and its sympathy with the cause of the Allies, and the auxiliary power that that country might bring to our assistance; but what right had they to argue thus upon a measure which avowedly authorised them to hire any foreign mercenaries? He held that we stood now in a different position from that we occupied in former wars. We had passed an interval of nearly a half-century of unbroken peace; and we must test this war and the mode of conducting it, not merely by constitutional principles and the principles of civilisation, but by the principles of Christianity itself; and he contended that it was inconsistent with the duty of a Christian people, when engaged in a just and necessary war, to give the go-by to their own willing citizens and to hire mercenaries in any part of the world to do the work of slaughter for them. The right hon. Secretary at War could not defend the Bill on the general ground of necessity for hiring foreign mercenaries, but he was obliged to suggest that the troops they were to raise were men actuated by the "high moral motives" spoken of in the letter of Sir William Napier, wherein, describing the German Legion, he said it was "well composed," and was, indeed, a national force, with high moral motives. Well if that were so, why not at once declare it? The right hon. Gentleman said the Government were not neglecting any means for carrying on the war with vigour—that, in fact, this was a mere supplement to their other exertions. But what the people of England and of Ireland said was, that they had not yet enlisted the whole of their militia force; and that when they had exhausted every other means at their command, then would be the time to go to Germany and other places for auxiliaries. He would remind the House of the celebrated speech of Sir James Mackintosh upon this subject, in which he said that Elizabeth had relied upon the most effectual ally of the country—the spirit of its people; and also of the opinion of Mr. Coleridge, that the moment a country looked over the world for sympathy and assistance the glory of that country was departed. It would be degrading and humiliating to the country to go about the world asking for hired mercenaries, it would be destructive of the spirit of the people, and of all that moral elevation which, after all, was the great resource and defence of nations. The Bill, he asserted, was an odious Bill, repugnant to the feelings of the people; and he felt convinced that there was a strength and a truth in the instinct of the country that would not allow the Government to act upon the measure. In opposing it, then, he was simply discharging his duty as a Member of the Legislature; for he could not imagine that the Parliament of England had been called together merely to enregister the edicts of Ministers; and he hoped that every species of resistance would be offered to the measure. With regard to public opinion in Germany, he challenged the right hon. Gentleman to make trial of that opinion; and if, during the short recess about to ensue, the people of England applied their minds to the consideration of the probable operation and effect of the Bill, and did not, throughout the kingdom, wherever honesty of purpose, true patriotism, sincere regard for England, and a deep felt sympathy for her stability and permanence among the nations of the world were to be found, unite in its condemnation, he would never again ask permission to address that House whilst he had the honour of occupying a seat within its walls.

MR. COBDEN: Although, Sir, I protested against sending out our men to fight the battles of Europe upon land—although I protested against the objects of our continental policy in fighting those battles—and although I think that the expedition to the Crimea is about the rashest of any of which an account is to be found in our annals—and that is saying a great deal—yet the nation having willed that 30,000 of our fellow-countrymen should go 3,000 miles off to invade the empire of Russia, I say that the nation is bound to assist, by every means in their power, those brave men who are now in the Crimea. But if you were to put it to our countrymen who are rotting in such misery on the heights of Balaklava, what would they say of the aid you propose to send them? Would they ask for mendicant Germans to rescue them from their present difficulties? No! they would ask for their own countrymen, and I cannot help thinking that this proposal, among other disadvantages, will be accepted as no compliment by those men who are proposing to serve. But, beyond this, it appears to me that you are, in the face of the world, holding out a signal of distress, suing *in formâ pauperis*, proclaiming a sort of national bankruptcy in men and in courage, in proposing, in the first year of the war, to go and raise recruits among foreigners. Has the fervour with which the war has been regarded in the country been sincere or not? The newspapers are careful to tell us that there is a unanimity in favour of the war; we are constantly reminded of the enthusiasm that everywhere prevails, and we have dealt with the war in a way which ascribes to ourselves a sense of justice and motives of disinterestedness and high generous honour, almost assuming the attribute of the Deity himself, in the power we lay claim to, and the inherent sense of justice with which we wield that power. Is this reality or is it not? The world will judge us, not by what we say, but by what we do, and I am afraid that this proposal of the Government to enlist foreigners to help us will be taken as a considerable discount from our enthusiasm. We have heard from the Government that there is a reserve in this country to fight our great battles; indeed, we are told by the Government that large numbers of recruits can now be got in England. If that be so, what is the motive for sending over for these Germans or other people? But it seems to me that while you are gratuitously lowering your character by bringing forward this measure, you are doing so without any guarantee of its success. I listened with anxiety to the observations of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War in hopes of hearing where you are to get recruits from, but I have heard nothing yet more tangible than that you are going to intercept a number of German emigrants on their way from Hull to Liverpool by the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway. That appears to me a most puerile resource. The emigration from Germany to the United States consists generally of grown-up men and women with their families, of communities of labourers carrying with them their clergyman and their doctor, who have booked themselves upon the Rhine for Cincinnati or Buffalo, or some other place in the Far West. Can anything be so puerile as to dream of intercepting these people, of stopping them on their way through England, and inducing them to go to Sebastopol? It appears to me that even if you pass this Bill there is no guarantee whatever that you are going to get the men whom you want to enlist; but I join with the hon. Gentlemen who oppose this measure upon moral grounds, even if you do succeed in carrying it into effect. What is it? The opinion of most people would sanctify the practice of war, and make the profession of arms one of the most honourable pursuits of man. What is the reason of this? Why, it is assumed that men fight for a cause, that they are actuated by a love of home, devotion to the country, or attachment to a Sovereign; these are the sentiments that are considered to hallow the pursuit of arms. But what motives have these men whom you endeavour to hire out of the back slums of the towns of Germany? They can have no pretensions to fighting from any moral motive whatever; they are deprived of every ground upon which you can justify war, and, as they want the motives which I have described, there is just the difference between them and an ordinary soldier fighting for his country that there is between a hero and a cut-throat. It is wholesale assassination to employ them. Not to go over the arguments which have been used so abundantly by other people, I will only ask whether you are really going to fight the Emperor of Russia, with his 800,000 armed men, upon his own shores, when you say you are obliged to seek help from abroad before you have hardly got into the fray? The noble Lord (Lord John Russell) has told us candidly that he made a mistake with regard to the difficulties in the way of taking Sebastopol. I think, the moment you have landed an armed force in an Empire like Russia, 3,000 miles off, you must be assured that, unless you are prepared to put forth energy such as this country never put forth before, you must have taken a step which will lead inevitably to disaster and disgrace. Was it a light thing to land such a force upon the shores of an Empire like Russia? I repeat the sentiment which I expressed the last time I addressed the House, that there is no country, except the United States, where you cannot permanently maintain a footing better than in Russia. There is no other country the territory of which it would be so difficult to invade and occupy permanently. And I also drew the distinction between contending with Russia by land and by sea. I once used a phrase which has been a good deal abused, and has caused much amusement, and I dare say will do so again. I was speaking at a public meeting in 1849 of those who threatened us with an attack from Russia, and my words were these—

> "If Russia were to attack England or the United States, or any other great maritime Power, they would fall upon her like a thunderbolt, and crumple her up in her own dominions by means of their shipping."

Have we not done so by means of our shipping? The moment our ships appeared, did not the fleets of Russia disappear? But if you attempt to fight Russia on land, you must be prepared for a very different state of things from that which you contemplated, and it is reducing your efforts to a most disproportionate proportion—it is using the strength of a dwarf for doing the work of ten giants—to peddle over your Foreign Enlistment Bill to enable you to go abroad and get aid to carry on the war. I had intended to have said something upon the general question of the war, but the arguments have been carried on with such a close attention to the question under discussion that I will not be so bad a logician as to be the first to stray from the subject. I had intended to notice a remark which fell from the noble Lord President last night, with reference to the existing state of our relations with Russia, to the present state of the war, and the proposals held out by Russia for coming to terms of peace. I will not go into that subject now. I will allow the present debate to go on, and I will not repeat all the arguments which have been used with regard to this measure. But I give notice that, upon the bringing up of the Report, I will, with the permission of the House, make some general remarks upon the present aspect of the war, particularly with reference to the important official disclosure made last night by the noble Lord as to the proposals made at Vienna by the Government of Russia; and I think that the majority of the House will agree with me that we ought not to separate in this critical state of our affairs without being able to give an opinion, and, perhaps, to elicit an opinion from the Government, although they may continue to shut themselves up in reserve, upon the most important questions which have arisen at this crisis. For this House is in danger of losing its character for independence, and for being the real great council of the nation, if it permits itself to be sent back without one word having been said with regard to the prospects and the conduct of the war. If I may judge from the communications I get from Sebastopol, you cannot be doing a greater act of kindness to the army than entering into a discussion of that question, and, at all events, they will have the gratification which, from the course our debates have hitherto taken, they can hardly have now, of knowing that the representatives of England have not separated without giving some attention to the unparalleled miseries under which they are now literally rotting.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL: Mr. Speaker, whenever the hon. Gentleman brings forward for consideration the question relative to the present state and prospects of the war, Her Majesty's Government will be ready to enter into it. But, in the meantime, I must say I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman, after having heard a misrepresentation rectified three or four times by Members of the Government, should have resorted to that misrepresentation for about the sixth or seventh time. The misrepresentation I mean is this:—It is asserted, as against this Bill, that it in the only measure which has been provided in order to supply soldiers for the expedition to the Crimea. You have, it is said, an army engaged in the siege of Sebastopol, and the only resource you have by which to supply their wants is this Bill, by which you propose to raise about 10,000 men, to keep them in drill for four or five months, and then send them to the Crimea. Now having raised that superstructure, it is very easy to knock down the Bill. But then, Sir, the superstructure is so obviously false, so obviously beside everything that Ministers have stated as the real state of the case, that I really wonder that one gentleman after another should argue upon such an hypothesis. I beg to remind the House, in a few words, what are the measures which the Government have adopted. The hon. Gentleman the Member for the West Riding has stated truly that the expedition which was sent out, not having succeeded in the time in which we had hoped it would have succeeded, it became necessary that it should be reinforced. What, then, was done by the Government? The first thing done was to send out British regiments in as high a state of efficiency as we could procure them. It must be observed, that there were some of those regiments who, having furnished men in order to increase the battalions that had gone to the Crimea, had been obliged to recruit very largely, and were not, for some time, in a state of efficiency. But what were the numbers that we sent? In October we sent upwards of 2,000 men, in November upwards of 7,000, and in December 2,500, making 11,500 British troops; and in the face of that fact, which has been repeated over and over again, it has been alleged, by one gentleman after another, that the only succour intended for the expedition to the Crimea is the sending out of a foreign legion. I think hon. Gentlemen must be at a great loss for arguments against this Bill when they are obliged to make use of a misrepresentation so obvious. But did we stop after that? Was this the next measure? Far from it. There are still some British troops left in the British garrisons in the Mediterranean, and we propose to send out British regiments of militia in order to replace those garrisons and send them to the Crimea as speedily as it can be done. We also lowered the standard of height, and increased the bounty, to give greater facility to the recruiting for the army. All these are measures tending to increase the British army and to augment the forces in the Crimea, and the whole foundation of the objection to which I have alluded is, therefore, entirely set aside. That there are other objections I do not deny, but I endeavoured to dispose of them last night. I will, however, again repeat that this Bill, instead of being the first or the second, or even the third measure that we have adopted, is one of a series of measures taken with the view of bringing the war to a satisfactory conclusion. I will not again enter into the arguments which I brought forward last night as to whether or no it is desirable that we should have, as we have had in all former wars, foreign troops receiving pay in our service. I cannot see why we should depart from the precedents of all former wars; but, Sir, I must say, that I greatly regret, not the opposition by which this Bill has been met, but the tone which has been taken in that opposition, and the attempts which have been made to prejudice beforehand the enlistment into a service of this kind; I regret that every attempt has been made to prejudice foreigners who, I think, might with the purest motives enlist in our service in order to fight the battles of Europe, to degrade their character, and to represent them to the world as men who ought to be treated with disrespect and insult. I do hope that hon. Gentlemen will not again and again repeat that this is the first and the only measure we have proposed for the support of our troops. The measures that we have taken are of a very different character, but we have been of opinion—and I do not think we were wrong in that opinion—that we were bound to consider not only the immediate necessities of a campaign not yet concluded, but also what were our means for carrying on the war next year. If we had not done so, you would have come some six months hence and said, "How little is your foresight! You provided only for the wants of the day, and thought nothing more was necessary; you did not foresee that this might be a war of several years' duration; you ought to have had a much larger army and a foreign legion if you had had sufficient foresight." Because we have attempted to exercise that foresight, and to provide for the successful carrying on of the war, we are now taunted with preferring foreign troops to Englishmen. You know that statement is perfectly untrue; it may produce an effect upon the country for the present, but I am convinced that when the people of England know what we wish—an army of 180,000 or 200,000 men, composed of British troops, with a foreign legion to assist them—they will see how much they have been misled by the allegations which have been made in this debate.

Lord CLAUD HAMILTON said, that gloomy as the general aspect of the war was, it had been made much more so by the proposition of the Government. The noble Lord had brought men from all parts of the empire, and what had he proposed to them? nothing whatever in the speech of Her Majesty to hint a suspicion of the present scheme. The Government did not dare to announce it on that occasion, because of the public indignation which they anticipated. The House was told that they ought not to express their opinions because the country was said to be in danger; but so far from the Government trusting to public opinion, any one who knew the country was aware that their conduct in regard to the question at issue was adverse to that opinion. He (Lord C. Hamilton) complained that in the division of the previous night men went into the lobby with the Government, while their convictions were with the Opposition, because they feared to lose their seats. He denied that there was any parity between the present proceedings of the Government and those precedents which they quoted in their support. The map of Europe was considerably modified by the Emperor Napoleon, who created what he called kingdoms, but which the world called satrapies, that were ruled by his brothers and other relatives; and the people of those countries, animated by a spirit of patriotism, took service with England against him. Napoleon having suppressed all the nationalities of Europe, all the independent spirits of those kingdoms came to England and offered their services for his overthrow. That was widely different from going to seek in Germany for that German enthusiasm of which the right hon. Secretary at War spoke. What did the right hon. Gentleman mean? Did he mean to send his recruiting serjeants with a bag of gold in one hand, and the blue books on the Holy Places in the other? And were the recruits to be catechised on the four points before they should be enlisted? The right hon. Gentleman had quoted the Turkish army as foreigners, and also the German officers who command them; but the laws of Turkey compelled all officers in the Turkish army to renounce their religion before they could obtain a command. Omar Pacha had done so; likewise Bem; and the gallant Guyon was without a command because he would not become a renegade. The noble Lord the Home Secretary had stated that Napoleon I. employed great numbers of foreign troops; but these troops were those under the command of his own relatives—Neapolitan, Spanish, German, and Dutch—and Napoleon did not, as the Government now were about to do, turn his back on the French conscription. These troops wore the uniform, and were officered and paid for by the several States to which they belonged, and not by French money. The House would surely agree, therefore, that there was not much analogy in the case cited by the noble Lord. Until British energy, courage, and resources fail, the Government was not doing justice to the country in attempting to carry on the war by the aid of foreigners. The noble Lord spoke of public feeling as approving of the measures of the Government. Would the noble Lord point out a single great centre of public opinion which had expressed itself in their favour as regarded the measure? The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War had given a very discouraging prospect of the Bill; it would not accelerate the growth of the raw recruit; and, according to the inference to be drawn from the right hon. Gentleman's statement, there could not be, under the circumstances he stated, an effective British army for five or six years. He did not blame the Government for the defect of the Commissariat, but he would suggest that the right hon. Gentleman should get the loan of a Commissariat staff from the French Government, so as to relieve our army from the fearful distresses under which it now laboured. That would be a better course than to send out Germans. Anything that could be performed could be done by British courage, and he was, therefore, opposed to any alteration in the material of our armies until all sources of amelioration were at an end. The Bill was one repugnant to English feeling, and he should, therefore, give it his opposition.

Mr. DANBY SEYMOUR said, he had voted for this measure, but he had never given a vote with greater regret in his life. Still, at a crisis like the present, as the Ministers on their own anthority declared that this was one of the measures necessary to reinforce our unfortunate army in the Crimea, he should not be doing his duty if by his vote he prevented the sending of a single man to the relief of that army, the extremely critical position of which was owing to the bad management of the Government. In common with, he believed, every Gentleman who sat like himself behind Ministers, he disapproved of the present measure; and the Government, by the division of last night, had received a mark of the confidence of hon. Members on the Ministerial Benches which he wished he could say he thought they deserved. He hoped that now, at any rate, they would listen a little to those remarks about the carrying on of the war which they treated so contumeliously during last Session. While they were besieging, or rather only half-besieging, Sebastopol, what was this fleet of fifty-four ships of war doing which conveyed our army across the sea, and which was pronounced one of the greatest naval armaments that ever appeared upon the waves? Those fifty-four men-of-war were near Sebastopol, not employed in cannonading the batteries, but remaining idle about Balaklava. At this very moment there was every kind of produce going in and out of every Russian port in the Black Sea, except that kind which we wanted, viz. bread-stuffs, the exportation of which was prohibited by the Russian Government. He had been informed by English gentlemen who had establishments at ports in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azoff, that cargoes were going out of those ports, and that in return there were brought back those materials and that wealth which were necessary for carrying on the war against us. The principal part of the profits derived from the existing commerce in the Black Sea was passing into the hands of the Greeks, because the English merchants, when they heard of the establishment of a blockade last summer, were foolish enough to put confidence in the British Government, and to believe that a blockade would really be established. No English house there had entered into any business speculation, or shipped any produce for our shores; but the Greeks, more astute, and looking with more impartial eyes at the Government that held the reins of power in this country, after a short time, finding that no blockade really was established, disbelieved the Government, and began to enter again into trade, and up to the present hour they had continued the ordinary shipments that English merchants had ceased. It had been well said by a French writer that a war on a great scale became a war of budgets, and the expenses of a war like the present were such that the question really came to be who could hold out longest with the money to pay the enormous armies and fleets it was necessary to employ? No doubt, it was only by crippling the power of Russia to pay her armies that we could hope to be conquerors in the tremendous struggle in which we were engaged. All the signs of weakness had already begun to be shown by Russia; the Emperor had found the same difficulty as that found by his first antagonist, Turkey—the difficulty of raising money. He had had his loans successively rejected in all the capitals of Western Europe. The loan which was attempted to be negotiated some few months ago at Berlin was refused, although the interest offered was, he believed, 6 per cent, and the loan was offered to the Berlin capitalists at the low price of 83. But a still more signal sign of weakness had appeared in the publication of a financial article by a person at the Ministère des Finances at St. Petersburg. M. Léon Faucher, in a very damaging article published by him in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, had lately shown the real financial position of Russia, how weak her resources were, how much she would require in order to enable her to carry on the war, how her loans had all been rejected, and how her finances could not hold out for another campaign such as that of 1854; and it was a most unusual thing for a person high in the confidence of the Emperor Nicholas to enter the arena of periodical literature, and in an article signed with his name to enter into a detailed refutation of the arguments of the French financier. When we saw those signs of weakness it became our duty to press on that weak point—not to confine ourselves to the mere blockade of Sebastopol, but to take care that no shipments should be made at any Russian port. It was unfortunate that at once, upon the declaration of war, we had not taken possession of the Straits of Kertch, which lead into the Sea of Azoff, for up to May last they were defended only by a few invalids. What use was made of the Sea of Azoff? The House was probably not aware that every part of the Russian munitions of war, and not only those, but the nourishment for their soldiers, all came down the Don and the Volga to Rostof, and were thence shipped across the Sea of Azoff to Arabat, on the coast of the Crimea, whence the distance to Sebastopol was about 100 miles, and for this journey a regular system of transport had been organised last summer. It would have been easy last summer to have cut off the Russian supplies, but since that time they had fortified the depôt at which they debarked their stores brought from the interior. Again, he would ask, why was not the fortress of Kinbourn, at the mouth of the lagoon of the Dnieper taken possession of? It commands the important passage leading to Nikolaief, the head quarters of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea and the town of Kherson, where there are large stores of timber. The fortress is on the level of the sea, and might have been taken without difficulty; while, if we were once in possession of it, we might have greatly annoyed our enemy, and interrupted his supplies. Surely the total neglect of this important point was a most grievous addition to a long catalogue of errors. All he could say now was, that he hoped, considering the fatal negligence of the Government, by which the best blood and the treasure of this country had been, as he believed, so futilely shed before Sebastopol—he did hope the Government would not lose one single day in remedying their past defects, and in visiting, even in the highest quarters, an authority that had been misused by a punishment which would be well deserved. He would say one thing with reference to the enlistment of soldiers. He trusted the Government would be careful from what part of Germany they got their troops, for he himself had seen thousands of wretches sent from the central parts of Germany as colonists, who were an object of thorough contempt and pity to the inhabitants of the countries to which they were sent. In many parts of Germany the people had much degenerated from the independent and warlike character of their ancestors. A long course of despotism and tyranny had deprived them of some of their finest qualities. The German nation two centuries ago had a struggle with their monarchs like the struggle of the people of England about the same time with Charles I. The result of that struggle, however, was different—in England, it was the people who were victorious; in Germany, it was the kings. Prior to that time the German people were animated by as great a spirit of liberty as ourselves; but since that melancholy period they had degenerated both physically and morally. And the fatal system of hiring mercenaries had done a great deal towards that degeneration. He assured the Government that he had often heard opinions expressed in Russia, by persons who knew the feeling of the Russian army, most derogatory to German soldiers, and, if he were not mistaken, they would hardly be thought worthy to be driven away by Russian bayonets. He was obliged to the House for its indulgence, and when the general question was discussed, he should say a few words on the policy of our ever having gone to Sebastopol at all.

Mr. PHILIPPS said, he would give both sides of the House the benefit of this admission—that, were it possible for him to regulate the events of war, he would not only reject the aid proposed in this measure, but he would have no allies at all. As, however, those events were not within the control of any human power, he could not help asking himself seriously whether, having once stated his willingness to support the Government in the war in which they were engaged, he could now consistently refuse them one of the means which they, acting under a stern and practical sense of great responsibility, declared to be necessary for the carrying on of the war. He knew that a statement of that kind must be taken with considerable limitation. He knew that if the means they were invited to have recourse to were contrary to the principles of morality, or to the principles of the constitution, he should not be justified in having recourse to such means. Of course, every man must judge of this question according to his conscience. He was not in the slightest degree imputing to any Member of the House the charge that he had not, in the vote he gave, voted according to his conscience. If, under any fear of invasion, they had recourse to foreign mercenaries to defend them, he thought that that would be an imputation upon the courage of this country; but it was not pretended that the present war was waged in an exclusively English interest. It had been called a European war; it was called in France *une guerre d'équilibrium;* in other quarters it was called a statesman's war, but nowhere in the world was it called a war solely for English ambition or English profit. Under these circumstances he could not see that we were not justified in having recourse to the assistance of persons who, according to the theory of war, had as immediate an object in the results of the war as the English nation could pretend to have. With that view of the case, and acting not at all under the influence of any party associations, he could not accept the very heavy responsibility that would attach to him were he to deny to the Government the means which those practically acquainted with the Executive, and possessed of far better information than he could possibly pretend to, declared to be necessary.

Mr. ALCOCK said, that in the course of this discussion he had heard it observed by two or three Members of Her Majesty's Government, that it would be extremely inconsistent in any man who complained of the inadequacy of our army in the Crimea not to vote in favour of the proposal now before the House, as if that were the only alternative. It was his opinion, however, that that was not the only alternative. In particular, there was the alternative that had been so often mentioned, that of increasing our bounties and diminishing our standards. He had also heard it suggested as an objection to this Bill, that, if we went to Germany, Switzerland, and such like countries, to enlist soldiers, we should not be able to place the same degree of confidence in them as in our own men. He confessed he could not share that opinion. If any men in Germany or Switzerland preferred entering into our service, we had no right to suppose that they would not fight for us as honestly and as well as they would under any other circumstances. But there was this difference. You could not expect, and it would not be a reasonable thing to ask, them to give more than their physical force, for they could have no great interest, or sympathy, or feeling in fighting our battles. The great Napoleon once said that in war the moral to the physical force was as three to one. Our object, therefore, ought to be to find some foreigners who would not only bring to bear their physical force, but who would give us the benefit of their moral power also. There were countries much nearer to Russia than any of those that had been spoken of in the course of the debate where there was a moral feeling in our favour—he meant the Caucasus. Let us, therefore, offer to the people of the independent Caucasus the money we now thought of offering to Swiss and Germans. Let the Government offer to take 30,000 or 40,000 of that warlike people into their pay, and they would command the support of the whole population from the Black Sea to the Caspian. The Caucasians were said to be of various tribes and languages, and even of various religions. It had also been said that they could not be got to fight under any but their own immediate chiefs; that they would pay no tribute, give no allegiance, yield no obedience, nor receive any commands from any but their prophet-prince, Schamyl. There was, however, one banner under which they would serve, namely, the banner of that nation that happened to be at war with Russia. Let that banner be exhibited in the independent Caucasus, and the man who says the Caucasians would not follow it does not know much of those countries or their inhabitants. The Russians had a garrison of 20,000 men at Anapa, and yet we had taken no step to clear that country of them. In the year 1828 he (Mr. Alcock) was in Georgia, and there saw and conversed with Prince Pakiewitsch. That was only the year after Anapa had been taken by the Russians, and it would be impossible to depict the Prince's satisfaction when he explained that they had lately taken that town, and had destroyed all communication between the Turks and the Circassians. Had we not in the Black Sea as large a force as that with which the Russians took Anapa? They took it, after a few days, with only eight line-of-battle ships and six frigates, assisted by a few thousand soldiers. Why had we been so long in wresting Anapa from them? The Government had either been utterly ignorant of what they should have done, or else they had grossly neglected their duty. Let Anapa be taken now, at any rate, and given back to the Circassians, to whom it belonged. The Russians were cooped up there as in a prison, not daring to stir 100 yards from the place. That showed the power of the Circassians, and the value of the assistance they could give as auxiliary troops. He had voted the preceding night against the Government, but should the Bill pass, he hoped, at all events, they would not forget Anapa.

ADMIRAL WALCOTT: Sir, I am wholly at a loss to conceive the reasons which induce the Government at this most inopportune moment to introduce a measure which I regard with suspicion, and shall oppose to the utmost of my power. The experience of history informs us in what state that country is which has resort to the aid of mercenaries. No momentary embarrassment should betray us into the enactment of a dangerous precedent and the imitation of a disastrous example. The debates of the reign of William III. show how distasteful such proposals are to this country and this House. We are not fighting, as in the last war, single-handed against combined forces, but with the noblest allies at our side, the greatest military Power of Europe,—whose glory is our glory, and our triumph will add to their triumph,—with unexhausted and inexhaustible resources; and they have shown how ready they have been able to supply them—hurrying off reinforcements to the Crimea so soon as our vessels arrived to transport them from their shores. There is no parallel analogy between our present circumstances and those of the last war, when Germans and Hanoverians fought under our flag. Our King was Elector of Hanover. Our population was far less than it is now. Our war was not with a single State, but with almost every nation consecutively or combined. Even then the measure was viewed with suspicion, and acquiesced in without conviction. Popular feeling, nationality, will never tolerate foreign recruits; you will have the cost of bringing them to this country, the charge of their maintenance, and the delay of their organisation. It is a dangerous expedient, a fatal policy, a stain on the British name, an affront to the willingness and sufficiency of Englishmen to serve their native land, and moreover, and far above all, a humiliating and dangerous confession of internal weakness to which I will never lend my voice. No! take the true course, promise, and observe it—give rewards, promotions, pensions, and a fair bounty, with an ungrudging hand and a free spirit; deal thus honourably with your men; show you care for the wounded and sick in the hospital, your forethought for their comrades in the camp; provide for the widows and orphans, support the family at home—then you will have an army of which you may be justly proud. Our troops, in bravery unsurpassed, are at this moment full of hope—they know you trust them, they will not endanger the honour of England. One marked characteristic of every officer's and private's letter from the seat of war which I have read, conveys to my mind a grand augury—I mean the utter refusal, one and all, of taking glory to their own skill, courage, and firmness, but referring their success quite from themselves to the Almighty God above. When we find such men fail us (I am ashamed to take such words on my lip), then in the last struggle which precedes her fall our country may enlist the foreign legionary; but till then (and God forefend the day), the presence of mercenaries will embarrass our army, dishearten its hopes, and rob its victories of glory.

Mr. F. SCOTT said, he had made several previous but unsuccessful attempts to catch the Speaker's eye, and he could not avoid complimenting the right hon. Gentleman on his discrimination in managing the debate. It was, therefore, his intention to reserve his observations for some future opportunity.

Mr. CONOLLY said, he was anxious to say a few words on the Bill, and hoped the House would give him their attention, notwithstanding the lateness of the hour. His feelings in a personal matter connected with the war had prevented him seeking an earlier opportunity of rising to address the House, and he knew, also, that there were more experienced men who ought to come before him, who could display much more wisdom and many more attainments than he could pretend to. It was with a feeling of the deep importance of the matter in debate that he now ventured to trespass on their patience. His forbearance in not rising earlier had had the effect of allowing the House to be favoured with some most able speeches from both sides of the House. He alluded more particularly to the convincing arguments of the right hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. M. Gibson), whose words had thrilled, not through England alone, but through all foreign countries, as to the humiliating nature of the proposal now brought forward. The speech of the hon. Gentleman did him infinite credit.

Debate *adjourned* till *To-morrow.*

The House adjourned at five minutes before Six o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Thursday, December 21, 1854.

Minutes.] *Sat first in Parliament.*—The Lord Denman, after the Death of his Father.

Public Bills.—2ª Militia.

Reported—Militia.

BLOCKADE OF RUSSIAN PORTS—QUESTION.

The Marquess of SALISBURY rose to put a question to the noble Duke the Minister of War with reference to the blockade of Russian ports. The noble Marquess was understood to complain that the measures of the Government respecting the blockade, both in the Black Sea and the Baltic, had been so ineffectual that they had only tended to enhance the price of imports to the British merchant without inflicting any injury on the trade of Russia. In some commodities 25 per cent had been added to the value, the whole of which went to the advantage of Russia. It appeared to him that, although at the commencement of the war some semi-official notice had been put out warning persons not to enter into commercial relations with Russia, up to the present no steps had been taken which were at all effectual in embarrassing its trade. He begged to ask if the Government would state whether the measures they had adopted to blockade the Russian ports had been carried into effect, and what had been the consequence of such measures?

The Duke of NEWCASTLE said, he need scarcely appeal to their Lordships whether the course adopted by the noble Marquess was, under the present circumstances, one according to the practice of the House or the convenience of the public service? There were a certain class of questions relating to the administration of the various departments of the Government in which the Ministers were always prepared to answer any questions that might be put to them; though it was the custom to give either private or public intimation of their intention to put such questions; and in that case no Minister would have any right to complain of want of courtesy if merely a simple question were asked. But the noble Marquess had come down to the House and made a somewhat elaborate statement with reference to the blockade of the Baltic, and another statement of the consequences of the blockade in the Black Sea—and the whole of that without any notice whatever. It was a matter of the most delicate nature, in which the Government of this country was not merely concerned, but also with that country with which we were in alliance. In the course of last Session, a noble Lord, whom he did not then see in the House (the Marquess of Clanricarde), more than once referred to the question of the blockade of the White Sea more especially; but invariably before doing so, he gave notice of his intention to put a question, and moreover admitted at once, when he (the Duke of Newcastle) replied to him that negotiations were going on with France on the subject, that it was not a question which ought to be discussed then in the House. Now, if he (the Duke of Newcastle) did not answer the question of the noble Marquess, he readily admitted it was on the principle that he must positively decline, on behalf of himself and colleagues, to answer questions of this nature, put in that House, in which France was concerned as well as ourselves. He thought this was a fair distinction, and one to which they had a right to adhere; and that the Government were not to be called upon to give an answer there on a question like that, in which France was equally concerned with ourselves, without first having an opportunity of conferring with the Government of France, or at least with the Ambassador of France residing here. He entirely demurred to the statement which the noble Marquess had made as to the effect on the trade of Russia of the blockade in the Baltic. If the noble Marquess chose to give notice of his intention to bring the subject under the notice of the House, he would find that either himself or one of his colleagues would be prepared to go into it with him; but it was one of too serious a nature to the trade of the country, in alliance as it was with France, to be entered upon, as he might say, in the haphazard way which was proposed by the noble Marquess. As to the course which it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to take with reference to the blockade of the Black Sea, he must decline to answer the question of the noble Marquess, but would be prepared to go into the subject if he gave notice of his intention to bring it before the House.

The Duke of Newcastle

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH believed that the rule of the House was to consider all questions irregular, and that they were only admitted by way of preventing a Motion. Of course, therefore, the Government would assume that when a question was put which they thought inexpedient to answer, the noble Lord who put the question would bring his Motion for the purpose of getting an answer.

THE EARL OF DERBY said, that although he concurred with the noble Earl in his interpretation of the rule of the House, he did not think the noble Marquess who put the question was open to the accusation of having made an elaborate statement, seeing he had only spoken altogether for three or four minutes. He was surprised to hear the noble Duke state that the question which had been put with reference to the blockade was one which he was not called upon to answer, for he (the Earl of Derby) had thought that the noble Duke had been appointed especially as Minister of War to preside over a War Department and all the operations of the war, and that a blockade was an operation of the war; therefore, if there was one Minister who should be prepared without notice to state whether or not the Government had practically enforced the blockade, that one was the Minister of War. It seemed, however, that he (the Earl of Derby) had been under a delusion all this time. The noble Duke said it was a delicate question. If it had reference entirely to the enforcement of a blockade prospectively, nothing could be more reasonable than that he should have declined to answer it without previous communication with other parties. But this was no prospective question. It had been announced over and over again on the part of Her Majesty's Government, that orders had been sent out to enforce the rigour of the blockade in the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the White Sea, and if there had been any Minister who had been more conspicuous than another in making those declarations, it was the Minister on whom such a duty would more naturally fall. The First Lord of the Admiralty had, in the last Session of Parliament, repeatedly declared that the most stringent orders had been issued to enforce a strict blockade of the Russian ports, not only in the Baltic, but the White Sea and the Black Sea, and it was by no means unreasonable now that Ministers should be asked whether their orders had been practically carried out, and what had been their effect. It did appear to him that his noble Friend ought not to be exposed to censure for having asked the question, more especially when it was materially a question of fact. They might have enforced the blockade in the Baltic without being able altogether to put a stop to Russian trade, because some portion of it might be carried on, though with considerable loss, through the neutral ports of Prussia. Yet that was the very trade which they had first attempted to put a stop to, and the trade of Archangel was not put a stop to till August. At the present moment the trade of Odessa was for all practical purposes uninterrupted, and Russian commerce went on as though no war was pending. Of course every blockade and impediment to trade were injurious to the commerce of our own country as well as to that of our enemy. There would never have been an Alma or an Inkerman if we had argued that, though in battle we might kill a good many Russians, yet we must also lose a great many Englishmen. Whether war operations caused an impediment to trade or not, they must consider whether the injury inflicted on the enemy did not counterbalance the injury we ourselves sustained.

Earl GRANVILLE rose to order. The noble Duke had objected to answer the question of the noble Marquess, not because he was unprepared to do so, but because it was of the highest importance that information upon so grave a subject should not be given off-hand by a Minister trusting entirely to memory, having received no previous notice of the question. This was a very important question, and could hardly have entered into the noble Marquess's mind since five o'clock, and therefore he might have given the Government a previous notice of his intention; but, having put his question without notice, the noble Duke declined to answer it, whereupon the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) had risen, and was entering into all the facts and merits of the question in a manner which was not exactly regular.

MILITIA BILL.

Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.

The Duke of NEWCASTLE: My Lords, although in the course of the discussions which have taken place upon the Bill now before the other House of Parliament (the Foreign Enlistment Bill), this Bill, the second reading of which I now propose, has been not only repeatedly referred to, but discussed at some length, your Lordships will, nevertheless, perhaps expect a few observations from me in explanation of its object. During this short sitting of Parliament, both sides of the House have frequently concurred in the necessity of establishing a reserve for the support of the army under Lord Raglan at some point or points nearer than the shores of this country, so distant from the seat of war—in which respect this war differs from any former war which we have ever carried on against any European Power. I apprehend your Lordships will admit that it is not only desirable that we should have a reserve of men, such as we are about to establish at Malta by an addition of four companies to each of the regiments now serving in the Crimea, but that it is also important, if possible, that a further reserve should be created in the shape of entire battalions not now employed in the service. Your Lordships are aware that, although the army of this country consists of 100 regiments, yet a great proportion are employed in the Colonies and in India; and although the numbers employed in the colonial service are now greatly reduced, the numbers serving in India, embracing a considerable proportion of the entire army, remain at their former amount. Under these circumstances, nearly the whole of the regiments available having been sent out of the country, the Government regard it as very important, with a view of conducting our operations in the spring, that we should be enabled to send forward to the seat of war those regiments which now constitute the important garrisons of Gibraltar, Malta, and the Ionian Islands. It is for this purpose that the present Bill is introduced; for, although it is worded generally so as to enable the Government to employ these troops in other parts than the Mediterranean stations, yet, as has been stated before in this House, the immediate object of the Bill is as I have represented. The accommodation in barracks and other buildings at Malta, will, I apprehend, be occupied by the reserve to which I have previously adverted—the depôts of regiments serving in the Crimea—and therefore, so far as Malta is concerned, it is not probable that, beyond, perhaps, a single regiment, the services of the militia will at present be required in that garrison. Gibraltar and the Ionian Islands are in a different position; but, in these places,—without the aid of this Bill, it would be impossible, with a due regard to the public safety, to reduce these important garrisons below their usual standard, by sending away the regiments now stationed there. [The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH inquired the strength of these garrisons?] The regular garrison of Malta has been set down at five regiments. The same number of regiments has also been deemed a proper garrison for Gibraltar, and the same for the Ionian Islands. At the present time the garrison of Malta does not amount to so much, because we have somewhat anticipated the sanction of Parliament to this measure, and we have despatched troops thence to the Crimea without waiting for authority to employ the militia in their places. My Lords, the Bill appears to have been somewhat misunderstood when it was discussed, not quite regularly, on the question of the Foreign Enlistment Bill; but your Lordships' minds must now be quite disabused of the idea that there is any compulsion in the principle or details of the Bill. Before I proceed to that part of the question, I ought to answer another objection which seems to have been entertained by some—that, even if the Bill were passed, there would be some difficulty in getting militia regiments to undertake foreign service. So far from that being the case, I can assure your Lordships that the greatest readiness exists on the part of the militia generally to come forward in any way that their services may be required for the public safety. I believe I may say that the voluntary offers of embodiment—without which, under the Act of this year, militia regiments could not be embodied—have been so general, that I think I can say they have been made by all the regiments, almost without exception—in fact I know of no exception; and I may add that the voluntary offers for foreign service were more numerous than the necessities of the time required. When I say foreign service, I do not mean merely service in the Colonies, to which this Bill is intended to be limited, but offers were made for service in the field of war. We have not thought it desirable to ask the sanction of Parliament to any measure to enable us to accept these offers for foreign service. [The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH was understood to say, that the Bill did give such powers.] If my noble Friend will be so kind as to state by and by his objections to the Bill, I shall be happy to reply to them. I can only say, the Bill was not drawn with any intention to send militia to the actual seat of war, and I do not believe it will bear such a construction. I doubt whether, if the Government were to attempt to employ this measure for such a purpose, the noble Earl would not be the first to rise and complain that we were greatly straining the Act, if we were not guilty of a violation of it. I was proceeding to observe, that when we declined these offers for foreign service, and stated that we did not propose to ask the sanction of Parliament to enable us to accept them, we have always been met by a counter-proposal to undertake service in any of the Colonies, in order to facilitate the removal of the regular troops now engaged there. I may, perhaps, anticipate an objection of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Ellenborough), and would draw his attention to the fact that there is a distinction between the wording of this Bill and the 54 *Geo.* III. c. 1, which had for its object the transfer of the militia from home to foreign service. He will see that the objects are quite different, and that the powers conferred by that measure were far more extensive than any we now ask you to sanction. I said just now that the principle of the Bill was purely voluntary. Not only is it voluntary as regards the officers—not only does it require a colonel to propose the services of the body he commands—but it absolutely requires the consent of each individual man in the regiment to be obtained before we can avail ourselves of his services. But the principle goes still further. It is not proposed that the regiment should volunteer for service in the Colonies generally, but for a specific particular place. Thus, for instance, if a militiaman volunteered for service at Malta, we should not have power under this Bill to send him to the Ionian Islands, unless, on our refusal to send him to Malta, he should volunteer for the other garrison. The noble Earl raised an objection on the second reading of the Foreign Enlistment Bill, to which I admit that this Bill as originally drawn was open, although I do not believe the operation of the Bill would have been as he supposed. The noble Earl said, we should have power by this Bill to send the whole of the militia abroad, without leaving anybody in reserve at home to serve as depôts for the army on active service. As the Bill was drawn undoubtedly it might have been open to that construction, although it would have been necessary, in any case, that depôts should be maintained. But as the Bill now stands, never more than three-fourths of any regiment can be accepted for foreign service, the other fourth being required to remain here as a depôt. Another alteration, and, I think, a manifest improvement, has been made in the other House. Considering the probable duration of the war, it was, perhaps, not wise to ask the militia to volunteer for foreign service "during the war," and the Bill now limits to five years the period for which the services of the militia were required on volunteering—the period for which they originally enlisted. Observations have been made as to the non-necessity of this Bill or the Foreign Enlistment Bill at the beginning of the war. I am unwilling to reiterate the arguments your Lordships have already heard upon that point; but I cannot forbear repeating that it is at the beginning, and not at the close, of a war that these additional powers and exertions are required and should be exercised. More than one noble Lord has made a statement of the force which this country had in arms in 1813 and other years. They have pointed out that we had then an enormous army serving abroad, an efficient militia, and a local militia. If you compare our present means with the condition of our forces at the commencement of former wars, and compare the forces which we have now sent to the East with any army we were enabled to send out on any former occasion, I think the comparison will be found greatly in favour of the present time. It is not fair to compare 1813 with the present time. You should go back to the commencement of the war in 1793. If you want a fair and just comparison, to see what the country can do, has done, and is doing, you ought to go back to 1793 to make such a comparison. The provisions of the Bill are so few and simple that I believe I have now described them. I have stated the object to be to enable the Government to have at their command additional reserves, in addition to that of the new battalion to be added to each regiment.

My Lords, a noble Friend (Earl Grey) the other evening expressed an opinion that I should, on moving the second reading of this Bill, give some information to show how far the powers given last year for recruiting and reinforcing the army have been effectual. I will therefore state what has been done to accelerate recruiting both the militia and the regular army. Under the provisions of the Militia Act, on the original enrolment of the militia, an enrolment fee of 10*s.* was paid to each recruit, and a further sum of 8*s.* 6*d.* for expenses. If a militiaman had enlisted for five years, and wished to be discharged, whether for the purpose of joining the regular army or any other reason, he was only permitted to leave the militia on repayment of the 18*s.* 6*d.*, and providing a sufficient substitute to fill his place in the regiment he sought to quit. The first step taken by the Government to encourage recruiting from the militia into the army was taken on the 3rd of March, by the repayment of the enrolment fee being remitted to the men seeking their discharges for the purpose of joining the regular forces. This first step was taken about three weeks before the declaration of war, and, on the 5th of April, shortly after the declaration of war, another relaxation of the restrictions upon recruiting from the militia took place. The payment was not only remitted to the man who sought to be discharged for the purpose of enlisting into the army before the time of the annual training of the regiment to which he belonged, but at the same time a further sum of 10*s.* was given to him to compensate any pecuniary loss to which he might be exposed by such a step. On the 27th of May, a further relaxation took place in the removal of all restrictions on the transfer of men from the militia to the army. In May, June, and July, eighteen regiments of militia were embodied, as your Lordships, no doubt, are aware. The removal of the impediments of recruiting from the militia for the army had been followed by a great increase in the number of recruits; but during the earlier part of the autumn recruiting from the militia dwindled to a very small amount, and in November a circular was issued to all the eighteen regiments which were embodied, calling upon them to contribute towards the regular army 25 per cent of the numbers comprised in their respective regiments, and, in order to encourage this enlistment into the line, an additional bounty of 1*l.* was granted to each recruit, and an ensigncy in the army was offered to every officer of militia who should bring seventy-five men to join. Since the 25th of November forty-five additional regiments have been embodied—thirty-six in England, and nine in Ireland. These last nine Irish regiments having been embodied before being enrolled, it is for the present impossible to look to them as an immediate source of recruiting; but, from the thirty-six additional regiments ordered to be embodied, and which I hope will be embodied in the course of the next fortnight, we expect to derive the same advantage of 25 per cent which we have already obtained from the other eighteen regiments previously embodied. Some observations have been made upon the number of recruits offering from the militia; but the number was not so great as was supposed until the plan was adopted of calling on the militia to furnish 25 per cent of their numbers to the line. I do not think the number who entered direct from the militia before that time exceeded 5,000, and those who were recruited by other means from the same source would swell that number, perhaps, by 2,000. I should add that, with the view of restoring the militia regiments, thus weakened by the withdrawal of 25 per cent of the men, to their proper numbers, encouragements have been held out in the shape of increased bounties, or rather in a redistribution of the bounty, by which the recruit receives the larger portion at the commencement, instead of the latter period, of the five years for which he enlists. Noble Lords will perceive from my statement that a very large proportion of the militia in England is ordered to be embodied. I can only add that the same system will be pursued with regard to the remaining regiments in a fit state, and that the whole of the militia which may be ripe for embodiment will be called out without material delay. With regard to recruiting for the army from other sources than the militia, the noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough) the other night said, the only thing necessary to be done was to lower the standard and raise the bounty. If that be all that he required, I can assure the noble Earl that before he made that observation both these measures had been adopted by the Government in concurrence with my noble Friend the Commander in Chief. [The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH: I said a further reduction.] The reduction, which was made long before the noble Earl offered any suggestion on the subject, was from 5 feet 6 inches to 5 feet 4½ inches. I had not apprehended any contradiction, or I would have been prepared with the date of the reduction; but to the best of my recollection it has been in operation for something like four or five weeks. I dare say, however, that my noble Friend the General Commanding in Chief recollects the date of that reduction. I know not what the date of the subsequent reduction may have been, but this I do know, that at the time when the reduction of 1½ in. was made, the General Commanding in Chief did not think that it was desirable at once to reduce the standard to that which existed during the whole Peninsular war, namely, 5 feet 4 inches, because he was anxious, in the first instance, to see what would be the effect of the reduction of 1½ inch, and his determination to reduce the standard another half-inch, with the entire approval of the Government, had no reference whatever to the debate which took place in this House. That reduction was, indeed, determined upon before anything was said on the subject in this House. It may be that, technically, the order may bear date the 19th of December; but many noble Lords conversant with such matters are aware that these orders frequently bear a date some days subsequent to that on which the measures to which they relate are determined upon. The standard was reduced a week or ten days ago to that at which it now stands—namely, 5 feet 4 inches—that having been the standard which existed during the whole of the Peninsular war; and I have the authority of the Commander in Chief for saying that, unless it should be absolutely requisite, he would strongly deprecate, upon sound military grounds, any further reduction. I must say, therefore, with regard to these measures, that they have been adopted without any pressure from the Opposition. With respect to the bounty, it was increased at the time that the first reduction of the standard took place, in different proportions to the three branches of the service—the cavalry, the infantry, and the artillery. At the same time that these two measures were adopted, a third, which was not suggested by the noble Earl, was also adopted—namely, that of extending the age up to which recruits would be accepted, from twenty-five to thirty years. This alteration took place at least four or five weeks ago; and at the same time another extension was made—namely, that soldiers who have obtained their discharge by purchase, may re-enter the service up to the age of thirty-five, the age of thirty having heretofore been the limit. [Earl GREY asked, what effect had been produced by these alterations?] It is, of course, not very easy to indicate the exact effect produced by each of these different causes. We have every reason to believe that the most material cause of the increased enlistment has been the embodiment of the militia, and the calling upon each militia regiment to furnish recruits to the line equal to 25 per cent of its numbers. Mark, I do not think it is owing to the embodiment of the militia alone, because practically that was found nearly inoperative; for, although some regiments were embodied in May, June, and July, yet from that time up to the period when the circular was issued calling for recruits in the proportion of 25 per cent from each militia regiment, the recruiting from the militia, so far from increasing, had been gradually dwindling away. The call of 25 per cent from each militia regiment most undoubtedly produced a great increase in the enlistments for the regular army. Of course the reduction of the standard applies to recruiting from the militia equally with recruiting from the general population. I cannot state what effect the increased bounty has had up to the present time; but at its first adoption, which took place a week before the issue of the circular to which I have referred, it undoubtedly had some considerable effect. The source whence we have derived the most material increase to the regular army has certainly been the militia regiments, from which 25 per cent of their numbers have been obtained. [Earl Grey asked whether the army had been brought up to the full establishment?] No, the army is not yet brought up to the full establishment fixed by the Votes of last year. My noble Friend will, of course, recollect that two separate grants for the increase of the army were made by the House of Commons in the course of the present year, the increase amounting altogether to 40,000 men. Now, though, upon the whole, the enlistments in the course of 1854 have been more considerable, I believe, than in any one year upon record, my noble Friend will at once see that an addition of far more than 40,000 men would be necessary to increase the strength of the army to that extent, after replacing even the ordinary casualties of such a force. The ordinary casualties of such an army are reckoned at 1,000 a month, or 12,000 a year, but it must be remembered that numerous additional casualties have taken place consequent upon the actions in which the troops have been engaged—so that the number of recruits necessary to bring the army up to its complete establishment would be something like 60,000 men. I am sorry to say that we have not yet arrived at that point. What effect may be produced by recruiting from the militia it is impossible to conjecture. I can only say that the recruiting from that source, at the present moment, would not in itself be adequate. When all the militia regiments are assembled, 25 per cent from every regiment in the kingdom would not be sufficient for the purposes of the army, and I sincerely hope that not merely noble Lords, but the public at large, so far from throwing any impediment in the way of recruiting generally from the population, will give it all the encouragement in their power. I have no hesitation in saying, that no measures which Her Majesty's Government may propose—whether Foreign Enlistment Bills, such Bills as that now before your Lordships, or any others—can form anything like a substitute for enlistments from the population of this country; and whatever efforts may be made, in connection with the militia or otherwise, we must look to a large recruiting from the general population of the country, without which our army cannot be maintained in such a state as will enable us to cope with the gigantic forces with which we have to contend. One mode of increasing the means at the disposal of the Government for the prosecution of the war will be the adoption of the present measure, which I believe to be as right in principle as I am certain it will be effectual in practice, at least to the extent to which it goes; and I trust your Lordships will give it your assent, if not unanimously, at any rate without a division.

Moved, That the Bill be read 2ª.

The Earl of DERBY: My Lords, I think it right to say that I do not concur as fully in the policy and expediency of this measure as I do in the avowed object with which it is brought forward, that object being numerically and otherwise to increase, as far as possible, and as rapidly as possible, the strength and efficiency of our regular forces. I confess it was with deep concern that I heard the announcement of the noble Duke, that, notwithstanding all the efforts which have been made in the course of the present year, it has not been found possible to meet the wishes and views and to second the endeavours of Parliament, by raising the regular forces up to the number which Parliament sanctioned during the last Session—that is to say, that the addition of 40,000 men, sanctioned by Parliament, *plus* the casualties and deficiencies in our regular forces, has been obtained. The noble Duke has not told us how far the number of men obtained falls short of the number required, nor do I think it necessary to call upon him for any information on that point. I have said, my Lords, that I do not concur as fully in the policy and expediency of the mode of action proposed by Her Majesty's Government as I do with the objects they have in view; and my objections to this Bill are founded upon the conviction, which I entertain in common with many noble Lords, and I believe with a large portion of the people, that the measure, so far from promoting, will rather tend to impede those objects, and that it will be accompanied with other inconveniences, not the least of which will be a total and entire change in the character of the militia service of this country. The militia force of this country I apprehend to be strictly for the maintenance of domestic tranquillity and the preservation of the country from the danger of foreign invasion, and, as supplementary to those objects, to enable us, when circumstances require its services elsewhere, to dispense within the United Kingdom of the services of nearly the whole of our small standing army. I say our small standing army, because at all times the Parliament and the people of this country have looked with suspicion upon a large standing army. My opinion is that that jealousy has of late years been pushed to an unreasonable extent, and that it will be found that the Parliamentary economy which has enforced reductions of our standing army in time of peace has proved a false economy, and has led us into the difficulties in which we are now involved with respect to raising sufficient forces for the war. The standing army of this country, from whatever cause, has been practically reduced to such an amount as may have been sufficient for mere attendance upon the Crown, with regard to the Household troops; and, in the case of the regiments of the line, for providing a force barely sufficient to reinforce and relieve from time to time that large portion of our army which is habitually employed in service abroad to a much greater extent than any other army in Europe. The object and use of the militia force, then, are the home service, and the home service alone, and to supply the place of that small portion of the regular army which, being habitually kept at home, it may, upon extraordinary occasions, be necessary to send abroad in the service of the country. Remember, that your militia force now—which was not the case in the last war—is essentially a voluntary force; and, as the population have shown the greatest readiness to volunteer for service in that militia force, it is upon a strict adherence to those terms and conditions which have been made with the various regiments that you must mainly rely for the existence of your militia, and for maintaining this perpetual nursery and seed-bed, as it were, from which to supply your troops. I will endeavour to consider the operation of this Bill, first of all as bearing upon the manner in which it contributes to the relief and reinforcement of our regular army, and, next, with regard to the effect it will have upon the future enlistment of the militia. With regard to the reinforcement of the regular army, the noble Duke was incorrect—though, no doubt, he correctly expressed the intentions of the Government—in stating the terms and conditions of the measure, that it does not enable Her Majesty to employ any regiment of militia upon foreign service otherwise than within our Mediterranean colonies. The noble Duke has called our attention to the variation between the terms of this Bill and those of the Act of 1814. There is a variation—but that variation, so far from being what the noble Duke represents, is one which gives far more extended powers to the Crown for the employment of the militia than were given to the Crown for the employment of that force by the Act of 1814. By that Act the Crown was restricted to the employment of these forces in Europe. By the present Bill there is no limitation whatever as to the quarter of the world to which the militia may be sent. The consent of the militia regiments is required before they can be sent to Malta, and precisely the same consent—neither more nor less—is required to send them to the Crimea or anywhere else. By the Act of 1814 the King was enabled to employ a definite portion of the militia in any part of Europe he might think fit; but this Bill enables Her Majesty to accept the services of the militia and to employ them in any parts or places out of the United Kingdom. The noble Duke is, therefore, quite incorrect in his statement, whatever the intentions of the Government may have been—and I have not the least doubt he has correctly stated their intentions; but the wording of the Bill gives the Government the power to send the militia, with their own consent, just as much to the Crimea as to Malta, Gibraltar, or the Ionian Islands.

My Lords, it is said that the intention of the Bill is to provide for the sending militia regiments to Malta, Gibraltar, and the Ionian Islands. Now, is this the best and most efficient mode of providing for the reinforcement of the army in the Crimea, under present circumstances? I think the noble Duke will hardly deny—I am sure, if he does, there is scarcely an individual in the kingdom who will concur with him—that the great error which has been made by the Government in the course of their preparations for this war, and in carrying it on, is that of not having provided an efficient reserve. They have sent 30,000 40,000, or 50,000 men to the Crimea, and they have no reserve at hand to support them. The noble Duke has stated that, at this moment, the garrison of Malta is reduced very much below its ordinary strength. I believe that garrison was so reduced; and if I am not mistaken, the garrison of the Ionian Islands also, by the acts of the officers commanding in those islands, upon their own responsibility; and, if they did so act upon their own responsibility, I conceive that they did themselves very great credit, looking to the circumstances in which our army in the East was placed. It is admitted by Her Majesty's Government that a great fault has been committed in not having in the Mediterranean a reserve immediately available for reinforcing the army in the Crimea; and with reference to that omission, I ventured, on the first night of the Session, to express my strong approval of the proposition—which I apprehend came rather from the old superseded department of the Horse Guards than from the modern lately-introduced department of the Secretary for War—namely, the proposition for forming a second battalion for all regiments, and for increasing the number of companies of all regiments, serving in the Crimea, and also for placing one-half of each of these second battalions as what may be called an advanced reserve in the Mediterranean, leaving the other half of such second battalions in this country, to form the nucleus for obtaining reinforcements for the army. Of that provision I entirely approve, because it appears to me to be the proper course to raise your raw recruits in this country, to send them forward, when they have received some training, to an advanced post near the scene of action, and then, as they become more perfectly trained and disciplined, to transport them to the seat of war. But, if the object of the Government is to have in the Mediterranean garrisons a large reserve force immediately available, why do you send to the Ionian Islands and to Malta, not regiments which can be sent to the seat of war, but regiments which, from the terms of their enlistment, are only available for service in the particular garrisons to which they are sent? Your object appears to be, not only to garrison Malta, Gibraltar, and the Ionian Islands, but to have at each of those points the greatest available reserve for the army in the Crimea; but your proposition will have the effect of displacing a considerable number of regular troops in those garrisons, and of filling them with regiments which, according to the intentions of this Bill, cannot be forwarded as reinforcements to the Crimea. I consider that, for the purpose of reinforcing the army, it would have been infinitely better to have maintained as large a number of regular troops as possible in the garrisons of the Mediterranean, and to have used every exertion in your power, by bounties, by lowering the standard, or by other means, to encourage the militia of this country, not to embark in bodies as militia regiments for foreign service, but to volunteer into the line, and thus to keep perpetually feeding your army with well-trained men. This Bill, however, so far from encouraging that object, tends to oppose and defeat it, inasmuch as you send out militia regiments to places where their services can be of comparatively little value, and thereby diminish the means of reinforcing and recruiting your army.

I am not going to quarrel with the noble Duke, nor to discuss with him at what time it was determined by the Government to increase the bounty or lower the standard, but I am ready to give entire credit to his assertion as to the period at which those measures were determined upon, and I am not in the least disposed to claim, on the part of those who are opposed to Her Majesty's Government, the slightest credit for having suggested such measures. I at once say that they are measures in the propriety and necessity of which I entirely and cordially concur. They are steps which the Government were bound to take, and which they have very properly taken; but I say that the effect of the present Bill will be, to a great extent, to neutralise all the beneficial results which might have been expected from the adoption of such a course; and that the better plan would be to afford encouragement to the militia regiments to supply recruits to the line. The noble Duke laid considerable stress upon the doctrine that this is a purely voluntary service, and, undoubtedly, to some extent it is so; though, when he claims credit for the large number of recruits who have been derived from the militia, he at the same time lets out what is hardly consistent with the purely voluntary principle—namely, that every regiment of militia was called upon and required by the Government to send 25 per cent of its numbers as recruits to the regular army; that every means were used by the Government to obtain that reinforcement; and that it is only since that requisition on the part of the Government for 25 per cent of the strength of the militia, that any very large number of recruits have been obtained for the army. Now, let me ask this question—and perhaps the noble Duke will not refuse to answer it, though he does not appear disposed to afford much information in that manner—let me ask whether encouragement will be given to the regiments of militia sent to the Mediterranean garrisons to furnish recruits to the line, or whether they will be prohibited from doing so? There appears to me to be this double difficulty and dilemma in the course you are taking. If these militia regiments are sent out without any permission or encouragement to volunteer into the line, then the maintenance of this large force in the Mediterranean will be utterly useless for warlike purposes; but supposing it is intended to encourage them to volunteer into the line, you run the risk of having these militia regiments which may be imperfectly drilled and trained when they are sent out, and which are to hold important garrisons, unduly weakened by this system of recruiting. From one of these two alternatives I do not see how the Government can escape. The noble Duke laid great stress upon the entirely voluntary character of this proceeding, and he says that, so far from there being the slightest difficulty in obtaining militia regiments for foreign service, a larger number of regiments than are required have volunteered for that service. I do not in the slightest degree doubt that fact. I do not doubt that, in the first excitement of active service, men who have already been embodied, and who have acquired a taste for military life, will be perfectly ready to volunteer in a body for foreign service. But I believe that almost an equal proportion of men would be quite as likely to volunteer out of militia regiments into the line, after they have acquired these military tastes, and thus I think we should obtain much more serviceable reinforcements. But what I am looking at is not the immediate pressure, nor the existing willingness of the militia to volunteer—I think it is a question, if you thus alter the character of the militia service, how far you are likely to obtain from the non-military portion of the population recruits for a service which may be converted into a totally different service from that for which they enter. When you first enlisted your militia regiments, certain conditions were laid down under which they were to be embodied—such, for instance, as the invasion of the country. Those conditions were extended to circumstances of war, and, even with regard to their foreign service under such circumstances, you thought it necessary to ask the special assent, not only of every regiment, but of every individual in each regiment. I think in that respect you did rightly, because nothing could be more dangerous than the slightest suspicion of breach of faith with these men, who were enlisted upon certain conditions. You then went further, and asked them to volunteer for five years. You ask them now to volunteer for active service abroad, and no doubt many of these regiments would be quite as ready to volunteer for active service in the Crimea as at Malta and Gibraltar. But that is not the question. At present the militia are chiefly connected with the rural and agricultural districts, and they do not object to the lowering of their earnings for two or three months, or even to being embodied; but they are a class upon whom all the pressure of friends and relations will hereafter be put in force when they find that, instead of the ordinary militia service for which they enlisted, the service is to become something like the regular service in the army. Do not tell me that this volunteering for foreign service is, with respect to individuals, purely voluntary. I have no doubt that, though many men have entered the militia who would be unwilling now to quit the country for active service, there would be, in the present excited state of public feeling, very great reluctance upon the part of any man to plead his own personal circumstances and his own private inconvenience as reasons for not going abroad when he found his comrades had volunteered for foreign service. He would be reluctant to escape from that which would be put before him for a duty, although it was a duty which he never contemplated when he entered the militia. Well, he would go—the man now in the militia would go;—but they would find country gentlemen, and persons employed in trade, would hereafter hesitate much to enter the militia, if they were to have that moral screw placed upon them in the shape of an invitation to volunteer into the regular service. A noble Friend behind me asks what is to become of the man with a family, who, possessing but small means, has insured his life? Such a man may have entered the militia without conceiving that he was entering upon any very sanguinary business, or that he would be exposed to any great risk. His life, however, will be risked by going to an unhealthy climate; he will be compelled to forfeit the insurance which he has effected as a provision for his family at his death; and all this will be done by requiring him to enter into an engagement which he never contemplated when he joined the militia. I conceive that this is pushing the voluntary principle to the furthest extremity. The noble Duke will perhaps remind me that a very considerable alteration has been made in this Bill by an Amendment moved in the other House of Parliament by a right hon. Friend of mine (Sir J. Pakington), and assented to on the part of Her Majesty's Government, whereby a limitation has been fixed to the proportion of any militia regiment to go abroad; and it may be said, on behalf of the officers of the various regiments to whom it would be inconvenient to go abroad, that they may be left at home with the companies remaining as depôts, in which case they would be still performing all the duties they contemplated when they entered the force. Now, I think the limitation which has been put to the number of each regiment to be sent abroad is very important in this respect, and it is also most important in another respect—in keeping up that which ought never to be broken—namely, the connection between the militia regiments and the country—as well as the various counties in which they are raised. If you were to send the whole of a militia regiment abroad—the Royal Bucks, or the Royal Lancashire, or the Royal Stafford—you would at once break up the connection of the regiment with the county—you would convert those regiments into mere regiments of the line, bearing the names of the counties in which they were raised, but being otherwise wholly unconnected with those counties. Depend upon it, my Lords, that with regard to the militia force—its peculiar constitution, its peculiar character, and its peculiar duties—it is of primary importance that you should connect it, not only with the country, but, locally, with the county to which it belongs, and with all denominations of men within that county, from the highest to the lowest rank. If you were to send the whole of a regiment abroad for the period of the war, or for five years—the limit which you have fixed—you would leave it no root in that county—no nucleus or means of recruiting its strength—you break up altogether its connection with its county, and so alter the character of the whole militia force. It has been admitted by the Government that the Amendment to limit the proportion of each regiment sent abroad hit a blot in the original draft of the Bill, but that it never was intended to take the whole of these regiments out of the country. Now, this Bill professes to be founded on the 54 *Geo.* III., c. 1; now, in that Act there is a clause precisely to the effect of the proviso which, on the Motion of my right hon. Friend in the other House, was inserted in the Bill, and inserted for the reasons I have mentioned—a proviso prohibiting more than three-fourths of any militia regiment being sent out at the same time. I say, then, if this was a blot, it was an intentional one on the part of the Government, and that the omission was studiously made. When the proviso to which I refer was inserted in the other House, another point was noticed which I think a very important one—namely, that in the former Bill there was a proviso not only limiting the proportion of each regiment to be sent out, but the total number of the militia to be sent out from this country as well. In this Bill there was no such provisio; and, in noticing the matter in the other House, the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for the Home Department, who has had great experience of military and militia affairs, objected to any limitation in this respect, not upon the principle itself, because he thought no man would ever think of sending out the whole militia force, but because in the Act 54 *Geo.* III. there was no such proviso. This, however, is not the fact; for in the Act of *Geo.* III. I find a proviso that no more than 30,000 shall be sent out at any one time. Thus, then, there are two provisions of the Bill of *Geo.* III, which have been studiously departed from in this Bill, one of which the noble Duke says was a blot, while the other is not admitted to be a blot, but is said to be a limitation for which there is no precedent. It was with great reluctance, my Lords, that I found myself compelled, in a matter of principle in which, I believe, the great bulk of the country concurred with me and with those who have acted with me—it was with great reluctance that I found myself compelled to object to the Foreign Enlistment Bill, and to call upon your Lordships to reject that Bill; but in a matter of less vital importance than the principle which was embodied in that Bill, I think the greatest latitude should be afforded to Government in the means they may adopt for reinforcing the army at this crisis. I do not intend, therefore, to offer any opposition to the Bill now before your Lordships, or to move any Amendment upon it; but I must say, with regard to the point to which I have already adverted, that, considering the objects for which the militia were raised, and the importance of keeping up that force, it was not unreasonable to expect that, whereas in 1814 a limit of 30,000 was put to the whole number to be sent out of the country, in this case some limit should also have been fixed—a limit, perhaps, of something like 15,000 men, considering that the numerical force of the militia at present is so much less than what it was in 1814. My objections to this Bill are founded, first of all, upon the belief that you are not taking the most efficient or advantageous mode of recruiting the strength of the army—that you would reinforce it much better by embodying the whole of the militia, and giving every inducement to the men to enter the line, than by sending militia regiments and portions of militia regiments abroad; and secondly, because, while I admit that the alterations which have been made in the Bill, make a material difference in the measure, still I cannot help thinking that, altered as it is, you are still exposed to a serious risk—not now, in the present year, and under the present excitement, but hereafter—as to how far you will be able in future years to keep up a permanent supply to the militia of the country. I think, moreover, that Her Majesty's Government will experience considerable difficulties when they come to deal with the bounties which are to be given for re-enlistment and for entering into foreign service. Great difficulty will be felt, I believe, in adjusting the bounties awarded to militiamen volunteering for foreign service, and to militiamen volunteering to take part in the war. That, however, is a question which may remain altogether in the hands of the Government.

My Lords, there is one peculiarity with regard to the militia to which I am now particularly desirous of calling attention—namely, the inconvenient position in which this Bill places the medical officers of the various regiments. The proposition of my right hon. Friend (Sir J. Pakington) in another place was that not more than three-fourths of the strength of any militia regiment should ever be sent abroad at any one time; and I am told that considerable amusement was excited by an hon. and gallant Member, when on the question being asked how many were to remain at home, the answer given was one-fourth. It would be very well if that were the case; but as the Bill is worded it would appear that not more than three fourths of the "establishment" of a militia regiment are to be permitted to serve out of the United Kingdom at one time. Conceiving the "establishment" of a regiment to be 1,200 men, if three-fourths of that regiment volunteered abroad, that would make 900 men so volunteering; but if a regiment in the whole amounted to 900, seeing that that number would not be sufficient to constitute its "establishment," I see nothing in the Bill to prevent the whole 900 leaving the kingdom; and, therefore, in such a case, one-fourth would not be left at home. If that is their intention, I must say the Government have acceded to the words of the Amendment, but have not adopted its spirit, namely, that there shall be always left in this country at least one-fourth of the strength of every militia regiment. I trust that we may hear from the noble Duke that it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government, whether three-fourths of the establishment of a regiment go abroad or not, to keep in this country at least one-fourth as a nucleus for reinforcing and recruiting the regiment. And now with regard to the medical officers. You place your militia in a certain locality, and you form the force out of persons more or less in that locality. You then embody them, and, to a certain extent, you subject them to inconvenience; but they are embodied only for a short time, and they hope soon to return to their regular avocations. The next step you take is to send them out for five years to a foreign country; and, in that case, in what situation do you place the medical officer? He enters the regiment and is content with the poor pay he receives, because he has an independent practice in the locality which he is desirous of retaining, and, if possible, of augmenting; but when you despatch the regiment to Malta or Gibraltar, he will either not go and you will have to send out an inferior man, or, if he does go, it will be to the ruin of his private practice, which it is impossible to suppose he can regain when his period of service has terminated. He is entitled to no half-pay when he comes back again; and you, therefore, claim from that man the sacrifice of his connection, his practice, his profession, and his means of livelihood; you send him abroad for five years, and, at the expiration of that period, you turn him loose upon the country to make his way as he can. Surely you cannot expect that a medical man, a gentleman well informed and well educated, will consent to forego all the advantages of private practice to form part of a militia regiment on this footing, though he would be proud and happy to form a portion of the corps if the objects for which the force was originally raised were adhered to.

My Lords, before I sit down, I hope I shall be permitted, as we are now considering the most effectual mode of carrying on the war and of reinforcing Her Majesty's troops—I hope I shall be permitted to say a few words upon a subject respecting which, on a point of form, I was properly interrupted a short time ago. I wish to call attention to that portion of Her Majesty's forces which has been employed in blockading hostile ports. In the other House of Parliament we have had the assurance of the First Lord of the Admiralty—or, if not, by other Members of the Government in that House, on several distinct occasions, that the strictest orders had been given to blockade the Russian ports in the White Sea, as well as in the Baltic; and in the Black Sea, as well as in the White Sea. An effectual blockade of the Baltic has taken place from an early period—I think from the beginning of last June. It was undertaken later in the case of Archangel, where also it was certain to be effectual; but up to this moment the ports of Taganrog and Odessa are just as much open to Russian commerce as if no blockade had ever been threatened. Russian commerce passes from these ports without let or hindrance, as if no word had been ever said about the blockade, and to the greatest injury of British commerce. A blockade of the ports of the Black Sea must naturally be felt to be a great loss to the commerce of this country; but, having declared that there should be a blockade, you have sent British industry to every part of the globe in order to provide substitutes for the produce which ordinarily came through those ports; and the importations of palm oil and other commodities from the West Indies and the coast of Africa have prodigiously increased in consequence of the announcement made by Her Majesty's Government that it was intended to maintain an effectual blockade of the Russian ports in the Black Sea. And now what has happened? Why, our enterprising merchants, acting on that declaration, are bringing home their goods from India and other parts of the world, and on entering the English market are met by the astounding fact, that notwithstanding the announcement of the blockade of the Russian ports the trade with Russia in the Black Sea is not only as brisk as ever, but that British merchants have this additional hardship placed upon them, that they are excluded, not only from the Black Sea, but from the Baltic and Archangel as well. And who is it that is carrying on the trade of the Black Sea? Why, it is notoriously the Greek houses. The British merchant is suffering all the inconvenience and hardship of a blockade, inasmuch as he abstains from carrying on the trade in the Black Sea, which goes to other quarters, and in particular our very cordial friends and well wishers, the Greek merchants, enjoy the advantages of an unrestricted commerce. Now, my Lords, I think this is a subject upon which we ought to have information. I think we have a right to ask if orders have been issued to blockade the ports of the Black Sea, and if Government have ascertained whether that blockade has been strictly maintained. I presume, however, that it has, or if it has not, then it must be in consequence of orders issued from the Government, because they have lately signified their approval of the conduct of the Admiral in command of the fleet in the Black Sea by giving the Thanks of Parliament to Admiral Dundas and the men under his command, for the manner in which they have discharged their duty in the Black Sea. In proposing that Vote, the Government asserted that Admiral Dundas had obeyed their orders strictly and effectually, and, therefore, one of two things must have occurred—Her Majesty's Government, having made a declaration to Parliament that they had issued orders to enforce a strict blockade of the Russian ports in the Black Sea, have either never issued those orders, or they have issued counter-orders since. It may be said that this is a delicate subject, and that we are acting in conjunction with another Power whom it is our duty to consult. It might certainly be a delicate subject were I to ask Her Majesty's Government if it was their intention to direct a blockade of some port against which no blockade had yet been maintained—but this is no matter of delicacy at all. Parliament have a perfect right to know whether Her Majesty's Government, having said one thing to Parliament, have practitically done another—whether, having announced to British merchants that there would be a blockade, they have since suffered unfriendly merchants to enjoy the whole of the commerce of the Black Sea, by taking advantage of the practical absence of a blockade. In my opinion, the Government ought and are bound to give an explanation on the matter. There is also another point upon which I wish for information. I may be quite wrong in the information I have received, but it is currently reported—and, if erroneously, it should be contradicted by Her Majesty's Government—that not only goods and merchandise have left the port of Odessa and other Russian ports in the Black Sea, but military stores, ammunition, and supplies have also at various times left the stores of Odessa for the Crimea. It is likewise reported that two Russian Princes the other day quitted Odessa by sea, and I ask the Government if they have reason to believe that such was the case? I have no reason to believe either in the truth or untruth of these statements; but I think it important that full information should be given upon the matter. With regard, however, to the existence of a blockade, I can speak with more confidence; and I am surprised that the rigid and rigorous blockade announced by the Government has not been adhered to. Perhaps I ought now to apologise for deviating from the subject more particularly before your Lordships—the Militia Bill—into that which appears to me to be a material portion of the general scheme for carrying on the war. I certainly do not approve that Bill; I do not think it likely to bestow any great advantage upon the army. I think it calculated to create great inconvenience, and to cause great discouragement to the militia; and it is only because I am desirous of not interposing the slightest obstacle to Her Majesty's Government in carrying on the contest in which they are engaged that I abstain from moving any Amendment upon it.

Earl GRANVILLE: My Lords, I think the noble Earl has somewhat misunderstood my motives for interrupting him upon a point of order when I rose very shortly to answer a question put by him. The noble Earl seems to think that Her Majesty's Government are either anxious to conceal from the House a fact which they knew, or that my noble Friend (the Duke of Newcastle), being War Minister, was ignorant of matters taking place in the conduct of the war. Now, with regard to the ignorance of my noble Friend, it so happens that the fact of the blockade was the subject of conversation between my noble Friend and the First Lord of the Admiralty this very afternoon, which shows to a certain extent that he had not acted from ignorance, but because he was anxious to keep up a most essential principle, which, so far as I am concerned, I shall always observe—namely, that no one of Her Majesty's Ministers should be required to jump up in his place and give an off-hand answer to any question of importance, which, even with a very good memory, might be very incorrect, and would place him, the next time the question was put, in the awkward position of appearing to be ignorant of the business of his department. The noble Duke never meant to say that the Government refused to give any information upon these points; but it is quite obvious that, in the matter of a blockade, involving in the greatest possible degree the interests of trade, and in which the interests of the French Government are combined with our own, it would be most rash not to take care of the strict and perfect accuracy of every part of the answer given to any question respecting it, and it was the delicacy of the matter which induced my noble Friend not to give any off-hand answer which might possibly be inaccurate. The noble Earl has stated very accurately the fact of the blockade as regards the Baltic. Until lately the blockade of some of the Baltic ports has not been enforced, and this has taken place almost exclusively on one ground—namely, that in certain ports there, particularly in Archangel, almost all the goods about to be exported were the property of British or of French merchants. It was, therefore, very desirable that some little latitude should be given in such a case; and I hope this explanation will satisfy your Lordships that no blame rests with the Government, with the department more particularly concerned, or with the officers upon whom it would have devolved to carry out the blockade. An explanation equally satisfactory can be given with regard to the blockade of the Russian ports in the Black Sea. Instructions were originally sent out for the strictest blockade of those ports. Those orders were received by both the British and the French Admirals; but difficulties both practical and theoretical arose as to their execution. At last plans were agreed to by the Admirals for blockading the Russian ports by watching the entrance to the Bosphorus. When this came to the knowledge of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, it appeared to him that such a course was contrary to the principles of international law. He therefore referred the case home to the British Government; communications were at once opened with the French Government upon the subject; and it was found that Lord Stratford was perfectly right, and that the Admirals could not, with regard to the blockade, take the course they proposed. Upon this, fresh communications were immediately entered into between the two Governments, and entered into, as regards the French Government, with the cordiality which has always marked their bearing towards the Ministers of this country. New arrangements were made, and fresh orders were sent out for the complete blockade of the Russian ports in the Black Sea. All this, however, occupied a considerable time, and entailed great delay; and then came that most enormous enterprise, the carrying over of the allied troops from Varna to the shores of the Crimea. During that time the material means were wholly wanting to the Admirals to enforce the blockade. Since then, however, fresh arrangements have been made, and the strictest orders given to our naval officers not only to enforce the blockade, but to harass the enemy in every possible way. I have no doubt that order is being efficiently carried out, as far as our commanders can possibly do so. [The Earl of Derby: When were those last orders sent out?] Two months ago. The noble Earl put to the Government another question which, from its nature, I cannot answer with perfect assurance—I mean respecting an enormous quantity of ammunition said to be sent from Odessa, and as to the two Russian Princes having gone from that port by sea to the Crimea. The only answer it is in my power to give to that report is, that four or five ships from the allied fleets have been constantly cruising in front of Odessa; that reports have been constantly sent to Her Majesty's Government from the commanders of those vessels; and it certainly appears perfectly impossible that such ammunition should have been sent, or that the Russian Princes should have been able to sail from Odessa to the Crimea in the way described by the noble Earl. Further than that, however, I cannot answer as to the truth or falsehood of these reports. With regard to this Bill, the noble Earl has certainly made an ingenious statement of his objections to it. The plan proposed by the noble Earl is, indeed, a most excellent one. I do not imagine there is one noble Lord on this side of the House who does not think that the best plan of proceeding would be, while we are making war in the Crimea, to have in the Mediterranean a large reserve of perfectly well-trained troops, able at once, in case of necessity, to replace those of our forces actually engaged against the enemy, and thus enabling us to keep our militia at home, where their services would be of the most value. But, unfortunately, we have to do, not what would be most desirable, but what is practicable and possible. We are blamed, forsooth, for that, having sent out some 50,000 men to the Crimea, we have not an equal reserve to support them. Now, a reserve would have been most desirable, but I hardly think, supposing in that case we could have gone to Sebastopol at all, that to have sent 25,000 men to the Crimea and to have retained a reserve of 25,000 men behind in the Mediterranean, would have been the best way of securing success there. When, therefore, the noble Earl says there ought to have been a reserve, I think he ought to have reflected where any reserve over and above these 50,000 men was possible. I remember, during the Administration of the noble Earl, that it was said it was absolutely impossible to scrape together in one spot in England 25,000 men, and even then, you would be taking every man from sentry duty and from the manufacturing districts. I mention this to show the difficulties, as regards the number of our forces, which existed during the Administration of the noble Earl, and which were duly appreciated by him then, because a Bill at that time was proposed by the Government of the noble Earl to increase by 5,000 the number of our troops. Now, however, when during the present war you have sent some thousands of miles 54,000 men—absolutely double the number which, so short a time before, it was suggested that our peace establishment could provide—after having done this, it is made a strong point of attack upon the Government that we have not an equal reserve of perfectly trained men at our disposal! With regard to our garrisons in the Mediterranean, it would no doubt be better to have them occupied by well-trained men. But that, unfortunately, is not the alternative presented to us. The additional companies which are to be raised and added to the line regiments will consist of perfectly raw recruits, and it is not desirable to intrust the whole garrisoning of our Mediterranean possessions to perfectly raw troops such as I have described. The noble Earl's plan of recruiting from the militia into the line regiments so sent out is not a bad one; but the fact is that there is not that immense readiness on the part of men to volunteer from the militia into the like which is supposed to exist. It has been declared that in many cases the appeal to the militia regiments was not followed by a voluntary recruitment. How that statement can be supported I really do not know. You wanted recruits for the line, so you sent to the militia to offer each man a bounty if he would enlist, and give an ensigncy to officers to induce them to use their influence. Now, I confess I cannot understand how the noble Earl can represent that as drawing a contingent of one-fourth from each regiment of militia. The fact is, that in some of those very regiments which have been most anxious to volunteer for foreign service as proposed, you have not been able to get this proportion of one-fourth when they were required to volunteer individually. I really must request your Lordships to look at this measure candidly, and I cannot help thinking that, when such measures are brought forward at a great crisis like the present, the ordinary Parliamentary system of examining into every little detail with great minuteness is hardly applicable, when you want really to strengthen the hands of your Government at home. This remark, I think, applies particularly to what has been advanced by the noble Earl about the medical men who are to accompany these militia regiments, The practical answer to his complaint on this subject clearly is this—the old-established, well-to-do medical men will not go out with the regiments, while you will get very able, energetic young men, who are delighted at the opportunity of going out, and under whose care I have no doubt the health of the troops will be looked to as well as by any possible arrangement which could be entered into. I will not occupy your Lordships' time longer, but, having answered, as far as it was possible to do so, the questions of the noble Earl, I trust that the second reading of this Bill will not be further delayed.

Earl GREY: My Lords, I cannot agree with the noble Earl who has just sat down that this Bill presents only petty details, which are not worthy the attention of Parliament, nor of discussion by noble Lords who are sincerely desirous of aiding the Government in carrying on the war. I do not think we need a very microscopic eye to discover flaws enough to give us great objections to this Bill. For my own part I object to this Bill, because I believe it to be wrong in principle, and a departure from the whole design of that Militia Bill which three years ago Parliament was induced to sanction. The object of that Bill was to create a defensive force for the safety of the country—a defensive force to consist of persons who, not adopting a military service for their profession, and not intending to give up the ordinary pursuits of civil life, were yet willing to devote a certain portion of their time to an annual training, in order to acquire a fitness to defend the country in case of actual danger or emergency. The Militia Act of 1852 differed considerably from our former Militia Bills. It contained the special provision—that even in time of war the militia was not to be embodied except in case of actual invasion, or imminent danger of invasion, or in case of rebellion or insurrection. It was not intended that even during war the militia should be constantly and permanently embodied like the militia raised during the last war. This is obvious from the terms of the Act of Parliament itself. Acting, then, on the faith of the principle so laid down, men went into the militia, both as officers and privates, who would not have entered into it if it had been thought that they would hereafter have been drawn wholly from their usual civil pursuits. Country gentlemen, professional men who could not without the greatest inconvenience, or even without actual ruin, give up their whole time to the militia service, yet, believing they were called upon by their duty to their country, came willingly forward and entered into a force which they believed would only call for a sacrifice of a portion of their time which they could spare. At the same time many of the privates were married men, men with large families, men with various occupations which they could leave for a time without much inconvenience, but which they never thought of leaving permanently. Having laid down these conditions, I say, a very considerable number both of privates and officers joined the various regiments of militia. I for one confessed that I did not approve the measure which was then brought before Parliament, because I believed that with less cost to the country a reserve force of a much more efficient character might have been formed; at all events, however, the measure introduced by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) did proceed upon a plan and upon a principle perfectly consistent with itself. That principle was to form, as I said, a force of that particular class of persons who could not be expected to enter into the army, and who, upon entering into the militia, would not interfere with the army. One of the great objects in view was, that this militia force should as little as possible interfere with the regular army, and, by having both privates and officers of the character I have mentioned, you did not, in fact, withdraw from your regular service persons who would probably have entered into it. Now, is it consistent with this principle that your militia regiments should be allowed to go abroad? Under the present Bill a militia regiment, if sent abroad, will probably not remain there for a period of less than two or three years. That being the case, your Lordships must perceive that the service which will be required of these militia regiments is a service altogether similar to that of the regular army during peace, and both officers and privates are as completely withdrawn from their avocations as if they had entered into the regular army; after such an interval they cannot resume their places in the ordinary society of the country; they will certainly find them occupied by other persons; their previous employment will be closed against them; and they will be debarred to a great extent from resuming their former career. Is it fair or just to ask the militia to enter into a bargain so obviously disadvantageous to themselves? Your Lordships will remember that, with regard to the line, when men enter into that service they do so as a profession, of which the mere pay is a part, and not the largest part, of the inducements. The officers look forward to rising to the honours and emoluments of their profession. The privates know they shall have increased pay for good conduct after a certain period of service, and ultimately a pension at the age of 39—supposing them to have enlisted at the ordinary period of life—when they are able, if they choose, to retire with a very comfortable provision for the future. But none of these advantages are in store for the militiamen. Officers in that force can rise to no higher rank than the grade of lieutenant colonel; no half-pay is provided for them; and, at the same time, as far as I am aware, no pension whatever is provided for the privates—nay, the Bill, as introduced into the House of Commons, contained a clause by which, if wounded in action, a militiaman would have a right to a pension; but in the progress of that Bill through the other House that clause was struck out. This shows clearly the course contemplated with regard to this force. Now, I repeat, is it right to ask men to enter into an arrangement so disadvantageous to themselves? If you do, it is quite clear to me that much discontent will hereafter arise. The noble Earl opposite said, very truly, that this volunteering for foreign service would not be really voluntary in all cases; that there would be a moral compulsion upon individuals, both officers and men, which would compel them to go abroad with their regiments. Look at what you have already done. I have pointed out that the Act of 1852 contained a clause which distinctly provided that regiments should only be embodied in case of actual or of apprehended invasion. The men enrolled themselves on the faith of this provision; they accepted a bounty calculated upon the supposition that the demand for their services would be limited to one month in the year during the five years of their service. Well, last year, without their consent, you passed an Act arbitrarily altering the terms of the contract into which these people had entered, and giving the Government power to call upon them to serve for the whole year instead of for a part of it. Now, the injustice of that arrangement, I recollect, was to a great extent obviated by a declaration of the noble Duke the Secretary for the War Department, who told us that no militiaman who objected to be permanently embodied would be required to serve for the year; that, notwithstanding the regiment generally might express a readiness to serve, still, if any individual felt it to be a hardship upon him, he would receive leave of absence if he thought fit to ask for it, or would be allowed his discharge. That declaration met the requirements of the case, and I trust it will be adhered to now, because I know that in the North of England, wages being very high, and men, having in many instances, made a great sacrifice in accepting 1*s.* 1*d.* per day for militia service when they are earning elsewhere 2*s.* 6*d*, or even 5*s.*, great discontent and great dissatisfaction will otherwise be created. But, leaving this point, I say that I object entirely to the policy of employing the militia in discharging the duty of regular toops, because, in the first place, you will necessarily alter the whole character of the employment. Your country gentlemen have important duties to perform at home, which cannot be left undone without great disadvantage to the country. In the same manner with regard to professional men, of whom I know there are many in regiments of militia, it would be absolute ruin to them to go even for one or two years from home. To a certain extent, this result is produced even by the permanent embodiment of the militia contrary to the original intention of the Act. I have already received two resignations from officers of the Northumberland militia expressing great regret that their avocations will not allow them to retain their commissions under these circumstances. To that embodiment there might not, however, be much complaint, because all classes were prepared to undergo a good deal of inconvenience to enable the Government to overcome the first difficulties of the war; but I repeat that if you carry out the proposals contained in this Bill you will destroy the last vestiges of the old character of the militia—henceforth it will cease to be a corps of men not following the military life as a profession. You will drive all such men out of the force. This will be a great injury and disadvantage, because, amid many defects which I think were contained in the measure of the noble Earl opposite, it had the great advantage that it did bring together all classes of the inhabitants of our counties in a manner attended with great social advantages, as well as the benefit expected to result as regards the defence of the country. What will happen if this measure be adopted? No man will enter the militia unless he wishes to devote himself entirely to a military life; all the best men of that kind will, of course, go into the regular army; and thus, while spoiling your militia, while discouraging men from entering into it for the future, and the entrance of gentlemen into it, you will be simply making an addition to your regular army—a force precisely as costly as your regular army, at the same time that it is not disposable for every kind of service like the regular army, and is officered in an inferior manner. Men now in the militia will, many of them, volunteer for foreign service, trusting at a future time to extort some compensation from Government; and no doubt, if the war goes on, and these regiments serve for three or five years, it will be quite impossible for you to turn them adrift without some compensation to both officers and privates, and you will find in that way that this measure will be very onerous to the country. This measure will, moreover, discourage enlistment in the militia by giving effect to the representation of intending recruits, and of such placards as were issued by the Peace Society in 1852, assuring them that, in spite of what was promised by the Government, the men would be drawn into the regular army; and you now seem to be fulfilling to a great extent that prediction. I want to know what necessity there is for having recourse to such a measure, and I did expect to hear some explanation from Her Majesty's Government on that subject; but, after having given my best attention to what has fallen from the noble Duke, I am still at this moment completely in the dark. The noble Duke stated that the object of this Bill is to establish a large reserve force in the Mediterranean garrisons; but does the noble Duke think that that is the most convenient reserve force which cannot be sent forward? The noble Duke has said that four companies of each regiment are to be employed in the Mediterranean station as a sort of advanced reserve to complete the regiments hereafter. That, no doubt, is a most admirable plan; but, in my opinion, a reserve force could be established in the Mediterranean in a different and less objectionable manner. Why could you not get militiamen to volunteer into these companies, and complete them at once? I believe that there would be no difficulty in doing so, and, indeed, that militiamen would be more ready to volunteer for the Crimea itself than for Malta or Gibraltar. What has been the course already adopted? You have allowed 25 per cent of every militia regiment to volunteer, and have given ensigncies to those regiments for every seventy-five men. Well, the principle is, I believe, a good one, and, if acted upon to a still greater extent, there would be, I think, no difficulty in completing the companies you want to form as an advance reserve. There is, however, one thing that strikes me still more, and that is, that this measure would not have been necessary, and the reserve companies of those regiments of the line on active service would have been quite sufficient for the duty required to be performed, if the Government had been more prompt in encouraging recruiting. The noble Duke has stated that the army is actually short of the number of men voted during the last Session of Parliament, and, if I have rightly understood, a Member of the Government is reported to have said, in the other House of Parliament, that it fell short by nearly 20,000 men. [The Duke of NEWCASTLE: About that number.] Well, that being the case, the Army never having been brought up to its establishment, I have heard with astonishment the noble Duke, in vindicating the measure of lowering the standard for recruits, tell us that the order for reducing the standard was issued only four or five weeks ago. I wonder that the order was not issued five or six months ago. Every one knew that we were engaged in war, and the most prompt exertions should have been made for the augmentation of the Army. Why was not the standard lowered on the very day upon which the House of Commons voted the increase to the Army, or even in anticipation of that vote? The same argument also applied to raising the bounty. It may be said that it is too late to look back; and we are now asked to repair the error of that delay—which, to me, was unaccountable, and which was matter for regret—to adopt the plan of allowing militia regiments to volunteer for service in the Colonies, and so to enable us to increase our effective forces by withdrawing the regular troops from those Colonies. I believe that the principle is a very erroneous one and a very impolitic one, and that we shall probably be spoiling our militia by the adoption of a measure which will have less effect in accomplishing an immediate increase of the Army than other methods which might be employed. At the same time I agree with the noble Earl opposite, that at this crisis it would not be expedient that your Lordships should reject this Bill: and, by stating my objections, I do not propose to offer any opposition to the second reading, but rather to check, for the future, the adoption of similar principles. I hope that the result of this discussion will be to bring the Government to adopt a different line of policy, but I do not wish to refuse them the means they now ask for to increase the effective forces of the country, and the same principle actuated me in voting in favour of another Bill, which I do not consider to be free from grave objections.

Lord DENMAN said, he believed, notwithstanding what had been said by the noble Earl who had just spoken, and by the noble Earl opposite, that the patriotism of the country would induce the people to volunteer for this service as well as for the regular service of the Army. The objections urged by the noble Earl (Earl Grey) would probably induce certain classes, especially professional men, to weigh well the advantages of the one service against the other before they determined upon their course of proceeding; but whether or not, he believed that in the present emergency all classes would unite in showing to the world the example of a united nation. The great difficulty under which we, as a people, laboured—that of not being properly trained to military duties—had been well pointed out. That was the difficulty, and for the future we must endeavour to repair it. He hoped orders would be issued to lower the standard still further, if necessary, and to raise the force required by the most ready means. In the late war the regular army was recruited to a considerable extent from the volunteer regiments, and persons were induced, by the promise of commissions, to use their influence to raise volunteers for the regular army. He thought the same course might be adopted now with advantage. He knew instances in which as many as twenty-four volunteers had been enlisted in one parish by one individual. If this country should be invaded we had no Sebastopol to stay the invader; and it was the duty of the Government to make every provision for increasing the military resources of the country.

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL entirely agreed with an opinion uttered by the noble Earl, that every discussion on the subject which had taken place in their Lordships' House had been attended with advantage to the Government and to the country, and he believed that such would always be the case when they were conducted in the spirit and temper which usually characterised discussions in that House. Every one entered that House under the full conviction that, whatever might have been necessary if certain steps had been taken, under existing circumstances the present measure was one of convenience, if not of necessity. He would admit that if we had had a large standing army the Government would not have asked the militia to volunteer even for garrison duty; but not having a large standing army, or a numerous army of reserve, they had to remove our troops from the garrisons, and were, in consequence, obliged to ask militia regiments to perform that duty. He did not deny that there were some objections to the measure, but there must always be objections to any measure which placed it in the power of the militia to leave the confines of the kingdom, and he agreed generally with the principle that they should be kept for the defence of the shores of England. All the objections, however, which had been taken to this measure were, he thought, exaggerated in the course of the discussion, and the measure itself was not without a precedent. The noble Earl opposite had drawn the distinction between the Act passed during the last war and the present Bill, that the men forming the militia under the former Act were drawn by ballot, and were not volunteers; but that distinction appeared to him not to tell against the present Bill, but to be rather in its favour. If men were compelled to enter the militia, it was a greater hardship to press them to go upon foreign service than when the militia service was itself entirely voluntary; and, indeed, he did not see any hardship at all in giving to the militia the option of performing these duties. The noble Earl said that a system by which the militia were sent out of this country to do garrison duty would strike at the very root of recruiting in this country. He had understood the noble Earl to say that if that system were adopted the relations of young men would dissuade them from joining the militia for fear of being made complete soldiers of, and being draughted into the regular army; but it appeared to him that that objection held equally against the system advocated by the noble Earl of allowing individuals from the militia to volunteer into the line. A very considerable number of recruits in the regular army had been derived from militia regiments, and he could not conceive why that state of things should not continue. It was most important, he thought, to preserve a portion of militia regiments in this country to maintain their local connection with the various districts of the country; and if this were done, and the services of the militia regiments were confined to the immediate objects of the Bill, he held that this measure would increase the military spirit of the people, and enable us to take more effectual measures for the creation of an army of reserve for the regular army.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH: My Lords, the noble Duke would have been more correct if he had stated, not that noble Lords were in favour of this Bill, but that they were in favour of the second reading of the Bill; for in what has fallen from him, he appeared to me to assume that all, or nearly all, the Members of your Lordships' House were in favour of this Bill in all its details, and there, I apprehend, the noble Duke is in error. As I understand it, my Lords, the necessity for this Bill arises out of an immediate and pressing demand for ten or eleven regiments now in the garrisons in the Mediterranean, to enable as many regiments to be made disposable for service in the Crimea. Now, I acquiesce in the second reading of the Bill, because I am ready to give power to the Government to that extent; but at the same time I must say that it is not consistent with Parliamentary usage to give to any Government powers beyond the necessity of the case; and least of all is it consistent with Parliamentary usage to pass a Bill subject to an explanation the Government may give as to the mode in which they mean to act upon its provisions;—and yet that is what we are now asked to do. This is a new system, which has been introduced of late, and I protest against a course so inconsistent with usage and with public policy. What the Government want is a Bill to enable them to garrison certain places in the Mediterranean. They want ten or eleven regiments, regiments of the line, and they ask for the whole militia;—there is nothing in this Bill to prevent the whole militia being sent to any part of the world. There is a very material difference between this Bill and the Act of 1813. That Act was passed at the very end of the war, when the Allies were making a rush upon Paris to put an end to the war, and the militia regiments, when sent out, arrived at Bordeaux too late, and there they remained in garrison until the conclusion of peace. It was not any part of the policy of the successive Governments that existed in this country from 1793 to 1813 to alter the character of the militia, and the Act of 1813 was only passed at the last moment of a war, and that exceptional measure was agreed to under particular circumstances. Considering the number of regular troops there were in the kingdom at that time, I think that that measure must have been adopted more on account of certain colonels of militia and certain regiments which were desirous of distinguishing themselves, than to perform any public service. I know no worse policy, either with regard to our military or our naval service, than at the beginning of a war to draw upon our last reserves. If a general does so at the commencement of a battle, he almost invariably loses it; and the same principle applies to the commencement of a war; and the fact of the Government already drawing upon their last reserves shows that they have provided very inadequately for the necessities of the circumstances under which they are placed. Under the Bill of 1813, the number that might be sent out of the kingdom was three-fourths of those on actual service, which was then not much below three-fourths of the establishment. At the present time three-fourths of the establishment amount to the whole of those actually serving, and in some cases even to more. At all events, the number remaining at home in 1813 was, in all cases, something that might be called a regiment; but now the establishment of a regiment may be 1,000 men, but there may be only 800 actually serving; and then if three-fourths of the establishment should be sent abroad, there would only be fifty men of the regiment remaining in this country. In the Act of 1813 there was a limit to the number that might be sent abroad. The limitation was not three-fourths of the establishment, but three-fourths of those actually serving. In 1813, too, the whole number of men to be sent abroad was limited to 30,000. At present the militia establishment is 80,000, and therefore three-fourths of the establishment is 60,000; but the number of effective men is only about 50,000, so that by this Bill the Government acquire the power of sending abroad more actually than all the effective men. But, again, one-quarter of the men in the militia regiments are called upon to volunteer into the line under a certain degree of moral pressure not agreeable to withstand; three-fourths are liable, by this Bill, to be sent abroad. Now, I pretend to no great mathematical education, but I remember enough to satisfy me that, if you take one-fourth for one force, and three-fourths for another, nothing remains. It seems to me, therefore, that there will be no militia left. Now, noble Lords on this side the House are desirous that something should be left; they do not wish totally to destroy the militia. The effect of this measure will be to establish at the commencement of the war two different armies, raised in a different manner, one of which will be officered in an inferior manner, and will be a local army of a limited size. I apprehend that nothing can be more inconvenient than the establishment of local corps, and in Committee I intend to propose an Amendment to prevent regiments volunteering for particular garrisons, and to give Government the power of transferring these men from one garrison to another. There ought to be some limitation, say 15,000 men, to the number of men to be sent out; and I think that to pass the Bill without such a limitation would be inconsistent with Parliamentary convenience, and, however unfashionable it may be at the present day, I still look with reverence to the constitutional practice of Parliament. With regard to this Bill, to employ an expression perhaps not quite consistent with the dignity of Parliamentary language, the effect of it will be to kill the goose that is laying the golden eggs, and to impair a militia that all parties have combined to render efficient. I believe, if the same spirit animate all neighbourhoods as has been evinced in some with which I am acquainted, 160,000 men might be brought to the public service. Those men were obtained by placing before them the circumstances of the militia as they stood then, and have always stood up to this time. Upon those occasions we have had invariably in our favour the exertions of the families of the men enlisted, because they saw in the bounty which they received, and in their pay, and in the certainty of their return at a fixed period, considerable advantages. Will you have the exertions of the family in your favour now when the men will be induced to go abroad, and in all probability not for a short time? I am certain that you will not. The women of the family especially will always entertain apprehensions that the men will be sent abroad; and I am satisfied that you will be cutting at the very root of a most valuable force—which produced most of your recruits in the last war, and which will produce them in this war if you only use proper care. As it is, you are asking more than you have a right to ask. All that you have a right to ask I will willingly grant. Take your eleven regiments, and I have no objection; but to give a general power to take practically the whole militia of the country for service in any part of the world appears to me to be destroying your future means of recruiting. I cannot assent to such a course, and I shall therefore propose Amendments in Committee which will tend to remove these objections.

THE EARL OF GLENGALL said, there was one point to which he wished to call the attention of the House, and that was the question of pensioning those soldiers serving in the militia who might be wounded while engaged abroad. He had scarcely any doubt that pensions would in such instances be granted; but the subject, nevertheless, was one with reference to which he should wish to receive some assurance from the Government. He thought there was a good deal of force in some of the objections which had been urged by the noble Earl; but he (the Earl of Glengall) looked at the subject in another light. We were now engaged in a very formidable contest—a contest of which it was extremely difficult to foretell what the duration might be. The more we attacked the dominions of the Emperor of Russia, the longer would the war last; if we took our stand in the Crimea and attempted to hold that position on the Emperor's own soil, he believed that every Russian would do as they did in 1812; for, while our soldiers continued upon the soil of Russia, neither the Czar nor any of his subjects would consent to treat with us otherwise than as enemies, and that was the course he should recommend to every nation that should be invaded. It was important, bearing that statement in mind, to consider what was the position of our army in the East. He believed that that army had suffered from disease and other causes so much, that it became absolutely necessary that an immense number of troops should be sent out to its relief, and that immense reserves should everywhere be kept up. It was, as a consequence of that necessity and the expediency of having the soldiers who might be sent to the Crimea as well adapted as possible to cope with the hardship of the war, that he was desirous the Government should have recourse to the services of the militia, who were, upon enlistment, accurately examined by a medical officer, and found to be sound in wind and limb, instead of depending upon Germans—who might be well-dressed, indeed, but who would be found devoid of that bodily vigour which, in order to encounter successfully the hardship of a winter in the Crimea, it was indispensable to possess.

Resolved in the *Affirmative.*

Bill read 2^a accordingly.

Standing Orders Nos. 37 and 38 *considered* (according to Order) and *dispensed* with: Bill *committed* to a Committee of the whole House *instanter:* House in Committee accordingly.

On Clause 1,

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH proposed an Amendment, the effect of which would be, he said, to make the Bill exactly analogous to that of 1813, and to confine the number of men to be taken under the Bill to three-fourths of the number actually serving. He had already given his reasons for this proposition, and therefore would not trouble the House again.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE regretted that he must oppose the Amendment. He readily admitted that such extreme cases might occur as the noble Earl had referred to in his former speech, but he thought that there was a considerable advantage in having a fixed rather than a fluctuating number. He would mention a circumstance which would show what he believed would be the practical working of the measure:—the greater part of the regiments which had been first embodied had volunteered, and their numbers were now again very nearly completed. The practical working of the measure would be very different from that suggested by the noble Earl; and, so far from the prospect of serving abroad operating injuriously on the zeal and spirit of these regiments of militia, as the noble Earl had inferred, such was the zeal and spirit of the country, that it had operated up to this time in precisely a contrary direction. The first regiment which had volunteered for foreign service had now given its quota of 25 per cent to the regiments of the line, and he believed that their original number had again been nearly, if not quite, completed. He adhered, therefore, to his opinion, that the rule adopted by the present Bill would be found to operate more satisfactorily in all respects than the plan proposed by the noble Earl, and he could not agree to the Amendment.

The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH was exceedingly glad to hear what had fallen from the noble Duke. It appeared from statements which he had before made, that after the battles of Alma and Inkerman there had been displayed on the part of the people of this country a stronger military disposition than had existed previous to those victories; but their Lordships must recollect that they were legislating for the whole war, and that we could not rely altogether upon the continuance, under adverse circumstances, of those feelings which had been created on the sudden by two great military successes. He thought, however, that it was highly desirable that, under all circumstances, Parliament should take care that there remained in this country a sufficient nucleus, as it were, around which all new recruits should rally. Before he sat down, he wished to put a question to the noble Lord the Commander in Chief. A good deal had been said upon the new establishment of the several regiments in the army, which consisted at the beginning of the war of eight companies, were then raised to twelve, and now were to consist of sixteen companies. What he wished to know was this:—when we had in this manner doubled the number of captains and lieutenants, and, he presumed also, of ensigns, was it proposed to add two additional majors and one additional lieutenant colonel? Because, if it were not so, it must be distinctly understood that the prospects of promotion to the higher ranks would be exactly twice as bad as before the alteration? That, in fact, was his great objection to the plan. He thought it would be much better to follow the old system, and have another battalion. There would then be two majors and one lieutenant colonel in the additional eight companies, and the same chance of promotion as hitherto. But now, when they were sending out officers to encounter great perils, they deprived them of one-half the prospect of promotion they had before.

Viscount HARDINGE begged to state, in reply to the question put by the noble Earl, that there would at once be an additional major, and eventually, as soon as the numbers reached anything like what they were fully expected to reach, there would be a second lieutenant colonel.

The Earl of MALMESBURY could not help thinking that, in another place, the idea just broached had not been that which was there understood. He knew that a great many persons who heard the Amendment — and, indeed, many noble Lords in that House—understood differently to what was now the impression. If, however, the noble Duke agreed that depôts should be left in this country, why did he scruple to have it made a law that only three-fourths of a regiment should be sent out of the country at once. The noble Duke seemed to fancy that all the eighteen regiments to which he alluded had been recruited to their effective strength; but that was not the case. Two regiments that he knew were 400 or 500 short of their full strength, in consequence of the number of men that had been drafted into the line. It was, therefore, impossible to have this first clause in the Bill, and carry it out as it should be carried out. But, as the Government appeared to him to share with his side of the House as far as the principle of the matter was concerned, he should have liked to know what reason or argument they had for refusing to alter the clause so as to carry out the principle in which they said they were agreed?

Lord DYNEVOR entreated the Government to consider the practical working of this measure. The noble Duke said the regiments of militia which underwent training last summer were all very nearly up to their number. That might be the fact, yet their effective strength might be considerably less than the number. If he were correctly informed, in those cases in which militia regiments had been embodied —embodiment being a voluntary act—the effect had been that a considerable number of the men had not been embodied. He knew a regiment which in time of training, when it was stated it was perfectly ready to be embodied, consisted of 900 men, nearly up to the establishment. Within a week the order came down for that regiment to be embodied, and 600 was the whole number which at that time came forward to go into barracks. Of the remainder, some, from the nature of their occupations, were not disposed to quit home; others were married men, and it was conceded on all hands that they ought to be allowed to remain. He believed that in all the eighteen regiments the same result had attended their being embodied, and that, in no case, even when the establishment had been complete in training, was it complete on being embodied. He thought all the necessities of the case would be met by adopting the suggestion of the noble Earl. They would not get, perhaps, so many men to garrison the Mediterranean ports as under other circumstances; at the same time, they would leave that which the noble Duke admitted to be necessary, a nucleus round which volunteers would gather, and from those depôts drafts might be sent out to supply the places of such men as volunteered for service in the Crimea.

The Duke of NEWCASTLE said, there was no noble Lord to whose opinion he should be more inclined to defer than to that of his noble Friend who had just spoken, because he knew the great attention he had paid to the subject of the militia; but the noble Lord had certainly supplied the Government with the very strongest argument in favour of the clause remaining as it stood. He had cited a regiment 900 strong, which, when embodied, only went out to the number of 600. The noble Lord, of course, did not mean that the 300 had ceased to belong to the regiment; but that, acting on the provision of the Act of Parliament, they had not come forward to be embodied. Then, did the noble Lord mean that it would be right to leave at home one-fourth of 600 as well as the 300? He was convinced, the more he examined into this question the more difficult would it appear to his noble Friend to take any other standard than the establishment. He readily admitted that Parliament would and must leave to the Executive Government considerable responsibility as to the regiments to be taken and the mode in which they would carry out the Act; but he was satisfied, looking at the present state of the militia, that any departure from that standard would create inextricable difficulties. As to the last proposal of the noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough), it was very much more stringent than his Amendment, and, of the two, the Amendment was much nearer the proposal of the Government. With regard to any supposed misunderstanding on the subject of this Amendment, he thought it impossible, because his noble Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department readily admitted the principle of an Amendment proposed by a right hon. Gentleman in the other House (Sir J. Pakington), but objected to the mode of carrying it out, and words now standing in the Bill were adopted instead, with the consent of the right hon. Gentleman.

The Earl of DERBY observed that, as to what had occurred in the other House, he rather thought the Secretary of State for the Home Department, from his long Parliamentary experience and practice in debate, had managed apparently to adhere to the Amendment while making a mere verbal alteration, very much to the gratification of the Mover, though completely defeating the object he had in view. When the noble Duke said there could be no error, he wished to know how that was reconcilable with the jocular allusion of the Secretary at War (Mr. S. Herbert), who, being asked if three-fourths went abroad, how many would remain at home, answered, "of course, one-fourth?" He thought the noble Duke would see that the error arose from the difference between the actual strength of the regiments when embodied and their actual strength at the present moment. The noble Duke would find a practical illustration of his error if the regiment alluded to was the regiment he supposed it to be. He believed the establishment of that regiment was 1,200, and that its present number was 920 after all the recruits had been added since its quota had been contributed to the line. That regiment stood first of those which had volunteered for foreign service; and he believed that other regiments that had volunteered stood in the same condition. The noble Duke, having the papers in his hand, would, perhaps, tell them whether the establishment strength did not greatly exceed the effective strength, and whether, in many instances, the taking three-fourths of the establishment would not be taking the whole effective strength of the embodied regiments?

The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH thought the noble Duke hardly understood what he had suggested. If one quarter of each regiment was to be left at home it would amount to the same thing as taking three-quarters for foreign service, provided the establishment and the effective strength were equal. If the regiments were below their establishments, the number serving abroad would be smaller. But if they were very much below, such as 1,000 amounting to only 750, under the noble Duke's proposition the whole regiment might go abroad and leave none at home.

Earl FITZWILLIAM considered it important there should be no doubt as to a nucleus from each regiment remaining at home. He very much objected to the measure in the form in which it was proposed. He had no objection to individuals volunteering for the line—he had not the slightest objection whether they were privates, or subalterns, or officers who joined the regular army, provided their doing so was purely voluntary. He would ask any noble Lord who had read the first clause, whether the terms in the second part of that clause were consistent with a real voluntary engagement? The first part, he admitted, was perfectly voluntary; but then it went on to say—

> "And it shall be lawful for Her Majesty, by any order signed by one of Her principal Secretaries of State, or by the Lord Lieutenant or other chief governor or governors of Ireland, or by his or their chief secretary, directed to the commanding officer of any regiment, battalion, or corps of such militia, to propose to such regiment, battalion, or corps, or any part or parts thereof, to extend their services to any parts or places out of the United Kingdom to be specified in such order, under such rules and regulations as Her Majesty may think fit to appoint."

He put it to their Lordships, as Gentlemen who knew how to weigh words, whether they would venture to resist that proposal if it were made to them? It would be difficult, in his opinion, even for privates, but for those in the condition of gentlemen it would be impossible to resist such a proposition, however distasteful it might be, however disagreeable in its consequences, however injurious to their fortune and property. It was a proposition which no Government ought to make. Let the volunteering be a true volunteering—that was to say, let the idea of volunteering arise in the mind of the man who volunteered, not in the mind of somebody who suggested it to him. He concurred in thinking the Amendment of the noble Earl would remove a great objection, but not the objection he entertained—that, under the specious garb of being an entirely voluntary proceeding, something was proposed and almost enforced on these regiments by the Queen's order.

The Duke of NEWCASTLE said, he trusted that he should be understood when he said that Government would not make any offer to any militia regiment, but would wait until it volunteered its services. They would not force any man who had been embodied under the old system to be embodied again under the new one.

In answer to a question by the Earl of Derby,

The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH, before the Amendment was put to their Lordships, wished to propose another, limiting the places to which the militia regiments could be sent to the Mediterranean garrisons and the Channel Islands.

The Duke of NEWCASTLE considered the restriction unwise.

Lord COLCHESTER had heard that in another place Canada had been mentioned as one of the places to which the militia were likely to be sent. Was that so?

The Duke of NEWCASTLE answered in the negative.

The Earl of DERBY said, it would be exceedingly desirable that their Lordships should know the actual state of the militia regiments. He perceived the noble Duke was perusing a document. Perhaps that document would enable the noble Duke to inform the House upon a point so material in considering this Bill?

The Duke of NEWCASTLE: The paper to which the noble Earl referred had been put in his hands since he entered that House. There was no date to it, only merely 1854, and he did not even know who sent it.

The Earl of MALMESBURY: The noble Duke obstinately refused to furnish information to their Lordships as to how the militia regiments now actually stand; and yet the whole question actually depended on that knowledge. He believed the truth was, that the noble Duke was ignorant of the fact.

The Duke of NEWCASTLE said, the noble Earl had resorted to his accustomed practice of lecturing the Government upon every possible occasion, and using terms, if not very applicable, certainly very discourteous. The noble Earl—he would not use that favourite term of his, "misrepresented," but he would say "misunderstood" every word he (the Duke of Newcastle) had uttered. He had never stated he was ignorant of the state of the militia, and the noble Earl was not entitled to assume that as a fact. He had stated the precise reverse. What he said, and what he now repeated was, that the great majority of the regiments embodied had very nearly their full establishment.

THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: Perhaps the noble Duke would gratify the House with a return, showing the number of regiments embodied which had their full establishment on that very day. Would the noble Duke give that to the House?

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: If the noble Earl made such a motion to-morrow he would consider it. He must say he thought further reference as to the state of the regiments was not desirable. [The Earl of DERBY: Hear, hear!] Yes, he understood the cheer of the noble Earl, but he (the Duke of Newcastle) felt sure that the people out of doors would be of opinion that he had already gone to the verge of prudence—he hoped he had not overstepped those bounds, and given information to the enemy which he ought not to give, in the statements he had made on that night. He had no wish to keep anything back which it was for the interest of the public service to furnish. He would not attempt to deceive the House, but he was not, without some consideration, prepared to agree to the request made by the noble Earl.

THE EARL OF DERBY would be the last man in that House to ask for information which it was not for the interest of the public service to be afforded, but, at the same time would remind the noble Duke that the return sought for was the very key to the question they were considering. As for what the noble Duke said about his noble Friend making a motion to-morrow, of course if the information were not furnished at once they could not have it until after the recess, when the Bill would have been passed, and when the return would be comparatively valueless.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE repeated his conviction that by far the greater number of regiments which had been embodied had their full complement—had completed their entire establishment. He begged to remind the noble Earl that a return of the militia force on that very day would represent almost the lowest figure at which it would stand, in consequence of those who had volunteered into the line, but in a fortnight the case would be very different. There would be some trouble and delay in obtaining the return, which must be obtained from each of the colonels of eighteen regiments; still if it were meant to test his veracity, it would be produced.

THE EARL OF MALMESBURY did not doubt the noble Duke's veracity—it was his information he doubted. He believed the noble Duke was totally misinformed as to the real strength of the militia regiments. He (the Earl of Malmesbury) himself knew five regiments which had not yet got half their establishment. The noble Duke ought to have at his fingers' ends the information for which he had asked.

THE EARL OF DESART was understood to support the Amendment.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH would submit to the noble Duke that it would be very desirable he should be furnished with a return each week, showing the number that had volunteered into and quitted each militia regiment.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE felt obliged to the noble Earl for the suggestion, which would not be lost sight of.

Amendment negatived; clause agreed to.

Clauses 2 and 3 *agreed to.*

On clause 4 being proposed,

THE EARL OF GLENGALL asked who it was that really had the control over the militia now—the Secretary at War, the Secretary for War, or the Home Secretary?

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: The recent appointment of a new Secretary for War had not made any difference in the control of the militia. So long as they were not embodied, the force was under the control of the Home Office, but when embodied, the control of the Home Office ceased, and the force came under the control of the Secretary for War.

Clause *agreed to.*

On Clause 5,

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH proposed that the volunteer force sent abroad be limited to 15,000 men, which was 4,000 more than the Government itself proposed. In 1813 the militia force sent abroad was limited to 30,000. He also proposed that not more than three-fourths of the actual strength of each regiment be sent abroad, and not three-fourths of the nominal establishment. His object was always to keep a nucleus at home for the due recruiting of the force.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE objected to the restriction as impolitic and unnecessary.

Amendment *negatived;* Clause *agreed to;* remaining Clauses *agreed to.* Bill *reported* without amendment, and to be read 3ª *To-morrow.*

THE EXCHANGE OF VESSELS WITH THE PRUSSIAN GOVERNMENT—QUESTION.

The Earl of HARDWICKE: I have given notice, my Lords, that I intend to put two questions to Her Majesty's Government to-night, and I assure the House I will be as brief as I can; but you will allow me to say that I do so, not so much for the purpose of getting an answer for myself as to bring before your Lordships' notice a case which bears on the subject of the war in which we are engaged. The first question which I wish to put to the Government has reference to an exchange which is stated to be about to be made between this country and Prussia, which seems to be considered a small matter by the answer which has been elicited from the First Lord of the Admiralty. The other day I was at Chatham, and I saw in one of the docks Her Majesty's ship *Thetis,* and on noticing that vessel, I was told by the officer who had charge of the yard that she was about to be exchanged for two gunboats belonging to the King of Prussia. I must confess I was extremely surprised at such an exchange, more particularly as the ship itself happened to be well known to me. I had been on an experimental cruise in that identical vessel, and I was very much struck with the circumstance of the contemplated exchange, knowing as I did that the *Thetis* was constructed by a superior class of British shipwrights as one of the trial ships of that day which was to exemplify the best possible form of a floating body. I knew her to be one of the best of her class, and, in fact, to be a model of perfection. I should not have referred to the matter after the answer of the First Lord of the Admiralty, if I had not seen and been informed that he, in another place, in a conversation on the subject of the exchange, stated that the agreement had been first for two corvettes and afterwards for an old frigate, and that the matter was, in short, of no sort of importance—of very little consequence. Now, there is no man living on the face of the earth who knows the force of language more than the First Lord of the Admiralty; and when he says in his place in Parliament, that the exchange was to be for "an old ship," I will ask anybody in this House, or out of doors, whether connected with the service or not, would not that convey to the mind, that it was a ship past ordinary service and of not much value? But, my Lords, this ship was built in 1846, and I took great interest in her, because she was built by a body of men in whom I felt interested; she turned out to be an extremely fine ship, and, indeed, one of the best ever constructed both in form and strength. She was nearly 1,600 tons burden, and could not have cost this country less than 40,000*l.* or 50,000*l.*, and when I saw her the other day she had been completely refitted with new rigging. Now, my Lords, even as a matter of trade, as a mercantile transaction, this matter is one of very great importance. What may have been in the breast of the Government at the time they made that exchange I cannot say; but when I consider that the cost of this vessel was what I have stated, and that the cost of the gunboats for which she was to be exchanged could not exceed 6,000*l.* apiece, such a transaction will be well worthy the attention of the House of Commons when the Estimates are brought before them; and if ever there was a case in which the First Lord of the Admiralty ought to be made to pay the difference, this appears to me to have been one of all others in which it would have been right to visit that great functionary with such a penalty. I can make no comment on this; it is a matter of fact; it is a matter of bargain and sale. He has certainly not gone to the cheapest market, but he appears to me, contrary to his own principles, to have paid the largest amount of money for these gunboats. One great peculiarity with regard to these boats is, that they were built by a gentleman of this country, Mr. Scott Russell, who, I understand, possesses models of them; and yet he was sent to Prussia to see whether they were fit to exchange and to be used in Her Majesty's service. He comes back and says they are peculiarly fit for the Baltic. Now, my Lords, I very strongly suspect that they are not fit for the Baltic; for I do not think that the Prussian Government would have been very anxious to exchange these very fine gunboats, as such vessels, particularly to a maritime nation, are of the greatest value. I have, therefore, taken the liberty of bringing this subject before your Lordships, in order that you and the public may know the value of this exchange, which I consider to be very detrimental to this country. I also think that the answer which I hope to get from the Government will be directly opposite from that which has been given in another place by the First Lord of the Admiralty, because he stated that the bargain was not completed.

Why, my Lords, these vessels have just arrived; the bargain is completed, and this country has given one of its finest ships, valued at 40,000*l.*, for two vessels not worth 10,000*l.* or 12,000*l.* It only remains for me now to inquire of Her Majesty's Government what were the circumstances under which the exchange was effected?

THE EARL OF CLARENDON: I hope if the First Lord of the Admiralty is to pay the difference of a bad bargain out of his own pocket, he is to be allowed to pocket the advantages of a good one. The transaction to which my noble Friend alludes having passed through the Foreign Office, I suppose that I am the person who is expected to answer the noble Earl's question. I propose in that answer to give him all the information I can; but not being exactly aware of what my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty did say, I am not sure I shall give the same answer. All I can undertake to do is to state the facts, and I have not the least doubt that they will turn out to be precisely what were stated in the other House. The proposal in question came from the Prussian Government, who stated that they wished to increase their marine force, and would be very glad, as they understood Her Majesty's Government were about to construct gunboats, to exchange the two gunboats in question for what they termed "donkey frigates." That was their proposition; but the answer of Her Majesty's Government was that they had no "donkeys" to dispose of, but that there were two corvettes which might be given in exchange, if, on a survey, the gunboats in question appeared to be valuable. This survey of the gunboats was made. I am not sure that it was made by Mr. Scott Russell, but I believe he made a report as to how they were constructed, and what they were peculiarly adapted for. I am sure they must have cost considerably more than my noble Friend says—5,000*l.* or 6,000*l.*—for I believe they were built to carry two or three mortars, and it was considered that they would be very desirable boats—in fact, just such as Her Majesty's Government wished to obtain in the middle of June. A noble Friend near me says that, with their armaments, they are now worth 40,000*l.* Some delay, however, took place on the part of the Prussian Government, and the negotiations were only renewed in the month of September, when my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty said it was no longer an object with Her Majesty's Government to obtain such gunboats, and objected to the completion of the exchange, upon which the Prussian Government answered, "Oh, but we have obtained your word—your word has been given," and it was under those circumstances that the exchange was consented to. With respect to the *Thetis* herself, I understand that she requires an expenditure of nearly 8,000*l.* before she can be put in a proper state, and that she will be handed over to the Prussian Government without any armament whatever. I hope this answer will be satisfactory to my noble Friend.

STATE OF BALAKLAVA HARBOUR—QUESTION.

THE EARL OF HARDWICKE: My Lords, the second question I wish to put to Her Majesty's Government is, as to who is the responsible Naval Officer in the Harbour and Roadstead of Balaklava? The town and harbour of Balaklava is one of the most important positions our army could possibly hold; and it is important that our army in the Crimea, whose safety depends upon the state and condition of another department of the service (the Commissariat), should be placed, as regards that other department, in such a position as to be able to meet any difficulties which may arise. I have been induced to-day to take notice of the state and condition of the port of Balaklava, in consequence of the afflicting circumstances which followed the gale of the 14th of November. It is unnecessary for me to describe to your Lordships the state of things which then existed, and which, I believe, has been, generally speaking, faithfully reported. The whole of the circumstances attending that tremendous storm, which inflicted such severe loss upon our shipping and that of our allies, have been before your Lordships. Among these losses was one, the circumstances attending which were of a very peculiar character, in consequence of that ship having gone out from England to Balaklava with almost every necessary for the relief and sustenance of our army—our seamen as well as our soldiers. In addition to her cargo, I understand she contained ammunition to a large amount, and it is well known that that ship perished in the gale. Now, my Lords, it is a bold thing for any one to assert, who was not on the spot, that that ship might have been saved; but I think I am justified in asserting my firm conviction, that if the regulations of the port of Balaklava had been such as they ought to have been, that ship would have been saved. Now, what were the circumstances under which this ship was lost? It has been spoken of in Parliament, and my noble Friend opposite has said, that he had himself sent out for the purpose of making an inquiry into its loss. I believe that I can pretty nearly tell the answer which will be made to the question. It has been stated that that ship was not commanded in the manner that she ought to have been; and I believe also, from statements made to me, and from assurances from my own acquaintance, that the Government were advised as to the want of ability on the part of the officer who commanded that vessel. But the point I wish particularly to allude to is an evidence of the truth of that statement, which also bears much on the condition of the harbour of Balaklava. When she arrived at the port of Balaklava, it is perfectly clear and well understood, that in entering she was taken in with such velocity and in such an unseamanlike manner, that in bringing up she lost her bower anchors. Whether the cables were what, in technical terms, is called "clinched" (or secured to the mast), or not, is a matter of some dispute; but, at all events, she ran her cables out in consequence of the inability of the officer to bring her properly into the port. But what was done by the officer who had charge of Balaklava? She was forced to leave that port and anchor outside with such anchors as she had left, which at the utmost could only have been one sheet-anchor, the others being only such as were used in warping. It is not stated precisely whether she had any of those anchors or none at all; but how is it that, with men-of-war lying there, a ship of such value was not supplied with an anchor, or was not directed to make an offing and lie to till such time as the necessary preparations were made to receive her? The whole transaction is one that shows, first of all, the greatest want of seamanship on the part of the commanding officer; and, secondly, great neglect on the part of the officer at Balaklava. Now, my Lords, I am going to make use of a statement inserted in a newspaper in this country which is acknowledged as an authority in all cases, and the reports of which have been given with such perfect accuracy that I do not think Her Majesty's Government will be able to "pooh, pooh" it. I will read a statement made in a report of the transactions which have taken place in the Crimea and the Black Sea; and I do not think that Her Majesty's Government will be able to say that it is a mere newspaper report, and not to be relied upon, as being without authority. But, even if they do say so, my object will be equally gained. I shall be glad to find, in putting the question with which I shall conclude, that the officer who is charged with the management at Balaklava Harbour is not liable to the charges made here. I shall take the liberty of very shortly reading one or two extracts from a report in the *Times* newspaper of the 18th of this month. I am not going to read the whole story; the reporter says:—

> "Will it be credited that, with all our naval officers in Balaklava with nothing else to do—with our *embarras des richesses* of captains, commanders, and lieutenants—there is no more care taken for the vessels in Balaklava than if they were colliers in a gale off Newcastle? Ships come in and anchor where they like, do what they like, go out when they like, and are permitted to perform whatever vagaries they like, in accordance with the old rule of 'higgledy piggledy, rough and tumble,' combined with 'happy-go-lucky.'"

And in another place he adds—

> "It is now more than two months since British vessels have crowded into this port, and yet there is not the slightest sign of anything like system in the mooring of the vessels. Without any regard to whether a vessel will stay a long or short time—whether it is a man-of-war or transport—whether it carries ammunition or grain—they are lying *pêle-mêle*. The consequence is, that the entrance or departure of every single vessel deranges the whole squadron. This circumstance may be attended with considerable danger, particularly if, as was the case yesterday, a strong breeze is blowing into the harbour. The *Cleopatra* screw steamer, with troops, the *Belgravia*, 105 transport, with stores, and three other smaller transports, came in the one after the other in close succession, running, of course, foul, now of a bowsprit, now of a yard, and causing a great deal of trouble and some damage, which, with a little care, should be all avoided. But most of the vessels come in without knowing anything of the port, and are obliged to anchor as best they can."

So much for the state of the port. Now, what I have to say is, that nothing could be more easy than for the officer having authority, and understanding his business, to have arranged the details and to have put things into proper order in his own mind first of all, and then to have used sufficient energy and activity in carrying out his own views. I ask, why it is that there is not this description of officer in the port of Balaklava? Who is the responsible officer there? and why is it that Her Majesty's officers placed in that quarter are not capable of conducting the affairs of the harbour in a proper manner? I do not mean to say that the Government of this country are answerable for the small details of everything that takes place in arrangements of that kind, but I will say they are entirely answerable for the officers placed there, and they should take care that they are officers of such ability as to be able to conduct the affairs of the country in that respect in a proper manner, There is no doubt the officer in question would have had no difficulty in finding men and officers for the purpose of carrying out any such arrangements, so as to secure order and regularity when ships are coming in or going out—to establish, in point of fact, a sort of police, to give their directions as to the course any particular vessel was to pursue—where she should be made to anchor, and all necessary warping arrangements. All these arrangements should be entirely finished and completed, and a certain fixed plan laid down in order to carry them into effect. Now, look at what the French have done. It really appears to me that the French are our betters in matters of detail, and more capable of carrying out minor arrangements. I must trouble your Lordships with another extract, for it does appear to me that the management with regard to the ships evinces such a state of absence of mind and carelessness on the part of those who have duties to perform as is absolutely surprising. Is it not astonishing that after they had such terrible disasters, that when a calm succeeded the storm, no opportunity should have been taken to collect the *débris* of every sort which floated upon the shore? Now, this reporter goes on to state—

> "Indeed, our cavalry is at present employed in feeding itself. It is all they have to do. The men are sent down with their horses from the camp to the waterside every day, and carry back their fodder and rations. It is perfectly disgraceful to the authorities, whoever they may be, to see on this, the twelfth day after the gale, trusses of compressed hay floating about and rotting in every direction in the harbour, while our horses are dying of sheer inanition. Scandalous neglect and indifference to the interests of the public service are chargeable somewhere or another in this matter. The compressed hay would have kept sweet for many days had it been fished out even within the week after it floated out of the wrecks, and the slight impregnation of the outer portion by salt water would not have rendered it at all distasteful to the horses. But, no: we are all 'Jolly Miller wights' out here, and care for nobody or nothing, and so the fodder floated and bobbed about, stranded on the fringe of unutterable abominations and corruptions by the beach, floated off again, and rotted and stank, and stinks and rots, while the animals are half starving. In the same way the immense amount of timber which washed about the harbour and on the coast outside, and which would have answered for hutting all the army, and for fuel, was permitted to drift out again the other day when the freshet set in to the head of the habour after the rains, and when the wind blew off the shore, and very little of it was saved, though woe betide the luckless wretch who may be found by the provost marshal walking off with a piece of wood for his hut without an order."

Upon the face of that statement alone the state of things appears to be of a serious character. I am confident, I may say, that the Government of this country and my noble Friends opposite, will take every means in their power to put the regulations with respect to the harbour and roadstead of Balaklava on a better footing. I have no sort of fear whatever for the ships in the port or roadstead, if they be properly handled. Some time ago I was told that nobody could go into the Black Sea in winter; but I expressed my conviction that the blockade in the Black Sea could be supported in winter if proper precautions were taken. I have no desire to reflect on the conduct of officers of my own profession; I know them too well to do that; but I trust for the future, if any circumstances should arise of a character to give warning of a gale, that the ships, instead of being "caught" on a lee-shore—which is a state in such circumstances to be of all things avoided, according to naval maxims —should be out twenty miles in the offing. This would give them the means of escape; for such is the formation of the land of the Crimea, that they could run where they liked, and have the opportunity of getting under some part of the land, where they might lie to in smooth water. The dangerous gale is that which blows from the south-west, and if the commanders of vessels take warning in time, and get to sea, there can be no question at all that steamships—and, I should say, sailing vessels too—would be safe if properly handled. I have made these remarks from a regard for the state and condition of our forces in the Crimea. I consider the port of Balaklava is the present basis of our operations, and upon its state and the condition of the roadstead depend, I will not say our success, but the means of properly supporting our troops; for it is the place where they look to receive all their sustenance, and to which, in time of real difficulty, they must also look for aid and assistance.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: I certainly am extremely glad that this question has been mooted in Parliament, and especially that the noble Earl, a member of the naval profession, has been the individual to attract public attention to a question of such paramount—I might almost say of such vital—interest. I cannot admit that all that has been said and written is absolutely to the letter correct; nevertheless, there have evidently been cases of neglect and want of foresight and attention to matters of real importance to the welfare of the army and the fleet, which I think may be corrected by the pressure now administered by Parliament, coming in aid of the remonstrances made by myself and others. Before I proceed to answer the question, the noble Earl will forgive me if I express some regret that he should have brought forward what he has called the disqualifications of the captain of the *Prince* steamer. I can assure my noble Friend that this is by no means an established fact; and considering that the individual—whether qualified or disqualified—has perished with the ship, I do regret that anything should be said in reference to him—at any rate until the question has been thoroughly investigated. The noble Earl should have remembered that I told the House on a former occasion, I thought it fair to wait the result of an inquiry, which, I stated, was to be originated. My noble Friend should also recollect, when he complains of other ships, which were wrecked and damaged in the storm to which he alludes, that it was not a storm of the ordinary character prevailing in that sea, or affording sufficient warning to get out of the way of danger. My noble Friend ought to bear in mind that this was a storm which came on without any warning, and was, in fact, a hurricane of the most violent description. I do not mean to say that greater care might not have been taken, but, at the same time, much allowance ought to be made for such accidents. My noble Friend says, with great fairness, that he does not charge against the Government any neglect in respect to minor details; but he says that the Government is responsible for the appointment of fit and able officers. I readily agree in that proposition; and if every noble Lord, and every hon. and right hon. Gentleman, and every one in and out of the two Houses of Parliament, would deal with the Government in the same spirit of candour, I certainly should have no cause of complaint. Undoubtedly it is our bounden duty to see our orders carried out by proper instruments, and the details must be left to them; but to say that the fact of some officers in the Crimea not having a change of linen is the fault of the Secretary for War, that is carrying the responsibility of Government into minutiæ which I am afraid it would be perfectly impossible for any Minister to attend to. I repeat that it is the bounden duty of the Government to appoint fitting instruments and to remove those that are not fit. I think I can satisfy my noble Friend that, as regards the *Prince*, there is no case of neglect on the part of the Government. I am asked by my noble Friend who is the responsible officer in the port and roadstead of Balaklava? In the first place, from the period of the flank march to Balaklava to the 17th of October, Sir Edmund Lyons was the responsible officer, and the noble Earl will admit that one more experienced and able is not to be found in Her Majesty's service. On the 17th of October he left for the purpose of attacking Fort Constantine. Since then he has been otherwise engaged in the public service, and has not resumed his position at Balaklava; but a captain in Her Majesty's Service—I will not say equal, but little inferior to Sir E. Lyons—was the person who succeeded to him, Captain Dacres, of the *Sanspareil*. He, therefore, was the responsible officer until he was invalided, shortly after the storm of the 14th of November—viz. somewhere about the 16th or 17th of November. I am not absolutely certain who succeeded him, but I have reason to believe it was Captain Drummond, of the *Retribution*, a very able and efficient officer. In addition to these officers, the commander of the *Vesuvius* has held the appointment of beach-master. Admiral Boxer, who had the command of the transport service between the Bosphorus and Balaklava, has been ordered out to Balaklava to undertake duties there, and Admiral Stopford will succeed him in his former office. I have now given an answer to my noble Friend's question as to who were the responsible parties in the port of Balaklava at the respective periods named, and if he thinks we have not appointed efficient officers, it will be, of course, his duty to comment on the conduct of the Government. I can only regret that there appears, according to the statement which my noble Friend has quoted—assuming it not to be exaggerated—a want of organisation in the port of Balaklava, and I have felt it my duty to call on Lord Raglan to make immediate inquiry into this alleged gross neglect, and report upon it to the proper department. I shall also give him similar directions to inquire as to the loss of the *Prince*, and orders will also be sent out by the Admiralty to the naval authorities to ascertain where the culpability, if any, exists, and to prevent, if possible, such disasters from occurring in future.

The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH said, he did not rise to offer any observations on the points particularly touched upon by his noble and gallant Friend, but to call their Lordships' attention to what had been stated in reference to the steam-ship the *Prince*. It had been represented that the whole of the warm clothing and medical stores were conveyed in that vessel, but that the medical stores were placed in the bottom of the hold with all the other stores above them, so that the medical stores being wanted at Scutari they could not be got at for landing without first removing the heavy articles, and, this being found impossible, it was necessary to take them on to Balaklava. Now that of itself showed great mismanagement on the part of the persons charged with the stowing of that vessel, and he thought it would be well that there should be some persons appointed who should be particularly responsible for the stowage of all vessels in the public service. But what he particularly wanted to suggest to the noble Duke was this, that every cargo sent out to the Crimea should be an assorted cargo, and that in no case should there be put on board of one vessel the whole of the stores of the same description; because, in the event of the vessel being lost, the whole bulk of the stores of one description would be lost likewise, and the army be left utterly destitute of that particular kind of stores. I think it essential that it should be adopted as an uniform principle, that every cargo should be perfect in itself, and should be an assorted cargo, containing a portion of each class of articles, however small; and then, if you lost one ship, you would suffer comparatively little, because the several ships, in a manner, insured each other, making up each others' deficiencies.

The Duke of NEWCASTLE said, he had not seen the statement to which the noble Earl referred, and certainly was not aware that any newspaper or individual had ever stated that the whole of the medical stores and warm clothing were on board the steamer *Prince*. But this he could assure the noble Earl, that if any such statement had been made, no statement more incorrect was ever put forth, because every ship or transport conveying stores, with the exception of those that carried the battering train, had invariably carried out an assorted cargo. Thus, for example, in the case of the very vessel whose unfortunate loss they had had so much reason to deplore: the *Prince* carried out a regiment of soldiers; it carried out besides a considerable quantity of ammunition; it carried out also a large amount of medical stores and warm clothing. So far from all the medical stores, however, having been placed on board that vessel, it was in fact the fifth or sixth consignment of such stores which had been sent out, and it certainly was not the last. Again, so far from all the warm clothing for the troops having been placed in that one ship, he rejoiced to say that nothing could be further from the fact. The *Prince* carried out a considerable quantity of warm clothing, which was lost; but since then various ships had arrived out with warm clothing, and a considerable number of the troops had obtained this comfort. The *Jura* arrived almost immediately after the loss of the *Prince*, with a considerable quantity of warm clothing on board, and he believed there was hardly a ship which had left this country for the Crimea during some time past which had not carried out warm clothing of some description or another; and especial care had been taken never to send out in the same ship the whole of the articles of one description, so as to avoid the risk of losing the entire stock. Thus houses for covering the troops and stores also had been sent out on board several different ships. This principle of assorted cargoes led to difficulty in the case of those enormous ships to which the noble Earl has referred. He says, the medical stores were placed at the bottom of the *Prince*. I believe that that, unfortunately, is too true; because if these enormous ships do not happen to load at one port, there is great difficulty in arranging the cargo, and the *Prince* after taking in these stores went to Woolwich and Portsmouth to embark other stores. He did not mean to say that they could not, perhaps, make a different arrangement by providing that the whole of the stores should be taken in at one port of embarkation—such as Portsmouth; and that, at whatever expense or inconvenience, the medical stores sent should be placed at the top, rather than at the bottom of the cargo. He did not say that these things might not be done; but great allowance ought to be made on account of the difficulty attending these arrangements, considering the immense quantity—thousands and thousands of tons—of every article necessary to be sent out. He believed the statement was correct with regard to the *Prince*, that the medical stores were at the bottom of the cargo; but the other statement with respect to the *Prince* was incorrect, for she carried stores of all kinds.

The Earl of HARDWICKE observed, that merchants loaded their ships at the port where the cargo was ready, and stowed it away according to the different places at which it was to be delivered. He believed that in the Thames and at other ports great confusion had arisen in loading the Government vessels, from different portions of the cargo being sent, and the persons in charge thereof each insisting on that portion under his care being stowed away immediately. All that would be remedied if, at the ports where Government ships were likely to be laden, there were placed trustworthy officers under the orders of the Government, to whom notice was given, when the cargo was about to arrive, of what it would consist, and where it was going—such officers being responsible for the stowage of the ship.

Lord ABINGER suggested whether it would not be possible to establish at Balaklava some corps for the delivery of goods, as he knew that officers had great difficulty in getting at the articles which were sent out? He believed the baggage of the army had arrived at the Crimea, but up to the present moment had not been distributed, being somewhere in a ship in the harbour, nobody knew where. It was obviously important that there should be some organisation for the reception and delivery of the baggage, and that baggage waggons should be ready to take it away to the different regiments, so as to have it distributed without delay.

The Duke of NEWCASTLE wished to say that he had already made an arrangement of the nature and for the end suggested, though whether it had been successful or not he was unable to state. About four or five months ago, finding that the Commissariat would not be able to manage this department satisfactorily, he applied to his right hon. Friend (Sir Thomas Fremantle), the Chairman of the Board of Customs, to select sixteen or eighteen landing waiters, who should undertake the conduct of this duty. They had been accordingly appointed and sent out, being made a branch of the Commissariat, in the hope that, by their aid, confusion and inaccuracies in the baggage department might be obviated. How far the arrangement had effected this object he could not undertake to say, but he should not omit to make inquiry on this head also.

House adjourned till To-morrow.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Thursday, December 21, 1854.

Minutes.] Public Bills. — 1° Common Law Procedure Act Amendment (Ireland).
Reported—Enlistment of Foreigners.

ENLISTMENT OF FOREIGNERS BILL.

Order read, for resuming adjourned Debate on Question [20th December], "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

Question again proposed.

Debate *resumed.*

Mr. CONOLLY said, it was a significant fact, that of the Gentlemen who had addressed the House from among that section which generally supported the Government, but who at the same time vindicated for themselves the right of freedom of thought and freedom of discussion, the most distinguished had united in denouncing this Bill as unworthy of the Government, unworthy of the object in view, and unworthy of the great country to which it was presented. He begged to offer his humble meed of approbation of the speech delivered by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Manchester (Mr. M. Gibson), in which he so boldly and successfully attacked and destroyed the principle—if, indeed, there was a principle on which the Bill was founded. That Gentleman, with an eloquence worthy of the subject, went at once to the fountain head, and exposed the immorality, in a national point of view, of trying to filch and decoy subjects of neutral States to engage in a war in which their Governments had not declared themselves engaged. On principle, indeed, Her

Majesty's Government had not a shred to stand by in the degrading proposition which they had made. Having admired the candid, straightforward, and truly English speech of the right hon. Member for Manchester, he felt himself bound also to pay a tribute to the speech of the hon. Gentleman who represented the West Riding of Yorkshire. That hon. Gentleman had come forward with true English spirit to say that this was not a Bill suited to the emergency, and that foreign mercenaries were not persons to be associated with the gallant army now engaged in the siege of Sebastopol. No one, indeed, would pretend to say that these mercenaries were men who would cheer the drooping spirits—if it was, indeed, possible that the spirits of such men could ever droop—of our soldiers either by their "lonely watchfires," their fatiguing marches, or amid the many hardships which they endured. In the words of the ancient poet—

> "Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis
> Tempus eget."

He rejoiced to hear sentiments like these coming from the other side of the House; and he asked, what must the Government think when they found the most eminent men, who generally supported their views, denouncing the measure which they now pressed upon the House and the country? It was evident that they had themselves no confidence in this measure. They had seen the noble Lord the President of the Council rise to defend it no less than three times, and to reiterate over and over again the arguments that had been so successfully refuted on all sides of the House. The Secretary at War had twice risen in defence of the measure, and a more feeble exhibition it never was his lot to witness than that made by the right hon. Gentleman in favour of this Bill. Indeed, the whole conduct of the Government was pitiable in the extreme. The noble Lord, when he found himself hard pressed by an argument, got up and complained of misrepresentation in a manner that was not very creditable to the Government. He heard the noble Lord with astonishment complain of misrepresentation on the part of the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden), because he said the hon. Member had looked upon this as the only measure taken by Government for relieving the troops serving in the Crimea. The hon. Member had made no misrepresentations whatever, and he believed that if they knew the noble Lord's real view of this matter it would be found not to be far different from that of the hon. Member for the West Riding. He did not wish to take detailed exceptions to the conduct of the Government, but the day would come when the whole conduct of the Government with regard to the war must undergo the most searching investigation, and then hon. Members on that side of the House would go into all the details. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War, instead of answering the other night the important charge brought forward by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich (Sir J. Pakington), had shielded himself under the mystification of a number of idle details. He stated that 56,000 had been sent from this country to the Crimea, just as if there was at any one time a force in the Crimea amounting to 56,000 men. That was a misrepresentation for which the people of England were not prepared, because it was well known that from 25,000 to 27,000 men only crossed to the Crimea, and that the miserable supplies sent from time to time had but barely filled up the losses they had incurred; but he would retain this and other charges against Ministers relating to the general conduct of the war for that full and ample discussion which the subject must at some future period receive. With regard to the Bill before the House, he drew the strongest arguments against it from the defence of the measure itself. He found in the weakness of the position taken by the Government—defended though it was by consummate debaters—in the miserable fallacies of the noble Lord the President of the Council, and in the plausible reasonings of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston)—in all these he found evidences of weakness which were conclusive in condemnation of the Bill. The noble Lord the Member for Tiverton endeavoured to make it appear that the constitutional jealousy of foreign mercenaries entertained in this country was nothing more than a difficulty which presented itself to the House of Commons; but no one knew better than the noble Secretary of State for the Home Department that this was not merely a question of Parliamentary privilege, not merely jealousy of the Crown on the part of the House of Commons, but a question of time-hallowed and sacred privileges on which the people of England set the highest value. He had no hesitation in saying that, if there was one feeling more cherished by the people of England than another, it was the inviolability of this sacred island from the tread of foreigners, and particularly of foreign mercenaries. But when these foreigners were not merely armed troops, but men filched and stolen by the most discreditable devices from the most dishonest of Governments—for those Governments must be dishonest if they affected to be neutral and yet permitted their men to fight under our standard—if these men were to be the scum, the vilest offscourings of all the petty States of Europe—which they must be if they were so wanting in character as to sell their nationality for gold—then nothing would exceed the disgust of the people of England. The noble Lord the President of the Council said there was no difference between such men and those who fought in the Peninsular war, and who under the Duke of Wellington won some of the most glorious victories that are recorded in the annals of this country; but he indignantly denied that there was any resemblance between them and our gallant countrymen, who fought for all that could ennoble life and render death glorious. He regarded this, therefore, as a most miserable and disgraceful measure. After what had been said on all sides of the House regarding it, he felt assured that he did not overstep the limits of moderation when he said that it was both disgraceful and odious—disgraceful in the eyes of foreigners, in the eyes of our enemies, to whom, above all men, they were bound to show a bold front. Well had it been remarked by the hon. Member for the West Riding that it was a cry, as it were, of national bankruptcy; and how delightful such a cry must be, when proceeding from the Treasury benches, to the Emperor of Russia. It made them equally disgraceful in the eyes of their allies. What would that great nation—the French—and their noble Emperor, who was doing his part in this war so nobly, think of this pitiful and miserable device that had been resorted to by our Government? And was it likely that Austria and Prussia would be as willing as they otherwise might have been to act in concert with a country which had resorted to such modes of warfare? But the Government was not England. The Government might have no confidence in the power and resources of this country, but there were others who had, and who would have nothing to do with the miserable measure which they had submitted to Parliament. There were men on that (the Opposition) side of the House who had no sympathy with such a measure, and who proudly maintained that there was in England a power and a determination to carry on this war to a glorious and successful issue. He could not, indeed, understand what had led men in the position of Government to come forward with a Bill which had been indignantly scouted throughout the kingdom, and he was prepared to give it his most unqualified opposition.

Mr. COLLIER said, that he was one of those Members who had not supported the present measure without reluctance, but he thought that the taunts thrown out against them of voting against their conscience were entirely misplaced. He was quite at a loss to see any inconsistency in reluctance to vote for a measure and a feeling of conviction at the same time as to its necessity. The question, and the only question, was, whether or not the measure was necessary. He, for one, would rather not adopt it, but would prefer that we should fight our own battles; but still the question was, whether or not it was necessary. Now, the Government, on the one side, asserted that it was necessary, and the Opposition, on the other, declared it was not; and he, as an independent Member, thought that the Government must be the best informed on the subject, though he could well understand that there might exist good reasons, independent of considerations of loss or retention of office, to induce the Government to withhold, at present, the information they possessed. The arguments against the measure had been accompanied with a great deal of eloquent declamation, wit, and powerful sarcasm, but he had not heard it proved—what, indeed, was a material point—that the country could do without the proposed assistance. He had listened to the Opposition with the view of learning what amount of disciplined and trained forces this country could bring into the field, and what number of troops would be opposed to them, but he had failed to hear any computation of our probable forces, or those of the enemy, by which it would appear that without the proposed aid we should be able to meet the forces of the Emperor of Russia. In support of the Government there was the opinion of the Commander in Chief—there was Lord Raglan writing home for succour of the kind now proposed, and there was our army in the Crimea, which would probably prefer the immediate succour of foreign troops to the promise of some aid of a different kind hereafter. Moreover, the Government, possessing, no doubt, full information, declared on their own responsibility that the proposed force was necessary for the conduct of the war, and, under all these circumstances, he felt he should incur a fearful responsibility if he refused that aid for the vigorous prosecution of the war which the Government stated was necessary. A great deal had been said about it being a reproach to this country that it was unable in itself to raise a sufficient force, but, for his part, he assuredly could not see that that was any matter of reproach. This country was in a transition state from being a peaceful to becoming a warlike nation. That state of transition must last some time, and it was no ground of reproach that in time of peace this country had not a large standing army, and that its Queen did not require the same military support as might be necessary to continental despots. In his mind, it was no cause of reproach that the weapon with which disturbances in this country were suppressed was the staff of the special constable, and not the bayonet of the soldier, and that, consequently, this country had not, like continental nations, a great standing army. However much, then, they might appreciate the conduct of the British soldiers—and he cordially admitted that they were the best soldiers in the world—still it was going beyond what they had any right to boast of to say that the English recruit of sixteen years of age was equal to the disciplined foreigner of twenty-six years of age, or that our ploughmen could suddenly be converted into soldiers equal to the continental veterans. If the Government declared that they wanted 20,000 men, and could not raise them here, what was the use of hon. Members boasting of resources which the country did not possess? Did they suppose they could conceal weakness by vain boasting? Which would damage the Emperor of Russia most—20,000 bayonets added to the allied force, or boasts of inexhaustible resources? He would not enter into the constitutional objections to the measure, which seemed one by one to have vanished, or into the distinction, which appeared more technical than substantial, between troops whose country was hostile to and those whose country was not hostile to Russia. He did not participate in the fear of the right hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. M. Gibson) that we might possibly embroil some of the continental Powers with Russia. He certainly should not feel much anxiety on that account. Every argument against the measure had been exhausted that could by fair criticism or perverse ingenuity be urged against it; and, not content with precedents in English history, hon. Members opposing the Bill had had recourse to the history of Greece. The House had had its attention directed to a despatch written by Nicias; but he thought there was a passage in the history of Greece far more applicable to the present case: when entering upon the war with Philip, Demosthenes urged the Athenians to prosecute the war with vigour, and rebuked them for substituting empty declamation for troops in the field. "Men of Athens," he said, "when will you do your duty? Will you wait for some catastrophe—will you wait for some necessity? But what greater necessity can there be than the reproach that your arms have hitherto failed?" That reproach now attached to this country; our arms had hitherto failed in taking Sebastopol, and it concerned our dignity and our honour, and it might concern our safety, that our arms should succeed. Those who had reproached the Government for being too late, now reproached it for being too early; and, like the procrastinating Athenians, would wait until some great catastrophe occurred. They would wait until the lives of all our gallant soldiers in the Crimea should be sacrificed; and then they would say was the time for the present measure. Heaven forbid that the fate of England should be like the sequel to that page in Athenian history, and that the English should be reduced to the condition to which the Athenians were brought! But if they did not take measures to avert such a catastrophe—if they did not render timely succour to the British troops in their present emergency in the Crimea, they would incur a heavy responsibility in which he was not ready to participate.

Mr. NEWDEGATE said, the hon. and learned Gentleman who had just sat down (Mr. Collier) appeared to have some difficulty in reconciling his conscience to the vote he had given in favour of this measure. The hon. Gentleman had spoken much of the consequences that threatened if the Bill were rejected, and of the immediate results likely to flow from the employment of these foreign mercenaries. But where, he (Mr. Newdegate) would ask, were these 10,000 men in buckram, of whom so much was said? By the very Bill itself, it was made perfectly plain that these foreign recruits, instead of being ready for immediate service, were to remain some time in this country for the purpose of training, and the Government refused to tell even the nation from whence they were to be drawn, but talked of collecting stray emigrants from abroad and forming them into battalions. This must be a work of time, and precluded the idea of these foreigners being available for the immediate necessities of the war in the Crimea. Let Her Majesty's Ministers get up and say that they have 10,000 men ready to proceed to the Crimea. Such a statement might in some degree justify the demand made for the admission of these troops into England; but no such statement had been made. Let them state the nation whence they are to come. Let some assurance be given that these men would be found trustworthy on their junction with our glorious army in the Crimea. He could never believe that the House of Commons would be hood-winked into voting for the introduction of this force of tramping foreigners, by a declaration that the country was unprepared for the present emergency, without some assurance that these foreign troops were really available to meet the emergency. There could be no doubt that the passing of such a measure would do much to check the progress of enlistment throughout the country. The language which he heard on all sides from his fellow-subjects was—

> "If the Government thinks that hired foreigners will fight the battles of England better than her own men, and the House of Commons sanctions such an opinion, why let them trust these foreigners—let them take these foreigners; we will wait till they are undeceived."

That, he could assure hon. Gentlemen, was but a common idea throughout the country. But there was another point which had scarcely received due consideration. Let the House consider the character of the enemy to whom they were opposed; of all the powers of Europe Russia best understood the means of corrupting her adversaries; no power had gained so much by the corrupt use of gold, and by flattering the feelings, the prejudices, the partialities, the ambition, the covetousness of those with whom she had to contend. There was no art of seduction, no course of intrigue, no species of falsehood, to which that Government did not feel justified in resorting. Now, of all troops in the world, mercenaries were the most liable to corruption; and yet they had not been told where these troops were to come from, and they were without any guarantee as to their character or good-will towards this country, although they were to be placed in the camp and in the line of battle of our gallant army in the Crimea, in close contact with the power most likely to corrupt them. The proposal of the Bill was simply this, that we should oppose to the most corrupting of all powers, of all forces the most corruptible. He did not think that the Government could fairly expect the House of Commons to incur such a danger. The House had heard him put a question to the noble Lord the Member for the City of London yesterday, relative to the transference of troops from India to the Crimea. Why, the Government spoke of the power of this empire as if it consisted only of the 27,000,000 population of the United Kingdom, and of the 120,000 men which composed our army. He was happy to say that there were men acknowledging Queen Victoria as their Sovereign in every clime. In India alone there was a population of 150,000,000 and a drilled force of 290,000 men, and he would remind the House, if the Government chose to adopt the means, that in less than four months they could place an armed disciplined force of British soldiers from India in the Crimea. Now, when they told him they would meet the emergency of the case by collecting an army of strangers from the Continent, and bringing them over here to drill them into battalions, he could turn on them and ask, had they taken any steps to avail themselves of the 290,000 men in India, part of which force might within four months be placed in the Crimea. Some of these were of the Queen's army, Europeans and Englishmen, and among the rest were reckoned as fine troops as need be led against the enemy—men with no Russian sympathies—with no doubtful allegiance—but men who had stood by the standard of England amidst all the vicissitudes of her long campaigns against their own neighbours and countrymen. There was another point scarcely yet noticed in the House. As the Bill was introduced into the House of Lords, it was distinctly specified that these foreign troops were to be quartered in this country, and were to be used in the country as well as without it. Their Lordships, however, objected, and very naturally objected, to that. They were not prepared to see this country under an Austrian or German occupation; and the provision was accordingly altered. Still, let them examine how the Bill remained. The House would find the tenor of the Bill in great measure unchanged. They were about to collect a foreign force to be drilled in this country, and yet the Secretary at War told the House he could not embody the militia, because there was not barrack room to house them as well as the regular army. So that they were actually going to barrack these mercenaries throughout the country, while they refused to embody the native militia for want of barrack room. He (Mr. Newdegate) wanted to know where these foreigners were to be placed—whether the Government were going to displace the garrisons of Plymouth, Portsmouth, Chatham, or Woolwich for the accommodation of these foreigners? Were they going to remove the troops from our arsenals to make room for these foreigners? Were they to occupy the Tower—the Trafalgar Square barracks — those of the Green Park? Were they about to add to the immense sense of safety, freedom, and security which Her Majesty enjoyed in the midst of Her own subjects, by placing a large body of these mercenaries at Windsor; merely, of course, for the purpose of drilling and training? It appeared to him that the whole framework of the Bill was consistent with its original intention—namely, that these troops were to be employed as home garrisons. The more he considered the Bill, the more he was surprised that the House of Commons should have placed such blind confidence in a Government who had made such an inadequate provision for carrying on the war, and now proposed such questionable measures. Although the expedition to the Crimea had proved hitherto unsuccessful —because it had been undertaken too late —becouse it had been left unsupported by any available reserve—because the Government had failed to secure a diversion by means of the Turkish army, and thus to prevent the concentration of the Russian troops in the Crimea—and because the Russian army were left in the undisturbed possession of the great resources of Odessa —although this expedition had hitherto proved unsuccessful through the rashness and incompetency of the Government, still he believed they were striking at Russia in the right place—that they would best curb her ambition by taking Sebastopol. He (Mr. Newdegate) sincerely desired the accomplishment of that great object. Nevertheless, he heartily and cordially voted against this Bill, as a measure which he had no reason to hope would meet the immediate necessity for the reinforcement of our army; as a measure dangerous in itself, as calculated to prevent the country putting forth its natural elements of strength; and, lastly, he would vote against it in order to force Her Majesty's Government to use the resources at their disposal by drawing British soldiers from India and elsewhere for service in the Crimea.

Mr. FRESHFIELD: Sir, I do not agree with my hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate) that he has confined himself to points which had not been made by other speakers; on the contrary, I am aware only of one subject discussed by him which has not already been urged—almost the only suggestion of my hon. Friend which approximates to originality, although in principle it is not so, because it falls within that general class with which the House has been so largely supplied—namely, improved means of carrying on the war. My hon. Friend recommends that the British force in India should be transferred to the Crimea; but if I am permitted to travel in the same course—I mean that of volunteering warlike suggestions—I must differ from my hon. Friend. I consider this not a war to obtain this or that local object; it has become a war with Russia in which we must endeavour by all means to weaken her power and her influence, and even to give greater effect to our present operations by making diversions on every possible point. I should therefore prefer the plan of employing the British force in the East in the invasion of the more remote possessions of Russia. But in pursuing that suggestion, I should open a new subject for discussion and a further cause of delay, instead of prosecuting the object for which I rose, which was to urge the House to discourage further delay and to proceed with the Bill—feeling as I do, in common with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Plymouth (Mr. Collier), that every objection to the measure is exhausted. The two great speakers opposed to the Bill were heard on Tuesday night; it may be said that they have not been answered; but even their warmest admirers will not venture to say that their speeches were unanswerable—on the contrary, although the hon. Baronet the Member for Hertfordshire (Sir E. B. Lytton) spoke with the advantage of great facility of composition and gracefulness of delivery, yet, in matters of fact, in constitutional principles, and in logical inference, he was conspicuously open to refutation, and in the excellent speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) there were obvious fallacies. I beg the excuse of my right hon. Friend for speaking of his speech as excellent—all his speeches are excellent—but to me his speech of Tuesday night was eminently so, because it was more condensed than his speeches usually are; but in that speech he relied much upon the fact, stated upon the authority of a foreign newspaper, that a foreigner had deserted from the allied army, and given information of the position of our force; and his inference was, that the enlistment of foreigners must therefore be unsafe, as it was proved that they could not be relied upon. I must own that I was surprised that a reasoner so acute could venture upon a proposition so unsafe as well as unsound; because my right hon. Friend could scarcely be uninformed of a fact established upon authority far less questionable, that three British soldiers had deserted from their respective regiments, and of course were able to convey important information to the enemy. But is my right hon. Friend prepared to conclude that every English soldier is a traitor, and ought not, therefore, to be trusted to fight the battles of his country? Sir, such speeches from those intrinsically of weight and influence have been answered, I may say, only departmentally or officially, with the disadvantage of judicious and necessary reserve, and not with the freedom of general debate; and even those Members who saw the insufficiency of the reasoning employed in opposing the Bill were nevertheless restrained by the understanding that it was for the convenience of the House that the division upon the question of the second reading should take place on Tuesday night. Well, Sir, we did divide, and the principle of the Bill was affirmed, and my right hon. Friend the leader of the Opposition in this House has declared that, technically, there is no objection to the Bill. If, therefore, the principle is adopted, and there is nothing technically wrong in it, what excuse have we for delaying to go into Committee? If there is anything wrong in language or the mode of carrying out the principle, that is the place in which to cure the defects; but to delay going into Committee is unreasonable and very objectionable. During the whole of yesterday's sitting we heard only of the faults of Ministers, their unsatisfactory mode of carrying on the war, the omission to do what the infallible self-created warriors of the House of Commons would have done; but no one reason was assigned to warrant our not going into Committee, except those reasons which had been unsuccessful when urged to prevent the principle of the Bill from being adopted. And, so far as I can perceive, the inclination of many hon. Members to-day is to repeat the inconvenient and useless course of yesterday. In some places this would be called talking against time. I am not inclined to impute this as a motive; but it is obvious that time is sacrificed, that it is opposed to the useful employment of time, and that consequences are likely to follow which hon. Members would regret. It is now Thursday evening; we had reason to expect that the adjournment of the House would take place to-morrow; but it is more than probable that, if no disposition is shown to make progress, we shall be obliged to sit on Saturday; and it is equally probable, that, instead of adjourning for the holidays, we shall have an adjournment only over Christmas day, and may have to meet on Tuesday. Whether this would be for the reasonable convenience of Members it is scarcely necessary to say, but I may say that the necessity so created will be as wanton as it will be void of utility.

Some hon. Members justify delay, upon the ground of giving time to the country to understand the subject—or, more truly it should be said, to adopt the prejudices which some speeches are calculated to engender; but if the success of the measure is to depend upon their opinion in dealing with the false alarms raised by their opponents, there would, upon that ground alone, be little to fear. No, Sir, the British people are too generous, too humane, to adopt the theory of ingenious men, rather than the just and patriotic duty of helping by all the means in their power those who have bravely encountered the horrors of the battle-field, and the no less destructive consequences of disease, and who now stand exposed to increased danger from the ravages made in their ranks by death; and on behalf of my just and humane countrymen and countrywomen, I confidently claim that ready assent, which I assert for myself, to afford the most ready assistance to our suffering heroes in the Crimea, whether English or French—to afford comfort and consolation to anxious fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, and other near relatives of those who have gone forth in the service of their country. It is said the additional force proposed is not necessary; but Ministers propose it upon the opposite ground. Who is prepared to solve the problem upon the mere assertion of the Opposition, who, at least, subject themselves to the unenviable charge of first endeavouring to deny to the Government the power of employing an additional force, and then, by loading that force with every form of opprobrium, to render them enemies rather than friends to those who profess to confide in their services? But Ministers seek the additional force upon their own responsibility; and, for one, I am not prepared to transfer the conduct of the war to other hands, notwithstanding the unexpected readiness shown in the course of this debate to criticise that conduct, and impliedly to offer superior management, and that even from quarters least likely to have studied the tactics of war. Sir, I am not insensible to the horrors of war. No one can feel more strongly the objection to any war not in itself just; but we are not now discussing the justice of the present war—even the party in opposition in this House is pledged to that justice—and it seems to me, as a national question, that it ought so to be carried on, and by such ample force, that, with the blessing of Providence upon our arms and the arms of our allies, we may be able to command an honourable, and a probably permanent peace—a peace which may not only establish the propriety of the war, but operate as a security against the recurrence of future wars.

With these considerations, and for the reasons I have adduced, I respectfully urge upon the House, that without further delay, we should adopt the Motion, that you, Sir, leave the Chair, and that the House proceed with the Bill in Committee.

MR. MURROUGH: Sir, I know not whether the hon. Gentleman the Member for Penrhyn considers that this subject has been exhausted in this House; but this I do know, that the people entertain grave doubts whether it has had sufficient consideration; and although it may not have sealed the fate of Her Majesty's Ministers within these walls, it has completed their condemnation by the country. The noble Lord the Member for the City of London has again attempted to overawe the House by a threat of resignation in case we reject this measure, but the House will bear in mind that during the last two Sessions of Parliament threats of this description have been of weekly occurrence; and although the Government have sustained defeats on questions of great national importance, their threats still remain unexecuted, and the noble Lord is far too discreet in his attachment to office to go to the country with the cry, "Vote for the Whigs and ten thousand Hessians." Sir, I feel a strong conviction that the Peace party would have numbered many more adherents in this House, could it have been anticipated that Her Majesty's Government would have taken so early an opportunity of proclaiming the moral and physical weakness of England by the advocacy of the mercenary system, which has long been condemned by the policy of every enlightened State in Europe; even Switzerland, long the great mart for mercenaries and free lances, has passed an edict against it, and proceeded to denationalise and expatriate the Swiss guard now in the service of the King of Naples. In our own country the law has denounced heavy penalties against enlistment for alien service, and it is now only a few years since an English Baronet stood in the dock to take his trial for levying troops for the purpose of an expedition to Ecuador. The noble Lord has, indeed, quoted as an authority, the fact that a great part of that victorious army which served under Marlborough against France was composed of foreigners, but the example is inapposite; for the noble Lord must remember that the army which Marlborough led at Ramilies was formed in the preceding reign, when the Crown of England was upon the head of the Stadtholder, and the Dutch troops were not only the allies, but the fellow-subjects of the British. In the Peninsula and at Waterloo, the foreign troops were not mercenaries, but allies and subjects of sovereigns engaged in the same struggle as ourselves. But the noble Lord has put this question as one of necessity, and the hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War exclaims, England furnishes nothing but lads of eighteen, who are unfit to endure the hardships of a campaign, and, immediately on their arrival at the seat of war, are compelled to become the inmates of a hospital. If this be true, your remedy is plain; alter your military system, and assimilate it to that of France, and thousands of well-grown, well-conducted, well-educated young men will flock to your standard. In the French army the young peasant, from the moment of his conscription, feels the spirits of Ney, and Soult, and Bernadotte, hover around him, and proclaim in language deathless and unmistakable, that the space between the ranks, and batôns, and dukedoms, and thrones is not only traversable, but has been already traversed by men of antecedents as humble as his own; while your English soldier, from the time of his enlistment, feels his spirit shrouded beneath the shade of a upas-like aristocracy, and that though he may pour out his blood like water, and leave his widow desolate and his children in the destitution of orphanage, in the service of his country, it is but to swell the triumph of some Brudenell or Somerset, whilst his sole and only guerdon is an unknown grave and an unrecorded name. Amend then, I say, your military system, and there will be at once an end of your degrading dependence upon those fifth-rate German princes, whose ablest finance ministers are the croupiers of gaming tables, and whose military superiority is a fraud and an imposture.

MR. DISRAELI: I am not going to detain the House by offering any observations on the Bill, upon which I have already expressed my sentiments fully; but, with their permission, I will say a few words regarding the conduct of the debate, respecting which I do not wish any mistake to be prevalent. I believe the noble Lord the leader of the House, having already taken some part in the debate, has not the opportunity of expressing any wish on the part of the Government that the House would proceed with the Committee; therefore, perhaps, he will excuse me if for a moment I should take his post out of his hands. I do not wish any hon. Gentleman for a moment to believe that there is any wish on this side of the House to throw any unfair obstacle in the way of the progress of public business, and if the noble Lord will reflect for a moment on the course of the discussion on this measure, he will see that there is not the slightest foundation for any such imputation in the present case. The Bill was read a first time on Monday, when the House remained sitting for a long time without business, but no Gentleman on this side took any advantage from that circumstance to propose any amendment. In a private conversation with the noble Lord, I expressed my wish to do everything I could to facilitate its being read a second time next day, and to have the division taken at an early hour. Every person must feel that any imputation upon this side of the House, of having thrown an obstacle in the way of public business, is quite unfounded. Considering that we entirely disapproved of this measure, it was quite impossible that we could have taken any other course than that which we have taken. With regard to the debate yesterday, we must all recollect that the noble Lord, the leader of this House, never rose and deprecated that debate. No doubt he was influenced by the feeling that, considering the suddenness with which the whole subject had been brought before Parliament, and the evident wish which had been shown on this side of the House to facilitate the legitimate progress of business, it was but fair that any Gentleman who desired to address the House on Wednesday morning should have an opportunity of expressing his opinion upon this subject. I do not suppose, in these circumstances, that the noble Lord thought that the discussion which took place yesterday was an unauthorised discussion. Well, we virtually have had two days' debate upon the second reading of this important measure, and I do not think that, in the circumstances under which the House met, that was at all an unreasonable arrangement. I think it would have been disrespectful to our constituents if the debate had been hurried. With regard to myself, I came down to the House this evening prepared to go into Committee, and to offer no opposition to the Motion for that purpose. I am perfectly ready to come to a fair understanding with regard to the progress of this measure. I think we might go into Committee upon it to-day, and agree to take the third reading to-morrow. I think that is a fair arrangement. There will be then a subsequent occasion, upon which any Gentleman who feels a strong conviction of duty that he ought to address the House on this important measure may express his opinion, and at the same time we shall have fulfilled the pledge which we gave that we would offer an uncompromising opposition to the Bill, doing so, however, in a legitimate manner, and without, I conceive, laying ourselves open to the imputation of impeding public business.

Lord JOHN RUSSELL: Sir, I must say a few words after what the right hon. Gentleman has suggested to the House. It is quite true that I did not make any complaint yesterday of the debate being carried on during the whole of the sitting, because I thought that hon. Gentlemen who wished to take part in the debate—they not having proposed an adjournment on Tuesday night, nor interfered at all with the decision of the House upon the second reading of the Bill—were entitled to express their opinions upon the subject on the Motion for going into Committee. I entirely concur with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire that we, on the part of the Government, have no reason to complain of the course which has been taken by hon. Members on the other side. The matter has been fairly debated; but I think it would be for the convenience of all parties, and I am sure it would be for the public interest, if the House were to go into Committee to-night; and I should be glad if the hon. Member who has given notice of an Amendment on the first clause would not bring it under the notice of the House this evening, but would reserve it for the third reading of the Bill to-morrow.

Mr. PACKE said, before the House went into Committee, he was anxious to ask the Government whether they were disposed to give them more definite information as to the duration of the Bill than was provided by the last clause. It was true that no human being could prophesy when the war would terminate. The only limitation for the services of those foreign troops, as indicated by the Bill, was the duration of the war. Now he would venture to say that there never was a measure before the House of greater importance than the present, nor one more calculated to excite jealous feelings in the country. As yet no public opinion upon it had been expressed in the country. The only way in which they could judge of the character of public opinion was by the speeches of the representatives of such large and important constituencies as those of Manchester, Birmingham, Westminster, the West Riding of Yorkshire, and other places. Now, the representatives of all those constituencies stated that the measure was most unpopular throughout the country, and yet there had been no test of public opinion upon the subject as yet. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War stated yesterday that he was perfectly willing to test public opinion upon the Bill. The hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. H. Drummond) said, that meetings were now in progress throughout the country to discuss this matter. All, therefore, which he had to ask the Government was whether they were disposed to limit the duration of the Bill to some definite time, and not to leave it so vague as it was at present. The speeches made by the hon. Member for Poole (Mr. Danby Seymour), and the hon. Member for Richmond (Mr. Rich), though in support of the Government, gave a very reluctant assent to the Bill. He therefore considered that it was most desirable that some definite time should be fixed for the duration of the Bill, in order that the country might have at some future time an opportunity of reviewing its merits. He did not wish unnecessarily to interfere with the measure of the Government, but he did ask them to make some limitation as to the duration of the measure, in order that the opinion of the country might be tested as to the policy of renewing it, after those foreigners had been quartered upon the people of this country. Unless the Government were prepared to give some more definite time than that mentioned in the last clause—namely, the duration of the war, he would certainly move an Amendment on the subject.

Mr. BRIGHT: Sir, I have a question to put to the noble Lord the President of the Council before the House go into Committee. My hon. Friend the Member for the West Riding has given notice that at a certain stage of this Bill—upon the bringing up of the Report—he would take an opportunity to go into the general question of the war, which could not well be done while adhering closely to the contents of this measure. But if no alteration be made in the Bill in Committee this evening, there will be no fixed time for the bringing up of the Report, and so the discussion which my hon. Friend is anxious to raise may be pushed off by the arrangement which has just been made. In these circumstances, perhaps, the noble Lord and the House will not consider out of order any hon. Gentleman who may not to-morrow keep so close to the clauses of the Bill as hon. Members have done in the previous discussions. I merely state this in order that anybody who chooses to get up to-morrow night and say a few other things to the Government than what is contained in the clauses of this Bill may not be considered as out of order, or as talking wide of the subject before the House.

Lord JOHN RUSSELL: I can assure the hon. Gentleman that I will offer no objection to the course which he proposes to take to-morrow night.

Question put, and *agreed to.*

House in Committee; Mr. Bouverie in the Chair.

Clause 1,

Mr. LOCKE KING said, he would now beg to move the proviso of which he had given notice—

> "That no contract with foreign soldiers shall be lawful, under the provisions of which this country shall be liable for any payments, except to officers disabled by wounds, to continue beyond the period of one year after the ratification of a definitive treaty of peace."

Looking back to the years 1815 and 1816, he found the sums proposed in the Estimates to be paid on account of foreign charges amounted to about 300,000*l.*; six years afterwards the sum was 140,000*l.*; and at the present time we were paying some 36,000*l.* a year in respect of disbanded foreign troops. What he should therefore propose would be, that we should at once come to an understanding with these foreign officers to pay them well while they were engaged, but that they should have no claim on us for half-pay after the conclusion of the war. As he understood the Bill, every foreign officer who came over here and trained one or two companies would be entitled to half-pay as soon as ever peace was concluded. This was increasing the dead weight of the country, and was scarcely fair to our own officers, for what was a miserable pittance in this country was a small fortune for a man living in a petty German State. There was always great difficulty, he believed, in ascertaining when these officers died; indeed, some persons asserted that they never did die. If the noble Lord would say that he would agree to the proviso on the third reading he would not press it now, but he thought it was highly desirable that some provision of the sort should be introduced into the Bill. The pay of the English army, although small, according to the scale of remuneration in this country, was yet considerable as compared with the pay of foreign armies; and it was desirable that foreigners entering our service should be considered to be remunerated by the current pay which they actually received while in our army, without reference to any advantages of a prospective nature.

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT said, it was not the intention of the Government to give any pay to foreign officers after the termination of the war, nor did he think it would be desirable to do so. Of course he excepted pensions to officers disabled by wounds, and he thought, also, that some pension should be given to the widows of those officers who might be killed in battle. He agreed with the hon. Member that any arrangement which might be made with foreign officers should be confined to the time they actually served, without any reference to prospective advantages. In the last war, when the German Legion was first raised, it was extremely unpopular in this country, and the consequence was that a clause was inserted in the Bill to the effect that no half-pay should be given; but when the Germans behaved with great gallantry, and became popular, not only with the army, but with the country at large, Parliament rescinded the prohibitory provision, and adopted a clause allowing half-pay. This only occurred, however, after a long period of service during which the legion had greatly distinguished itself. He agreed with his hon. Friend's observations as to the time during which the pay should be given. The officers of this corps would not be retained after the war was over, and, therefore, if they were to be put on half-pay, that would take place generally at an earlier period than could be the case with our own officers, who might still be wanted in the service in time of peace. He therefore concurred in his hon. Friend's principle, and his only question was whether it would be gracious to express that principle in words. However that might be, if the hon. Gentleman would not press his proposition that evening, so as to cause the Government to lose a stage, he (Mr. S. Herbert) would take an early opportunity of considering the point now raised, and then inform the House of his decision.

Captain KNOX said, he wished to know whether these foreign troops were to be commanded by English or by foreign officers, and whether the troops would be allowed to participate in the Patriotic Fund.

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT said, he did not know who the officers of this corps would be, but did not think there could be better officers than the English. As one of the Commissioners of the Patriotic Fund, he had not the slightest doubt that that fund would be distributed among the widows and orphans of British soldiers only, and he believed that to apply it to the relief of any other persons would be a breach of faith towards the subscribers.

Captain KNOX said, the reason he had asked the question, where the officers were to come from, was because a noble Lord, a Member of the Cabinet, had facetiously said that they would be Irishmen, and, perhaps, that was the reason why so many Irish Members supported the Government the other night.

Mr. W. WILLIAMS said, he wished the Government to direct its attention to the most efficient mode of arming our troops. New inventions were referred by them for examination to a committee of engineers, who were often backward in discovering their merits, when they were quickly discovered by other persons. New inventions in arms could be subjected to experiment at the cost of a few pounds, and they therefore ought to have a fair trial. He had heard of a gentleman who had an invention by which he undertook, in engagements like that at Inkerman, to do as much execution with one man as any eight men could do by means of existing appliances. Again, he had seen in the newspapers a letter, stating that when one of our posts was attacked our men were unable to maintain it because their percussion caps were wet and would not explode, and the position was only afterwards retaken with considerable loss. Now, a species of percussion cap had been invented which might be immersed in water for twenty-four hours, and yet when taken out would instantly explode. This and similar inventions ought to be put to the test by the committee of engineers to which he had referred, and he thought it would be better to appoint among the examiners some men who were free from the prejudices of old soldiers.

Mr. F. SCOTT said, he wished to know if under this Bill the officers would be entitled to half-pay, as some misapprehension prevailed on his side of the House on that point?

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT, in reply, said, that they would certainly not. Half-pay could only be given under express Parliamentary sanction.

Mr. HENLEY said, he wished to ask a question connected with this clause, in reference to a statement made by a Member of the Government the other night. If he understood the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War right, he said it was the custom in some of the German States to denaturalise their soldiers. He wished to ask what would be the condition of the wives and children of those men that would be enlisted by us, and what would be the position of the ratepayers in this country in respect to their maintenance? The emigrants from whom the right hon. Gentleman intimated that the Government might draw some, if not the whole, of the supply, were very often accompanied by their wives and children, who came over here, not as emigrants, but under letters of denaturalisation. It was not improbable that their wives and children would follow them here during the period of their training. As he (Mr. Henley) understood the law, if these men go abroad their families would be immediately chargeable on the parish of the port at which those soldiers had embarked. If those people be denaturalised, we could not send them back again to their own country. He consequently wished the right hon. Gentleman would give him an answer as to how they were to be maintained. Were they to be maintained out of the national fund, or as chance paupers at the places from which the regiment embarked? It would no doubt be a very heavy charge upon such parishes if they were to be maintained out of the parish funds.

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT said, he thought the question raised by the right hon. Gentleman a very important one. It should be understood that in any statement that he (Mr. S. Herbert) had made about the chances of obtaining these foreign soldiers, he necessarily spoke without book. Representations had been made to him that such and such a thing might be done, but whether it really could or not, remained of course to be proved. When the German corps was originally formed no inconvenience as regarded the wives and children of the men occurred, because they remained at their own homes. At present the stream of emigration which passed through England on its way to the Colonies entailed no evil on this country, because the emigrants took their families away with them; but, if he were right in thinking that the numbers of these persons who would offer to enlist would be great, of course the Government would select the men who had no wives or children, so that no difficulty on that score could arise. In other cases, where it might be thought that individual married men were so eligible for enlistment that it would be desirable to secure their services, their families might precede them in going to the Colonies to which the men had originally intended to emigrate. As to that, however, he could not positively speak; but, at all events, of course the Government would prefer enlisting single men.

Mr. HENLEY said, he considered that the right hon. Gentleman had only met a small part of his question. No inconvenience might have occurred at the last embodiment of these troops, but with the present facilities for communication with the Continent the case was very different; for what was to hinder the wives and families of Germans who did not tell that they were married when they enlisted, from coming over to this country?—and being the families of denaturalised subjects of a foreign State, serving under licence in our Army, when once they arrived in England they could not be sent back. The question could not be so narrowed as that they had only to intercept from the stream of emigrants passing through this country, such men as they wished to enlist, and then forwarding their wives and families on to their original transatlantic destination, leaving it to the Americans to take care of these incumbrances. Perhaps the Americans would not be so civil as to perform that obliging office for us. But the Government must grapple with this matter, and explain how they meant to deal with it before the third reading of this Bill. If they were to enlist as many as 30,000 German emigrants of mature age, or between twenty-five and thirty, and who had passed through military service in their native country, they could not suppose that such a number of persons of their time of life would not have among them a considerable proportion with wives and children, or families of some kind or other, belonging to them; and no doubt these dependents of theirs would speedily find their way to this country, where they knew there was a maintenance for them, while they could have none at home. In that case, these families must be taken care of, and could not be allowed to starve or beg; the law of this country said, that no person should be left destitute; they must, therefore, go to the workhouse, and be supported by the ratepayers of England. About this there could be no manner of doubt, because, having letters of alienation, or denaturalisation, or whatever we pleased to call them, by which they ceased to be German subjects, we could not pass them over to the Consul of their own nation, and so shift the burden. It would, perhaps, be inconvenient for him to move an Amendment at the present stage of the measure, for possibly the matter could be better dealt with by the Government, who, he hoped, would take it into their consideration before the third reading to-morrow, and tell the House how they meant to provide for these people; because, if only 15,000 out of the 30,000 men proposed to be raised were married, the question what was to be done with their wives and families was an important element in the discussion of this measure.

Mr. R. PHILLIMORE said, he thought the principle of municipal law in this matter had been correctly stated by the right hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley). When the right hon. Secretary at War stated that these troops were to be foreigners with letters of denaturalisation, he (Mr. Phillimore) regarded that assertion as a satisfactory answer to the powerful argument the other evening of the right hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. T. M. Gibson). But then arose one or two questions of international law worthy of attention. A State, by granting its subject a letter of denaturalisation, no doubt parted with his allegiance; but if that subject entered into the military service of another country he was certainly bound by a temporary allegiance to such country, and he thought the obligation remained upon that foreign country to defend him in all his subsequent relations. If that were sound international law, the Government ought well to consider its bearing on this question. He believed his right hon. Friend the Secretary at War was right in stating that German States granted licences by which their own subjects became divested of their allegiance, and, therefore, there could be no subsequent collision of allegiance with regard to them. Our own laws enabled foreign sailors to become naturalised by serving in our Navy; and, speaking in the presence of the right hon. and learned

Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Napier)—an eminent lawyer—who he thought would bear him out, he believed that a foreign soldier by enlisting and serving in the Army of this country had a clear right to the protection of this country so long as he remained in civil or military relations to it.

Sir JOHN PAKINGTON said, he wished for some explanations on an important point after what had fallen from the Secretary at War. He understood that right hon. Gentleman to have just stated that it was intended by the Government that the families of these foreign soldiers should in some instances precede their natural protectors by being sent to the colonies to which the latter also were ultimately to go. He did not understand the right hon. Gentleman on any former occasion to have said that it was designed to send these German soldiers to the colonies after the termination of their service, although he had certainly heard rumours out of doors to that effect. But if he (Sir J. Pakington) were correct in saying that this was the first reference that had been made to such a project, he thought he was certainly justified in asking the Government to explain what their intentions really were. He was the more entitled to make this inquiry, seeing that the Government contemplated raising from 30,000 to 40,000 of these men, and employing them in our service abroad at one time, and also recruiting to maintain that amount of force, and make up for the casualties occurring to them in the field, and were, therefore, likely to have a large number of them thrown upon their hands. There was reason to believe, from all that had passed during the discussions on this measure, that this species of force would not prove very popular to the people of this country, and it was a serious question whether our colonists would be willing, without their consent being asked, to permit so doubtful a class as these men would consist of to be discharged upon their shores. If such were the intentions of the Government, it was questionable whether they were at liberty to adopt any such plan without holding previous communication with the colonies to which it was proposed to send out these men. He wished, therefore, to ask whether the Government had any knowledge that the introduction of such a body of men would be acceptable to the people of our colonies?

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT said, he thought the right hon. Baronet had slightly misunderstood what he had stated when he said that it was the intention of the Government to send any large number of these persons to the colonies. He was informed that out of the whole number that we might be able to obtain, it would be possible to engage the services of a certain proportion of Germans who were in the habit of emigrating, some to the United States, some to Canada, and some to the Australian colonies. But he was not speaking of a gross number who are to be raised exclusively from this or from any other denomination of persons. It was true it might be possible for the Government to obtain the services of persons who came to England to go from thence to the British colonies, and in those cases, after their term of service had been completed, there of course could be no greater reason against their going to Australia, than if their services had never been asked for by the Government. So far, however, as concerned the colonies, he need not say that no Government would think of sending large bodies of men there against the will of the colonists. But the right hon. Baronet, from his acquaintance with colonial affairs, might know that there was a great anxiety felt in Australia to obtain German settlers, and that that Colony had even devoted a portion of its funds to procure their introduction, and especially the introduction of those who came from the banks of the Rhine, and were conversant with vine-dressing and wine-making. It was to this that he had alluded, but he did not venture to offer any exact information as to the probable number of persons whom they were likely to procure from among those who were proceeding to the colonies. He had merely wished to say that he thought we were likely to obtain a certain number of persons who, looking at the disposition they had evinced, and the destination they had shown their desire to reach, were likely to become British subjects by colonising portions of our empire, and that such persons it was desirable to secure.

Mr. DRUMMOND: If there were one thing that was definite in the intentions of the right hon. Gentleman, it seemed to be this—that he was going to set "gins" in the "runs;" or, to use a somewhat more elegant phrase, *in transitu*, just exactly as they caught rabbits. Now, according as they set the gin, sometimes they got a pheasant, and sometimes a polecat; and so it might turn out in this instance that the right hon. Gentleman's trap might catch Germans or anything else. But the question mooted by the right hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley) was much more serious than this. In Bavaria there existed a most cruel and wicked law, which was adopted by all the petty States, and which prohibited marriage between any persons unless they could give the Government a security that they were able to support the children of the marriage. The consequence was, that, throughout the labouring population of those States, not one couple in eight were legitimately married. And to such an extent of severity did they carry this law, that parties were prohibited from going into a neighbouring State or into a canton of Switzerland to be married; and if they violated this prohibition they were punished on their return. What, then, would be the result on these persons reaching England? Why, that a great portion of them would not have been married at all when they left their own country, and if they had been we could not have proof of the fact. Not to allow these men to receive half-pay would, he thought, be exceedingly objectionable. They were a class of persons who had been truly described as a sort of national assassins. ["Oh!"] Yes they were. What was an assassin? You have a quarrel with a man for a good or a bad cause—no matter which. You will not wreak vengeance upon him yourself; but you go and hire another man to do it for you. You quarrel with a man; you hire another to go and shoot him and stab him. The man you hire is an assassin. Well, but it appeared these persons were not to have any retiring allowance. Was not that neither more nor less than an enormous premium for plunder? How were the men to provide the means of subsistence for themselves when peace should be restored? They must obtain it in some way or other. Did the Government contemplate giving them so much pay as that they should be able to save money, or insure their lives for the advantage of their families and friends? Clearly not. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary that some provision should be made for them, and it was not just to place men in positions in which they could only by plunder obtain means for their future support. They ought to be treated like our own soldiers, and to receive half-pay.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT said, that our own soldiers did not receive half-pay until they had served a certain number of years.

MR. BANKES said, he thought the question now raised by his right hon. Friend (Mr. Henley) an entirely new one, and one of great interest to the ratepayers of the country, yet he observed neither of the law-officers of the Crown present to whom they could apply for its solution. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War could not be expected to solve it, and must have perceived its importance, and also that the answer he had given was unsatisfactory and beside the question. They might endeavour to secure the services of unmarried men, but still, after what the hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond) had stated, the Committee must be aware that there would be women and families attached to these men claiming to be married, and how could this be settled? In the case of the war being a short one, it had been said that these men would be transferred to the colonies, but at whose expense the Committee had not been informed. But in the case of the war not proving so short as they desired, then these women and children would remain in this country, unless the Government transferred them to the colonies at the public expense. And how were these women and children to live there, whose only means were the male emigrants, who were to be stopped *in transitu?* If transferred to the colonies, they would be transferred as paupers; and if they remained in this country, they would still be paupers, unless some mode were adopted by which a portion of the pay could be applied to their support. This question was an important one, and one which would not tend to increase the popularity of the measure. He regretted to be obliged to oppose the progress of the Bill through Committee, as he desired as much as possible to facilitate the business of the House, and to consult, as far as he fairly could, the convenience of the Government; but, as they had felt it their duty to summon Parliament before the Christmas recess, they should have done so earlier, and allowed time for discussion of a measure of which so little notice had been given, and which had been introduced with so little preparation on the part of the Government.

MR. VERNON SMITH said, he also desired to caution the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War before he embarked on this question of emigration. It might be true that there was a desire on the part of the colonies for German emigrants; but this desire was for men with families, who would prove useful and profitable. He wished to say nothing against the class of persons who might enlist, but still, if their wives and children were transferred to the colonies without the heads of those families, they would be totally different from the class of emigrants the colonists had expressed a desire to receive. The question of expense was perhaps the least in connection with this matter, but still the expense would be enormous; and he considered, also, that before this course was decided on the colonists themselves ought to be consulted.

Mr. BOOKER said, he wished to ask whether these men would be located in the manufacturing or rural districts? So jealous were our forefathers of the presence of foreigners in this country, that there was a provision that foreign troops in our service should not be allowed to go more than five miles from the coast. The German Legion was quartered at Eastbourne, Hastings, and St. Leonards, and there were in those places still visible traces of the visits of those men. He hoped that these troops would be kept together in masses, and he should like to know in what districts they would be quartered?

Captain KNOX said, he had heard it stated that these troops were to be sent out to the colonies, to serve in lieu of the regular British forces there, and he should be glad to know if that were so? He wished to know also, whether it was necessary that these troops should be commanded by foreigners?

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT said, he did not think any statement of that kind had been made from the Treasury bench; but certainly there was no such intention on the part of the Government. With respect to the second question, he found, upon inquiry, that the troops comprising the German Legion were commanded by Germans.

Mr. OTWAY said, he would remind the Government that at this moment there was a large body of English officers living upon half-pay, many of whom were perfectly capable and willing again to accept active service. Now, could not these gentlemen be made available for the purpose of officering these foreign troops.

Mr. NEWDEGATE said, he felt bound to demand an explicit answer to the question of the hon. Member for Herefordshire (Mr. Booker). Were these troops to be stationed at Chatham, Portsmouth, London, or sent to Manchester, or quartered at Windsor? There was a strong wish in the country to know where this army was to be placed.

Mr. GROGAN said, that by some remarks made by the right hon. Secretary at War, the veil had been partly raised from the Government intentions, and it was evident that this German Legion was to be dealt liberally with at the Government expense. The great object of the Government was to get men of a mature age and constitution, capable of undergoing the fatigues of service in the Army; but had it ever occurred to them that if they held out the same inducements to their own subjects that they offered to these Germans they would then be enabled to obtain as many of their own countrymen as they liked of mature age and constitution, and men who would, in addition to this, be animated by the motive of fighting for their native land?

Mr. F. SCOTT said, he had, during the last quarter of an hour, heard a number of questions asked, none of which had been answered. This might be a very simple mode of conducting a Bill through the House before the Christmas recess, and no doubt, by a compromise, it might be so passed if the Government would give no explanations. During the last ten minutes as many questions had been asked. Firstly, where were these troops to be located? Secondly, how were they to be officered? Thirdly, were they to be employed as a military force in the colonies? Fourthly, how did they propose to deal with the families of those persons who might be left in England? Fifthly, were the families of these mercenaries to be sent to the colonies? Sixthly, had any information been received from the colonies as to whether they would be acceptable? Seventhly, whether the men would be sent to the colonies; and eighthly, would the men so sent be sent at the expense of the colonies, or of the public of this country? He had arranged these questions categorically, in order that there might be no misunderstanding, and, although they had as yet listened patiently, they might not continue to do so unless these questions were answered.

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT said, the questions came so quickly that he could not answer them at once. He was asked whether these troops were to be officered exclusively by Germans; there was no provision for that in the Bill, but he had already stated, as a precedent, that the German Legion was so officered, and he had no wish to put a restriction upon the military authorities now in that respect any more than prevailed formerly. With respect to the half-pay officers, it was true there was a great number of them, but from the augmentation of the regular army which had recently taken place it had been thought advisable to make inquiry into the condition of these, and now almost every man who was capable was in active service. Next, he was asked, where were these troops to be located? But that was a point which must be left entirely to the Executive, though he did not anticipate that any serious difficulty would arise out of it, because there were places in England where the troops could be located without injury or offence to anybody during the short time they would have to be here on the way to their ultimate destination. With regard to the question of emigration, the House has got into some confusion upon that point. No doubt it was one of considerable difficulty; perhaps the colonies might object to it if the means of transit were not found; while, on the other hand, there was the question raised by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxfordshire if the families were kept at home. All these questions were of great difficulty and importance; but there seemed to be an impression in the minds of the Committee that the Government had got some distinct plan of emigration in view which they were going to apply to these foreign troops. Now, all he had stated was simply that it had been suggested by competent persons that there was a good deal of German emigration going on which might be made available for the purposes of this Bill. He did not conceal from himself the difficulties which surrounded the question; but he had thought it right to mention the suggestion to the Committee as one well worthy of consideration.

Mr. F. SCOTT said, he hoped that the right hon. Gentleman would, between that time and to-morrow, take it into his consideration, and state distinctly to the House how they intended to provide for the wives and families of those whom they might enlist.

Colonel DUNNE said, that if the families of these men came here, they must be supported. If the Government did that, they would be doing more for foreigners than for their own soldiers. When subscriptions were made for the Patriotic Fund, he always thought that our soldiers and their families ought to be provided for by their country. If the Government intended to support the wives and families of these mercenary foreigners, our own soldiers must consider themselves to be treated with great unfairness. Of course he took it for granted that the widows and children of those Germans who might fall in the war with Russia would not be left by the Government to starve. He wished to know what rank, whether of colonel or lieutenant-colonel, would be assigned to those who might have command of these foreigners? It would be most unjust to our own countrymen on half-pay, who would not be allowed to hold a higher post than that of lieutenant-colonel, if foreigners were to be appointed colonels of those regiments. He knew a great many of our own half-pay officers who had sought employment from the Government, but it was denied to them, and yet the Government now wished the House of Commons to consent to their going on a search for foreign officers.

Mr. J. G. PHILLIMORE said, it was his intention to reserve for the third reading his Amendment, to the effect that a third of these troops should be commanded by English officers, and that the troops themselves should not be allowed to remain in this country for more than a year after the period of enlistment.

Lord JOHN RUSSELL said, he understood one of the objections made to the Bill to be, that the Government had not proceeded with their plan before asking the assent of Parliament to it. After the Bill had passed they would endeavour to settle the details in the manner which they considered best calculated to obtain the service of these foreigners. The right hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley) had asked a very pertinent question with regard to the families of the soldiers who might enlist, and he believed the right hon. Gentleman had correctly stated the law, that they would be like poor without a settlement, and would, no doubt, have a claim upon the poor-rates. Whether any special provision should be made for those cases was a very fair question, and one which the Government would consider, but it was impossible to say exactly where these persons would be stationed, and to explain all the details of the measure. With reference to the Colonies and the question of emigration, give him leave to ask this question—suppose there should be a large German family come over here for the purpose of emigrating; suppose a father and family came with a married son, and the married son should enlist while here, and the father of the family should have suffiecnt funds to transport him and the rest of his family to Australia, surely there would be no objection to his spending his money in that way? No public money, however, would be applied to that purpose without the consent of Parliament having been obtained.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON said, the imaginary case put by the noble Lord was very different from the answer given by the Secretary at War. The noble Lord had said that several hon. Gentlemen complained that the Government had brought Parliament together without being able to answer questions of detail relating to the measures which were proposed. But that was not the ground of complaint against the Government. What was complained of was this—that the Government had summoned Parliament for the purpose of asking its assent to this extraordinary Bill; and that, when asked about nine questions of the greatest importance with respect to results that might flow from it when passed, the only answer which the Government made was, "We do not know." When his right hon. Friend (Mr. Henley) asked what was to be done with the wives and children of the foreigners whom it was intended to enlist, the Secretary at War said that their wives and children might precede them.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT: I said it had been suggested that their wives and children might precede them, but I said, at the same time, that it would be prudent for the Government to enlist unmarried in preference to married men.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON: Just so; but it seemed that there was an intention to send the wives and children of the married foreigners to those colonies to which the latter might be sent on the termination of the war. When it was said by way of objection to that, that our colonies might not like emigrants of that kind, the Government said, "German emigrants are very acceptable in Australia." No doubt; but it did not follow that German mercenaries, with their wives and families, "who might precede them," would be equally acceptable with such a class of German emigrants as left this country for our colonies. Before such men, or their wives and families, were sent to our colonies, a communication should be made with the colonies on the subject. He was afraid that our own soldiers, whose wives and families had only the Patriotic Fund to look to, would feel very unfairly treated with reference to the apprehended proposition to send these foreigners, with their wives and families, to the colonies. Either the Government had not fully considered all the details of this measure, or they were afraid to speak candidly to Parliament upon the subject.

COLONEL NORTH said, that the German Legion raised during the last war were not only our allies, but our fellow-subjects. The King of England was King of Hanover. And he (Colonel North), having been a great deal in former years with those distinguished men, could take upon himself to say that the officers were composed of men who were connected with the first families in Hanover and Brunswick. If the Government would only state that we were to have a body of men like the old German Legion, commanded by officers like the officers of that legion, he was sure there would not be the slightest hesitation on that (the Opposition) side of the House in giving them its support. Those gallant men left a character in this country, not only for bravery, but for good conduct—the officers for gentlemanly conduct—and he was confident they would be received on this side of the water, not as mercenaries, but as friends and former fellow-subjects. Whom they were to have now, God only knew. But he should think that officers who were ready to take 5*s.* 6*d.* a day to cut Russian throats, if they could, and with the certainty of having their own throats cut should they once fall into the hands of the Czar, would not be the sort of men that English officers would be most proud to associate with. He hoped that, whatever took place, no English barracks would be given to these foreigners so long as there was an English regiment, militia or regular, to occupy it. He hoped more particularly that no barracks in the manufacturing districts would be allotted to them, as on the occasion of rows, which occasionally occur from want of employment, they would be brought into hostile collision with the working classes. Continental soldiers were never called out against the people except for immediate action; whereas he could speak from his own experience, the English soldiers have endured the pelting of their own fellow-countrymen for several hours without firing on them in return—a thing which foreign soldiers would never do.

Lord JOHN RUSSELL said, there was no intention to employ them in the manufacturing districts.

Colonel NORTH said, he wished, then, to know who would preserve the peace in the manufacturing districts in case of riots after our regular troops and the militia had been sent abroad?

Lord JOHN RUSSELL said, that foreigners would not be employed on such service at all.

Lord NAAS said, he hoped that before the Bill passed through Committee some assurance might be given that the apparently ill-considered scheme of emigration connected with the measure would be given up, for nothing, he believed, was more calculated to create discontent, not only in this country but in our army abroad. The noble Lord seemed to throw out that those German emigrants' families might be allowed to proceed to the colonies at their own expense; but should we not be obliged at the end of the war to send out, at our expense, those members of their families who had been left behind? No boon could be more agreeable than that of giving at the close of the war a free passage to the colonies to those men who had not attained too great an age; but nothing would create more ill-feeling than the fact of the foreign troops obtaining at the end of the war a boon which was denied to our own troops, and of which many of our own men would be most glad to avail themselves, if it were offered them. He knew that of his countrymen in the Crimea almost all had relatives and friends in the colonies; and if any intimation were made that at the end of the war the German troops were to have free passages out, he hoped that a similar notice would be given to the British troops.

Lord JOHN RUSSELL said, that the noble Lord might rest satisfied that no advantage would be offered to foreign troops that would not also be offered to British. The noble Lord probably knew that great pains had already been taken to facilitate the settlement of soldiers in the colonies.

Mr. HILDYARD said, he wished it to be distinctly understood that this House was not, on the part of the nation, undertaking any liability which was not borne upon the face of the Bill. If they did not choose to place upon the Bill the indulgences, other than pay, that were to be accorded to the troops, he could only say that hereafter he should not feel himself restrained from refusing to saddle the country with any expense asked upon the plea that when we called these men into our service we virtually bound the nation to deal with them in the way that might then be proposed.

Mr. F. SCOTT said, he could not consent to saddle any parish in England or Scotland with which he was connected with additional burdens, the extent of which was unknown. If the noble Lord would not give an assurance as to how the burdens were to be disposed of, he should be forced to divide the Committee, in order to record his protest against this blind bargain being carried out.

Mr. NEWDEGATE said, he was not prepared to see the arsenals of the country committed to men of whose character they knew nothing. London was not prepared, and it would be a degradation to see the care of the Queen and the Royal Palaces committed to troops of whom the description was not calculated to inspire confidence. Now that the Government had confessed their inability to give any information about those foreign troops, or as to what their character and conduct were likely to be, they could not expect that House to view their silence on this subject as other than a grave addition to their already serious objections to the Bill. He was firmly persuaded there would be throughout the country a most justifiable jealousy, unless the House of Commons were informed where those troops were to be located, or whether they were to be kept in camps. Then there was the great question of the right hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley) as to whether incumbrances in the shape of families following those troops were to be saddled upon those localities in which it might be decided to station them.

Mr. WARNER said, he hoped that no barracks in this country would be given up to foreigners to the prejudice of the militia. There was throughout the country a great prejudice against the Bill, and nothing but the extreme urgency of the case would induce the Government to pass it; nor would anything increase that prejudice, and prevent the people's getting over it, so much as the giving up the barracks of manufacturing towns to foreigners. This was a question in which his constituents took a great interest.

Lord JOHN RUSSELL said, that the Committee had now heard one hon. Gentleman say, "Let foreigners by no means be placed in any of the arsenals of the country;" another exclaiming, "Let them not be placed in any barracks in the manufacturing districts!" and another, "For God's sake, don't let them come into the rural districts!" Now, it would be very difficult to say in what manner they were to be placed. His belief was that, although a prejudice had been raised, that prejudice would prove to be of a very temporary character. At first there existed a similar prejudice in 1804; but when it was seen, as it would be, that these troops were fighting bravely for us, a respect would be excited for them, and the people of England would be sorry to have entertained those prejudices.

Mr. WHITESIDE said, he hoped that a provision would be introduced into the Bill to the effect that these foreign troops should not be allowed to advance into the country more than five miles from the coast. A similar limitation had existed in 1804, such was the constitutional jealousy of the period; but, as the noble Lord had said, the progress of enlightenment and the increase of education ought to dispose the people of England to dispense with such a provision. If the noble Lord could have given any information at all about the character of the people he proposed to employ, he might with fairness have expected such a result. If those troops were to go to Ireland, he (Mr. Whiteside) would propose that they should be located in the poor houses nearest the coast, for, happily, those establishments were destitute of other tenants.

Mr. WILKINSON said, it was assumed that these recruits were to be the scum of the earth, and they were called cutthroats and assassins; but it seemed also to be admitted that, if they behaved as well as the German troops in our pay in the last war, then they were to be considered as respectable men.

Mr. BANKES said, he wished to know if the Secretary at War meant to ask for power to billet these foreigners on the public?

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT said, he really must ask the Committee to be reasonable. There were in all Bills certain details which only an executive could decide upon. Most of the questions that had been asked were questions that the military authorities could decide much better than anybody else; and it was to the Executive that must be left all those questions as to barracks, rank of officers, &c. As to that constitutional jealousy of which the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Whiteside) spoke, which ordered in 1804 that foreigners should be quartered not more than five miles from the coast, that order was entirely disregarded, and such a provision at the present day might force the Executive to station troops in places where it would be most imprudent to have them. It would be the interest of whatever Government had the Bill to work to place the troops where the least prejudice would be excited by their presence, and he hoped the Committee would not persist in confining the Government to expressions of opinion upon all those minute details. It was quite true that the Government did not pretend to give any accurate and definite description, or any minute detail, as to the forces for which they had only now obtained the consent of Parliament. There must be a preliminary to every step that was taken. Having got that preliminary, they would take their steps in accordance with the will of Parliament. When the Estimates came before the House, an account would have to be given of every step that had been taken, and the House would then have a full opportunity of criticising their conduct.

Colonel DUNNE said, he thought that the whole details of the Bill should have been matured before it was brought into Parliament. Of all classes in the country, the military class was the most opposed to the Bill. He wanted to know how they were to be placed relatively to those foreign soldiers—whether they were to have equal rank, or if they were to be commanded by them?

Mr. BENTINCK said, he should have been entirely of the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War, that details should be let alone for the present, if they had received any information as to what the men were to be, or as to their character or conduct, and where they were to be brought from; but when they were refused all information, when they did not know whether these men were to be the most respectable people in Europe or the scum of the earth as some hon. Gentleman had termed them, he thought they should be wanting in duty to the country if they did not insist upon some clear statement, or if they did not resist the quartering of the men in places where their presence might be extremely objectionable, he was therefore quite disposed to divide the Committee on the question.

Mr. BANKES said, he thought that that question was not a trivial one which related to whether his fellow-subjects were to have foreigners billeted upon them against their will. With regard to our own army, those matters of detail were left to the Executive, but were annually brought before the House when the Mutiny Bill was considered. He could hardly think the Government were perfectly sincere in thinking they should carry the measure when he saw the manner in which it was drawn.

Mr. GROGAN said, he would suggest that the precedent of the former Act should be adopted, and that then it should be repealed, as formerly, when these troops had shown, by their good conduct, that they deserved the favourable consideration of the House.

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT said, that no restriction of the kind spoken of had been inserted in the Act of 1804. It was very well for hon. Gentlemen to speak of the German legion as not a foreign legion. At the time that legion was instituted it was looked upon quite in the same way as the foreign legion now proposed, and the terms scum of the earth, mercenaries, hired assassins, &c., were applied to them then as they now were. The measure was then a very unpopular measure; and yet there was no restriction imposed of the nature stated.

Mr. WHITESIDE said, the right hon. Gentleman had not answered the question as to the billeting of foreigners in this country.

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT said, he could only state the feelings of the Government; and what earthly use could there be in billeting upon the country troops that were to be here only for a few weeks for the purpose of being drilled?

Mr. F. SCOTT said, that on a former occasion the foreign troops remained under canvass, and suffered there from hunger and exposure till the transports were ready to take them back to Hanover. In the following year Lord Chatham was prevailed upon by the German influence, which was paramount at the Court of George III. to pass a Bill enabling and enforcing the billeting of foreign troops on English families. In the year 1804 the legion was composed, not of foreigners brought here for the purpose, but, as stated in the preamble of the Bill, of foreigners actually in the country at the time.

Lord JOHN RUSSELL said, he must complain of this attempt to delay the passage of the Bill. He had understood the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire to admit that it was desirable for the public convenience that the Bill should go through Committee that night, and that the discussion on the third reading should be taken to-morrow. If the Bill were to be rejected, it ought to be immediately rejected; but, if on the contrary, it were to become law, it was of the highest importance in the estimation of the Government that it should become so at once. What the object of this delay, therefore, could be he was at a loss to imagine. It had been asked whether these foreign troops were to consist of respectable persons, or of the scum of the earth, but to that he could only reply that it would, of course, be the object of the Government to secure as far as possible the services of respectable persons; but it could scarcely be expected that they could bring men before that House with certificates of character in their hands. It was, in fact, a question which the House of Commons could not regulate, but which must be left to the discretion of the Executive. He hoped that the Committee would not sanction this measure of delay, or decide in favour of a postponement.

Mr. DISRAELI said, he did not think the noble Lord had drawn a correct inference from what he said. He had never consented that a Bill should go through Committee without discussion, or use his influence towards such a result. And in agreeing that the Bill should go into Committee, he never had any intention at all of controlling the debate, or preventing hon. Gentlemen taking, upon subjects of great importance, such views as they might think it their duty to do. In the present case a very important question had been mooted; and he should be sorry if Her Majesty's Ministers were not able to give a satisfactory answer to the Committee; but he could not attempt to control the conduct of Gentlemen sitting on that side of the House, or prevent them expressing and acting upon their opinions. He had done what he could in order that the House might go into Committee, trusting that, in Committee, the Government would be able to support their Bill.

Mr. SPOONER said, he thought the noble Lord should not have said that hon.

Gentlemen were bringing on this subject merely to create delay. The question was should these foreigners be billeted in the houses of our countrymen? A right to billet would exist unless it were restricted, for that right was in the Mutiny Act, under the clauses of which those persons would be brought. He could not give his consent to any measure which did not restrict that right in the case of these foreigners.

Lord JOHN RUSSELL said, it had been already stated more than once that there was not the slightest occasion for asking such a question. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Bankes) would give notice of an Amendment containing his views for the third reading.

Mr. BANKES said, he should prefer that the Government would write their own Bill.

Clause *agreed to*; as were the remaining Clauses, House resumed, Bill *reported* without Amendment.

WOODEN HUTS AND CLOTHING FOR THE ARMY IN THE CRIMEA—QUESTION.

Sir GILBERT HEATHCOTE said, he begged to ask the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War when the wooden houses for the troops in the Crimea might be expected to arrive, and whether any progress had been made in providing huts or shelter from any sources derived from the country itself? He also begged to ask when it was expected that the winter clothing for the troops would arrive in the Crimea?

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT: In replying to the questions of my hon. Friend, I will answer him in the order they stand upon the paper. With respect to the wooden houses, we gave orders to have them constructed as soon as we received information from Lord Raglan that they would be required. A portion of them is at sea, and as far as I am able to form a guess that portion is at this moment at the Bosphorus. Day by day they are going out, but the numbers sent are not sufficient to hut the whole army. We have sent word by telegraph to Constantinople to Lord Stratford to procure as much materials as possible there for constructing huts and to send them to Balaklava; and Lord Raglan has sent to Sinope to purchase timber there. We have sent by telegraph to Lord Westmoreland to have huts constructed in Austria; and by the mail before last we learned that an Austrian Lloyd steamer had left Trieste with some of those huts on board. I do not know the exact extent of the aid we have received in Austria; but, from what we can gather by surmise from the amount of the Bill, I trust the operation has been a very considerable one. With respect to the warm clothing, a considerable portion of it has arrived—a great portion is on sea—and a portion has not yet gone. The last letter I received from Lord Raglan stated that the warm clothing which had come by the ships was in process of distribution, and he hoped the result would be that the troops would be much more comfortable.

Sir GILBERT HEATHCOTE said, he would also beg to ask whether any steps had been taken to do away with the difference between the dress of the officers and privates, both in reference to their ordinary clothing, and that specially ordered for winter use in the Crimea? He asked the question in consequence of the great and disproportionate loss of officers in the late battles.

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT: With regard to the clothing ordered for winter use we gave instructions to Lord Raglan—as many officers would be unable from the want of facilities for transport to obtain clothing—that he should have the power to issue clothing to the officers as well as to the men from the stock sent out, and so far as that is done they will be similar in appearance. With reference to the new pattern uniform, which is that by which the clothing of the regiments in the East will be made up next issue, the distinction between officers and men has been greatly minished. There will be no epaulette on the officer's coat, and that which is now the most distinctive mark between the officer and private has been done away with. It has been stated by an officer who came from Balaklava that a misapprehension exists as to the officers having been picked off on account of their uniform. The fact is, that officers from the nature of their duty, are much more exposed than any other persons, especially mounted officers, who are more likely to catch the eye of marksmen, and who are more exposed than others.

Sir GILBERT HEATHCOTE: Will there be an undress uniform?

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT: I think there is to be no undress uniform.

The House adjourned at half after eight o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Friday, December 22, 1854.

MINUTES.] PUBLIC BILL.—3ª Militia.

THE PUBLIC DEBT—SAVINGS BANKS.

LORD MONTEAGLE moved for returns:—respecting deficiency Bills; Sales or Purchases of Stock by the Bank, or by the National Debt Commissioners; of Balances in the Exchequer; of Additions, or Reductions from the National Debt; and of Surplus Revenue certified to the National Debt Commissioners—from the 5th April, 1854, to the 5th January, 1855. The noble Lord said that the returns he now moved for were in continuation of papers which had already been laid before Parliament. They were explanatory of the state of the Public Debt, and of the operations which had taken place in relation to that branch of the public service.

In one of the morning papers of that day an opinion was attributed to himself which he wished entirely to disavow. It arose apparently from a misapprehension of what he had said on a former occasion with reference to the power given by the Exchequer Bonds bill to the Chancellor of the Exchequer of converting deposits in savings banks into Exchequer bills, and afterwards funding them. The article in question related to the subject of savings banks, and after referring to an opinion pronounced in the House of Commons, it attributed to a right hon. Gentleman there a statement that a measure which had been passed on the subject of savings banks had diminished the security of savings bank depositors, and it went on to state that he (Lord Monteagle) had in that House expressed a similar opinion, or that he had practically expressed an opinion that the interest of depositors in savings banks had been materially affected by the measure of the Government. Now not only had he not expressed any such opinion, but he had expressed an opinion directly the reverse. He was not aware he had used any words calculated to alarm the depositors in savings banks, and if he had done so it was entirely by inadvertence. What he stated, or what he meant to have stated, was, that he could not for a moment apprehend the probability of loss to the depositors of the money which had been invested, and that if there was a loss that loss would accrue to the State. The state of the law was this—the public acted as the banker of the persons who made those deposits. The depositors had a book in which their deposits were entered exactly such as their Lordships might have in which the moneys they paid to their bankers appeared, and the Government was responsible for those deposits. Whatever the Government might choose to do in relation to the investment of these funds was a matter for themselves to consider, and in no shape affected the depositors. The invariable usage had been to invest in the public securities. Accounts had been called for which showed that, at the price of the day, the amount of assets in the public securities was not equal to the amount of liabilities with which they were charged, but he must be very ignorant who imagined that the apparent deficiency, direct or indirect, affected the interest of the depositors, because the Savings Banks Act gave the depositors the full amount of principal and interest. The accounts of the savings banks were made up in November, and generally presented to Parliament in March or April. He suggested that they should be put into such a shape as that they could be presented when Parliament met after the recess.

EARL GRANVILLE said, there was no objection to the production of these returns. He was bound to state that his recollection of what passed in the House on the occasion referred to entirely coincided with the statement of the noble Lord. There was a great objection in principle to the practice that had been adopted by different Chancellors of the Exchequer of selling out stock belonging to the savings banks and purchasing Exchequer bills with it, and then funding the Exchequer bills, thereby adding to the public debt without coming to Parliament for express authority to do so. With regard to the accounts he would make inquiry whether they could be presented by the time Parliament met again.

Returns ordered to be laid before the House.

House adjourned till to-morrow.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Friday, December 22, 1854.

MINUTES.] PUBLIC BILLS.—1° Savings Banks and Friendly Societies Investments; Fairs and Markets (Ireland).
2° Common Law Procedure Act Amendment (Ireland).
3° Enlistment of Foreigners.

TEA DUTY—THE WAR.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I take this opportunity of giving a notice which is of a somewhat unusual character probably, but which I trust the House will consider justifiable under the circumstances of the case. It is a notice to the effect that, without giving any other intimation whatever, or holding out any presumption that there is any intention on the part of the Government to propose any other financial measure of any other kind, it is the intention of the Government, in the event of the continuance of the war, when the time shall arrive for making the financial statement for 1855, that the duty on tea, instead of progressively falling until it shall reach 1*s.* per pound, shall continue at the rate at which it now stands, of 1*s.* 6*d.* It is on account of the enactment of the House being of such a long date, and that diminution of duty having been so long looked forward to, that the Government have thought it right to give this early notice of their intention to make this alteration in the law.

UNSTAMPED PUBLICATIONS.

Mr. BRIGHT said, he begged to call the attention of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer to a little paper which he held in his hand, and which was printed on one side by Thomas Stephenson, Wheeler-gate, Nottingham. It contained an article headed "Taxes on Knowledge," and also contained latest intelligence from Hamburgh, and extracts from the *Moniteur.* The proprietor stated that recently, before going to press, he was served with a writ by the Solicitor of Inland Revenue for the publication of intelligence connected with the war, and what he complained of was that telegraph notices should be allowed to be published with all kinds of intelligence, while the Government would not allow a paper of that kind to be published. It was not a periodical sheet, for it came out some days, and some days it did not come out—it did not come out in a series; and he conceived that whereas the clubs at the West End obtained publications on a single sheet by telegraph, he should be exempted from any interference on the part of the Government. He (Mr. Bright) would not ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer what he intended to do in reference to this subject, but what he wished to do was to bring under his notice the annoyance to which honest citizens were put in various parts of the country who were endeavouring to enlighten the country as to how the great operations of the war were conducted, with respect to some of which he thought it would be better if they were not conducted at all. He therefore called the attention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the subject, in the hope that he would prevent anything being done to annoy and throw expense on this individual, who was endeavouring to inform the public as to the events that were taking place.

GOOD-CONDUCT MONEY—QUESTION.

Mr. APSLEY PELLATT said, he begged to ask the Secretary at War whether a corporal having good-conduct money in addition to his usual pay, would be deprived of that allowance on his promotion to the rank of sergeant, so that his aggregate pay might be reduced below what he had previously enjoyed as a corporal; if so, what were the reasons, and whether Government contemplated a remedy for such apparent injustice?

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT said, that when the good-conduct warrant was introduced by Lord Howick (now Earl Grey) good-conduct pay was given to privates and corporals in lieu of the additional pay to which they would be entitled for length of service. As sergeants had no additional pay on that account, there was, of course, nothing to commute as in the case of the corporals and privates. It was perfectly true that under the good-conduct warrant there might be cases in which a sergeant might receive a less amount of pension than he would have done had he remained a corporal, and had received the additional pay. His (Mr. Herbert's) attention had been called to the subject in consequence of a case which had arisen at Chelsea; and he had in consequence drawn up an alteration in the warrant, which would be immediately promulgated.

PUBLIC-HOUSES IN SCOTLAND—QUESTION.

Mr. COWAN said, he wished to ask the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate if he had any reason to believe that the Act for the Better Regulation of Publichouses in Scotland, passed in 1853, had been fairly put in operation within the Royalty and under the jurisdiction of the Magistrates of the City of Edinburgh; if he had received any complaints that, beyond those bounds, and in the Sheriffs Courts and Justice of Peace Courts, this law was virtually a dead letter; and whether, in this case, it was his intention to apply a remedy, or to introduce any legislative measure in order to secure a more fair and uniform administration of the Statute referred to?

THE LORD ADVOCATE said, the question was so worded as scarcely to admit of a categorical answer, but he had no reason to think the Act was not fairly put in operation within the Royalty of the City of Edinburgh. No doubt there had been complaints that beyond the Royalty there had been no prosecutions under the Act; but the fact was that neither the sheriffs nor the justices could put the Act in force. It was an Act under which private informers alone were entitled to prosecute; and if the Procurators Fiscal prosecuted, they did so as private informers and at their own expense. There was no obligation upon them to initiate proceedings. With regard to the last part of the question—namely, whether he proposed to introduce a legislative measure on the subject, he had to state that this Act stood in exactly the same position as other Statutes now in operation in Scotland, and with regard to which it was a matter for serious consideration whether any alteration should be made in them or not.

THE SLAVE TRADE—CUBA—QUESTION.

SIR GEORGE PECHELL said, he begged to ask the noble Lord the President of the Council if any information had been received that the new Government in Spain had given effect to those decrees relative to the abolition of the slave trade and the registration of slaves in the Island of Cuba which were issued about the month of June last? Also, whether the number of our cruisers on the coasts of Cuba had been increased, as was promised last Session, and in conformity with the Report of the Select Committee on slave-trade treaties.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL: In answer to the question of my hon. and gallant Friend, I have to say that the late Governor of Cuba did certainly put in execution these decrees with great zeal. With regard to the new governor, General Concha, we have not hitherto received at the Foreign Office any account of his proceedings so as to enable us to give information to the House on the subject; but on quitting Madrid in August last he gave assurances to Lord Howden, our ambassador there, that in everything relating to the fraudulent admission of negroes, the British Government would find in him a vigorous and uncompromising enemy to the slave-trader, and one determined to enforce the slave treaties which had been entered into between Spain and this country. I trust that General Concha, who holds a very high character, will maintain that promise, and so execute those treaties. With regard to the number of cruisers I am not able to give a particular reply to the question, but I have no doubt my right hon. Friend (Sir J. Graham) can.

SIR JAMES GRAHAM: With respect to that part of the question of the hon. and gallant Member for Brighton I have to state that since the end of the Session the squadron under the command of Admiral Fanshawe has been greatly augmented, and his attention has been particularly called to the importance of using every exertion for the suppression of the slave trade on the coast of Cuba. What the present distribution of the force may be I cannot say, as the largest discretion is left to the admiral on the station. But I am sure that if General Concha's co-operation which my noble Friend trusted would be brought into play, it would be infinitely more effectual for the suppression of the slave trade than any augmentation of cruisers which we could command.

THE PORT OF MEMEL—QUESTION.

MR. DISRAELI: I wish, Sir, to ask a question of Her Majesty's Government, which I put to-day without notice, as I may not have an opportunity of doing so to-morrow. It is, whether Her Majesty's Ministers have received any official account of the blockade of the port of Memel by Russian gun-boats?

SIR JAMES GRAHAM: Sir, so far as I have received any accounts I have every reason to believe that no such blockade has been estsblished. I have received information from Admiral Chads, dated Elsineur, December 15, stating that up to that date Her Majesty's cruisers were still in the Baltic, to the north of Bornholm; and I have no reason to believe that any Russian ships of war have appeared off Memel; and least of all do I believe that they have instituted a blockade, not only of a neutral, but a friendly Power.

ENLISTMENT OF FOREIGNERS BILL.

Order for Third Reading read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read the third time."

SIR EDWARD DERING said, he rose to move the Amendment of which he had given notice, namely, that the Bill be read a third time that day six months. In doing so he trusted he should be acquitted of the presumption of a responsibility which would devolve with so much more propriety on many hon. Members sitting around him; but having been generally requested to elicit the opinion of the House on the question that this Bill be read a third time, he felt that he ought to let his private inclination give place to his sense of public duty ; and he therefore had now only to ask the kindness and indulgence of the House whilst he proceeded briefly and succinctly to state the grounds on which he now asked the House to arrest the further progress of this measure. Before he entered into the discussion, he wished to draw the attention of the House to the very unsatisfactory nature of the replies which were given by the Government yesterday, in Committee, to those questions that were very pertinently and appropriately put to them by the right hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley). That right hon. Gentleman pointed out to them that, unless some special provision were made for the foreign troops which it was proposed by this measure to introduce into the kingdom, they might fall as a burden upon the parishes in which they were situated, as casual poor. The noble Lord the President of the Council admitted the correctness of the law as interpreted by his (Sir E. Dering's) right hon. Friend, but went no further than to state the propriety of providing some special provision for those men would be taken into consideration. Now, he considered that those hon. Members who, like himself, had reluctantly voted for the second reading of the Bill, would think that it was the duty of the Government to have considered fully beforehand all those details, and to have placed themselves in a position to give a full and ample explanation as to the manner in which they were prepared to carry out this measure. He wished, at the outset, to state that he entirely concurred in the opinion which had been expressed by several hon. Gentlemen opposite as to the constitutional objections urged against this measure. At the same time, he entertained no constitutional jealousy whatever in looking forward to the establishment of certain depôts for foreign troops in this country. The explanations given, that they were only to be used for purposes of training, was, to his mind, perfectly satisfactory. The objection he took to the measure came from a very different source. Before the House gave their assent to a Bill which involved an acknowledgment that they were unable, by their own strength, to uphold national honour and national interests—an acknowledgment that was totally inconsistent with our condition as one of the great Powers of Europe—before they were called on to make this assertion, they had a right to demand from Government evidence much stronger than they had yet produced, that they were yielding only to the pressure of overwhelming and unavoidable necessity. He contended not only that there was no necessity for calling in the aid of foreign troops, but that, even if it should be admitted we were obliged to look for assistance elsewhere than at home, there were other resources within our reach which were equally available, and the employment of which would be in no degree repugnant to the great mass of the people. The alleged ground on which the measure was brought forward was the want of trained troops. Now, he entirely and heartily concurred in the desire that we should lose no time in reinforcing our troops in the Crimea. But the Bill, as it now stood, did not carry out the object they had in view. The Government did not propose by this Bill to enter into any treaty with foreign States, as was done on former occasions, for the aid of large bodies of men ready equipped and officered. That would be a straightforward mode of action, and, as an hon. Gentleman opposite had said, would be in accordance with all the recognised principles of international law. But by this Bill they were about to pursue a course that was entirely unprecedented. They were aware that the minor States of Germany were not at liberty, without the consent of the Diet, to commit any act that was tantamount to a declaration of war against a foreign Power ; and, therefore, in order to get over this difficulty, the Bill proposed to levy men with the consent, he apprehended—or, as he might almost call it, the connivance—of the Sovereigns, but not with the cognisance of the Diet. He had been told that it was the custom in Germany, after the Landwehr had completed their period of service, to grant them a passport for purposes of emigration, and that the effect of that passport was, *de facto*, to denaturalise them. He would not stop to ask how far it would be a dignified proceeding to get hold of these men, or how far it might be in the power of the Diet to offer very serious impediments to the raising of a large body of troops, it being understood that the object of raising these troops was to employ them in the war in which we were engaged. But, assuming that the Government should succeed in smuggling out of Germany 10,000 men, it still was somewhat singular that no intimation whatever had been given by the Government or by anybody else as to the time which would be consumed before bringing these men into the field. Her Majesty's Ministers had had, as yet, according to their own declarations, no communication with any foreign Power on the subject, and, consequently, negotiations had yet to be commenced. Now, the experience of the last year had shown that diplomatic transactions in Germany did not proceed with any great rapidity. Still, supposing all negotiations at an end, and that the consent of the German Powers had been obtained, they would then have to go through the process of enlisting officers and men scattered throughout a vast extent of territory, and then proceed to convey them to the resting place prepared for them in this country. Now, these were distinct operations, each of which would consume a great deal of time—so much so that he could hardly imagine the most sanguine of hon. Gentlemen opposite believed that the 10,000 men could be placed in the depôts before a period of three months; after which, what between arming them, clothing them, organising them, and fitting them for foreign service, a similar period must elapse before they could take the field. He would ask, then, what did they gain in point of time by substituting foreign mercenaries for the British soldier. And here he would observe, that in using the term foreign mercenary, he had not the smallest wish to speak disparagingly of the soldiers of Germany. No Gentleman that had addressed the House in acknowledgment of the high merits of the German Legion during the last war was more willing than himself to give those distinguished soldiers his meed of praise. Indeed, so far from having any pitiful feeling as to fighting side by side with foreigners, he could wish that, if the troops to be employed were of the same stamp as the King's German Legion, Her Majesty's Government had called upon the House to grant them permission to embody four times the number they had asked for. The fact was, however, these mercenaries would be of very different materials. He might be told that the German Legion was not originally composed of Hanoverians, and that the men were not all subject to the same Sovereign as the English. The House had been reminded the other night by the noble Lord the Secretary for the Home Department of the Chasseurs Britanniques, of the Corsican Legion, and other foreign corps; and the noble Lord triumphantly observed, that the men composing them were not subjects of the British Sovereign. Nevertheless, he would ask, were not those men united with the people of this country by a common cause, common ties, and common sympathies? and they were fighting against a common enemy—that great Emperor who overrun, with the exception of this country, the whole of Europe. But what tie or sympathy would the men now proposed to be enlisted have with the people of this country? Only that arising from the payment of a pecuniary reward. They must necessarily be devoid of those sentiments of patriotism and public spirit which animate the soldiers of France and England, and which never could be entertained by men whose feelings were not in some way involved in the struggle. He contended, that, within as short a period as would be required to send these 10,000 foreigners from this country, an equal number of British trained troops could be procured. The noble Lord the President of the Council said the other night, that the Government were short by 20,000 men of the number voted by Parliament. He must confess that he heard that statement with regret and astonishment. He was astonished to hear such a statement from the noble Lord, of whom it might be said that discretion and prudence were among his great characteristics. He could conceive nothing more gratifying to the Emperor of Russia than to hear from so high an authority that our powers of recruiting were almost exhausted. All he could say was, that the Secretary at War, if he did not get men quickly enough, was bound to use all the means in his power to make the military service more attractive. If the soldiers' allowances were not sufficient to induce men to enlist, the Government ought to apply to that House, and there was no man, in or out of the House, who would not liberally respond to the appeal. The Government complained that, wanting men of twenty-five years of age, they could not get them at the present bounty. Now, he thought that the sternest economist would say that, at such a moment as this, it would be an economical investment of capital to give even double bounty. They might rely on it that, if they only stimulated the military ardour of the country by holding out suitable rewards, present and future, they would have thousands upon thousands of men readily offering themselves as recruits. The right hon. Secretary at War had talked about recruits and the time it took to make an infantry soldier, but the hon. Member for Hertfordshire (Sir E. B. Lytton) justly pointed to the behaviour of the recruits at the Alma and at Inkerman, and the hon. Baronet might also have referred to the materials of which the battalions that stood the shock at Waterloo were composed. It was not the veteran heroes of the Peninsula who stood the shock of that great day. It should ever be recollected, to the honour and immortal glory of those engaged in that great battle, that the brunt of the engagement was borne by raw recruits, for the first time engaged in action. Other means besides the present Bill for obtaining aid had been referred to; and as by treaty this country was now engaged to protect Austria in case she should be attacked by Russia, he might hope that, in return, the result of the deliberations which, in conformity with an article in that treaty, were to take place within a week of the present time, would be to place an ample quota of her veteran and gallant troops at our disposal. He confessed, however, that he had no very great reliance on any active co-operation on the part of Austria, for, after all that had passed, his fears surpassed his hopes. But he asked, why should they not endeavour to organise Turkish troops—our natural allies, and the natural enemies of Russia? Why should they not endeavour to organise them in the same way as on a previous occasion they had organised the Portuguese Legion? The campaign of Silistria showed that, if they were well officered and led they would prove equal to any emergency. The Secretary at War the other night, he thought, went rather out of his way to throw a passing sneer upon the Turks, and argued that because they were celebrated for fighting well behind stone walls, *ergo*, they could not fight except behind such protection. Now it struck him that that observation laid the right hon. Gentleman open to the same rebuke he administered to the hon. Member for Hertfordshire for having spoken disparagingly of the German Legion and of the people in alliance with the country. There would be this incidental advantage in organising a large Turkish force—that it would be of incalculable service, after the termination of the present war, for the defence of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire. The House would also recollect that this country had an inexhaustible fund of men to draw from, not only in the Indian army, but also in the Indian population, who were capable of the most brilliant deeds when organised and led by men of courage and energy like Major Edwardes. After the long discussion which had taken place on this subject, he felt it difficult, if not impossible, to touch on any ground which had not already been gone over, and he had, therefore, confined his remarks to practical points. He hoped, therefore, that in moving the postponement of the consideration of this Bill for six months he should not be taunted with acting in a factious or hostile manner towards the Government, which on many occasions he had been in the habit of supporting. There was no difference between the two sides of the House as to the absolute necessity of carrying on the war with all possible vigour and energy. The difference was only as to the means, and he had endeavoured to show that the measure before the House was totally inapplicable for the purpose, and that, while it was very depressing and dispiriting to our countrymen, it would greatly increase the confidence of Russia, and thus considerably retard the period when we might enjoy the blessings of peace. He had also endeavoured to show that the Government, by acting towards the British soldier with a liberal and generous spirit, which would meet with a response throughout the whole length and breadth of the land, would be able to send from this country army after army composed of men having the same sympathies as those who fought on the fields of Alma and Inkerman, and in whom that House and the country would be disposed to place unbounded confidence, knowing that each and all of them would be proud, freely and fearlessly, to pour out the last drop of their blood in the defence of national honour and national interest.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months."

Question proposed, "that the word 'now' stand part of the Question."

MR. COBDEN: If I ask permission, Sir, to enlarge a little the scope of our discussion, I have, at all events, this excuse, that the subject-matter more technically before the House has been already very ably and fully discussed. There is another reason why the question may be viewed in a more general way as affecting the conduct of the Government in carrying on the war and conducting negotiations; namely, that we have heard several hon. Members publicly declare that they refuse to entertain the matter now before the House on its merits, but persist in voting in respect to it, contrary to their own opinions, and simply as a question of confidence in the Government. I must say, among all the evils which I attach to a state of war, not the least considerable is that it has so demoralising a tendency as this on the representative system. We are called on to give votes contrary to our conscience, and to allow those votes to be recorded where the explanation would not often appear to account for them. It was stated the other night by the noble Lord the Member for the City of London, that proposals for peace had been made on the part of Russia, through Vienna, upon certain bases, which have been pretty frequently before the world under the term of the "four points." Now, I wish to draw attention to that subject, but, before I do so, let me premise that I do not intend to say one word with respect to the origin of this unhappy war. I intend to start from the situation in which we now find ourselves, and I think it behoves this House to express an opinion upon that situation. I avow myself in favour of peace on the terms announced by Her Majesty's Minister. At all events, hon. Members will see the absolute necessity, if the war is to go on, and if we are to have a war of invasion by land against Russia, of carrying it on in a different spirit and on a different scale from that in which the operations have hitherto been conducted. I think both sides of the House occupy common ground in this respect; for we shall all recognise the propriety and necessity of discussing this important and critical question. Before I offer an opinion on the desirability of concluding peace on these four points, it will be necessary to ask what was the object stated for the war? I merely ask this as a matter of fact, and not with a view of arguing the question. It has been one of my difficulties, in arguing this question out of doors with friends or strangers, that I rarely find any intelligible agreement as to the object of the war. I have met with very respectable and well educated men, who have told me that the object of the war was to open the Black Sea to all merchant vessels. That certainly could not be the object, for the Black Sea was already as free to all merchant vessels as the Baltic. I have met with officers who said that the object was to open the Danube and to allow the ships of all nations to go up that river. The object certainly could not be that, for the traffic in the Danube had, during the last twenty years, multiplied nearly tenfold, and the ships of all nations have free access there. I have heard it stated and applauded at public meetings, that we were at war because we have a treaty with the Sultan binding us to defend the integrity and independence of his empire. I remember that at a most excited public meeting at Leicester, the first resolution, moved by a very intelligent gentleman, declared that we were bound by the most solemn treaties with the Sultan to defend the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire. Now, Lord Aberdeen has even ostentatiously announced in the House of Lords, for the instruction, I suppose, of such gentlemen as I have referred to, that we had no treaty before the present war binding us to defend the Sultan or his dominions. Another and greater cause of the popularity of the war out of doors has been, no doubt, the idea that it is for the freedom and independence of nations. There has been a strong feeling that Russia has not only absorbed and oppressed certain nationalities, but is the prime agent by which Austria perpetuates her domination over communities averse to her rule. I should say that this class was fairly represented by my lamented and noble Friend the late Member for Marylebone, from whom I differed entirely in reference to his views on the question of interference with foreign countries, but for whose private virtues and disinterested conduct and boundless generosity I always entertained the greatest veneration and respect. The late Lord Dudley Stuart for twenty years fairly represented the popular feeling out of doors, which was directed especially against the Emperor of Russia, and the popular sympathies, which were centred mainly on those territories which lie contiguous to the Russian Empire. I used sometimes to tell that noble Lord jocularly, that his sympathies were geographical—that they extended to all countries, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, bordering on Russia; that if the Poles, Hungarians, Moldavians, or Wallachians were in trouble or distress, he was sure to be in that House the representative of their wrongs; or if any unhappy individuals from those countries were refugees from oppression in this country they were sure to go instantly to him for relief and protection. Lord D. Stuart represented a great amount of the public sympathy in this country with respect to nationalities, as it is termed; but I ask, whether the ground on which the public impression is founded—that we are going to war to aid the Poles, Hungarians, Moldavians, or Wallachians, has not been entirely delusive; and whether it may not be ranked with the other notions about opening the Black Sea, or a treaty with the Sultan and about the Danube not being free to the flags of all nations? I ask whether all these grounds have not been equally delusive? The first three grounds never had an existence at all, and, as to setting up oppressed nationalities, the Government certainly never intended to go to war for that object. To set myself right with those hon. Gentlemen who profess to have great regard for liberty everywhere, I beg to state that I yield to no one in sympathy for those who are struggling for freedom in any part of the world; but I will never sanction an interference which shall go to establish this or that nationality by force of arms, because that invades a principle which I wish to carry out in the other direction—the prevention of all foreign interference with nationalities for the sake of putting them down. Therefore, while I respect the motives of those Gentlemen, I cannot act with them. This admission, however, I freely make, that were it likely to advance the cause of liberty, of constitutional freedom, and national independence, it would be a great inducement to me to acquiesce in the war, or, at all events, I should see in it something like a compensation for the multiplied evils which attend a state of war. And now we come to what is called the statesman's ground for this war, which is that it is undertaken to defend the Turkish Empire against the encroachments of Russia—as a part of the scheme, in fact, for keeping the several States of Europe within those limits in which they are at present circumscribed. This has been stated as a ground for carrying on the present war with Russia; but I must say this view of the case has been very much mixed up with magniloquent phraseology which has tended greatly to embarrass the question. The noble Lord the member for the City of London was the first, I think, to commence these magniloquent phrases, in a speech at Greenock about last August twelvemonths, in which he spoke of our duties to mankind and to the whole world, and he has often talked since of this war as one intended to protect the liberties of all Europe and of the civilised world. I remember, too, the phrases which the noble Lord made use of at a city meeting, where he spoke of our being "engaged in a just and necessary war for no immediate advantage of our own, but for the defence of our ancient ally and for the maintenance of the independence of Europe." Well I have a word to say to the noble Lord on that subject. Now we are placed to the extreme west of a continent, numbering some 200,000,000 inhabitants, and the theory is, that there is great danger from a growing eastern Power which threatens to overrun the continent, to inflict upon it another deluge like that of the Goths and Vandals, and to eclipse the light of civilisation in the darkness of barbarism. But if that theory be correct, does it not behove the people of the continent to take some part in pushing back that deluge of barbarism? I presume it is not intended that England should be the Anacharsis Cloots of Europe; but that, at all events, if we are to fight for everybody, those at least who are in the greatest danger will join with us in resisting the common enemy. I am convinced, however, that all this declamation about the independence of Europe and the defence of civilisation will by-and-bye disappear. I take it for granted, then, that the statesman's object in this war is to defend Turkey against the encroachments of Russia, and so to set a barrier against the aggressive ambition of that great empire. That is the language of the Queen's Speech. But have we not accomplished that object, I would ask—have we not arrived at that point?— have we not effected all that was proposed in the Queen's Speech? Russia is now no longer within the Turkish territory; she has renounced all idea of invading Turkey, and now, as we are told by the noble Lord, there have been put forward certain proposals from Russia which are to serve as the bases of peace. Now, what are those proposals? In the first place there is to be a joint protectorate over the Christians by the five great Powers; there is to be a joint guarantee for the rights and privileges of the Principalities; there is to be a revision of the rule laid down in 1841 with regard to the entrance of ships of war into the Bosphorus, and the Danube is to be free to all nations. These are the propositions that are made for peace, as we are told by the noble Lord, and it is competent for us, I think, as a House of Commons, to offer an opinion as to the desirability of a treaty on those terms. My first reason for urging that we should entertain those proposals is, that we are told that Austria and Prussia have agreed to them. Those two Powers are more interested in this quarrel than England and France can be. Upon that subject I will quote the words of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton, uttered in February last. The noble Lord said—

> "We knew that Austria and Prussia had an interest in the matter more direct and greater than had either France or England. To Austria and Prussia it is a vital matter—a matter of existence, because if Russia were either to appropriate any large portion of the Turkish territory, or even to reduce Turkey to the condition of a mere dependent State, it must be manifest to any man who casts a glance over the map of Europe, and who looks at the geographical position of these two Powers with regard to Russia and Turkey, that any considerable accession of power on the part of Russia in that quarter must be fatal to the independence of action of both Austria and Prussia." [3 *Hansard*, cxxx. 1033.]

I entirely concur with the noble Lord in his view of the interest which Austria and Prussia have in this quarrel, and what I want to ask is this—why should we seek greater guarantees and stricter engagements from Russia than those with which Austria and Prussia are content? They lie on the frontier of this great Empire, and they have more to fear from its power than we can have; no Russian invasion can touch us until it has passed over them; and is it likely if we fear, as we say we do, that Western Europe will be overrun by Russian barbarism—is it likely, I say, that Austria and Prussia would be the first to suffer, would not be as sensible to that danger as we can be? Ought we not rather to take it as a proof that we have somewhat exaggerated the danger which threatens Western Europe when we find that Austria and Prussia are not so alarmed at it as we are? They are not greatly concerned about the danger, I think, or else they would join with England and France in a great battle to push it back. If, then, Austria and Prussia are ready to accept these proposals, why should not we be? Do you suppose that, if Russia really meditated an attack upon Germany—that if she had an idea of annexing the smallest portion of German territory, with only 100,000 inhabitants of Teutonic blood, all Germany would not be united as one man to resist her? Is there not a strong national feeling in that Germanic race—are they not nearly 40,000,000 in number—are they not the most intelligent, the most instructed, and have they not proved themselves the most patriotic people in Europe? and if they are not dissatisfied, why should we stand out for better conditions, and why should we make greater efforts and greater sacrifices to obtain peace than they? I may be told that the people and the Governments of Germany are not quite in harmony on these points. ["Hear, hear!"] Hon. Gentlemen who cheer ought to be cautious, I think, how they assume that Governments do not represent their people. How would you like the United States to accept that doctrine with regard to this country? But I venture to question the grounds upon which that opinion is formed. I have taken some little pains to ascertain the feeling of the people in Germany on this war, and I believe that if you were to poll the population of Prussia—which is the brain of Germany—whilst nineteen-twentieths would say that in this quarrel England is right and Russia wrong; nay, whilst they would say they wished success to England as against Russia; yet, on the contrary, if you were to poll the same population as to whether they would join England with an army to fight against Russia, I believe, from all I have heard, that nineteen-twentieths would support their King in his present pacific policy. But I want to know what is the advantage of having the vote of a people like that in your favour if they are not inclined to join you in action? There is, indeed, a wide distinction between the existence of a certain opinion in the minds of a people and a determination to go to war in support of that opinion. I think we were rather too precipitate in transferring our opinion into acts, that we rushed to arms with too much rapidity, and that, if we had abstained from war, continuing to occupy the same ground as Austria and Prussia, the result would have been that Russia would have left the Principalities and have crossed the Pruth, and that, without a single shot being fired, you would have accomplished the object for which you have gone to war. But what are the grounds on which we are to continue this war when the Germans have acquiesced in the proposals of peace which have been made? Is it that war is a luxury? Is it that we are fighting—to use a cant phrase of Mr. Pitt's time—to secure indemnity for the past and security for the future? Are we to be the Don Quixottes of Europe, to go about fighting for every cause where we find that some one has been wronged? In most quarrels there is generally a little wrong on both sides, and, if we make up our minds always to interfere when any one is being wronged, I do not see always how we are to choose between the two sides. It will not do always to assume that the weaker party is in the right, for little States, like little individuals, are very often very quarrelsome, presuming on their weakness, and not unfrequently abusing the forbearance which their weakness procures them. But the question is, on what ground of honour or interest are we to continue to carry on this war, when we may have peace upon conditions which are satisfactory to the great countries of Europe who are near neighbours of this formidable Power? There is neither honour nor interest forfeited, I think, in accepting these terms, because we have already accomplished the object for which it was said this war was begun. The questions which have since arisen, with regard to Sebastopol, for instance, are mere points of detail, not to be bound up with the original quarrel. I hear many people say, we will take Sebastopol, and then we will treat for peace. I am not going to say that you cannot take Sebastopol — I am not going to argue against the power of England and France. I might admit, for the sake of argument, that you can take Sebastopol. You may occupy ten miles of territory in the Crimea for any time, you may build there a town, you may carry provisions and reinforcements there, for you have the command of the sea, but while you do all this you will have no peace with Russia. Nobody who knows the history of Russia can think for a moment that you are going permanently to occupy any portion of her territory, and, at the same time, to be at peace with that empire. But, admitting your power to do all this, is the object which you seek to accomplish worth the sacrifice which it will cost you? Can anybody doubt that the capture of Sebastopol will cost you a prodigious sacrifice of valuable lives, and, I ask you, is the object to be gained worth that sacrifice? The loss of treasure I will leave out of the question, for that may be replaced, but we can never restore to this country those valuable men who may be sacrificed in fighting the battles of their country—perhaps the most energetic, the bravest, the most devoted body of men that ever left these Islands. You may sacrifice them if you like, but you are bound to consider whether the object will compensate you for that sacrifice. I will assume that you take Sebastopol; but for what purpose is it that you will take it, for you cannot permanently occupy the Crimea without being in a perpetual state of war with Russia? It is, then, I presume, as a point of honour that you insist upon taking it, because you have once commenced the siege. The noble Lord, speaking of this fortress, said—

> "If Sebastopol, that great stronghold of Russian power, were destroyed, its fall would go far to give that security to Turkey which was the object of the war."

But I utterly deny that Sebastopol is the stronghold of Russian power. It is simply an outward and visible sign of the power in Russia; but by destroying Sebastopol you do not by any means destroy that power. You do not destroy or touch Russian power unless you can permanently occupy some portion of its territory, disorder its industry, or disturb its Government. If you can strike at its capital, if you can deprive it of some of its immense fertile plains, or take possession of those vast rivers which empty themselves into the Black Sea, then, indeed, you strike at Russian power; but, suppose you take Sebastopol, and make peace to-morrow, in ten years, I tell you, the Russian Government will come to London for a loan to build it up again stronger than before. And as for destroying those old green fir ships, you only do the Emperor a service by giving him an opportunity for building fresh ones. Is not the celebrated case of Dunkirk exactly in point? In 1713, at the Treaty of Utrecht, the French King, under sore necessity, consented to destroy Dunkirk. It had been built under the direction of Vauban, who had exhausted his genius and the coffers of the State in making it as strong as science and money could make it. The French King bound himself to demolish it, and the English sent over two Commissioners to see the fortress thrown to the ground, the jetties demolished and cast into the harbour, and a mole or bank built across the channel leading into the port; and you would have thought Dunkirk was destroyed once and for ever. There was a treaty binding the King not to rebuild it, and which on two successive occasions was renewed. Some few years afterwards a storm came and swept away the mole or bank which blocked up the channel, by which accident ingress and egress were restored; and, shortly afterwards, a war breaking out between England and Spain, the French Government took advantage of our being engaged elsewhere and rebuilt the fortifications on the seaside, as the historian tells us, much stronger than before. The fact is recorded, that in the Seven Years' War, about forty years afterwards, Dunkirk, for all purposes of aggression by sea, was more formidable than ever. We had in that case a much stronger motive for destroying Dunkirk than we can ever have in the case of Sebastopol; for in the war which ended in the peace of Utrecht there were 1,600 English merchant vessels, valued at 1,250,000*l.*, taken by privateers which came out of Dunkirk. Then, again, in the middle of the last century we destroyed Cherbourg, and during the last war we held possession of Toulon; but did we thereby destroy the power of France? If we could have got hold of some of her fertile provinces—if we could have taken possession of her capital or struck at her vitals, we might have permanently impoverished and diminished her power and resources; but we could not do it by the simple demolition of this or that fortress. So it would be in this case—we might take Sebastopol and then make peace, but there would be the rankling wound—there would be a venom in the treaty which would determine Russia to take the first opportunity of reconstructing this fortress. There would be storms, too, there, which would destroy whatever mole we might build across the harbour of Sebastopol, for storms in the Black Sea are more frequent, as we know, than in the Channel; but, even if Sebastopol were utterly destroyed, there are many places on the coast of the Crimea which might be occupied for a similar purpose. But then comes the question, would the destruction of Sebastopol give security to the Turks? The Turkish Empire will only be safe when its internal condition is secure, and you are not securing the internal condition of Turkey while you are at war; on the contrary, I believe you are now doing more to demoralise the Turks and destroy their Government than you could possibly have done in time of peace. If you wish to secure Turkey, you must reform its Government, purify its administration, unite its people, and draw out its resources; and then it will not present the spectacle of misery and poverty that it does now. Why, you yourselves have recognised the existing state of Turkey to be so bad that you intend to make a treaty which shall bind the Five Powers to a guarantee for the better treatment of the Christians. But have you considered well the extent of the principle in which you are embarking? You contemplate making a treaty by which the Five Powers are to do that together which Russia has hitherto claimed to do herself. What sort of conclusion do you think disinterested and impartial critics—people in the United States, for instance—will draw from such a policy? They must come to the conclusion that we have been rather wrong in our dealings with Russia if we have gone to war with her to prevent her doing that very thing which we ourselves propose to do in conjunction with the other Powers. If so much mischief has sprung from the protectorate of one Power, Heaven help the Turks when the protectorate of the Five Powers is inaugurated. But, at this very moment, I understand that a mixed Commission is sitting at Vienna, to serve as a court of appeal for the Danubian Principalities; in fact, that Moldavia and Wallachia are virtually governed by a Commission representing Austria, England, France, and Turkey. Now, this is the very principle of interference against which I wish to protest. From this I derive a recognition of the exceptional internal condition of Turkey, which, I say, will be your great difficulty upon the restoration of peace. Well, then, would it not be more statesmanlike in the Government, instead of appealing, with claptrap arguments, to heedless passions out of doors, and telling the people that Turkey has made more progress in the career of regeneration during the last twenty years than any other country under the sun, at once to address themselves to the task before them—the reconstruction of the internal system of that empire? Be sure this is what you will have to do, make peace when you may; for everybody knows that, once you withdraw your support and your agency from her, Turkey must immediately collapse and sink into a state of anarchy. The fall of Sebastopol would only make the condition of Turkey the worse; and, I repeat, that your real and most serious difficulty will begin when you have to undertake the management of that country's affairs after you withdraw from it, and when you will have to re-establish her as an independent State. I would not have said a word about the condition of Turkey, but for the statement twice so jauntily made about her social progress by the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton. Why, what says the latest traveller in that country on this head? Lord Carlisle, in his recent work, makes the following remarks on the state of the Mahometan population, after describing the improving condition of the Porte's Christian subjects—

> "But when you leave the partial splendours of the capital and the great State establishments, what is it you find over the broad surface of a land which nature and climate have favoured beyond all others, once the home of all art and all civilisation? Look yourself—ask those who live there—deserted villages, uncultivated plains, banditti-haunted mountains, torpid laws, a corrupt administration, a disappearing people."

Why, the testimony borne by every traveller, from Lamartine downwards, is that the Mahometan population is perishing—is dying out from its vices, and those vices of a nameless character. In fact, we do not know the true social state of Turkey, because it is indescribable; and Lord Carlisle, in his work, says that he is constrained to avoid referring to it. The other day Dr. Hadly, who had lately returned from Turkey, where he had a near relation who had been physician to the Embassy for about thirty-five years, stated in Manchester that his relative told him that the population of Constantinople, into which there is a large influx from the provinces, has considerably diminished during the last twenty years, a circumstance which he attributes to the indescribable social vices of the Turks. Now, I ask, are you doing anything to promote habits of self-reliance or self-respect among this people by going to war in their behalf? On the contrary, the moment your troops landed at Gallipoli the activity and energy of the French killed a poor pacha there, who took to his bed and died from pure distraction of mind, and from that time to this you have done nothing but humiliate and demoralise the Turkish character more than ever. I have here a letter from a friend describing the conflagration which took place at Varna, in which he says it was curious to see how our sailors, when they landed to extinguish the fire in the Turkish houses, thrust the poor Turks aside exactly as if they had been so many infant school children in England. Another private letter which I recently received from an officer of high rank in the Crimea states—

> "We are degrading the Turk as fast as we can; he is now the scavenger of the two armies as far as he can be made so. He won't fight, and his will to work is little better; he won't be trusted again to try the former, and now the latter is all he is allowed to do. When there are entrenchments to be made or dead to be buried, the Turks do it. They do it as slowly and lazily as they can, but do it they must. This is one way of raising the Turk; it is propping him up on one side to send him headlong down a deeper precipice on the other."

That is what you are doing by the process that is now going on in Turkey. I dare say you are obliged to take the whole command into your own hands, because you find no native power—no administrative authority in that country; and you cannot rely on the Turks for anything. If they send an army to the Crimea, the sick are abandoned to the plague or the cholera, and having no Commissariat, their soldiers are obliged to beg a crust at the tents of our men. Why, Sir, what an illustration you have in the facts relating to our own sick and wounded at Constantinople of the helpless supineness of the Turks. I mention these things, as the whole gist of the Eastern question lies in the difficulty arising from the prostrate condition of this race. Your troops would not be in this quarter at all but for the anarchy and barbarism that reign in Turkey. Well, you have a hospital at Scutari where there are some thousands of your wounded. They are wounded Englishmen brought there from the Crimea, where they have gone, 3,000 miles from their own home, to fight the battles of the Turks. Would you not naturally expect that when these miserable and helpless sufferers were brought to the Turkish capital, containing 700,000 souls, those in whose cause they have shed their blood would at once have a friendly and generous care taken of them? Supposing the case had been that these wounded men had been fighting for the cause of Prussia, and that they had been sent from the frontiers of that country to Berlin, which has only half the population of Constantinople, would the ladies of the former capital, do you think, have allowed these poor creatures to have suffered from the want of lint or of nurses? Does not the very fact that you have to send out everything for your wounded prove, either that the Turks despise and detest, and would spit upon you, or that they are so feeble and incompetent as not to have the power of helping you in the hour of your greatest necessity? The people of England have been grossly misled regarding the state of Turkey. I am bound to consider that the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton expressed his honest convictions on this point; but certainly the unfortunate ignorance of one in his high position has had a most mischievous effect on the public opinion of this country, for it undoubtedly has been the prevalent impression out of doors that the Turks are thoroughly capable of regeneration and self-government—that the Mahometan population are fit to be restored to independence—and that we have only to fight their battle against their external enemies in order to enable them to exercise the functions of a great Power. A greater delusion than this however, I believe, never existed in any civilised State. Well, if, as I say is the case, the unanimous testimony of every traveller, German, French, English, and American, for the last twenty years, attests the decay and helplessness of the Turks, are you not wasting your treasure and your men's precious lives before Sebastopol in an enterprise that cannot in the least aid the solution of your real difficulty? If you mean to take the Emperor of Russia eventually into your counsels—for this is the drift of my argument—if you contemplate entering into a quintuple alliance, to which he will be one of the parties in order to manipulate the shattered remains of Turkey, to reconstitute or supervise her internal polity, and maintain her independence, what folly it is to continue fighting against the Power that you are going into partnership with; and how absurd in the extreme it is to continue the siege of Sebastopol, which will never solve the difficulty, but must envenom the State with which you are to share the protectorate, and which is also the nearest neighbour of the Power for which you interpose, and your efforts to re-organise which, even if there be a chance of your accomplishing that object, she has the greatest means of thwarting? Would it not be far better for you to allow this question to be settled by peace than leave it to the arbitrament of war, which cannot advance its adjustment one inch? I have already adduced an illustration from the history of this country, as an inducement for your returning to peace. I will mention another. We all remember the war with America, into which we entered in 1812, on the question of the right of search and other cognate questions relating to the rights of neutrals. Seven years before that wa rwas declared, public opinion and the statesmen of the two countries had been incessantly disputing upon the questions at issue, but nothing could be amicably settled respecting them, and war broke out. After two years of hostilities, however, the negotiators on both sides met again and fairly arranged the terms of peace. But, how did they do this? Why, they agreed in their treaty of peace not to allude to what had been the subject-matter of the dispute which gave rise to the war, and the question of the right of search was never once touched on in that treaty. The peace then made between England and America has now lasted for forty years; and what has been the result? In the meantime America has grown stronger, and we, perhaps, have grown wiser, though I am not quite so sure of that. We have now gone to war again with a European Power, but we have abandoned those belligerent rights about which we took up the sword in 1812. Peace solved that difficulty, and did more for you than war ever could have done; for, had you insisted at Ghent on the American people recognising your right to search their ships, take their seamen, and seize their goods, they would have been at war with you till this hour before they would have surrendered these points, and the most frightful calamities might have been entailed on both countries by a protracted struggle. Now, apply this lesson to the Eastern question. Supposing you agree to terms of peace with Russia, you will have your hands full in attempting to ameliorate the social and political system of Turkey; but who knows what may happen with regard to Russia herself in the way of extricating you from your difficulty? That difficulty, as respects Russia, is no doubt very much of a personal nature. You have to deal with a man of great, but as I think, misguided energy, whose strong will and indomitable resolution cannot easily be controlled. But the life of a man has its limits, and certainly the Emperor of Russia, if he survive as many years from this time as the duration of the peace between England and America will be a most extraordinary phenomenon. You can hardly suppose that you will have a great many years to wait before, in the course of nature, that which constitutes your chief difficulty in the present war may have passed away. It is because you do not sufficiently trust to the influence of the course of events in smoothing down difficulties, but will rush headlong to a resort to arms, which never can solve them, that you involve yourselves in long and ruinous wars. I never was of opinion that you had any reason to dread the aggressions of Russia upon any other State. If you have a weak and disordered empire like Turkey, as it were, next door to another that is more powerful, no doubt that tends to invite encroachments; but you have two chances in your favour—you may either have a feeble or differently disposed successor acceding to the throne of the present Czar of Russia, or you may be able to establish some kind of authority in Turkey that will be more stable than its present rule. At all events, if you effect a quintuple alliance between yourselves and the other great Powers, you will certainly bind Austria, Prussia, and France to support you in holding Russia to the faithful fulfilment of the proposed treaty relating to the internal condition of Turkey. Why not, then, embrace that alternative, instead of continuing the present war, because, recollect, that you have accomplished the object which Her Majesty in her gracious speech last Session stated that she had in view in engaging in this contest? Russia is no longer invading the Turkish territory; you are now rather invading Russia's own dominions and attacking one of her strongholds at the extremity of her empire; but, as I contend, not assailing the real source of her power. Now, I say you may withdraw from Sebastopol without at all compromising your honour. By the bye, I do not understand what is meant when you say that your honour is staked on your success in any enterprise of this kind. Your honour may be involved in your successfully rescuing Turkey from Russian aggression; but, if you have accomplished that task, you may withdraw your forces from before Sebastopol without being liable to reproach for the sacrifice of your national honour. I have another ground for trusting that peace would not be again broken if you terminate hostilities now. I believe that all parties concerned have received such a lesson that they are not likely soon to rush into war again. I believe that the Emperor of Russia has learnt from the courage and self-relying force displayed by our troops that an enlightened, free, and self-governed people is a far more formidable antagonist than he had reckoned upon, and that he will not so confidently advance his semi-barbarous hordes to cope with the active energy and inexhaustible resources of the representatives of Western civilisation. England also has been taught that it is not so easy as she imagined to carry on war upon land against a State like Russia, and will weigh the matter well in future before she embarks in any such conflict. I verily believe that all parties want to get out of this war—I believe that this is the feeling of all the Governments concerned; and I consider that you have now the means, if you please, of escaping from your embarrassment, notwithstanding that some Members of our Cabinet, by a most unstatesmanlike proceeding, have succeeded in evoking a spirit of excitement in the country which it will not be very easy to allay. The noble Lord the Member for London, and the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton, have, in my opinion, ministered to this excited feeling, and held out expectations which it will be extremely difficult to satisfy. Now, what do you intend to do if your operations before Sebastopol should fail? The Secretary at War tells us that "Sebastopol must be taken this campaign, or it will not be taken at all." If you are going to stake all upon this one throw of the dice, I say that it is more than the people of England themselves have calculated upon. But if you have made up your minds that you will only have one campaign against Sebastopol, and that if it is not taken then, you will abandon it, in that case, surely, there is little that stands between you and the proposals for peace on the terms I have indicated. I think you will do well to take counsel from the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard), than whom—although I do not always agree with him in opinion—I know nobody on whose authority I would more readily rely in matters of fact relating to the East. That hon. Gentleman tells you that Russia will soon have 200,000 men in the Crimea; and if this be so, and this number is only to be "the beginning," I should say now is the time of all others to accept moderate proposals for peace. Now mark, that I do not say that France and England cannot succeed in what they have undertaken in the Crimea. I do not set any limits to what these two great countries may do if they persist in fighting this duel with Russia's force of 200,000 men in the Crimea; and, therefore, do not let it be said that I offer any discouragement to my fellow-countrymen; but what I come back to is the question—what are you likely to get that will compensate you for your sacrifice? The hon. Member for Aylesbury also says, that "the Russians will, next year, overrun Asiatic Turkey, and seize Turkey's richest provinces"—they will probably extend their dominion over Asia Minor down to the seacoast. The acquisition of these provinces would far more than compensate her for the loss of Sebastopol. I suppose you do not contemplate making war upon the plains in the interior of Russia, but wish to destroy Sebastopol, your success in which I have told you, I believe, will only end in that stronghold being rebuilt, ten years hence or so, from the resources of London capitalists. How, then, will you benefit Turkey, and especially if the prediction is fulfilled regarding Russia's overrunning the greater portion of Asiatic Turkey? I am told, also, that the Turkish army will melt away like snow before another year; and where then, under all these circumstances, will be the wisdom or advantage in carrying on the war? I have now, Sir, only one word to add, and that relates to the condition of our army in the Crimea. We are all, I dare say, constantly hearing accounts from friends out there of the condition, not only of our own soldiers, but also of the Turks, as well as of the state of the enemy. What I have said about the condition of the Turks will, I am sure, be made as clear as daylight when the army's letters are published and our officers return home. But as to the state of our own troops, I have in my hand a private letter from a friend in the Crimea, dated the 2nd of December last, in which the writer says—

> "The people of England would shudder when they read of what this army is suffering, and yet they will hardly know one-half of it. I cannot imagine that either pen or pencil can ever depict it in its fearful reality. The line, from the nature of their duties, are greater sufferers than the artillery, although there is not much to choose between them. I am told by an officer of the former, not likely to exaggerate, that one stormy wet night, when the tents were blown down, the sick, the wounded, and the dying of his regiment, were struggling in one fearful mass for warmth and shelter."

Now, if you could consult these brave men and ask them what their wishes are, their first and paramount desire would be to fulfil their duty. They are sent to capture Sebastopol, and their first object would be to take that strong fortress, or perish in the attempt. But, if you were able to look into the hearts of these men to ascertain what their longing, anxious hope has been, even in the midst of the bloody struggle at Alma or at Inkerman, I believe you would find it has been that the conflict in which they were engaged might have the effect of sooner restoring them again to their own hearths and homes. Now, I say that the men who have acted so nobly at the bidding of their country are entitled to that country's sympathy and consideration; and if there be no imperative necessity for further prosecuting the operations of the siege, which must—it will, I am sure, be admitted by all, whatever may be the result—be necessarily attended with an immense sacrifice of precious lives—unless, I say, you can show that some paramount object will be gained by contending for the mastery over these forts and ships—you ought to encourage Her Majesty's Government to look with favour upon the propositions which now proceed from the enemy; and then, if we do make mistakes in accepting moderate terms of peace, we shall, at all events, have this consolation, that we are erring on the side of humanity.

Mr. CORRY said, he did not intend to enter upon the wide field of discussion which had been opened by the hon. Member for the West Riding, who had last addressed the House; on that subject he would merely observe that he totally differed from the hon. Gentleman as to the policy of this war, which he (Mr. Corry) thought had been forced upon the country by the aggressive spirit of Russia, and which he trusted would be prosecuted to a successful issue, at whatever sacrifice and by every means at the disposal of the Government. His object in rising on this occasion was, simply to revert to what was, properly speaking, the question before the House, and to state what were his objections to the Bill. He was anxious to make that explanation, because, at a crisis like the present, and feeling, as he did, that it was the duty of the Government to make every effort to carry the war to a successful conclusion, and to augment our military establishments by every legitimate means, he should be sorry if his opposition to the measure could be attributed to any other motive than the sincere belief that the means now proposed were, in many respects, most objectionable. He was not disposed to insist on the constitutional objections which had been raised to the Bill

—to which he objected rather on moral grounds—on the ground of the bad moral effect it would have at home and abroad—on our allies, as well as on the enemy. With respect to the first of these objections to the Bill—the effect it would have at home—he never recollected a measure more unpopular among all classes, of all political persuasions—in this House, no less than out of this House, for he was convinced, from conversations he had had with several hon. Members, that if the division on Tuesday night had represented the real convictions of the House, uninfluenced by the threat of resignation, the Government would have been left in a minority on the Bill. When he objected to the measure on account of its unpopularity, he hoped it would not be imagined that he meant to insist on that as a conclusive argument against it. On the contrary, he was aware that questions frequently arose on which it was the duty of Parliament and of the Government to stem the tide of public opinion, but he did not think that a question of enlistment could be one of those questions. It had been his fortune to serve at the Admiralty for several years along with his right hon. Friend the Secretary at War, who, he was sure, could bear him out in the truth of the assertion that it was at all times necessary to evince, on every question affecting the enlistment of sailors, the greatest regard for the feelings and even the prejudices of the seafaring part of the people. He did not know if similar tenderness were necessary with respect to the army, but he imagined that it must be so, as we had no conscription, but depended for our supply of recruits solely on voluntary enlistment, and he thought that at a time like the present, when they were told by the Government that a martial enthusiasm pervaded all ranks of the people, it would be highly dangerous to do anything that would risk the possibility of damping their military ardour, or lessen their enthusiasm in favour of the war. Now, what had the Government said with reference to that enthusiasm? They had told us that as dangers arose and difficulties increased, so had the martial ardour of the people risen and increased with them. He was convinced that that enthusiasm was not simply the result of a thirst for glory inspired by the noble deeds of our army in the Crimea, but he believed it was to be traced to principles of the purest patriotism, and that the people came forward to fight for the country because they felt that the country had need of their services. But if the impression had gone abroad that it was after all a matter of no such great importance whether Englishmen came forward to enlist or not, and that the Government had a reserve—not that to which the noble Lord the Secretary for the Home Department had adverted—the people of England—but in an unlimited supply of foreigners, was it probable that the people would have been so ready to exchange the occupations of peace for the dangers of war as they had been when they felt that it was to themselves, under God, that they must trust for success against the enemy? But he considered that the measure was even more objectionable on the ground of the effect it might have on the Continent of Europe. There it would be looked on in no other light than as a confession of weakness—a weakness which he firmly believed had no existence in reality. Notwithstanding the hardships and the losses our army had sustained, he believed that at no former period of our history had anything tended more to raise England in the estimation of foreign nations as a great military Power than had the events of the last six months. During that period, without any very great preparations, as the Government themselves admitted—with a force hardly exceeding a peace establishment, we were enabled, by the instrumentality of our magnificent steam fleet, to convey to a distance of 3,000 miles one of the finest armies that ever left our shores. We succeeded in landing that army in the Crimea actually in larger numbers than the French, and down to the present moment, in every encounter with the enemy, our troops had borne at least as conspicuous a part as the army of our brave ally. All Europe was looking on, in suspense, at the great struggle in which the allied armies were engaged. One at least of the great Powers of Europe appeared to hesitate on which side to declare itself until events should show which was the most likely to prove the strongest; and, he asked, was it wise at such a moment to put forth such a confession of weakness as was made by this Bill? If Government could show the necessity for having recourse to foreign auxiliaries; if they could show that they had exhausted all their means at home, that the manhood of England was completely used up, and that, though we had boys, with hearts bold enough to come forward and face the enemy, we could not find men with arms to use the musket, or constitutions to bear the hardships of a campaign, then he would grant that this was a sad necessity which would compel him to give his assent to the Bill. But how could the Government say that they had exhausted the military resources of the country, when up to this moment not a single Irish or Scotch militia regiment had been embodied? And the Government had by a recent circular recognised the embodied militia as a source from whence to derive large reinforcements for the regular army. He did not think, therefore, it could be asserted that the military resources of the country were exhausted, or that that could be pleaded in defence of this measure for the enlistment of foreigners. There was one other consideration to which he invited the attention of the Government. What did they suppose would be the effect of this change in the constitution of our army upon that confidence which the army of our French ally now reposed in the English troops? He believed that the mutual confidence at present existing between the two armies was the great secret of the successes which attended our arms in the Crimea; and that without such confidence success would have been impossible. And he should like to know whether, on the morning of the 5th of November, when 60,000 Russians assailed the heights of Inkerman, defended by only 8,000 English troops, it was probable the French division, under the gallant General Bosquet, would have come to our support with the confidence which was so necessary to success, if the army of England had been a sort of exhibition of the troops of all nations, instead of those brave Englishmen, Irishmen, and Scotchmen, upon whose courage they had learned in many a well-fought field to place the fullest reliance? He felt, however, that debate upon the subject was completely exhausted; and he would detain the House no longer than to add that he deemed it his duty to oppose this measure, because in his conscience he believed it to be a mischievous measure, and one that was at once dangerous, unnecessary, and impolitic.

Mr. ROBERT PHILLIMORE said, it was impossible not to admire both the moral courage and intellectual ability displayed upon this, as upon all other occasions, by the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden), and those who agreed with him, in the peculiar views which he entertained in regard to international rights of peace and war; but he was astonished that it should have escaped the sagacity of so acute a logician that the whole drift of his speech was an entire answer to his attack upon the Government. He had said that he should show, in the course of his speech, that the conduct of the war had been ill-managed by the Government; and yet the whole argument of his speech amounted to this—that all which Her Majesty had declared to be necessary, and which the Government had intended to effect, had been produced by the fleet and army, through the exertions of Her Majesty's Government. He would say that nothing but the most partial blindness to aught else than his own peculiar views could have made a man, possessed of such powers, not perceive that he had answered in his own speech all the objections he had raised. But the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Cobden) spoke as if everything was a mere matter of figures and calculations; but he (Mr. Phillimore) believed that, with nations, as with individuals, there was much that could not be measured by rule, or counted on the fingers, and which was as valuable to the well-being of nations, as to the well-being of individuals. He well remembered a passage in an anonymous writer whom he did not greatly admire, but who had well said that—

> "Private honour is wealth; public honour is credit; the feather which adorns the noble bird supports him in his flight; deprive him of his plumage, and he falls to the ground."

And so it was with a State. We were too powerful to be mean in our conduct towards other nations; we could not, if the hon. Member believed the phrase, afford to be so, and it would not be difficult to demonstrate that we were taking the most prudent, as well as the most noble and honourable course, in defending Turkey at this moment from the aggressions of Russia. That he would term the real subject before the House. The right hon. Member who had last spoken had said of the supporters of the Government upon the present occasion, that they had left their convictions in one lobby, and given their votes in another. Had it never entered the minds of hon. Gentlemen opposite that a private individual, without official knowledge and information, might think it his duty to give his support to a Government better informed than himself upon the subject, and be unwilling to set up his own private judgment in opposition to that of persons necessarily possessed of the very information of which he was almost as necessarily ignorant? He, for his part, did not look with peculiar favour upon this Bill; but, placing confidence in Her Majesty's Government, placing confidence in the statements of the Commander in Chief of Her Majesty's forces—and he thought that hon. Gentlemen opposite would respect the opinion of that great man, the brother in arms of the Duke of Wellington, who had been raised to his present position by the Government of which the Earl of Derby was the head—and when they had heard, in another place, that noble Lord say that he believed this measure to be necessary efficiently to carry on the present war, and to render assistance to our army in the Crimea, he did wonder that in the followers of Lord Derby there should be any hesitation in following so high an authority. He was willing to confess that the measure was such as might fairly excite the constitutional jealousy of that House. He agreed that Her Majesty's Government had no right to complain that a measure such as this was watched with jealousy by those who took an interest in the country. They had no right to complain that such a measure should be thoroughly canvassed and sifted by every Member of Parliament; and he would take the liberty to say that the debate in this case had been elevated beyond the usual tone of the discussions in that House in consequence of the magnitude of the subject, and the importance of the interests involved. The Amendment was introduced in a speech by the hon. Baronet the Member for Hertfordshire (Sir E. B. Lytton), which showed how well great literary genius might be united with the graces of an accomplished orator—supported by the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn (Lord Stanley), upon whom his father's talents appeared to have descended in no scant proportion—and discussed in a brilliant oration by the hon. and learned Member for Enniskillen (Mr. Whiteside); while from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli), the House invariably expected, and would be disappointed if it did not receive, as it had done on this occasion, a brilliant oratorical display. But the Opposition received a foreign enlistment upon this occasion, for there came to their aid some of those who were generally in the habit of supporting the Government, and foremost among them, on account of the great ability which distinguished his speech, was the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Manchester (Mr. M. Gibson). Yet he must take the liberty of saying that, after paying the greatest attention to every speech which had been made, he could not help thinking that while all the eloquence of these hon. and right hon. Members was against, all their logic was in favour of, this measure? There was no point upon which the Opposition had expressed such discordant opinions as upon the assistance to be derived from any foreign troops whatever. Half the arguments used would be good against troops supplied by a State with which we were in alliance. The hon. Baronet the Member for Hertfordshire had said that our people were so greedy of honour, that they did not wish to share it with any other nation. That argument would, of course, apply to the French, our allies, as well as to any foreign troops that might be fighting with us. Indeed, if the arguments employed by hon. Members against the measure were analysed, he believed that one-half would be found to be antagonistic and quite opposed to the other half. The right hon. Member for Manchester said that the Bill was opposed to international law and international morality. He would ask whether we were to enter into a treaty with those countries whose subjects we enlisted, or not? If we enlisted those foreigners, was it to be with the consent of their Governments or without it? If it was with their consent, then that nation departed from its neutrality, and we should have to defend her in case of necessity; if without, we should be guilty of a breach of international law. "And what," said the right hon. Member, "if Russia should go to America, and ask the Government there to allow Russian privateers to serve under American letters of marque?" In answer to that came the Message of the American President, in which he expresses it as the intention of that Government to maintain the right to allow privateering. But the answer of the right hon. the Secretary at War to this difficulty about foreign troops was quite satisfactory. The right hon. Gentleman said, that in Germany there were those who, having served in the militia for a certain time, were entitled to receive letters of, as he understood him, denaturalisation, which enabled them to serve under foreign Governments; and there could be no doubt that such soldiers would not object to enlist, without fear of involving the State to which they had originally owed allegiance in any departure from their neutrality. He wanted to know by what right it was that hon. Members asserted that the German, who chooses to accept service in the armies of a nation fighting for the liberties and common interests of Europe, was to be stigmatised as a mercenary, a cut-throat, and a national assassin? Was the cause nothing? Let it be remembered that both sides of the House, however much divided on other matters connected with the war, had at least agreed that the cause was a holy and a righteous one. Then, if so, what right had any one to stigmatise the foreigner as a cut-throat and a mercenary? But it had been said that the measure seemed to set aside the services of our own common soldier; and this had been most unfairly urged against the Government. On the contrary, however, the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War had said that which should entirely dissipate this impression. That right hon. Gentleman had remarked, in words that would go down to future history, that "the battle of Inkerman was a soldiers' battle;" and the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Home Department had likewise said that, at the same battle, "it was impossible to tell whether the leaders or their men had accomplished the more distinguished achievements." He (Mr. Phillimore) thought that the whole argument from the other side would be answered if hon. Gentlemen would use the true word "addition," instead of the false word "substitution." This would set the whole matter right. There was another point which had been discussed—namely, the conduct of the war—into which, however, he would not go; for no Member who had spoken upon the subject had agreed with the hon. Gentleman the Member for the West Riding. Mistakes, no doubt, had been made, and they had been admitted by the Government. Then, he would ask, why cavil so much at the mistakes committed at the outset of the war; for he would challenge any hon. Member to adduce any instance of a great war in which so few mistakes had been committed, and in which so many great victories and successes had been won. But would not the arguments which had been adduced on this point tell both ways? If Government had hitherto been so remiss as was asserted, ought not the House now to strengthen their hands? Was it a reasonable statement on the part of the Government that by having disciplined foreigners, good succour could be transmitted to our army in the East? Government, with good sources of information, had said that this measure would produce this universally-derived result. The Commander in Chief had been asked the question, and he had answered, "Yes." It was not, then, for those who had no official information to say "no." The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) concluded his speech the other evening by one of the most disheartening perorations to which it had ever been his lot to listen. He told them to study the immortal pages of Thucydides, and find a parallel to the present disasters of England in the Athenian expedition to Sicily. He forgot to state that both the civil and military condition of England were as different as possible from that of Athens. We had not lost our fleet, nor had we been defeated in war. For his own part, he rejected the right hon. Gentleman's omens; he abominated his auguries; and he would not contribute to the fulfilment of his sinister prophecies by refusing to Ministers the means of sending immediate and effective succour to our gallant and suffering troops in the Crimea.

Mr. SANDARS: Sir, I do not rise to enter on the general question now under the consideration of the House, as that I am of opinion has already been entirely exhausted; and after the able speeches both from this side of the House and that against this Bill, I feel that I am unable to throw any new light thereon. But, Sir, I rise to refer to a petition that was presented the other night from my constituents, by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire, against this measure. This petition emanated from a public meeting in the borough of Wakefield, numerously attended, and most enthusiastic, for carrying on the war with the utmost vigour consistently with the honour and morality of the country. But, at the same time, they strongly condemned the enlistment of foreign mercenaries into our Army, and carried a resolution to the following effect—

> "That this meeting has learned with alarm and indignation the attempt of Her Majesty's Ministers to pass through the Houses of Parliament a measure for the enlistment of foreign mercenaries, and deprecates such an unusual and un-English proceeding, and resolves to forward petitions to both Houses of Parliament against the Bill, believing that a sufficient number of Englishmen

> will come forward, if but proper measures are taken, to defend the honour of their country without calling on foreigners for their assistance."

Sir, I must confess I entertain similar views on this question, and if the Government will but adopt proper means by increasing the bounty, reducing the standard of height, and increasing the age, that sufficient British soldiers will be found to carry on the war with vigour, so as to bring it to a successful and honourable termination. My informant tells me that this meeting held in the borough of Wakefield, the centre of the West Riding, that great hive of industry, was most enthusiastic for carrying on the war with the utmost vigour. Yet they thoroughly deprecated this measure as unnecessary and degrading to the British Army. I believe, Sir, that this feeling is general through that district, of which Wakefield is the centre; and further, I believe, it is the feeling of the country, and if time were but allowed, and this measure delayed till after the recess, that that table would be covered with petitions against it. They also expressed a strong opinion that Her Majesty's Ministers had not hitherto prosecuted the war with that vigour and determination that its magnitude and importance demanded, and that in consequence our brave army was now suffering more than language could depict; but they rejoiced to see that Her Majesty's Government had at last become aroused to a sense of their duty and of the responsibility of the great war on which they had entered, and the language used in Her Majesty's gracious Speech afforded strong grounds for believing that henceforth the war would be prosecuted with that energy and vigour which the country called for, and which was the surest way of bringing it to an early and successful termination. Having considered it my duty to say thus much, and feeling that I can add nothing to throw any new light on the question, I shall not occupy the time of the House any longer by any remarks of my own on the conduct of the war in general, as I am free to admit that Her Majesty's Government have had many difficulties to contend with in carrying on such a war after forty years of peace.

MR. DIGBY SEYMOUR said, that on Wednesday evening last he addressed a meeting of his constituents at Sunderland, in which there were more than 2,000 persons assembled, and the result was an unanimous vote of confidence in the course of his Parliamentary conduct, including his vote of Tuesday evening in favour of this Bill. The hon. Gentleman who had just sat down represented the feeling of Wakefield to be the popular feeling of the country, and he had thought it right to correct that statement. Another hon. Member stated that he believed there was no Member sitting behind Ministers who had voted for this measure but what had done so with regret. Now, he happened to be one of the Members thus referred to; he voted for the Bill, and he did not regret the vote he had given. He did not vote for it because it was said that Ministers were likely to resign, although at this peculiar crisis, and under existing circumstances, their doing so would have been a great national calamity. He was not swayed by any such consideration; on the contrary, he felt as an independent Member that when they had the assurance of the Minister that every exertion had been made to carry on the war with vigour, that he had refused no assistance, come from what quarter it might, and that now he appealed to Parliament to give him another weapon for bringing the war to a speedy and successful termination, he had no alternative but to support the measure. The fate of Europe was at stake in the result of our operations in the Crimea, and he had felt it to be his duty to give the Ministers his hearty and independent support. Nor did he shrink from the consequences of his vote, because he believed the country generally when it came calmly to reflect upon the course taken by the Government would agree in thinking that, as in the days of Marlborough, Wellington, and Napoleon, the assistance of foreigners was justifiable in a war of this magnitude; so it was at the present day. Ministers had historic precedents in their favour; and, for his part, he could discover no moral grounds whatever to justify the opposition which had been raised to the passing of this Bill. We were engaged in a just war, and he did hope that it would be prosecuted with energy, so as to ensure a successful termination. Whatever mistakes they might have made—whatever shortcomings they might have displayed—he felt that Ministers were now making a splendid atonement for the past, and he had no hesitation in giving them his hearty support.

LORD LOVAINE said, he could not see any splendid atonement on the part of Her Majesty's Ministers in urging the passing a Bill which he firmly believed was detrimental to the honour of the British soldier, regular and militia. Neither could he see anything splendid in the way in which the war was proposed to be carried on, even upon the confession of the Government. He (Lord Lovaine) should still continue to believe that it was a first principle of morals that the man who could be bought for 1*s.* a day to cut other men's throats was neither more nor less than a hired mercenary, and he should be very sorry to see him placed upon the same footing as the British soldier who had so gloriously maintained the honour of his country in the Crimea. He should like to inquire into the mode in which the Bill was to be carried out. On that subject the Government professed to be in total ignorance. All they knew was that six months hence a certain number of men were, it was supposed, to be thrown upon the shores of the Crimea, and that they were supposed to be trained to arms. How that was to be contrived he did not know, nor where they were to be obtained. As to obtaining them from German emigrants, that, he believed, would be impracticable. He trusted that if the scheme was carried out care should be taken that we did not secure to ourselves the conscripts of petty German Princes, but the men we obtained enlisted voluntarily, and that every pains should be taken to enlist men of the condition and feeling required, otherwise he was afraid that the Foreign Legion would be composed of persons whose notions of *meum et tuum* were very indistinct in their own country. He should feel himself to be unworthy of having ever stood in the British ranks and mixed with British officers, if he could admit that any foreign troops were equal to them in spirit, in endurance, and in good conduct; though he did not deny that the Hanoverian regiments at Albuera, one of which was commanded by the hon. and gallant Member for Cockermouth (General Wyndham), subjects of the same Sovereign, had acted in the best and bravest manner. He could not arrive at the same conclusion as the hon. Member for the West Riding, that the war would be put an end to by the abandonment of Sebastopol—on the contrary, he believed, with the Duke of Wellington, that to terminate the war speedily, it should be carried on with the greatest energy. He admitted that the Manchester gentlemen had endeavoured to oppose themselves to the popular prejudice; and he esteemed them more now when they no longer acknowledged that idol worship than when they ruined the character of British statesmanship. He entreated Her Majesty's Government to bear in mind, however, that whatever might be the result of the siege, it would be unwise policy to relinquish their demands. It would be far better to lay down just proposals at the outset, and adhere to them subsequently under any change of circumstances. He also entreated them to listen to the cry of the miserable Christian population which had been so long oppressed in Turkey. He thought that Government should, in return for the assistance which England was affording Turkey, obtain from that Power a recognition of the civil liberties of the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire. Her Majesty's Government would also do well to remember that in all ages the popular voice was eager for bloodshed as much as Cæsar, or Alexander, or any other tyrant; and that if they strayed a single inch from the right path, in obedience to that cry, they would be, in the eyes of Heaven, as guilty as any Napoleon or Timur, who defaced the work of God for his own ambitious purposes.

Sir ERSKINE PERRY said, he could not help feeling that the arguments upon this Bill were almost exhausted, but, nevertheless, he could not sit quietly by and hear the men to be raised under this Bill stigmatised as ruthless mercenaries. Having protested against such language, he would proceed to notice the speech of the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden). Much as he admired the talents of the hon. Member, he could not help feeling that the speech he had made tonight was exceedingly inopportune. England at the present moment was in so critical a position as to require that all her energies should be directed to the attainment of one object, and unless she put forward all her exertions, her honour and interest would be subject to a crisis she had never yet known; and if that were so, as it undoubtedly was, then any discussion as to the policy of the war, or as to the conduct of the war, however well fitting for future deliberation, ought not to be brought forward at the present moment. Let any one, however, look back to the course of proceeding which Russia had prescribed for herself, and he must at once perceive that she had been expecting the occasion which had now arrived for the last twenty years. It had been believed in military circles, and such seems to have been the belief of the English and French Governments—that the Russian army in the Crimea could not possibly receive reinforcements under the old system of Russia. After the battle of the Alma, all the reinforcements it was possible to get collected together were on the spot, while Lord Raglan himself announced publicly that the occupation of the Principalities by Austria was quite sufficient to prevent Russia obtaining reinforcements, and yet, on the 5th of November, to the astonishment of Europe, the battle of Inkerman was fought. Now, he would ask, how was Russia enabled to bring 60,000 or 70,000 men into the field on that occasion? Why, from a letter which had appeared in a newspaper, written from Odessa, it appeared that at the commencement of the war Russia abandoned the old bullock-cart system, travelling a mile an hour, and laid down, or established, stages for a change of horses, so as to enable their carts, carrying eight and twelve soldiers each, to travel at the rate of thirty and even forty-five miles in a day. In the same way they carried their provisions and munitions of war, and the letter stated that from Odessa the army was also supplied by sea with stores. Small vessels, it would appear, were used for creeping along the coast and navigating the shallow waters, and in that way the enormous supplies at Odessa had been transmitted to the Crimea. That, then, being the position of Russia, the question for England to consider was, how could she meet the enemy in the same manner? It was evident that the possession of the Crimea depended upon which Power was able to bring reinforcements into the field at the earliest period, and if that was to be done, it was clear that all the energy of England, and all her deliberations, should be directed to the one point how such reinforcements could be obtained. Now, the speech of the hon. Member for the West Riding led clearly to one conclusion, which was, that we should at once hold out the hand of peace to the Emperor of Russia, accede to his own terms, and make no further exertions in the cause we had undertaken. That was exactly the policy which the Emperor of Russia and his astute advisers predicted would happen, and which they had all along expected would occur. This was proved by the despatch of Prince Lieven, written upon the state of this country in 1825, but which was so applicable to the present day that it might have been written by Baron Brunnow in 1853. Prince Lieven, when Ambassador at this Court in 1825, writing to his Government at St. Petersburg to express his belief that England would never interfere at all between Russia and Turkey, said—

> "In the meanwhile it is important to throw dust into the eyes of the allies by rejecting none of their overtures; but, at the same time, binding ourselves to nothing which does not lead directly to our object. In one word, we must prevent them from obtaining any moral certainty of our intentions, remove, if we can, all suspicions as to them, but never budge an inch from the strong position in which our Cabinet has been placed by the blunders of our allies, as well as by the firm and upright conduct of our Emperor."

The conclusion drawn by that astute diplomatist, from what he had seen and heard in England, was simply that England would never enter into any alliance with France to resist Russia. Now, that was exactly the policy the hon. Member for the West Riding was recommending. He advised that we should listen to the proposals of Russia—that we should reopen the negotiations—but he forgot that, in the meantime, Russia would be collecting her forces to strike the blow which should place her in the position she had been seeking to acquire for the last fifty or sixty years. The doctrine of the hon. Member was founded upon the principle of non-intervention, and he agreed with that principle entirely when it was fully carried out, but it could not be introduced and adopted by one Power alone. Like the pacific conduct of a Quaker, it could only be adopted by a moral body of men who were better than their fellows; but if one State acted upon this principle while others laughed at it, consequences fraught with evil to Europe would arise, as they had arisen before. The hon. Gentleman asked why was England to be more earnest in this interference with Turkey than either Austria or Prussia, who were so much more connected with the subject, and whose interests were so much more deeply concerned in it? Well, it might be that England, feeling secure in her own constitutional Government, and relying upon the wisdom and support of a free people, was not afraid to stand up boldly for a cause which should give encouragement to the growth of free nations in every part of the Continent, while that might be precisely the reason why Prussia and Austria should not be so enthusiastic in the matter as sound policy would seem to dictate. But had we not been equally remiss in former times? The partition of Poland was a gross act of immorality, which England and France never should have permitted. So, also, it was the passive conduct of England and France, at the time of the Treaty of Adrianople, that placed Turkey in the hands of Russia. The hon. Member for the West Riding denied that the designs of Russia were opposed to the progress and growth of civilisation; but the true character of her policy, with regard to Turkey, was developed in a despatch from Count Nesselrode to the Grand Duke Constantine at Warsaw, dated 12th of February, 1848, explaining the Treaty of Adrianople. Count Nesselrode said—

> "It only depended on our army whether we should march on Constantinople and extinguish the Turkish Empire. No Power would have opposed it, no immediate danger would have threatened us if we had given the last blow to the Ottoman kingdom in Europe. But, in the Emperor's opinion, this monarchy, reduced to exist only under the protection of Russia, and to listen to her will, is better suited to our political and commercial interests than any new combination which would force us either to extend our dominions too far by conquests, or to substitute for the Ottoman Empire new States that would not have been slow in rivalling us in power, civilisation, industry, and wealth."

Here, then, we have Russia deliberately opposing herself to the progress of Turkey in civilisation and wealth. Well, then, on the other hand, what was the policy of the British Government with regard to Turkey? Why, it was to preserve the *status quo* which should allow Turkey to reform herself from within or enable her Christian population gradually to develope their energies. Now, the Treaty of Adrianople was to prevent that, as was admitted by Count Nesselrode in the despatch he had just alluded to. In that despatch there was the deliberate statement of the Prime Minister of Russia, that Russia was determined to present every obstacle to the free development of civilisation and enterprise in Turkey, and yet they were told by the hon. Member for the West Riding that this barbaric Power was, in point of fact, not opposed to the civilisation of Europe. The Emperor of Russia in 1852 said, that he would not allow of the formation of a Greek Empire out of the provinces of Turkey, and the only eventuality the hon. Member would recognise was, that Turkey should virtually fall into the Emperor's hands, as she had done by the Treaty of Adrianople, and should remain in that position. In a pamphlet which had been sent round to hon. Members, defending the views of the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright), the question in dispute was represented as beginning with the Holy Places, and the writer altogether overlooked the Treaty of Adrianople, which Russia acknowledged had placed Turkey in her hands. The speech of the hon. Member (Mr. Cobden) was, as he had previously said, out of season. All that Parliament ought to do now was to determine upon the most energetic means of supporting our gallant army in the Crimea, which brought him to the immediate subject of that night's debate—namely, the enlistment of troops who had been so often stigmatised as foreign mercenaries. Against such a measure he had heard no solid argument advanced, though he had heard a good deal of declamation and appeals to the feelings and prejudices of the people against it. It was said that it would be better for us to rely upon the spirit and patriotism of our own troops than to have recourse to the assistance of foreigners; but although that general proposition might be true enough, this Bill might still be a wise measure, in spite of the alternatives which some hon. Members had suggested for it. It was not necessary for hon. Members who supported the Government to maintain that foreign mercenaries were as good as national soldiers, but still this Bill might be a wise measure, and quotations from Filicaia and Lord Bacon, to show that nations who availed themselves of foreign swords in their defence must be in a state of decay, were commonplaces, very suitable for a young lady's album, but which did not apply to the subject under discussion. He was sorry to hear the hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond) ascribe motives to the class of men who were likely to enrol themselves in this Foreign Legion, such as would repel all honourable men from joining the service. The hon. and learned Member for Enniskillen (Mr. Whiteside) took the same line of argument, but he could not have recollected the brave exploits of his countrymen, the Irish Legion, in France. It might be said that such men were driven from their country by domestic persecution, but it was not to be supposed that the whole of the Irish Brigade in the service of France enlisted under such motives. A few of the officers might have left their country animated with hatred against England, but the rank and file probably joined that brigade for the sake of employment and advancement, and the exertion of their energies in an honourable calling. In another place, a noble Lord (the Earl of Derby), formerly a Prime Minister, and probably the future Prime Minister of a war Ministry, had pointed to India whence we could obtain supplies of troops to obviate the necessity of this measure; but did the noble Lord suppose that the natives of India entered our army from any great love of the British nation, or from a patriotic feeling? The Indian army was principally composed of Hindoos and Mussulmans, and while the one class was shocked at the sight of a slaughtered cow, the other had been driven from India and supplanted in their authority by the British. Was such a body of troops more likely to be eager in support of civilisation than German troops? Yet where could there be found a body of men more faithful to their salt? And yet these very men were open to all the stigmas that had been thrown upon foreign mercenaries. The reference to India as an eligible and practical resource on the present occasion was invalid also on other grounds. In the Bill for the government of India that was so minutely discussed in that House two Sessions ago, on the opinion of all the best military authorities, it was decided that the present English force in India was not large enough for its purposes. It was clear, therefore, that except a cavalry regiment, or a battalion or two for the moment, nothing could be drawn from the English forces to meet the present emergency. If it was to the native force that reference had been made, that only showed a surprising ignorance of India, and of the ability of its inhabitants to support a change of climate such as that proposed. So that made it wholly impracticable to draw from India any force so as to obviate the necessity for the present Bill. He only rose on the present occasion because he felt that a very gross injustice had been done in the debate to the noble race from whom resources were expected to be obtained — he meant the German people. There should be kept in view the great distinction that existed between the German people and the German aristocracy. He did not misrepresent the German aristocracy when he said that, as a body, they were wholly opposed to constitutional government. That aristocracy had naturally looked to the Emperor of Russia for many years past for protection and support, and were justly grateful to him for the great services he had rendered to the Conservative cause. The Emperor had, moreover, practised towards that body — he would hardly say cajolery, for that would indicate something low and immoral—but he courted them so much in various ways, and they were so connected with Russia by their estates, and, particularly in Austria, by blood, that, as a general rule, they were heart and soul bound to him and his policy. It was for that reason that Austria evinced so much hesitation on the present occasion; and had it not been for the firmness of the young Emperor of Austria, and the exertions of Prince Metternich and Count Buol, we should certainly not have arrived at the present state, which seemed to promise a firm alliance. The people, on the other hand, were democratic beyond any other Anglo-Saxon race in the world; arrived in Pennsylvania, they were the most "go-the-whole-hog" for all reforms of any that arrived there; and he ventured to say, in contradiction to what he had heard stated that night, that the German people were unanimous in favour of the Western alliance. In the *Revue des deux Mondes* of that month, a very careful analysis was made of the German daily publications, and of the pamphlets and military works of the last six months; and it appeared, what was most remarkable, that there was not a single newspaper that advocated a Russian alliance. At Berlin, even, where the Russian interest was so strong, it was not able to support a single paper to advocate the Russian alliance. It was, then, to that German people, who were so heartily with us in sentiment, who had fought so often by our side in battle — it was with respect to this noble people that accusations were bandied about, of assassins, cut-throats, *sicarii*, *condottieri*, and every word of reproach which was to be found in any language. The speech of the hon. Member for Hertfordshire (Sir E. B. Lytton) formed an exception in that particular to the speeches generally of Gentlemen opposite. The hon. Baronet, by his literary tastes, had been led to read and judge more correctly of the true character of the German people, and he pronounced a noble eulogium upon them. He was sorry and surprised to find that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War mistook the hon. Baronet's argument. He was glad, and all Germany would be glad, to have heard such praise from so competent an authority, and he trusted it would outweigh the reproaches so unjustly cast upon the German race, who, wherever they had shown themselves in arms, fighting in a good cause, had gathered as proud laurels as any nation in the world. They were a family sighing for the same liberal institutions, the same government, which Anglo-Saxons in other parts had obtained. They had been cheated and deceived by their monarchs, who on former occasions had stimulated them to action by large promises of liberal government. To that noble nation we should now hold out our hand, to join us in a war which we believed to be just, which we believed to be necessary, and which we knew to be unselfish. If we obtained 30,000 or 40,000 men of that nation, they would form a most excellent support to that brave army now fighting in the Crimea, which had gained the applause of their countrymen and the admiration of Europe, and we should give to that great people an opportunity of placing themselves on a level with France and England, while opening to them a field for their energy in the cause of civilisation and progress which their own Governments hitherto had not had the good sense or the good policy to afford.

Mr. EVELYN said, he thought that the House was in an unusual if not in an unprecedented position, since it appeared there were two topics before them, to either of which any hon. Member was at liberty to address himself. The hon. Member who had just sat down would have more correctly described the introduction into debate of the prospects of the war by the hon. Member for the West Riding as out of order, rather than as out of season; for nothing would be more advantageous to the country than such a debate during the present sitting of the House, affording an opportunity, as it doubtless would, for some Member of the Government to make a statement as to those prospects. He must protest most strongly against the principle laid down by the hon. and learned Member for Tavistock (Mr. R. Phillimore), that the House was to accept this measure on trust, vote for it, and, because the Government had brought it forward, not take the responsibility of throwing it out. He must entirely dissent from that doctrine, for, as that House was a deliberative assembly, the Government was bound to give the grounds on which the measure was entitled to support, and if they shrouded their reasons in mystery, the House had no alternative, in his opinion, but to reject it. He was himself strongly opposed to the measure, and he would rest the whole case on the speech of the right hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Gibson). That right hon. Gentleman had demonstrated that the measure was at variance with the usual practice of nations, and if that argument were correct, (and no Member of the Government had refuted it,) it was, he felt convinced, fatal to the Bill. The hon. Gentleman who spoke last (Sir E. Perry) had endeavoured to convert words used with regard to mercenaries, into an insult to the German people. No one had a greater respect for the qualities of the German race than himself; it was a race to which we were kinsmen; but he thought the character of the German race had nothing to do with the matter, and he wished to know whether the man who hired himself to any one to cut throats did not come within the definition of a cut-throat and an assassin? The measure was degrading to this country; all the precedents for it had broken down; and, if any precedent could be adduced, he thought it desirable to establish a rule that England, in future, would not resort to so degrading a practice as having recourse to the enlisting of mercenaries without the sanction of their own Governments. It had been attempted to be shown that the feeling of the country was not against the Bill, when the fact was, the Government had taken the country by surprise, had endeavoured to steal a march, and thus prevent the expression of public opinion. If it were not so, why was there no allusion in the Queen's Speech to a measure so important, that on it depended the fate of the Ministry? The county he had the honour to represent had the advantage of being near London, and a meeting had been held in the town of Guildford, at which men of all classes and all shades of politics were unanimous in opposing the measure, and had got up a petition against it. Although he did not agree with all that had been said by the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden), he confessed there were parts of that speech with which he could not but concur. He hoped the Government would not pledge itself to an indefinite prolongation of the present war. If it were true that propositions were entertained which would secure the objects for which we commenced the war, then he agreed with the noble Lord (Lord Lovaine) that it would be most impolitic to continue the war. It might last ten or twenty years, and if all the objects were attained for which the war was commenced, its continuation could only be to humiliate and degrade Russia. He was one who thought that was not an object justifying the continuance of war, that it would be disadvantageous to this country, and inconsistent with a lasting peace. It would leave a wound which would rankle in the breast of Russia, and, in proof of his argument, he would remind the House of a passage in Roman history, where the deputies of a town came to beg mercy of the Roman Senate. The consul said, "What sort of peace shall we have with you?" "Peace firm and lasting," was the answer, "if the terms be fair; but if not, you will have a peace which will soon be broken." In conclusion, he would not refer to the situation of the army, which every Englishman must regard with feelings of admiration, and he feared now with some feelings of pity, as he thought that subject could be discussed with less advantage at the present moment than any other.

Mr. BENTINCK said, he was anxious to state briefly the reasons which induced him to give his vote against the measure. He fully admitted the importance of the question itself and of the consequences to which it would lead, but an attempt had been made to give it additional importance by a threat thrown out by Her Majesty's Ministers that the rejection of the measure would lead to their resignation. That threat had been too often made to create much alarm, and, as far as he understood the feelings of the House and of the country, they would not very much regret the loss which they would then sustain. There was no man in that House less interested than himself in the struggles of party warfare, and certainly he thought it would be an unfriendly act if he went out of his way to place those distinguished men with whose views it was his good fortune generally to agree, in a position in which they would be called upon to remedy the great errors of their predecessors. He could safely say, that in giving the vote which he did on the second reading, and the vote which he should give to-night, he had no wish to remove from office Her Majesty's Ministers; but, in saying that, he must add, that if a Motion of want of confidence had been brought forward, he would have given it his support without the slightest hesitation, and he should have done so with no disparagement to Gentlemen opposite, but because he believed, be their ability what it might, it was impossible that a Coalition, without definite opinions or any common bond of union except a determination to hold power at the sacrifice of principle, ever could govern this country with advantage. He fully concurred in what fell the other night from the hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond) as to the conduct of the war, and he regretted extremely that the House had not been called upon to come to a vote on that question. He believed it was the opinion of the country generally, that the great losses sustained by our troops in action from the disparity of numbers, might be attributed to the want of energy and ability on the part of those who had the conduct of the war, and he doubted whether any amount of Ministerial pressure would have induced that House to record its opinion in favour of the Government. Various objections had been urged against this Bill by speakers far more conversant with the subject than himself, and in the majority of the arguments used he fully concurred; but he thought the strongest ground of opposition was the want of any proof of the existence of a necessity for a measure so objectionable; and, in his opinion, the House was entitled to much more ample explanations from the Government as to the details and the hopes they entertained of its ultimate success before asking them to pass the measure. He could not separate the question now before the House and the question of the conduct of the war. The two questions turned on the same pivot. They both depended on what use the Government had made, up to the present time, of the resources they possessed. If they did possess large resources, was it not want of energy on their part which led them to desire to call into action, in the first place, a power admitted on all sides to be so objectionable? The only Member of Her Majesty's Government who had really gone into the questions at any great length, who had attempted a defence of the conduct of the war and of this measure, was the Secretary at War, whom he regretted not to see in his place. He listened with great attention to the eloquent speech of his right hon. Friend on a former evening, and whatever might be the amount of responsibility which attached to his right hon. Friend for his share in the conduct of the war, the impression he derived from hearing that speech was, that it was not owing to any want of anxiety or kindly feeling on his part that the wants of our army had not been better supplied. Having said this much, he was bound to say that he did not think that the right hon. Gentleman had fairly grappled with the question, either of the necessity for this Bill, or the conduct of the war. When speaking upon the subject, the right hon. Gentleman had always dilated upon what the Government were now doing, and had lost sight of the real matter at issue, which was one not of facts, but of dates. If the right hon. Gentleman could have proved that the Government had availed themselves, from the earliest commencement of the war, of all the resources of the country—if he could have told them that they had called out and embodied months ago the whole militia of the country—if he could have shown that they had made the same appeal to the loyalty of the Colonies, and had left no stone unturned by which men might be procured for carrying on the war vigorously and efficiently—he would not only have established a justification of the conduct of the Government, but would have made out a fair and legitimate ground for coming to Parliament with the present measure. But the right hon. Gentleman had made out no such case. He had simply stated that the Government were now doing all that they could do; but that was no answer for the past, and no justification of the present measure. Every Gentleman who was in the House must remember what had occurred on the previous evening, while in Committee. The questions which had been put to the Government from all parts of the House were very numerous, and the great majority of them had remained unanswered —the Committee terminated its labours without their being able to obtain any insight into those questions upon which so much interest was shown, and so much anxiety existed. The position of the Government appeared to be this:—without answering any of the questions put to them, they said, "We cannot go now into the details of the measure. We ask you to agree to the general principle of the Bill, and to pass all the details, which ought to be left to the Executive." That would have been a very good proposal in common cases, but if, at the commencement of the war, the Government had been asked how they were going to provide proper reinforcements and the necessary stores for the army in the East, they, no doubt, would have answered that all those things, also, were matters of detail which ought to be left to the Executive. But how had those details been carried out? The House and the country very well knew what the position of the Government was with respect to those details, and yet they now asked the House to repose unlimited confidence in them, and to leave to them without question the whole conduct of the war. The Government said that it was perfectly true that they were either unable or unwilling to give any explanation of the measure before the House—they could not even tell them whether it would succeed or not — they hoped it might; but it was an experiment only, and because they had signally failed in everything which they had as yet undertaken, they now asked the country to place in them unlimited confidence. That was the whole state of the case, and with the antecedents of the Government he certainly was not prepared to give them that confidence. As an independent Member of Parliament, responsible only to those who had done him the honour to entrust their public interests to his care, he had not the slightest hesitation in recording his vote against a measure which, he believed, would conduce neither to the interest nor the honour of the country.

Viscount EBRINGTON said, that he had approached the consideration of this Bill with feelings of great doubt, because it seemed to him to be one which justly excited some constitutional jealousy on the part of the people of England. At the same time he had been unwilling to believe that the veteran defenders of constitutional liberty in the darkest times, such as his noble Friend the President of the Council, the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston), and, above all, his venerable Friend in the other House—the Marquess of Lansdowne—would be likely to assail the liberties of the people of this country; and upon examining the Bill and weighing the arguments, *pro* and *con*, he was clearly satisfied that it was a measure which might do some good, and which, fenced as it was, could do no harm. He was much surprised at some of the arguments used by the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down. He was surprised to hear him speak of abandonment of principle on the part of Members of a Government as a conclusive reason why they should not be competent to manage the affairs of the country. He thought he had a recollection of very different and opposite politics being professed by different Members of the Government of Lord Derby. He had a recollection of free trade and protection being an open question between Members of that Government after they had accepted office; and therefore he was much surprised to hear the hon. Gentleman speak in the strain he did of the present Government. It seemed to him that the question they had now to consider with regard to the Bill was, not whether Government had or had not done all that was necessary to carry on the war in the most effective manner, but whether the measure before the House was one which was requisite and likely to be useful in the present state of affairs. He must say that he thought that hon. Gentleman had a little forgotten the character which the people of this country had delighted to attribute to this war. We had spoken of it as a war of principle, undertaken in vindication of national good faith—in defence of the liberties of Europe; yet, to judge from the speeches of some hon. Gentlemen, it would seem as if there were no sympathy on the part of the nations of Europe for the cause in which we professed to believe that their interests were most nearly concerned. He entirely concurred with what had been stated upon this branch of the subject by the hon. Member for Devonport (Sir E. Perry), and believed that there was a great sympathy with us on the part of the true-hearted German people, as distinguished from their Sovereigns and aristocracy, too much, alas! under the influence of Russia He believed from personal communications which had been made to himself by those who were well competent to give an opinion, that there was a large proportion of the Slavonic population of Europe which looked upon this war in the light in which we had represented it, and which did sympathise with our exertions in the Crimea as calculated to advance the general cause of liberty and civilisation. When brave men in earnest entertained those sentiments, and their Sovereigns prevented their following the bent of their natural inclinations, he saw no reason why they should be stigmatised as *sicarii* and *condottieri.* He believed that one reason why there had proceeded from Germany such a stream of emigration, resulted not more from the large amount of population than from impatience on the part of the liberty-loving German people, of the institutions under which they found themselves condemned to dwell; and he could conceive no better initiation into the ranks of British subjects than would be formed by a campaign undertaken in the cause of liberty, and carried on side by side with our own heroic countrymen in the Crimea. For these few reasons he should give his clear and decided vote in favour of the Bill.

Mr. P. O'BRIEN said, he would not have risen if any other Irish Member holding his opinions had exhibited any disposition to speak on the question; but in the absence of any such hope, and after the eloquent speeches which he had heard against the Bill, especially from the hon. Member for Enniskillen (Mr. Whiteside), and after the vote which he himself had given the other night, he could not do other than state his reasons for giving that vote. This was not a party question. The question was whether, at a period when we had no opportunity of finding among our militia trained soldiers capable of assisting in the war, all assistance from any quarter was to be denied to those brave men—most properly eulogised in that House—who were fighting in defence of the liberties of Europe? He was surprised to hear the number of antagonistic arguments brought forward in support of the same conclusion. The hon. Member for the West Riding was opposed to enlisting any one in support of a military position, because he said we were not a military but a maritime nation. The manufacturers of Manchester and of the north of England seemed to have got hold of the old utilitarian theory, and to care nothing about our existence as a nation so long as they were safe and protected. He (Mr. O'Brien) could not sympathise with such an opinion. He believed that there existed in this country, as he was certain there did in Ireland, a regard for European liberty and for general civilisation, quite apart from interested motives. But, again, on the other hand, one of the Members for Surrey (Mr. Alcock) says, we demand an overwhelming force; but, almost in the same breath, states, I refuse you 10,000 soldiers: the conflict of opinion exhibited the weakness of the general argument. The position which they ought on this occasion to take up would be, either by an express vote of want of confidence to declare that they thought the Government unfit to carry on the war, because they were Russian in their sympathies; or, if they thought them a responsible body, why deny them the power which they were required to exercise, and for which power they meant to hold them responsible? He was no Government man, but decidedly was likewise no Conservative, although the absence of cross-benches reluctantly compelled him to sit on the Tory side of the House; but he conceived that this was not an occasion for the exhibition of party views, and he voted, therefore, in this case, to protect our army, and advance at once a national and an European interest. An argument often urged against the measure was, that it authorised the employment of mercenaries; and yet some of those who had used this argument had not hesitated to say that if we only increased the bounty 1*l.* per man, we could get what number of men we pleased—declaring thereby that 1*l.* made a patriot. He repudiated such a principle, and declared it to be his belief that, while no doubt the love of country was the highest motive to influence a soldier, there yet existed amongst different nations a common love of liberty—a common interest in the cause of civilisation. It would not, in his opinion, be disadvantageous that by the enlistment of Prussians their King should see that the opinions of his subjects were adverse to his own unpatriotic ideas, and condemned the despotism under which they were compelled to live. It might afford, too, a useful lesson to the Czar, were he to observe that amongst his Finnish subjects and Swedish neighbours we were obtaining recruits in support of a cause which they thought almost their own. It is not for me to ask the Government whether it is in Sweden, in Switzerland, or in Spain, that they intend to enlist those men. Suffice it to say they demand this force, and I, in common with our other representatives, will hold them responsible for its proper employment. But the hon. Member for the West Riding said that we had no interest to fight for in this war, and asked why we should send cut-throats —*condottieri*—to cut the throats of the people of Europe? He (Mr. O'Brien) said that his object was not to cut the throats of all Europe, but his object was to save the throats of our men in the Crimea by this measure, seeing that we had not a timely supply of trained men. Was it, then, impossible for a German to sympathise in the cause that involved the liberty of Europe, and to fight for it? This was not a war in the defence of British, or Gallic, or German policy, and he did not think it improbable that we should find men who despised the influence exerted over their Governments, and would readily join a new legion to fight with the French and the English in a common cause. When he heard hon. Members disparaging the Germans, he felt that the times were changed. He could remember one of these hon. Members—the representative of the University of Dublin—being the Secretary of the Brunswick Club, and the greatest laudator of the Brunswickers; however, it would appear that old times were changed with him. The hon. Member for Enniskillen had made use of Lord Bacon's opinion against the Government on a previous occasion, and stated his doubt whether they had a copy of that author in the War Office. That statement brought to his mind the recollection of a passage which plainly reminded him of the motive that actuated the hon. Member and many of those with whom he acted—"*Ut ita Israelitarum simile in deserto quos cupido incessit redeundi ad ollas carnium, mannæ autem fastidium cepit.*"

Mr. COWAN said, that as a Scotch Member, who could boast of being a countryman of those noble Highland regiments who had fought and bled in the fields of Inkerman and Alma, and who were acquainted with every part of military tactics except that which they had never been taught—how to retreat—he trusted he might be allowed to address a very few observations to the House. In the first place, it appeared to him that they ought to go to work zealously and energetically, instead of wasting time in wrangling and disputation. He should have wished that, instead of having long debates upon this subject, the House had gone into Committee to consider the best method of sending succours to those brave men in the Crimea which, upon the testimony of Lord Raglan, were required, and of which no Member of that House could deny the necessity. To throw difficulties in the way of sending the succours would be to act a part unworthy to that band of heroes to whom the country was so much indebted; and just as the Russian Government would, he believed, rejoice at the divided state of that House, so would the soldiers in the East be saddened to see a want of unanimity at home. He had recently had a conversation with an officer in the Indian army on the subject, and that officer had expressed his surprise that there should be any objection offered to the Bill, at the same time citing the case of the Indian army as an instance of how advantageous had been the enlisting and training of foreigners by this country. An hon. Member on the other side of the House had expressed his want of confidence in the present Government, and that opinion, he presumed, was shared by all hon. Gentlemen opposite; but, in his opinion, even if the Opposition were prepared to lay on the table a measure implying that want of confidence, the present was not the fitting time for taking such a step. If hon. Members did not approve of the means proposed for sending assistance to the army in the Crimea, still let them remember that the need for that assistance was urgent, and that the Bill before the House was the only measure which had been proposed to render the assistance required and to carry on the war with vigour. He might remark that in these debates the Government had been under the disadvantage of the absence from that House of officers of experience and service. Some of those gallant men were no more, but he had hoped, before these debates closed, to see in his place that gallant officer on whom such high encomiums had been so properly passed, the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster. With regard to the Bill itself, he had at first felt some repugnance to it; but it was enough for him to know that the Government and the Commander in Chief, who might be considered to be good judges of the circumstances of the case, had expressed their opinion of the absolute necessity of some such measure. Lord Raglan had, on more than one occasion, declared the absolute necessity for reinforcements, and the Government were consequently under a heavy responsibility; but an awful responsibility would fall upon hon. Gentlemen opposite if they were to be the means of overthrowing the Government, and of thus placing the country in more critical circumstances than it was at present.

Mr. A. SMITH said, he must deny that he was in any way actuated by factious motives in opposing the present Bill. There was hardly a man in that House, or in the country, who was not eager in the support of the war, and the only difference of opinion that existed was as to the degree of vigour and energy with which it should be carried on. The whole force of public opinion had been urging on the Government the necessity for vigorous exertions in carrying on the contest. The whole country with one voice had expressed a determination to defend the weak against the strong, and to curb the grasping ambition of the Czar; but such a measure as the present would, undoubtedly, tend to check the enthusiasm which existed on the subject. The House had been told that this was not a strong military Power, but it possessed what he considered of infinitely more importance—the determined spirit and the power of a free people. It was by such men that the heights of Alma were so gallantly won, and who, by their undaunted courage, conquered at Inkerman; and it was upon men of that class, and not upon hired mercenaries, that the country must depend for success. Frederick of Prussia had shown the opinion he entertained of men of the description that would be enlisted under this Bill, when he declared that those foreign troops whom we had enlisted to go to America should pay toll in passing through his dominions like any other cattle. For these reasons he should feel it his duty to oppose the further progress of the Bill.

Mr. LAING said, if he troubled the House with a few remarks, it was mainly in consequence of the turn which had been given to the debate by the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden), who, in the remarkable speech which he had made, impugned the whole policy and conduct of the war. In the present temper of the public mind it was important that an independent Member, in no way connected with the Peace party, but, on the contrary, opposed to the views it took of the origin of the war, should bear testimony to the principle laid down, that if an advantageous and judicious peace could be obtained, it would be incumbent on a statesman to accept it rather than continue indefinitely a state of war. The proposition of the hon. Gentleman was this:—Supposing Russia willing *bonâ fide* to negotiate on the four points, and supposing the German Powers to come forward and say they were willing to concur in the same object, then it would be desirable that peace should be restored on such terms, rather than that the war should be continued indefinitely for ulterior objects and for the annihilation of Russia. The object they had in view was to prevent Russian aggrandisement in Turkey. That we should carry on the war for the annihilation of Russia, for the restoration of oppressed nationalities, for the reconstruction of the map of Europe—however plausible that might appear—would not, he thought, receive the support of any statesman. It might be that Providence, with some wise design, might not intend that this war should conclude without some large ends, and that the Czar might be smitten with judicial blindness to urge on the war. If so, we must accept the necessity; but we should only do so as a last resort, and after having exhausted all attempts for an honourable peace. He did not know whether Russia would accept the four points as a basis, or whether Germany was willing to co-operate for peace on such a footing. These were points known to the Government alone. He admitted that the public feeling ran at the present moment very much in favour of war, but still if peace could be obtained on advantageous terms, all the common sense and intelligence of the country would soon be in favour of the Government. One word as to the immediate question before the House. Although he had expressed an opinion in favour of an advantageous peace, he was not the less anxious that the war should be prosecuted with the utmost vigour, until the proper moment for negotiating for peace had arrived. He wished to say one word with reference to the immediate object of this Bill now under consideration. At the present moment, they had no evidence that a safe and honourable peace was likely. He believed that the best means of obtaining such a peace would be to provide the means of vigorously prosecuting the war. He had heard with regret some hon. Members say that they supported the present Bill against their convictions, and that their only object in doing so was to show their confidence in a Ministry in whom they had no confidence. He had no hesitation in saying, for his own part, that he had considerable confidence in the Government, founded on the manner in which they had conducted the negotiations and the war which followed. His vote on this measure was not given in consequence of that confidence in Ministers, but from an honest conviction that it was his duty to support the measure now before them. They were now involved in a war with the greatest military Power in Europe. They had found it expedient, in order to extort a peace, to attack one of the strongholds of that Power, and they had arrived at a crisis which demanded the greatest number of troops in the shortest space of time. For that object, measures had been brought forward sanctioned by the highest military authorities—in accordance with what appeared to him to be precedents — and supported by arguments which to him appeared to be conclusive. To his mind, the facts stated by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War were most important, for they were told that recruits were coming in in large numbers, but that generally they were mere lads, who, however effective they might be in the course of a few years, had not yet sufficient stamina to resist the hardships of a campaign in the Crimea. Were they then to refuse the means which offered of reinforcing our army with able-bodied and experienced soldiers? The greater part of the arguments which had been advanced against the measure went to the condemnation of employing foreign troops under any circumstances. But surely that objection could have no weight, especially when the object was not to employ the troops in this country, but merely to form depôts here, to form skeletons of regiments to be afterwards filled up abroad. He could understand that there might be an objection in the abstract against employing foreign troops in our own country, and even to serve with our armies abroad, if it were intended to swamp our own armies by the number of foreigners incorporated with them. Abstract principles, however, were frequently found defective in practice; and when it was only intended to incorporate some 30,000 or 40,000 in an army of upwards of 200,000 men perhaps, what danger there could be, he could not imagine. Then there was the moral objection against employing men who had no personal interest in the quarrel, and whose inducement to fight was pay, and pay only. But it was well known that the German people, from whom these auxiliary troops would no doubt be drawn, sympathised warmly with us in the contest. The leader of the Russian party in the Prussian Chamber admitted the other day that if they calculated heads throughout Germany they would find that the great majority of the people were in favour of the Western Powers, and opposed to Russia; but, he added, if they looked at quality (and by that he meant probably those whose breasts were decorated with Russian orders) the opinion would probably be the other way. Again, the German Diet at Frankfort had acquiesced in the justice of the four points which had been laid down by the Western Powers as the basis of peace. It could not be fairly said that in employing Germans we were hiring foreign mercenaries to fight for pay, and for pay only. If this Bill were rejected, and next spring we should receive accounts of disasters suffered by our troops in the Crimea for want of the reinforcements which it was proposed to provide, he should, had he contributed by his vote to its rejection, feel that a deep responsibility rested upon him.

MR. W. E. DUNCOMBE said, that the mode, in his opinion—the mode in which the present war had been conducted, was calculated greatly to shake the confidence of Parliament and of the country, not only in the ability but also in the wisdom of Her Majesty's Ministers. They had wasted most valuable time in making fruitless attempts to patch up a peace when they ought to have been employed in vigorous preparation for hostilities. He did not wish to underrate the efforts of the Government, or the conduct of negotiators, or to speak lightly of the alliance which they had concluded with Austria, but he thought, nevertheless, that it was quite possible that we might have sacrificed too much to obtain the advantages which that alliance might be supposed to confer. He should like to learn from Her Majesty's Ministers how it was that when every post which arrived from the Continent was bringing tidings of the marching of Russian armies towards the East, and when the despatches which they received from the different representatives of this country in that quarter ought to have conveyed to them no inadequate idea of the inexorable character of the Czar, they had been so blind to the interests of the nation as to make no sufficient preparation to meet the dangers of the crisis which was at hand? He should also like to know how it was that Austria had been permitted to occupy the Principalities, and by that step had precluded the army under Omar Pacha from taking any active measures against the Russian forces? The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had stated that the occupation to which he had just referred had been the result of a convention which had been entered into between Austria and Turkey, without the interference of any other Power. But he should ask the right hon. Gentleman whether it was not the bounden duty of Her Majesty's Ministers, if they possessed any influence over the Governments of Austria and Turkey—and over the latter they surely had a right to exercise some control—to prevent them from entering upon a policy which had proved so injurious to the successful conduct of the war in which we were engaged? The fact was, that from the commencement of hostilities up to the present moment Ministers had betrayed so decided a want of that knowledge which was necessary to the success of our arms, that they had no claim whatever to the confidence either of Parliament or the country. After Lord Raglan had landed in the Crimea, had marched on towards Sebastopol, and had won the heights of the Alma, what were the statements contained in the despatch which he had sent to the Government of England? In that despatch Lord Raglan distinctly stated to Her Majesty's Ministers that he had lost no less than 2,500 men in killed and wounded, and that the cholera had pursued his troops into the battle-field. The Government having been made aware of those facts at so early a stage of the campaign, why was it, he should wish to know, that they had not at once sent out the necessary reinforcements? It had, indeed, been stated that reinforcements to the amount of 7,000 soldiers had been sent out in November. Those troops, however, must of course have arrived too late for the battle of the 5th of that month, while, if they had been despatched to the seat of war immediately after the tidings of the battle of the Alma had reached this country, they would have been in the Crimea to aid their fellow-soldiers on the glorious day of Inkerman. But the Government had not only displayed a want of energy in forwarding troops to the East, but had also exhibited extraordinary remissness in not sending out proper clothing and tents to those soldiers who were actually encountering all the rigours of a winter in the Crimea. He believed it was only on Tuesday last that a vessel had sailed with tents—a proof that the Government had been extremely negligent in providing for the comfort of our troops. And what was the measure which under these circumstances they submitted to the House for the more effectual prosecution of hostilities? Why, a Bill for the enlistment of foreign soldiers—a Bill which was most distasteful, and naturally so, to the feelings of the English people. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of War referred to precedent in favour of the measure; but he must beg leave to remind the right hon. Gentleman that the circumstances in which this country was placed at the present day were widely different from those which existed upon the occasions when foreign troops had been formerly called in to fight our battles. We had of late years increased in wealth, in consumptive power, and in industry. We were not, therefore, placed in the same position in the present as we had been during the last war. Besides, in that war, the Germans who fought by our side were our allies, while the Bill under the consideration of the House proposed to bring, not allies, but mercenaries to our aid. He would ask the House to look to the position of Italy, in which country he was given to understand foreign mercenaries were to be engaged, and to reflect before they would consent to any measure which might reduce England to anything like that State. The fact was, that wherever mercenaries were introduced there were to be found corrupt Governments — there civil and religious liberty was crushed, and universal national demoralisation prevailed. It was because he considered the measure before the House calculated to lead to such results, and because he believed it to be hostile to the feelings of the people of England, that he should vote against its passing into law.

Mr. VINCENT SCULLY said, he had supported the proposed measure for two clear reasons: First, he thought that the Emperor of Russia possessed one great advantage over the Sovereign of this country, in being his own Executive, able to carry on the war as he might think best, without being obliged to consult any gentlemen of Lords or Commons on a matter of this nature. The present question was one of the few temporal matters on which he should be prepared to surrender his own judgment, in order to support any reasonable measure for a vigorous prosecution of the war, which Her Majesty's Generals might call for, and the Government, on its own responsibility, recommend. But he had supported the present Bill not merely through a confidence in the Executive, but from a conviction of its utility, and a strong feeling that were he now Emperor of the United Kingdom, he should not hesitate, so long as he had a shilling in his pocket, to expend it in procuring the services of as many soldiers, foreigners as well as natives, as he could induce to render their assistance. He had not ventured to address the House on the subject of the war during last Session, not feeling then perfectly informed about it; and he would confess that his natural horror of war had, at the time, inclined him to lean strongly towards the Peace policy of the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright). But he had availed himself of the recess, to make himself better acquainted with the question; or, as the lawyers say, to "read up the case" upon original papers, ancient as well as modern, emanating from the statesmen and diplomatists of Russia itself, for it was not his habit to condemn an accused party on any *ex parte* statements. No person doubted that his hon. Friend who sat next him, the Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden), however mistaken, was perfectly sincere in the views he had expressed against the origin and continuance of the present war; but he believed his attention had been confined to modern documents. Had that hon. Member studied the history of Russia during the last 200 years, he could not have failed to satisfy his honest and intelligent mind that the whole Russian system was intended and calculated for universal conquest. He believed there was but one calamity greater to a nation than war, and that was its subjugation to a foreign Power, which involved evils one hundredfold heavier than those of the most disastrous war. For his own part he would prefer that all his children were dead in their graves, than that they should become exposed to the miseries which must of necessity ensue should the Russian secure a permanent footing in these kingdoms. He knew what his own nation had suffered during seven centuries, from suffering itself to be conquered; and it was well known what terrible evils the Saxons had endured for four hundred years, from the Norman conquest of England. [*Laughter.*] Hon. Gentlemen opposite might laugh, but let them, as he had done, inform their minds by studying history and geography. The ultimate aim of Russia was the subjugation of all Europe; and if they wanted an exact analogy from former ages, they would find it in the position occupied towards the ancient States of Greece by Macedonia, in the time of Philip and his son Alexander. On a larger scale such was now the position of Russia towards the nations of Europe. The hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden) had argued that to employ any foreign troops, except those belonging to nationalities directly interested in the war, would be to hire butchers, not soldiers—men who might become cut-throats, not heroes. But there was no nation or state in Europe, large or small, that was not more immediately concerned than England in resisting Russian aggression, by successfully prosecuting the present war. For this was the country most remotely endangered, and was, he believed, in the happy predicament of enjoying the special privilege, accorded to Ulysses by the giant Polyphemus, of being eaten last. It was under these convictions that he had voted for this Bill, sincerely believing that, sooner or later, we should need every soldier, native and foreign, that could possibly be raised. Russia was the only aggressive Power in Europe. Her strongholds of Sebastopol, Sweaborg, and Cronstadt were not erected for mere self-defence. They were a robber's dens on the highways of nations. But though he had supported the Foreign Enlistment Bill, he did not do so upon any understanding that it should interfere with recruiting for the native army or militia in these countries. He did not believe that the utmost had as yet been done towards securing the voluntary enlistment of native troops, and such was, perhaps, also the opinion of those Members of the Government who may have already used their best exertions for that purpose. He could only speak positively respecting matters within his own immediate knowledge, and as representing the largest of Irish counties, which had been sometimes designated the "Yorkshire of Ireland," in the same manner as the constituency of his hon. Friend near him (Mr. Cobden) might be fairly termed the "Corkshire of England." It was most important to excite the military ardour of those two counties, which, as compared with some petty German principalities, were really large kingdoms. About ten years since, the population of Cork exceeded 800,000 souls. He was sorry to say it was now reduced to 500,000, and more than one-half the fighting men were dead or gone. From the remaining half million of inhabitants, it had been proposed to raise 3,000 militia; but he felt certain that, were the military ardour of the people of Cork properly aroused, more than ten times 3,000 men would be contributed by that county. About six weeks since he had written to the Chief Secretary for Ireland a letter, which he had hitherto abstained from bringing before the public, lest it should have any prejudicial operation, but he would now read it to the House, in the confident hope that effect might be given to its suggestions in some practical form. In it he said—

> "As a representative of the county Cork, I feel called upon to inform you that great dissatisfaction prevails among my liberal constituents, from an apprehension that the militia, about to be embodied there, will be officered exclusively by Tories and Protestants, whilst the vast majority of this large force (3,000 in number, and one-tenth of the whole militia of Ireland) will be Liberals and Catholics."

That was a plain-spoken sentence. The letter went on—

> "Such a state of things would, necessarily, cause just discontent; and I trust sincerely, the Irish Government will take effectual means to avert so grave an evil, should it be likely to arise through any political predilections of the Earl of Bandon, who is the local Lord Lieutenant of both county and city, and against whose one-sided selections I have repeatedly remonstrated to the present Lord Chancellor, in regard to the magistracy of the county. It is with unfeigned reluctance I now write on a matter which may, perhaps, seem outside my legitimate province; but I know that my constituents will expect of me to bring it formally under your notice, as Chief Secretary for Ireland."

That communication was an important one, not merely as regarded Cork, but the whole of Ireland. He would not trouble the House by reading the answer to it. [*Cries of* "Read, read!"] Hon. Members opposite appeared anxious to hear the answer to that letter. He could not gratify them on this occasion, and for two plain reasons. The first would probably suffice for the House. In point of fact, he got no answer at all; and he trusted that, under the circumstances, he would not be suspected of any breach of confidence. He hoped the Government would not fail to use its utmost exertions to induce Irishmen to enlist in the militia, and to volunteer in support of their heroic fellow-countrymen—the Sullivans of Cork, and the Houghlahans of Waterford—at Sebastopol or elsewhere. But, from past experience, he feared greatly he could not calculate on any assistance from the Tory benches, to effect such a change in the law as might enable the existing Government to counteract any political predilections of local Lord Lieutenants in such districts as Cork, which he begged the House to remember was the most important county of Ireland, and to give him credit for being actuated by no sectarian spirit in the communication which he had felt it his duty to address to the Irish Chief Secretary, for the common good of these counties.

Mr. I. BUTT: I am sure the House will not expect me to enter into any of the questions just raised by the hon. and learned Member for Cork, further than to express—which I do most sincerely—the regret which I feel that the hon. and learned Gentleman should have introduced any political topics into the discussion of a question connected with that great war in which we are now engaged, and which I firmly believe unites the Irish nation as one man—or at least unites them as one man, with the single exception of the hon. and learned Gentleman himself—in defence of the rights of the British Crown. I ask the attention of the House, however, while I briefly state the reasons which compel me to repeat the vote which I gave on a former evening against the present proposal of Her Majesty's Government. That proposal is not, as some hon. Gentlemen seem to imagine, that you should raise 10,000 foreign troops; but it is a proposal that you should have 10,000 foreign troops in this country, although, as I admit, solely for the purposes of drill. Now, the proposal that you should have a depôt of 10,000 foreign troops in this country involves of necessity the further proposal that you should have abroad an army of 30,000 or 40,000 foreign troops; and it is with this latter part of the proposal that we are now called upon to deal. The more I reflect on that part of the proposal, the more insuperable become the objections which I entertain to it. Now, if ever there was a war in which England ought to take care that her army in the field should be actuated by British sympathies, and influenced solely by a regard for British interests, it is this war; and I shall vote against this measure precisely on this ground, that in proportion as you appeal to foreign States to represent you in the field, in the same proportion do you give those foreign auxiliaries a voice in controlling the conduct of the war. I do not think the constitutional objection to the measure has been satisfactorily answered. That objection is not that Parliament has not the power of granting to the Crown the right to have foreign troops in this country. The constitutional principle is, that the Crown cannot have them here without the consent of Parliament. But if you allow the consent of Parliament to be asked as a mere matter of form, and to be given as a mere matter of course, then, I say, you are violating the constitution as effectually as if you were giving to the Crown the right to have those foreign troops in this country without the consent of Parliament. I think this is a precedent which we ought not to establish on the mere *ipse dixit* of a Minister, and without being told why or how we are to have those foreign troops among us. Let me refer to one argument employed in favour of the measure which appears to me a delusion on the best feelings of the people of this country. We are asked to send out foreigners to the seat of war, for the purpose of relieving our own overtasked troops. But I appeal to the common sense of the House whether the measure that is thus proposed can remedy the evils of the desperate condition in which our army is placed at Balaklava? What is the cause which has led to that condition? It is that the Ministry, with a recklessness unparalleled—I will not only say in the history of statesmen, but unparalleled on the part of any men who had the care and custody of the lives of their fellow-beings—sent their army to the Crimea ill-provided with every necessary for enabling them to carry out hostile operations in that country with any chance of success. The army, I again assert, is in a desperate condition, because it has not tents; it is in a desperate condition, because it has not warm clothing; it is in a desperate condition, because it is ill-supplied with food. Now I ask, will this Bill remedy any one of those deficiencies? The source of those evils is mismanagement at the War Office; and while that mismanagement continues they can only be aggravated by your sending 10,000 Germans or Belgians to the Crimea. Take away that mismanagement, on the other hand, and send to the Crimea the forces which you can send without having recourse to any foreign aid, and I will venture to say that the troops which have already defended the heights of Balaklava will keep them until they shall receive native reinforcements which will enable them to secure a complete triumph over the enemy. I believe that the history of the world presents no parallel to the condition of our army in the Crimea, which is now without any of those comforts that in civilised nations are usually regarded as necessaries. Here we are with the means of reaching that country in sixteen days, with all the resources of England at the disposal of the War Office, with an enthusiasm on the part of the people that has never yet been equalled—an enthusiasm that has led working men to give a day's pay for the relief of the sick and wounded soldiers—which has led ladies accustomed to all the elegancies of life to go out to discharge, in crowded hospitals and in a foreign country, the duties of nurses—which would lead every one of us to take the coat from his back, if he thought that he could thereby afford an additional covering to any of our brave troops—here we are, I say, with all these advantages, and without a single hostile vessel to intercept our progress over the ocean—here we are with an army without food, without clothing, without shelter from the weather, and all the remedy you propose for this most lamentable state of things is a Foreign Enlistment Bill. If we are to have a Foreign Enlistment Bill at all, let it be a Bill that will apply to Downing Street and the War Office—let it be a Foreign Enlistment Bill that will infuse new blood, or at all events new vigour, into the War Department. You may endeavour to remedy the neglect and incapacity of that department; but to talk of giving to it a power of drilling 10,000 foreign troops for the purpose of relieving our army in the Crimea, appears to me a great absurdity and a delusion, as I have already stated, on the best feelings of the nation. But is this all? Not only do you pretend—I wish to use the word without offence—that this measure is to remedy the state of things in the Crimea, but you say that it must be passed in such haste that this House must not wait to discuss it; and if I venture on this, the second night on which it has been taken into our consideration, to canvass its merits, I am not sure that some hon. Gentleman will not rise and tell me that it has already been sufficiently debated, that very eloquent speeches have been made on the subject, and that I am only obstructing business, when I express my opinions with respect to it. You even bring in this measure in such haste that you cannot give the ordinary notice of it in the Queen's Speech at the opening of the Session. Now, I ask, was there ever a measure such as this which is to give the Crown the power of employing foreign troops in this country, passed by the British House of Commons, except after the receipt of a Message or a communication from the Crown? When you meant to attack Sabastopol, you did not hesitate to announce your determination beforehand, and your only successful surprise is to be this ambuscade on your own Parliament and your own country. I would ask the House seriously to consider the position in which Her Majesty's Ministers would place the country. Are these the troops with whom we are to continue the war? If that is the object of the Bill, I ask you seriously to consider the condition to which you will be reduced if you allow your army in this war to consist of 30,000 or 40,000 foreigners. I will suppose that you get them from the German States. Are they to be mere hirelings? Are they to bring what is called German enthusiasm into this war? Do you not see that if they take up your cause for pay to-day, they will sell you for higher pay to-morrow? I will, however, take the case most favourable to the Bill. I will set aside the supposition that you are going to catch the stray German emigrants who pass through Hull. What I imagine you will do is, to enlist the subjects of some foreign States under some convention with their rulers. But if you do that, you must remember that those men are to be formed into separate corps, that they are to be officered by their fellow-countrymen, and perhaps, although paid by you, they will retain the character of an army of the State from whence they have come, that State itself not being at war with Russia. Is it impossible—is it improbable, that in the progress of this war the sympathies of Germans may not be so entirely with England as we are told they are at the present moment? We hear of offers of peace made by Russia. Let me suppose that those offers are such as it is the interest or the supposed interest of the German States to accept, although such as it would not be for the honour or the interest of France and England to accede to. How would you stand, if, under such circumstances, you had an army of 30,000 or 40,000 Germans in the field, influenced by German sympathies?—and the more honourable and more high-minded men they would be, the more dangerous would they be. I ask, could you refuse any terms of peace which the interest of Germany would force on you then? I feel this consideration so strongly, that of itself it obliges me to resist this measure to the last. The greater the necessity you will have for these men, the stronger will be this argument. And this is not a distant or visionary speculation. We have a treaty now lying on the table of this House, under which, if I understand it rightly, you are to devise with Austria what terms you are to impose on Russia, unless that Power should strike by next Monday week. I should be very sorry to say one word which could disturb that interesting deliberation. But suppose it should continue, like the Vienna Conference, for a period of three months; and suppose you should in the meantime have reinforced your army in the Crimea by 30,000 German troops—I am, remember, attributing to the measure a success which I do not think it will meet with—would there not be a danger that you would place yourself in the power of Austria, which might, by its intrigues or its influence, control those German States whose troops you were employing? Would the representative of Great Britain at that Conference—whether Lord Westmoreland, or Lord Clarendon, or Lord Aberdeen—hold the high position which he might otherwise occupy, if it was in the power of the representative of Austria to say, "You talk of making what terms you please, but the interests of Germany must be considered; for you confess that it is only by the sympathy of Germany that you can prosecute this war, and you have 30,000 troops who may leave your standard at any moment?" I put it seriously and sincerely to Ministers, are they prepared to place England in that humiliating position? I tell you, you make a mistake in trusting Austria. I trust she may turn out as you hope. But I never will consent to trust the independence of England to any Power. You gave Austria the key of the military position when you gave her the protection of the Principalities; take care that by this measure you do not give her the key of the British camp. Was it improbable that, in the progress of the negotiations, or of the war, terms of peace might be signed by Austria, which might satisfy European interests—providing, for instance, for the free navigation of the Danube—but which did not meet the requirements of France and England? If that were the case, would not England be at the mercy of the German Powers, and of Austria, so far as she could influence those Powers? These, Sir, are the considerations that induce me to vote against this measure. But I cannot shut out of view the fact that you are demoralising war—not only this war, but war abstractedly and in a general sense. If war be an evil — and I admit it is — it has also ennobling and redeeming compensations—the personal risks and sacrifices made to sustain a cause believed to be just. But I protest against a war carried on by mercenaries, which aggravates all the evils of war itself, at the same time that it extinguishes every redeeming characteristic. It has been said of the gift of mercy that it is twice blessed — it blesses him who gives and him who receives; but the hirer of the mercenary is, in my opinion, twice accursed in his deed, for he curses the nation that gives, and degrades the nation that receives. Sir, in alluding to the demoralisation attending the employment of mercenaries, I do not mean to speak of the German States with disrespect. I believe there are States in Germany with which it is the European interest of England to be allied, and if this struggle should continue I do not despair of seeing those States, which have been allied with us in former wars, taking their place beside us in fair, open, and honourable warfare, under the legitimate banners of their own Sovereigns; but are we not risking such a result by the introduction of this measure against the mind of the people of England? Think you that a German Legion, under their own native leaders, will hereafter be as popular as they otherwise would be, when our soldiers remember that a short time previously they were mere mercenaries? I repeat again, this measure will work injury, and I wish Her Majesty's Ministers would now withdraw it, and advise the Sovereign to trust to the fidelity and zeal of her own subjects. I tell you, you are demoralising the British nation by unteaching it the lesson which has made her what she is in arts and commerce, in progress and civilisation. Remember the old familiar lines—

> "Nought can make us rue,
> If England to herself be true."

You are by this proceeding endangering that spirit of self-reliance which has made England everything she now is. You are unteaching the motto, and leaving England to "rue," because you are leaving to mercenaries that which should be accomplished by Britons. You are teaching this nation, for the first time in her history, the lesson that she is not to rely in difficulty and danger upon herself, but that she is to subsidise foreign aid in her own behalf. Sir, I hold that popular opinion is one of the great elements that must determine whether this course is right or wrong. You have evoked great enthusiasm in the course of this war; think you, you will sustain that enthusiasm if you pass this measure? There is a gentleman in this House who represents this city, and he can tell you how, within the last few days, the glow of the nation's benevolence has been checked, until an assurance was given that none of the money subscribed to the Patriotic Fund should go to the widows and orphans of those foreign soldiers. Why, then, I ask, will you throw down the apple of discord? Why have you forced us to discuss a measure like the present? You are forcing it through the House with undue, with unprecedented haste. You are forcing it by the unconstitutional threat of resignation. And what does that threat mean? It means this, that unless we obey your commands you will abandon the vessel in the midst of the breakers into which you have steered her; and thus, by the extorted acquiescence of this House, you are forcing the measure upon an indignant, upon a disgusted people. Were I to think of party I would applaud your act, and say, "Go on, and consummate this measure of unpopularity—enrol your mercenaries; but you will be ere long visited with public odium and indignation." Unfortunately, however, the unpopularity of the measure cannot be confined to yourselves; and, doubt it not, in the place of the present enthusiasm there will be a serious reaction. ["No, no!"] Am I right? Then this measure is not forced upon the House. [*Cheers.*] Really those cheers, coming from hon. Gentlemen opposite, who have successively disapproved of the principle, and only supported the measure because it proceeded from that side of the House, surprises me. The right hon. Secretary at War told us the other evening that he was willing to test this measure by its popularity. I applauded the sentiment, for I really thought he was going to postpone the Bill until after Christmas, so as to afford time for the expression of popular opinion. I now ask, will you dare test public opinion on this matter? You have hurried the Bill through this House against all rule and almost without discussion. War did not depend altogether upon physical force; there was a moral power that imparted strength which no numerical force could conquer; but by this measure you have demoralised the war. It will no longer be a war of a great nation fighting for itself and in the cause of justice and of right, but it will be a war of mercenaries. Was that a position in which England should be placed? Have you, by your proceedings, upheld the power and honour of England? Sir, there was a time, and there were statesmen, who would have come down to this House and said, "We are in danger; but perish England before we sustain ourselves by mercenary aid. Let us defend ourselves or perish." If we are not able to defend ourselves, believe me we cannot do so long by the aid of mercenaries. I call on Her Majesty's Ministers to advise the Sovereign to send a Message to this House, saying, that even against the divided opinion of her people she will not rely on foreigners, but on her own subjects, and you will evoke a burst of enthusiasm worthy of the declaration. But persevere in this measure, and believe me you will find before long you have given away an enthusiasm, a devotion, and support on the part of the nation for which foreign bayonets will be but a poor substitute. If I could support this measure I would do so, but every reflection has only added to my conviction of the danger of the case; and I never gave a vote with a clearer conscience than that which I now record against the third reading of this odious and disastrous measure.

MR. MICHELL said, he did not rise to join in the cry for Ministers to press on the war, but to impress upon them, if possible, to restore peace. He wished, indeed, to know what the war was now being carried on for. He understood that in the beginning, the crossing of the Pruth by the Russians was not considered a *casus belli:* but after they had crossed the Pruth war was declared. The Russians had now recrossed the Pruth; he wished therefore to have some explanation what it was that they were now fighting for. Were they going to take the Crimea as a guarantee against Russia coming at a future time, and against taking possession of Wallachia and Moldavia? Again, he would ask, who were to pay the expenses of the war? If they went to war with a view to conquer Russia, he would just remind them that, when the greatest warrior of modern times invaded that country, and occupied Moscow with an army of about 500,000 men, on his sending to the Emperor of Russia a message asking whether he would make peace, the Russian nobleman who brought the message to him was immediately degraded. One of the most serious things attending the war was, that in all probability, it would entail upon us a vast debt, as other wars had done. After all, however, the war was neither more nor less than a religious war. ["Oh, oh!"] It was a religious war, but not between Turks and Christians, but between Romanism and Protestantism. Had not the House noticed that every Roman Catholic Member in it voted for the Ministers? [" No, no!"] There was a great excitement on the subject of the war in Ireland, because it was said the Emperor of Russia had caused nuns to be whipped. Was it not a fact that, in the first instance, the whole dispute was betwen Russia and France which should possess the Holy Places; the Emperor of France espousing the Latin Church and the Emperor of Russia the Greek? But the question before the House at the present time was whether they were to have foreign troops in this country? His belief was that, if they had and placed them in barracks here, the people of England would rise up as one man against such policy.

Sir JOHN FITZGERALD said, the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate) and the hon. Member for North Staffordshire (Mr. Adderley) having suggested that the army in the Crimea might be recruited by means of the army of India being employed, he having the honour of being on the staff in India hoped the House would allow him to make a few observations on that particular subject. In the first place, supposing the Sepoys were adapted to the service that would be required of them, the expense of bringing them from India would be enormous; but, secondly, even if it were judged proper to incur that expense, he begged to observe that the native troops of India would never be able to stand the climate of the Crimea. But if they were to be brought there, it would be necessary to raise another native army, and he did not believe they would be able to induce the natives of India, with the prospect before them of being taken out of their own country, to enter the service. The European troops in India were hardly sufficient to protect our territories in that extensive Empire. He therefore thought it would be madness to attempt to remove any part of the army of India to the seat of the present war. He had on a former occasion stated his reasons for supporting the Bill before the House, and would not, therefore, trouble the House with any further remarks.

Lord JOHN RUSSELL: Mr. Speaker, I can hardly think it necessary to enter again into any arguments in favour of this Bill, because, although, no doubt, hon. Gentlemen are very thoroughly persuaded that their objections to the Bill are well founded, it appears to me, after hearing all their speeches, that they amount to nothing more than a repugnance to employ foreigners, and a declamation on their part in favour of the employment of British troops. Now, I say at once, that if we had an establishment of 200,000 or 250,000 British troops I should have thought it quite a sufficient force with which to carry on the war at its commencement, and I should have been ready to contend that it was quite unnecessary to resort for assistance to foreign troops. But when I state the position in which we are placed, I am immediately met with two different answers—one from the hon. Gentleman who has moved the rejection of the Bill, and who, after stating all the objections to the employment of foreigners, and after alluding to what I have stated with respect to the number of the recruits to be raised, and to the nature and discipline of those recruits, said, "How could you be so imprudent as to inform the Emperor of Russia as to the deficiencies in your army." If this House had been disposed, as a question of confidence, to place the necessary powers in the hands of Her Majesty's Government, I might not have been forced to state the circumstances in which we are actually placed, but it is rather too much, first, to raise every possible objection against the Bill, and to endeavour to arouse public opinion against it, and then, when the great fact is told, that the present number of our troops is not sufficient, to turn round upon us and ask how we can be so imprudent as to tell the truth. The hon. and learned Gentleman who spoke last but two (Mr. I. Butt) has another answer, of a very different kind, for he says, "If you cannot go on without foreign troops then perish England." That, again, is a somewhat extraordinary answer, and I confess it is one with which I cannot agree. It is objectionable, no doubt, that you should be forced to seek for the aid of foreign troops in addition to your own force of 50,000 men, but I say I do not wish to see England perish. For my part, I am ready to propose any means that I think legitimate, that will insure the successful prosecution of the war. I wish the war to be brought as soon as possible to a successful issue; and, without any sort of declamation upon the subject, it appears to me that it was advisable for the Government to propose this measure to the House. But the hon. and learned Gentleman says it is a most unconstitutional threat which Her Majesty's Ministers have held out of resignation. Now, it appears to me that it was only the right course to pursue for the Ministers to say, "If we cannot have the powers that we desire for the successful prosecution of the war, let those have the conduct of it who think they can do so without the means which we have asked for." If the pilot of a ship is told that he must conduct the ship through the breakers, but that he is to have no discretion as to the course he should take, as to the arrangement of the sails and the general charge of the vessel, then he may very well say, "I cannot in these circumstances carry the vessel safely into port." I say, then, we must either have these powers, or the Government must be placed in the hands of those who think they can successfully carry on the war without them. We should be acting a most unworthy part, if we attempted to conduct the war without those powers, and afterwards reproached the House, and said, "No wonder that we did not carry on the war successfully when you refused us the powers that we wanted." It appears to me, therefore, that the arguments on this subject have been very much exhausted, and that if the repugnance of the Gentlemen opposite is not to be overcome—and I give them credit for sincerity in feeling that repugnance—still, considering the present state of our army, considering what my right hon. Friend the Secretary at War has stated, and what I have been forced to state, there is, it appears to me, actually no argument against the employment of these foreign troops. And then the inconsistency of those who argue against this measure. They say, these are mercenaries who will be actuated by mercenary motives only, and are we to think of employing them alongside our own countrymen, who are guided by higher and more laudable motives? But we say it is a plain fact that, while giving full credit to the enthusiasm of the people of this country, we do not find that we have recruits of the number and age that are sufficient. Then it is said, "Oh! give them more bounty." They who reproach us for employing mercenaries turn round and say, "Give 2*l.* or 3*l.* more bounty. You will get all the troops you want for 30*s.* or 40*s.* more a-piece." I say, therefore, I cannot—giving every credit to the conscientious and patriotic nature of the opposition that has been made—I cannot see the necessity of entering further into this subject. But there is a question that has been raised by the hon. Member for the West Riding into which I do not wish to go at length, but on which I think it desirable to give some explanation and some answer. The hon. Gentleman said he would not go into the origin of the war, and yet his whole argument was founded on the supposition that the ostensible cause of the war was not the true one. The hon. Gentleman supposed that my noble Friend the Secretary for the Home Department and I were disposed to enter into a war of propagandism, and he made reflections, very just and very true, upon the folly of nations acting on mere notions of chivalry, and saying they would defend the cause of Christianity against barbarism without any call on them to undertake such a war. But, Sir, such is not the nature of the war in which we are engaged. The cause of that war is an attempt at aggression by Russia, and an attempt at aggression begun by the most unjust and unjustifiable attack, intended, if not resisted, to secure Turkey and of Constantinople, and a preponderance of power that would be alarming to every State in Europe. That is the cause, and that we consider a legitimate cause for war; and it is surely likewise justifiable to say that, being engaged in that war, if our enemy were successful, the cause of barbarism would triumph, while, on the contrary, if the enemy were defeated, the cause of civilisation would be promoted. This is not a mere abstract or theoretical defence of civilisation; but considering the character and nature of the forces opposed to us, it is giving, I think, a just description of the nature of the war in which we are engaged, and the consequences that may attend it. The war itself is not a thing that was so unforeseen —not a war entered into without ample notice. So far from that, twenty years ago the Emperor Napoleon predicted that the next great war in Europe would be caused by an attempt of the Emperor of Russia to possess himself of the Turkish Empire, and he said, if anything can unite France and England it will be the cause of resisting such an aggression. But there is one circumstance, and a most remarkable circumstance, with regard to which the Emperor Napoleon has proved himself to be in error; for, without any reflection on his sagacity, all the consequences of an event cannot be foreseen; and, indeed, so little was this foreseen that the Emperor of Russia himself thought but two years ago that that would happen which Napoleon, looking into futurity, had foretold. That prediction was that the Emperor of Russia would be opposed by France and England,

and that Austria would be tempted by a share of the spoils of Turkey, and would be a confederate of Russia, so that she would be able to overcome all resistance that could be offered by Turkey, and the other Powers. This, to the honour of Austria, has not been the case. The Emperor of Austria has, at all events, been no party to this aggression. On the contrary, he had the wisdom to see that, whatever nominal share of the spoil might be left to him by Russia, his own empire would be so enfeebled by the success of Russia that his power and independence would scarcely exist in reality, though it might in name, for a few years after the Russian success. And now, Sir, what was the proposition made by the Emperor of Russia? The proposition made by that potentate to the English Government—made not for partition, but made supposing the case that the Sultan was unable to maintain his authority—was that the Danubian provinces should be put directly under the protection of Russia without any other power, such as the Sultan, interfering. In fact, the authorities of those provinces would have been merely prefects of Russia. Then it was proposed that England should have a certain share of the spoil on the Danube; she was to have had Candia as her share, but it was provided carefully that there should be no extension of free institutions, in the provinces, and that the kingdom of Greece should not be increased. It was, in fact, a proposition for an increase of Russian power, and at the same time a careful bargain against that diffusion of free institutions, of civilisation, and of knowledge, which we might have expected from the professions that had been made that it was the intention to establish them. We declined that proposition. I formerly gave what I thought very good reasons why it was not the interest of Russia to propose such a measure. I went on, it has been said, to flatter and praise the Emperor of Russia; and I certainly did praise what I really considered to be his prudent and disinterested conduct during many years. But now the attempt has been made. War has taken place; and then the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Cobden) rises to question us as to its cause. He puts it in this way—that the Emperor of Russia having been defeated in his objects, that the Principalities, not having been occupied, that the demands made on the Sultan having been abandoned, we have nothing to do but to sign a treaty of peace, and replace all things as they were. I for one think, however, that, having gone to war, at a great expenditure of blood and treasure, to defend the independence and integrity of Turkey, it would be most unwise to place things exactly in the same state in which they were two years ago, and to leave the Emperor of Russia in possession of all the means of subduing Turkey which he had two years ago, without the certainty of there being again the same combination to defeat them. Let us see, without going into particulars—particulars which I cannot communicate—the general nature of the terms on which we think the termination of this war can only be arrived at. I agree with what has been said, that if we can arrive at a peace which would give us security, we have no desire for any merely indefinite object to continue the miseries of war. The Government have no wish, no desire to continue the war for any such purposes as have been declared by the Russian organ, —namely, for the sake of dismembering Russia, or depriving her of any portion of her territories. The four points which have been laid down appear to me to be pre-eminently moderate. The first of these regards the Principalities. In those Principalities have taken place the invasions of Russia, and we know that the provisions of the treaty of Adrianople were so framed as to leave the road to Constantinople open to Russia without any guard whatever; while we saw how, two years ago, the Emperor of Russia was able to occupy those provinces. It is also proposed to place those Principalities, and the Christian inhabitants and princes of those Principalities, under the guarantee of the four great Powers of Europe, so that any aggression upon them by Russia would rouse the resistance of those Powers, who would be in a position to protect them. Here is one security for the future; and with regard to that security Austria and the Porte are entirely agreed. The next security, which is hardly so much a security for Turkey as a provision for the defence of Europe, regards the opening of the navigation of the Danube. If that were secured against what has been the unfair conduct of Russia, and the capricious manner in which she has put obstacles to the free navigation of the Danube contrary to the provisions of the treaty of Vienna, and contrary to the general interests of commerce, and solely for the selfish interests of Russia, in order to divert the trade into other channels, I say, if that protection and security were attained, Europe would, I anticipate, be a considerable gainer by the change. The third point contains, no doubt, a matter of more difficulty. It refers to the revision of the treaty of 1841, and it refers to it with the addition of these significant words:—"In the interest of the balance of power." Now, the meaning of those words is obvious. As matters stood previous to the war, none of the Powers of Europe could send their ships of war, or ask the Sultan, according to the treaty, during peace to admit them to ascend the Dardanelles, or, in other words, to come under the walls of Constantinople. But the Emperor of Russia, having a great fortress and harbour in the Black Sea, in which was a fleet of eighteen or twenty sail of the line, could at any time with a fair wind come down with 30,000 or 40,000 troops, occupy the Bosphorus, and threaten either to destroy Constantinople by the guns of his fleet, or land an army and take possession of it; and certainly after we have seen so unjustifiable an aggression as that which took place two years ago, that would be a very unsafe position in which to leave Russia. Sir, I think, and I must state again, that having gone to war with Russia to maintain the security, the independence, and the integrity of the Turkish Empire, it would be an act of the grossest folly to consent to a peace if it were obvious that within six months after the signature of that treaty of peace, the Emperor of Russia having sought a fresh quarrel—which is so easily found—sending afresh Prince Menchikoff, or any other emissary, and having made a fresh levy of troops, would have the opportunity of destroying that independence which we are seeking to secure. Sir, the fourth condition refers likewise to a matter of very considerable difficulty, upon which the hon. Member for the West Riding has addressed the House. He says, and says very truly, that Turkey has been misgoverned; and every traveller who has visited it has given an account of the desolate nature of the country, the want of proper management in the towns, and the want of security for commerce and industry. My noble Friend the Secretary for the Home Department said that Turkey had made great progress; but how has that progress been made? It has been made in consequence of the change of manners which has taken place throughout Europe. The Christian subjects of the Porte especially are a class of persons whose minds are devoted to trade, and whose operations are confined principally to the creation of wealth.

MR. COBDEN: I beg your pardon, you are speaking of the Turks, not of the Christians.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL: I am speaking of Turkey—and the Christians form a part of the population of the country—and, if the hon. Gentleman will allow me to go on, I dare say my argument will be as good as the argument of the hon. Gentleman, and it will, perhaps, go a little further. I believe it is England, and not Russia, which, during these differences, has constantly impressed upon the Porte the advantages to be gained by a just administration of the law, by favouring trade and commerce, and by an equal diffusion of privileges among all classes of persons in her dominions. The Sultan of Turkey has been, in a great degree, favourable to the adoption of these just ideas. The Turks who have been in France and England have learnt the manners and institutions of both countries, and although the great body have remained in their former ignorance, the consequence has been that the Christian subjects of the Sultan have gained great advantages, and being no longer treated as they were in former ages, with indiscriminate injustice and oppression, they have made great progress, and as my noble Friend has said, the spirit in which they are treated, the liberality with which they are allowed to follow their own customs, their freedom in respect to criticism, and the general indulgence shown to them, has been one great reason of the advancement in wealth and civilisation which has been manifested in the dominions of the Sultan. Now, what I wish to see is the continuance of that progress, and that this Fourth Article should be the means of establishing a system of which only the outlines are shadowed forth at present—that the Sultan should give such assurances to the Christian Powers of Europe, that we shall see before long an equality among the different subjects of the Porte—that persons of our religion shall have the same privileges possessed by those of another religion, and thus a foundation will be laid for the prosperity of that country, which, if established by such means, will be a prosperity co-existent with the general diffusion of thought, with a knowledge of literature and a toleration of religious opinions, combined with a dissemination of religious and moral instruction, which we well know the Emperor of Russia will not allow in any dominion of his own. We know perfectly well that during the reign of the present Emperor of Russia even the circulation of the Bible, which was so much promoted by the late Emperor Alexander, a man of great benevolence, has been prohibited among Russian subjects, and if the Emperor of Russia, whose conduct the hon. Member for the West Riding so consistently palliates, were allowed to have his way, although, no doubt, there would be Christian worship in St. Sophia, there would be that stain on society which is the unmistakable sign of despotism, namely, the ignorance and barbarism of the general population of the country. Well, Sir, I have said that this war has been undertaken, not with any speculative object, but in consequence of the aggression of Russia upon its neighbour, and the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright), in a letter which he has very widely circulated, has failed to justify such a threat as that sent by the Emperor of Russia to Constantinople, in which he said—

> "Unless you sign a note, which I will dictate, in less than eight days, your territory shall be occupied, if not your chief city itself destroyed."

But the hon. Member, failing to justify such a threat as that, says—

> "It is no more than you have done yourselves. You sent a fleet to Athens with equally strong menaces to that Power."

But what were the circumstances of that case. The truth is, that some English subjects being injured in their property, and failing to obtain justice, the fleet was sent for the purpose of instituting a blockade, and interrupting the trade of that place, until the particular object was gained, but such a thing as the bombardment of Athens was never thought of. I have made these remarks because the hon. Member for the West Riding referred, at the beginning of his very fair and temperate speech, to the nature of the war. On this occasion, as well as on many others, all I wish to do is to point out that there must be some security for the future; and, let me say that, having stated at the end of the discussion on the first night of the Session what were the general provisions of the treaty with Austria, I think the House will allow that I did not overstate the terms, as I did not wish to mislead the House or to give an exaggerated view of the nature of that treaty. But having stated what I did, I repeat, that my belief is, that although not contained in the original terms of the treaty, Austria will acknowledge that as we do not propose to diminish the territory of Russia, but to leave her a great and powerful State, only asking for securities, which are as necessary for Austria as they are for England and France, the Allies ought to obtain that wish. If, however, Russia should not consent to such very moderate terms as it will be our duty to propose, after the Minister of the Emperor of Russia has declared he is directed to enter into negotiations, but should still continue of opinion that that great scheme which was begun in the reign of the Empress Catherine, if not before, and which is to end in adding Turkey to the Russian dominions, must be prosecuted; if he is still of that opinion, I feel convinced that we shall, before the opening of the next campaign, have the alliance of Austria, both in offensive and defensive operations. I will state to you that Austria is not literally bound to any course. I am free to admit I always thought we might be obliged to have a long protracted war if Austria were a party in that war against us, but if Austria join us, as I believe she will, we shall be in such a position that the war will not be protracted, but that it will be speedily ended by a durable, satisfactory, and honourable peace. Now, Sir, I could not avoid making this explanation, which has nothing to do with the matter immediately before the House. I have not heard any new argument tonight. If hon. Gentlemen wish to continue the discussion, I have no objection, but it seems to me that the measure has been sufficiently discussed, and that if it passes it will in no long time be acknowledged as a useful and efficient one.

Sir JOHN PAKINGTON: Sir, the speech just delivered by the Lord President of the Council has been in reply to that striking address delivered at an early hour of the evening by the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden), and I confess I was surprised that no Minister rose at an earlier period to reply to it. The noble Lord the other evening expressed great indignation at a suspicion intimated by my right hon. Friend (Mr. Disraeli) as to a wish on the part of the Government to avoid discussion on this measure; but, I must say, I think the hon. Member for the West Riding has reason to complain of being so long unanswered. It is not my intention to enter into the subject of that speech now, but I feel the great importance of a full discussion on the matter, and I confess I have been in some degree tempted to enter into it by the reference the noble Lord made to the Russian despatches, for I must be allowed to differ from the view of the noble Lord with reference to those despatches, and to repeat the opinion which I have always entertained, and have never shrank from expressing, that the despatches which the noble Lord has just referred to, in a great degree misled the Emperor of Russia with regard to the real temper and intentions of the British Government, and probably was one cause of the war in which we are now engaged. The noble Lord has adverted very briefly to the Bill before us, and has repeated what he has before said, and what has been repeatedly said on that side of the House, that we object to the introduction or employment of any foreign troops. The noble Lord is mistaken on this point. The objection we entertain is not to the employment of foreign soldiers, for we are now fighting side by side with foreigners, but to the employment of mere mercenaries, who, having no interest in this great struggle, are to be hired to fight our battles in the Crimea. What has fallen from the noble Lord has not affected the great triumph in debate and argument which has marked the opposition to the Bill, though it is true that the noble Lord has led a reluctant majority into the lobby in favour of the measure. I cannot allow this debate to close without expressing my extreme regret for the painful and, I think, unfair position in which we, the Opposition, have been placed by the Government on this subject. We came up to this short Session willing and anxious to give the Government our support. Let the country consider the circumstances of this war in which the present Government have involved us. When the late Government left office there was no sign or prospect of war; but, from the hour when the Coalition Government came into power, the danger has increased from day to day; and the manner in which the negotiations were conducted have involved us in this terrible struggle with the great empire of Russia. We therefore had no desire to interpose in the conduct of this war further than was necessary for the safety and welfare of the country. All parties felt that it was necessary to strengthen our military forces. We were willing to join in doing so, and we came up here fully prepared to find the Government prepared to propose some plan for strengthening those forces, such as we could concur in without difficulty or hesitation. The Government have, however, submitted to Parliament, during this short Session, measures so objectionable in themselves, and so ill concocted, that we find ourselves in this dilemma, that we are obliged either to offer opposition to the Executive at a moment when unanimity is desirable, or to abandon our duty to our country, and support measures which we cannot approve of. We have been driven reluctantly, in the exercise of our strict Parliamentary right, to criticise the measures which the Government proposed, and for that course we have been charged by the noble Lord the Home Secretary with having been guilty of faction. That I assert is a most unjust and unfair charge, and one of which we are altogether clear, even by the admission of the noble Lord the President of the Council, who has again and again admitted the justice and fairness of the course we have pursued, and of the spirit by which we have been actuated. The noble Lord the President of the Council, however, had brought forward an accusation far worse than that of faction. It was with deep regret that I heard the noble Lord on a former evening impute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire, that he gloated over the prospect of disaster. Do not let the House suppose that I have any intention to defend my right hon. Friend from such a charge, I will no more condescend to defend him against that charge than my right hon. Friend condescended to notice it when it was made; but I complain of such language being used, and I think the noble Lord must now regret it. When the noble Lord, because we exercised our Parliamentary right of criticising and opposing this measure, charged an hon. Member, not with a mistake, but with a baseness from which any loyal subject would shrink, I think he exceeded the fair limits of debate. The course pursued by the noble Lord reminds one of this advice given to a young lawyer, "When you have nothing to say, abuse the plaintiff;" and I can only suppose the noble Lord is aware that the cause he advocates is extremely bad, when I find him resorting to such language. I will now turn for a moment to the cause which led to this demand for foreign enlistment. At the commencement of July the Government determined to attack Sebastopol. They then came to a most important resolution — namely, to change the character of the war from a defensive war to a war of aggression against Russia; and to attack that Power in what was at least the second stronghold of the empire. I do not say now whether that was wise or unwise; but surely it was the duty of the Government to take every possible precaution to ensure victory and the success of the attack. The noble Lord, on a former night, referred to a passage in a speech of the Duke of Wellington, and I was surprised to find that the noble Lord and his colleagues, in another place, considered that passage in the Duke of Wellington's speech, made many years ago, on a militia Bill, to contain a vindication of the conduct of the Government. The Duke of Wellington alluded to the fact that in the Peninsula a portion of the British army consisted of persons not born British subjects; but the effect of the noble Duke's opinion is, that if you want an army of reserve, you must take care to organise it in good time, and the point on which the noble Duke dwelt was the extreme importance of the militia, and he states that the value of that force was illustrated by the conduct of the young Hanoverian militia at the battle of Waterloo. This passage, which Her Majesty's Ministers have quoted in their favour, appears to show in the strongest manner the want of wisdom and prudence displayed by the Government. Did they organise a body of reserve in good time; and did they avail themselves of this valuable force, the militia? I have no hesitation in expressing my opinion that if the Ministry, in last July, had acted upon this passage in the Duke of Wellington's speech and embodied the militia, and taken steps for organising a reserve force, this House would never have heard of the present most objectionable measure. In explanation, I presume, of the want of provision on the part of the Government, the noble Lord, the other night, told us, with what I may call a fatal candour, that the Government had made a mistake and underrated the strength of Sebastopol. The country may ask whether such a Government are fitted to conduct affairs? There have been many mistakes made within the last six months by the Government, some serious, some accidental, from the novelty of their position, of which we, on this side of the House, took no notice, and refrained from criticising; but I think the mistake with regard to the strength of Sebastopol is without excuse. We can hardly apply the term mistake to such an error. I call it a grave and dangerous error, for the consequences of which the Government must be held responsible. Well, after making this mistake, and underrating the strength of Sebastopol—after determining to attack it, and making no preparation by strengthening the army, the Government concluded the Session; the Ministers dispersed—some going to the sea-side, some to Scotland and other places—and the war was left to take its own course. The people were anxious, and their anxiety became alarm; but the Government went on in their delusions through August, September, and October. At last, at the end of October, events seemed to open the eyes of the Ministers to the peril in which they stood. Those terrific battles at the Alma, at Balaklava, and at Inkerman had been fought; our first attempt against Sebastopol had failed, and the Government suddenly found themselves in the position of having, from want of ordinary prudence, brought affairs to the very brink of discomfiture and destruction. When these discoveries were made, the Government, as they had been improvident in the outset, were precipitate in the sequel, and in hot haste Parliament was summoned to assemble. It was evident that the Government had had no design to meet Parliament before Christmas, for it had been prorogued to the 14th of December, but their plans were suddenly changed, and Parliament assembled two days before that period, but so late in the month of December that nothing remained for it to do when it met but to register the Bills of the Government. The Ministers then proposed their plans, and brought forward their measures—one for enabling the militia to volunteer for foreign service, and the second was the Foreign Enlistment Bill. As to the proposed despatch of militia volunteers to occupy the garrisons in the Mediterranean, I believe that these volunteers are only to be sent to specific places where they have engaged to go, and that if they should be sent to other places a gross breach of faith would be committed towards them. Now, I ask, would it be wised or prudent, of all places in Her Majesty's dominions, to send the militia to the Mediterranean garrisons? It seems to me to be the most unwise plan the Government could adopt. These garrisons are nearest to the seat of war. You cannot tell what emergency may arise, or what pressure there may be for reinforcements to the army, and I would press upon the Government most strongly the importance of sending to these Mediterranean garrisons such troops as should be disposable for the immediate purposes of the war, and as could be sent at the shortest possible notice to the seat of war. As regards the two Bills which have been submitted to us, I must say they are not only open to criticism and objection in themselves, but, although the only measures submitted to us during this short Session, they have been prepared so carelessly, or rather brought in with apparently so little preparation and forethought, that, both as regards the Enlistment Bill in the House of Lords, and the Militia Bill in this House, the Government have been compelled to resort to the advice of their opponents, and to mould the Bills, even for their own objects, according to the manner in which we have suggested to them to alter these Bills. And then, let me remind the House, while noticing the extraordinary carelessness and want of preparation with which these Bills have been introduced, that they have been introduced by a Government, a great portion of whom had felt it to be a duty to desert their former friends, and to form new political connections, that the country might have the benefit of their great administrative abilities. So far, I confess I think there is some fitness and appropriateness in these Bills being pressed on by that portion of the Government to which I have referred—I think I may call that portion of the Government political "free lances." In the course of the last four years they have been ready to enlist under any banner—to wear any uniform. But now this Foreign Enlistment Bill having been shaped by the opponents of the Government to carry out the intentions of the latter, is that Bill one which we are justified in adopting? I feel incapable of adding any novelty to the arguments which have been already adduced against the Bill, but I feel bound to state my concurrence in those arguments and my agreement in those objections, and to declare my opinion that the Government have taken a most unfortunate course—that they have proposed a measure most repugnant to the feelings of the nation—humiliating to our pride as Englishmen—a measure, as I believe, immoral in its tendencies, and which can only have the effect of lowering us in the eyes of Europe, and giving to European Powers a false, mistaken, and dangerous idea, that this country is too weak to defend her own cause without foreign aid. I therefore think we have just reason to complain of the manner in which these Bills have been brought forward. It is impossible not to see that the object of the Government throughout the progress of the Foreign Enlistment Bill has been to avoid discussion. This Bill ought to have been, from its importance, introduced into Her Majesty's Speech; instead of that it was brought into the House of Lords in a manner which proved that the Government did not intend that it should be submitted to discussion; they were afraid of the opinions of the people; and, although we have devoted some days to its discussion in this House, still it does seem to me that this measure has been hurried on in a most unusual and improper manner, and no time has been allowed for the expression of public opinion upon its merits. Why is it that the Government have been unable to answer any inquiry as to the details of the Bill? Why did they come here unprepared to explain, not only the working of the measure, but who were to be the officers, and whence were to come the mercenaries? In vain have they been asked where these troops were to be brought from, where they were to be quartered, and many other inquiries of great importance have been equally unanswered; therefore, the conclusion must be that the Government had made up their minds that they would have no discussion on the measure, for I firmly believe that they did not themselves know what the Bill really meant. The precedents which the noble Lord and others had cited in favour of the Bill I consider to have completely failed to support this measure. The noble Lord had alluded to one precedent—the employment of German troops in the American War, and of that and all other precedents at all in point, I must say that I think they are rather warnings of what we should avoid than examples which we should follow. But the majority of these precedents alluded to—the battle of Minden, the wars under Marlborough, the battle of Waterloo, and our struggles in the Peninsula—were not similar in their circumstances to the present case. It is unnecessary for me to repeat the answers which have been already given to these most fallacious arguments, to show that there is a broad distinction and complete difference between the united action of allies in those struggles and the employment of mercenary soldiers, merely hired to sell their services to this country, as is proposed by this German force. But the main argument, and the one upon which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War relied so much, is the necessity for this Bill. Let me first ask how that necessity stands. My opinion is, that there exists a striking necessity, but that necessity is to avoid such dangerous measures. If the Government can convince me that the successful conduct of the war really requires the measure, and if they could show that that necessity existed, I admit that to be the first and paramount consideration, and I for one would feel compelled to give my vote in favour of the Bill, however objectionable it might appear to me to be. But I altogether deny the necessity for it; I deny it, and I think the statements of the Government enable me to prove that denial. Now, here let me ask what this supposed necessity consists of? Does it arise from want of zeal on the part of the people of England? No Member of the Government, I apprehend, would dream of alleging that. If there is any subject which may console us for the evils of the war, if from anything we can derive a solace for the privations and evils caused by this terrible war, it is to be found in the gratification which all parties have derived from the spirit, the loyalty, and good feeling which the people of this country have evinced. It has been proved at least that the British heart is sound, for never did the people of this country come forward in a more creditable manner than at the present time. No one, then, can maintain that there has been any want of zeal on the part of the people to support the Government on the present occasion. I believe from the moment that war was declared the Horse Guards have been applied to by every military officer in the country for leave to share in the fatigues and honours of the campaign, and, throughout the whole period, recruiting has been carried on with greater rapidity than ever. Does the necessity turn upon a question of numbers? I think the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War was conclusive on that point. He told us the other day that recruiting was going on at a greater rate than he was enabled to embody regiments. I know myself, by a letter from Liverpool, which I read to-day, that on Saturday last the number of volunteers was so great, that the final arrangements for the enrolment of the recruits was necessarily postponed till Monday. But, then, has the Government sufficient means at its command? How can the Government explain the startling fact stated by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Enniskillen (Mr. Whiteside) that up to that moment the Irish militia had not been embodied, nor had all the English regiments of militia been embodied? Why has not the Government long ago embodied the whole of the militia? How can the Government complain of any want of means to recruit their army when this legitimate reserve, the militia, has not been called into action? That is a point upon which Irish Members perhaps can deal better than I can, but I believe that, if the Government felt any pressure upon it for soldiers for immediate service, there is no quarter to which they could turn with more success than to the Irish constabulary, a finer body of men than which can nowhere be found. They are highly disciplined, fit for immediate service, and, I believe, from what I hear from those best acquainted with Irishmen, that no difficulty would be experienced and no danger incurred by having recourse to that source; while, on the other hand, the Government would have two effective brigades of well-trained men. I cannot, therefore, think that, on the ground of numbers, there is any pressing necessity for resorting to the enlistment of foreigners. On the contrary, I think that, from the militia, even now—although it should have been embodied long ago—if the whole force is embodied, there will be no difficulty to find a sufficient force to send out speedily to the Crimea. Does the necessity, then, turn on that point upon which the Government have rested more than on any other—the want of a force ready drilled to be sent out immediately? Upon this point my hon. Friend the Member for West Kent (Sir E. Dering), who moved the Amendment, has expressed himself so clearly, and, as I think, so conclusively, that it is unnecessary for me to dwell upon it. My firm impression is, that you might collect a sufficient force to send out to the relief of our overburdened troops in the Crimea from the English and Irish militia regiments. You might drill them and make them efficient to any extent required, and send them out to the Crimea sooner than any foreign force you can collect together. Time must elapse before you can enlist these mercenaries. The men must be brought here, embodied, and drilled. I believe an English force could be obtained in as short a space of time, and might be as rapidly conveyed to the seat of war. But then, assuming that you (the Government) should get these foreigners, embody them, drill them, there still remains this question, when you have got them, how far can you trust them? Remember that the Emperor of Russia will fight us, not only with steel and iron, but also with gold. If you buy the services of those men who have no interest in this war, who have no other tie to you beyond the pay you give them, is there not a manifest danger that these men whose services you buy may again be bought? You may buy the blood of these men, but you cannot buy their hearts. Remember the circumstances of the war. You are not fighting Russia on the Danube—not in the Principalities. You have invaded the Russian soil—you have attacked Russian hearths, and have raised in the minds of the Russians the same feelings which enabled them to repel the legions of the great Napoleon from Moscow. I believe you have done this in a just war, but of this I feel convinced, that if you are to bring this deadly struggle to a successful issue, it can only be done by meeting the Russian forces by men who are impelled by the same animus by which they themselves are animated—loyalty to the Crown and attachment to their country. Remember, you cannot place reliance on these mercenary troops. Remember, also, what the Duke of Wellington said of mercenary troops in the Peninsula. He was forced to leave a large body of them at Lisbon, for fear, he said, they should desert him. I hope, therefore, that Parliament will reject this Bill; but, at any rate, we on this side of the House will have the consolation of knowing that we have raised our voices against a measure which we think dangerous and unpolitic, derogatory alike to our national feelings and our national honour.

MR. BRIGHT:* Sir, at this hour of the night I shall not make a speech; but I wish to make a few remarks in answer to the noble Lord the Member for the City of London, who has very strangely misapprehended—I am not allowed to say "misrepresented"—what fell from my hon. Friend the Member for the West Riding. The noble Lord began by saying that my hon. Friend had charged the Government with making war in something of a propagandist spirit in favour of nationalities throughout the Continent; but that was the exact contrary of what my hon. Friend did say. What he said was, that that portion of the people of this country who had clamoured for war, and whose opinion formed the basis whereupon the Government grounded their plea of the popularity of the war, were in favour of the setting up of nationalities; but my hon. Friend showed that the Government had no such object, and the war no such tendency. The next misrepresentation was, that my hon. Friend had spoken in favour of the *status quo;* but there is not the shadow of a shade of truth in that statement. What my hon. Friend said was precisely the contrary; but the noble Lord, arguing from his own misapprehension of my hon. Friend's meaning, went on then to show that it would not do to establish a peace on the *status quo* terms, thus knocking down a position which nobody had set up. The noble Lord was also guilty of another mistake with reference to an observation of my hon. Friend as to the character and position of the Turks. We have referred over and over again to a monstrous statement made by the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton as to the improvement of the Turks—a statement which is contradicted by all facts. To-night, with a disingenuousness which I should be ashamed to use in argument—[*Cries of* "Oh!"] It is very well for hon. Gentlemen who come down to cheer a Minister to cry "Oh!" but is it a fact, or is it not? Is there a man who hears me who does not know perfectly well, when the noble Lord said that the Turks had improved within the last twenty years more than any other nation in Europe, that the statement referred not to the Christians, whose rights and interests we were defending, but to the character of the Mahometan population? But to-night, with a disingenuousness which I could not condescend to use, the noble Lord turned the question to the condition of the Christian population. The real question was, as every hon. Gentleman knows, What was the condition of the Mahometan? and there is not a Gentleman in this House who is not aware that the Mahometan portion of the population of the Turkish Empire is in a decaying and dying condition, and that the two great Empires who have undertaken to set it on its legs again will find it about the most difficult task in which they ever were engaged. What do your own officers say? Here is an extract from a letter which appeared in the papers the other day—

> "They ought to set these rascally Turks to mend them [the roads], which might easily be done, as under the clay there is plenty of capital stone. They are, I am sorry to say, bringing more of these brutes into the Crimea, which makes more mouths to feed, without being of any use."

I have seen a private letter, too, from an able and distinguished officer in the Crimea, who says—

> "Half of us do not know what we are fighting for, and the other half only pray that we may not be fighting for the Turks."

The only sign of improvement which has been manifested that I know of is, that on a great emergency, when their Empire, under the advice of Her Majesty's Government, and that of their Ambassador, was placed in a situation of great peril, the Turks managed to make an expiring effort, and to get up an army which the Government, so far as I can hear, has since permitted to be almost destroyed. Another sign of improvement there is, perhaps, that they have begun to wear trousers; but as to their commerce, their industry, or their revenue, nothing can be in a worse condition. You have now two Empires attempting to set the Turkish Empire up again; and it is said that a third great Empire is also about to engage in the task. The Turk wants to borrow money, but he cannot borrow it to-day in the London market at less than from eight to nine per cent. Russia, on the other hand, is an Empire against which three great Empires, if Turkey is to be counted one still, are now combined, and it is said that a fourth great Empire will soon join the ranks of its enemies. But Russian funds at this moment are very little lower than the stock of the London and North-Western Railway. You have engaged to set this Turkish Empire up again—a task in which everybody knows you must fail—and you have persuaded the Turk to enter into a contest, one of the very first proceedings in which has forced him to mortgage to the English capitalist a very large portion—and the securest portion, too, of his revenues—namely, that which he derives from Egypt, amounting, in fact, in a fiscal and financial point of view, to an actual dismemberment of the Turkish Empire, by a separation of Egypt from it. Why is it that the noble Lord has to-night come forward as the defender of the Greeks? Is it that he has discovered that, when this war is over, that Turkey, which he has undertaken to protect, the empire which he is to defend and sustain against the Emperor of Russia, will have been smothered under his affectionate embrace? or, to quote the powerful language of the *Times*, when the Vienna note was refused, that whatever else may be the result of the war in which Turkey has plunged Europe, this one thing is certain, that at its conclusion there will be no Turkish Empire to talk about?

The noble Lord quoted a letter which I wrote some time ago, and which, like others who have discussed it, he found it not easy to answer. In that letter I referred to Don Pacifico's case; and I am sure that the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton will remember a despatch which he received through Baron Brunnow, from Count Nesselrode, on that subject; a despatch which I think the House will forgive me reading to it on the present occasion, as it gives the Russian Government's estimation of that act of "material guarantee" on the part of England—

> "It remains to be seen whether Great Britain, abusing the advantages which are afforded her by her immense maritime superiority, intends henceforth to pursue an isolated policy, without caring for those engagements which bind her to the other Cabinets; whether she intends to disengage herself from every obligation, as well as from all community of action, and to authorise all great Powers, on every fitting opportunity, to recognise to the weak no other rule but their own will, no other right but their own physical strength. Your Excellency will please to read this despatch to Lord Palmerston, and to give him a copy of it."

If there had been no more temper—no more sense—no more unity in the negotiations which took place with regard to this matter, in all probability we might have had a war about it. It was a case in which Russia might have gone to war with this country if she had been so minded. But Russia did not do that. Fortunately, the negotiations that ensued settled that question without bringing that disaster upon Europe. But the noble Lord again misinterpreted my hon. Friend (Mr. Cobden). I appeal to every Gentleman who heard my hon. Friend's speech whether the drift of it was not this—that in this quarrel, Prussia, and certainly Austria, had a nearer and stronger interest than England, and that he could not understand why the terms which Austria might consider fair and safe for herself and for Turkey, might not be accepted with honour by this country and by

France. Now, I am prepared to show that, from the beginning of this dispute, there is not a single thing which Austria wished to do in the course of the negotiations, or even which France wished to do, that the Government of the noble Lord did not systematically refuse its assent to, and that the noble Lord's Government is alone responsible for the failure in every particular point which took place in these negotiations. I will not trouble the House by going into the history of these negotiations now, further than just to state two facts, which will not take more than a few sentences. The noble Lord referred to the note which Russia wanted Turkey to sign, known as the Menchikoff note; but the noble Lord knows as well as I do, that when the French Ambassador, M. De la Cour, went to Constantinople, or whilst he was at Constantinople, he received express instructions from the Emperor of the French not to take upon himself the responsibility of inciting the Sultan to reject that note. ["No!"] I know this is the fact, because it is stated in Lord Cowley's despatch to the noble Lord.

I am expressing no opinion on the propriety of what was here done; I simply state the fact: and it was through the interference of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe—acting, I presume, in accordance with instructions from our Cabinet, and promising the intervention of the fleets—that the rejection of that note was secured. The next fact I have to mention is, that when in September, last year, the last propositions were drawn up by Counts Buol and Nesselrode, and offered at Olmütz by the Emperor, as a final settlement of the question, although Austria and Prussia were in favour of those propositions, and though Lord Westmoreland himself said — I don't quote his exact words—but they were in substance that they were of such a nature that they might be received; thus indicating his favourable opinion of them: and though, likewise, the Emperor of the French himself declared that they guarded all the points in which England and France were concerned—for this was stated by Count Walewski when he said that the Emperor was prepared to order his Ambassador at Constantinople to sign them along with the other Ambassadors, and to offer them to the Porte in exchange for the Vienna note; nevertheless, the Earl of Clarendon wrote, not in a very statesmanlike manner in such an emergency, but in almost a contemptuous tone, that our Government would not, upon any consideration, have anything further to do with the Vienna note. The rejection, first, of the amended Menchikoff note, and then of the Olmütz note, was a policy adopted solely by the Government of this country, and only concurred in, but not recommended, by the French Government and the other Governments of Europe. Whether this policy was right or wrong, there can be no doubt of that fact; and I am prepared to stake my reputation for accuracy and for a knowledge of the English language on this interpretation of the documents which have been laid before us. That being so, on what pretence could we expect that Austria should go to war along with us for objects far beyond what she thought satisfactory at the beginning? or why should we ask the Emperor of the French to go to war for objects which he did not contemplate, and to insist on conditions which, in the month of September of last year, he thought wholly unnecessary? But one fact more I hope the House will allow me to state. There is a despatch in existence which was never produced to the people of this country, but which made its first appearance in a St. Petersburg newspaper, and was afterwards published in the Paris journals—a despatch in which the Emperor of the French, or his Minister, urged the Russian Government to accept the Vienna note on the express ground—I give the exact words—that 'its general sense differed in nothing from the sense of the original propositions of Prince Menchikoff.' Why, Sir, can there be dissimulation more extraordinary—can there be guilt more conclusive than that this Government should act as it did, after it had recommended the Emperor of Russia to take the Vienna note? For the noble Lord has told us, over and over again, that the Government of England concurred in all the steps taken by the French Government. The House will allow me to read the very words of the despatch, for, after all, this is no very small matter. I have an English translation, but the French original is underneath, and any hon. Gentleman who chooses may see it. The despatch is from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the French Foreign Minister, who states—

> "That which the Cabinet of St. Petersburg ought to desire is an act of the Porte, which testifies that it has taken into serious consideration the mission of Prince Menchikoff, and that it renders homage to the sympathies which an

identity of religion inspires in the Emperor Nicholas for all Christians of the Eastern rite.

And further on—

> "They [the French Government] submit it to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg with the hope that it will find that its general sense differs in nothing from the sense of the proposition presented by Prince Menchikoff."

The French words are—

> "Que son sens général ne diffère en rien du sens du projet présenté par M. le Prince Menchikoff."

It then goes on—

> "And that it gives it satisfaction on all the essential points of its demands. The slight variation in the form of it will not be observed by the masses of the people, either in Russia or in Turkey. To their eyes the step taken by the Porte [that is, in accepting it] will preserve all the signification which the Cabinet of St. Petersburg wishes to give it; and His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas will appear to them always as the powerful and respected protector of their religious faith."

This despatch was written, recommending *la note Française* which is the basis of, and in reality and substance, the same thing with the Vienna note; and, up to this moment, neither the Government of France, nor the Government of which the noble Lord is a Member, had for an instant denied the justice—I do not say the extent or degree—but the justice of the claim made on the part of the Russian Government against the Turks; and when they turn round upon their own note and tell you that there was a different construction put upon it. Was there any construction put upon it different from the recommendation here made and the argument used by the French Government? No; and the whole of that statement is a statement that is delusive, and if I were not in this House I would characterise it by a harsher epithet. I say now what I stated in March last, and what I have since said and written to the country, that you are making war against the Government which accepted your own terms of peace; and I state this now only for the purpose of urging upon the House and upon the Government that you are bound at least, after making war for many months, to exact no further terms from the State with which you are at war, than such as will give that security which at first you believed to be necessary; and that if you carry on a war for vengeance—if you carry on a war for conquest—if you carry on a war for purposes of Government at home, as many wars have been carried on in past times, I say you will be guilty of a heinous crime, alike in the eyes of God and man. One other remark, perhaps the House will permit me to make. The noble Lord spoke very confidently to-night; and a very considerable portion of his speech—hoping, as I do, for the restoration of peace at some time or another—was to me not very satisfactory. I think that he would only be acting a more statesmanlike part if, in making speeches, he were at least to abstain from those trifling but still irritating charges, which he is constantly bringing against the Russian Government. I can conceive of one nation going to war with another nation; but why should the noble Lord say, "The Sovereign of that State does not allow Bibles to be circulated—he suppressed this thing here, and he put down something else there?" Why, what did one of the noble Lord's present colleagues say of the Government of our ally? Did he not thank God that that despotism could not suppress or gag our newspaper press, and declare that the people of France were subject to the worst tyranny in Europe. These statements from a Minister—from one who has been Prime Minister—and who, for aught I know, may again be Prime Minister, show a littleness that I did not expect from a statesman of this country, whose fate and interests hang on every word the noble Lord utters; and when the fate of thousands, ay, and of tens of thousands, may depend on whether the noble Lord should make one false step in the position in which he is now placed. And when terrible calamities were coming upon your army, where was this Government? One Minister was in Scotland, another at the sea-side, and for six weeks no meeting of the Cabinet took place. I do not note when Cabinets are held—I sometimes observe that they sit for four or five hours at a time, and then I think something is wrong—but for six weeks, or two months, it is said no meeting of the Ministers was held. The noble Lord President was making a small speech on a great subject somewhere in Cumberland. At Bedford he descanted on the fate of empires, forgetting that there was nothing so likely to destroy an empire as unnecessary wars. At Bristol he was advocating a new History of England, which if impartially written, I know not how the noble Lord's policy for the last few months will show to posterity. The noble Lord the Member for Tiverton undertook a more difficult task—a labour left unaccomplished by Voltaire — and when he addressed the Hampshire peasantry, in one short sentence he overturned the New Testament and destroyed the foundations of the Christian religion.

Now, Sir, I have only to speak on one more point. My hon. Friend the Member for the West Riding, in what he said about the condition of the English army in the Crimea, I believe, expressed only that which all in this House feel, and which, I trust, every person in this country capable of thinking feels. When I look at Gentlemen on that bench, and consider all their policy has brought about within the last twelve months, I scarcely dare trust myself to speak of them, either in or out of their presence. We all know what we have lost in this House. Here, sitting near me, very often sat the Member for Frome (Colonel Boyle). I met him a short time before he went out, at Mr. Westerton, the bookseller's, near Hyde Park Corner. I asked him whether he was going out? He answered, he was afraid he was; not afraid in the sense of personal fear—he knew not that; but he said, with a look and a tone I shall never forget, "It's no light matter for a man who has a wife and five little children." The stormy Euxine is his grave; his wife is a widow, his children orphans. On the other side of the House sat a Member, with whom I was not acquainted, who has lost his life, and another of whom I knew something (Colonel Blair). Who is there that does not recollect his frank, amiable, and manly countenance? I doubt whether there were any men on either side of the House who were more capable of fixing the goodwill and affection of those with whom they were associated. Well, but the place that knew him shall know him no more for ever. I have specified but two; but there are 100 officers who have been killed in battle, or who have died of their wounds; forty have died of disease; and more than 200 others have been wounded more or less severely. This has been a terribly destructive war for officers. They have been as one would have expected them to be, the first in valour as the first in place; they have suffered more in proportion to their numbers than the commonest soldiers in their ranks. This has spread sorrow over the whole country. I was in the House of Lords when the vote of thanks was moved. In the gallery were many ladies, three-fourths of whom were dressed in the deepest mourning. Is this nothing? And, in every village, cottages are to be found into which sorrow has entered, and, as I believe, through the policy of the Ministry, which might have been avoided. No one supposes that the Government wished to spread the pall of sorrow over the land; but this we had a right to expect, that they would, at least, with becoming gravity, discuss a subject the appalling consequences of which may come home to individuals and to the nation. I recollect when Sir Robert Peel made a speech on subjects which threatened hostilities with the United States. I recollect the gravity of his countenance, the solemnity of his tone, his whole demeanour showing that he felt, in his soul, the responsibility that rested on him. I have seen this, and I have seen the present Ministry. There was the buffoonery at the Reform Club. Was that becoming a matter of this grave nature? Has there been a solemnity of manner in the speeches heard in connection with this war—and have they become statesmen and Christian men speaking on a subject of this nature? It is very easy for the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton to rise and say, that I am against war under all circumstances; and that if an enemy were to land on our shores, I should make a calculation as to whether it would be cheaper to take him in or keep him out, and that my opinion on this question is not to be taken either by Parliament or the country. I am not afraid of discussing the war with the noble Lord on his own principles. I understand the blue books as well as he; and, leaving out all fantastic and visionary notions about what will become of us if something is not done to destroy or to cripple Russia—I say—and I say it with as much confidence as I ever said anything in my life—that the war cannot be justified out of these documents; and impartial history will teach this to posterity if we do not now comprehend it. I am not, nor did I ever pretend to be a statesman; and that character is so tainted and so equivocal in our day, that I am not sure that a pure and honourable ambition would aspire to it. I have not enjoyed for thirty years, like those noble Lords, the honours and emoluments of office. I have not set my sails to every passing breeze. I am a plain and simple citizen, sent here by one of the foremost constituencies of the empire, representing feebly, perhaps, but honestly, I dare aver, the opinions of very many, and the true interests of all those who have sent me here; let it not be said that I am alone in my condemnation of this war, and of this incapable and guilty Administration. And, even if I were alone, if my voice were the solitary one raised amid the din of arms and the clamours of a venal press, I should have the consolation I have to-night—and which I trust will be mine to the last moment of my existence—the priceless consolation, that no word of mine has tended to promote the squandering of my country's treasure, or the spilling of one single drop of my country's blood.

Question put,

The House *divided*:—Ayes 173; Noes 135: Majority 38.

List of the AYES.

A'Court, C. H. W.
Acton, J.
Adair, H. E.
Anderson, Sir J.
Atherton, W.
Baines, rt. hon. M. T.
Baring, rt. hn. Sir F. T.
Barnes, T.
Berkeley, hon. H. F.
Bethell, Sir R.
Biggs, W.
Blackett, J. F. B.
Bonham-Carter, J.
Brady, J.
Bramston, T. W.
Brocklehurst, J.
Brockman, E. D.
Brotherton, J.
Bruce, Lord E.
Cardwell, rt. hon. E.
Caulfield, Col. J. M.
Chambers, T.
Cheetham, J.
Clay, Sir W.
Clinton, Lord R.
Cockburn, Sir A. J. E.
Coffin, W.
Cogan, W. H. F.
Collier, R. P.
Cowan, C.
Cowper, hon. W. F.
Davie, Sir H. R. F.
Dent, J. D.
Divett, E.
Drumlanrig, Visct.
Duke, Sir J.
Duncan, G.
Ebrington, Visct.
Elcho, Lord
Ellice, rt. hon. E.
Elliot, hon. J. E.
Esmonde, J.
Euston, Earl of
Ewart, W.
Fagan, W.
Feilden, M. J.
Ferguson, Col.
Ferguson, J.
FitzGerald, Sir J.
Fitzgerald, J. D.
Fitzroy, hon. H.
Forster, C.
Forster, J.
Fortescue, C. S.
Fox, W. G.
Freestun, Col.
French, F.
Freshfield, J. W.
Gladstone, rt. hon. W.
Goodman, Sir G.
Gordon, hon. A.
Gower, hon. F. L.
Grace, O. D. J.
Graham, rt. hon. Sir J.
Greene, J.
Greene, T.
Gregson, S.
Grenfell, C. W.
Grey, rt. hon. Sir G.
Grey, R. W.
Grosvenor, Lord R.
Hall, Sir B.
Hankey, T.
Harcourt, G. G.
Hardinge, hon. C. S.
Hastie, Arch.
Herbert, rt. hon. S.
Hervey, Lord A.
Heywood, J.
Hogg, Sir J. W.
Howard, hon. C. W. G.
Howard, Lord E.
Hughes, W. B.
Hutchins, E. J.
Hutt, W.
Ingham, R.
Jackson, W.
Jermyn, Earl
Keating, R.
Keogh, W.
Kershaw, J.
King, hon. P. J. L.
Kinnaird, hon. A. F.
Labouchere, rt. hon. L.
Laing, S.
Langton, H. G.
Lee, W.
Lindsay, W. S.
Locke, J.
Loveden, P.
Lowe, R.
Luce, T.
Mackinnon, W. A.
Mangles, R. D.
Manners, Lord G.
Marjoribanks, D. C.
Martin, J.
Massey, W. N.
Matheson, Sir J.
Milligan, R.
Mills, T.
Milner, W. M. E.
Milnes, R. M.
Mitchell, T. A.
Molesworth, rt. hn. Sir W.
Moncrieff, J.
Monsell, W.
Mostyn, hn. T. E. M. L.
Mowatt, F.
Mulgrave, Earl of
O'Brien, P.
O'Brien, J.
O'Connell, D.
O'Connell, J.
Osborne, R.
Owen, Sir J.
Paget, Lord A.
Palmerston, Visct.
Paxton, Sir J.
Pechell, Sir G. B.
Peel, F.
Peel, Gen.
Pellatt, A.
Perry, Sir T. E.
Phillipps, J. H.
Phillimore, R. J.
Phinn, T.
Pilkington, J.
Pinney, W.
Price, Sir R.
Price, W. P.
Reed, J. H.
Ricardo, O.
Richardson, J. J.
Robartes, T. J. A.
Russell, Lord J.
Russell, F. C. H.
Russell, F. W.
Sadleir, J.
Sawle, C. B. G.
Scholefield, W.
Scrope, G. P.
Scully, F.
Scully, V.
Seymour, H. D.
Seymour, W. D.
Seymour, W. D.
Smith, J. A.
Smith, rt. hon. R. V.
Steel, J.
Thornely, T.
Walter, J.
Warner, E.
Watson, W. H.
Whitbread, S.
Wickham, H. W.
Wilkinson, W. A.
Williams, W.
Wilson, J.
Wood, rt. hon. Sir C.
Wrightson, W. B.
Wyvill, M.
Young, rt. hon. Sir J.

TELLERS.

Hayter, rt. hon. W. G.
Berkeley, C. G.

List of the NOES.

Alexander, J.
Arbuthnott, hon. Gen.
Archdall, Capt. M.
Ball, E.
Bankes, rt. hon. G.
Baring, T.
Bennet, P.
Bentinck, G. W. P.
Beresford, rt. hon. W.
Boldero, Col.
Booker, T. W.
Bright, J.
Buller, Sir J. Y.
Bunbury, W. B. M'C.
Burghley, Lord
Butt, G. M.
Butt, I.
Cecil, Lord R.
Chambers, M.
Chelsea, Visct.
Christopher, rt. hn. R. A.
Clinton, Lord C. P.
Cobbett, J. M.
Cobbold, J. C.
Cobden, R.
Cocks, T. S.
Coles, H. B.
Conolly, T.
Corry, rt. hon. H. L.
Deedes, W.
Dering, Sir E.
Disraeli, rt. hon. B.
Drax, J. S. W. S. E.
Duncombe, hon. A.
Duncombe, hon. W. E.
Dunne, Col.
Egerton, W. T.
Egerton, E. C.
Evelyn, W. J.
Farnham, E. B.
Farrer, J.
Floyer, J.
Follett, B. S.
Forester, rt. hon. Col.
Frewen, C. H.
Gaskell, J. M.
George, J.
Gibson, rt. hon. T. M.
Graham, Lord M. W.
Grogan, E.
Guinness, R. S.
Hadfield, G.
Hall, Gen.
Hamilton, G. A.
Hamilton, J. H.
Hanbury, hon. C. S. B.
Harcourt, Col.
Henley, rt. hon. J. W.
Herbert, Sir T.
Hildyard, R. B.
Hotham, Lord
Hudson, G.
Hume, W. F.
Jolliffe, Sir W. G. H.

Kelly, Sir F.
Kendall, N.
Kennedy, T.
Kerrison, Sir E. C.
King, J. K.
Knightley, R.
Knox, Col.
Knox, hon. W. S.
Lacon, Sir E.
Langston, W. G.
Laurie, J.
Lennox, Lord A. F.
Lennox, Lord H. G.
Lockhart, W.
Lytton, Sir G. E. L. B.
Macartney, G.
MacGregor, J.
M'Mahon, P.
Maddock, Sir H.
Malins, R.
March, Earl of
Meux, Sir H.
Miles, W.
Michell, W.
Montgomery, H. L.
Mowbray, J. R.
Naas, Lord
Napier, rt. hon. J.
Newdegate, C. N.
Noel, hon. G. J.
North, Col.
Oakes, J. H. P.
Packe, C. W.
Pakington, rt. hn. Sir J.
Parker, R. T.
Phillimore, J. G.
Rolt, P.
Sandars, G.
Scott, hon. F.
Seymer, H. K.
Shirley, E. P.
Sibthorp, Col.
Smijth, Sir W.
Smith, J. B.
Smith, A.
Spooner, R.
Stanhope, J. B.
Stanley, Lord
Stuart, W.
Sturt, H. G.
Swift, R.
Tollemache, J.
Tyler, Sir G.
Tyrell, Sir J. T.
Vance, J.
Verner, Sir W.
Villiers, hon. F.
Vyvyan, Sir R. R.
Vyse, Col.
Waddington, D.
Walcott, Adml.
Walpole, rt. hon. S. H.
Walsh, Sir J. B.
Welby, Sir G. E.
Whiteside, J.
Whitmore, H.
Williams, T. P.
Willoughby, Sir H.
Wyndham, Gen.
Wyndham, H.
Yorke, hon. E. T.

TELLERS.

Taylor, Col.
Mandeville, Visct.

Main Question put, and *agreed to.*

Bill read 3°.

On the Question that the Bill do pass,

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL said, he wished to propose to substitute the following clause for Clause 2—

"Provided always, that the men serving under this Act shall not be employed in the United Kingdom except for the purpose of being trained, arrayed, and formed into regiments, battalions, or corps for foreign service, and except such bodies of reserve as may be kept in the United Kingdom, and which shall be kept and used solely for the purpose of training and arraying recruits, and for supplying vacancies in such regiments, battalions, or corps; and the men serving under this Act shall not be billeted or quartered on any person or persons; and that there shall not be within the United Kingdom more in the whole than 10,000 men serving under this Act at any one time."

THE EARL OF MARCH said, he gathered from the proposed clause of the hon. and learned Solicitor General that it was not intended under the Bill to billet or quarter these men on any person or persons, and that this new clause was introduced in order to prevent its taking place. If the hon. and learned Gentleman meant to preserve the clause in its present shape, then he (the Earl of March) would like to know how the Government contemplated moving the troops from one part of the country to another? For instance, supposing there were among these foreigners a regiment of cavalry quartered in Dorchester barracks, how would he get them to a port of embarkation without billeting them on the road? Or, in the event of a body of infantry being stationed at some distance from the sea coast in the interior of the country, and, on being marched to the port of embarkation, finding the vessel in which they were to sail not ready, or the weather so unfavourable as to render it impossible to get on board, how were they to be fed unless a power existed to billet or quarter them in the town?

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT said, that as these men were not intended to be used in this country in the same way as our own troops, and would not therefore be, like them, moved about from place to place, the difficulty he contemplated would not occur.

MR. MILES said, the men must be marched to the coast, and possibly might have to march for three or four days, and he wanted to know how these men were to be kept without billeting during that time?

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL said, that the words billeting or quartering were very well understood. There were certain clauses in existing Acts of Parliament by which inhabitants of houses were compelled to receive soldiers into them; but under the present clause those parties would not be liable with respect to those foreigners.

COLONEL SIBTHORP said, he considered the clause an absurdity. If those men were not billeted in certain houses, under proper regulations, they would be let loose upon the community. He had had experience of foreign troops, and, if they were to be let loose on the wide world, where was the purity, where was the protection, that would be enjoyed by that portion of the community on whom we all looked with respect and affection—he meant the female portion? He would suggest that these foreign troops should be billeted in Downing Street, and in that case he advised the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) to take care of his cellars. All he could say was, that he wished he had the drilling of the Treasury Bench. He believed they would be a very awkward squad, but he would make them do their duty.

THE EARL OF MARCH said, he was not satisfied with the answer of the right hon. Secretary at War. If this clause remained in its present shape, these troops must be trained within one day's march from the port of embarkation. If not, it would be impossible to get them to the port where it was intended to ship them.

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT said, the noble Lord had only to look at the map of England to see that the railways did away with the question of one or two days' march to the port of embarkation.

Mr. BANKES said, he approved of the clause, but he thought it was desirable that the Bill should be very clear on the subject of billeting.

Clause *agreed to*, and added to the Bill.

Mr. LOCKE KING said, he would now beg to move that the following clause be added to the Bill—

> "Provided that no officer serving under this Act, when reduced, shall be entitled to receive half pay; provided nevertheless, that when any such officer shall be rendered incapable of military service by wounds or infirmities contracted while discharging his military duty during the period of his continuing to serve as such officer under the provisions of this Act, then and in such case it shall be lawful for Her Majesty to make such provision out of any funds granted by Parliament for such officer as She shall think proper and necessary, so that such provision shall in no case exceed the half-pay of the rank in the British service, similar to that which such officer shall have held at the time of his becoming so incapable as aforesaid."

Mr. SPEAKER said, he would suggest that the words "out of any such funds granted by Parliament" should be inserted in the clause.

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT said, that Government had no intention of granting half-pay.

Lord JOHN RUSSELL said, he should not object to the clause.

Clause *agreed to*, and added to the Bill.

Mr. J. G. PHILLIMORE said, he wished to move that the following Proviso should be added to Clause 4—

> "Provided always, that at least one-third of the officers of the said 10,000 men shall be British subjects, and that none of the said 10,000 men shall remain in this kingdom above one year from the time when they shall be enlisted under the provisions of this Act."

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT said, he must object to the Proviso. It would be highly inconvenient to lay down beforehand the strict number of officers. He also could not agree with the latter portion of the Proviso.

Question, "That those words be there added," put, and *negatived*.

Mr PACKE moved as an Amendment to the 5th Clause the following words—

> "This Act shall continue in force until the end of the next Session of Parliament, or until one year after the ratification of a definitive treaty of peace, if such treaty shall have been sooner concluded; provided, that the expiration of this Act shall in no way affect the service of each foreigner who shall have enlisted before this Act shall expire."

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT said, he objected to the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Bill *passed.*

The House adjourned at Two o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Saturday, Dec. 23, 1854.

MINUTES.] ROYAL ASSENT.—Militia; Enlistment of Foreigners.

Their Lordships met, and, having gone through the business on the paper,

House adjourned to Tuesday, the 23rd of January next.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Saturday, Dec. 23, 1854.

MINUTES.] NEW WRIT.—For Sunderland, *v.* William Digby Seymour, Esquire, Recorder of Newcastle-upon-Tyne.

The House met, and having transacted the business on the paper,

House adjourned at half after Two o'clock, till *Tuesday*, 23rd January.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Tuesday, January 23, 1855,

THE VOTE OF THANKS—THE NAVY.

The LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House, That he had received the following Letter from Vice Admiral James Whitley Deans Dundas, in return to the Thanks of this House communicated to him by The Lord Chancellor in obedience to an Order of this House, of the 15th of December, 1854—

> "*Britannia*, at Malta, 6th January, 1855.
>
> "My Lord—I have had the Honour this Day to receive your Letter, dated the 18th ultimo, transmitting the Resolutions of the House of Lords expressive of the high Sense it entertains of the valuable Services rendered by myself, and by the Officers, Seamen, and Marines in the Fleet lately under my command:

"Having on the 31st ultimo transferred my Command to Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, I have transmitted Copies of your Letter to me, and of the Resolutions of the House of Lords, to be made known to the several Officers who were serving under me:

"I have also, in obedience to the Orders of the House, forwarded to Admiral Hamelin the Resolution thanking that Officer and the French Navy for their cordial Co-operation in the various Services in which the combined Fleets have been engaged; and as Admiral Hamelin has also transferred his Command, I have sent Copies to Vice-Admiral Bruat for Communication to the French Navy:

"The high Honour and Distinction the House of Lords has thus been pleased to confer on myself, the Officers, Seamen, and Marines of the Fleet lately under my Command, will be received by all with deep Gratitude and Respect; and I have to beg your Lordship will be pleased to accept my sincere Thanks for the generous Terms in which you have conveyed to me the Resolutions of the House.

"I have the Honour to be,
"My Lord,
"Your Lordship's most obedient humble Servant,
"J. W. D. Dundas,
"Vice-Admiral."

The same being read, was Ordered to lie on the Table; and to be entered on the Journals.

THE CRIMEAN MEDAL—THE BATTLE AT BALAKLAVA.

The Duke of RICHMOND: My Lords, in pursuance of a notice which I gave to my noble Friend the Minister for the War Department, and which I gave privately, because the House was not sitting, and I could not place it on the Votes, I rise to move for a copy of the order which has been issued from the War Office, granting a medal to the army in the Crimea. I call your Lordships' attention to the subject, because, while I am quite sure that the soldiers in the Crimea will feel grateful to Her Majesty for having given a Crimean medal with clasps for Alma and Inkerman, I also think that when Her Majesty's Government gave clasps for those two splendid victories they did not go far enough, when they omitted to recognise in the same manner the victory at Balaklava. If your Lordships will refer to Lord Raglan's despatch—and he must be a competent judge of the conduct of the troops there engaged—you will see that he states that the conduct of the 93rd Highlanders, in repulsing, in single line, an attack of a large body of Russian cavalry, was most meritorious; and, if we consider the conduct of the heavy brigade of cavalry, overmatched by numbers as they were, it is impossible to praise it too highly. And, my Lords, we ought never to forget the splendid conduct of that heroic and devoted band, the light cavalry, under the command of my noble Friend (the Earl of Cardigan), whom I am glad to see again in his place. When we see what the conduct of those heroic cavalry soldiers was, when they were sent to do what they knew it was utterly impossible for them satisfactorily to carry out—when we consider that those men, surrounded by a large body of Russian cavalry—hemmed in by infantry—swept from the field by continuous discharges of grape from the enemy's batteries—still retired, as we have learned from Lord Raglan's despatch, in good order, and cut their way back to their comrades, surely, my Lords, no man can say that Balaklava was not a victory. Did not the Russians attempt to turn our flank—did they not attempt to raise the siege of Sebastopol? and if it had not been for the gallant bearing and heroic conduct of the soldiers there engaged the siege of Sebastopol would have been raised. Will not the people of this country, who speak so much of the gratitude which they feel to their soldiers, say that the army there engaged, both infantry and cavalry, have the strongest claim to a clasp with Balaklava inscribed upon it? I know very well that up to a very late period medals were not given for actions such as those I have described; but in recent times we can refer to few actions such as this. My Lords, formerly, in the late war, Parliament and the country were satisfied if they gave ribands and stars to the commanding officers of regiments, and to commanding officers of the army; but, I am happy to say, that that system is entirely exploded now. I wish to ask my noble Friend (the Duke of Newcastle) on what ground it is that he has not given a clasp for Balaklava? and I will ask him, also, whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to give the Crimean medal to the sailors who have landed with the troops, and who have lightened and shared in the dangers, and participated in the victories, in the Crimea? I cannot understand why a private gunner in the Royal Artillery, working in a battery, should get a medal for his conduct at one gun, and that the man at the next gun, subject to the same privations and dangers, should not get the medal for equally good conduct, because he wears the blue jacket of a sailor. When men are doing equal duty, and rearing their laurels from the same stem, why should there be one rule for the one, and a different rule for the other? It is not necessary for me to detain your Lordships by describing the great value which the soldiers and sailors of England attach to medals given for actions in which they have distinguished themselves. I believe it is admitted now by all that they do value these testimonials of their country's and of Parliament's gratitude. What is the use to a private soldier of a Vote of Thanks of Parliament? It must be very gratifying to him, when he reads the paper signed by my noble and learned Friend on the woolsack, conveying the thanks of Parliament. It may do very well so long as that man remains in that ship or in that regiment; but if a man is wounded and comes home, or when he goes back to his native village and to his cottage, he speaks of the dangers he has undergone and the triumphs he has achieved, he has nothing—if he be without a medal—to show that he was present in those actions. The object of the medal is to remedy that want, so that on his return to his domestic hearth he may be able to show with pride upon his breast the mark that he had done some good service for his country. I object also that Her Majesty's Government do not give the medal to the representatives of those who have fallen in action. I think there can be no reason against it. Formerly there was this reason—you delayed so long the giving of it to the Peninsular and old war officers and sailors, that there was great difficulty in finding out who were the persons entitled to receive it as representatives. But now will there, I ask, be more difficulty in finding out the representatives who are entitled to receive the war medals than there is in finding out the persons who are entitled to receive a portion of that Patriotic Fund which has been so properly started by Her Majesty—a fund which does credit to the people of England from the way in which they have subscribed to it. I think, however, that it should be a tax on the country at large; for I do not see why you should ask the good, generous, and liberal people of England to subscribe; for you know well that the peacemongers, be they few or many, have made their dislike to war an excuse for not subscribing to this fund. If you can find the representatives of those who have fallen, or who shall fall, in the Crimea, and when you are giving to those representatives relief in money, there is no reason why you should not find them out for the purpose of conferring on them the honour of the medal. I must apologise to your Lordships for bringing the subject before the House; but I feel most deeply the justice of the case of those people that I have now ventured to allude to. I will venture to say this—that in no part of our history has there been an occasion on which the gratitude of the country ought to be more called into action than the present one, when our brave men have acted so nobly, amidst great dangers and under great privations—the necessity for which I stop not to inquire into, though every man must admit that the privations have been of no ordinary character. If any man should come into the House at the present moment, he would think that I was asking for a large grant of public money to reward those brave and heroic men; and I am only asking you to give them a clasp in order that when they shall come home to the domestic hearth, they may show a clasp in attestation of their services to their country. I move, therefore—

> "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for, Return of a General Order of the Horse Guards of the 15th December last, granting a Medal for the Campaign in the Crimea, with Clasps for the Battles of Alma and Inkerman."

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: My Lords, the noble and gallant Duke has apologised to your Lordships for bringing this subject under your notice; but, I am sure your Lordships will feel that no apology was necessary on the part of my noble Friend for bringing forward this subject. On the contrary, I am sure that every one of your Lordships, as well as every one out of doors, feels the greatest interest in a subject that involves rewards and honours to those gallant men who are fighting our battles in the Crimea. I am sure there is no person more aware than my noble Friend of the difficulty of exercising an accurate and nice definition in the distribution of such honours as those to which he refers—namely, the giving of clasps for actions. He would not, I am sure, think it would be right, throughout a long war or a protracted campaign, that clasps should be given for every engagement, however gallant, that might occur. I believe, that although no general rule has been absolutely laid down, yet the general practice has been that clasps should be given for general actions when those general actions have led to a victory. There can be no doubt that Alma and Inkerman come within that category; but I feel there is some doubt with regard to the action at Balaklava, though there can be no doubt that every man engaged in that battle is as fully entitled to reward and honour as any man who took part in the other battles to which I have referred. There might be a doubt with reference to Balaklava on the ground I have mentioned; but Her Majesty feels that if there be a doubt, that doubt should be resolved in favour of men who have so greatly distinguished themselves, and She has directed that a clasp shall be given for the action at Balaklava. I trust it may not be considered that the Government or the military authorities are about to depart from the rule to which I have referred by granting this clasp; but certainly I do feel, after the comments that have been made on that action, and the few words that fell from my noble Friend himself in calling attention to the subject, that it would be ungracious and undesirable on every account that this reward should be withheld from these gallant men. I say with the greatest confidence, that in all the records of our battles—whether fought by large numbers or small—there is no battle in which British troops have been engaged in which greater gallantry and self-devotion have been exhibited, than were displayed by officers and men, cavalry and infantry, who were engaged at Balaklava. Having disposed of the first part of the observations of my noble Friend, I shall now come to the second part, in which he called attention to some supposed defect in reference to the mode of granting the Crimean medal. I do not know whether the misapprehension in the mind of my noble Friend has arisen from the despatch which I wrote to Lord Raglan, but undoubtedly it was never intended that the Crimean medal should be confined exclusively to the soldiers engaged in those battles, nor was it even intended that it should be confined to the sailors who were engaged in manning the guns. Her Majesty feels, in giving the Crimean medal, that the Navy is as justly entitled to that reward as the army. No doubt the navy has not participated in all the hard-fought actions that took place, but they have participated in great dangers, and have rendered the most valuable assistance on every occasion to the troops that were engaged. Under these circumstances, it has been always intended—and if there has been any misapprehension on the subject I thank my noble Friend for affording me this opportunity of correcting it—that the medal for the Crimea should be given not only to all the officers and soldiers, but to all the officers and sailors who have been engaged in that part of the world. As to the third point to which my noble Friend has referred, here again I am able to meet his observations in the spirit in which he offered them. My Lords, I entirely agree with my noble Friend, that if the families of those who have fallen in these engagements can derive consolation—and no doubt they will derive consolation—from the circumstance of possessing a medal which would have belonged, if they had lived, to their gallant relatives, it is right indeed that the country should afford it to them. My noble Friend has rightly said this evening that, as the system heretofore has been, medals have been granted so long after the service for which they have been conferred that it has been impossible to give those medals to the representatives of those who have fallen, because it would be impossible in very many instances to ascertain them. The same difficulty does not exist now, and a new precedent may be made, which I believe to be a sound and good one. In giving this medal Her Majesty's Government think that this wholesale innovation may be introduced, and we propose that the medals shall be given to the representatives of the officers and soldiers, and officers and sailors, who have fallen, or who may fall, in the various actions. My noble Friend will see that to render this boon of value and of practical effect it is absolutely necessary that the name should be engraved upon the rim of the medal. When first the medal for the Crimea was ordered, I had hoped that by dispensing with this usual form we should have gained the great advantage of sending out these medals to the brave troops who are fighting for their country at a much earlier period than we could send them out if the name were engraved on the rim of the medal. I hope this explanation may suffice; and if, for the purpose of carrying out the object more effectively, some two, three, or four months may elapse before the medals, which are very numerous, can be completed, I hope those to whom they are granted will feel that we have not been neglectful in the matter. I hope they will feel that it is the impossibility of completing them that has caused the delay, and I hope, also, that I have satisfied my noble Friend.

When the country recollects the services that have been rendered, I am confident it will approve of the determination of the Government which I have now the pleasure to announce to your Lordships.

THE EARL OF HARDWICKE said, that nothing could be more satisfactory than the speech just delivered by his noble Friend (the Duke of Newcastle), nor could anything be more liberal; indeed, in his view, it was almost of too liberal a character. He was about to make what he hoped would not be considered an unpopular speech, because, with reference to his own profession, he desired to be as popular as possible; but, in his opinion, in order to make a decoration of honour satisfactory to the wearer, it must be earned in some way or other, so that he might be able to give a creditable answer to any one who questioned him about it. He did not know anything which would so degrade him in his own opinion as to be the wearer of a decoration when he felt conscious that he had not earned it; and if the medals in question were to be given, as he understood they were, to the officers and seamen who had merely served in the Black Sea, he was perfectly certain, from his knowledge of the high character of the officers of that profession of which he was a member, that such medals would not prove altogether acceptable. They felt desirous on all occasions, with reference to any honours which they might receive, that those honours should be fairly won; and in his (the Earl of Hardwicke's) belief an extreme liberality in their distribution was very likely to have a depreciating effect and to operate in a manner totally different to that which was intended. If they meant to make their honours valuable they must take care to give them to none but those who really deserved them; but if, on the contrary, they were to be distributed indiscriminately, they would in a great measure destroy the object they had in view in granting them. This was a matter of much importance. In this country, at all events, if not throughout the rest of Europe, honours and decorations received from the Sovereign had been held in the highest esteem; and why had they been so esteemed? Because they had been given to those alone who deserved them; he did not mean that those who had received them were deserving in a moral sense, but in the sense which was implied in the grant of a medal or decoration—namely, that they had enacted great deeds for which their country was desirous of bestowing honours upon them. He believed that up to this time the honours which had been bestowed upon the military portion of the service had been invariably bestowed upon those only who had been under fire, except in those cases in general actions in which there had been a reserve. In such instances he believed medals or honours had been distributed; and very properly so; for, in his opinion, when a reserve, by a strict obedience to the orders it had received, and the faithful performance of its allotted duties, had been instrumental in the attainment of a great victory, it was as deserving of honours and decorations as any other part of the army. He begged, however, to impress upon his noble Friend, although he might be justly anxious to render honour where it was due, to adopt that course of judicious discrimination which could alone render the honour valuable.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH: My Lords, the point to which my noble Friend has called the attention of the noble Duke is one of great importance. At a time when it is intended to extend the grant of medals, it is well we should truly understand on what principle we are proceeding. It so happened that I had to distribute nearly 60,000 medals for good services performed in India, and I acted upon one strict principle, which I would earnestly recommend for the adoption of the Government—I held it to be wrong to give any medal unless for distinguished service actually performed under the fire of the enemy. My Lords, that principle has not always been acted upon. I know that men have received medals because they happened to belong to corps which had contributed to the general success by the position which they occupied; but I think that is a very false, a most erroneous, and a deceptive system. When we see a man wearing a medal, the meaning conveyed to our mind is, that that man has done good service under fire. For my part, I never see a man wearing a medal without coming to that conclusion, and feeling disposed to give him my respect;—but how can that feeling be entertained if men receive medals who were never under fire at all? Every pecuniary advantage—every other advantage—that can be bestowed on men who have a just claim, from having contributed to success by the position they occupied, or by having done all they could to engage the enemy—should be given by the Government, but never that medal which should be always the mark for good service actually performed under fire; and I must earnestly recommend the adoption of that principle to Her Majesty's Government. I rejoice that the clasps are at length conceded for the action at Balaklava. I rejoice to hear also that they are to be granted to the seamen;—but I think the noble Duke who made the Motion adverted only to the General Order proceeding from the Horse Guards, which of course could not include seamen. I have seen no corresponding Order from the Board of Admiralty, and I do not think that the claims of the seamen in the batteries—the strongest of all—have yet been noticed by the Board of Admiralty. I entertain the strongest doubt about giving the Crimean medal to all the men engaged in the ships in the Black Sea. I look so strictly to this matter that I would hesitate very much how I gave medals indiscriminately even to all the seamen who were engaged in the attack of the 17th of October. I should get strict information as to the conduct of the men before I would do so, because I would wish to give the medal most strictly according to the rule I have laid down. I am glad the medals are now to be given. I cannot say how much I regret there was ever any hesitation on the subject. What soldiers and sailors love, is promptitude in rewarding their services. They are of all men the most sensitive. Honour to them is life. Life without honour is to them not worth having. The only thing they desire is personal distinction. It is for this they rush into action, as did the men who fought at Balaklava, and enacted deeds of arms for which I can scarcely find a parallel in history. I can find a parallel for the deeds at Alma, great as they were; I can find a parallel for the deeds enacted at Inkerman, still more remarkable as those deeds were; but I do not see where I can find a parallel for the deeds performed at Balaklava. Cavalry have charged guns before; cavalry have charged infantry before; cavalry have charged cavalry before; but I know not the instance, though there may be such, in which cavalry have charged cavalry, infantry, and artillery, at one and the same time, belonging to a powerful army in position. I never heard of such a thing, and I do not believe that there exists such a thing in history. Why did it not occur to the noble Duke that to reward the army as it should be rewarded, the medal for Balaklava should be instantaneous? When Curtius threw himself armed into the gulf in order by the sacrifice of himself to promote the future glory of his country, he did not enact or do a deed of more desperate fidelity. He did not do an act of more absolute self-devotion than was performed by the light cavalry at Balaklava when they obeyed the order to charge. And let me not forget that noble regiment, the 93rd, who were under that gallant officer Sir Colin Campbell on that occasion. They justly felt confidence in that officer—one of the very first officers we have—an officer who had the entire confidence of the late Sir Charles Napier for more than ten years, who I believe had designated him on his deathbed for that command in the army which I trust he will hold. I say that they justly felt confidence in that officer, and he justly felt confidence in them; and it was that mutual confidence, and that mutual confidence alone, which enabled them to receive the charge of that mass of cavalry in that one single red line —which has so often secured the victory. My Lords, I will say no more; but I cannot, I assure your Lordships, express the pain with which I have witnessed the delay that has occurred in granting this honour. It does not look well that there should be a doubt upon the subject. It does not look well that the communication of the concession should be deferred until the noble Duke (the Duke of Richmond) moved for the General Order in this House and drew public attention to it. It is not well, also, that the medal for the great services at the Cape of Good Hope should have been deferred until the noble Duke again and again put a question upon the subject in this House. Still more strange is it that an occurrence which took place months ago should not have been made known until after the death of Sir George Cathcart. I will say no more at present, except to express my hope that hereafter Ministers will look thoroughly into every circumstance connected with every particular action, and that they will form their opinions on just and deliberate grounds, and at once grant the honours they judge fit to be awarded.

THE DUKE OF RICHMOND: My Lords, I have duly seen the general order from the Horse Guards, and I have not seen any order from the Board of Admiralty. Although there may have been one from the Board, I have not seen it, and therefore I thought it right to bring the subject under the notice of your Lordships; for I believe that the Royal Marines and the seamen who landed in the Crimea have well deserved the honours that are to be conferred on them. With respect to what has fallen from my noble Friend behind me (the Earl of Hardwicke), I must say that I do not wish that any medal should be given to any man unless he has been engaged in active warfare with the enemy. I was never an advocate for the bestowal of medals on the principle upon which they were given on the occasion of the battle of Waterloo; and I am of opinion that the indiscriminate way in which they were then bestowed was one reason why public opinion has not gone with me since with respect to the distribution of medals. There were some 15,000 men on the road, who were not actually engaged, who did not know that the battle of Waterloo was fought until the next morning, and yet these men got the Waterloo medal. The men who received medals should have been in position, or should have been exposed to fire, or should have been in a general action. There was one regiment at Waterloo, commanded by a general officer lately deceased, of which a certain number of the men belonging to one of the battalions were sent to the rear with the wounded, and who did not come back again that evening. They were brave men, but their commanding officer knew that after they had taken the wounded men to the rear where the baggage was, they amused themselves by looking into it. The officer ordered an inquiry, and it is on record, and I do not wish to mention the regiment; but in that battalion there were sixteen or seventeen men whom the court of inquiry awarded had not given sufficient reasons for their absence from duty, and therefore those men did not get the medal. When one calls into consideration what has been done by the army in the Crimea, it is self-evident that every man there has nobly done his duty. When it is remembered that there were six to one against them, every person feels satisfied that they have all deserved well of their country. My Lords, I will either move for these returns, or I will withdraw my Motion, after my noble Friend's speech; or I will now move for the order issued by the Horse Guards, and on a future occasion move for any order of a similar nature which may have been issued by the Board of Admiralty.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: Under the circumstances, perhaps, the better course for my noble Friend to propose would be, to postpone the latter Motion to a future day.

Motion *agreed to.*

House adjourned to Thursday next.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Tuesday, January 23, 1855.

MINUTES.] NEW MEMBERS SWORN.—For Maldon, George Montagu Warren Peacocke, esq.; for Norwich, Sir Samuel Bignold.

PUBLIC BILLS.—1° Nuisances Removal and Diseases Prevention Acts Consolidation and Amendment.

THE WAR WITH RUSSIA—THE NEGOTIATIONS—QUESTION.

TREATY OF DECEMBER 2ND—THE FOUR POINTS.

MR. LAYARD wished to inquire of the noble Lord the President of the Council whether he had any objection to lay on the table of the House the correspondence which had taken place with foreign Powers, relating to the treaty of the 2nd December, 1854, and especially any document communicated to the Russian Government, containing the interpretation placed by the English Government and that of France on "the four points," not for negotiation but for acceptance?

LORD JOHN RUSSELL: I cannot at present say whether it is possible to lay on the table any of the correspondence to which my hon. Friend refers. As regards the correspondence generally, I wish to say that it would not be usual, nor for the convenience of the public service under present circumstances, to lay it on the table; but there may be one of those papers which it may be possible to lay on the table, and I will consider that point before I give a final answer. Perhaps, as my hon. Friend has asked this question, I may state generally what has occurred with respect to "the four points," and in what state that question stands at present. At the end of November the Russian Government, through their Minister at Vienna, declared their acceptance of what are called the four points; and on the 2nd of December a treaty was signed between France, England, and Austria. On the 28th of December a meeting was held by the Ministers of France, England, and Austria, at Vienna, with Prince Gortchakoff, the Minister of Russia. At that meeting the French Minister read, on the part of England and Austria, as well as his own Government, the interpretation which the three Powers had put on the four points which were to be considered as the basis of negotiation. I will mention only that, with respect to the third point, it was proposed by that interpretation to put an end to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. Prince Gortchakoff stated that he would not agree to this interpretation, but that he would request further instructions from his Government. Ten days afterwards he informed Count Buol that he had received those instructions, and on the 7th or 8th of January another meeting was held at the office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, at Vienna. At that meeting Prince Gortchakoff read a memorandum, which he said he had received, containing the views of his Government. It was replied to by Count Buol, Lord Westmoreland, and Baron de Bourqueney, that they had no authority to receive any such memorandum, and that they must require, as the basis of negotiations, the consent of the Russian Plenipotentiary to the interpretation of which he had already received a note. The Russian Plenipotentiary, Lord Westmoreland states in his despatch, then withdrew the memorandum he had read, and declared his acceptance, on the part of his Government, of the communicated interpretation as the basis of negotiation. My hon. Friend will see that by that Act the Russian Plenipotentiary accepted this interpretation as the basis of negotiation, of course reserving to himself the power, when this basis shall have been laid down in a definite article, of making any observations on the part of his Government which he should think proper. The Government of Her Majesty have declared their readiness to enter into negotiations on this basis, but hitherto no full powers have been given to any Minister to negotiate.

SIR H. WILLOUGHBY wished to ask if the noble Lord opposite would consent to produce a copy of the protocol of the 28th December, explaining the four points laid down in the note of the 8th of August?

MR. LAYARD wished to know whether the House was to understand that negotiations were actually going on, or that they were suspended?

LORD JOHN RUSSELL: With respect to the question of the hon. Baronet, I beg to say that is a point I have reserved for consideration, and I doubt whether that protocol can now be laid on the table. As to the question last put to me, I beg to say that negotiations have not yet begun.

MR. BRIGHT understood the noble Lord to say that certain terms were offered to Russia, and that, after some deliberation, Russia had consented also to that one of the four points which had for its object to put an end to the predominance of Russia in the Black Sea. He hoped the noble Lord would not withdraw from that, and he wanted to know whether instructions were about to be sent out for the purpose of opening negotiations, as the noble Lord left the House to infer the contrary? Would, when a distinct proposition had been accepted, instructions for the prosecution of negotiations be sent out?

LORD JOHN RUSSELL: I have already stated that Her Majesty's Government have expressed their willingness to negotiate on those points, and I cannot state anything further at the present moment.

SOLDIERS IN HOSPITAL—QUESTION.

MR. STAFFORD wished to ask the Secretary at War whether any arrangement had been made by which wounded soldiers in the hospital at Scutari were enabled to transmit money from their pay to their friends and relatives at home?

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT said, instructions had been given to the paymasters so far back as last May to afford every assistance in their power for this object; and Lord Raglan was requested, with a view to give greater publicity to the facilities provided for the remittances of money, to issue a general order relative thereto. In September last, when depôts were formed at Scutari, instructions were issued to the paymasters, especially with the view of calling attention to the facilities existing, and having heard of remittance orders not being obtained, he sent out orders on the 27th of December last that the greatest care should be taken in order that the wishes of the soldiers might be complied with; that unnecessary forms should be dispensed with; and that the money they desired to remit should be sent to their relatives with promptitude.

SANITARY MEASURES—PUBLIC HEALTH ACT AMENDMENT.

SIR B. HALL then rose and expressed a hope that he should be excused for soliciting the attention of the House, as he was about to address them on a question of vast interest, and one of no little difficulty in respect to legislation. He proposed to introduce two Bills, both tending to the same object. It would be in the recollection of the House that towards the close of last Session a Bill was introduced for the purpose of continuing the system of the Board of Health, with certain modifications, and an intimation was given that a Select Committee would be moved for at an early period of the present Session for considering the manner in which the Act of 1848 had been carried out, and for determining what alterations should be made. The House of Commons, however, decided that the system should be put on an entirely new footing; and it was enacted that the department relating to the public health should be presided over by a Member responsible to that House. As he had accepted that responsibility, he did not consider it consistent with his duty merely to move for a Select Committee, and then leave the question wholly to that Committee; but he deemed it more convenient and more proper to bring in a Bill making such amendments of the Act of 1848 as he conceived to be advisable. Should it meet with so much favour from the House as to pass the second reading, he should then move that it, together with another Bill of which he had given notice, should be referred to a Select Committee in order that they both might be considered fully in detail by gentlemen practically acquainted with the operation of the law, from whom valuable suggestions might be expected. He thought he might ask for this assistance without fear of meeting with a refusal, for the subject was not one of a party character. If he considered that referring the Bills to a Select Committee would retard the accomplishment of sanitary improvement he should not ask the House to adopt that course, for he was most anxious that some measure on this subject should pass at a very early period of this Session, in order that, if it should please Providence to afflict the country again with such a pestilence as prevailed during last summer, such precautions might be adopted as legislative foresight could devise. The most convenient course for him to pursue would be to state briefly the origin of the present law, to point out its various defects, and show the manner in which he proposed to deal with them. He would not at the present moment say one word with respect to the necessity of some measure of sanitary reform, for that would be admitted on all hands; it would, however, be his duty to call attention to the various courses taken in reference to legislation and attempts at legislation on this subject. He found that various reports had been made to that House either by Committees or by Royal Commission on the question of sanitary improvement. In 1840 a Committee of that House sat, and made a valuable and useful report in favour of a similar proposition to the one he was now about to submit to the House. From 1840 to 1845 inclusive Commissions were appointed, and they made reports all in favour of the same object. It appeared also that the subject had been referred to in the Speech from the Throne in January, 1847, in November, of the same year, and in September, 1848. He would now notice the various attempts made to legislate on this subject. In 1845 a Bill was introduced, based on the principle of centralised Government authority, but so much objection was felt to it that it was found impracticable. In 1847 another Bill was framed, of a rather more liberal character; but, great powers being still retained by the Government, much objection to it was entertained, and the Bill was not proceeded with. He now came to another Bill, introduced, in 1848, by the Earl of Carlisle (then Lord Morpeth). It was introduced on the 8th of February, but did not become law until the 31st of August, in consequence of the great opposition given to it. That measure was to endure for five years, and to the end of the then next Session of Parliament, but no attempt was made by its promoters to renew it until the eve of its expiration. The Bill, as introduced, contained provisions of a most arbitrary character; but some alterations were made in it through the Committee. When the Act was first passed, the demands from various districts to have it applied to them were very numerous, but they rapidly fell off, as the Act became unpopular and difficult to work. From August, 1849, to December, 1849, there were nineteen applications; in the year 1850 they rose to sixty-six, but in 1851 they sank to thirty-six; in 1852, to thirty-seven; in 1853 they were twenty, and in 1854 they fell as low as nine. This showed that there was something wrong in the Act. The defects of the Act were unquestionably many, and he had therefore determined to apply to Parliament for an entirely new one. He proposed to repeal the existing Act altogether, retaining, however, those parts which were useful and inserting them in a remodelled form in the Bill which he should ask leave to introduce by the side of the new matter, in order to avoid the necessity of a perpetual reference to a repealed Statute. He had always thought the manner in which provision was made for the application of the Bill was very objectionable. At present, on a petition from one-tenth of the ratepayers the Board of Health had power to send down inspectors, and to take all the measures necessary for the application of the Act in places where there were defined boundaries and no local powers, without any reference to Parliament; but in places where there were no defined boundaries, and where there were local powers, the board had to apply the Act by provisional order, and to obtain the sanction of Parliament afterwards. He had always thought, too, that great delay took place in the application of the Act in consequence of the very complicated machinery which had to be set at work; but this he proposed very much to simplify. Another point which had been urged upon him very strongly was the inconvenience of the present system of giving several votes to one voter, and he proposed that, for the future, instead of one voter having, as he might now under Sturges Bourne's Act, any number of votes from one to six, each voter should have only one vote. Another grievance which had been greatly complained of, and which was, no doubt, often felt to be very galling, was, that local boards could not dismiss their surveyor, or appoint or dismiss their medical officer, without the permission of the General Board. During the time that he had held the office of President of the Board he had never interfered in these matters, because he was aware that if he had refused to sanction the dismissal of any officer the local board would easily have carried its point by stopping the supplies, when, of course, the official in question would cease to act. These clauses, therefore, had generally been nugatory, though in cases where attempts had been made to enforce them they had, no doubt, been found most galling. Another point was the limit at present placed to the borrowing powers of local authorities. There were many places which, though not wealthy, found it desirable to carry on great works, and at present they could only borrow money for such a purpose to the extent of one year's rateable value, and were obliged to repay the sum so borrowed in thirty years. He should propose to increase the capability of borrowing to the extent of two years' rateable value, and, while retaining thirty years as the general term for repayment, to give power to the Board of Health, under special circumstances, to extend it as far as fifty years. There was one most objectionable feature in the former Act, which had, no doubt, in some measure, impeded its successful working. Under the old system the General Board of Health appointed inspectors, who were sent down to places which petitioned for the application of the Act, to survey and to make reports, and these gentlemen were permitted also to give estimates for the construction of the works, and even, in some cases, to carry out the works themselves. He would show the House what were the consequences of such permissions, and then, perhaps, they would no longer be surprised to find that the Act had got into bad odour, for localities not unnaturally expected that when Government inspectors were sent down to make surveys and to prepare estimates, those estimates would, at least, be guarded. He would first read a list of the towns where the original inspection had been made, and the works ultimately carried out by the same inspector, contrasting, at the same time, the estimated and the actual cost. At Ashby-de-la-Zouch, the estimate was 6,500*l.*; the actual amount raised on loan, 8,000*l.* At Alnwick, the estimate was 6,500*l.*; the amount raised, 11,000*l.* At Croydon, there was no estimate, but the works cost 49,062*l.*, and much of the work had to be done over again. At Ormskirk, the estimate was 7,500*l.*; and the actual amount, 10,000*l.*; giving total estimates to the amount of 20,500*l.*, and actual cost, 29,000*l.* — a difference of nearly 9,000*l.* Next came towns where the works were carried on by an inspector who did not originally visit the town. At Launceston, for instance, the works were estimated by one inspector at 4,500*l.*, but they were carried out by another for 7,800*l.*; at Rugby, they were estimated at 11,609*l.*, and carried out for 18,000*l.*, making a difference in these two towns of more than 9,000*l.* between estimate and actual cost. These were towns where the works were now completed, but there were others where the works were still in progress, and in these, too, the difference was quite as great. First, with regard to cases where the towns had been inspected and the works carried on by the same inspector. At Berwick-on-Tweed, the estimate was 14,500*l.*, and 10,000*l.* had already been raised on loan; at Southampton, the estimate was 63,490*l.*, and the amount now raised, 60,000*l.*; at Burslem, the estimate was 11,300*l.*, and the amount raised, 14,589*l.*; at Epsom, a small town, the estimate was 7,012*l.*, and the amount raised 15,921*l.*; at Rotherham, the estimate was 18,009*l.*, and the amount raised, 30,500*l.*; at Selby, the estimate was 6,929*l.*, and the actual amount raised, 8,600*l.* — making a total amount of 121,240*l.* estimated cost, and 139,610*l.* expenses actually already incurred. The most remarkable instance, however, was that of Dover, where the town had been inspected by one inspector and the works carried out by another. In this case, the estimate was 16,500*l.*, and the actual cost incurred was 50,000*l.*—making a difference of 33,500*l.* He had only been able to find one case in which the cost of the works had been less than the estimate, and that was Knighton. Here the estimate was 2,700*l.*, and the cost of works, 2,100*l.* By the Act, however, of last Session, it was arranged that the inspectors were to be paid by salaries, and the inconveniences to which he had just alluded were therefore obviated. He had conceived it to be his first duty on entering office to carry out the decision of the House of Commons, and it was with this view that the following letter had been written to the gentlemen appointed to act as inspectors—

> "General Board of Health, Aug. 31, 1854.
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> "I am directed by Sir Benjamin Hall to say that he will appoint you as superintending inspector, and will recommend the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury to assign you a salary of 800*l.* per annum, commencing from this date. It must be distinctly understood that you do not, directly or indirectly, by yourself or by a partner, become engaged in any surveys, contracts, or works, and do not enter into any business or speculations during the time that you are connected with this department. The Act under which the appointments are made is limited in duration to one year, and until the end of the then next Session of Parliament; and you must not consider yourself entitled to have any claim upon Her Majesty's Treasury for compensation or otherwise in case your services should not be required beyond that period, when a reappointment, if approved by the then President, will be necessary. I am directed further to refer you to the section of the Act which relates to the appointment and dismissal of officers engaged by this Board."

In order, too, to carry out still further what he understood to be the intentions of the Legislature, he had looked through the various instructions given to the superintending inspectors, comprised in a volume of 300 folio pages, and he had had these compressed into such a shape that the inspectors could read them at the public meetings which they might have to attend. These were as follows—

> "The inspector is to show that there is no intention or desire on the part of the General Board of Health to force the application of the Act upon the district against the desire of the inhabitants. He will state that those ratepayers only who will derive direct advantage from the works will be charged with the cost of such work. The superintending inspector will especially urge that the object of the inquiry is to elicit facts for further consideration, and not to make out a case for indiscriminate application of the Act. He will seek the aid of all parties best qualified to afford information, and will so conduct the proceedings as to give every one the opportunity of being heard, and he will invite all persons, especially those who deny the want of improvement, to accompany him in his tour of inspection. Having ascertained the existing state of the district, the superintending inspector will examine and consider how far it may be advisable and practicable to apply the remedies of the Public Health Act within such cost as the inhabitants might be reasonably called upon to bear. To arrive at any accurate conclusion as to the cost, proper plans setting forth the levels, &c. must be furnished, and these plans are not to be undertaken by the superintending inspectors, but by persons selected to act by the local anthorities after the locality shall have adopted the Act; but it will be the duty of the superintending inspector to make such general examination as will enable him to pronounce as to the practicability of remedial measures, and this may frequently serve for preliminary guidance of the local board and their surveyors in working out the necessary plans. It will generally be desirable that the superintending inspector, after completing his inquiry, should attend another meeting of the inhabitants before leaving the district, at which meeting he will state the conclusions at which he may have arrived and the recommendations which he will be prepared to make. An opportunity will thus be afforded to receive suggestions, and consider any objections which may be raised, all which may facilitate further proceedings. He will at the same time explain that all statements which may be transmitted from the locality to the General Board in reference to his report will receive the fullest attention and consideration."

Not very long ago a petition had been sent up from a large place in the north of England of not less than 20,000 inhabitants, praying to have the Act applied, and directly after it came a strong counter-petition praying that the Bill might not be applied. An inspector was sent down to the place; he attended a public meeting at which he read these instructions, and the consequence was that the people, on receiving this strong assurance that it was not the intention or the wish of the Board of Health to force the Act upon them, immediately withdrew their opposition, and gave the inspector all the assistance in their power. A petition had just been received by the Board in favour of the application of the Act, signed by the majority of the ratepayers, and it was the intention of the Board to apply the Act. He came now to the provisions of the Bill which he was about to lay before them. It consisted of 170 clauses, and might be divided into three parts—the first relating to the constitution of the General Board of Health; the second, to the manner in which the Act was to be adopted and applied; and the third, to the powers and duties of the local boards. With regard to the first point, he proposed that the General Board of Health should substantially remain the same as at present constituted. With regard to the second part, he proposed that the Act should be applied either by adoption or by application. The first step to the adoption of the Act would be that a certain number of ratepayers—ten, at least—should present a requisition to the chief local authority—called in the Bill the summoning officer—who would then call a public meeting, at which the adoption of the Act would be discussed. If the decision was in favour of its adoption, the resolution of the meeting would be forwarded to the General Board of Health, and upon that the Board would proceed to apply the Bill. When, however, there was a difference of opinion on the subject, the summoning officer was to appoint a day for taking a poll of the ratepayers, and if the poll were favourable to the adoption of the Bill it would be forwarded to the Board, but, if not, of course the whole matter would drop to the ground. Power was also given to the Board of Health to apply the Act to places having no defined boundaries, and to portions of places, on the receipt of a petition signed by one-tenth of the ratepayers. On the receipt of such a petition the Board would proceed to send down an inspector, and, on his report, would make a provisional order for the application of the Act. As the law at present stood, that provisional order would be binding on the locality; but he proposed that it should first be sent down for the consideration of the inhabitants, and should not be applied unless they signified their willingness to accept it. With regard to the compulsory application of the Act, power would be given to the General Board of Health to proceed at once to put the Act into operation in places in which

it should appear from the Registrar-General's report that the mortality exceeded twenty-three in 1,000. There would also be power to attach portions of places, in which the mortality was found to be excessive, to adjoining districts in which the Act was already in force. He came next to the powers and duties of the local boards. They would be empowered to appoint and remove officers, and in many respects would exercise the same duties as at present. He proposed, however, to take some very large powers, to which he would invite the special attention of the House, because, if this proposition were sanctioned by the Legislature, it would not only interfere with many of the existing duties of Parliament, but also supersede the necessity of applying to Parliament for local Acts. They were powers which had been long desired, and in favour of which the House of Commons had reported over and over again in reference to the subject of private Bill legislation. If any one wished to know what the opinions of Commissioners on this point were let him read the report issued in 1847, in which the proposition he was now about to make was fully considered and also recommended. If, however, hon. Members should think that large folio volume too great a task to wade through, he would advise them to read the admirable article in the *Edinburgh Review* of this month, in which the suggestions of the various commissions were succinctly summed up. Perhaps the House would allow him to read a short extract from this article. The writer said—

> "These abuses of private Bills Committees have been the subject of discussion almost annually during the present century in both Houses of Parliament; there are upwards of seventy long Reports, in which the delay, expense, and general inconvenience of our private Bill system have been from time to time pointed out. Some salutary changes have certainly been made in the institution of Committees, the mode of selection, and the reduction of the number of members, and the more important reform has been carried of providing, by general law, for several subjects hitherto dealt with only by private Acts; but the system of private Bill legislation and the greater portion of the inconvenience still remain."

He held in his hand a list of the improvements Bills relating to water supply, gas, and markets, that had been prosecuted in that House between the years 1850 and 1855, inclusive. The number of these Bills was as follows:—In 1850, there were proceeded with 47; in 1851 there were 53; in 1852, 70; in 1853, 85; in 1854, 96; and in 1855 notices had been given of the intention to prosecute 77; making a total within those years of no less than 428. He had been informed by those who were best qualified to advise him as to the probable cost of prosecuting these Bills that if he put down the sum of 2,000*l.* for each, exclusive of the expenses of opposition, he would be quite within the mark. Therefore, a sum of not less than 856,000*l.* had been spent in the prosecution of private Bills from the year 1850 down to the present period. Now, the proposition he was about to make was this—that where the local Boards desired to acquire land, either in or out of their locality, for purposes of drainage works, water supply and the like, it should be in their power to acquire it without the necessity of coming before a Committee of the House of Commons. In order to make himself distinctly understood on this subject, which was one of very great importance, he would read the clause that had been prepared in reference to it. It ran thus—

> "Every local board shall have power to purchase any land necessary for carrying into execution the above objects (drainage, water supply, &c.) And for the purposes of this section the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, shall be incorporated with this Act; but the exercise of the above powers shall be subject to this restriction, that no such reservoir as aforesaid shall be made, nor shall any land be purchased, under the compulsory powers of the said Lands Clauses Consolidation Act for the purposes aforesaid except with the sanction of the justices assembled at some court of quarter sessions, such sanction to be obtained by the local board who have projected any such work in manner hereinafter mentioned."

The Bill then went on to provide that the local boards should publish notices in the newspapers of their intention to apply for the sanction of the justices, and should also serve notices on the owners and occupiers of the land to be taken; and persons whose property might be injuriously affected by the construction of the works would have a right of appeal before the justices, the decision of such justices to be binding on the local board. The effect of these provisions would be to exempt the local boards giving notice from the necessity of appearing before that House, which everybody knew was not the most satisfactory tribunal in such cases, but to require them instead to go before the court of quarter sessions sitting in the immediate locality where the land was to be taken, and which was, therefore, more likely to arrive at a sound decision. If he were now proposing to grant these powers in the case of schemes undertaken by private enterprise, such as railways, for instance, this course might be open to grave objection, but where the property was required not for purposes of speculation, but for a public object, to be carried out by a public body for the benefit of the inhabitants of the district; and the tribunal to which the matters would be referred would consist of gentlemen conversant with the circumstances and requirements of the locality, and, therefore, well qualified to pronounce whether the powers sought for ought to be conferred. He had stated this part of his plan not with the view of eliciting much discussion upon it on the part of the House at that moment. Hon. Members would have ample opportunity for giving it that consideration which it demanded at a subsequent stage of the Bill. If he were allowed to introduce the measure, he should feel it his duty to make the various local boards acquainted with its provisions, and enter into communication with the proper parties to ascertain whether such powers as he had described could be safely granted, or whether they were liable to such serious objections that Parliament ought not to assent to them. In his own opinion, very few persons could object to such a proposition. Of course, those who derived professional advantage from their practice on Private Bill Committees might not view it with any great favour, but he did not apprehend that on any other ground serious objection could be offered to it. He had stated already that great complaints had been made in consequence of some deficiencies in the former Bill as to the regulation of the building of new houses and the re-erection of old. He wished to put a stop, if possible, to the power of building houses in streets not only side by side, but also back to back, so as to entirely preclude any outlet or inlet for air except in front, and utterly to prevent the construction of the outbuildings which were indispensable for the proper accommodation of every dwelling. He had received communications on this subject from Sunderland, Leicester, Coventry, and other places; and these clauses were suggested by some of the largest towns in the kingdom. With regard to slaughter-houses—great nuisances—it was proposed that no new one should be allowed to be built without a licence, and every slaughter-house would have to be registered. The local boards would be enabled to erect slaughter-houses on their own land. Powers would also be given them to levy rates and raise money on mortgage, as at present. He proposed that they should also make by-laws, but such by-laws as inflicted penalties would be subject to the approval of the Secretary of State. At present the ratepayers very frequently had no means of knowing how their money was expended; and he, therefore, proposed that every local board should make an annual report of what it had done during the year in the execution of the Act, and send a copy of it to every ratepayer, and also one to the General Board of Health. The sum which the General Board of Health had sanctioned the raising of, upon mortgage, amounted to a total of 585,477*l.*; yet no authority existed in that Board for seeing how the outlay it had sanctioned had been incurred. He therefore proposed that the Board of Health should have power to inspect the town, and discover whether the money had been expended in conformity with the plans originally sent up and approved. Having taken this power, he thought the General Board of Health ought to make a Report annually to Parliament of what it had accomplished in pursuance of the Act; and the Bill would contain a provision to that effect. He would not trouble the House further. He had already sketched the general outline of the Bill, which would provide that the Act should not be applied to any town without the consent of the ratepayers, excepting in cases where the mortality was excessive; that parts of places might adopt the Act; that the necessity for having an Act of Parliament for local improvements should be almost entirely avoided; that the General Board of Health should have power to see that the money borrowed under its sanction by the local boards had been appropriated in accordance with the scheme which the ratepayers had themselves sent up. In the Bill of last Session it was provided that the Act should be continued for one year, and thence to the end of the next Session of Parliament. He proposed now that this Bill should be continued for two years, and thence to the end of the next Session of Parliament. He believed that by that time the House and the country would have had ample opportunity of knowing how far the measure was applicable to the objects it was designed to meet, and whether it had proved successful. His own impression was that it would be a most useful measure for country districts. He felt persuaded, if the individual placed at the head of the department over which he now had the honour to preside would make up his mind not to set up fanciful theories or to seek to determine every case according to one inflexible rule, but would examine into the peculiarities of each district and apply the Act to it in conformity with its special circumstances—that then the office which he held would be respected rather than shunned, and he believed that that department—though it might not be one of the highest in the State—might be made one of the most useful. The right hon. Baronet concluded by moving for leave to introduce a Bill to alter and amend the Public Health Act.

Mr. WILLIAMS was glad that the right hon. Baronet had taken up this question, which was one of very great importance. He much approved referring the Bills to a Select Committee. He understood that the first Bill did not apply to the metropolis, but that the Nuisances Removal Bill did. It was necessary that the Government should allow evidence to be taken before the Committee, as many important trades would be affected by the second measure.

Leave given; Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Sir Benjamin Hall and Viscount Palmerston.

NUISANCES REMOVAL BILL.

Sir B. HALL then rose to move for leave to bring in a Bill to alter and amend the Nuisances Removal Act. He said that his hon. Friend (Mr. Williams) had stated very truly that the Bill he had just introduced did not affect the metropolis. The fact was that the Bill could be only applied or adopted under very peculiar circumstances, and therefore it did not affect any particular district whatever. But the Bill he was now about to introduce would affect the metropolis most materially, and he intended that it should have that object. He knew of no place which ought to be dealt with by legislation in reference to those nuisances of which they had heard so much during the late epidemic more than the metropolis. He would state as briefly as possible the provisions of his second Bill. During the late epidemic the existing Act was found to be wholly inoperative. Innumerable complaints were made to him of the inadequacy of the Act; some by persons honestly anxious to carry out its provisions effectually, and others by persons desirous rather of evading the fulfilment of their duty, and urging the cumbrous mode of procedure they had to go through and other pleas as excuses for not carrying out the Act. The local boards had no power, except under order in Council, or under the orders and regulations of the Board of Health, to appoint those officers whose duty it was in every locality to assist in suppressing nuisances as soon as they arose, and in keeping the country free from such abominable evils. When the epidemic broke out, great anxiety was shown by the local boards to do what was necessary to stay the ravages of disease in their districts; but everything was hurry and confusion; there was no method, and a vast deal of expense was incurred in consequence. As soon, however, as the scourge ceased—and he saw this to be particularly the case at present in the metropolis, as well as throughout the country—the supervision likewise ceased, and things relapsed into the same state as they stood in previously to the appointment of these officers. He could state that on the 12th of August, when he took office at the Board of Health, there was hardly an inspector in existence for the whole of the metropolis; and he had the greatest possible difficulty in making some of the boards of guardians appoint inspectors. In the case of Clerkenwell, for instance, he was obliged to threaten to cause an inquest to be held if any person died in a district which had not been previously visited under the direction of the board of guardians. He did have an inquest, and the case was fully proved before the jury, which had a salutary effect in inducing this body to do its duty to some extent. He must mention the measures taken for affording medical aid during the late fearful visitation in a parish containing 190,000 persons, and having property of the rateable value of 500,000*l.*, as it illustrated the way in which the people were cared for in certain districts of the metropolis. On the 12th of August last a circular was sent out by the sanitary committee of the board of guardians of Lambeth to 120 medical men of that parish, offering to enter into engagements with them to attend the poor of the parish professionally, and to pay them for their services at the rate of 1*s.* 6*d.* for every diarrhœa patient, and 2*s.* 6*d.* for every cholera patient—the patients to be afterwards referred to the medical officer of the district. This was the remuneration offered to these medical practitioners by the authorities of a parish which could have raised 2,083*l.* by a penny rate on its annual rental. The case of St. James's was deplorably bad; and a special report would be made and laid before the House relating to that sad disaster. Happily there were some admirable exceptions to this state of things. St. George's, Paddington, Islington, Marylebone, St. Pancras, and some other great parishes rendered him all the assistance that he could have desired, and set an excellent example to the rest of the metropolis, as would appear from the inspector's reports, which would also be laid on the table of the House. One very remarkable feature was, the happy effect produced where constant sanitary supervision had been adopted. The most beneficial results had also been attained by the exercise of common care, as in the case of the model lodginghouses of the metropolis. At the Streatham Street model lodginghouses, Bloomsbury, where fifty-three families resided, there were but six cases of diarrhœa, which yielded speedily to medical treatment; at the model houses, Bagnigge-wells, where there were 175 inmates, no case of sickness occurred; at the kindred establishment in St. Giles's, where there were 104 inmates, there was not a single case of sickness; and at the other institutions of the same character similar results were visible. He wished next to show the House how the City of London had been spared during the late epidemic. He had in his hand the report of Mr. Simon, the medical officer of the city, whom he had consulted in framing these Bills, and to whom he took that opportunity of expressing his thanks for the valuable assistance he had rendered him (Sir B. Hall), ever since he had held his present office. In his report to the City Commissioners of Sewers, Mr. Simon said—

> "In your population of 130,000 there have died from cholera during the last few months 211 persons, of whom 26 were under five years of age. This mortality has been at the rate of 16 to every 10,000 inhabitants of the city. Its distribution among your several sub-districts is given in the annexed tables, which also indicate, through successive weekly periods, from July to November, the gradual rise and decline of the disease. London generally has suffered from the recent epidemic less than from that of 1849. The cholera deaths of the metropolis were then at the rate of 60 per 10,000; now they have probably not exceeded a rate of 45; so that this visitation, measured by the proportion of deaths, has been 25 per cent lighter than the last. But in favour of the city there has been a difference greatly beyond this metropolitan average. Our cholera deaths of 1849 amounted to 728, on which our recent mortality of 211 (since the population is nearly

fixed) shows a reduction of 71 per cent. In the former epidemic we contributed to the metropolitan mortality almost one-twentieth of its total; we have on this occasion contributed less than one-fiftieth. Our former contribution was little under what should have been inferred from our proportionate population, if the disease had been equally allotted to the metropolis; on this occasion our share has happily been less than two-fifths of what, on that principle, might have been predicted to befall us."

Mr. Simon then went on to say—

> " A year ago, considering these things prospectively, I could not but feel great alarm as to what amount of epidemic suffering the City might experience. Former encounters, too, had shown how vulnerable we were, and it was impossible to forget the well-known tendency of the disease to revisit places which it has once ravaged. But against those threatening auguries at least one good was to be counted. Unlike the rest of the metropolis, the city had a sanitary government. For some years you had been giving care to the physical condition of public health. You had paved and sewered the City, even through its courts and alleys. You had established daily scavenging; you had almost abolished cesspools; you had put water within reach of all; you had done something (little was in your power) against overcrowding; you had set on foot the periodical inspection of houses, with a view to their better cleanliness."

He (Sir B. Hall) was now going to ask the House to give such powers to every part of the kingdom, as far as they could be made applicable, as was at present the case with the City of London, and, by so doing, he was sure that they would prevent much misery and save to a considerable extent human life. He proposed to place every district in England under the local authorities, and to empower them to remove and prevent the recurrence of nuisances—to deal with those houses unfit for human habitations, and to provide for the abatement of those nuisances caused by parties carrying on offensive trades. The Act would also compel the local authorities to make out an annual account of their proceedings, and to furnish a copy to every ratepayer. He would also go further than this, and in cases where local authorities neglected to do their duty, left their powers in abeyance, or showed great carelessness, he thought it the duty of the Legislature to compel those local authorities, who had voluntarily undertaken their duties, to carry them out, and even to impose a penalty for neglect. He begged to call the attention of the House to a report, one of the most valuable ever published on this subject. He alluded to the report of the commission sent to Newcastle to inquire into the recent outbreak of cholera in that town. The report was drawn up by Mr. Simon, Mr. Hume, and another gentleman. He desired to bring this case prominently before the House, for it was not one in which some miserable pavingboard was concerned, or one which existed in any small parish. The corporation of Newcastle was described by the Commissioners as not only being "ancient, wealthy, and influential, but as having for at least seven years possessed under its own Local Acts, in 1837, 1846, and 1853, unusually extensive sanitary powers." The town was said to afford remarkable facilities for draining, and that under the Acts of 1837 and 1846 the corporation "obtained complete powers of supervision and extensive powers of control over the formation of new streets and the erection of houses, including the provision of proper domestic conveniences and other important points." Under the Local Act of 1846 they obtained power to lay down rules for cleansing and whitewashing filthy and unwholesome dwellings, and to make regulations for the registering of lodging-houses and the maintenance of cleanliness therein. It was also enacted that the owner of every house unprovided with necessary outbuildings should provide them, and that no house should be erected without them. Powers were also given for the cleansing of all necessaries, ashpits, &c., and for the management of public necessaries, for compelling owners of houses to pave the streets on which the houses abutted, for regulating the keeping of swine, and for compelling manufacturers to consume their smoke. By the Act of 1853 the town-council were empowered to cause streets to be sewered, drained, &c., to make regulations as to the levels of houses, streets, drains, &c.; to order the closing of dwelling-houses unfit for human habitation; to order the erection of necessary outbuildings to hotels and public-houses; to carry private drains into the common sewer at the expense of the owner; to cause the owner of a house to repair and cleanse the private drains. It was also enacted that no house should be erected or rebuilt until the drains were made, and that all manufactories, fireplaces, and furnaces should be constructed so as to consume their own smoke. These Acts were obtained at great cost. And in January, 1854, a commission was sent to Newcastle to inquire into the causes of the late outbreak of cholera. They stated that the average of deaths for fifteen years was 28·6 in every 1,000, and they ascribed the virulence of the outbreak of cholera to the neglect of proper sanitary measures by the town council. In the words of the town surveyor, the Local Acts "have been a dead letter altogether." The powers conferred on the town council by these Acts were also said to "have been allowed to remain wholly inoperative," "no exercise or enforcement of them appeared to have taken place;" and again, the commissioners spoke of "the entire neglect by the town council of their apparently unlimited power as to cleansing filthy and unwholesome dwellings." "There are districts in Newcastle which were more ill-conditioned, probably, than any other districts of anything like the same area in Great Britain." Many of the necessaries and ashpits were so built that the liquid filth "oozed through the walls" of the houses, and new houses presented the same evils as old ones, and many of them were "utterly unsewered and undrained." The corporation property was said to be, if possible, in a worse condition than any other; "a great part of their tenanted property was really unfit for human habitation, and should be condemned as such." It was suggested to the commissioners, that the Act was not enforced because the town council held house property. Inspectors had found in one room from 9 to 15, 16, 17, and 19 persons. Cholera had broken out "in rooms in which as many as 20 or 25 occupiers were congregated," which gave but 50 cubic feet of air for each person, and the stench in the rooms was described as overpowering. No advantage had been taken of the Labouring Classes Lodging-houses Act (1851), and there was no map of the drainage. Only 1,421 houses had water-closets or any drainage; the remaining 8,032 were "entirely unprovided." In Sandgate, a district adjoining Newcastle, it was said that out of a population of "4,600, perhaps not 100 had right of access to any private necessary, and at the very lowest computation, more than 9-10ths of that resident population, besides the casual population of the shipping alongside, were wholly dependent on a single public necessary." "In another district, containing 3,000 inhabitants, there were but one public and one or two private necessaries," and 15,000 families had no right of access to any private necessary. The Board of Guardians had frequently proceeded against the corporation, to make it abate or remove nuisances of its own creation, and the power of enforcing the consumption of smoke had been "left entirely in abeyance." The expense occasioned by the outbreak was 35,000*l.*, which might, the commissioners stated, have been avoided by timely precautions. He would undertake to say that there was no corporate body with greater powers than Newcastle; and, if those great bodies neglected to carry out the powers entrusted to them for the benefit of the public, he thought that the time was arrived when they ought to compel them to do so. He proposed, therefore, to establish a local authority in every district, and to order that such local authority should for the purposes of the Act appoint and remunerate a sanitary inspector, who should be a constant officer, and, in case smaller parishes might not be able to pay a separate officer, it was proposed that the surveyor of highways might also, in connection with his own, hold the office of sanitary inspector. He was aware that various objections would be raised by persons carying on offensive trades to anything in the Act which could be regarded as infringing the liberty of the subject, and he had endeavoured as strongly as possible, by the provisions of the Act, to guard against any such charge. He proposed, as the ground for proceeding, that the officer under the local authorities should ask for power to inspect premises between 9 o'clock in the morning and 6 in the evening, and, in the case of the person in occupation refusing to allow him to do so, then for him to go before a justice, and state that he had reasonable cause to believe that a nuisance existed contrary to the provisions of the Act, and thereupon the justice should have power to issue a summons, and before two justices the case might then be determined. He now came to the case of houses unfit for human habitation, and he proposed to ask the House to prohibit the use of such houses until they were rendered fit for human habitation. He wished to show the House that he had good grounds for the provisions on this subject contained in the Bill, and he would, therefore, read an extract from a report issued in the *Labourers' Friend* with reference to Wild Court, in the vicinity of Drury Lane. He had lately, with Lord Shaftesbury, visited the neighbourhood in question, and seen the deplorable condition of Wild Court, which contained 13 houses and, as nearly as could be ascertained, 200 inhabitants. The report he had alluded to stated that—

> "None of the basements are at present occupied except as lumber places, and are in a most filthy state, emitting at times effluvia the most foul, partly in consequence of the accumulation of animal and vegetable matter, which is thrown in through the area windows, and through holes made in the ground-floors, and partly from the occasional overflow of badly-constructed dry brick drains which passed beneath the floor, in some instances not more than three inches. There is no paving to these floors. In the houses 2, 3, 4, and 5 the necessaries are large open holes, sufficiently capacious for a man to fall into; they have risers of wood rails, but no seats. Fortunately the rails are fixed too high for children, or accidents must now and then occur. This is one reason why the yards are constantly in such a filthy state."

It was impossible to describe the state in which these houses were. In some of them there was actually a sewer running through the bedrooms in which the people slept. He had made personal visits to this and other places, and had instituted inquiries, and all he could say was, that they were in such a disgraceful state of filth or—to use the only word—beastliness that he should be sorry to have one of his dogs sleep in them, and he thought, when they saw that human beings occupied these dwellings, that they ought to insist on the owners putting them into a more decent condition. That these houses were not the property of poor people, but of men who collected high rents on every Monday morning, and who turned out the poor wretches from these places for any neglect of payment, would be seen by the following extract, which had reference to Charlotte Buildings, Clerkenwell. The book contains many drawings. Among them is one exhibiting an attic in a state of repose. Mr. Godwin says—

> "This, if possible, exhibits greater poverty than below. The walls are full of large holes, and the light is visible through the roof. The rent of the attics is the same as of the floor below. It may seem strange that the price of rooms should not vary, but this uniformity is effected by the landlord removing those whose necessities are greater or who may be a shilling or so in arrear of rent to the upper quarters. The first feeling, after visiting this place, is that of astonishment that persons should be allowed to let such dilapidated buildings to these poor people, who really pay more than a fair rent for a good house. The rooms are seldom unoccupied, and the loss trifling. The rent would be 41*l*. 12*s*. per annum. The population of this small court is immense. If we take an average of 15 persons in each floor of the houses visited—and this is greatly below the number—we find 60 persons are occupying one house, and 900 are in the court. Something should be done with Charlotte Buildings. Few of the countless throng who flood the paths in Gray's-inn-lane have any knowledge of the hotbed of disease and vice which exists within a dozen yards of them."

He proposed to take powers to put a stop to these miserable dwellings; and, also, that after a justice had made an order for their prohibition an appeal might be made against such order after giving 14 days' notice. He proposed to deal with offensive trades—not by any new enactments, for he knew the objections that would be raised to such; and had in preparing the present Bill looked through local Acts, seen the powers already granted, and had only taken such powers as had been already granted by the Legislature. These powers were expressed in the Towns Improvement Clauses Act, and he proposed to take powers for suppressing any nuisance that might arise under the Clauses of that Act. He had also taken from the Privy Council the power of issuing orders, as given under the Nuisances Removal and Diseases Prevention Act. With regard to the non-performance of duties under the Act, he should propose—as in the case of the surveyor of highways, who was liable to a fine of 5*l*. for neglect of duty—that in every case where notice of a nuisance had been given, and no steps taken for its removal, it should be lawful for a justice, on the oath of one witness, to inflict a fine on the inspector or person appointed by the local authorities who should appear to the justice to be liable for such neglect. He wished, also, that the House would insist on an annual account being made by the local authorities to the ratepayers, of the money paid, and received, and of the steps taken by them under this Act. These were the general provisions of the Bill, and he desired that it might, together with another which he should ask leave to bring in, be referred to a Select Committee. He was not aware, as it contained no new enactment with reference to the removal of nuisances, whether it would be necessary to take any fresh evidence on the subject, but, should it be deemed so, he would not oppose it. He was only anxious that some enactment on this subject might soon take place, in order that, should they again be visited by the dreadful infliction of the past year, they might be prepared to meet it with some measure of real and useful legislation. The right hon Baronet concluded by moving for leave to bring in a Bill to consolidate and amend the Nuisances Removal and Diseases Prevention Acts, 1848 and 1849.

MR. WILKINSON wished to say a word or two on behalf of the creators of nuisance. He was aware that they were not popular, but still he thought that they suffered some hardships, for in many cases they had carried on their trades for forty or fifty years in districts at first thinly inhabited, but in course of time the public had come to them, their neighbourhood had been largely built on, and then they had been complained of as nuisances. He knew of a case in which a person, one of his constituents, had occupied for years a strip of land as a market garden; a row of houses had been built opposite it, and he was complained of as a nuisance for manuring his land in the ordinary way. He thought that some provision ought to be made by which compensation might be insured to parties for removing in such cases.

MR. THORNELY asked whether there was any intention of placing the burial-grounds under the control of the Board of Health, or whether they would remain under the control of the Secretary of State for the Home Department?

SIR B. HALL replied that they would remain as at present, and he could not now state whether any alteration would take place with respect to them.

SIR H. WILLOUGHBY asked whether it was contemplated in the present Bill to establish local authorities within the great metropolitan districts? He knew that there was a great feeling with reference to this subject, and he could never understand why the metropolis should be deprived of the benefits of municipal institutions.

SIR B. HALL said, that one of the great objections to the system at present in operation in the metropolis was, that there were too many local authorities. He had given notice of a Bill for the 2nd of next month, by which he proposed to create bodies which would be empowered to carry out the provisions of these Nuisances Removal Acts and the other works necessary for the improvement of the sanitary condition of the people of the metropolis; they would also have large powers conferred upon them for the administration of their local affairs.

VISCOUNT EBRINGTON thought it would be very undesirable that the House should embark in the complicated and difficult question with regard to the local government of the metropolis, without having first made up their minds as to what were the principles they proposed to apply to the general sanitary legislation and local government of the rest of the empire. He therefore hoped some progress would be made with the general Bills before they entered into the question of the metropolis. He could assure his right hon. colleague that he should have his earnest support in carrying out measures for which he had long contended, and he rejoiced at the prospect of comprehensive and effective legislation upon this subject.

MR. PELLATT asked whether it was intended to give the local authorities power to deal with the question of wharfage in many of the low districts, particularly in Southwark, which were liable to be overflowed by the Thames?

SIR B. HALL said, the subject ought to be dealt with by a separate measure.

MR. W. WILLIAMS said, the expense of carrying out the alteration to which the right hon. Gentleman referred ought not to fall upon the owners and occupiers of wharfs, but upon the public, for whose benefit it would be undertaken.

Leave given; Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Sir Benjamin Hall, Viscount Palmerston, and Sir William Molesworth.

Bill *presented*, and read 1ª.

House adjourned at a quarter before Seven o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Wednesday, January 24, 1855.

MINUTES.] NEW MEMBERS SWORN.—For Sunderland, Henry Fenwick, esq.; for Limerick County, Stephen Edward De Vere, esq.

THE CRIMEA—THE VOTE OF THANKS.

MR. SPEAKER acquainted the House, that he had received a Letter from Lord Raglan in answer to a Letter communicating the Thanks of the House of the 15th and 18th December last, relative to the operations of Her Majesty's Forces in the Crimea.

Letter read, as follows—

"Before Sevastopol, January 7th, 1855.

"SIR—I have had the honour to receive your Letter of the 18th December, transmitting the Resolutions of the House of Commons, and requesting me to communicate them to the Officers and Men of the British Army, and to General Canrobert; and I beg to acquaint you that I have fulfilled your instructions, and am proud of having been charged with so agreeable a commission.

"The Officers and Men of the British Army derive the highest gratification from the knowledge that their gallant exertions in the cause in which they are engaged have been honoured by the approval of the Representatives of the British Nation, and they accept with feelings of the deepest gratitude the unanimous thanks of the House of Commons.

"I shall best make known to the House the sentiments entertained by General Canrobert of the public recognition of the brilliant achievements of the French Army, in cordial co-operation with the Troops of Her Majesty, by transmitting to you a copy of His Excellency's Letter in reply to my communication, and the General Order in which he announced to the Army under his command the Resolutions of the House, and expressed his due appreciation of the thanks they conveyed.

"I trust you will be so good as to assure the House that I am deeply sensible of the great distinction it has conferred upon me in noticing my services, and that you will yourself accept my warmest acknowledgments for the manner in which you have performed the duty of communicating to me its Resolutions.

"I have the honour to be,
"With the highest respect,
"Your most obedient servant,
"Raglan.

"The Right Honble. The Speaker."

Mr. SPEAKER laid on the Table Copy of Letter from General Canrobert to Lord Raglan, in answer to the Thanks of the House of the 15th day of December last, relative to the co-operation of the French Army with Her Majesty's Land Forces in the Crimea, together with a Copy of the General Order to the Army of the East.

On the Motion of Mr. WALPOLE, the letters were ordered to be *printed.*

House adjourned at half after Twelve o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Thursday, January 25, 1855.

Minutes.] *Sat First in Parliament.*—The Earl of Abingdon, after the Death of his Father.

THE VOTE OF THANKS—THE ARMY.

The LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House, that he had received the following Letter from Field Marshal Lord Raglan, in return to the Thanks of this House communicated to his Lordship by The Lord Chancellor, in obedience to an Order of this House of the 15th of December 1854; together with the following Letter received by Field Marshal Lord Raglan from his Excellency General Canrobert, acknowledging the Thanks of this House, and enclosing a Copy of the Order published by his Excellency to the Army under his Command—

"Before Sevastopol, 7th January 1855.

"My Lord—I have had the Honour to receive your Lordship's Letter of the 18th December, transmitting to me, in obedience to the Commands of the House of Lords, their Resolutions, expressing the high Sense they entertain of the great and eminent Services rendered to the Country by me and the gallant Army under my Command, and requesting me to signify these Resolutions to the several General and other Officers under me.

"I have had the Satisfaction of announcing to the General and other Officers and to the Troops the Tribute of their Lordships' Thanks; and I hasten to assure your Lordship that they warmly appreciate the great Distinction that has been conferred upon them.

"The flattering terms in which your Lordship has been so good as to convey to me the Resolutions of the House of Lords, and the gratifying Notice their Lordships have been pleased to take of my Services, demand the Expression of my heartfelt Gratitude; and I hope I do not trespass too much on your Lordship's Kindness in asking you to be the Organ of my Sentiments to the House.

"I have lost no Time in transmitting to General Canrobert the Resolutions conveying their Lordships' Thanks to him and the French Army for their gallant Co-operation with Her Majesty's Forces; and I have now the Honour to enclose a Letter which I have received from his Excellency, containing a Copy of the Order he has published to the Army under his Command, and requesting me to express to their Lordships how deeply he feels the distinguished Honour of their Thanks, and how fully these Feelings are participated in by the French Troops, whose Association with the British Army has produced such beneficial Results, and exhibited to the World in so conspicuous a Manner the intimate Alliance established between the Two Countries.

"I have the Honour to be,
with the highest Respect,
My Lord,
"Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,
Raglan.

"The Right Hon. The Lord Chancellor."

Armée d'Orient.
Cabinet du Commandant-en-Chef.
Au Quartier Général devant Sébastopol,
le 6 Janvier 1855.

"Mylord—Le Parlement Anglais, en prenant les résolutions que vous voulez bien me transmettre, a comblé d'honneur l'armée Française. En combattant à Alma à côté de l'armée Britannique, dont l'inébranlable solidité a été si hautement remarquée, en l'aidant à Inkermann à battre l'ennemi commun, elle croyait avoir fait son devoir seulement, et ne s'attendait pas à recevoir des Représentants de la nation Anglaise un témoignage d'estime à la fois si bienveillant et si éclatant.

"Permettez que je vous prie d'être auprès du Gouvernment de Sa Majesté la Reine et du Parlement Anglais l'interprète des sentiments qu'ont fait naître dans nos esprits ces actes solennels. Ils rendront plus étroite, par les armées, la solidarité qui unit les deux peuples dans cette guerre entreprise pour la défense du droit.

"La lettre si affectueuse que votre Seigneurie a bien voulu m'adresser à cette occasion, ajoute un nouveau prix à l'honneur qui nous est fait. Je pense avec vous, Mylord, que l'union entre les Généraux-en-Chef est la meilleure garantie de l'union entre les armées; et depuis qu'elles opérent ensemble, votre bienveillance m'a rendu le concert si facile qu'il est pour moi un entraînement naturel autant qu'un devoir de situation.

"Recevez, Mylord, l'expression de mon respectueux dévoument.

"Le Général-en-Chef,
"G^al. CANROBERT.
"A. S. S. Le Feld Maréchal
"Lord Raglan,
"Commandant-en-Chef l'Armée Anglaise."

"P.S.—J'ai l'honneur de vous donner communication de l'Ordre Général par lequel j'ai fait connaître à l'armée Française les résolutions du Parlement Anglaise. "G^al. C."

"Soldats—Je vous ai fait connaître les termes si flatteurs et si dignes dans lesquels il a plu à Sa Majesté la Reine de la Grande Brétagne de louer, par l'organe de son Ministre de la Guerre, votre conduite devant l'ennemi.

"Aujourd'hui, j'ai à vous informer, avec un légitime orgueil, que vous partagerez, de l'honneur insigne et rare que les grands pouvoirs publics de l'Angleterre viennent de vous décerner.

"A la date du 15 Decembre, la Chambre des Pairs et la Chambre des Communes vous ont voté solennellement des félicitations et des remercîmens qu'elles ont chargé le digne Chef de l'Armée Anglaise, le Feld Maréchal Lord Raglan, de vous transmettre.

"La résolution des deux hautes assemblées est ainsi conçue.

"'Résolu a l'unanimité, que des remercîmens seront portés à l'armée Française et à son Chef, pour leur vaillante et heureuse co-operation dans l'attaque des positions ennemies à Alma, avec les forces de terre de Sa Majesté; pour l'assistance opportune et énergique qu'ils leur ont prêtée pour repousser l'ennemi à Inkermann; enfin, pour les efforts remarquables qu'ils deploient devant Sébastopol de concert avec l'Armée Britannique.

"'Le Feld Maréchal Lord Raglan est chargé de leur transmettre la présente résolution.'

"Cette éclatante manifestation n'est pas seulement un témoignage d'estime dont vos armes doivent s'honorer. Elle est l'expression des sympathies d'un grand peuple notre allié dans une cause dont l'Europe entière proclame la justice.

"Vous en sentirez tout le prix, et je vais assurer, en votre nom et au mien, le Feld Maréchal Lord Raglan qu'elle resserrera encore, s'il est possible, les liens de bonne camaraderie qu'ont formés entre nos vaillantes compagnons d'armes de l'armée Britannique et nous, une haute estime réciproque et le sang versé en commun.

"Le Général-en-Chef,
"G^al. CANROBERT.

"Au Quartier Général,
"devant Sébastopol, le 6 Janvier 1855."

The said Letters and Order having been read, the same were Ordered to lie on the Table; and to be entered on the Journals.

RESIGNATION OF LORD JOHN RUSSELL.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: My Lords, a communication has been made, within this hour, in the other House of Parliament, that the noble Lord the leader of the Government in that House—Lord John Russell—has tendered to Her Majesty the resignation of the office which he holds as President of the Council, and that Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to accept that resignation. Under these circumstances, upon the Motion of the noble Lord the Home Secretary, the House of Commons has consented to adjourn until to-morrow. My noble Friend at the head of Her Majesty's Government has, in consequence of the resignation of Lord John Russell, gone down to Windsor, and I believe it will be in accordance with precedent, and will also be for the convenience of the House, if your Lordships will follow the example of the House of Commons in this instance—although it is not so essentially necessary—and will consent also to adjourn until to-morrow. Should my noble Friend whom I see opposite (the Earl of Winchilsea) and my noble Friend on this side the House (Earl Grey) have no objection to postpone until to-morrow the Motion of which they have given notice, I will venture to move, under the circumstances, that this House do now adjourn.

THE EARL OF WINCHILSEA was understood to express some indisposition to withdraw his Motion.

THE EARL OF DERBY: I should be very sorry to put my noble Friend (the Earl of Winchilsea) to the slightest personal inconvenience, but I would venture to suggest to him, after what has fallen from the noble Duke opposite, and in the necessary absence of the noble Earl at the head of Her Majesty's Government, that it would meet with the general concurrence of the House if, whatever personal inconvenience he may sustain, he would have the goodness to postpone his Motion, and would take another opportunity of drawing attention to the very important subject to which it refers.

THE EARL OF WINCHILSEA said, he would not object to postpone his Motion until to-morrow, if he would then have an opportunity of saying a few words on the subject.

EARL GREY said, that he had already postponed his Motion.

EARL FITZWILLIAM: My Lords, before the House adjourns I may perhaps be allowed to say a word or two upon a matter which must be regarded with great interest by the House and by the country. We have been informed by my noble Friend the noble Duke opposite, that a noble Lord who held a high office in the Government, and who was practically, though not technically or constitutionally, what is called the leader of the House of Commons, has resigned the position which he occupied. We have been informed of this fact by another Member of Her Majesty's Government; but of the causes which have led to the resignation of the noble Lord we have no information whatever. Now, my Lords, I do apprehend that changes of this kind ought not to be made in the constitution of the Government without the Houses of Parliament being informed of the causes which have led to them.

The Duke of NEWCASTLE: Will my noble Friend permit me to interrupt him? I know it is irregular to do so, but I wish to represent to him that the noble Lord to whom I have referred has not made any statement in his place in the House of Commons; but I have every reason to believe that he will make such statement to-morrow. Under these circumstances, I think the noble Earl will feel that any attempt to anticipate the explanation of the causes of the noble Lord's resignation would not be fair, and I appeal to him whether he will not think it right to abstain from entering into the subject on the present occasion.

Earl FITZWILLIAM: If those who can give information on the subject think that it is not desirable to afford such information, of course I cannot elicit it from them. Yet I cannot but think that an event of this kind ought not to be communicated either to the other House of Parliament—in which the person alluded to sits—or to your Lordships, without some information being afforded as to the ground upon which office has been resigned. It does appear to me a subject upon which information ought to be given to the two Houses at the very same time when the fact of resignation is communicated. The mere fact of the resignation is of little importance, in comparison with the grounds upon which such a course has been taken, because, give me leave to say, it is no light matter in these days either for the Government *en masse* to resign, or for one of the most important Members of that Government to say that he severs himself from all connection with the Administration.

The Marquess of LANSDOWNE observed that it belonged, of course, to the noble Lord who had resigned to state the grounds of his resignation. He had reason to believe that it was the intention of the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) to state those grounds to-morrow, and it could not be maintained that it was incumbent upon Her Majesty's Government to make that explanation for the noble Lord which he alone was competent to make for himself.

House adjourned till To-morrow.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Thursday, January 25, 1855.

Minutes.] New Members Sworn.—For Canterbury, Charles Manners Lushington, esq.

THE ARMY IN THE CRIMEA—MOTION FOR SELECT COMMITTEE POSTPONED.

Mr. ROEBUCK: I beg to postpone until to-morrow the notice of Motion which stands in my name for this day, for a Select Committee to inquire into the condition of our army before Sebastopol, and into the conduct of those departments of the Government whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of that army.

THE WAR—ADDRESSES FROM THE COLONIES.

Sir G. GREY, having laid certain papers on the table of the House, said: In accordance with the promise I made to the hon. and learned Member for North Staffordshire (Mr. Adderley) before the recess, I now lay these papers on the table, and I will take the opportunity of briefly explaining to him of what they consist. They are addresses and resolutions passed by the legislatures and public bodies in various British colonies in reference to the subject of the war in which this country is now engaged. In all the addresses which have been received, the House will be gratified to find an expression of feeling of the most devoted loyalty and attachment to Her Majesty, and also a feeling of the most ardent and earnest sympathy towards this country in reference to the war that is now being waged against Russia. Some of the addresses will be found to contain more substantial proofs of that attachment, by the great liberality evinced by those from whom they proceed, in contributing to the wants of the widows and orphans left destitute by the loss of their husbands and parents in the course of the war. Among them is a joint address from the Council and Legislative Assembly of Canada, tendering their congratulations to Her Majesty on the glorious successes which have attended Her army in the East, and expressing their readiness to contribute to the relief of the widows and children of the soldiers of the allied armies of England and France who have fallen during the war. I have the satisfaction to state, that this address was entrusted to Lord Elgin, who brought it to this country from Canada on his leaving the administration of that colony, and that it constituted one of the last acts of his Government. I have since received from Sir Edmund Head, the present Governor General of Canada, two draughts of 10,000*l.* each, being the sum of 20,000*l.* appropriated by the Legislature of Canada for that purpose.

MR. ADDERLEY begged to ask the right hon. Baronet whether, as there had been such a strong expression of sympathy on the part of the representatives of the people of Canada towards this country in regard to the present war, he had any intention of proposing any acknowledgment on the part of the Imperial Parliament, of the high sense they entertained of such a feeling being expressed by the legislative body of a colony which constituted one of the most important and most essential resources of this country.

SIR G. GREY begged to remind the hon. and learned Gentleman that these addresses were to Her Majesty; and he need hardly say that he had received Her Majesty's commands to express to those parties from whom they proceeded, her sentiments respecting them. With respect to the question put to him by the hon. and learned Gentleman as to the course which might be pursued by that House, he would take the opportunity of answering it on some future occasion.

RESIGNATION OF LORD JOHN RUSSELL.

MR. HAYTER: Sir, I have been requested by the noble Lord the Member for the City of London to state, that he has considered it consistent with his public duty respectfully to tender to Her Majesty his resignation of the office which he held as President of the Council, which resignation Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to accept. The noble Lord will take an early occasion of stating the grounds upon which he has been induced to come to that resolution.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: Sir, after the exceedingly important announcement which has just been made by my hon. Friend, I trust the House will not think that Her Majesty's Government are trespassing too much upon its indulgence if I ask the House to adjourn until to-morrow. There are obvious reasons, I think, for acceding to the proposal which I now venture to make. I should hope, therefore, that those Gentlemen who have Motions standing for to-day, will have the goodness to postpone them until to-morrow, at which time they will stand in the same position as they otherwise would have stood in to-night. I beg, then, Sir, to move that this House do now adjourn until to-morrow.

MR. DRUMMOND: I really must say, with all deference to the noble Lord, that he is under some misapprehension as to the rule of notices postponed until to-morrow, which certainly will not stand in the same position as they do to-day. Of course, knowing what the feeling of the House is, I do not wish to bring on the question which I have raised this evening; at the same time, I cannot consent to any postponement in its regard unless the noble Lord will agree to give precedence for to-morrow to the Motion of my hon. and learned Friend near me (Mr. Roebuck). And if the noble Lord will but agree to do so, I, on my part, will promise to condense my observations relative to the notice which I have given as much as possible, but which I shall persist in, in order that the returns for which I shall call may go before my hon. and learned Friend's Committee. But if these Motions are to have precedence, it must be done by order of the House.

SIR J. PAKINGTON: Sir, as the Motion of which I have given notice on the subject of national education stands first for this evening, I wish to state that, after the appeal which has just been made, I at once accede to the request of the noble Viscount, and will postpone the Motion until this day week. On looking, however, to the state of the notice paper, I find it is extremely uncertain whether I can bring it forward on that day; under these circumstances, therefore, I hope I may venture to trust that Her Majesty's Government will take care that hereafter I shall not be in a worse position relative to that Motion than I stand in at present.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: Sir, in answer to what has fallen from my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey (Mr. Drummond), I may observe that the hon. Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) has already postponed his Motion until to-morrow, and therefore it will take precedence. And it is the wish and intention of Her Majesty's Government that no impediment should be thrown in the way of such an arrangement.

MR. ROEBUCK: I believe it is the wish of the House that my Motion shall have precedence of the Orders of the Day to-morrow. Therefore, if the noble Lord consents to my Motion coming on first to-morrow, I at once accede to the proposal for an adjournment.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: There are no Orders of the Day to-morrow.

House adjourned at a quarter before Five o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Friday, January 26, 1855.

RESIGNATION OF LORD JOHN RUSSELL.

THE EARL OF ABERDEEN: My Lords, I think it may be convenient to your Lordships to receive information as to the circumstances connected with the retirement of my noble Friend, the late President of the Council, from the station which he held in Her Majesty's Government. That retirement, my Lords, must materially affect Her Majesty's Government, and from the station and character of my noble Friend great importance must be attached to it. I am not fully possessed of all the motives that may have induced my noble Friend to adopt this decision; and I cannot do better, perhaps, than read to your Lordships the letter containing the offer of his resignation, which I received from him on Tuesday night:—

"Chesham-place, Jan. 23, 1855.

"My dear Lord Aberdeen—Mr. Roebuck has given notice of a Motion for a Committee to inquire into the conduct of the war. I do not see how this motion is to be resisted. But as it involves a censure upon the War Departments conducted by my colleagues, my only course is to tender my resignation. I have therefore to request that you will lay my humble resignation of the office which I have the honour to hold before the Queen, with the expression of my gratitude for Her Majesty's kindness for many years past.

"I remain, my dear Lord Aberdeen,
Yours very truly,
"J. RUSSELL."

According to my noble Friend's desire, I laid his resignation before Her Majesty, who was graciously pleased to accept it. I have said, my Lords, that I was not fully possessed of the motives—all the motives—that might have induced my noble Friend to adopt this course. I was well aware that some time ago—two months ago—my noble Friend disapproved of or was dissatisfied with the conduct of the war; but after the explanations which took place on that occasion, and his constant activity in sharing the business and preparing the measures of the Government up to the day on which Parliament reassembled, I was certainly somewhat surprised, as well as deeply concerned, at receiving the letter I have read to your Lordships. My noble Friend may be at this moment giving—at all events, it is his intention this day to give—a full explanation of his motives and of his conduct. It is not for me to do more than express—which I do most unfeignedly—the deep regret I feel at the step which he has thought it his duty to take. My Lords, no man can possibly feel more than I do the great loss which Her Majesty's Government must sustain by such an event as this. Indeed, any of your Lordships who were present must recollect that at the formation of the present Government I expressly stated that I never would have ventured to undertake the formation of an Administration, had I not secured the effective co-operation and assistance of my noble Friend. My Lords, under these circumstances, and in ordinary times, I might, perhaps, have adopted myself a different course from that which I have resolved to take; but in the present condition of the country and of public affairs, and of Her Majesty's Government, I felt it due to our own honour, to our own consistency, and to our sense of duty, to meet that motion which is to be made this night in another place, and which will decide whether a censure is to be pronounced upon Her Majesty's Government or not. Even without the great and powerful and almost indispensable assistance of my noble Friend, we have thought it due to ourselves, to meet the motion so announced, and which induced him to take the course which I have now stated.

ROMAN CATHOLIC PROCESSION IN TUAM—QUESTION

LORD BERNERS rose, pursuant to notice, to inquire whether the attention of Her Majesty's Government had been called to the public procession of Roman Catholic ecclesiastics in the town of Tuam on the 15th day of August last, wearing the habits of their order, in contravention of the 10 *Geo.* IV. c. 7; and whether any proceedings had been taken to vindicate the law, and prevent its violation in future. In bringing forward this subject, he begged to remind their Lordships that on a former occasion the noble Earl at the head of the Government, in answer to a question from his noble and gallant Friend (the Earl of Cardigan) respecting the Six-Mile Bridge affray, declared that no distinction should be made between soldiers and priests, and that while he was at the head of the Government, whether it was the case of a soldier or of a priest, of a peasant or peer, justice should be administered. The statute to which he (Lord Berners) had alluded was the Roman Catholic Relief Bill, passed in 1829, and which was received by the Roman Catholic hierarchy as a constitutional compact, which admitted Roman Catholics to the freedom of the State. Such processions as that to which his question referred were prohibited by the 7th section of that Act, which rendered Roman Catholic ecclesiastics who exercised any of the rites or ceremonies of the Roman Catholic religion, or wore the habits of their orders, save within the usual places of Roman Catholic worship, liable to a penalty of *50l.* It was considered by the late Government that there had been an infringement of the law, and they had thought it to be their duty to issue a proclamation to the effect that, while they were resolved to protect the Roman Catholic subjects of Her Majesty in the full enjoyment of their religious liberties, they were determined to repress the commission of all such offences. At another period, a question having been put to the noble Lord the Home Secretary with reference to an infringement of the law, he stated he was informed that it had occurred inadvertently, and was, therefore, passed over, but it was at the same time intimated that if there was any further infringement of the law, the statute would be strictly enforced. The person who was the originator of, and who had instigated the breach of, the law to which he (Lord Berners) was now calling their Lordships' attention, was no other than Dr. M'Hale, the self-called Archbishop of Tuam. There could be no doubt that his object was to show that he set the law of the land at defiance, and to establish in this country an authority which was incompatible with the Imperial authority of the realm. This was a person who, in the years 1826 and 1830, signed two pastoral addresses, accepting in the fullest sense the Emancipation Act as a constitutional compact between the Roman Catholics of this country and the Government. The description of the procession was contained in the *Tuam Herald* [an extract from which the noble Lord read], and a communication had been received from the resident magistrate in Tuam, stating that the substance of the report was correct. He would beg the House to reflect what the consequences of such a proceeding must be in a country like Ireland, where the feelings of the people were so excited, under the thraldom under which they were placed by the Romish priests. He had purposely abstained from alluding to the religious view of the question, but it had frequently occurred to him whether it would not be fitting for that assembly to ponder over the lesson which history had taught them, that the weal and woe of this great country had always followed the line of policy which had been adopted by the nation in promoting or discouraging the Protestant Church of which we were members.

THE EARL OF ABERDEEN begged to inform the noble Baron that the attention of the Government had been called to the procession referred to as having taken place in the town of Tuam, in the month of August last—a procession, in the opinion of many, undoubtedly in violation of the law. The Government and the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland had referred the question to the law authorities, and it appeared that this violation of the law, which the noble Baron thought so clear and unquestionable, was matter of great doubt. It was doubtful whether the law had been violated at all, and doubtful whether the facts were as they were stated; and under these circumstances their Lordships would not be surprised if his noble Friend had hesitated in instituting a prosecution on such a subject upon authority so doubtful. No doubt an ostentatious procession had taken place from the dwelling of Archbishop M'Hale to the door of the cathedral, and no doubt it had been witnessed with respect by the population; but looking at the circumstances and to the difference of opinion among the learned persons consulted, he thought that a wise discretion was exercised in not instituting a prosecution, which would not have had a probability of success. The noble Lord (Lord Berners) spoke of the possibility of a violation of the peace; but he (the Earl of Aberdeen) thought that the institution of such a prosecution would have been infinitely more likely to provoke it, and that at this moment above all others it would be unwise to raise questions of a doubtful character, which would only be certain to produce religious animosity. If the law had been perfectly plain, and the Government could have expected with certainty a successful result, there might be much force in what the noble Lord stated. But though he admitted that all laws ought to be respected and enforced, yet he could conceive of cases in which it might be wise to abstain from enforcing a law. On this occasion, at all events, he thought that a wise discretion had been exercised in abstaining from a prosecution, considering all the circumstances, and that there had been no excess or outrage, or breach of the peace, but a simple procession, which was not prohibited by the Act to which the noble Lord referred, and for which it would have been probably most difficult to procure a conviction.

Lord BERNERS said, he deeply regretted to have heard the observations of the noble Earl, especially that the law of the land might be allowed to be broken with impunity. Such cases could be drawn into precedents, and fetter succeeding Governments who might desire to enforce the law.

THE 12th AND 91st REGIMENTS —QUESTION

Earl GREY inquired whether it were true, as had been stated in the newspapers, that ships had been chartered from this country to bring home the 12th and 91st Regiments from the Cape, and that no orders to that effect having been given to the officer in command at the Cape, he had refused to allow the regiments to be embarked?

The Duke of NEWCASTLE said, the circumstances were these. In the despatch he addressed to Sir George Cathcart, at the time that the constitution was given to the Colony, he stated the amount of military force which he thought ought to remain at the Cape for a time, and also the amount to which it might be ultimately reduced. Subsequent events, however, and communications with Sir George Cathcart, had led him to believe that it would not be possible to reduce the force so rapidly as he had proposed; and on December 22, 1853, he addressed a despatch to Sir George Cathcart, intimating that the force would not be further reduced until he had had an opportunity of completing his arrangements. On the 14th of March last he received from Sir George Cathcart information that he thought it undesirable that the force should be reduced lower than 5,000 men; and though he (the Duke of Newcastle) had informed him that the 12th and 91st Regiments, which stood next for relief, should be brought home, Sir George Cathcart expressed a desire that the 12th should be left, and said that he would remove the 91st from the frontier to Cape Town, with a view to its embarkation, when ships, which probably would be calling at the Cape on their way from Australia, would bring them home. The breaking out of the war led to an alteration in these arrangements. It became impossible to relieve the 99th in Van Diemen's Land, and also desirable that the 46th, which was to have gone out to Victoria, should be retained at home, with a view to its being sent (as it ultimately was sent) to the Crimea. That being the case, it being desirable to bring home the 91st as soon as the Cape force was raised to 5,000 men, arrangements were made that the force should be raised to that amount by drafts sent from this country, in vessels which should bring home the 12th and 91st Regiments. Accordingly the *Maidstone* and the *Punjaub* were chartered for that purpose; and on the 6th June he wrote a despatch to the Lieutenant Governor of the Cape, informing him of these arrangements, and of the vessels which would be sent to bring home these regiments; and he also addressed letters on the 30th of May (a week previously) to the Admiralty and to the Horse Guards, informing the Horse Guards of the arrangement, and desiring the Admiralty that ships might be provided to bring home the troops in question. The vessels arrived at the Cape in the middle of October; but it appeared, unfortunately, that although his despatch to the Lieutenant Governor had arrived, the General in command of the forces—Major General Jackson—had not received corresponding orders from the Horse Guards; and under those circumstances, though he was informed by the Governor of the directions he had received from the Minister of War, he declined, because the drafts sent were not sufficient to raise the force to the number of 5,000 men, to allow either of the regiments referred to, to come home. He (the Duke of Newcastle) had subsequently written to him for a more complete explanation of the circumstances. But it was too true that one of the vessels sent out had come back empty, and that both would have done so had it not been for an accidental circumstance—the wreck of a vessel on its way to India, in consequence of which the other of the vessels had brought home a detachment of the 27th Regiment. With that qualification, the report referred to by the noble Earl must be admitted to be founded on fact.

THE "TIMES" CORRESPONDENT WITH THE ARMY.

THE EARL OF WINCHILSEA, in rising to call the attention of the House to the course taken by the press with respect to the war in the Crimea, said: I shall occupy your Lordships but a very few moments in drawing your attention to the subject which I am anxious to bring under your notice. I think some noble Lords may be inclined to remind me that this is one of those subjects on which "the least said the soonest mended;" and I have no doubt in my own mind that the noble Lords whom I have now the honour to address—and some, perhaps, of those who occupy the Treasury bench—may think that I have taken a bold course in venturing to place myself in opposition to the *Times* newspaper, and to risk the vituperation which no doubt I shall receive at the hands of the able writers of that journal, for daring to presume to call in question any part of the course which that journal has thought proper to adopt in reference to the war in the Crimea. But, my Lords, I never have been deterred, and I never will shrink, from boldly declaring my sentiments when I think that any part of the public press of this country outsteps its legitimate bounds, and I conscientiously believe that the course which it is pursuing is detrimental to the public interests of my country. My Lords, I am well aware how inferior I stand in point of talent and abilities to the majority of those whom I have the honour to address. I am perfectly sensible how little service I can render to my country from lack of talent and ability; but I trust I may be permitted to express my sincere hope that I have not been deficient in that moral courage which has so long adorned the House in which I have the honour of sitting, nor that I have been behind your Lordships in openly expressing, at every opportunity, my sentiments upon such subjects as may have come before us, at whatever risk and personal inconvenience. I regard this as one of the greatest blessings among many which I possess at the hands of God. It is this moral courage which enables a man to act up to his principles, and I trust that throughout life I have done so. That principle was strengthened and confirmed in me by the precepts, and, above all, by the example, of one whose memory I shall ever cherish with affection, and under whose tuition I passed my early years. Among his maxims was one which left a deep impression upon me. It was this—"Fear no man. Honestly and conscientiously do your duty in whatever state you may be placed; and God and your own conscience will support you and obviate the difficulties by which you may be surrounded." My Lords, there stands not among you a greater friend to the liberty of the press than I am. My opinion, perhaps, may not be in accordance with that of many of your Lordships, but I believe the public press has been not only of great public benefit, but, further, that it has been a great public blessing. Liberty, however, has its limits as well as everything else; and if those bounds are exceeded, liberty becomes licentiousness. I refer now to attacks upon private and public character—to those anonymous letters and attacks from which the writers, for some object or other, I will not say from cowardice, have thought proper to withhold their signatures. For my own part, in any communications I have made through the press, I have never placed a sentiment before the public to which I have not had the honesty and the boldness to attach my name. Now, my Lords, I am prepared to contend that the paper to which I have alluded—the *Times*—has exceeded the bounds of free discussion, and I am prepared to contend that it has exercised its influence against some individuals holding high situations of confidence and of trust in our army—men who are now fighting England's battles at this moment in the Crimea—in a manner most cruel and most unjust. I stand not here to vindicate the character and talents of those entrusted with the command of our armies. I am no military man myself, and I should scorn to form an opinion of the conduct of our generals until I had the fullest information. But not so the press. It is a new era in our history if the public press of this country is to send out an individual with our expeditions to comment upon all that takes place in the camp and in the field, to pass strictures on our military movements, and upon the conduct and character of those entrusted with the command of our troops, and, above all, to convey to the enemy information most dangerous to the interests of our army. My opinion is, that if a spy were within our camp, paid by all the gold with which the enemy could reward him, he could not give them more useful information, or more detrimental to the interests of our army, than the correspondent of the *Times* newspaper has afforded them. What would that great man have said whose loss is felt more and more every day? Would the Duke of Wellington have suffered such a state of things in any army which he had the command of? Would he have allowed information to be conveyed to the enemy in this way? Would he have allowed the weakness and the losses of our army and of our lines of defence, the diminution in our forces, their sickness, our loss of cavalry, and other losses, to be detailed for the information of the enemy, so as to give encouragement to our foes, to show them our weakness, and to place our army in a still more fearful situation than that in which it is now placed? As I said before, I stand not here to offer an opinion as to the military talents of the men who command our armies. But there has been an attack not only against the professional character of Sir Richard England and of Sir John Burgoyne, but against the character of that noble Lord who commands our army in the Crimea—a noble Lord with whom I have been for many years of my life acquainted, and whose friendship I am proud to say I possess. What has the *Times* stated of that noble Lord? Why, that he has no feeling, no sympathy in the sufferings and privations of the gallant men he commands, that he never is seen in the camp and among his men. A more foul, false, and malignant calumny never was levelled against the character of any man upon earth; for, if there be one man more than another who possesses a really kind heart and sympathy with those placed under him, it is the noble Lord who commands our army in the Crimea. When writers talk about his not showing himself to his army, they cannot have taken into consideration how deeply and incessantly that noble Lord must be occupied in the difficult position in which he is placed—how fully occupied he must be in directing the different departments of his army, and in commanding it in the presence of an overwhelming force of the enemy. Perhaps, indeed, he may have shrunk from witnessing the sufferings of his poor soldiers, from a conviction and a knowledge that it was neither in his power to alleviate or to remove them. But I say that the public press of this country has outstepped its province, and if it is to take upon itself the direction of the war and to pass censures upon what is done in the camp and in the field, the sooner the government of this country is placed in the hands of the press, and the sooner the noble Lords opposite abdicate their functions, the better. My earnest wish is that the Government had treated with coldness and with contempt the bitter taunts levelled against them with regard to the expedition to Sebastopol; that the Government had followed the sounder dictates of their own judgments, and had deferred the expedition until the spring, when a more powerful force might have been sent, and England might have brought into the field an army sufficiently strong to meet the Russian forces and to really besiege Sebastopol—which we have not yet done, for no place is besieged unless it is regularly invested. I believe the Government were warned of the fearful climate to which the troops would be exposed. I believe they had the opinion of many leading officers—naval and military—both in our own and the French army, that we could not send such an expedition at that time of the year without great risk to the health and to the lives of our men, and without great risk of total failure. But, returning to the main point of my observations, I want to know, if the state of things to which I have alluded is to continue, what man will take the command of an army in the field when he runs the risk of encountering such attacks arising out of offence given to the newspaper correspondent, as I cannot help thinking Lord Raglan appears to have offended in this instance? The question I wish to put to the noble Duke opposite is this—Has the correspondent of the *Times* paper in the slightest degree received the countenance of Her Majesty's Government? I do not ask the noble Duke whether the expenses attending that gentleman's transport from this country to the Crimea were defrayed by the Government; but I have been led to understand that he had a free passage out in one of Her Majesty's ships. I am further informed that this gentleman has regularly drawn rations for himself during the time he has been in the Crimea. I wish to have answers to these two questions; but I wish further to know whether the noble Duke has received any communication from Lord Raglan, as Commander of the British forces in the Crimea, stating that the course pursued by the press has been detrimental to the best interests of that army, and calling for the adoption of some means by which to prevent the evil? I hope the noble Duke will be enabled to give a satisfactory reply to these questions.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: I am sure my noble Friend will excuse me if I do not follow him upon the present occasion into any discussion as to whether we have been taunted by the press into undertaking the expedition to the Crimea prematurely, and have placed the English army in any danger in consequence. My noble Friend upon the cross-bench (Lord Lyndhurst) has given notice of a very stringent Motion upon this subject for Friday next, and it will be my duty, on that occasion, to vindicate the Government from any such charges, quite irrespective of the conduct of the press. My noble Friend and the House will probably forgive me, therefore, if, upon the present occasion, I am not led into that discussion which, towards the close of his observations, my noble Friend rather seemed to anticipate. I concur with my noble Friend that the press of this country has not acted upon all occasions with judgment and discretion. I would say, indeed, that I think it has acted with great lack of judgment and of discretion in publishing information which it has on various occasions communicated, not to the people of this country—for, if that was all, I should rejoice at every information which could possibly be given, be it good or bad—but in publishing information which we must recollect has been conveyed at the same time, and that, too, with the greatest rapidity, to the Emperor of Russia. I believe it to be the fact that there are persons in this country who are in the habit of communicating to the Emperor of Russia by telegraph information which is published by the press of this country in the morning, so that that information may be known at St. Petersburg in the course of that very day. I say, then, that I do think the press of this country—though I will not impute to them a want of patriotism—have evinced a want of discretion in the way in which they have published intelligence from the army. My noble Friend asks me whether the correspondent of one particular paper has received from the Government any encouragement or assistance in the functions which he has performed in the course of the expedition, and he has pointed out two allegations which have been made to him—one, that the individual in question has, with the concurrence of the Government, drawn rations with the army in the East, and that, secondly, he was afforded a free passage on his way out with the army. As it is first, in point of time, I will first address myself to the latter allegation. It is perfectly true that an individual, who was certainly not entitled to give such a permission, did intimate that in one of the vessels—I think it was the first vessel which sailed from this country—which was to convey troops to Malta, the gentleman referred to might have a free passage. Before, however, that vessel sailed the fact came under the notice of the Government, and we sent down express to Southampton or to Portsmouth—I forget, for the moment, which of those two places—a message stating that it was contrary to rule—that vessels were taken up for the conveyance of troops alone, and that the gentleman—who was, I believe, at that moment, on board the vessel—must leave. Accordingly that gentleman did leave the vessel and went in his own way, and of course at his own expense, to Malta. I hope I have satisfactorily disposed of this question. Now, with regard to the second statement—as to rations. If this question had been put to me at the beginning of the month of December, I should have given my noble Friend as positive a contradiction as I have been enabled to give to the other one of the statements he has repeated. I answer in these terms for this reason—that it has been my duty to give such an answer, of course under the thorough conviction that that answer was a perfectly true one. At the commencement of December applications were made to me by the editors of two newspapers in this country, requesting that their correspondents in the Crimea might receive rations along with the troops. It was my duty to inform such applicants that it would be contrary to all the rules of the Commissariat service to grant their requests—that no persons could receive rations unless they were present with the army upon public duty, and that, therefore, it was quite impossible that such assistance as they asked for could be afforded. A rejoinder was made by one of these gentlemen, to the effect that the correspondent of one of the London papers was already in the enjoyment of this privilege. It so happened that I had had an opportunity, not long before, of conversing with a friend who had been in the Crimea, and, upon his authority, I positively contradicted that statement. Just before the meeting of Parliament, however, I received an intimation from another gentleman who had come from the Crimea of such a nature as led me immediately to make further inquiries. It is right that I should here state, what is already before your Lordships in the papers I have presented, that it was only in the course of December that the Commissariat came under my immediate management. It was about the middle of December that the arrangement took effect, and, consequently, I was not personally cognisant of the details of the business transacted in that department. The fact is undoubtedly that, by a private permission given by the head of this department of the Treasury, the correspondent in question has received rations from the Commissariat. I can only say that the moment it came to my notice that such a permission had been given, I intimated, through my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the disapproval of the Government at the course which had been taken, and I should certainly hope that that course has since been pursued which ought to be taken—namely, that the privilege in question has been abandoned. I wish, my Lords, that these circumstances should be distinctly understood, and if your Lordships think I have erred, I wish, at all events, the fact should be known that, under the circumstances, I did not think it was fair at once to give a peremptory order that the privilege should be withdrawn. I have trusted to the good feeling of the gentleman referred to at once to abandon a privilege which certainly, according to the rules of the service, ought never to have been conferred upon him. At the same time, I have signified my positive displeasure and disapproval of any such exception having been made. It is not only in reference to this gentleman or to any individual traveller; the Commissariat ought never to give out rations at all under such circumstances. As far as I am individually concerned, therefore, and as far as the Government is concerned, such a course will not be continued, and if this gentleman has not withdrawn from the receipt of rations, undoubtedly it will be the duty of the Government to issue a positive injunction upon that subject. My noble Friend asked me, further, whether I had received any complaint from Lord Raglan with reference to the information which had been conveyed to the enemy by the publication of articles, or rather of correspondence, in the newspapers? I have received such representations from Lord Raglan. The first which I received from him was on the 5th or 6th of December. He sent me an extract from a newspaper, pointing out how admirably the writer had—no doubt, unwittingly—managed to assist the objects of the enemy, and to thwart the objects of the allied army; and he applied to me to use my influence to endeavour to prevent a recurrence of that. Upon receiving this communication I took a step which, I believe, a Minister of the Crown is not justified in taking except in very extreme cases indeed. I addressed myself to the editors of the newspaper press of London, requesting that they would abstain from publishing such intelligence as might be useful to the enemy, and so prejudicial to the operations of our own army. It was the first time I ever made such an application, and I should not have done so—feeling the impossibility of attempting to interfere peremptorily—if I had not absolutely felt it my duty to interpose in a friendly spirit to endeavour to obtain so great an object. As I before said, I wrote to the editors of the London press, stating the nature of the complaints made by Lord Raglan, pointing out the inconvenience which had arisen, and appealing to their patriotism and sense of duty to exercise a vigilant control over communications not only from their own correspondents, but over the private letters received by them, which are in many instances doubtless as mischievous, if not more so, than the letters of newspaper correspondents, and urgently requesting them to put a stop to the mischief which resulted from such publication. From some of the conductors of journals thus addressed I received no answers, but those I did receive were of a most courteous description, promising that the greatest care should be taken for the future. I can only say I do regret that the courteous promises contained in these letters have not been as completely and as thoroughly fulfilled as, I must say, I had reason to expect; for Lord Raglan has had occasion to make another complaint, which I received only the day before yesterday, pointing out reports of the same character proceeding from the same quarter on the 18th of December. I deeply deplore these facts, but it will not be my duty to make a similar communication again, and I can only regret that my first communication has not been so successful as I had reason—on the part of the public, and not in any way on my own account—to anticipate. I shall rejoice, indeed, if the remarks made by my noble Friend this evening induce these gentlemen in future to exercise greater control over their correspondents and over themselves, and to abstain from publishing facts which, however much they may interest the public here, must be most prejudicial to our army by the information communicated, not merely to the Emperor of Russia, but, with the greatest possible rapidity, to the commanders of the enemy's forces in the Crimea.

THE EARL OF HARROWBY was understood to say that he had been informed that a meeting of the correspondents of the newspapers had taken place, and that Lord Raglan, or some one in his behalf, had addressed them all, and remonstrated with them as to communicating information which might be detrimental to the allies and useful to the enemy; that some one of these gentlemen had used insolent and arrogant language, and that Lord Raglan had found it necessary to send him out of the camp. He understood further that all the newspapers but one had given Lord Raglan an assurance that they would not communicate anything detrimental to the service. That gentleman said he was under no obligation whatever to observe secrecy; that he was sent there to report what fell under his observation. He believed that a second remonstrance had also been made, urging upon those gentlemen the propriety of being more discreet.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE stated, that he had understood that Lord Raglan had, either by himself or through others, remonstrated with some of the individuals who were the correspondents of newspapers in the Crimea, but he was not aware of the circumstance of any of those gentlemen having used arrogant or insolent language in reply, or of their having been subsequently sent out of the camp. If any gentleman had so conducted himself, after having been remonstrated with in a proper form and upon sufficient grounds, he should, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, consider Lord Raglan as fully justified in sending such person out of the camp; and most undoubtedly that noble Lord would be supported by the Government if he should consider it his duty, under such circumstances, to remove any correspondent of a newspaper from the camp.

THE EARL OF DERBY stated, that in the course of the observations just made by the noble Duke, he had said that the Commissariat Department had not been handed over to his control until the middle of December. Now, on the 18th of December, a Motion was made in that House for the production of copies of any Order in Council respecting the establishment of the separate departments of the Secretary of State and the War Department, and of any correspondence which had taken place between the departments on the subject. In consequence of that Motion, which was at once acceded to on the part of the Government, papers had been laid upon the table of the House, from which it appeared that somewhere about the 12th of June the office of Secretary of State for the War Department was constituted, and the noble Duke was appointed by an Order in Council. With respect to correspondence on the subject, only one paper had been produced, and that was a Treasury minute dated the 22nd of December, four days after the Motion was made, and which could not, therefore, be referred to at the time the Motion was made. Was the House to understand that from the 10th of June to the 22nd of December, no correspondence whatever had taken place on the subject, or that no record existed of it, and that no arrangements had been made regarding the functions of the Secretary of State for the War Department, as constituted by the Order in Council of the 10th of June, with the exception of the letter of Sir Charles Trevelyan, produced in compliance with the Motion of the 18th of December?

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: The noble Earl had, as usual, in addition to putting his question, endeavoured to draw unfavourable inferences from circumstances which he had but imperfectly stated; he had, however, no objection to answer the question. When the noble Earl moved for a copy of the minute to which he had referred, and of other papers on the subject, he (the Duke of Newcastle) mentioned this Treasury minute as being then in existence. It did undoubtedly bear date four days after the Motion was made, but it had been prepared at least three weeks previously. When the noble

Earl gave notice of his Motion, he (the Duke of Newcastle) was perfectly cognisant of the contents of the minute, and he had every reason to believe that it had passed the usual assent of the Treasury. But those who were acquainted with the mode of conducting business in the Treasury knew that, although the First Lord and the Chancellor of the Exchequer in reality controlled the minutes of this description, it was necessary to pass them by the junior Lords before proper validity could be attached to the minute; and from this circumstance it occurred that, although the minute in question had been previously approved by the heads of the Government, still the minute bore date, according to the Treasury rules, several days later than the day on which his noble Friend brought forward his Motion. The noble Earl wished to know whether any other communications had passed with respect to the arrangements of the military departments. When the noble Earl made his Motion in December, he expressly stated that he did not of course refer to any private correspondence which must in all cases pass between the heads of departments before so important a change could be effected. No doubt a very considerable amount of private correspondence had passed between the various departments on the subject of the establishment of a Secretaryship for war; but the only official document was the Treasury minute which had already been presented to the House. It was not usual to communicate to the House communications which were, generally speaking, of a confidential character, and he thought it would be unadvisable at the present moment that such communications should be produced. With respect to the transference of the Commissariat to the War Department, although the two Secretaryships were divided in June, still it was not until December that the unfortunate Secretary represented in his person had a room in which to put his head, and he was conducting his business as best he could in two rooms lent to him by the noble Earl at the head of the Government. Under such circumstances he refused to undertake the duties of the Commissariat Department, which, being nominally under his direction, would be actually under the direct control of another department. Such a state of things would be neither fair towards that branch of the service nor to himself, and it was not therefore until offices had been provided for him that the duties of the

Commissariat had been transferred to him.

Lord VIVIAN was understood to ask the name of the officer in the Commissariat Department who had allowed the *Times* correspondent to use army rations.

The Duke of NEWCASTLE stated, that it was not usual for the Government to cast any blame upon its subordinate officers, and, as far as possible, it was the duty of the Government to assume the blame of all transactions to themselves; still at the same time the instructions in respect to the correspondent of one of the newspapers being of a private nature, and being decidedly unauthorised, and therefore unprotected by the usual good official rule, he could not under such circumstances decline mentioning the name of the gentleman who had given instructions—it was Sir Charles Trevelyan.

House adjourned to Monday next.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Friday, January 26, 1855.

Minutes.] New Member Sworn.—For Fermanagh, Hon. Henry Arthur Cole.
Public Bill.—1° Friendly Societies.

RESIGNATION OF LORD JOHN RUSSELL.

Lord JOHN RUSSELL: Sir, at the request of my noble Friend at the head of the Government, I have postponed to this day the statement I wish to make with respect to my resignation of the office which I lately had the honour to hold—that of President of the Council. I shall go at once to the matter, fearing that the statement I have to make may be prolonged more than I could wish it should be. On Tuesday last, when I was present in this House, the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) gave notice of a Motion for a Select Committee—

> "To Inquire into the condition of our Army before Sebastopol, and into the conduct of those Departments of the Government whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of that Army."

Sir, I of course had thought it probable some Member might move for an inquiry of that kind. I had not, however, fully considered the course that I ought to take; that depended much on the nature of the Motion that might be made, and I should say, likewise, that it depended much on the quarter from which it might come. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Sheffield, it is evident, is in a position to evince no hostility to the Government which he has supported, and I could not conceive that he had any other object than that which we have all at heart—the vigorous prosecution of the war. Now, Sir, with respect to the power of inquiry, it is a most valuable privilege of this House. This House has no power of appointment, no power of directing the measures that may be taken; but by the power of inquiry it corrects abuses, it reforms maladministration, and strengthens those establishments which it may seem for the time to shake. A Motion for inquiry, however, may be resisted on two grounds—the one, that there are no evils existing of sufficient magnitude to call for inquiry; the other, that sufficient means have been taken to remedy those evils, and that they will be best cured by other means than by a resort to the inquisitorial powers of this House. Now, Sir, with respect to the first of these grounds which I have stated, it is obvious that it was impossible to be resorted to. No one can deny the melancholy condition of our army before Sebastopol. The accounts which arrive from that quarter every week are not only painful, but horrible and heart-rending; and I am sure no one would oppose for a moment any measure that would be likely—if not entirely to cure—even to do anything to mitigate those evils. Sir, I must say that there is something, with all the official knowledge to which I have had access, that to me is inexplicable in the state of our army. If I had been told as a reason against the expedition to the Crimea last year that your troops would be seven miles from the sea—seven miles from a secure port—which at that time, when we had in contemplation the expedition, we hardly hoped to possess—and that at that seven miles' distance they would be in want of food, of clothing, and of shelter, to such a degree that they would perish at the rate of from ninety to a hundred a day, I should have considered such a prediction as utterly preposterous, and such a picture of the expedition as entirely fanciful and absurd. We are all, however, forced to confess the notoriety of that melancholy state of things. It was not, therefore, by denying the existence of the evils that I could hope to induce this House to reject the proposition of the hon. and learned Gentleman. But, Sir, I had further to reflect that I was in a position not to give a faint "No" to the proposal—not to express in vague and equivocal language a wish that the Motion should not be carried, or to use any evasion with respect to the letter of its terms with a view to defeat the Motion. It was my duty—a duty which, I trust, I have ever performed when in that situation—to stand in the front of the battle, and manfully to take my part in opposing the appointment of that Committee. Then, Sir, I had to consider whether I might not give the second reason for refusing the Committee to which I have alluded—namely, that measures had been taken, that arrangements were in progress, by which those evils would be remedied, and by which the administration of the war would be vigorously and, as was to be hoped, successfully prosecuted. Sir, I should have been more disposed to give that reason, because it is obvious that the concession of a Committee on the subject—a Committee sitting for weeks, perhaps for months—would be fatal to the efficiency of those military departments which it would chiefly affect. There was, therefore, the strongest inducement, if possible, to put forward such an objection to the inquiry which the hon. and learned Gentleman proposed to make. But, Sir, I found upon reflection that it was impossible for me to urge with effect, and according to my own conscience, and with truth, that objection to the proposition for a Committee.

I hope the House will here permit me to refer to some circumstances personal to myself, though they hardly come within the scope of the statement I have to make. When the office of Secretary of State for War was separated from the office of Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Earl of Aberdeen thought it right to propose to the Duke of Newcastle to keep which of the two offices he should most desire; and the Duke of Newcastle, with a commendable ambition, as I think, replied that, having exerted himself in fitting out a very large expedition, he should, of course, like to remain at the head of the department which should have the direction of the orders of that expedition and the general management of the war. The Earl of Aberdeen consented to that arrangement, and I was a concurring party to the appointment. At the end of the Session, the various Members of the Government, especially those who are Members of this House, dispersed, as they usually do; and it appears to me that that dispersion, after the excessive labours of this House, is so necessary to the due performance of their duties, that no one, unless he is in charge of very urgent duties, is to blame for resorting for purposes of health to distant parts of the country. I was not in any office which obliged me to take any part in the conduct of the war; but, during my absence, there was scarcely a day in which I did not both receive from, and write a letter to, my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with respect to the occurrences that were daily taking place. It has been said, that I went lecturing about the country at that time. The truth is, an hon. Friend of mine, the Member for Bristol (Mr. H. Berkeley), had said, on the day this House separated for the holidays, that it would give great gratification to his friends at Bristol if I would attend the meeting of a literary society in that place; and the day was named between us. Then, when I was coming from the north, and being at the house of my brother, he informed me that his neighbours in Bedford would be gratified if I would attend a literary meeting in that town. I complied with these two requests, which certainly did not exhaust much time, or call for much study with respect to what I had to say. I conceive, however, that, as President of the Council, these meetings were not very alien from the duty of promoting education. It has, nevertheless, been cast on me as an imputation that I attended to the request of these gentlemen. But, passing from that to a more important point, I have to state that, having attended all the Cabinet Councils that met on the subject of the war, I wrote to my noble Friend (the Earl of Aberdeen) at the time that I supposed there would be Cabinet meetings—at the beginning of October—that I should be ready to attend them whenever they met. My noble Friend, in reply, informed me that he should not return from Scotland till the 14th of October, and on the 17th of October a Cabinet Council was held, which I thought it my duty to attend. But in the course of that month, and from the beginning of the month of November, it struck me that a better administration of affairs relating to the war was required. I made up my mind with considerable difficulty. I was loth to stir up any difference on a subject that affected, in some degree, the reputation of a colleague who had not long before assumed the office which he held; but, still, I thought that duty imperatively called upon me to state my views, and a correspondence ensued between my noble Friend at the head of the Government and myself, from which I shall be obliged to read some extracts in order to put the House in possession of the ground on which I came to the decision at which I arrived on Tuesday evening last. The correspondence itself is long, and enters into the details of some personal matters it is quite unnecessary to quote; but, as it is, I must request the House to listen to the representations which I thought it necessary to make, and to the answers I received. I wished, if possible, to put the matter in a light that would bear rather the air of a different official arrangement than any displacement of individuals. I, therefore, stated the question of the War Department in two points of view—the one as referring to an arrangement which it was necessary to make, in consequence of the pledge given to this House last Session, that the whole of the War Department should be considered with a view to arrangements which should provide for its efficiency; and the other point of view, that which related to the carrying on of the war. With respect to the first point, I said I thought it was of the utmost importance that a person of the rank of Privy Councillor should hold office in this House, upon whom should devolve the moving of the War Estimates, and who should be an authority able to answer the various difficult questions which it was to be foreseen would come before the House. I will not trouble the House with any details on that part of the subject; but I proposed that the office of Secretary of State for War and the office of Secretary at War should be held by the same person. In a letter addressed to the Earl of Aberdeen on the 17th of November, 1854, I said—

"From the other point of view the prospect is equally clear. We are in the midst of a great war. In order to carry on that war with efficiency, either the Prime Minister must be constantly urging, hastening, completing the military preparations, or the Minister of War must be strong enough to control other departments. Every objection of other Ministers—the plea of foreign interests to be attended to, of naval preparations not yet complete, and a thousand others, justifiable in the separate heads of departments, must be forced to yield to the paramount necessity of carrying on the war with efficiency of each service, and completeness of means to the end in view. . . . . If, therefore, the first consideration here presented lead to the conclusion that the Secretary of State for the War Department must be in the House of Commons, the latter considerations point to the necessity of having in that office a man who, from experience of military details, from inherent vigour of mind, and from weight with the House of Commons, can be expected to guide the great operations of war with authority and success. There is only one person belonging to the Government who combines these advantages—my conclusion is, that before Parliament meets Lord Palmerston should be entrusted with the Seals of the War Department."

That is the opinion I gave, confidentially, to the Earl of Aberdeen. Before I read the Earl of Aberdeen's answer, I have to say that, the Earl of Aberdeen having requested some days to consider a matter of such importance, I wrote to him again on the 18th of November, stating that I concurred in that delay, adding—

> "I wish, however, that before you decide you should show my letter to the Duke of Newcastle. It was my intention in writing the letter to avoid throwing any blame upon him. Indeed, I think he deserves very great credit for the exertions he has made. But he has not had the authority requisite for so great a sphere, and has not been able to do all that might have been done with larger powers of control."

To my letter Lord Aberdeen replied—misstating my proposition, I must say—that he could not acquiesce in the proposal I had made. On the 21st of November he writes thus—

> "Your proposal being founded on the supposed impropriety of Herbert moving the Estimates, and the consequent necessity of the Secretary of State for War being in the House of Commons, renders the removal of the Duke of Newcastle from his present office unavoidable. But, although you would regard this as the inevitable result of an official arrangement, it is not to be supposed that it would be considered in this light by the public, or, indeed, by any impartial person. The dislocation of the Government would be so great, and the reason assigned for it apparently so inadequate, that it could only be considered as a mode of substituting one man for another. Although you may be far from entertaining any such desire, the transaction could receive no other interpretation. In justice to the Duke, I do not think that his colleagues, without very strong grounds, would wish to place him in such a position."

In the other parts of his letter the Earl of Aberdeen states that he did not think any man would undertake the duties which I proposed should be undertaken by one person—namely, those of Secretary of State for the War Department, and, at the same time, Secretary at War. He considered it to be necessary that a Privy Councillor should be continued in the latter, and that that office should be held in connection with the finances of the Army, independently of the Secretary of State for the War Department. He stated also—a consideration well deserving of attention—that it might be desirable that hereafter some military chief, who might be a Member of the House of Lords, should have the office, and, therefore, it could not be always held by a Member of the House of Commons. I considered the various objections of the Earl of Aberdeen, and on the 28th of November I wrote as follows—

> "I come, therefore, having cleared the ground of all these obstructions, to the real question, what are the requirements of the great war in which we are engaged? Setting aside all historical references, both on your part and mine, I think it is clear either that the Prime Minister must be himself the active and moving spirit of the whole machine, or the Minister of War must have delegated authority to control other departments. Neither is the case under the present arrangement."

I went on to give some instances of errors that had been committed, I thought, owing to that want of power and control. I then said—

> "The Cabinet has, it is true, in its recent meetings, done much to repair omissions; but a Cabinet is a cumbrous and unwieldy instrument for carrying on war. It can furnish suggestions, or make a decision upon a measure submitted to it, but it cannot administer. What you want, therefore, I repeat, is a Minister of War of vigour and authority. As the welfare of the empire and the success of our present conflict are concerned, I have no scruple in saying so. Keep up, if you think right, as a temporary arrangement, a Secretary at War. Make it clear that it is temporary —that is to say, only to last till more complete consolidation can take place; but let Parliament and the country be assured that you have placed the conduct of the war in the hands of the fittest man who can be found for that duty."

In answer to this, I received a long letter from Lord Aberdeen, which I shall read to the House. It is dated November 30, 1854, and is as follows:—

> "After all, I think your letter plainly reduces the question to the simple issue of a personal preference, and the substitution of one man for another. In answer to my suggestion that some consideration was due to the Duke on the part of his colleagues, you say that you understood the Administration was founded on the principle of doing what was best for the public service, without regard to the self-love or even the acquired position of individuals. Undoubtedly this was the case; and I fully agree in thinking that the Duke of Newcastle would be the last man to wish for any exception to this rule in his favour. But I must observe that at the formation of the Government no such office as the War Department was contemplated; and when, subsequently, the Colonial Office was divided, no objection whatever was made to the choice of the War Department by the Duke; nor, as far as I am aware up to this moment, to his management of the office. Now, I think you will admit that, although another per-

son might perhaps have been preferred on the first constitution of an office, it is a very different thing to displace a man who has discharged its duties ably and honourably, merely in the belief that another might be found still more efficient. Undoubtedly, the public service must be the first object; but, in the absence of any proved defect or alleged incapacity, I can see no sufficient reason for such a change, which, indeed, I think is forbidden by a sense of justice and good faith. . . . . On the whole, then, believing that any change like that proposed would be of doubtful advantage to the public, feeling very strongly that it would be an act of unfairness and injustice towards a colleague, and thinking, also, that all such changes, unless absolutely necessary, only tend to weaken a Government, I must repeat that I could not honestly recommend it to the Queen."

Lord Aberdeen spoke to me afterwards on this subject, and asked me when I intended to bring the question before the Cabinet; and I, certainly after a good deal of hesitation, told him that, as he had said he could not honestly recommend that change to the Queen, and as I did not wish to do anything which might tend to disturb his Government and remove him from office, I should not press the matter further. I should say that my hesitation arose very much in consequence of the opinion of other high authorities, with whom I for years—during the whole of my political life perhaps—have been living in the closest intimacy, who told me they thought the change unadvisable, and that it would weaken that which I meant to strengthen, and who therefore advised that I should not press it. Now, when I stand here to justify my resignation, and when I am told as I have been, that I have acted prematurely, I own that the doubt that presses on my mind is whether I ought not at that time to have brought the question of this change to an issue. But among those who urged me not to do so was the noble Lord himself, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, who at the time when the correspondence took place was absent, but to whom I afterwards read it. He urged me, considering the objection which had been made by Lord Aberdeen, not to press the matter any further.

Sir, that being the case with respect to men, I had further to consider what was the case with respect to measures. I have reminded the House that last year a pledge was given that a new arrangement would be made of the military departments, with the view of rendering them more efficient. I have had the honour of serving on two commissions having for their object the consolidation and improvement of those departments. Various commissions have reported from time to time, that it was expedient that such a consolidation should be carried into effect. It is now, I think, twenty-two years since the first of them was appointed. At the commencement of the war, then, that which before had been expedient became urgent and necessary, and that consideration to which I have referred was due to the interests of the public and to the fulfilment of the engagements which had been entered into with this House. The only change I was able to announce in the Session before Christmas was that the Commissariat was placed under the War Minister. With respect to any further change I heard no mention until a proposal was made in the Cabinet—I think on Saturday last. I reflected on that proposal, and I then went to my noble Friend at the head of the Government, and told him that, after considering the proposal, I thought it incomplete and inefficient; I gave him also a paper containing my own views on the subject. This, the House will observe, was very lately; but I had no reason to expect that my views would be adopted. I had therefore to consider, when I came to reflect upon the Tuesday evening on the course to be taken on the following Thursday, whether I could fairly and honestly say, "It is true that evils have arisen; it is true that the brave men who fought at the Alma, at Inkerman, and at Balaklava, are perishing many of them from neglect; it is true that the heart of the whole of England throbs with anxiety and sympathy on this subject; but I can tell you that such arrangements have been made—that a man of such vigour and efficiency has taken the conduct of the War Department, with such a consolidation of offices as to enable him to have the entire and instant control of the whole of the war offices, so that any supply may be immediately furnished and any abuse instantly remedied." I felt I could not honestly make such a declaration. I could not say, after what I had written—and I only mention this in passing, because I think nobody will impute it as blame to my noble Friend Lord Aberdeen, as he had not taken an active part in the direction of the war—I could not say that there was a person with such power and control, and of sufficient energy of mind and acquaintance with details, at the head of the War Department. I could not say either that the arrangement which had been proposed on Saturday last—that of the consolidation of the military departments—had either been carried into effect or was in prospect in such a way that I could pledge the faith of Government to the efficiency of the arrangement. Well, feeling this—giving the matter the most painful attention — feeling also, as I have already said, that I could give no faint nor faltering opposition to the proposition of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, and that I must get up, if I opposed it at all, and stand in the way of that which many would think might afford a remedy for those sufferings and distresses which had been complained of, or, at least, if it failed in doing that, might point out a way for their correction and remedy—feeling, too, that many Members of this House would look for an assurance on my part as that to which I have referred, and would act upon my assurance that such a provision would be made—knowing that many did so honour me with their confidence, I felt that I should be repaying that confidence with treachery if I gave an assurance of the kind, knowing it not to be justified by fact. Well, it appeared to me, no doubt, that the Members of the Government could hardly remain in office if such a Committee as the one proposed were appointed; that it would not be, I will not say dignified, but that it would not be consistent with the practical good working of our institutions, that there should be a Minister sitting on that bench — the Ministerial bench — to govern the war, and that the military departments should be at the same time constantly overlooked and checked by a Committee sitting upstairs; and that the Minister for War should have not only to consider what he was to do in order to provide for the urgent necessities of the war, and to attend to applications for the requisitions which came from day to day, but should also have to consider the evidence to be adduced with respect to his conduct five or six months ago. Such a state of things could not be consistent with the efficiency of our administrative system. I, therefore, felt that I could come only to one conclusion, and that as I could not resist inquiry, by giving the only assurances which I thought sufficient to prevent it, my duty was not to remain any longer a Member of the Government. It would be competent for others, if they thought either that everything necessary had already been done, or would be done, consistently to oppose the Motion for inquiry; but for my own part I felt that I could not do so, and I therefore wrote in very short terms, not quite accurately stating the terms of the Motion, a note to the following effect—

> "Chesham Place, Jan. 23, 1855.
>
> "My dear Lord Aberdeen—Mr. Roebuck has given notice of a Motion to inquire into the conduct of the war. I do not see how this Motion is to be resisted; but, as it involves a censure upon the War Departments, with which some of my colleagues are connected, my only course is to tender my resignation. I, therefore, have to request you will lay my humble resignation of the office which I have the honour to hold before the Queen, with the expression of my gratitude for Her Majesty's kindness for many years.
>
> "I remain, my dear Lord Aberdeen,
> "Yours very truly,
> "J. RUSSELL."

To that note I received no answer; but on the following evening my noble Friend informed me that he had been to Windsor with my resignation, and that Her Majesty had been pleased to accept it, with the gracious expression of her great concern in doing so. This, then, so far as this immediate statement is concerned, is my case with respect to my own conduct. Those Ministers who believe that they can successfully oppose inquiry—who believe that they are right in respect to what has been done and what is doing—will be perfectly justified in taking the part of opposing the Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman. I should have been out of place in taking such a course. But, at the same time, I must say that I have heard that there is a rumour, and, I hope, a true one, that the arrangement which I proposed in my first letter, of the 17th of November, or rather in my subsequent letter, namely, that of placing the seals of the War Department in the hands of the noble Lord the Home Secretary, has been made. I shall greatly rejoice if that is the case, for I believe it will be of great benefit to the country that my noble Friend (Viscount Palmerston) should hold that office. I shall be glad to think that my retirement from office has in any way contributed to that change, and I believe it must in some way have contributed to it; for, otherwise, I have no doubt that my noble Friend (the Earl of Aberdeen), with the fairness and candour which belong to him, and which I always found in him, would have answered the letter I have just read, by saying that circumstances had in some respect changed, and that that which he could not honestly recommend to the Queen in November he had thought necessary at the present time; and that, therefore, my difficulty in opposing the Motion of inquiry might be in some degree lessened, if not entirely removed. That cannot have been the case. This must have been a subsequent arrangement, and I shall be very glad if my retirement from the less important office, in the present conjuncture, of President of the Council could have led to the appointment to the War Department of my noble Friend the Home Secretary, of whom I cannot speak in higher terms than I have already used in one of my letters.

Having, Sir, stated thus much with respect to my own position and the position of the Government, I have not regularly any right to go further; but as, perhaps, I shall take no part in the debate on the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, and as it is not my intention even to give a vote on the question, I may be permitted to say somewhat more in reference to the present state of public affairs. I should state, in the first place, that I believe that all parties in this House, without distinction—for I will make no distinction whatever—are anxious that the war should be carried on, as the meeting at Leeds declared, by the most vigorous measures, until we can obtain a just and honourable peace; and I repeat my opinion that those measures which are the most vigorous for the prosecution of the war, and those terms of peace which are most decidedly and unquestionably just and honourable, will meet with the most favour from all parties in this House. I thoroughly believe that if any triumph attends Her Majesty's arms, those who are in opposition to the Earl of Aberdeen's Government will as heartily rejoice in that triumph as those who have supported it. This, at least, gives great facilities to the Government at present for carrying on the war with success. What further I have to say is, that I do not think that the general aspect of affairs abroad at all warrants the depression which I see it has in some quarters produced. No doubt the accounts which we have received from our camp before Sebastopol are gloomy and disheartening; but, with respect to the great objects of the war in which we are engaged, I believe that our prospects are by no means gloomy. When I spoke on a former occasion with reference to Austria, my language was most erroneously construed as depreciating the conduct and intentions of that Power. Now, I wish to give every credit and importance to that which Austria has done. It is in consequence of the large armaments she has made, the equipment of her Army to the extent of 500,000 men, the entrenchment and strengthening of points which were weak, and the raising of an enormous force of cavalry—it is in consequence of these preparations that the Emperor of Russia has abated much of his pretensions, that he has been induced to consent to propositions which, in August last, he utterly rejected, and that he is now willing to consider whether or not he will make those concessions which are necessary for the purpose of procuring peace. We have, therefore, in a great degree owing to the admirable ability, and, still more, the admirable patience, exhibited by Lord Clarendon in his negotiations, obtained the advantage of Austria throwing her weight into negotiations, with the assurance that if a peace, such as she thinks safe for Europe, cannot be obtained, she will act in the field with the allies, bringing with her the aid of 500,000 men to the armies now employed. We have, in the next place, to rely, without the smallest hesitation or doubt, on the fidelity of our ally the Emperor of the French, of whose good faith, besides all other actions and all other assurances, I saw and heard such proofs during my last residence in his capital, that I cannot have the slightest hesitation in assuring the House that the two countries of England and France will remain united to the end of this great struggle. Well, Sir, with these advantages I think we may hope to see one of two things—one, no doubt, more desirable than the other; but the other, at the same time, an honourable course, and one from which we should not shrink:—either the Emperor of Russia will make those concessions which will be just and honourable for England, for France, and for the safety of Europe; or, if he should fail in making those concessions, that there will be such a force of European armies collected against him that final triumph must attend our arms. I could not help expressing this conviction on the present occasion; because I think that, whoever may be Minister, he may rely, first, on the patriotic zeal and loyalty of this House, and next on the unflinching alliance of the Emperor of the French, and, thirdly, on the assistance of the Emperor of Austria, if honourable terms of peace cannot be obtained.

Perhaps I may be permitted to say, as I have now left the Earl of Aberdeen's Government, that I cannot refrain on this occasion from quoting the words of Sir Robert Peel, with respect to that noble Lord, and also from declaring that, in my opinion, they are fully justified. When Sir Robert Peel was leaving office he said—

> "My noble Friend has dared to avow that there is a moral obligation upon the Christian Minister of a Christian country to exhaust every effort for the maintenance of peace before incurring a risk, not to say the guilt of war. But while he has not shrunk from the manly avowal of that opinion, I will, in justice to him, add this—and it is perfectly consistent with that opinion as to the moral obligation of maintaining peace, while peace can be maintained with honour—that there never was a Minister less inclined to sacrifice any essential interest, or to abate anything from the dignity and honour of this country, even for the purpose of securing that inestimable blessing."

I believe the opinion thus expressed by Sir Robert Peel to be perfectly just. My noble Friend entered into this war not until it was necessary; and it was only a few days ago that I had a long conversation with him on the terms on which peace might be satisfactorily concluded; and I must say I entirely concurred in all he said, and that I have the fullest reliance that he will not concur in any peace which is not just and honourable, and which would not be approved by the general opinion and feeling of this country.

Perhaps I may also say a few words with respect to the Government I have left, and for joining which I have been often taunted. I cannot but say, Sir, that I look back to my association with many of the measures and acts of that Administration with great pride and satisfaction. I look back, above all, with the greatest pride and satisfaction to that speech of eloquence and wisdom delivered by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer when proposing his financial scheme two years ago, and in maintenance of what I believe to be the true principles of finance. It is a satisfaction to me to think that the splendour of that exhibition was so great as to shed some portion of its brilliancy on those who were his colleagues. I know, Sir, it was said, at the time when that Administration was formed, that those with whom I had always been connected—the Whig party—had not, in the distribution of power, that share of influence that properly belonged to them on account of their character, their abilities, and their numbers. It always appeared to me, before that period, that a very unjust notion had found its way into the public mind to a very great extent—namely, that the Whig party was an exclusive party, and required all power and office for itself, and was not prepared to support any system of Administration in which it did not enjoy that monopoly. I must say I think that opinion is an unjust one, and that the conduct of the Whig party during the last two years fully justifies my opinion. I will venture to say that no set of men ever behaved with greater honour or more disinterested patriotism than those—I might say the whole—of the Whig party, who, during the whole of that period, have supported the Government of the Earl of Aberdeen. It is my pride, and it will ever be my pride to the last day of my life, to have belonged to a party which, as I conceive, upholds the true principles of freedom and the just influence of the people; and, whether in or out of office, it will be my constant endeavour to preserve the principles and to tread in the paths which the great Whig party have laid down for the guidance of their conduct.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: Sir, I cannot allow the address of my noble Friend to pass without some observation on the part of Her Majesty's Government. I must, in the first place, assure my noble Friend and the House that nothing could be more painful to me, either officially or personally, than the step which my noble Friend thought it his duty to take in separating himself from the Government of which we were both Members. There have, no doubt, at particular times, been temporary differences between my noble Friend and myself, which may, for a time, have appeared to estrange us from each other; but I can assure him and the House that those differences have passed away from my mind, and I know they have passed away from his; and that whether we act together, or whether we are divided in politics, the high esteem which I feel for his high character and for his great abilities, and the deep friendship with which I am animated towards him, never can be affected either by the past, the present, or the future. Now, Sir, undoubtedly I must admit that every public man has a perfect right, without any impeachment on the part of any person, whenever he thinks his continuance in office cannot be reconciled with his opinions or his sense of duty, to retire;—however those from whom he separates may regret his loss, still, if he acts in the manner I have stated, he stands perfectly free from all reproach. Now, Sir, with regard to the circumstances to which my noble Friend has adverted, it is not for me to say whether my noble Friend was right or wrong in acquiescing in the early part of last year in the appointment of the Duke of Newcastle as Secretary of State for the War Department; or in proposing in November last that I should be substituted for the noble Duke in the discharge of the duties of that office. I was absent in Paris when the correspondence of which he has read a portion to the House took place between himself and Lord Aberdeen; but he has correctly stated that on my return he communicated to me that correspondence, and that on the question arising whether, in consequence of Lord Aberdeen having declined to adopt his recommendation, he should or should not deprive the Government of his services—that I then, together with, I believe, every one of his colleagues, urged and entreated him not to quit the Government: in consequence, I certainly thought it my duty to join with my colleagues in earnestly requesting my noble Friend to continue to give the Government the benefit of his services. Well, my noble Friend consented to do so;—he yielded to the recommendation of his colleagues; and from the time when that correspondence closed—I think on the 3rd of December—to the period of his resignation, I am not aware that he ever reverted to the proposal which he had made to Lord Aberdeen. Now, Sir, I am quite ready to admit that my noble Friend may have felt a difficulty in meeting such a Motion as that which stands for to-night in the name of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sheffield. Entertaining as he did an opinion that a change ought to be made in the War Department, my noble Friend may have felt a difficulty in resisting a Motion, the obvious intention of which was to effect a change in that branch of the Administration; but, at the same time, I think my noble Friend himself, in the remarks which he made just now upon that Motion, has abundantly shown that, independently of all personal considerations, apart from all preference for one man over another, there were grave constitutional objections to that Motion to have enabled him or any man to have opposed it upon that ground alone. My noble Friend has very properly said that it was impossible that a Committee of that sort, supervising, criticising, and superintending the daily transactions of the War Department, could coexist with the proper discharge of the executive duties of that department. But, though my noble Friend might properly and naturally have continued to entertain an opinion that a change was necessary with regard to the person who held the office of Secretary of State for War, yet I must venture humbly to submit to him that that opinion ought to have been repeated to the noble Lord at the head of the Government before the reassembling of Parliament after the Christmas adjournment. He ought to have given him the opportunity, after consulting with the other Members of the Government, of stating to him whether or not that proposal would be accepted on his renewal of it. If, before Parliament met, my noble Friend had said to my noble Friend at the head of the Government, "I, in common with all mankind, expect that when Parliament meets some motion will be made, either inculpating the Government or requiring an explanation from them with regard to the conduct of the war"—for, indeed, the conversation at every street corner, the leading articles in every newspaper, must have satisfied every one that such an event was to be looked for—if the noble Lord had said, "Such a motion appears to me, if not inevitable, at least highly probable, and I tell you beforehand that if it comes on I cannot resist it, unless such and such changes are made in the department which has the conduct of the war," then the Government would have had the opportunity either of reconsidering the objections which had been urged to the noble Lord's proposal, or of acquiescing in it at once, if it had been thought fit to do so; or, if the same objections which had been made to it on a former occasion had prevailed, the Government would then have had the opportunity of determining whether they would continue in office after sustaining the loss of the noble Lord's services, or whether they would deem that loss to be of such preeminent importance as to impose on them the necessity of surrendering their offices into the hands of Her Majesty, with a view to the formation of some other Government. A resignation at that time, and under those circumstances, might have happened without any disparagement to any of the parties concerned. Ample time would have been given for arrangements of any kind—either for the remodelling of the existing Government, or for the formation of a new one; and such a course of proceeding would have been in accordance with the ordinary practice of politics. But the course taken by my noble Friend, I must venture humbly to submit to him, was not in correspondence with the usual practice of public men. It was one calculated inevitably to place the Government which he left in a position of embarrassment in which, at the hands of a colleague at least, they ought not to have been placed. But my noble Friend—not having while he was in the Cabinet made any distinct proposal, of which I am aware, for the better prosecution of the war, excepting that which had been rejected, and on the rejection of which he was entitled to say that he could not continue to be responsible for measures of which he disapproved—my noble Friend, I say, on Tuesday evening last, after having appeared in this House, and having given notice of Motions which he had to make in his capacity of President of the Council on that very night, writes to the noble Earl at the head of the Government, and tenders his resignation upon the simple ground that he is unable to resist the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield. If, as I have said before, my noble Friend's resignation was founded upon the objection of the First Lord of the Treasury to adopt the change which he had proposed in the War Department, I think he would have done better to have repeated that reason in the letter in which he tendered his resignation. If my noble Friend had again laid his proposal before the noble Earl at the head of the Government, that would have given him the opportunity of reconsidering the proposal, and the reasons on which it was founded; and if he had again declined to adopt it, and my noble Friend had still continued of opinion that that was an essential and *sine quâ non* change which he had proposed, then his resignation would have stood on grounds to which it appears to me nobody could in reason have taken any objection. But I must say that I think the noble Lord's colleagues are entitled, not only to feel regret at the loss of so eminent and so influential a Member of the Government and of this House, but they are entitled also to say that that loss occurred to them in a manner so unexpected that, according to the usual practice, they were not justified in expecting it to take place. Now, Sir, having said so much with respect to the circumstances under which my noble Friend tendered his resignation—the hasty and precipitate way in which it was announced—and the grounds on which it was placed—having stated that I think it was a departure from the ordinary practice, and was a course of which the Government have some right, I will hardly say to complain, but at least to say that it was a thing they were not justified in expecting—having said thus much, I shall, upon that point, abstain from any further remarks. I can assure my noble Friend that, in making that criticism upon the course which my noble Friend has pursued, he will consider that I do it from a strong sense of duty, and not from any unfriendly feeling towards him. Sir, my noble Friend said, in the conclusion of his address, that his conviction is that, whoever may be charged with the conduct of the war in future will feel it his duty, as far as he can, to conduct that war with vigour and energy, with a view to a successful result. Sir, undoubtedly I concur in that conviction. Her Majesty's Government have felt it their duty, notwithstanding the great loss they have sustained in the secession of my noble Friend, not to run away from the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, which is to come on to-night. They have felt that it would have been a disgraceful flight if they had not resolved to meet that Motion—standing with regard to it exactly in the same position which they did before, *minus* the services of my noble Friend, but without any other change whatever. We present ourselves, therefore, to the House as we are to meet the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield. If that Motion should be carried, of course, as the noble Lord has said, it is unnecessary to say what the result will be. If in the course of the debate, reasons should be urged against the Motion of sufficient weight to induce the House to reject it, why then it will be for Her Majesty's Government to consider what course they shall pursue with regard to the recomposition of their own body. We present ourselves to-night as we stand; the future will depend upon the result of the debate. But again I say that, whoever may be the individual whose duty it will be to perform the functions of the Minister of War, I am satisfied he will feel it his duty to act in the manner described by my noble Friend, and will consider that the war should be pursued, in accordance with the public feeling, with all the energy and vigour of which the Government is capable; and if so, like my noble Friend I am confident that the war will be conducted to a successful issue. Sir, as my noble Friend said, we have not only in our aid the unanimous and enthusiastic feeling of the British nation, but we have also the cordial assistance and co-operation of our great ally the Emperor of the French and the French nation; and I must say that it is one of the most magnificent spectacles which history has ever presented to mankind to see those two great nations uniting their efforts in a just and honourable cause. We have seen in former times great Powers united and co-operating for purposes of injustice—for purposes of conquest, and for the destruction of the independence of nations; but this I will say is the first time in the history of mankind in which we have seen two great nations co-operating cordially and disinterestedly in the vindication of a cause which is honourable to both; and I do feel the utmost confidence that, if the energies of this country are directed, in conjunction with those of the French nation, by a Government which knows the value of the instruments it possesses, and that duly appreciates the objects at which they aim—I am confident that in that case my noble Friend will be a true prophet, and that the war will be conducted to that honourable and safe issue which will secure, not only the dignity and safety of the nation, but the independence and future liberty and peace of Europe.

ARMY (CRIMEA).

THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR, AND CONDITION OF THE ARMY.

MR. ROEBUCK then rose to bring forward the Motion of which he had given notice—

> "That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the condition of our Army before Sebastopol, and into the conduct of those Departments of the Government whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of that Army"—

and said: Sir, in bringing forward the Motion that stands on the paper in my name, I must, in the first place, beg the kind indulgence of the House to aid, in some degree, my physical inability. The question itself is so serious that it requires no apology. We have sent from this country an army the most unparalleled in its efficiency and in its numbers that ever left this coast; which has by its deeds not only maintained but enhanced the glory of its country; and it now appears by the acknowledgment of the noble Lord the Member for the City of London this evening, that this army, by the neglect of the Government at home, has been reduced to a condition that wrings the heart of the nation. Therefore, I say, Sir, when I consider the duties of this House—what they are and how they are to be employed—I think the question which I am about to submit to the House requires no apology. But, Sir, when I address myself to the question itself, I cannot but regret what has fallen from the noble Lord this evening. The noble Lord says that he was unable, as a Minister of the Crown, to resist this Motion. He says that the House ought to exercise its inquisitorial duties with regard to this question; and in the same breath he says that he will not support the Motion either by his speech or by his vote, thus neglecting that which, as a patriot, he ought to perform. He ought to forego private affections and personal regards, when he considers not only that an army of England is at stake, but also that the very safety of the country is in jeopardy. Deserted, then, by the noble Lord, but maintained, as I believe, by the inherent value of the question itself, I shall boldly address myself to that which I have to propose to the House. The question naturally divides itself into two parts —first, what is the condition of our army before Sebastopol? and, next, how has that condition been brought about? Now, Sir, it appears to me, as the noble Lord himself has confessed to-night, that about the condition of the army there cannot be two opinions. The troops are without shelter, without clothes, without food, and without ammunition. That is the condition to which they have been reduced, as I believe, by the incapacity of those whose duty it was to minister to their wants. We have nothing before us to make us believe that the position of the Government as regards the army is in the slightest degree changed. The incapacity that has brought about this result still continues to govern; therefore, all I have to do is to submit to this House that inquiry is requisite as to the causes that have brought about this state of misery in which the army now exists, and when I have done that I think I shall have done my duty to this House. Now, Sir, it may be thought necessary that I should say something as to the state of the army before Sebastopol. I beg, first of all, however, to say that with the military part of the question I have no concern. As to the expedition to the Crimea I am unable to judge. I am no soldier; but as to the conduct of those whose duty it was to minister to the wants of that army, when so placed, I think this House is able to judge, and, as a Member of this House, I think I am bound to pass a judgment on this matter. Now, Sir, the first question I have to inquire into is as to the number of soldiers before Sebastopol. I think it is pretty well ascertained that we have sent from the shores of this country 54,000 soldiers, equipped as we have never equipped soldiers before, who have done all they could to support the honour and glory of this country. I want to know what has become of these 54,000 soldiers? It appears, from the best and most authentic accounts that we have at present, that there are now not more than 14,000 men actually in arms before Sebastopol, and of these 14,000 less than 5,000 are in a state of health. I have now in my hand a letter dated January 8, from Constantinople, the writer of which states that, according to the best information he had been able to obtain, the effective force of the British before Sebastopol did not exceed 14,000 men; that the artillery and engineers had diminished in a similar ratio; and that the cavalry had ceased to exist as a force, the horses having been taken up for the transport of provisions. The writer also says he is sure that the British army will within two months be totally destroyed; and, speaking of a General who has been out there and has now returned, he states that, in accordance with his opinion and the opinions of those most likely to be well informed, he is firmly persuaded that a great disaster is about to befall the army before Sebastopol. It appears, then, that 14,000 men remain out of the whole 54,000. I want to know, Sir, what has become of the 40,000 troops who have disappeared from the ranks of your army? This is a simple matter of figures, and if your force has been reduced from 54,000 to 14,000 men, I repeat—and I am obliged to ask the question—what has become of these 40,000 troops? [The hon. and learned Member paused, from evident physical weakness.] I feel, Sir, that my strength is very inadequate to this task, but I still hope that the House will bear with me. [Several hon. Members recommended the hon. and learned Member to seat himself.] No, no; I will endeavour to proceed. The condition of the army being such as I have stated, my next inquiry is—how has that condition been brought about? My belief is, that it has been produced by incapacity at home and incapacity abroad—by incapacity on the part of those whose duty it is to minister to that army's wants. At the present moment, I am given to understand that the harbour of Balaklava is encumbered with stores—that a country which possesses means of transport beyond those of all the world, has been enabled, through the enthusiasm of the people, to lay on the shores of that harbour stores sufficient to maintain an army twice as large as that which now exists; but that nevertheless the soldiers are in want of food, clothing, and shelter;—that, having transported these stores 3,000 miles across the ocean, another seven miles intervene, and that, therefore, your forces are deprived of everything it requires for their maintenance as an army. How has this been occasioned? Why, first, by the insufficiency of the provision made here when the army was sent to the Crimea; and, next, by the inefficiency of those to whom it was confided when it reached that country. [Here the hon. and learned Gentleman was again unable to proceed.] I really, Sir, feel my strength so feeble that I cannot continue these remarks; and, in my present state, I shall at once move the Resolution which is in your hands.

The Motion having been seconded; Question proposed—

> "That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the condition of our Army before Sebastopol, and into the conduct of those Departments of the Government whose duty it has been to administer to the wants of that Army."

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT: Sir, I have felt some hesitation in rising at this moment through witnessing that which, I am sure, has been the subject of pain to every one present—the physical infirmity under which my hon. and learned Friend was compelled to desist from his attempt to address the House in support of the Motion of which he has given notice. My hon. and learned Friend, I must say, was fully entitled to make that Motion, from the high position which he holds in this House, from the great talents by which he is distinguished, and likewise from the independence of character which has secured for him the respect and esteem of every Gentleman present. Sir, I still more regret the indisposition under which he labours, because it places me in a position of some difficulty, inasmuch as there has been no charge made, no case substantiated, or even attempted to be substantiated, to which I might apply myself to answer. Now, the statement which the hon. and learned Gentleman made he put upon a very simple issue. He says that there left the shores of this country one of the largest and best appointed armies that England ever sent forth. He recites their numbers, and he asks what has become of those forces. Sir, let me say, in the first place, that my hon. and learned Friend fell into one inaccuracy in making this statement, because he asks what has become of the whole number of men that have gone out to the Crimea, as if they all went out with the original expedition, and overlooking the fact that many of them have been sent out since then, and that others have not yet arrived; and, therefore, arithmetically speaking, the difference between 54,000, or the whole number sent out, and the existing force, will not represent the number who have fallen in battle or perished by pestilence. Sir, I confess that I approach this subject with unaffected feelings of pain. I am not about to attempt or pretend to bolster up a case by reading letters or extracts from letters, seeking to convey to the House impressions other than those that in my conscience I know to be correct. I do believe that exposure to suffering—exposure to an inclement climate and to privations of all descriptions—has reduced the army under the command of Lord Raglan to a state that does excite deep anxiety in the mind of every Englishman. But, Sir, so far as it depends upon us, I might content myself by quoting the very observation which fell from my hon. and learned Friend when he said, "You have transported to the shores of Balaklava stores enough to feed and shelter twice the number of men that you have sent out." Sir, it may be asked—as I have no doubt it will be asked—what is the reason why an army sent out, as the hon. and learned Gentleman described it, so fully equipped, should have fallen in so short a period into a state arguing a great want or great defect in the internal organisation, either of that army itself on the spot, or in the departments charged with the administration at home? The lengthened remarks I made the other day when I had to discuss this subject will, I trust, enable me to abridge, and even justify me in abridging, as much as possible, the statement I have to offer to-night;—but I stated then, and I state now, my belief that the first cause to which you must trace the disorganisation in that army is to be found in the system we have pursued during a long period of peace. I am not now speaking merely of reductions effected in men or in votes of money, but of the destruction of the very sources of our military power during the forty years' peace which followed 1815; and I think I can satisfy you in a very few words that we have had virtually no army during that time—that we have kept our troops for the purposes of police at home and in our colonies rather than for purposes of defence abroad. We have, indeed, maintained a certain number of men in a state of high discipline up to a certain extent of organisation, but not beyond it. What I mean—if the House will pardon me for noticing it—is simply this;—Englishmen are people who can do as well, and, perhaps, one's natural national vanity leads one to think that they can do even better, than any other persons, anything whatever that they choose to practise:—but, I ask, what is your English army? It is only a collection of regiments or rather a number of regiments not collected. The internal discipline of those regiments is certainly complete—you have in every company and in every regiment a most perfect regimental system;—but you have nothing more:—and if you inquire into the subject you will find that during the whole campaign, and in all the actions that have taken place, there has not been the slightest sign of regimental disorganisation. On the contrary, it is admitted on all hands that the relations between the officers and the men—the affection between them and the confidence the men have shown in the courage and capacity of their officers—have been most admirable, and could not be exceeded. Everything of this kind has been as it should be; but this has been wanting—that general organisation and aptitude of the whole army, which can be obtained only by practice; and you have had no such practice. I say, then, in fact, that what you term the English army has not been an army, but a number of regiments. Why, I venture to say that there have been field officers in command of regiments in the Crimea who, until they went there—unless they had been in India or been quartered in Dublin—never in their lives saw a brigade. What, then, I ask, can you expect from such an army? You look for a perfect regimental organisation, and you succeed in finding it; but when you come to the staff I say, can you expect men who have not only never seen an army in the field, but who have never seen two regiments brigaded together, to exhibit an acquaintance with the organisation of an army? Can you expect men who are utterly unacquainted with the movements of such a force, and with the regulations required for its sustenance and movements—can you expect such persons to be Heaven-born administrators, who can do not only what they have never practised, but what they never even saw done? This is a very important element in the consideration of the causes of the misfortunes which have occurred to our army abroad. Again, look at the composition of your army as regards the individual men. In England you have the highest degree of civilisation to be found in the world. As a matter of course, therefore, you have the minutest subdivision of labour; and, from the smallness of the country and the close proximity of different places, you have the most rapid communication between your cities and towns and the country. Well, what is the result? Why, that the English peasant never does anything for himself, as is the case in less advanced states of society. Everything, in consequence of the great division of labour, and the great proximity of supply of all kinds, is done for him—his house is built for him, his doors, his windows, his bedsteads are ready made to his hand, so is his dress and everything else he requires. There may be a few exceptional cases of the most remote districts of your empire, where a few of the peasantry may be found who build their own cabins and make their own clothes, shoes, and other articles in a primitive manner; but still, it cannot be denied that the great subdivision of labour consequent on high civilisation offers such facilities for every man getting everything done for him, that a man does not know how to turn if he is thrown upon his own resources and left to shift for himself, in the same way as the inhabitants of other countries can do. I recollect an hon. Friend of mine opposite handing me, last autumn, a letter, with suggestions of great value relating to the clothing of the army to be sent to the Crimea, which the Government adopted without loss of time; and that letter concluded, I remember, with a remarkable sentence of warning, to the effect that when we had done all these things that he had recommended they would be almost valueless, for the men would suffer through not knowing how to avail themselves of them. An army is a vast and complex machine, and I might refer you to the failures that occurred at the commencement of former wars in which England has been engaged from want of knowledge how to handle and divert that machine. I might also ask you to look at the successive reductions which have been made by Parliament in the strength of your force, and especially to the disembodiment of the militia after 1815—a measure which continued until this body was reconstituted, for the first time, in 1852. I might, further, point to the destruction of your waggon train—to the entire destruction of your staff abroad, and to the deterioration of many other useful branches of your army. All these things have been done, year by year, under the pressure of economy without there being a single attempt made—indeed, that was thought to be almost foreign to such a country as ours—to organise an army for any purpose in the field; and the result is now before us. It will be useless to attempt to organise our army until we have undone many things that we have done since 1815. Well, Sir, a few years ago the nation was startled by the appearance of a letter from a great authority—the greatest military authority this country ever saw. The Duke of Wellington addressed his celebrated letter to Sir John Burgoyne, protesting against the defenceless state in which England was placed. Subsequently to this—and even prior to it—great efforts were made to increase the steam navy which we now possess, the creation of which began some ten years ago, and an augmentation was likewise made to our army; but, above all, the Government of Lord Derby restored that great source of military power—the militia—which had been lying dormant for so long a period. It must not be forgotten that since the last war, while we were reducing our military forces, our commerce and our wealth, and, consequently, our means of supporting our national establishments, were simultaneously increasing. We had, at the same time, a growing demand for the services of those establishments. Our colonies were rising into empires, Australia was fast becoming one of our most important possessions, and our dominion had extended in other parts of the globe scarcely less important. Now, that being so, I want to know if it is the opinion of hon. and learned Gentlemen that a war is a thing so simple that its practice can be acquired without the least difficulty, and at a moment's notice? Just look at the different occasions on which we have commenced war. I do not know of any instance in which England has been plunged into war in which she has not met with reverses. But former cases differ from the present in this, that we have now to set against misfortunes of this description great military successes. If I were to read to the House the description which the Duke of Wellington gave of the state of his army after the retreat from Burgos you would recognise complaints very similar in terms to those we now see in the public press; but the former complaints did not arise so soon after the beginning of the war, but at a period long subsequent to the breaking out of hostilities, and even after the army was guided by the greatest military genius of our country. Take a later case. When our expedition was sent into Afghanistan the mortality in the army was frightful. Again, the expedition that went under General Godwin into Burmah suffered from a rate of mortality amounting to 48 per cent. I sincerely wish I could draw up a more favourable statement than I can do regarding our army now in the East, because I grieve to say that, since I was asked at the commencement of the Session what number of our men had fallen by disease or the sword, the mortality has nearly doubled, and the drain now going on in the army under Lord Raglan amounts, unfortunately, to nearly 14 per cent—and I grieve to say, that, as was indeed to be expected, that average of mortality has gone on increasing since the commencement of the war. I said I would not quote letters that I have received, stating that in some portions of the army there is a very different degree of efficiency, because there is a very different degree of comfort; for I apprehend that every one in this House knows perfectly well that the sufferings of the men have been proportionate to the distance of their encampment from that port which was described by the hon. and learned Gentleman as choked with stores, food, clothes, and the means of shelter, sufficient for a body of troops twice their number; and that it has been not the want of those provisions or stores, but the impossibility of moving them from Balaklava up to the camp, which has constituted the difficulty. I have received a letter from a gentleman who has been engaged on a commission which we sent out some time back to inquire into the state of the medical department and hospitals, both at Constantinople and in the Crimea, and he puts the case in this way. After describing the condition of affairs at the camp, he says, "Your Government has sent out plenty of everything; they have sent it 3,000 miles; but the distance is 3,006; and the last six miles are more difficult than the first 3,000." I believe this is a true representation of the state of things. You will ask me what is the cause of that deficiency? Well, in discussing that point the House must make allowances for the great difficulties that had to be encountered there, as also for the circumstances that at this distance from the scene we cannot be fully informed of the real state of the case. We know that before the army left Varna there was a collection of animals amounting to about 5,000 with the expedition. Since then the cavalry horses and many of the artillery horses have died from exposure to the cold and want of food, and this at a time when it was said that there was forage to a great amount in the harbour of Balaklava, at least so it is said. Now, I have an extract here pretty well describing what happened in the Crimea before a certain date. It states—

> "Before the middle of August there were in the six regiments of English cavalry 1,000 men dismounted, and the horses of 700 others were unserviceable. The baggage animals died, the artillery cattle were scarcely able to drag the guns, and one-third of the reserve ammunition was given over to the Spaniards because the ammunition carts were required for the conveyances of the sick, the number of which daily increased."

This sentence applies strongly, I apprehend, to Balaklava and Sebastopol, as it describes, especially in the description it gives of the destruction of horses, the impossibility of obtaining ammunition. It then goes on further to describe the state to which the Light Brigade had been reduced—

> "These troops (the Light Brigade), which only three weeks before had travelled sixty miles in a single march, were now with difficulty, and after many halts, able to reach the heights, although only four miles from the camp, and the sides of the mountain were covered with the carcases of many hundred animals who died in the effort."

The extract proceeds—

> "The loss of the British army in September was considerable. Above 3,500 men had died of sickness or fallen into the enemy's hands. 1,500 horses had perished from want, exclusive of those lost in battle. To fill the cup of disaster, fever and diarrhœa, assailing bodies which fatigue and

bad nourishment had already predisposed to disease, made frightful ravages. Dysentery, that scourge of armies, raged, and in a short time many thousand men died in the hospitals."

Now, all this was not written by Lord Raglan, detailing how his army was situated —it was written in the year 1809, to describe the state of the British army after the battle of Talavera; and I quote it because it tallies with singular exactness with the precise amount of our losses in each particular arm of our service now. It is, as I said before, difficult to see where the fault has originated. It is sometimes stated that we have "the command of the seas"—that was the popular expression; and it was said—"You might as easily supply your men before Sebastopol as you could supply them at home." But when we talk of commanding the seas, we are apt to be rebuked by Him at whose breath the stormy wind arises, and we are visited by the terrible calamity which befel our transports a short time ago. We have this further disadvantage as regards transports by sea, that we have almost exhausted our resources for conveying by steam the articles necessary for the sustenance of our army. I should like to state to the House—because it is, perhaps, scarcely aware of it — what amount of transport has been necessary to convey, not only our men, not only our horses, not only our ammunition, but the food, the provender, and military stores requisite for the maintenance of an army such as ours. And when it is said that certain departments of the Government have been slack and remiss in their mode of executing their duty, I think I owe it to the Admiralty to read this paper to show what an immense power has been put into exercise in order to convey this army and its stores to the Crimea. I find that from the 7th of February, 1854, to the 10th of December, 1854, and from the 11th of December, 1854, to the 22nd of January, 1855, the Admiralty in their own ships or hired transports have conveyed to the East—British troops from England, officers, 2,141; men, 54,224; horses, 5,408; provisions from England, 29,261 tons, navy service; 18,897 tons, army service; 19,105 Ordnance stores; 110,867 tons of coals; 3,320 naval stores, and from Malta 7,180 tons. French troops from Marseilles and Toulon—officers, 556; men, 14,055; horses, 193; stores, 8,037. From Calais to the Baltic—French troops —officers, 437; men, 12,888; horses, 21; British stores, navy provisions, 9,346 tons; Ordnance stores, 266 tons; naval stores, 247 tons; coals, 47,907 tons; making a grand total of 3,134 officers, 81,167 men, 5,622 horses, and 254,433 tons of provisions and stores. I have read this statement, for I deem it of importance that the House should know the description of duties exacted from this department, and to show the extent to which the Admiralty has been able to co-operate with the military departments in furnishing these necessary supplies for the sustenance and strengthening of the army. I shall hereafter have occasion to show the charges made with respect to these departments; but I will now go back to the point from which I started, which was, that if the Government be asked who is to blame that the stores have not been removed from Balaklava to the camp—if we are expected to make random guesses in order to put on other men's shoulders and to shift from ourselves, the blame and the burden which we ought to bear, you will be disappointed in your expectations; for the Government are determined to take no such course—they are determined to take upon themselves the whole responsibility. We have always acted on that determination. We have written to the Commander in Chief, pointing out the failures which appear to have taken place, drawing his attention to circumstances which have been reported to us, and we have asked him to tell the Government with whom the blame lay. We have also desired him to use the supreme powers entrusted to him to displace those men who may have shown themselves incompetent, and to replace them by those acting under his eye, who have qualified themselves in the stern school of experience, and who may have given proofs of their administrative ability in those services in which their exertions are required. But it is not in the power of the Government, at this distance and without the information that is requisite, and it would be a cowardly and discreditable thing without they were certain of what they were saying or doing, to attempt to throw the blame on men who are absent—who after all may be accused unjustly, and who, at any rate, are now gallantly perilling their lives in the service of their country.

The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield has not quarrelled with the Government on a subject which last Session was the great subject of debate. Then, the complaint was, that we had not sent out men enough, that we had neglected to form a reserve; but I think those discussions showed at least that the Government had sent out a considerable force, and had formed a considerable reserve, which, however, I admitted had ceased to be a reserve, as it was sent to reinforce the main body of the army, which is the object and use of a reserve. The difficulty now arises to create a reserve, and the Government will ask for powers to form one, and I have no doubt but that they will receive from this House every Vote necessary for that purpose. I wish to state that the Government have no desire to conceal any portion of their conduct, but they may have, and they have, strong reasons for refusing to submit to this Vote; but anything that the Government can produce in the way of information, which will show what has or has not been done, the Government are perfectly willing to produce. My hon. Friend has given notice of what he desires shall be produced; but some part of that information cannot be obtained because it does not exist; but everything without prejudice to individuals that can be got will be produced. I will add to those of which notice has been given, the accounts of ammunition, of which there is said not to have been a sufficiency, and also those of food and clothing—I will add all these, for I think there exists in the country a great delusion on these matters, and that it is imagined, because the army is not in possession of what it ought to be, that these stores have not left the shores of England. There are some of the statements which have been made so absurd that I should hope they almost carried their refutation with them. I read in a newspaper the other day a paragraph, headed, "How the Government provides ammunition," giving an account of the Lancaster guns, the shells of which, it was said, were so small that they would not fit the bore, and there was so much "windage" that it was impossible to fire with accuracy. I, by a great chance, met with another paragraph in a different paper, headed, "The Ordnance again," which stated that the shells sent by the Ordnance for the Lancaster guns were much too large, so that the men were constantly engaged in filing down these shells, so that they might fit the bore and be fired from the guns. Now, if these statements were read by Gentlemen who could not read both, they, seeing them in print, might deem either of them conclusive. So again, I was told the other day that the huts which were sent out had been sent without nails to nail them together. I thought this a most extraordinary statement, but, before I could receive information on this from official quarters, a gentleman happened to come into my room to whom I mentioned this, and he said that, as he was very curious to see the huts stowed, he went down to see them embarked, that he had examined them with great curiosity, and that he was particularly struck, not only with the frames into which they fitted, but also with the way in which every nail and screw appeared to be sorted and arranged so as to be ready for its proper place. Yesterday I read a statement with respect to the clothing sent out, in which it was stated that it was the custom to send out the coats without buttons, which were sent with them and sewn on by the soldiers; and the assertion was made that the army in the Crimea had been served with great coats without any buttons on them. In answer to this, in the first place, I am told that it is not the custom to send out coats without buttons, and that the coats sent to the army in the Crimea were completed before they left England. I will not detain the House with a budget of these statements I have collected, but I mention these as specimens of the levity with which such charges are made, and which have not the slightest foundation in fact. I have stated the intention of the Government to lay on the table of the House the returns, for were I now to go into details as to how many thousand blankets and coats had been supplied, such a course would be wearisome to the House; and I would much sooner pass over these things and lay the necessary documents before the House, and they will then be able to judge of the truth of the statements of the insufficiency of the provisions made by the Government. Sir, the noble Lord who sits, I am sorry to say, behind me (Lord J. Russell) has mentioned that one cause of the determination at which he arrived of leaving this Government was this—that the War Departments were not so modified, so consolidated, so brought under one central authority as to be really effectual for the purpose of war. The noble Lord, I think, objected to the humble individual who is now addressing you being charged with certain of the duties attached to his office, such as the moving of the Army Estimates in this House; for he thought the office of the Secretary at War ought to be combined with that now held by the Secretary of State. The House will recollect that in the discussions which took place last Session I stated my views as to the manner in which these departments ought to be reorganised and consolidated; and that at the same time I stated the opinion I entertained as to the position held by the Secretary at War. I stated then, what I think now, that the office ought not to be held by one who was a Cabinet Minister, but that his duties ought to be confined simply to the management of the financial details of the army. I stated also that at the moment the Government should be enabled to make arrangements by which those changes could be effected and these departments put on a better and sounder footing, I was not the man to stand in the way, and that I would readily and gladly give up the office I now hold. When the noble Lord, therefore, pressed this matter on the attention of the Earl of Aberdeen, I stated that I was perfectly willing to resign the office which I held, for I felt—an opinion which I had expressed, and which I still adhere to—that a change was necessary, and I felt that I ought to lose no time in redeeming the pledge which I had made. I consulted some of my colleagues on this matter, and among others the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston), and I told him my feeling as to quitting the office I now hold in the Government—that many changes must be made in it, and the office must either be merged in another, or so altered that I could not with propriety hold it. The noble Lord gave me his opinion with great friendliness, and with sincerity, I believe, and said that the combination of the office of Secretary at War with that of the Secretary of War would impose so large an amount of business on the Secretary of State that it would be impossible that a single man could perform it, and he strongly urged that I should not take the course I contemplated—that of placing my resignation in the hands of Lord Aberdeen. I cannot say that I have seen any reason to change the opinion I stated as to the necessity of a complete remodelling of these War Departments. You want some person to conduct the finance of the army, another for the provisioning of the army, another for the arming of the army, and again, the commander-in-chief to maintain and conduct the business of the army; these are the persons who in my opinion should form a Board, over which the Secretary of State, the chief Minister for the War Department, should preside, and from whom the others should receive instructions, and to whom they should make the suggestions they might have to offer respecting the carrying out of his recommendations, and to whom they should report the progress made in carrying out his will. I understand, speaking generally, that this was a view shared in by all the Members of the Government, and answers, with the difference of the Financial Minister, to that recommended by the Duke of Richmond. What you want in these departments is a division of labour, and to secure among the subordinates the complete subordination of all to one common head. It was with this view that the noble Duke the Secretary of State has for some time past been in the habit of having meetings of all the different heads of the departments—sitting together to receive instructions, and to make suggestions—bringing any business which they had not the power singly to perform, and to receive instruction in the presence of each other, so that each might know exactly what the other was doing. The object of this was, that they should understand the object of the orders that were given, and should be enabled to combine all the means in their power to attain a common object. Unless that be done, there can be no unity of action. Minutes were taken at these meetings, copies of which were sent to the principal Members of the Government. At every fresh meeting the minutes of the last were read, and reports were made as to the progress of the works going forward under the administration. This was the germ of a Board which, in my opinion, should be formally constituted. The Government had come to the conclusion that such a Board should be formed. The noble Lord behind me (Lord J. Russell) says that he differed from me as to the constitution of this Board; but I did not know at the time, neither do I at this moment, the amount of the difference of opinion between us. I have mentioned this, because it has been alleged that the Government have not taken any steps towards the consolidation of the War Departments, and never intended to take any. We stated that the Commissariat should be taken from the control of the Treasury, and placed under the control of the chief military authority;

and that has been done. We stated that a Board ought to exist, of which the Secretary of State should be the head, with whom the subordinates should not have co-ordinate authority, but from whom they should take orders and execute them—orders taken in the presence one of the other, so as to produce combined action and real co-operation. Well, I must say there has been no want of subordination in these departments; but, on the contrary, they have all cheerfully recognised the authority of the Secretary of State, and have used their utmost efforts to secure the carrying out of his directions. It is said, however, that we have not been able to make the changes that are necessary for carrying on the war—that we have not been able to make practical changes. At the commencement of the operations last year, there were found to be very great difficulties—for instance, in the Ordnance there was experienced a very great difficulty in supplying a sufficient number of shells for the use of the army. There could not be got a sufficient number of shells for the work in hand; but an officer of artillery, of very great distinction, received instructions from the Secretary of State, and in the course of five weeks organised a factory entirely from his own resources, in which almost every part of the delicate operation of shell filling can be executed in a very short time. This experiment has demonstrated the existence of an enormous power of creating fresh material of this description, and, positively at a saving to the country of 30,000*l.* or 40,000*l.* a year. I mention this to show what can be done by an energetic application of the means at hand without cost to the country. Again, we had a waggon train to form. It has been stated that a waggon train did not exist till the latter end of the Duke of Wellington's campaigns. He formed it himself. It lasted, gradually dwindling, down to 1838, at which period it was finally extinguished. I except a waggon train from the list of those establishments which should be kept up in a state of efficiency in time of peace. It is really of use only in time of war. You cannot have your regiments marching from place to place, with all their luggage following on trains of horses and arranged on pack saddles, while you have railways to convey them with all their luggage to the place of their destination, with great speed and without any trouble. I am not making any charge for the abolition of that system in time of peace, but it requires a long time to get things back into a thoroughly-organised state. To make that train effective for its purpose there is requisite a great number of baggage animals, such as are not readily to be found on the shores of the Crimea. It was the duty of the Commissariat to provide it, but they were unable to discharge the duty efficiently. The Government, however, felt the necessity of themselves providing a baggage corps, and commenced buying animals not only along the coasts of the South of France, but in Spain, Tunis, Egypt, and wherever they are likely to find horses or mules adapted to the purpose. The Duke of Newcastle has organised and is now sending out a train composed of a sufficient number of everything requisite for the exigencies of the case; and I am glad to see from the papers that there have already been some fresh arrivals of baggage animals at Balaklava. When this establishment shall have been put upon a proper footing, by an experienced officer who performed the same duty under Sir Charles Napier, I think we shall find it is not possible for an army to fall into the state in which our army was a few weeks ago. The Commissariat there, in my opinion, is overburdened by its work; it ought to be confined to the providing of provisions, and ought certainly not to have anything to do with the transport service also. The Duke of Newcastle has also established a staff corps for the purpose of providing a police for the army. This was sent out some time ago. He is engaged in forming a hospital staff, which will, I believe, be the means of redressing one of the most crying grievances of the army, by supplying the want of a permanent staff attached to the hospitals, instead of trusting to chance men and convalescents passing through the hospitals. It is impossible for anything to be worse than the system that has hitherto been pursued in this respect; I trust that by adopting a sounder one, copied from that of our allies, our hospitals will be placed in a more efficient state than they have ever yet been. Again, there are allegations that the naval transport corps has been numerically insufficient for the transaction of the business required of them, without being subjected to a strain which ought not to be put upon that service. My right hon. Friend the first Lord of the Admiralty will, on a future occasion, explain the alterations intended to be made, in order to produce an efficient transport service, and to enable them to grasp a business as comprehensive as that which has of late been thrust upon them. Again, I may state that the moment it came to the knowledge of the Government that errors had taken place in the way of stowing the ships—by the overcrowding of one ship and then shifting the cargo to another—a Committee was appointed to examine into the cause, to trace out the delinquencies, and to lay down a clear and simple system by which the recurrence of these errors would be prevented. In the same way, when, in last autumn, the Government received accounts showing the insufficiency of the medical arrangements, they sent out a Commission to inquire into the causes of the alleged inefficiency; but they did not intrust this to medical men only. They thought it necessary, in order to secure the most searching investigation, to attach to the Commission a gentleman independent of the medical profession, and who could have no interest in screening its errors; unconnected also with the Government or with any department of the Government, and who should, therefore, have no interest in screening its shortcomings. They received instructions to probe the matter to the bottom, to obtain the truth and to expose it without mercy. At the same time they received instructions, in order that no precious time might be lost, to report as they went on—to make every practical suggestion they deemed it desirable to adopt; and instructions were given also to the heads of the hospitals at Scutari, and to Lord Raglan, to adopt such suggestions on hearing the reasons on which they were founded. I hope shortly to lay the results of these inquiries before the House; and, what is of more importance, the steps taken in consequence of them.

Sir, I have now stated, I fear at some length, details which must be wearisome to the House; but, having done so, compressing what I had to say upon details as much as I could, I wish to ask the House what is its intention with regard to the Motion before it? Do you propose to refer to a Committee upstairs of fifteen Gentlemen no less a subject of consideration than the condition of the army before Sebastopol, and the conduct of the departments at home who have the management of that army? I will take the last case first, and I ask, supposing you carried this Motion—supposing there was to be found a Government which would submit to such an inquiry—what would be the effect of the appointment of the Committee upon those departments, and what would be its ultimate effect upon that army, whose safety, of course, is the object of the efforts of these departments, and the ultimate object of the Motion? I apprehend that if you refer to the Committee the inquiry of how those departments are to be remodelled and consolidated, how they are to meet and how to deliberate, and how their authority is to be made subservient to one supreme authority, the Government must, until the Committee have decided what they will recommend, abstain in the meanwhile from carrying into effect their own measures for that very purpose, and wait until some blue book comes out in August, to the recommendations of which they can give practical effect. How will the Committee get at their information? Will they examine the men charged with the execution of the measures into which they are inquiring, or will they have to get the opinions of those men at second hand? The Members of the Government are, at this moment, more conversant than a Committee can be with the deficiencies of the machinery they have been called on to work; they know its weak places, they know what are the remedies that should be applied, they have a clear object in view, and they are ready to carry it out; but a Committee must hear evidence and counter-evidence, must sift that evidence backwards and forwards, and, after a long delay, must come probably to the same conclusions as her Majesty's Government have already arrived at, having interposed the delay of a whole Session for the purpose of doing by their authority what ought to be done by the authority of the Government. But what, I ask again, will be the effect of the inquiry upon the departments themselves? We know what it is to subject the conduct of any department to a Committee. The head of that department, with other members of the Government in this House, must attend the Committee to conduct his defence. And I want to know what time would be left to the Members of the Government to administer the army, to carry on the measures necessary for the prosecution of the War, if their time is to be spent day after day in a Committee room of the House of Commons, answering questions, producing returns, and endeavouring to defend themselves from the attacks made against them in the Committee. For all purposes of action, the Government would be simply paralysed during the time the inquiry lasted, What would be its effect upon the army, into whose condition you intend to inquire? and how do you intend to conduct that inquiry? Do you intend to send Commissioners to the Crimea to inquire into the conduct of the Commander in Chief, like those which the Directory sent to General Dumouriez, or to send out Commissioners such as were sent by the Dutch Senate to worry and impede the Duke of Marlborough? You will not do that. Then, do you intend to bring home officers from Sebastopol to give accounts to the Committee of the condition of the army? Those are the duties of the Commander in Chief and of the Executive Government. If the Commander in Chief is incapable of performing them he ought to be recalled; and if the Government are convinced of his incapacity they are guilty of a crime in not recalling him; but they would also be guilty of a crime if they jumped at the conclusion of his incapacity without evidence and without proof, and disgust the army by committing a gross injustice and sacrificing a man for the unworthy purpose of placing on his shoulders the blame that the House of Commons wished to place on the shoulders of the Government. There may have been Governments who have shielded themselves under proceedings like that, but this Government is not capable of such conduct, and, if it were, I for one would not remain a Member of it for one hour. If you intend to carry this motion, you intend to paralyse the action of the Government at home and of the army abroad, for it is impossible for a Commander in Chief and his officers to act freely when they know that there is a jury sitting on their every action, and that there are witnesses whom they have not the means of answering misrepresenting their conduct. Yon will also inspire the army with distrust of their commander, so that, in whatever way you put it, the inquiry is objectionable, because either you will fail in getting your information, or, if you get it, you will do so at the expense of the efficiency of the army. I cannot conceive by what arguments you can justify this Motion. You may say,—here is a case of disaster, of great sickness and mortality in the army, and we think the Government are to blame for it; but if that is what you think, the Government are the persons who ought to bear the punishment. You cannot mean to inquire into the mode of conducting the business of a department, or to enter into a pedantic disquisition as to the duties of this or that office; for, depend upon it, you must look not so much to the form of the office as to the energy and will of the man who holds it. It is your duty, if you entertain the opinion that a Government has not administered its duties as it ought to have done—not to institute inquiries which may be prolonged to the dog-days—but fearlessly to say, "You, the men conducting this War, are unfit for your posts; you are conducting it in a manner discreditable to yourselves, and, what is much more important, destructive to the best interests of the country; we will, therefore, put you out of the Government, and we will substitute for you those in whose capacity and integrity we have more confidence." I am perfectly willing to abide by that test; but I ask the House, if they have made up their minds to take that course, to avow it manfully, and at once. There is no disguising the fact that this Government has been for a long period a Government existing without what may be termed genuine Parliamentary support; it has, consequently, been subjected to constant defeats upon cross motions of every description, and, no doubt, its strength and efficiency have been greatly impaired by such proceedings. The Government has also been exposed to much obloquy and calumny. Some people have said it should despise obloquy and calumny, but, however the calumniator may be despised, no Government in a country like this can afford to despise the calumny. With constant repetition it has its effect upon the estimation of the character of public men, as this Government has found by that course which has been recklessly and unscrupulously pursued. But the Government now stands in a situation much more precarious than it did. We cannot deny that a Government already weak has received a heavy blow by the secession from its ranks of a man whose talents, character, and antecedents, make him in every way the first man in this House, and give him a personal influence over it that no one else possesses. I lament that secession for the sake of the Government, for the sake of the public service; and I hope the noble Lord, who has treated me since I have been his colleague with a confidence and kindness I shall ever gratefully recollect, will pardon me for saying that I regret his secession for his own sake; also I do not think that this is a moment when any servant of the Crown ought to leave the public service, the emergency being so serious; but I feel the full weight of the loss of the noble Lord, and on account of that loss, I think I am entitled to ask the House, above all things, for a plain, rapid, and intelligible decision as to ourselves. You have negotiations of the greatest importance pending—you have a state of things in the Crimea requiring constant and daily action — you require both for the negotiations and for the purpose of carrying on the war measures to be at once directed and carried into effect; and the suspension of all the functions of the Government which necessarily takes place when its existence is staked on a vote of the House of Commons, of which no one can say what will be the result, is most fatal to the public service. What I ask is, a decision at once and in plain language upon this point. It is indifferent to me in what shape it comes; but I should regret to see it in such a moment as this carried, for I do not want a precedent to be set for transferring to Committees upstairs the functions and prerogatives of the Crown, and I wish the Executive to be respected by this House, as well as to see it respect the decisions of the House. Each has its own peculiar functions, and neither can encroach upon the other without danger to the State. I hope the House will consider well the course it is about to pursue. There are great perils surrounding this country—it is a moment of breathless anxiety—and it does become the Senate of the nation clearly to express its intention as to what men it will intrust with the management of the difficult and delicate affairs that are now in progress.

Sir, with these feelings, I express my intention of voting against the Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman. I have endeavoured, as shortly as I could, to vindicate the Government from the charge that has been made—the charge of having knowingly and, as it were, with their eyes open suffered our gallant army to perish. I have even, by the last mail, received accounts of a re-distribution of ground, by which the work and labour to be borne by our soldiers will be much decreased, and of the arrival of baggage animals, which, I trust, may facilitate the carrying up to our army of the clothes and provisions and shelter necessary for its very existence. I do not wish to impress upon the House opinions with regard to the future of that army more gloomy than necessary; but it is essential for that army and for the interests of the country, that a speedy and distinct decision should be taken as to the stability or the termination of the Government which now holds the reins of power—a Government which will not hold them at all if they cannot hold them effectually. I say, Sir, it is time that the House of Commons should decide upon this point. We are ready to abide by their decision; but, I say again, let that decision be plain and intelligible, and, above all things, let it be speedy.

MR. H. DRUMMOND: The right hon. Gentleman shall understand, at least from me, plainly and intelligibly, that I do impute it to the gross incompetence of some man or men that an event has occurred without a parallel in history — that an army, three times victorious, has been left to perish—to be utterly destroyed—by the incompetence of those whose duty it was to have supported it. The right hon. Gentleman says, "Come forward and make your charge;" but how can we do that until we have got information? The whole country is in wrath with somebody, but no one seems to know who that somebody should be. That is the plain question we want to have answered—we want to know who it is that is responsible for results that have excited general wrath and indignation. And is this wrath confined to one party, or is there not a burst of indignation from one end of the kingdom to the other? Is it not re-echoed from Germany and from France? Is it not asked in all their papers, what can the English Government be composed of? Was ever such cruelty exhibited towards men as that with which they have treated their army? I should have thought the right hon. Gentlemen themselves would be the very first to thank us for coming forward and asking for information. I am not content to throw the blame on a Government. I can understand that it is very decent and proper and right for all the Gentlemen sitting there to put themselves forward in order to screen their colleagues; but it is not satisfactory to us. Does any one mean to say that it is the fault of the right hon. Gentleman that the army is starving? No; but it is the fault of the Government. Does any one say that it is the fault of the noble Lord? No; but it is that of the Government. It is the Government in their collective capacity that is blamed; and the disasters are attributed to the fault of the Government because the right men who are really to be blamed cannot be known. Why did the noble Lord retire? Because he has not yet been able satisfactorily to ascertain upon whom the fault rests. The right hon. Gentleman has not disclosed with whom it is that the fault rests; he has completely evaded that question. I, for my part, have arrived at the conclusion that there are certain persons directly responsible for the mistakes that have been committed; who they are I cannot tell, and I wish to be informed on that point. I do not charge the right hon. Gentleman with the faults that have been committed—his printed speech completely exonerated himself—it was too clever by half. It showed him to be a very eloquent man. Eloquence is a fine art, the sister of poetry and painting, and there is a strong family likeness. The consequence was, that when we got the speech in plain black and white before us, many things appeared very different to what they were before they had been translated. There was no doubt as to the propriety of sending troops to Varna, for the assistance, as was said, of "the Turks and civilisation," although how the two got together I know not. [*A laugh.*] Varna lies on the road from Russia to Constantinople, and it was very natural to plant an army there; but, to my infinite astonishment, I found, after the army had arrived there, that one of the essentials of an army—namely, a waggon train, had been wholly forgotten; and it now turns out that the Duke of Newcastle, having sent the army there in September—having always intended to send it there—just discovered—three weeks ago—that a waggon train was necessary, and accordingly telegraphed to Colonel M'Murdo to come over, who, I believe, remained here for three weeks.

MR. S. HERBERT said, a waggon train did exist, but it was under the Commissariat until the alteration to which the hon. Gentleman referred had been made.

MR. H. DRUMMOND: The army remained for a considerable time in that unhealthy place Varna, no one knows why. Sending an army without a waggon train is like sending a ship to sea without masts or steam. An army is not merely a collection of regiments, but consists of various branches, cavalry, infantry, artillery, and the Commissariat. But I am not going to enter into the military question; I shall take the vulgarest-looking view of the whole subject, for I think that if there had been sense enough in the Government to leave the whole to the management of a private commercial concern, they would have got over this wonderful seven miles. There is no doubt that my right hon. Friend has fully discharged his duty, that he has sent out articles liberally and lavishly, and that we shall have to pay a lavish bill for them; but the persons for whom we bought, and to whom we sent them, never got them—that is the point. The Duke of Newcastle refused to allow officers of cavalry regiments to take their bat horses, because "Colonel Kinloch was gone to buy mules in Spain." Well, Colonel Kinloch did buy mules in Spain. I believe that, for three months after they were bought, they remained in Spain, and I do not know whether they have ever been sent out at all. The inquiry we wish to make is as to how these things came about. How was it, again, that the Commander in Chief did not give the Duke of Newcastle a hint that he had forgotten the waggon train? Does the Duke of Newcastle ever go to a friend's to dinner by railway? If so, does he not ascertain before he arrives at the station whether his friend will send his carriage to carry him the odd two miles to his house. If not, that two miles may lose him his dinner in the same way that the odd seven miles in the Crimea have lost the army their dinner. But this is still more remarkable. Only last spring Lord Hardinge issued an order directing each man to carry in his kit three pounds and a half less than before, promising that that three pounds and a half should be carried at the public expense. Could not Lord Hardinge have asked the Duke of Newcastle whether he had any means of carrying these baggages? We may remember, too, the debates in the House of Lords, in which Lord Ellenborough distinctly alluded to this question of waggon trains, and pointed out either their distance from the scene of action or their inefficiency. But I now pass on to the most extraordinary thing. I lost sight of the army for a time, when on a sudden I found that it had left Varna and gone to the Crimea. What appeared so extraordinary to me was, the war being undertaken for the defence of Turkey, that Her Majesty, this House, and the whole country, should think that the defence of Turkey and the invasion of the territory of Russia was one and the same thing. This invasion of Russia was the more inexplicable, because at the end of the last war the Government desired the Duke of Wellington to draw up a statement upon the military power of Russia, its power of aggression upon Europe, and its means of defence. The Duke did so, and we never heard or thought more of it until he came into office many years afterwards, when he found that the Governments of Austria, Bavaria, and Prussia had obtained the same kind of information, and the three reports were lying in some office in this country. They all agreed upon this point, that however Russia might bluster she could do nothing in the way of attacking the rest of Europe; but that all the other Powers of Europe would perish in an attempt to attack Russia. This appeared to me a very strong reason against our proceeding as we did. But it is still more unaccountable that the army should have been sent into the Crimea without any of the necessary information. The right hon. Gentleman said the other night that Lord Raglan had been directed to procure the best information. They had written to Lord Raglan to procure information! Why, it appears to me that the instructions issued to Lord Raglan somewhat resemble the Chinese proclamation—"Sound the gongs, and drive the barbarians into the sea." Writing to Lord Raglan did not give him the information he wanted. Why did you not make our Ambassador at Constantinople procure that information for you before you went to the Crimea? My right hon. Friend has alluded to a letter that I troubled him with; but I also forwarded him a letter relative to a person who was thoroughly master of all the languages necessary for the purpose, and who offered his services to the Government to procure information for them. The right hon. Gentleman gave me a civil answer, and the person was not employed. I know that Lord Stratford was asked for this information in 1853, and that a relation of mine was sent to Lord Stratford, and recommended to him a person who spoke the whole of the languages of the country. Lord Stratford was implored to send this person to the Crimea to obtain information. Instead of which, the army was sent with no knowledge either of the fortifications or the country, the force in the town of Sebastopol itself, or the Russian force in the Crimea. I say this was a most rash and ill-considered proceeding, and that the thing wanted was the information which the Government had refused to take measures to obtain. It is all very fine now to talk about despising calumny. The only doubt I have is, whether there has not been too much leaning on the part of the Government to the direction of the newspapers, and whether, if it had not been for the newspapers, that expedition to Sebastopol would ever have been sent. You did not know, as I have said, the nature of the soil, the extent of the fortifications, the number of men in the place, nor the disposition of the inhabitants; and so ill-informed have you been, and so ill-informed has Lord Raglan been, that while the German newspapers—no doubt instructed by the Russian Ministers in those States—have from time to time published statements detailing the number of reinforcements sent by the Emperor of Russia into the Crimea, Lord Raglan had no knowledge whatever of the arrival of those reinforcements. The diplomatic department ought to have supplied this kind of information, and our Ministers at Berlin and Vienna ought to be asked why they have neglected to procure this information. I should like, also, to know the truth about the opinions of officers highly placed relative to the amount of force necessary for this expedition. It has been stated by the friends of Marshal St. Arnaud, that it was his opinion that it was impossible to expect success unless the fortress of Sebastopol was invested by an army of 50,000 men, with another army of 50,000 besides to protect the besiegers. I should like to know whether other, and British commanders did not share that opinion. I remember hearing that a strong opinion was expressed by an officer high in our service, who was engaged in the expedition, that the force which invested Sebastopol was not sufficient. In the last edition of a work by Sir Howard Douglas I find that that officer is of opinion, that to invade the Crimea and lay siege to Sebastopol with the force at our command was a desperate and daring operation, and that it was undertaken contrary to the judgment of the chief engineer officer, whose opinion ought to have been taken. But while it would not be difficult to prove that several persons of high authority thought the force sent to the Crimea was insufficient, the course I shall pursue is to give the Government everything they ask in order to carry on the war, strongly objecting to your whole proceedings from beginning to end. The landing of the troops in the Crimea was, I admit, an operation highly creditable to the navy. It was, indeed, considering the extent of the force to be landed, a most wonderful thing, and people who think that the landing of such an army upon a hostile shore is as easy a thing as going down to a whitebait dinner at Greenwich know very little of the difficulties of such an undertaking. I then come to the case of the artillery. Now, did you intend from the beginning to invade Russia or not? If you did, why was there no proper siege artillery ready? Only this morning I received a letter from an officer in the army, who says:—"There was not one single 13-inch mortar for the first two months of the siege." Then, again, why was no provision made for hospital accommodation? There were neither hospitals at Balaklava nor at Scutari. And here, again, I wish to attribute no blame to my right hon. Friend. He has done admirably in sending 10,000 beds, but I do not believe they are put up yet at Scutari; while one part of the bedding went to one place, another went to another. The same observation might be made with regard to arms, for while the Minié rifles were sent to one place, the ammunition necessary for their use found its way to a totally different place. I want to know, then, who had command of the vessels that carried these things out, or, in vulgar parlance, who was it that acted as supercargoes to see to the proper delivery of the articles, as well as who it was that ought to have received them—because it would appear that the army has been kept without many necessaries solely because no one had been ordered to receive them. With regard to the Commissariat department, no less grave mistakes have been made there. There were provisions without end at Balaklava, but the army could not get them because no one had the order to give them out. The Commissariat has been, as they say, in the hands of the Treasury. Lord Aberdeen was the head of the Treasury, and is it possible that the whole feeding of the army was intrusted to Lord Aberdeen and the clerks of the Treasury? No wonder, if so, that the troops could not get anything to eat. I have received a letter from an officer in the Guards. [The hon. Member proceeded to read the letter, which stated that the writer met the colonel of his regiment with a pair of saddlebags upon his horse, with which he was going to Balaklava to draw tallow candles for his men, which, it was stated in a general order, would be issued for their use. They went together to the stores, where they were told that there was not a tallow candle in all Balaklava.] Another general order was issued that any regiment might have potatoes on application. Down the writer went to Balaklava, but none could he get for his men, although tons of potatoes at Balaklava were beginning to decay. Sooner than throw them overboard, the French and Turkish soldiers were allowed to take them for nothing. Why, then, the writer asked, were these general orders given to issue potatoes and candles, except to humbug the people of England? The men, too, he added, were one year in arrears of clothing. It had been at Scutari for months, and it had been promised to be brought up, but it was there still, and the men were in rags. The writer of this letter says this sort of thing has been caused by the country's neglect. I say it has been caused solely by Ministerial incompetence. So, again, the militia clothing has been delayed, until the tailors have lost 10,000*l.*, because Lord Hardinge could not settle the cut of those ridiculous German postboys' coats. An order was sent to Gibraltar for the men there to practise with the Minié rifle. But from the day on which the order was given, until a few weeks ago, I understand there was not a Minié rifle ever seen there. With regard to this Minié rifle, I believe that Mr. Westley Richards went to an enormous expense, and incurred a great deal of trouble, to perfect it. After a wearisome delay, one of the specimens was selected, and what did the Government do? They sent it to Liege to be manufactured, and there they also manufacture Minié rifles for the Emperor of Russia. Upon inquiry, I find that Mr. Filder is still at the head of the Commissariat at Sebastopol, who was the man that Sir Thomas Picton wanted to hang. Again, the coffee sent out was in the raw state; but, supposing it had been roasted, there was no means of grinding it in the Crimea. Again, when the wooden huts were first talked about, the Duke of Newcastle was asked how they were to be got up from Balaklava to the camp? "Oh," says he, "the men can draw them up." They are already overworked by other duty, and it has been calculated that it would take the labour of 2,500 men for three weeks to draw them to the camp. By the last accounts it was stated that some of them had arrived, and that they were being carried up by two planks at a time upon mules, the planks being burnt up for firewood as they arrived, from the unlikelihood of the rest ever following them. The want of shoes and other clothing has been disgraceful. The fact of who is responsible for such neglect in these matters of detail we can only get at through the instrumentality of a Committee of Inquiry of this House, which I therefore think ought to be granted. The original fault, from the beginning, I take to be not so much a single fault as an aggregation of faults, arising from your having despised your enemy too much. Whatever the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Cobden) may say, his talk about "crumpling up" Russia like a sheet of paper ran through the country, and people thought that Russia was a little, foolish, second-rate Power, which you had the means of crumpling up whenever you liked. I was sorry to hear the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) say the other night that the Allies were willing to allow Russia to remain a great Power. I wish Russia may allow you to remain a great Power; but if it depended on us to allow Russia to remain great, how came it that our men were fighting in the livery of France? This kind of blustering has been fostered by your speeches at the Reform Club. The appointment of the new Minister at War, with his present powers, has been something like a trick upon the House, because when I put a question to the Government and asked them to give us a Minister at War, it was in the sense in which the appointment had been recommended by Lord Grey, Lord Ellenborough, and the right hon. Member for Coventry (Mr. E. Ellice). At length we have got the new War Department, but the only consequence has been that my right hon. Friend the Member for Morpeth has returned to the Treasury bench; to which, however, I make no objection. "Long may he live, and happy may he be." I am sorry to see the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) on the benches behind the Ministry. I think a War Minister might have been got at a cheaper rate. But we must have a War Minister, and our whole military operations must be placed under one head if we are not to become the laughingstock of Europe. Another obstacle in the way of the vigorous prosecution of the war is the want of firmness in the head of the Government with regard to his subordinates. The office of First Lord of the Treasury is a very responsible one, and one requiring upon occasion the exercise of much firmness, and if the First Lord finds a Member of his Cabinet conducting a war which he knows no more how to manage than a steam-engine, it would have been better for him to give him a month's wages and get rid of him. If the head of the Ministry won't do it, then it has to be done in an irregular way, and more damage is done than if the man at the head of the Government does his duty. The course which has been pursued in the present case is unfair both to the Government and to the colleagues of the individual to whom I have referred. There is one other point which I wish to impress upon the House. If we are to get out of this mess it will require no ordinary energy and no short paltry measures. The Government must do a great deal, and let the House prepare to do a great deal in its turn. Let them give the Minister of War all the power he requires—let them pass Acts of Parliament if he wants them—let him be, in fact, for the time, a species of military dictator. That England is not a military Power is pretty clear from the exhibition we have been making at Sebastopol. If we are to remain a military Power, why should not our army remain inseparably united?—why is one half in the Crimea and the other half in India?—why do we cut our military force in two, and why do we not put our Indian force into the Queen's service? If the two were united there might be some hope of the speedy termination of the war. But so great has been the repugnance to this step, that when the Duke of Wellington asked for Sir Thomas Munro to be his second in command in Spain, all his influence was unable to procure the appointment. At that time the Whigs were sitting here (on the Opposition benches), and opposing and decrying the Duke of Wellington. But no one is decrying the present war or refusing the Government the aid they require; and it will be the fault of the Government if they do not do what is wanted. My right hon. Friend (Mr. S. Herbert) may rest assured that he is the last man to be found fault with. But if I am asked who is the true culprit, I should accuse, first, the total ignorance of the Government of what the army undertook in going to the Crimea and in besieging Sebastopol; and, secondly, the total incompetency of Lord Aberdeen to conduct a war Ministry; and lastly, the incapacity of the Duke of Newcastle to manage the War Department with a staff composed of Treasury clerks. I hardly know the Duke of Newcastle when I see him, but I have known Lord Aberdeen long; but it is his amiable and peaceful, not his belligerent qualities, that endear him to all his friends.

COLONEL NORTH said, he entirely agreed with the Secretary at War, when he spoke of the disadvantages encountered by an English army from the regiments being so rarely brigaded together. There was not an officer who had served in India but what felt the advantages of that experience in his profession. At the same time, persons who had only gathered their knowledge from books, had no other idea of a brigade than that it was composed of a certain number of regiments. People might ridicule the camp at Chobham, but he regarded it as a most fortunate thing that this camp had been formed. The French officers who visited the camp had passed a very just critique upon the army they saw there; they said that there could be no finer troops in the world than the men, that the officers of the regiments thoroughly understood their duties, and that the manœuvres were perfect, but that the falling off was in the staff officers, who had no means of learning their duties practically. The only means that staff officers had of learning their duty was when a large body of troops was brought together. The only establishment we had which gave English officers the opportunity of learning staff duty—that of Sandhurst—was in such a miserable state of inefficiency that it was impossible for the officers of the staff to learn their duties theoretically, much less practically. In a few days he hoped to bring the state of the Sandhurst establishment before the House. Government had been blamed for much that had occurred; but he thought they ought to look for the parties to blame much nearer home:—they should rather find fault with that section of the House which had thought it the greatest feather in their caps to degrade the army and navy of the country. He remembered that when the late King first came to the throne the flank companies of the Guards were encamped at Windsor, and there was a great discussion raised as to who was to pay for the ammunition that was being fired away. Within a short period of that time he was present, in company with Lord Frederick Fitzclarence, whose loss must be sincerely deplored by all, at a Prussian camp of 43,000 men. He there saw soldiers learning all the business of a camp, and the real practical duties of their profession; and he could say, for his own part, that he learned more of soldiering in six weeks than he had ever seen before or since. One circumstance, however, this country seemed to have lost sight of, and that was, that our gallant army, which had rendered itself illustrious as much by the manner in which it had met and encountered the severest privations as by its bravery in the field, was opposed to an enormous force, which had the advantage of being brought together every year by thousands, thus affording its generals and the staff officers an opportunity of becoming intimately acquainted with its general management — an advantage of which our own officers were totally destitute. The formation of such camps was the only means of teaching our staff officers their important duties, and he hoped, on the termination of the war, to see them established in this country. It had been acknowledged on all hands that no officers were more anxious to learn their duty, or more zealous in its execution, than our own; but hitherto no means had existed of giving them that practical instruction by which alone they could hope to become proficient. Even our artillery had been unable to practise at long range for want of sufficient space; on some occasions for days, and frequently for hours together, the practice had been suspended at Woolwich in consequence of the passage of ships in the Thames; and, although a practising ground had lately been established at Shoeburyness, it was only sufficient for two companies to exercise at the same time, so that we had no practical means of rendering this important arm effective on a large scale, as was done in foreign armies. The right hon. the Secretary at War had alluded to the commissioners sent by the French Directory to Dumouriez and his army, and he asked whether they were to send out commissioners to interfere with the Commander in Chief, or to give him assistance? Now the French Commissioners had been sent by the Directory to assist the French armies; now, if report were true, a commission certainly had been sent out in the shape of a correspondent of one of the leading papers of this country, who had given anything but assistance to the Commander in Chief. Nobody could entertain a greater sense of the influence and high duties of the press than himself, but he was bound to say that he thought some means ought to be taken of repressing the evils it had occasioned. He did not mean to say that it ought not to find fault with things which appeared to be opposed to proper management, but he must say that it had given information which must have been most injurious to our army and beneficial to the enemy. It was most painful, go where they would in civil society, to hear the univeral complaints made against Lord Raglan and Lord Hardinge for allowing our soldiers to undergo so much suffering and so many privations; and, really, from the general tenour of the complaints, one would suppose that the only men who cared nothing about those matters were those illustrious commanders, whose names and position ought to protect them from such observations. If ever any man born was above anything like shabby or improper conduct, it was the noble Lord now in command of the army of the country; and, therefore, when he heard a letter quoted by the hon. Member who had just sat down as having been received from an officer, in which it was stated that an order had been issued to receive potatoes, in order that the press might say this or that, he must say, from his knowledge of the high character of that noble Lord, that he believed it was impossible that he should have issued any order for the soldiers to receive rations which he knew they had not the power of receiving, and the officer, whoever he was, must have been grossly deceived. No man was more esteemed by every officer of the army than Lord Raglan. But what he (Colonel North) complained of was the manner in which things had been sent out, and the improper spirit in which the patriotic offers of our own merchants had been received, and which he could term nothing less than official insolence. On this topic he might allude to a remarkable correspondence between the Admiralty, the Treasury, and Messrs. Collier, merchants of London, with reference to the offer from the latter of assistance in sending out roasted coffee, which, if the House permitted him, he would read. On the 11th of December Mr. J. Collier wrote to the Secretary of the Admiralty as follows—

"Sir,—From several reports, we regret to find our brave defenders at the Crimea are not so capable of making that much-sought for beverage, a cup of coffee, while their friends, the French, obtain it quickly, the latter being served with rations roasted and ground, while our poor men get theirs raw, and scarcely resting time, much less for the purpose of roasting and grinding their coffee, an article so much preferable at meals under the circumstances of cold, frost, and rain.

"We have the most extensive plant in operation daily for the purposes, and capable of roasting, grinding, and packing large quantities of coffee; being honoured with a most extensive patronage of the trade for forty-one years past, we are conversant in treating the article (the roasting of which produces or destroys its flavour), which could be packed ready for use as fresh as if obtained at home on ordinary occasions.

"Should your hon. Board consider our suggestion worthy of notice, and have the same prepared in any of Her Majesty's dockyards, we shall be most happy to render any assistance in arranging or suggesting any feature to assist in promoting the comfort of our brave fellow-countrymen, the gallant defenders of our great nation.

"Remaining yours most obediently,
"JAMES COLLIER AND SON."

A more patriotic offer than that could hardly be imagined, inasmuch as there was no kind of stipulation that these merchants should supply the coffee themselves, all they wished being to give the Government the benefit of their skill and experience. But how was that offer met? The answer of the Admiralty was in the following terms—

"Admiralty, Dec. 13, 1854.

"Gentlemen,—In acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 11th instant, I have to refer you to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury on the subject of roasting and grinding coffee for the troops in the Crimea.

"I am, Gentlemen, your obedient servant,
"T. T. GRANT."

On the receipt of this communication, Messrs. Collier, supposing the Admiralty had nothing to do with grinding and roasting the coffee, addressed the same letter to the Treasury; and he (Colonel North) must say that the reply which they received, and which was signed by Mr. Trevelyan, was a most insulting reply to a very handsome offer.

"Treasury Chambers, Dec. 22, 1854.

"Gentlemen,—I am commanded by the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury to acquaint you, with reference to your letter dated the 15th instant, that the coffee sent out for the use of the army in the East is roasted in the naval establishments, and my Lords are not aware that any additional assistance is required to hasten the operation.

"I am, Gentlemen, your obedient servant,
"C. E. TREVELYAN.

"Messrs. Collier and Son, 10, Foster Street, Bishopsgate."

But, notwithstanding this reply, what really turned out to be the fact? Why, that up to that time not one particle of the coffee sent out had been ground, and it was only within a very short period previously that any had been roasted. Was it not, he asked, enough to disgust any Englishman to see persons who came forward in a purely patriotic spirit, not asking for anything that might increase their trade, but tendering their gratuitous services, answered with that sort of official insolence? Unless an example were made of some of our departments, he was convinced our army would never get what they were entitled to. Then, again, with respect to Minié rifles, he believed, from a letter he had received, that a large quantity of those valuable weapons were sent out in a vessel commanded by the hon. Captain Keppell. But in what manner were they received? They were put on board at twelve o'clock at night, packed up in boxes, and in such a manner that it was impossible to tell whether they were Minié rifles or anything else. He did complain that when so much time was allowed things should be sent to the authorities at the last moment, and when there was no time to examine them. While he agreed in the statement of the right hon. Gentleman with regard to the condition of our army, he wished to say that he did not consider the right hon. Gentleman so much to be blamed. The blame, in truth, rested with the House of Commons, who would not willingly grant money in time of peace for military purposes, and, therefore, it had no right to expect the officers of the British army to be as perfect in staff duty as officers in foreign armies, who had great opportunities afforded them of becoming thoroughly acquainted with their duties.

Mr. M. MILNES said, he regretted very much that in a debate of such overpowering interest, and one which in itself was a kind of inquisition into the cause of the misfortunes of our army, any accidental circumstances, however important, should have been allowed to creep in. Whatever might be the peculiar circumstances of the case, and whatever interest they might have had in the speech of the noble Lord the Member for the City of London, he believed that on that (the Ministerial) side of the House there was but one feeling of the deepest regret that he had separated himself from his colleagues. He (Mr. Milnes) felt the more regret at that separation, for, notwithstanding the able vindication of the noble Lord, he could not disguise from his mind that the moment was not one in which that resignation ought to have been made. Sympathising as he did with the noble Lord in many of the grounds of his objections, and agreeing that the choice of the Duke of Newcastle was most unfortunate both for the noble Duke himself and for the country, he thought nevertheless that there were two courses which the noble Lord might have taken, one of which was that he should have made an alteration in the department of Minister of War the condition of his remaining in office, and the other—which it would have been much more agreeable to him that the noble Lord should have taken—was, that he never should have consented to that appointment. He sympathised, and the whole House sympathised, with the personal feelings of the noble Lord, but what, he asked, was the position of the affair at the time that appointment was made? Was it not notorious that the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton was designated by the common voice of the nation as the man who was the fittest to occupy that position, and that nobody was better aware of the popular feeling in that respect than the noble Duke? The country had made little allowance for the great difficulties of the undertaking, and the noble Duke, having unnecessarily placed himself in such a position, had been visited with the consequences of the national disappointment to an extent which, perhaps, he hardly deserved. On the great question now before the House he felt justified in making some observations, for, although the speech of his right hon. Friend the Secretary at War was most interesting, it laboured under the unhappy disadvantage that all official accounts whatever, in the circumstances in which the country was now placed, were received by the House with considerable doubt and incredulity. It was so difficult for any one to reconcile the official reports that were made to the House and the country, not only with the private information which they received on the subject, but with the very confession of the Government itself, that he must say all confidence whatever in official reports had ceased. When he read in one of those thousands of interesting letters which occupied the attention of the country every morning in the papers the expression, "How little can the poor Duke of Newcastle know of what is going on," he felt it was but one instance of what was passing through the mind of every man—namely, that the greatest difficulty which people in this country had to grapple with was the official system of the War Departments. He believed that in every department, from the highest to the lowest, an inquisition was required, but he did not think a Committee of the House of Commons was the best medium through which such an inquisition could be conducted. He thought the investigation should be conducted by a man of character, vigour, and great power, placed in a position of authority in which he could carry it out. His hon. Friend who had just sat down had laid on the House the burden of a great part of the misfortunes of our army; but on that point, which he knew was a very popular one, he could by no means agree with him, because he could not attribute to the reductions in the number of our forces in time of peace the present misfortunes of our army, for he could not believe the organisation would have been more perfect, or the discipline would have been better, simply because the army might have been more in numbers; on the contrary, if our army, such as it was, was disorganised, there was every probability that a larger one would have been no better arranged. He thought it most important at this crisis that they should understand their position, and they should not allow themselves, when they wished to avoid burdening the people of the country with a feather weight more than was necessary, to be open to the charge, "If you do not grant this, you will damage the army." He did not believe the present misfortunes of the army were owing to any such causes, but to a long-continued system of mal-administration which required a firm and vigorous hand to grapple with it. It was as easy to call for a great Minister or a great general as for any other man of genius, but they would not get either the one or the other by calling for him: nevertheless, they must do their best, and it was the duty of this or any other Government to "strike and spare not" in this matter, and whatever might be a man's station, power, or social position, they should not regard individual feeling; it was due to the nation to say to any one where there was a just cause, "You must be superseded. You have failed to conduct the operations of the war to the satisfaction of the country." His hon. Friend who had just sat down had commented on the conduct of the press with reference to the campaign in the Crimea. He (Mr. Milnes) could only say that the best organs of the English press seemed to him the only truth-tellers in the matter, and their accounts had been confirmed in all main points by that evidence which the House could alone trust—that of private letters and the private information which they had received from their friends in the Crimea; and not only that, but the prognostics of the leading portion of the English press had been in every case fulfilled, and those very warnings which had been held up to them as vaticinations of factious violence thrown out without foundation, would, if properly listened to and heeded at the time, have at least modified the evils which had come upon them. He did not think it became the House or any portion of the country to speak slightingly of what the press had done in the Crimean War, when they saw 10,000*l*. subscribed for the "Sick and Wounded Fund," so nobly inaugurated by his hon. Friend the Member for Tamworth (Sir Robert Peel), and for which he trusted he would receive the acknowledgment of the House, expended in a manner which had saved hundreds of British lives, and last, not least, had been the means of supplying with winter clothing a British regiment, which the British Government had sent out without that first requisite for health and efficiency. Ought they, in the presence of such facts as these, to speak with disregard of the press of this country? But the question before the House was, whether they should consent to the appointment of a Select Committee to investigate the condition of the army in the East? In the propriety of that appointment he could not concur, because it would be intrusting, as it were, the affairs of the whole country to it; and, although politicians might say, when a new Government came in they would rescind it, or object to the names, or shift it off one way or other, he could tell them that the people of this country would not allow of such a proceeding, but that if the House chose to appoint it, it must make it a reality. Did any man believe that a Committee of the House of Commons was a proper tribunal or competent to judge of such a matter as was here proposed to be submitted to it? He did not wish to undervalue the effect of Parliamentary Committees, knowing, as he did, the many advantages which had resulted from them; but, in his opinion, no one would contend that they were competent to undertake this investigation. He believed not only that a majority of the House was of his opinion, but that if the Motion was dissevered from its political character as a vote of want of confidence in the Government, not twenty men would be found to vote for it. In the case of the Walcheren expedition the question was judged by a Committee of the whole House, and the witnesses—he might almost say the culprits—were examined at the bar of the House, and the Government remained in power to be judged by the House. That judgment was constitutional and just; but the Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman was totally unjust, and as he (Mr. M. Milnes) had said before, he did not believe it would be entertained by the House. Therefore, he regarded this question as a reality, and if he voted for such a Motion it would be with the intention that a Committee should sit, and not be a fraud and a delusion on the people; but believing, as he did, that the appointment of such a Committee would be unjust, he should vote against the Motion.

THE MARQUESS OF GRANBY: Sir, I feel the same difficulty in knowing how to vote on this occasion as the hon. Member feels who has just sat down. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that the appointment of a Committee is not such a measure as we could honestly wish for, for I think it is one which would fail in its object, and that we cannot, therefore, conscientiously consent to it. I cannot see how some thirteen or fourteen Members of the House of Commons sitting here can judge of the actions of men 3,000 miles off in the Crimea. At the same time, we are told by the noble Lord the Secretary of the Home Department that he considers the Motion as one of want of confidence in the Government. I feel it impossible to give a vote of confidence in the Government, because I think at the beginning they entered upon the war unnecessarily, and that, since they have entered upon it, they have not conducted it with the vigour and ability necessary to bring it to a successful issue. We who think that the war has been unnecessarily entered upon have been placed in a position of great difficulty and delicacy; for previous to the war being declared, and when negotiations were going on, if I or any one else on this side ventured to express an opinion on the question, we were at once told that that was not the time for explaining our views and sentiments, that important negotiations were going on, and that, desirous as we were of peace, we, by giving utterance to our opinions, would absolutely endanger the success of the object we had in view. Parliament was prorogued. When Parliament met again, war was declared, and then we were told that we must no longer express our opinions in favour of peace, for that it would be un-English and unpatriotic to do so, war having been actually engaged in. But I do hope—now that negotiations are again on foot, and that the noble Lord the Member for London has referred to them—that I may be allowed again to state my opinion of the war, in order to show why I think we entered upon it when there was no occasion for our doing so. I wish, however, to guard myself from being considered as one of those who hold that this country ought never to go to war. That is far from being my opinion. I have on former occasions, in endeavouring to explain my views of national policy, stated my belief that circumstances might occur which would justify this country engaging in war. I do not wish further to allude to this matter now, because it might have the appearance of party spirit; but I wish distinctly to say that I am not one of those who think that, under all circumstances, and at all times, war is to be avoided. I believe that to be impossible. But what I say is this, that before entering upon a war we should be well convinced of its necessity, and that the aggression is of so grave a nature as to render it impossible for this country to look on and not interfere. My assertion is, that no such occasion has occurred in reference to the present contest. My assertion is, that the Emperor of Russia never intended to seize on the Ottoman Empire. You say that we must go to war for the sake of maintaining the balance of power in Europe. I will show you that that has not been your real object in going to war. I will show you a case in which the balance of power in Europe—if it was endangered by Russia—was equally endangered by France. I will refer to the opinion of the noble Lord the Member for London to show that such was his opinion. In the beginning of 1853 the noble Lord wrote to Lord Cowley—

> "But Her Majesty's Government cannot avoid perceiving that the Ambassador of France at Constantinople was the first to disturb the *status quo* in which the matter rested; not that the disputes of the Latin and Greek Churches were not very active, but that without some political action on the part of France these quarrels would never have troubled the relations of friendly Powers. In the next place, if report is to be believed, the French Ambassador was the first to speak of having recourse to force, and to threaten the inter-

vention of a French fleet to enforce the demands of his country."—No. 77.

If the balance of power in Europe is endangered by the course taken by the Emperor of Russia with regard to the rights of the Greek Church, I ask was not the balance of power in Europe equally endangered when the Ambassador of France threatened to send a fleet to Constantinople to intimidate Turkey to make the concessions demanded? I do not see how you can get over that. But again, I maintain that the Emperor of Russia has throughout declared that it is not his wish to take Constantinople. I will not trouble the House by reading the repeated declarations of the Emperor on that point. He has declared that Russia is already too large, and that it is neither his interest nor wish to take Constantinople. You say you do not believe the word of the Emperor of Russia, and that his assertion is so much waste paper. I cannot, of course, make you believe in the truth of what the Emperor of Russia says. That is a matter of opinion. Confidence is no doubt a plant of slow growth. The Emperor of Russia has been on the throne for thirty years, and if his conduct has not inspired you with the feeling that he never yet broke his word, nothing I can say will make you believe the assertion. But if you have no confidence in the Emperor of Russia, have you also none in yourselves? Have you any confidence in France, or in Lord Aberdeen, the head of the Government? If you have, you will perhaps allow me to refer to a passage in a despatch written by Lord Aberdeen in 1829—a despatch which he has never disavowed, and which was produced in another place last Session. That despatch was written after the conclusion of the Treaty of Adrianople, and Lord Aberdeen states his opinion of that treaty. Lord Aberdeen says—

> "Permanently advanced to the centre of Armenia, into the midst of a Christian population, Russia holds the key both of the Persian and Turkish provinces, and whether she be disposed to extend her conquests east or west—to Teheran or Constantinople—no material obstacle can resist her progress."

That was in 1829. Twenty-six years have elapsed since the Treaty of Adrianople was formed, and since Lord Aberdeen penned that despatch. Now, I ask you fairly, if it be true that the Emperor of Russia is so anxious to seize Constantinople as he is now represented to be—if that be the one thought of his mind, the one wish of his heart—why he has allowed twenty-six years to elapse without doing that which Lord Aberdeen says he could do at any moment without any material obstacle being opposed to him? Will you tell me the Emperor of Russia has had no opportunity, and that he has been waiting for the favourable moment. Can we so soon forget the year 1848, when there was not a country in Europe the throne of which was not shaken to its foundation—when Austria must have fallen but for the very man whose ambition you say now leads him to compass the possession of Constantinople? Was France then, I would ask, in a position to stop the progress of a Russian army in an advance upon the East? Was England, proudly as we boasted of our condition as compared with other nations, at that time able to send 50,000 soldiers to perish in the Crimea, or even to land them at Constantinople? Why, if ever there was an opportunity which the Emperor of Russia might have seized for carrying out the designs attributed to him, that opportunity must have occurred in 1848, and not in the year 1853 or 1854, when Europe was at peace, and the armies of France, Austria, and England were all unemployed. But notwithstanding all those circumstances—notwithstanding the rejection of your own note by the Sultan at Constantinople—notwithstanding the expression of the Emperor of Russia's willingness to accept your own interpretation of that note, and the rejection by the Sultan of subsequent notes, to the expressed dissatisfaction of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, you decided upon declaring war against Russia. And having declared war, what course did you adopt? Why, you sent out an army entirely unequal to compete in point of numbers with the superior forces of your enemy. We have heard this evening described the woful condition to which that army has been reduced—of its want of clothing, of food, of shelter, of everything which it requires. Those wants may, perhaps, even now admit of a partial remedy; but the argument which was made use of by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War in defence of the conduct of the Government, and which rests upon the circumstance that all the requisites for the army have been sent out to Balaklava, is not sufficient to show that for the wants of our troops adequate provision has been made. The hon. Gentleman who spoke last said, that it was not the fault of the Government; and that if a larger army had been sent out matters would be in a position proportionately worse. The justice of that proposition I must beg leave to deny. One of the chief causes why the things which have been sent out to Balaklava are now lying useless in that town is, that Lord Raglan has not men to spare in order to bring those things up to the camp. I had a letter myself from the Crimea as late as the 9th ultimo, in which it is mentioned that the men are obliged to go down from the camp before Sebastopol to Balaklava, to bring up provisions and everything else. A road to Balaklava has not been made, because Lord Raglan had not a sufficient number of men to employ in that service;—had he had 10,000 men to spare he could have made a road. I do not pretend to judge of Lord Raglan's military capacity; but it is obvious that if he or any other general wanted stores brought up, and had men to make the road whereby to bring them up, he would have done so. Nobody who knows how our soldiers have suffered in the trenches, and the losses which the army has sustained, can doubt that fact. I am, therefore, inclined to attribute the greater portion of the evils which have attended this expedition to the Crimea to the insufficiency of the numbers which were originally sent out. But, then, the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War says we, properly speaking, had no army fit to take the field, and of late have never had one—that we have regiments, but that we have no army. If that were the case, why, I would ask, did you send our troops against the strongest fortress in Europe, knowing, as you admit you did, that they were unfit to perform the task which you called upon them to accomplish? The blame rests upon the Government that those brave soldiers, who you say were not an army, have gone forth to perish upon the shores of the Crimea:—it was somewhat late to discover that when, as the hon. and learned Gentleman who brought forward this Motion said, there are 40,000 men to be accounted for out of the 54,000 you have sent abroad. But, amid all the suffering and all the misery by which the expedition to the Crimea has been attended, there shines one bright star whose light is sufficient to dispel the surrounding gloom —that is the unparalleled bravery and devotion of our troops. It matters not where they meet the cavalry or the infantry of the enemy—whether attacking the heights of the Alma or resisting the onslaught in the valley of Inkerman, or attempting unheard-of deeds at Balaklava—the result is in every instance the same. Still more than all these glorious achievements is the patient endurance of the British soldiers amid the horrors of the Crimea calculated to inspire us with something like confidence in the future. That confidence acquires additional force from the unswerving fidelity of our allies the French, and from the hearty co-operation which throughout this contest we have received at their hands. That our alliance with that brave nation may not terminate with the present war I sincerely trust, though I must regret that it has not had its commencement in the more enduring interests of peace rather than the uncertainties of war. There is one portion of the speech of the noble Lord the Member for the City of London which I heard this evening with some regret. The noble Lord stated, that in consequence of the attitude which has been assumed by Austria, France, and England, the Emperor of Russia was now inclined to make peace upon reasonable terms; and the noble Lord went on to say that he trusted a peace would, in consequence, be concluded, honourable to Austria, to France, and to this country. But the noble Lord did not go on to say that he hoped a peace would be concluded which would also be honourable to Russia. In my opinion we should not limit our views to our own interests or to our own ambition. Nobody has declared more solemnly than the noble Lord that we possess no personal interest, no exclusively personal objects to serve, in prosecuting the present war against Russia; such, too, has been the proud boast of the Governments both of England and France; and acting upon those sentiments, I do trust that we shall take enlarged and comprehensive views of our duty, and have a due regard, as we profess to have, to the interests of all the nations of Europe. I regret, therefore, that the noble Lord should have omitted from his speech all allusion to the interests of Russia—an omission which I feel no doubt was perfectly unintentional; but such an omission by a person of his Lordship's position and character is in my opinion unfortunate; for if there be any real desire to have a peace safe and honourable not only to England, France, and Austria, but to Prussia and Russia, we must take not isolated, but large and comprehensive views.

MR. LINDSAY said, he would not enter

into the causes or policy of the war; it was sufficient for him to know that the country was at war, and that our noble army was dwindling away at the rate of 100 per day, and that it was unclothed, unsheltered, and unfed. He supported the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, quite independent of the question of confidence or no confidence in the present Administration. Taking them as individuals, he had every confidence in them; but as a body, he regretted that they did not display the unanimity which was so desirable under the present circumstances. He agreed with what had been said by an hon. Member near him (Mr. M. Milnes), that a Committee upstairs was not altogether a proper tribunal to which to refer the question under discussion; but when they found the Government admitting that gross mistakes had been made somewhere, and yet did not take steps to effect that radical reform which was requisite—what course was the House to take? If the Government would not do what was necessary, the House must take up the matter and send it before a Committee. As he found that the Government would not adopt those measures of reform which he thought absolutely necessary, he must on that ground support the Motion. He was very much pleased to hear from the right hon. Secretary at War that out of the noble army which had left our shores only fourteen per cent had been lost; but presuming the statement of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield to be correct, that out of that army there only remained 14,000 men, he should like to know what had become of the other 40,000—how many had fallen gloriously on the battlefield, and how many had fallen through sickness brought on, he was sorry to say, by neglect. He did not lay the charge of neglect upon any one in particular, but that there was gross neglect somewhere no one could doubt—and that was another reason why he supported the Motion. The hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War had alluded to the great difficulty of sending stores from Balaklava. He estimated that he had sent out 107,000 tons of one description or another to Balaklava, but stated that the difficulty which existed was to convey those stores to the camp. Now, any ordinary man of business would not have neglected the proper means of transporting these goods to the camp, instead of allowing them to rest at Balaklava whilst our troops were dying from want. It was obvious that the first thing that should have been done, was the making a road from Balaklava to the camp. With respect to the transport service by water, it was evident that there was something radically wrong. There appeared to him to be no responsible head. He would take the case of one ship. The Admiralty chartered a vessel, and were the only responsible parties to whom the owners had to look; but unfortunately, under the system now adopted, the Admiralty had very little to do with her afterwards. Now, the Admiralty ought to be the only responsible party for all the goods in such ship, and for their landing at the proper destination. If it was requisite to send out 200 tons of ammunition, the Ordnance would communicate with the Admiralty, in order that a vessel might be provided for the purpose. The same process would be adopted if the War Office wished to send out 500 troops, or the Storekeeper General found it necessary to send out 200 tons of provisions. Such an arrangement was so far well and good; but unfortunately, afterwards, the Admiralty had very little to do with the matter. The Ordnance sent a party to see their stores embarked, the Storekeeper General sent out another party to see the provisions embarked, and the War Office sent another party to see the troops embarked, neither of these parties being responsible to the Admiralty, who chartered the ship. What he desired to see was, the Admiralty solely responsible to the country, not only for the ship, but for the stores sent in her, having proper parties to take account of those stores on their being landed, to send a receipt home which should correspond with the accounts in the Admiralty, and to be accountable to the Commissariat General, through whom the Commander in Chief would know what stores were in hand. But no arrangement of the kind existed at present. It was for these important reasons that he should support the Motion of his hon. and learned Friend.

Mr. LAYARD said, he had not come down to the House with the intention of taking a part in the debate, but he could scarcely give a silent vote after the speech of the right hon. Secretary at War. In treating this great question he had always wished to avoid mere questions of detail, but, as usual, the right hon. Gentleman compelled him once more to go into details with which the House had been over and over again troubled. He felt that in following the line adopted by the hon. Gentleman he owed an apology to the House. The right hon. Gentleman was generally so ingenious in his speeches that they required following to show what the value of his statements really was. He did not for a moment insinuate that the statements made by the right hon. Gentleman were not strictly true, but they were put in a form likely to mislead. The right hon. Gentleman had attempted to justify the neglect which had distinguished the present campaign by referring to events in the history of the Peninsular war. But they might as well consign all books of history to the flames, if their purpose was not to warn those who followed to avoid the errors of past times. The right hon. Gentleman said, that after Talavera a state of things existed similar to that which now existed at Balaklava; but, surely, if a great Minister undertook a great war, the first thing he would do would be to refer to history to see how former wars had been carried on, and what mistakes had been committed, in order, if possible, to avoid them, and not, when too late, to refer to history to justify failure and screen the guilty. Having to a certain extent justified the errors which have been committed, the right hon. Gentleman attempted to defend them—first throwing the blame on the system, and then, he regretted to say, on the army. If he remembered rightly, Parliament endeavoured last year to compel the Government (as they had to compel the Government to do almost everything) to alter the system by reforming the various departments connected with the army, and consolidating them under one head, and some kind of promise was given that the system should be altered. That system had not been altered; it remained in precisely the same state now as at that period; no amalgamation had taken place; nothing whatever had been done. The right hon. Gentleman then threw the blame on the army, saying there were no officers capable of commanding a brigade. ["No, no!"] The right hon. Gentleman said no regimental officer knew anything about brigade service. Now, after the great wars in India, surely there were plenty of officers who had commanded brigades, and he wanted to know why some paltry jealousy was allowed to prevent the employment of men who had gained experience in our great Indian campaigns? He took the instance of Sir Colin Campbell. To him we owed one of the greatest victories we had gained in India. His services were at the disposal of the Government. Did they put him in command of a division? No! but in the command of a brigade, under a general officer who had never seen a shot fired, and knew nothing about a campaign. Who were the other general officers? He did not wish to say anything unpleasant, but the time was come when they must speak out. One general officer had been placed in command who had returned from India with a somewhat doubtful reputation. He did not pronounce whether that reputation had been justly assailed or no, but there was no man who would not acknowledge that the rumour must have a very bad effect on those who served under him. Other commands were given to others no less incompetent; and yet there were men who had seen service of such a nature in India as entitled and qualified them to take part in the great events which were now taking place in the Crimea. Then, the right hon. Gentleman said that our soldiers were taken from a class of people who were dependent for almost everything on others—they could not, he said, even make their own beds. Now he begged to remind the House that our sailors were taken from the same material—sailors and soldiers were alike Englishmen. Why was there this difference between them? Because the soldier was reduced to a mere machine. When a soldier entered the ranks he was, in effect, told he must no longer exercise his intelligence. The sailor, on the contrary, was called upon every moment to exercise his intelligence; and that was the cause of the difference between the two services. In the French army the soldier was in very nearly the same position as the sailor in the English navy; his intelligence was called out in the same manner; and no one could stay a week with the two armies without perceiving how far more intelligently the French soldier performed his duties than the English, not because he was a better or a braver man, but because he served under a better system. If they wished to go to the root of the evil they must go to the Horse Guards, and not till then would the evil be radically corrected; it would continue, and be the cause again, as it was now, of half the mischief of which complaint was made. The right hon. Gentleman had attributed the greater part of those disasters, which he was forced to confess had befallen us, to the want of a road from Balaklava to the camp. The noble Lord the Member for the City of London actually said, that if the Government could have foreseen that seven miles would have intervened for the transport of food to the army, they would have hesitated before they undertook a campaign of the kind. [Lord J. RUSSELL expressed dissent.] He understood the noble Lord to say, that if the Government had been aware the army would be so placed as to have seven miles between the point of communication and the camp they might have hesitated. [Lord J. RUSSELL again signified his dissent.] He begged the noble Lord's pardon and would not further allude to the subject; but it struck him that some such remark had been made. But he would ask, had any army ever entered on a campaign without the possibility of seven miles intervening between the point of communication and the camp? He remembered last year, in the winter, Her Majesty's Government applied to him for information on various subjects connected with the East; among other questions, he was asked if any class of individuals could be engaged as porters, and it was stated there was some intention of engaging Greeks. He replied, that if they engaged Greeks, they would all perhaps run away or be spies; but that there was a nation, the Armenians, who acted as porters at Constantinople, and might be trusted. He was asked by a distinguished individual whether they were Mussulmans or Christians. He said they were Christians, and suggested that, as they were favourable to the Turkish Government, a brigade might be formed of them, to be employed especially as carriers. Of course that suggestion, like many other useful ones, was neglected; and, notwithstanding all the warnings Government received, no means of transport were provided for the army. The right hon. Gentleman said, means of transport were provided, but that the horses were left behind at Varna. Would the House believe that those horses were not calculated for transport service? They were officers' horses. And how were the officers treated? Officers of all grades, many with only their miserable pittance of pay to live on, were required, in order to carry on a campaign in Turkey in Europe, to buy two horses each—in some cases four or five. They had scarcely incurred the consequent expenses, when the army was ordered from Varna to the Crimea. The horses were left there to die, and not one sixpence of recompense had been received by these gentlemen. These were the several thousand horses which the right hon. Gentleman said the Government had procured at Varna for transport service. Then it was said there was a waggon train. It was true waggons had been sent to the Crimea six weeks ago, but when the army landed in the Crimea, there was no waggon train, and, what was unheard of in war, the officers had to carry on their backs all the requisites for a campaign, even their own provisions. That was not the case with respect to the French army. How could officers do their duty when reduced to be beasts of burden? It would have been better to sacrifice the transport of a whole regiment than to have exposed the officers to such treatment. The result was, that by the time the army reached Balaklava, a large number of officers were dead, or no longer able to serve. The right hon. Gentleman said they had provided a transport service, but the horses were left behind at Varna, and that the mules died for want of food. Surely that was no excuse. Why was there no food for them? The fact was, the Commissariat officers seemed to have a curious idea with respect to these animals—they seemed to look on horses and mules as machines not requiring food. As an instance, he remembered forty mules being sent from Varna to Balaklava without any provender being put on board for the passage. Fortunately, it was a grain ship, and by sweeping up the hold a little corn was obtained, just sufficient to feed the poor animals until their arrival at Balaklava. Last year the Government were told they would be in want of all the necessaries of life in Bulgaria, that the country was almost depopulated and its resources exhausted. He (Mr. Layard) suggested establishing a market at Sinope, and took the greatest trouble to point out how available it would be, whether for an army at Varna or Sebastopol, or in Asia Minor. From Sinope they might have had a full supply of fresh meat and provender, and by a little trouble they might have obtained regular transport service from the people of the country. But no! the Government would not listen to a single man who knew the country, and they made a rule not to employ any one who could either speak the language or had been in the country before. He recommended a gentleman who had been many years in the country and spoke all its languages as well as he did English; but, when that gentleman went to a gallant officer at the head of a large department on the subject, he was told that it was desired to engage his services, but he could not be placed in a position to dine with the officers; of course the gentleman refused entertaining any further proposals. Why was such an objection raised? Because the Government could not break through the system —they must employ Sir Charles Trevelyan's clerks, men who had never seen service, and who did not speak a word of the languages of the country to which they were going. The Government sent a gentleman to Constantinople to make a report on the country. He recollected pointing out the absurdity of sending a gentleman who knew nothing of the languages or the people, and who was to spend a fortnight in the capital, to report on the state of Turkey generally, with its mixed populations, as different, one from the other, as black from white, and he (Mr. Layard) was met by an eulogium on that Gentleman, and a reference to his Report and its index of seventy or eighty subjects, of which the person could know absolutely nothing. That was exactly what he complained of—that they were induced to believe they had information on matters which people who had lived in Turkey half their lives knew very little about. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War had adverted to the large number of transports which had been employed by the Government; but it appeared that those transports had only been engaged in conveying goods to Balaklava and back again without ever landing anything. An hon. Friend opposite had given them an account of the state of affairs at Balaklava, and had particularly instanced the want of vegetables. This was strictly true, for he (Mr. Layard) had himself been a witness to it, and had seen the unfortunate soldiers brought down to carry upon their backs enormous sacks of potatoes and onions up to the camp, which they were scarcely able to move. The provisions might certainly have been there, but had they been consumed by the troops? The House must not be misled by returns of the abundance of provisions at hand. There might be an abundance of clothing and vegetables, but unless the vegetables were consumed and the clothing worn by the troops, what was the use of sending them there? The House had been completely mystified by the accounts which had been given of the cargo of the *Prince*. They were told that that unfortunate vessel had all the winter clothing on board, and that the fact that such clothing was there showed that the Government had not exhibited the negligence of which they had been accused. Now, in point of fact, the *Prince* had not on board what could be properly called Crimean winter clothing; it was such clothing only as the troops might have put on any day of the year. There was no special clothing whatever to enable them to stand the severity of a Crimean winter. There was not a single rag of that description—all that was on board being a certain number of shirts, stockings, and other articles which would have been given out to the soldiers at that particular time of the year, when winter was setting in, in England or in any other part of the world. And now he would for a moment call the attention of the House to the case of the siege artillery. They were told that so far back as the spring of last year the Government contemplated a descent upon the Crimea. For the sake of the Government themselves, he could not believe this to have been the case. It appeared to him to be impossible, considering the nature of the siege train sent out. They had already heard that there were no mortars in the train calculated for a siege of such magnitude as that of Sebastopol. The mortars available were of very small calibre; and there were no siege guns of any size, those at hand being merely calculated for a campaign in Bulgaria, in besieging such small places as the Russians might have taken. But, even in Bulgaria, they would have been unfit for service, as no horses had been sent out with the siege train, and, in conveying the guns to the heights before Sebastopol, they had been compelled to use the horses of the Horse Artillery; and how many guns were there? Fifty. Fifty guns to besiege a place which was the great arsenal and fortress of Southern Russia—which was your Woolwich, Plymouth, and Portsmouth, combined! and then, to complete the absurdity, only such a supply of ammunition was sent out as, at the common rate of firing, would be exhausted in five or six days! Then, as to the hospitals. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War said, every endeavour would be made to fit up the hospitals; but why had this not been done before? Did the Government think they could go to the Crimea and fight battles there without having any killed and wounded? The French evidently did not think so, for they had already established their hospitals before they commenced the campaign. No outcry had been heard against their proceedings in that respect. On the contrary, their hospitals were admirably arranged, and not one man had been suffered to die from the want of proper accommodation for the sick and wounded. The right hon. Gentleman told them the Government were now about to send out a Commission of Inquiry. [Mr. S. HERBERT observed that the Commission was sent out on the 7th of November last.] That was after many of the disasters which had overtaken our troops had occurred. It now appeared that Lord Raglan had been directed to make a Report to the Government upon the state of the army; but how were they to get at the truth in that Report? Did they think that if they examined the officers they would tell them all they felt? Not a bit of it. And how would these Reports be made? Were they likely to be fair Reports? On the contrary, and very naturally too, would not all that reflected credit be given, and all that was unfavourable be kept in the background? That was the nature of the Reports they would get, and not the least dependence could be placed upon them. The right hon. Gentleman had asked them if they would have them send out Commissioners, such as those sent out by the French Republic? Certainly, if they would have an equally good effect. This was certainly no revolutionary war; but in the case referred to by the right hon. Gentleman the French army was in a state of demoralisation, and it was reorganised and led on to victory, performing deeds rarely exceeded in the previous history of the country, in consequence of the efforts of the Commissioners. He had heard that, through the vicious system adopted by the Government, the medical officers before Sebastopol had resigned in a body. Of course Lord Raglan refused to receive their resignation, but the matter was a very serious one, and it showed how badly the Government departments must be managed when the medical officers, finding they were unable to discharge their duties properly, were compelled to resign in a body. He had no wish now to enter into any full details respecting the war. He knew, as the right hon. Gentleman told them, that the Government could not grant this Committee, for if such a Committee were sitting upstairs the hands of the Government would be shackled, and disclosures might be made which would be most prejudicial to the public service and most dangerous to the result of the campaign. It was not, however, because he anticipated any beneficial results from the Committee that he should vote for the Motion of his hon. and learned Friend. He should vote upon it distinctly because he believed it to be a vote of confidence or no confidence in the Ministry, and not because for a moment he imagined that a Government could at such a moment concede such a Committee. He had been told it would be well to let the matter rest now, for the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston) had been Minister for War, and that under his auspices affairs would in future be conducted to the satisfaction of the country. But the resolution he had come to would not be shaken, because, at the last moment, with imminent danger hanging over their heads, the Government had appointed the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton Minister for War. That was not the way to conduct the Government of the country. The state of things which had raised public indignation had been going on now for the last twelve months; and the Government had been told last year that the proper person for Minister of War was the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton. He well remembered his lamented Friend the late Member for Marylebone (Lord Dudley Stuart) making a Motion in that House upon this very subject, a Motion which was resisted by the Government on the ground that they had appointed the best Minister, and now, at the last moment, it was admitted that those who held that opinion in favour of the noble Lord were right and the Government were wrong. But such had been the case in everything. Last year hon. Members proposed an amalgamation of the War Office and the office of the Secretary at War. They were told it should be done, and the House liberally voted 17,000*l.* on the understanding that the amalgamation should take place. But what was done? A noble Duke, against whom personally he wished to say nothing, as he had the highest opinion of his honesty and zeal, was appointed the new Secretary of State for War. Being inexperienced in the duties of his office, and unacquainted with the details of war, he (Mr. Layard) had naturally supposed that the new Minister would have chosen as his under secretaries some persons who knew something of the business of such a department; but he found one of the under secretaryships was given to a relative of the noble Duke—a military man who might consequently have had some qualification—and the other to the noble Duke's private secretary, who, as far as he (Mr. Layard) could ascertain, had none whatever. It was really astonishing to see how the public interests were trifled with, and, unless a better system were adopted, the House of Commons had better at once resign its functions. Then, again, the utterly deficient condition of the transport service was brought under the notice of the Government; but nothing was done in the matter, until Ministers saw that the country was determined to have a proper transport service, when they stepped in and consented to make one. Time after time he and other hon. Gentlemen had risen in that House to state that there was no blockade in the Black Sea. Over and over again he was flatly contradicted by the First Lord of the Admiralty, and told that there was a blockade. He (Mr. Layard) told them that the trade in the Black Sea was as open as it ever had been, that many of our merchants had been ruined, and that the commerce was being carried on regularly by Greek merchants; but he was contradicted more than once; though now, when public indignation had been excited, they found a notice issued to establish a blockade from the 1st of February next. Really, this was laughing at the public, and he could not understand how people could allow themselves to be treated in such a manner. Was it true or not that there had been a blockade? It was evident that none had existed, inasmuch as they now found the fact virtually admitted by the Government themselves. The other day a complaint was made that medals had not been given for the action at Balaklava. When Government saw the strong feeling entertained by the public on account of this neglect they at once conceded the matter, and came down to the House to say that a medal would be granted. Now, was this statesmanship, or what was it? If it were, did it not bear out the truth of the words of a celebrated English writer, that it would be of little detriment to the public service to throw a piece of orange peel into Palace Yard, and make the first man who picked it up Prime Minister? Recent events bore out most strongly the truth of this remark of Mr. Carlyle. Either Lord Raglan was sent out at the head of the expedition, or he was not. If he was not, why throw any blame upon him? Upon all sides there was the same—he scarcely knew what to characterise it—the same sacrifice of public interests to private interests. Whether in diplomatic appointments or in military, he found the same evil system. He could not refrain from pointing out, when alluding to diplomacy, recent appointments at Athens and Florence, and ask if it was creditable, when the very existence of the country was at stake, that they should sacrifice its honour and welfare for private and personal feelings? His hon. Friend the Member for the City of London had attempted to explain away the speech he made some time ago with respect to Austria, but he would much rather that his noble Friend had adhered to his former version. He did not mean to say that Austria would not join the Western Powers, and ultimately act with them; but what had she done hitherto when one word upon her part spoken in time might have saved half of those who had been sacrificed in the Crimea? Did they think that Russia would have advanced beyond Odessa if Austria had been against her? Certainly not. How could he, by voting against the Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman to-night, declare confidence in a Government which had proved itself to be incapable, not only of carrying on war, but of conducting the commonest diplomacy, as evinced by the Vienna Conferences? It was admitted by the Government themselves that they had made a gigantic mistake, and had brought us to this terrible position; and he trusted the House would allow him a few moments, while he endeavoured to point out the really critical state in which we now were. He looked upon the Crimea and Sebastopol as comparatively nothing in this great question. It appeared that the Government were now concentrating their energies on potted meat and warm clothing for the Crimea—certainly most important things, but not the only important things to be looked to. What was the real position of the country at this moment? We were engaged in a vital struggle with a gigantic Power, and our army—what little army we now had—was in the Crimea, and could not be drawn thence. In what position did Russia stand? She had upon her Asiatic frontiers a vast army, which it was highly probable, as soon as the warm weather set in, would march upon Erzeroum and Kars and Bagdad, and perhaps overrun the whole of Asia Minor. If she did so, could we send, or could we induce the French to send, a single regiment to that country? And what would be our position if Russia gained possession of Erzeroum, and engaged Persia on her side? The Government did nothing last year either to induce or to compel Persia to declare for the Allies, and they did nothing till the winter even in the way of sending an agent there. The gentleman they then sent was certainly a man of considerable abilities, one whom he should be glad to see in almost any diplomatic position; but he was not quite the man to send to Persia. There was, however, a man who, above all others, was, at such a moment as this, capable of carrying on our diplomacy in Persia, a gentleman well acquainted with the political condition and resources of that country, with those of India, and with those of the adjacent countries; he referred to Colonel Rawlinson, who, of all men, was the one to send to Persia, and who would alone be worth an army of 20,000 men to the Government. He (Mr. Layard) had strong reason for believing that before long the Government would not be able to bring Persia into their system of policy;—it was only by success that we could secure the assistance of Persia. If they did not take Sebastopol Persia would be against them, and in the course of a year would be at Bagdad, when our possession of India would be, he would not say imperilled, but at any rate greatly shaken. And what was the position of Turkey in Europe? All the Turkish troops had been taken from Bulgaria, with Omar Pacha, the only man that could command them, and thrown into the Crimea to assist our unfortunate army, which, from our own guilty neglect, was perishing from insufficient supplies. To repair the mistakes made by the Government at home, Turkey had been deprived of all defence, and at a time when the Government were actually doubtful of the course Austria would take. He could not believe that she would declare against us; if she did, Russia would be at Constantinople before a single regiment could be sent to oppose her. Even supposing that Russia fell upon Austria, raised Hungary against her, and beat her in a pitched battle, what was there to prevent Russia from going to Constantinople? If she did, what was to save the army and fleet this country had now before Sebastopol? With such immense dangers impending over us, how could the House for one moment allow the affairs of the country to be administered by men who had shown themselves incompetent in war and incompetent in diplomacy? It would be a crime on his part to vote against the Motion, and thus to say that he had the slightest confidence in those who had betrayed what he considered to be the best interests—the dignity and honour—of the country. For the first time, brave hearts which had never desponded before were desponding at the state of things existing in the Crimea. He had received letters from two gentlemen he knew well, and from whom he had never heard a word which betrayed that they either doubted or feared—letters up to the 8th instant—which stated that at last they must confess things were desperate. This, then, was not the moment to hesitate; and it was only by the country compelling the House of Commons to take the matter in their own hands, and by insisting upon the appointment of men equal to the occasion to carry out the policy of the country, that they could hope for safety. He believed there were men who could do this, and who could save the country. But we must not hesitate —we must once for all insist upon having men who would carry out a policy worthy of the country; for if that policy were not carried out they might depend upon it that England ere long would be reduced to the position of a second-rate Power. It was with these convictions— these solemn convictions—that he felt himself compelled to record his vote in favour of the Motion of his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sheffield.

Sir G. GREY: Sir, it is with deep reluctance that I offer myself to this House to take any part in the present debate; but I feel that I should be shrinking from a public duty if I merely gave a silent vote against the Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Sheffield, and if I did not record in the most distinct and emphatic terms that I give my vote without the slightest doubt or hesitation, thinking that I should be betraying my public duty were I to sanction the precedent of committing an inquiry such as that proposed to us to any Committee of fifteen Gentlemen selected from the body of this House. The objections stated by several hon. Gentlemen in the course of the debate, and by none more forcibly than the hon. Gentleman who has just addressed the House—the objections thus stated to committing such an inquiry to hon. Gentlemen upstairs—I believe to be fatal to the Resolution of the hon. and learned Member; and I confess that, deeply pained as I am now to stand here severed, for the first time in no short political life, in any matter of political importance, from my noble Friend behind me (Lord John Russell), I am astonished that any man, who knows what are the responsibilities of office, who has been conversant with the administration of affairs, or who can suppose that he may hereafter become conversant with it, should, upon mature reflection and consideration, assent to a Motion, the only effect of which must be to paralyse the exertions, I will not say of this Government alone, but of any Government whatever sitting upon these benches and conducting the affairs of the country at a most critical period—a period when greater confidence should be placed in the Government than under ordinary circumstances, and when it is essential that the hands of Government should be left free and unfettered, in order to enable them to pursue those measures, which, if they have the confidence of the country, they would adopt with a view to the vigorous prosecution of the war, and the maintenance of the honour, dignity, and best interests of England. I have not the slightest hesitation in believing that the hon. and learned Gentleman who has brought forward this Motion has done it with a view to serve the best interests of the country; but I feel it my duty as a Member of the Government, as it would, in my judgment, have been equally my duty as a Member of this House, to record my vote against that Motion. I do not rest my opposition to the Motion on the single ground of its being a covert and indirect mode of passing a vote of want of confidence in the Government. There are those who no doubt say—"We will appoint this Committee, and then, by a subsequent vote, we will rescind the order of the House for the nomination of the Committee, and thus leave the division on the present Motion to imply a want of confidence in the Government." ["Hear, hear!"] Hon. Gentlemen opposite cheer that statement—those who not long since filled high office in the Administration of this country, and who now aspire again, perhaps, to fill those offices which they before filled. What!—Have they no confidence in the Government, and do they shrink from coming forward and proposing a direct vote of want of confidence? Are they driven to the subterfuge of adopting a Motion proposed by an hon. Member on this side the House, and acceding to a proposition, so objectionable in principle, and objectionable, as I contend it must be in the greatest degree, in its practical effect? Why do they not raise the plain and simple question of "confidence or no confidence," which it is their duty to raise if they entertain the opinion which by their cheering I suppose them to entertain, and call upon the House of Commons to decide to whose hands the Government of the country shall be intrusted? I admit that any man who votes for this Motion, will express an entire want of confidence in the Government; but still I wonder that there should be among those hon. Gentlemen who sit opposite, no man of inventive genius enough, or of courage enough, to come down and explicitly avow that feeling by proposing a direct resolution on the subject so distinctly and unambiguously worded as to relieve any man from doubt, as to which way he should give his vote. It is not fair to the Government to raise the question in this form, because a man might vote against this Motion for the reasons to which I have just referred, although he might think that the Government, as at present constituted, is not deserving of the confidence of the House. What is it that my hon. Friend who last addressed the House stated? He admitted that the Motion was objectionable in principle and must be disadvantageous in practice. I, however, rest my opposition to the Motion on other grounds. I admit, to the fullest extent, as my right hon. Friend near me (Mr. S. Herbert) admitted, the right of the House and of the country to be furnished with the most ample information which the Government can give with regard to the state of our army, as well as with regard to the causes of those admitted miseries and evils which exist in that gallant army, limiting that admission of right to this extent only, that every consideration shall be given to what the public interest requires in regard to the degree of information to be given at any particular period of time—for it cannot be denied that a certain degree of information only may prudently be afforded on a particular subject at one period, concerning which, at a later period, more ample information may be safely granted without prejudice to the public interest. My right hon. Friend has said that he was ready not only to agree to, but to enlarge the terms of the Motion, so as to give it a more general and searching character. Do not let it, therefore, be said that the Government are shrinking from affording all the information which can be given consistently with that public duty, which, so long as I am a Member of any Government, I will never consent to betray for any momentary purpose of advantage. But it is principally owing to the feeling that this Motion involves a censure of a grave and serious character against certain departments of the Government that I oppose it; for, although the department over which I preside is not immediately connected with the conduct of the war, still I stand here as fully responsible for all the acts of my noble and right hon. Friends upon whom the immediate direction of the war has devolved, as if I had been personally at the head of the departments they themselves fill; and I feel that to assent to this Motion would be to cast censure upon men whom I consider to be undeserving of that censure. I am not here, however, to say that no mistakes have been made or errors committed, or that everything has been done in the right way or at the proper time. I am not here to assert that if we had possessed that foresight which past experience would have afforded us, we might not have been able to guard against many of the evils which we all lament; but I believe that those evils have resulted, not, as an hon. Gentleman opposite has said, from the incapacity or the ignorance of any one man, or of any other man, but that they are mainly attributable to that inexperience under which we have all suffered, owing to what we justly regard as the inestimable blessing of a forty years' undisturbed peace. The war came upon us after a long peace, and found us unprepared with that knowledge and that experience which could only be acquired by almost continuous or protracted wars. I am not here to say that a road could not have been constructed from Balaklava to the camp before the mud had so accumulated as to make the communication almost impossible. I am not here to say that hospitals could not have been more efficiently provided, or that the transport service has been conducted in the most unexceptionable manner; but I am here to say that I think it would be most unjust—an injustice in which I cannot concur—to lay the blame of these results upon any one man. I believe that if any one of us now composing the Government had been placed in the same position we might have fallen into the same errors; for we should not only have laboured under that inexperience which results from the absence of war for many years, but also under the absolute want of those non-combatant departments of the army which were essential to its safety and success, but which had to be created at the time the war broke out. I have thus, Sir, stated what I believe to have been the main cause of those evils and sad results which we are now lamenting. A great deal of the misery has also proceeded from disease, which has been the effect of climate, and against which no experience or foresight could have guarded. What was the first effect of the troops being put in motion after having had their spirits depressed and their health destroyed by being kept in a state of inaction at Varna, where disease was carrying them off in great numbers? I say that the disease in the camp and the scourge of cholera, which, even in this country had its almost countless victims, seriously affected the army by weakening its strength and diminishing its efficiency, and that though the first effect of its being ordered on active service was to raise the health and spirits of the men, yet disease followed them to the Crimea, and continued most seriously to diminish their numbers; and it would be most unjust to attribute these results to the conduct of any portion of the Government. As this Motion has been taken up as a vote of want of confidence in the Government by hon. Gentlemen, I can only say that if the blow is to be struck and blame is to be cast on the Government, strike the blow as early as you possibly can. This is a time not for debate or hesitation; it is a time for action. Let the House come to a decision, and, be it adverse or be it otherwise, to that decision we must bow. I was much gratified to hear the hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond) pass a well-merited compliment on that department of the administration which is more immediately under the direction of my right hon. Friend (Mr. Sidney Herbert), against whom, nevertheless, the force of the present Motion is particularly directed. There are a few points, however, respecting which it appears to me there exists a great deal of misrepresentation, no doubt arising from misapprehension, of what my right hon. Friend has said. The hon. Member for

Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) has said that the Secretary at War had actually thrown blame, and even a stigma, on the army, by stating that its officers were not capable of taking the command of a brigade. My right hon. Friend said nothing of the kind. What he said was, that our army is not an army in the sense in which that word is used in war, or the sense in which it is used when speaking of the great continental armies, which are kept up in a perpetual state of efficiency for defensive and offensive operations. What my right hon. Friend did say was, that our army is an aggregation of regiments; that its regimental organisation is perfect, but that from the very nature of the duties in which it is engaged in peace, the service is a regimental service, and not that of an army; and that there are many officers, even officers in command of regiments, who, from the nature of the service in which they have been engaged, often a severe and arduous service, have never had the opportunity of seeing a brigade. But, surely, to say so is casting no reproach upon the officers of the British Army. The next observation I have to make is not with respect to any misrepresentation of what has fallen from my right hon. Friend, but a misrepresentation which has been made by the hon. Member for Aylesbury himself with respect to the condition of the British soldier. My right hon. Friend had alluded to the previous habits and employment of the men of whom our army is composed, as accounting for the difference between them and the soldiers of other armies. Is that speaking in disparagement of the British soldier? But the hon. Gentleman goes further, and says the British soldier is a mere machine, and that if you make him a machine you must expect him to be destitute of intelligence. Now, let me quote, in opposition to the opinion of the Member for Aylesbury, the opinion of one, of whom on account of the gallant deeds with which his name is associated we are all proud, and to whom we are so greatly indebted as the historian of the Peninsular War. If the hon. Gentleman has not read this passage, let me advise him to do so before he again ventures to cast imputations upon the character of a British soldier.

Mr. LAYARD said, that the charge which had been made against him by the right hon. Gentleman was a most serious one. He begged to say that he had cast no imputation upon the British soldier. What he said was, that as a raw material

he possessed all the excellences of a soldier, but that the system made him a machine.

Sir G. GREY: Yes, that as raw material he was excellent, but that that material, in consequence of the system, was so deteriorated that it made him a mere machine. Now, Sir William Napier, in a passage of his work, gives this description of the qualities of a British soldier—

> "That the British infantry soldier is more robust than the soldier of any other nation can scarcely be doubted by those who, in 1815, observed his powerful frame, distinguished amidst the united armies of Europe; and notwithstanding his habitual excess in drinking, he sustains fatigue and wet and the extremes of cold and heat with incredible vigour."

There is the raw material; and now we come to the machine.

> "When completely disciplined—and three years are required to accomplish this—his port is lofty and his movements free, the whole world cannot produce a nobler specimen of military bearing; nor is the mind unworthy of the outward man. He does not, indeed, possess that presumptuous vivacity which would lead him to dictate to his commanders, or even to censure real errors, although he may perceive them; but he is observant and quick to comprehend his orders, full of resources under difficulties, calm and resolute in danger, and more than usually obedient and careful of his officers in moments of imminent peril. It has been asserted that his undeniable firmness in battle is the result of a phlegmatic constitution uninspired by moral feeling. Never was a more stupid calumny uttered! Napoleon's troops fought in bright fields where every helmet caught some beams of glory, but"—I am now come to a passage, the accuracy of which I do not admit, as applicable to the present time—"the British soldier conquered under the cold shade of aristocracy. No honours waited his daring, no despatch gave his name to the applause of his countrymen, his life of danger and hardship was uncheered by hope, his death unnoticed. Did his heart sink therefore? Did he not endure with surpassing fortitude the sorest of ills, sustain the most terrible assaults in battle unmoved, overthrow with incredible energy every opponent, and at all times prove, that while no physical military qualification was wanting, the fount of honour was also full and fresh within him!"

I hope I need not apologise to the House for having read this eloquent passage from so eminent an authority, and I trust, that from this time forth the hon. Gentleman will not venture to describe the British soldier as being composed of a "raw material" which is excellent, but which is converted into a mere machine by the system of the British Army. But, Sir, since this passage was written by Sir William Napier, not only has a great improvement taken place in the habits of the soldier, but his deeds of valour are now recognised in a manner which was formerly never done, and rewards of merit given, and commissions bestowed upon him with a liberality that was never before practised in the Army. His death, too, is recorded equally with that of the officers who fall in battle or die of disease. The letters received from our brave soldiers now in the Crimea have been such as to come home to the hearts and sympathies of all in this land; and surely it is no slight proof of the improvement that has taken place in the character of our Army, when we find such letters published, equally from the private soldier as from the officer. One word with reference to a misapprehension of the hon. Gentleman in the assumption that authority had been given to Lord Raglan now for the first time to remove incompetent officers. Does he not know that, from the first moment Lord Raglan set foot in the Crimea, or took the command of the army, he had as Commander in Chief, full authority, and would be supported in the exercise of that authority, to remove every officer who might be found incompetent to the discharge of his duties? Or, does he mean that if Lord Raglan conceived he had no such authority, he would not, if he thought it necessary, at once have applied for it? I have thus stated generally the grounds on which I feel it incumbent on me to stand on this occasion by the acts of my colleagues when attacked by the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield —to avow my full responsibility for those acts, to share in the censure which this House may impose on them by passing this Resolution, and to defend them as far as I am able—not from all ground of censure or blame for errors which may have been committed — but stating the case openly, fairly, and honestly to the House, to appeal to its candour and fairness in coming to a decision. This imposes on me the necessity of making one or two observations—which I do with considerable reluctance—on what fell from my noble Friend the Member for the City of London, in the early part of this evening. He has stated with great clearness, and moderation, the grounds which have induced him to retire from the Government of Lord Aberdeen; and knowing, as I do, the character of the noble Lord, I do not for one moment doubt that he has been actuated by a high and conscientious sense of duty in taking that step, and in withholding his vote and support from his colleagues in resisting the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield. The noble Lord has referred to the correspondence that took place between Lord Aberdeen and himself some time in November, and he has also referred, and referred no doubt truly, to the opinion which he says was conveyed to him by his colleagues on this question. I certainly thought he was not at that time justified in resigning his post in the Government in the circumstances in which we were placed; but I beg most distinctly to assert, and I expressed this opinion without hesitation, that, whatever be the position of a Government—whatever may be the consequences which may follow such an act—any Member of a Government is entitled, nay, is bound to separate himself from that Government in any circumstances even of peril to the country, and of deep anxiety and responsibility, if, when he proposes a course of action which he considers essential to the interests of the country, he finds that proposal overruled. I should have felt that I was departing widely from my duty, and that I was taking a course not worthy of myself or of him, if under such circumstances I had hesitated to tell him, "You have stated that you think a certain course is essential to the interests of the country; but, that course having been negatived by the head of the Government, you are bound to withdraw from it." I should rather have said, "You have only one course to take." But in my own defence, and without casting the least blame on him, I must say that I understand that the arrangement proposed by my noble Friend, and to which he referred in one of the letters he read, was a mere arrangement for attaining more speedily the object of unity of action in the different departments of our military administration by combining them into one. His proposal was that the two offices of Secretary at War and Secretary of State for the War Department should be combined, and that the two offices should be held by a Member of this House. My noble Friend intimated at the same time, that if that change was to take place—as he wished that it should—that there was no man the country would look to with so much confidence for holding this combined office as my noble Friend who now holds the seals of the Home Department. But I certainly did not understand my noble Friend to press this change, as essential to the conduct of the war, or essential to the interests of the country. The proposal was not known to me till about the last day of November, certainly not till after the notice appeared in the *Gazette* for the meeting of Parliament on the 12th December; and when, in fact, it had been already negatived. Now, I frankly admit that, all things now considered, knowing what the results are, seeing the feeling of the country, and recognising what has been described as the vigorous mind of my noble Friend the Secretary for the Home Department, I wish that when the original appointment was made to the War Ministry, the office had been confided to him. I do not say that even in that case a different result from that which we now witness would have been obtained; but the country would have felt that the man of greater administrative experience and longer official life than any other man was intrusted with the office, and, whatever the results might have been, I do not think the same censure would have attached to the Government that is now cast upon it. But I must say that when I was solicited by my noble Friend to join the Government in June, when the re-arrangement of offices took place, I then understood him not only to consent, but to approve the arrangement by which the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) retained the office of Home Secretary, and the Duke of Newcastle received the seals of the War Department. As many of the Duke of Newcastle's colleagues separated after the prorogation, they were unable to give him that advice and assistance which he might have wished to obtain in the very trying duties he had to perform. I speak only for myself, but I certainly do feel that there would have been the appearance of a want of generosity in turning round on a colleague who was acting most ably and laboriously in the office which he filled, and ejecting him from that office as soon as complaints were made and dissatisfaction arose. No doubt we concurred in the opinion that a change might at some time or other be desirable. But I certainly thought it my duty to represent to my noble Friend that he would break up the Government by leaving it, and that, before doing so, he should consider the responsibility attaching to such a step. I was one who dissuaded him at that time from insisting, I will not say on the proposal then made, but on leaving the Government on account of it. Although, therefore, I knew that my noble Friend, in common with many others, no doubt, thought that some change might at no distant period be desirable, I certainly heard with surprise on Wednesday evening that he had tendered his resignation to Her Majesty in consequence of the notice of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield. I feel the deepest pain in being for the first time separated from my noble Friend—I trust it will be the last time we shall be so separated. Nothing could grieve me more than to believe that the rest of my life was to be spent in difference of opinion with him on matters of importance. But I could not, consistently with my views of honour, and my sense of what is due to my colleagues, have acted otherwise than I have done. Do not suppose that I think any consideration for a colleague ought to stand in the way of the public interests; but I did not feel that the proposed change was at the time essential to the public interests, and I therefore felt it my duty to give the advice which in common with others I did to my noble Friend. I deeply regret that he is not here now to share the responsibility of those acts for which he, in common with us, was responsible. One word, in consequence of what fell from my noble Friend, and which was repeated more explicitly by the hon. Member for Aylesbury, namely, that since he left the Government, the very change which he proposed has been made —that, in short, my noble Friend the Secretary for the Home Department has been appointed to the War Department. All I can say is that I stand here, a member of Lord Aberdeen's Government, to defend the acts of that Government, and to submit, in common with my colleagues in that Government, to any censure that may be passed upon it; but I am no party to any arrangement by which any reconstruction of the Government is to take place. I do not mean to say what course may hereafter be taken by the Government. If this Motion is carried, there is of course an end of the Administration—it will become our duty to bow to the pleasure of the House, and to resign our functions into the hands of our Sovereign. If, on the other hand, it be not carried, it will, of course, be open to Lord Aberdeen and his colleagues to consider whether a change in the administration of the War Department may advantageously be made; but no change such as has been referred to has received the sanction of the Government. I know of no such change. All I say is, that I am a Member of the existing Government, ready to submit to the verdict of the House, whatever that may be. If that verdict should prove not to be a hostile one, with my colleagues, I shall have to consider whether, consistently with our honour and duty, we can continue to administer the affairs of the country, and feel ourselves justified in retaining the offices we hold. I earnestly join, however, in the appeals that have been made to the House, not to keep this question pending in an undecided state for two or three days. Let the result be known at the earliest moment, that the Government may know the position in which it is placed, and the country may understand in whose hands the management of public affairs is to be vested—that the Government, by whomsoever conducted, may be able without delay to take those measures that are required for the safety, the honour, and success of our gallant army in the East.

Mr. WALPOLE: Sir, I wish to state very shortly to the House the view which I take of the present Motion. I am not certain that I should have taken the smallest share in the present discussion if it had not been for one or two remarks that have fallen from the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down. One of these was that this Motion, if carried, will be detrimental to the public interests and to the administration of affairs in this country; the other, that there had been an unwillingness displayed on this side of the House to take that course which would best become us, namely, that, if we aspired to the Government, and if we disapproved of the conduct of Ministers, we ought to have come down boldly and proposed frankly a vote of want of confidence in Her Majesty's Government. Now, I can assure the House on this point—namely, that of aspiring to the government of the country—I have always said in private, and I do not hesitate to repeat in public, that, in my opinion, it would be a great misfortune to the country if the Government were changed at the present moment. It would, Sir, in my opinion, be much better for the public interests that the Members of the Government should reconstruct themselves in such a manner as that they should be enabled to administer our public affairs, instead of causing all that confusion which a change in the Administration must necessarily occasion. In respect to the other charge—that the Motion, if carried, would be detrimental to the public interests—I will content myself with stating the reasons which induce me to give my vote in favour of the present Motion, which I certainly intend to do. Sir, after the speech made by the noble Lord the Member for the City of London, it appeared to me that it was totally impossible to resist such an inquiry as is now demanded, and that the only question upon which the Government had to decide was, what was to be the scope, the form, and the tendency of that inquiry? You have the evidence of the noble Lord, who is the only person in this House out of the Government who knows all the circumstances connected with this war, and who is, therefore, competent to inform the House whether some inquiry is necessary or not; and I must say that, after such declarations as he has made, confirming the accounts which have everywhere been published, it would be a serious disappointment to the country at large—it would create the greatest possible dissatisfaction, if this House were now to refuse to grant an inquiry. That inquiry is absolutely necessary, with the view of eliciting the information necessary to enable the House—to enable the country—to judge of the persons responsible for the mismanagement that has occurred in our army. The daily accounts—at least the weekly accounts, that come from the Crimea are so calamitous—the condition of the troops, if these accounts are to be accredited, is so alarming, the apparent mismanagement of almost every department is so clear—I say the apparent mismanagement, for I am determined not to prejudge this question—while in the midst of that plenty to which my right hon. Friend the Secretary at War has alluded—in the midst of that plenty heaped up in useless profusion at Balaklava, which is, in fact, the strongest confirmation of the mismanagement of the war on the part of some person, when there is nothing provided in all this abundance for the health, comfort, and safety of the army—I say, under such circumstances, and with so much that is heartrending, and so much that is inexplicable, as the noble Lord admits, I should have thought the first duty of the Government, when they knew that such was the state of things, and such the prospects of the army, would have been to ask for this inquiry, in order that information might be given to the country to show how far they themselves were free from blame, or who in effect were the parties to whom blame ought principally to attach. Sir, I should further have thought it was the duty of the Government, in justice to those commanders who, in their absence, behind their backs, and without the opportunity of answering the charges that are brought against them, have thus had censures heaped indiscriminately upon them, to furnish us with the means of defending their character, or at least of knowing how far those characters have been justly assailed. I should further have thought, in justice to the country, now demanding inquiry from one end of it to the other, that the last thing which the House of Commons should have done would be to increase the dissatisfaction which so universally prevails, by resisting inquiry so imperatively needed, and, give me leave to add, so reasonably demanded. These are reasons which, to my mind, are absolutely irresistible in favour of some inquiry, unless the objections taken to such inquiry by the right hon. Baronet (Sir G. Grey) and by my right hon. Friend the Secretary at War could prevail—namely, first, that an inquiry of this kind would be seriously detrimental to the public interests; and, secondly, that it implies a censure upon the Government, which, if the House is prepared to impute to it, ought rather to be conveyed by a direct Motion. Allow me to refer very briefly to both those points. The only real argument, the only strong objection, which has been urged against this Motion is, that it may be detrimental to the public interests. Now, observe what is the nature of the inquiry which is asked for. It is an inquiry into the condition of the army before Sebastopol, and into the conduct of those departments of the Government whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of that army. It is not such a searching, roving inquiry as has been alluded to by my right hon. Friend the Secretary at War, which is to continue hanging over the heads of our generals and admirals during the time that the inquiry is going on. It is an inquiry into the past, and into the conduct of those departments to which the interests of the army have been intrusted, with the view of ascertaining why the wants of that army have not been properly ministered to. Now, how can such an inquiry be detrimental to the public interests? Being a retrospective inquiry, with reference to a state of things which is appalling the country at this moment, it is precisely similar to the inquiry which was instituted at the time of the Walcheren expedition. ["No, no!"] Yes, with the exception that the Walcheren inquiry was made by a Committee of the whole House, or rather at the bar of the House, instead of being conducted—like the inquiry now proposed—by a Select Committee. When I said that the Walcheren inquiry was similar to that now proposed, I meant with respect to its retrospective operation. I have heard it objected that this inquiry would be prosecuted into the affairs of the expedition while it is in progress; but I deny entirely that that is the object of the inquiry now sought; and, if such had been the object of the inquiry, I conceive that the Government ought to have limited it to the past, and I venture to say that this House would almost unanimously have supported them in such a limitation. It is also objected that the inquiry is to be prosecuted before a Select Committee, instead of before a Committee of the whole House; or, rather at the bar of the House itself; but are hon. Gentlemen aware of the immense difficulties which occurred before, and which would occur again, if you were to prosecute an inquiry of this description in a Committee of the whole House? Are they aware that the reporters were excluded from the House during the whole of the Walcheren inquiry because of the danger that might arise to the public interests from the publication of the proceedings? Do they recollect that the evidence produced before that Committee found its way into the public papers, and that serious riots took place in consequence, notwithstanding the exclusion of the reporters? I think the House must see that it would be infinitely preferable to have a Select Committee inquiring into this matter, with the power of closing their doors while the inquiry is in progress, and then furnishing the House with the necessary information to enable them to form a judgment upon the subject. It seems to me that the inquiry which was directed by a majority adverse to the Government at the time of the Walcheren expedition is the strongest possible precedent for granting the inquiry which is now demanded; and, indeed, until you grant that inquiry, I know not how this House will obtain the information which they ought to possess with regard to the prosecution of the war. But it has been said by my right hon. Friend, "You will hamper the generals and those who have the conduct of the war if you grant this inquiry." Why, I appeal to the House whether anything can be worse or more embarrassing than what is taking place at present with reference to those generals? You have every day anonymous letters appearing in the papers, charging the generals with misconduct, with incapacity, with want of knowledge in their military duties, when they themselves are at a distance of 3,000 miles—when they have no friends here with sufficient information to justify their conduct, and when this House, if it should adopt the plea set up in opposition to the Motion, would in fact deprive them of their only means of defence. For these reasons, therefore, instead of this Committee being detrimental to the public service, it would, I firmly believe, be rather conducive to its interest than otherwise; although I admit that by inquiries of this description considerable difficulties must always be placed in the way of those who have the management of public affairs. We have, however, to weigh in the balance two sets of inconveniences—the inconvenience of interfering with the conduct of public affairs to a certain extent, and the still greater inconvenience of refusing to the House and to the country that information which they now demand, and which they justly demand, when they find the finest army that was ever sent out from their shores reduced from 54,000 to some 20,000 men, or as some accounts state, which I would fain hope are incorrect, to 14,000 effective bayonets. This, then, being my answer to the first objection, let us see whether the second objection ought to prevent us from voting for this Committee. That objection is, that the Motion involves a censure upon the Government, and that, if any censure is intended to be cast upon the conduct of the Government, it ought to be done by a direct Motion. I must frankly avow—although I believe that the same view of the question is not taken by a majority in this House—that I do not vote for the present Motion in the strict sense of casting a censure upon the Government. On the contrary, I look upon the Motion as a proposition for inquiry, in order that the blame may be fixed upon the proper persons, as soon as information is rendered to this House. My argument would be that, seeing that so much damage has happened to your troops—seeing that they are in want of all the necessaries that would enable them to perform their military service—seeing that they have neither fuel nor food, nor clothing, nor shelter, nor ammunition—not because these things are not at Balaklava, but because your agents and officers have not the means of carrying them up to the spots where they are immediately required—I feel it impossible to refuse an inquiry which would enable us to ascertain why none of these things have been delivered to the troops in proper quantities and in adequate time; and in prosecuting such inquiry I do not necessarily impugn either this or that man's character. I say further, however, that if the Government are to leave the question upon the present state of our information, gleaned as it must be from the public organs, and if they will not furnish us with that information which would enable us to judge more accurately, we must then bestow our censure where *primâ facie* it seems to be deserved—namely, upon the public departments which are charged with and are responsible for the conduct of the war. *Primâ facie* the heads of those departments are responsible for the whole of the business transacted by, through, or under them, and it is for them to discharge themselves of that responsibility by showing that they have done all they could do, first in securing the proper supply of all things requisite for the service of the army; and then, in the second place, if that has not been done, then in ascertaining who were the parties to blame for this neglect, and having ascertained that fact, they ought to have recalled the blameable persons from the positions which they have previously occupied. I think, then, the objection that the inquiry would be detrimental to the public interests is not so strong as the countervailing objection that if you refuse inquiry you are denying to this House, and to the people, whose representatives you are, that information which is imperatively demanded, and which, I must say, is imperatively needed. I also conceive that the objection taken to the Motion, on the ground that it involves a censure upon the Government, does not strictly apply; for, although blame undoubtedly attaches somewhere, you would not specify the particular individuals to whom such blame attached until a proper and sufficient inquiry had been instituted. These, then, are the reasons which will induce me to vote for the appointment of the Committee. It has been said indirectly—and, no doubt, it is felt in many quarters—that, if this Motion should be carried, it will lead to a change in the Government. One word I should like to say upon that subject. In my view of the Government of this country, nothing is more disastrous than constant and frequently-recurring changes. For the stability of the Government, it is important that the same hands should carry it on continuously, as long as they are able to do so in unity among themselves and for the benefit of the public service. I have always held, and I still hold, that, as Conservatives—at least as right-minded Conservatives—our first duty is not unnecessarily to hamper the Executive Government. That is a duty which I think we ought to impose upon ourselves, and a duty which I believe is felt by most of the Gentlemen sitting on this side of the House. But there are times when we may think that a Government is either wrong in principle, or that public affairs have been so misconducted that some step may fairly be taken, even by those who are willing to strengthen the hands of the Executive, lest they should be implicated in the responsibility of measures which they feel in reason they are bound to condemn. This consideration undoubtedly leads us to the question—supposing the Government is displaced, how is it to be re-formed? Is it to be reconstructed from Members of its own body, or is a new Government to be formed in its stead? I know that I tread upon delicate ground in touching upon this subject, but the reason why I most regret the retirement of the noble Lord is the enormous difficulty which the Government may find by reason of his retirement in the way of their reconstruction. I do not hesitate to say that reconstruction is the best thing that could have happened if it had happened before the Government met Parliament; but, in such reconstruction, it would be necessary for you to consider how you could have suited the places to the men who were to fill them, rather than how you could fit the men to the places they were to occupy, however ill qualified they might be, to fill them. There is another thing of which I cannot lose sight, and which has been apparent for the last year or two. I cannot conceal from myself that the experiment of what is called a "Coalition Government" has again failed, as it always has failed in this country—not from want of ability, not from want of principle, not from want of integrity of character in the men who compose the Government; but it has failed because—as no one can have failed to see who has watched the course and the measures of the Government—there was not one mind pervading them; because there was a difference of opinion amongst the Members of it which was sadly detrimental to the public interests. That difference has manifested itself upon almost every great question; it has manifested itself signally upon the question now before us—the question of the war. We have had Ministers in the two Houses using very different language; and, since there comes to be a question of reconstruction, I may say I hope that if you do reconstruct yourselves you will take care that, at any rate, in future there shall be fixed plans, steady views, perfect consistency and unity of purpose. Without that the Government of this country cannot go on, and, whatever may be the injury done by a Committee of inquiry, a far greater injury will result from continuing a Government discordant in its opinions and inconsistent in its policy. The noble Member for the City of London (Lord John Russell), in his memoirs of the great Whig leader of whom he was always proud, and justly proud, to be a follower, has made some remarks upon what a Coalition Government is, and upon its want of success when Mr. Fox joined Lord North. He says, in his *Memoirs of Mr. Fox*, that when that Coalition Government was formed its Members, by their own conduct, pronounced its condemnation. He tells us that Mr. Fox said, "Unless it meets with complete success there is nothing to justify it;" and he adds that General Fitzpatrick remarked that, "Unless it was followed by really good Government, nothing could justify it;" and then he gives us his own opinion, "The want of this success was therefore its condemnation." Whether or not these remarks are applicable to the Government which we have seen during the last two years history no doubt will hereafter judge. I think its judgment will be an unfavourable one. But, however that may be, I must say that whatever happens—whether this Government is reconstructed or a new Government is formed—the condition of things which has been existing for some twelve months ought not to be allowed to continue much longer; for it is a condition of things which I say sincerely, because I feel it deeply, is unwise in point of policy, and unsound in point of principle—and that it will prove in the end as degrading to yourselves as it is seriously detrimental to the best interests of the country.

MR. VERNON SMITH said, he would compress his observations into the smallest possible space, because he was in hope that, as the division on the present Motion would be of such importance, it would take place that night. He entirely put faith in the first observation of the right hon. Gentleman who last spoke, that it was not his desire, nor the desire of those about him, to take possession of office by any course they might take upon the present occasion; for he could not see how any man in his senses could be so desperately ambitious, or cravingly hungry, as at the present moment to wish to occupy the Ministerial bench. The right hon. Gentleman had divided the question into two parts—one, concerning a censure or vote of want of confidence with respect to the Government; and the other relating to the necessity of the proposed inquiry. With respect to a question of confidence or no confidence in the present Administration, he should be prepared to vote quite at his ease, for he could not imagine any one possessing such an amount of credulity as to have confidence in the Administration as it at this moment existed, if, indeed, it could be said to exist at all. He had given an independent and sincere, though critical support to the Administration hitherto, placing his confidence in three of its Members most particularly—the Marquess of Lansdowne, to whom he owed every species of allegiance, and for whom he entertained the highest possible admiration as a statesman; the noble Lord the Member for London, and the noble Lord the Home Secretary. The noble Lord the Member for London had now withdrawn from that Administration, and so far his (Mr. V. Smith's) confidence was withdrawn from the Government; and, excepting the Marquess of Lansdowne, who was not in this House, his remaining confidence was due and given to the noble Lord the Home Secretary. But what did that noble Lord tell the House that evening? Why, he said, "Give us your confidence to-night, and to-morrow we will make a new Administration." The noble Lord said that the Administration was under recomposition; but the Secretary for the Colonies, on the contrary, stated that he had nothing to do with the reconstruction of the Cabinet, and that he defended it as it stood at the present moment. Then whom was the House to give confidence to? Who was the leader of the Commons at the present moment, and who the War Minister? These were most important questions to know; and if any Minister had risen and said that the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton was now the War Minister, that announcement, no doubt, would influence many votes with respect to the present Motion. He entirely concurred in the proposition made by the noble Lord the Member for London, that the noble Viscount should be made War Minister; but he was afraid that the proposition might now come too late—and the art of doing things "too late" might be called an attribute of the present Administration. Last Session, at a meeting of political Friends, he stated that the creation of a War Minister was called for, because the country desired the noble Member for Tiverton to conduct the affairs of the war; and he believed that if that noble Lord had been appointed to the office at its first creation, all Europe would have been abashed, and all England would have exulted at the same time. But accepting the Secretaryship for War was not the same thing now as on the first creation of the office; for the reputation of the noble Lord, if appointed to the War Department, might depend on his power to remedy all the evils which had been previously created. He now came to consider the Motion proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, who, he regretted to see, was not able, owing to physical debility, to support his propositions with all the force of that intellect which belonged to him. He disagreed with the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down in his opinion that the House ought to vote for any sort of inquiry proposed, because inquiry was desired by the country. As a Member of Parliament, he was bound to consider what sort of precedent he should be setting. The right hon. Gentleman said he saw no difference between the Walcheren inquiry and that now proposed, except that the former was an inquiry by the whole House, and the latter would be an inquiry by a Select Committee. But the right hon. Gentleman forgot that the Walcheren expedition was over when that inquiry commenced, and that the Crimean expedition was still in the greatest peril. If there was to be a Committee upstairs, who were to be named on it? They would have to inquire into the conduct of fifteen Gentlemen of the Administration through the agency of fifteen other Gentlemen not a bit wiser on the subject. But how was the inquiry to be conducted? The first person that should be called to give information should be Field Marshal Lord Raglan; then should be called the Quartermaster General, and the Adjutant General, and, indeed, all the persons present with the army in the Crimea who were reputed or supposed to have failed in their duty. But that was morally impossible, or, if not impossible, was impracticable; and he did not think it would be reasonable to vote for such an inquiry. He could not think that the right hon. Gentleman who last spoke really believed that such a Committee could proceed with its business. If the House really wished to inquire, it should send out a Commission to the spot; and, if so, what general would consent to remain in the service while such an inquiry was going on? If the hon. and learned Gentleman had confined his motion to an inquiry into the conduct of the Administration, that (though the motion might be considered a vote of censure) was an inquiry which might have been conducted while the Ministers remained in office. He (Mr. V. Smith) therefore felt constrained, though in very great difficulty how to vote, to oppose the present motion; for he knew the country was thirsting for information, and every person who had lost a relation in the Crimea was anxious to know whether the loss was occasioned by the fair chances of war, or by the imbecility of the Government; therefore it was due to the people that some such inquiry as that should take place. If the war was to be carried on, the people were anxious that it should be carried on with the greatest spirit. They had opened their purses, and refused nothing to the Government. They had exulted when they heard of victories, and had endured to hear of reverses. There was, however, one thing they would not endure, which he was sorry to hear the Secretary for the Colonies state, that because the War Minister had been engaged while the rest of Ministers were taking their holidays, it was not fair now to turn round on him and turn him out of office. Now the people of England would put up with a great deal, but they would not bear to see their destinies trifled away, or this great country fooled into a small one out of compliment to any noble Lord or Duke.

Colonel SIBTHORP said he had come down to the House from a sense of duty. He publicly thanked the hon. and learned Gentleman for bringing forward this Motion, as well as the hon. Member for West Surrey for the manner in which he had acted, and proposed to act. He regretted that, upon the side of the House on which he had sat for so long a time, there was so much of the *sauviter in modo* and so little of the *fortiter in re.* He more particularly referred to the right hon. Gentleman who had recently addressed the House (Mr. Walpole). He would remind that right hon. Gentleman that fair words buttered no parsnips. He (Colonel Sibthorp) had never done it, and he never would do it. He had never flattered man, woman, or child. He would give his support to the Motion of the hon. and learned Member, whose indisposition he regretted. Whether that Motion amounted to a vote of want of confidence, or cast a stigma upon the Government, he cared not. With the exception of one or two men—he might mention the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—he cared not how soon they turned about right-face and marched out of office. He could not, as an old soldier, but deeply lament the hardships to which our brave troops had been subjected through want of management, want of knowledge, and want of energy. An hon. Gentleman was fearful this Motion, if carried, would paralyse the Government, but, in his (Colonel Sibthorp's) opinion, the Government had been paralysed for a very long time. They had been frozen up. Let that House now break the ice, and see what would come forth. The noble Lord the Member for the City of London had retired from the scene and let the curtain drop. When would that noble Lord again make his re-appearance? But he would not say one word more of the noble Lord than this, that "conscience makes cowards of us all." He was rather anxious to hear also when the Queen (God bless her) was to get rid of this inefficient, weak, loose set. He was subservient to no party; he had preserved, and would continue to keep, an independent and a free course—that course to which his duty pointed. This course, on the present occasion, was to support the Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman, which he certainly would do.

Sir JOHN FITZGERALD: Sir, on a subject of such importance as is now before the House, I feel myself called upon to make some observations.

I do not consider the fault lies with the Government at home for the misfortunes that have befallen our army before Sebastopol. Every requisition that was made from that quarter was promptly attended to. But I do think that all the evils that have arisen to the army have been the consequence of want of forethought with the authorities out there. Was it the fault of the Government that when the *Prince* arrived at Balaklava she was left outside the harbour at a time of year when storms are so prevalent in the Euxine? I should suppose a harbour-master's duty was to have a vessel freighted with Government stores insured against accidents so liable to occur. No wharfage inspector appears to have existed, and to this neglect I ascribe the loss of the vessel.

The provisioning of the army has been most shamefully neglected. When it was found that for want of carriage the soldiers were obliged to go to Balaklava, from the encampment a distance of seven miles, it appears strange that no intermediate depôts were established on that road, so that the distance the soldier had to go for his rations might be curtailed one-half; this would have lessened the fatigue, and, in some measure, also, the fatal consequences of the soldier being overworked.

The next cause of the great sickness that prevails in the British army is imputed to the severe duty required from the soldiers: what with working parties in the trenches, covering parties, and outlying pickets, and the number of sick—if you can believe the reports from the army, both from the officers and soldiers—the duty falls every second night on the troops, whereas in the French army it comes to one night in five. Now, Sir, if this be true—and I have no reason to doubt it—does it not appear extraordinary that the general officer in command of our army did not make such an unequal proportion of fatigue, falling on the army under his command, known to General Canrobert, and request that a proportion of the Allied Army might be attached to our army, so as to render the duties of our soldiers more equal with those of the French troops, or, in case of an objection, to separate his army; that he would lengthen his line of entrenchments, so, by that means, our line being shortened, the duty would fall less heavy on our soldiers? As the case is represented by letters from the Crimea, it appears not extraordinary that the physical strength of our army should have given way, and produced that mortality which we all so sensibly feel.

Now, Sir, with this conviction on my mind, that the sad misfortunes which have befallen our army are mainly attributable to the authorities, both naval and military, in the Crimea, I cannot in conscience censure the Government at home for the want of proper judgment of those who were 3,000 miles distant, and to which I attribute all those disasters. I shall give my vote against the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield.

MR. KNIGHTLEY, in reply to the challenge of the Government, that they should have proposed a vote of want of confidence, quoted the language of Mr. Fox when a similar remark was made to him at the close of the Addington Administration. The Motion for the removal of that Administration was lost by 240 to 203, but still Mr. Addington retired. When Mr. Pitt was called upon to take the Government he perceived that the national indignation was chiefly concentrated upon one particular section of the Cabinet—that intrusted with the War Department—and he accordingly removed the obnoxious Members—the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies—and retained the least objectionable. Now very nearly the same course might be pursued with regard to the present Administration; and if the precedent were followed, it would be hailed with satisfaction throughout the length and breadth of the land; for he believed that the people of this country had made up their minds that so long as the Earl of Aberdeen was Prime Minister, the Duke of Newcastle Secretary of War, and the right hon. Gentleman opposite Chancellor of the Exchequer, the war would never be conducted with proper vigour or a safe and honourable peace concluded.

MR. STAFFORD moved that the debate be adjourned until Monday.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON said, he had hoped that the debate would have been concluded this evening; but if it were thought by a considerable portion of the House that, looking to the importance of the subject, there should be an adjournment of it till Monday, he should certainly not oppose the proposition. He hoped, however, that the House would feel that it was really incumbent upon it to pronounce an opinion on this Motion not later than Monday—and upon that distinct understanding he should have no objection to agree to the adjournment of the debate to that day.

Lord C. HAMILTON said, he believed the great mass of the Irish representatives were still unaware of the resignation of the noble Lord the Member for the City of London, and, therefore, unless an adjournment were agreed to, it would be impossible that the opinion of the Irish constituencies could be heard on this question.

Debate *adjourned* till *Monday* next.

House adjourned at Twelve o'clock till *Monday* next.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Monday, January 29, 1855.

Minutes.] Public Bills.—1ª Speedy Trial of Offenders.
2ª Bills of Exchange.

THE CHARGE OF THE LIGHT CAVALRY AT BALAKLAVA—QUESTION.

Lord VIVIAN said, that as some reflections had been cast upon the noble Lord the commander of the army in the Crimea, on account of the advance of the cavalry at Balaklava, he begged to ask the noble Duke at the head of the War Department whether he had any objection to place before the House the exact terms of the order given to Lord Lucan on that occasion? Two versions of that order had appeared in the public prints—the one giving it the character of an imperative and the other of a discretionary order. It was right that the House and the public should have an opportunity of knowing all the circumstances attending that action, and therefore it was right that they should have the very words of the order before them. He wished also to know whether he had understood correctly, that the Government intended to give a clasp for the action at Balaklava?

The Duke of NEWCASTLE: I have to state, in reply to the first question put to me by the noble and gallant Lord, that, I shall not be disposed at the present moment to lay before the House the exact words of the order to which he refers; and for this simple reason, that in consequence of the circumstances attending it, the order led to a correspondence, which correspondence has been but very recently brought to a close. I cannot wish to bring that correspondence before Parliament in anything like an imperfect shape; and it would not be considered as altogether fair by the parties concerned if only a portion of it were produced. Under such circumstances, then, I should prefer delaying it until the whole of the statements connected with the transaction can be brought forward. In answer to the second question put by my noble Friend, I have to acknowledge that he has correctly understood the statement made by me the other night, which had reference to a question addressed to me as to the distribution of medals and clasps, and which gave rise to a very interesting discussion. As regards the Crimean medal, it is intended, as explained the other day, that all those concerned with this campaign, from the first down to the present time, should receive that medal. But there can be no doubt that with regard to clasps they stand on a different footing from medals, being given, not for a campaign, but for individual actions. All soldiers, therefore, engaged in actions will receive clasps—that is all those under arms. Of course even in such cases there must be a latitude allowed; still, speaking generally, when clasps were given, they were only given to those actually taking part in the action on account of which it was allowed. As I have already stated every soldier engaged in the action at Balaklava will receive a clasp.

INSTITUTION OF A CROSS OF MILITARY MERIT.

The Duke of NEWCASTLE: My Lords, as my noble and gallant Friend has raised the present question, I think I have here a not unfitting opportunity for making a communication to the House, which I feel sure will be most agreeable to your Lordships as well as to our gallant army. After very careful consideration—a consideration which ought always to attend changes of such a description—Her Majesty has been advised to institute a Cross of Merit, which shall be applicable to all ranks of the army in future. It is not intended, my Lords, that this new Order shall in any way affect the present Order of the Bath, but that a separate and distinct Cross of Military Merit shall be given, which shall be open to all ranks of the army, and which, I hope, will be an object of ambition to every individual in the service, from the General who commands down to the privates in the ranks. My Lords, I cannot say that the rules for this new Cross are entirely matured, for the subject requires a great deal of consideration. Still I can inform your Lordships that the Order will be somewhat analogous to those existing in some countries of the Continent—I believe in Spain, Prussia, and Austria; while I may also state generally that its distribution will be so arranged as to obviate the invidious task of selecting the individuals upon whom it is to be conferred from devolving upon officers; for in all cases the principle will be adopted of adjudicating the distinction according to the verdict of a jury of the peers of the individual who is to be distinguished; that verdict, however, will have to be confirmed by the decision of the home authorities. I believe, my Lords, that the rule which I have here stated is that which guides the distribution of rewards under those orders of Spain and Prussia to which I have just referred.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH was understood to say that the Austrian Order of Maria Theresa was only conferred by the Sovereign in person. The principle which he himself wished to see carried out, and for which he had contended the other night, was, that no one should receive a medal unless he had taken actual part in the engagement or engagements on account of which it was given.

MALLEABLE IRON ORDNANCE—QUESTION.

EARL FITZWILLIAM said, great interest was felt out of doors in a proposal which it was understood had been made to Government, towards the end of November, by a gentleman who undertook to frame ordnance of malleable instead of cast iron. He wished to know from the noble Duke what course had been pursued with respect to that offer?

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE said, the question was not quite so distinct as he could have wished. More than one offer had been made to the Government for constructing guns of malleable iron; but the gentleman to whom the noble Earl referred was, he believed, Mr. Nasmyth, who made a proposal to the Government about the time to which his noble Friend referred. He had had frequent opportunities of becoming aware of the great merits of Mr. Nasmyth, and had an interview with him upon this subject, when he placed in his hands such powers as would enable him accurately to test the value of his malleable iron guns. He believed that, immediately on the receipt of the order with which he had been furnished, Mr. Nasmyth commenced operations, and that all the machinery necessary for carrying on the manufacture had been provided and considerable progress made.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE ARMY—THE WAR DEPARTMENT.

EARL GREY: My Lords, the subject to which I propose this evening to call your attention is one which, in the present circumstances of the country, is of such extreme importance that I assure you I feel very painfully how unequal I am to the task I have undertaken; but I entertain so strong a sense of the urgency—of the absolute necessity—of some such change as that which it is my purpose to recommend, that, however unequal I may be to the proper performance of this task, I have not thought myself at liberty to avoid it. Before I go further, I ought probably to offer some apology for having taken the somewhat unusual course, after giving notice of my Motion for Thursday next, of bringing it under your Lordships' consideration to-night. My reason for doing so was this:—I had learnt, in common with the public, that certain circumstances which have recently occurred rendered it not improbable that some changes might take place with reference to the administration of the affairs of the army; and it appeared to me—and I found also, from communications with noble Lords on both sides of the House, that it appeared to them—that before any such changes were carried into effect it was desirable that this House should have an opportunity of expressing its opinion as to the principle on which such changes should be made.

I intend to move that your Lordships should agree to a Resolution declaring your opinion that serious evils have arisen from the present division of authority and responsibility in the administration of the affairs of the army; and that therefore the business relating to this most important branch of the public service, which is now distributed among various different offices, should be placed under the immediate control of a single and well-organised Department. I must remind your Lordships that twice in the course of the last Session of Parliament I called your attention to this very important subject. In the debate on the Address in reply to Her Majesty's gracious Speech from the Throne, I called the attention of the Government and of your Lordships to the great inconvenience which was certain to arise from the present constitution of the military departments, in the event of that war taking place with which we were then threatened. On that occasion, which was about two months before the war broke out, I urged, as strongly as I could, that preparations should be made for it in this respect; and subsequently, after the war had commenced —on the 7th of April—I again, by a distinct Motion, called your Lordships' attention to the subject. I then moved for certain papers; but, as I wished to leave the matter in the hands of Her Majesty's Government, I carefully abstained from making any motion which would lead to a difference of opinion, and I only asked for papers about granting which there could be no difficulty. The production of those papers was acceded to by Her Majesty's Government; and, as I have referred to them, perhaps I may be permitted to pause for one moment to say that I think my noble Friend, the noble Marquess below me (the Marquess of Clanricarde), was quite right in calling the attention of your Lordships to the irregular nature of the return which was, in the first instance, laid upon the table. I consider that, in order to enforce the respect due to this House, it was quite proper on the part of my noble Friend to call attention to a return in which the very unusual course had been taken of including in the correspondence laid upon the table an elaborate answer to the speech of the Peer who moved for that correspondence. But, so far as I was individually concerned, I have not the least objection to that answer having been placed upon your Lordships' table. On the contrary, I am rather glad that your Lordships should have seen what are the arguments and statements which can be advanced in this manner in reply to those which I submitted to you. With regard to that part of the letter which controverts certain statements made by me, I will only say that the most important of those statements—those relating to the rations supplied to the troops in the West Indies —were founded upon official correspondence which was laid upon the table of the other House in consequence of a Motion which I myself made in 1840; and, if any of your Lordships will take the trouble to refer to that return, which is in the library of this House, you will find that it bears out to the very letter every word I uttered. The remaining part of my statement which was contradicted, and which does not rest upon that correspondence, was founded upon reports made to me officially when I was Secretary at War, by a gentleman whose accuracy I never in any one instance found at fault, and upon whom I have the most perfect and entire reliance.

But, returning from this digression, into which I should not have entered had I not been charged with inaccuracy in this matter, I beg to say, that the object of the Motion which I made last year was not to call for any expression of opinion on the part of this House, but to direct the attention of your Lordships, of the Government, and I will also say of the public, to a subject which appeared to me very urgently to require consideration. Nor do I think that I was altogether unsuccessful, or that I failed in making some impression even upon the Government; because, although the noble Duke, now at the head of the War Department, argued at great length, in reply to my speech, that the existing arrangements were perfectly satisfactory and were working admirably, and stated that he had no doubt they would continue to do so, and that he anticipated no difficulty in carrying on the war under those arrangements, yet, within about two months from that time, it was announced that it had been found necessary to divide the Colonial and the War Departments, and to appoint a Fourth Secretary of State to take the exclusive charge of the Department of War. I hold in my hands a paper which has been laid upon the table of this House—in consequence of an Address to Her Majesty which I moved before Christmas—explaining, so far as it does explain, this division of offices. I cannot help expressing my great disappointment that that explanation should be so imperfect. I confess I did expect that when a measure of such importance was adopted, there would have been some regular and official record of the manner in which it was to be carried into execution—that there would have been some Minute by Her Majesty in Council, such as has been made on former occasions, or some other equivalent official document, accurately defining the limits of the duties of the new office to be created, and pointing out how the business was in future to be conducted. I cannot help thinking that the absence of any such formal document proves in itself that the measure was a crude and ill-digested one. I must add, my Lords, that from what we know of the measure from this very short account of it which has been laid before us, and from what we learn from the public newspapers, it is, in my opinion, anything but satisfactory. I would remind your Lordships that in bringing this subject under your notice last year, I pointed out two great objections to the existing arrangements. The first was, that the business relating to the administration of the army was divided among far too large a number of independent departments; and the second was, that the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, whose authority was supposed to keep all these independent departments in one line of action, had far too much to do to enable him to execute that task. Now, it is quite true that, by the arrangements which have been made, the second of these objections has been removed. A Secretary of State has been appointed whose special and exclusive business it is to take charge of all that relates to the conduct of the war; but the first, and by far the most important, of those objections remains altogether untouched;—you have as many independent departments as before concerned in the administration of business relating to the army. Nay, I should say that the objection has rather been aggravated; because, instead of simplifying a machine which was already too complicated, what you have done has been to introduce into it a new and unnecessary wheel, and the only step in the nature of a consolidation which has taken place was the transfer, on the 22nd of December, of the Commissariat to the War Department. I cannot, however, call that a consolidation at all. I cannot, for my own part, understand how a description of business involving so much detail and so many matters of finance, can be conveniently dealt with in an office constituted like that of a Secretary of State. I certainly think it is a description of business that would have been more properly united to departments which are more conversant with pecuniary transactions and with matters of detail. The other departments continue precisely as they were:—you have still the same number of entirely independent departments, and your only security for their working harmoniously together is, that they may be made to do so by the common and superintending authority of the new Secretary of State. I cannot help thinking that the experience of the Admiralty might have taught us that the expectation that these independent departments would be made to work well together, by one superintending authority of this description, could not be realised. I may remind your Lordships that when the Navy Board and the Victualling Board were distinct departments under the Admiralty, although they were entirely subordinate to the Admiralty, it was found that difficulties and delays were constantly occurring, and the inconveniences at length became so great that Parliament—in my opinion, very wisely—abolished these independent Boards, merged them in the Admiralty, and brought the whole business relating to the Navy under one single authority. But the Navy Board and the Victualling Board were far more completely subordinate to the Admiralty than the various departments connected with the Army are to the new Secretary of State. One of the Army departments is presided over by a Cabinet Minister. You have a Secretary at War and a Secretary for War, both in the same Cabinet. Again, you have a Commander in Chief—a Minister of very considerable authority—who takes the pleasure of the Sovereign directly on business relating to his own department. You have, too, the Master General and Board of Ordnance likewise possessing a very large independent authority. It seems to me, therefore, that it was vain to expect that so cumbrous a machine would work with the necessary promptitude and vigour. I think it was easy to predict, from the commencement of the war, that a machine so constituted would not be found to answer.

Unhappily, the anticipations to that effect which I entertained the moment I heard of the measure which was contemplated have been far more than fulfilled. I have only to point your attention to the calamitous events of the last few weeks and to the present position of our army in the Crimea, to convince your Lordships how far this system has failed to provide for the satisfactory management of military affairs. I will not attempt to harrow your Lordships' feelings by describing the present position of our army in the Crimea. I will not attempt to give an account in detail of the various acts of mismanagement to which that unhappy condition is attributable. I wave any advantage I might obtain for my argument by doing so, in order that I may spare your Lordships and myself the pain of dwelling upon such topics, and also that I may avoid the risk of making those observations which I mean to direct against the system, appear as if they were intended as personal censures upon individuals. It is sufficient that I should assume that your Lordships are well acquainted—indeed, who is there who is not well acquainted?—with the present state of the army in the Crimea; and, knowing what that condition is, I would point out to you that the statements which have been made by Her Majesty's Government in their own defence afford the strongest and the most conclusive arguments in favour of that view of this subject which it is my object to press upon you. My Lords, you will remember we have been told that ample stores of every description have been sent to the Crimea—that food, and clothing, and medicine, and everything required for the comfort and convenience of the soldiers, have been despatched in quantities ample, if not profuse —that mules and horses have been bought for transport, and have been sent, or rather have been ordered (for unfortunately this is an important distinction), with provender for their support, to the East. You have been told all this, and I have not the slightest doubt that you have been correctly informed; but, though all this has been done, it is unfortunately but too certain that, owing to defects of organisation—of which the noble Duke very frankly acknowledged the existence, in the short Session before Christmas, these supplies have not been available at the time and at the place where they were wanted; and because those supplies were not so available when and where they were required, as a direct consequence of this failure our gallant army has been reduced to its present condition, for its losses by sickness and death, brought on by fatigue and by want, infinitely outnumber the losses occasioned by battle or by non-preventible diseases. We know this. It is acknowledged on all sides that from the want of organisation these unhappy consequences have resulted. Then, let me ask, how is it that errors having such fatal consequences have occurred? To that question, my Lords, I am quite unable to return a complete answer, but I think we can form a very safe judgment as to how these errors are, in part at least, to be accounted for. These mistakes—these errors, are, I think, the natural, if not the inevitable result of that complicated and cumbersome mode of transacting the business of the army which has so long prevailed in this country.

It is because you have had a Secretary at War, a Commander in Chief, a Board of Ordnance, and a Commissariat Department, carrying on a voluminous correspondence with each other, with the other departments of the Government, and with the officers serving abroad, that, in such correspondence, the essentials of what was to be done have very often been lost sight of, and mistakes and errors have taken place, and, when mistakes have not occurred, the most ordinary arrangements have only been effected with a great loss of time, which, in war, is too often a loss of everything. I will not trouble your Lordships with more than one or two instances of the mistakes to which I refer; but although I am anxious, as far as possible, to avoid touching upon particular errors and blunders, still, as an example of the working of the system, I think it is necessary that I should mention one or two cases. One of those cases we have heard of for the first time this evening, and I certainly regard it as a very remarkable one. We have learnt, from the question which has been put by my noble Friend on the cross benches (Earl Fitzwilliam) that an offer having been made to Her Majesty's Government by a most eminent engineer—Mr. Nasmyth, a man of European reputation—and the Government having determined to employ his great talents in manufacturing artillery of a certain description, he applied himself to the work: but while he was in full work to meet the requisition of Government, the work was suddenly interrupted and suspended—for, I believe, as long a period as a fortnight—owing to some misapprehension between the different departments. I read, too, the other day, in the newspapers a correspondence with regard to an offer to supply the army with candle stoves. A firm in this country—Price's Patent Candle Company—a firm known, not merely commercially, but for its success in what I may call one of the greatest philanthropic experiments ever made—seeing how grievously the army was suffering for want of fuel, from mere patriotic motives suggested to the Secretary at War that it was very desirable that a contrivance called "candle stoves," which were extremely portable, should be supplied for the use of the troops, and that thereby the great difficulty of carrying up heavier stoves and fuel from Balaklava might be surmounted. It seems that this suggestion or offer was made to the Secretary at War before Christmas; it was at once entertained by him, and was referred to the Board of Ordnance. Mr. Price, or the company, was for a long time without hearing from the Board; they complained through the public papers; and the result was the publication of two letters which I cannot help reading, illustrating, as they do, the mode in which the present system works. The first is from the War Office, and is as follows:—

"War Office, Jan. 3.

"Sir,—I am directed by Mr. Sidney Herbert to thank you for the anxiety and zeal you have shown for the welfare of the public service, but he regrets to say that he has no authority to accept any tender—that must be done through the Ordnance Department; and Mr. Herbert has requested that no delay should take place in coming to a decision on the matter.

"I am, Sir, yours most obediently,
"GEORGE D. RAMSAY."

Well, I do not wonder that the Messrs. Price, having received that letter from the Secretary at War, thought they were quite safe in applying to the Ordnance, and that the necessary authority was, at all events, to be obtained there. But it appears that these arrangements are so complicated, that very often the heads of departments themselves do not know what is the proper quarter to which particular applications should be addressed; for the following is the answer received from the Board of Ordnance:—

"Ordnance, Jan. 18, 1855. W–4,431.

"Gentlemen,—With reference to your letter of the 13th instant, addressed to the Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance, requesting to know whether the Government is likely to require any, and what quantity, of your candle stoves for the use of the army in the Crimea, I have the Board's commands to acquaint you that they have no cognisance whatever of this subject, not any communication having been made to them respecting Messrs. Price's stoves. They are, therefore, unable to give you the information you desire as to the intention of the Government with regard to these stoves.—I am, Gentlemen, your obedient servant, "J. WOOD."

I really think that it is very remarkable that the Messrs. Price, being referred from one office to another in this manner, did not give up the business altogether. They did not do so, however, but they went next to the War Department, and this is an account of what occurred when they went there—

"On receiving the Ordnance letter we went to a third office—that of the Secretary of State for the War Department—to try if we could there get an answer to the tender. We found that it was under consideration, but that two difficulties existed in the way of its acceptance—first, that a number of ordinary stoves, with ordinary fuel for them, had already been sent out, so that Government was doubtful about sending any of these new ones except for some special purposes—such as warming camp hospitals; and, secondly, that in all hospital matters it was necessary to consult the proper medical authority, and he had been ill, so that his report had not yet been received, but was daily being looked for, and on it being received our Company's tender would be answered."

Now, my Lords, that was a matter which, if it were to be useful at all, was to be useful in the shortest time. Candle stoves should have been sent out by the quickest possible conveyance;—as fast as they could be got ready they should have been despatched to the Crimea, if they were to be of any use at all. But the suggestion was made before Christmas; and here I find, upon the 22nd of January, Messrs. Price still waiting for a decision; and the subject is still under consideration and hung up, while they are driven about like shuttlecocks from one office to another, and at last waiting until the director of the medical department is well enough to give an opinion upon it. Really, this is an instance which is in itself an epitome of the whole system. I am sorry to go into these details, but those who have not themselves been concerned with the working of these departments cannot understand the question without having one or two of these particular instances brought before them. Take one more case—that with reference to which I asked a question an evening or two ago of the noble Duke. I asked whether it was true that the 91st Regiment had been sent for from the Cape, and that the ship which ought to have brought it back had come home empty, because the necessary order for sending it home had not been sent by the Commander in Chief to the General commanding on that station. The noble Duke said that it was true, and he stated certain circumstances explaining how it had happened. Those circumstances were, that the noble Duke had written to the noble Viscount the Commander in Chief, informing him that the regiment was to come home, and that he had also informed the Lieutenant Governor of the Cape that it was to come home; but no despatch had been written to the military authority at the Cape. The Lieutenant Governor being a civilian, and having no authority over the troops, undoubtedly the General in command had a right to expect that a despatch would have been addressed to him. I do not express any opinion whether in the circumstances of the case he ought to have been satisfied with the information received through the Lieutenant Governor or not. That is a question which it is quite unnecessary for me to enter on; for it is clear, that it ought not to have been left to that chance, and that he ought to have had direct orders from his superior in this country to forward that regiment. I see exactly how this arose—it was precisely from that division of authority of which I am complaining. The noble Duke no doubt thought that the noble Viscount had written to order the regiment home, and the noble Viscount, upon his side, believed that the noble Duke had given orders—[Viscount HARDINGE: Orders were given.] The noble Viscount says, that orders had been given; yes, but only to the civil Lieutenant Governor, and in all official correspondence I have always found it most strongly insisted that orders to military authorities were not to go through civil authorities, and that when there is a civil Governor of a colony, orders for the removal of a regiment should be addressed not only to him, but also to the officer in command. That is a rule which I, in my experience, never knew departed from; and, when I had the honour of holding the office of Secretary of State for the Colonies, certainly if I had departed from it I should have had a remonstrance of a kind which I should by no means have liked to have received from the then Commander in Chief the Duke of Wellington; and a very just remonstrance it would have been.

VISCOUNT HARDINGE: Perhaps it will save time if I state what the facts were. Precise orders did go out from my noble Friend the Secretary of State for the War Department. Those orders were precise that the 91st Regiment was to return to England. The Lieutenant Governor and the General commanding conferred together upon the propriety of that order. It appeared that there were 300 men under the establishment of 5,000 which it was thought prudent to maintain in the colony; and in consequence of the concurrent opinion of the Lieutenant Governor who received the order from the Secretary of State, and of the General commanding, it was decided that the 91st Regiment ought not to return. Those are the real facts of the case

EARL GREY: I can only say, that if I made a mistake I was led into it by the answer of the noble Duke the other day; because I appeal to your Lordships whether he did not distinctly state that I was correctly informed, and that the reason why the regiment was not sent home was because the military authority at the Cape had received no direct orders himself? Therefore, if I have made a mistake, I can only say that I am not responsible for it. Now, see how this has worked upon the public service. You have not only incurred the unnecessary expense of the ship coming home empty, but you wanted this regiment urgently for the war in the East. It is a very fine regiment, which had gone through the Caffre war, and consisted of trained and disciplined soldiers, and was worth—I need not inform your Lordships, two or three times the number of freshly-enlisted men from this country, whom alone you could otherwise have sent. But you have by this mistake between the departments—a mistake, I say, directly arising from the multiplication of unnecessary authorities—been deprived of the services of this regiment which were so much required.

VISCOUNT HARDINGE was understood to say that his order had not gone to the Cape, but that the order of the Secretary of State was quite sufficient to have warranted the sending home of the regiment. In consequence of the state of the colony, however, at that moment, and the arrangement before entered into that there should not be less than 5,000 men in that colony, the Lieutenant Governor and the officer commanding both determined that the regiment ought not to be sent home.

EARL GREY: That is my case. The military authority at the Cape did not receive direct orders from the Commander in Chief because the order of the Secretary of State was sufficient. The noble Viscount will excuse me, but I think that he had better comment upon this afterwards, instead of interrupting me in the progress of my address.

My Lords, I say that mistakes of this kind have had a most material and most unfortunate influence upon the progress of our arms in the East; but it is an act of justice which I am glad to pay to Her Majesty's Government—even if it were not necessary to my argument, of which, however, it is a most essential part—it is, I say, an act of common justice to Her Majesty's Government, to observe that the want of success which we have experienced in the East, is to be accounted for not merely by errors which have been committed since the commencement of the war, but by errors of much longer standing—errors in the management of the army which no

Government for many years past has been able to avoid—errors of at least as long standing as from the commencement of the general peace in 1815. My Lords, I say that it is to errors in the administration of the army of that long standing that a great part of our misfortunes are to be attributed; and I think I shall be easily able to convince your Lordships that that is a correct statement. In the first place, let me ask you, is there any man who does not feel that the want of success in the East has been in no slight degree attributable to the deficiency which has existed of officers of rank and experience who are at the same time of such an age as to make them efficient in the field? Has not the want of a sufficiently wide field of selection for general officers to be employed in the Crimea, been one great difficulty with which Her Majesty's Government have had to contend? Does any man doubt that? If not, let me ask how that deficiency is to be accounted for? It is to be accounted for by the circumstance that during a long peace, in spite of many remonstrances, you have adhered obstinately to that system of promotion to the rank of general officer by seniority, and by seniority alone —and, although I think that it would be absurd to expect by mere seniority to get efficient general officers, even if confined to officers who were actually serving, our system is infinitely more absurd than that—a man rises to be a general officer not by serving, but by simply living upon half-pay. When a man has once attained to the rank of lieutenant colonel, under certain circumstances, he then, without doing another day's duty, and fit or unfit, rises by seniority alone to the rank of a general officer, and it is the only way in which he can attain that rank. Let me show you the consequence. I had the honour of serving last spring upon a Commission of Inquiry upon this subject, and it was proved by the papers placed before that Commission, and it is stated in our report, that of the general officers employed during the last twenty years more than half had been above ten years out of active employment in their profession previous to being appointed to the staff as general officers:—that many had been for periods exceeding twenty years unemployed:—and that in one case an officer actually had done no military duty of any description for very nearly thirty-seven years before he was so employed. Now, my Lords, I wish to ask you whether you can expect, with such a system of appointing general officers, to have them efficient? Can you expect that, even during peace, all the important functions which general officers have to perform in maintaining the efficiency of the army, by inspecting regiments, and seeing that on distant stations, and at the various garrisons, discipline is properly maintained—do you think it possible, I ask, however excellent an officer a man may have been in early life, that one who has been thirty-seven years out of the exercise of his profession, and who is appointed because he has outlived all his contemporaries, can perform efficiently, even in peace, the duties of a general officer? You will find also, my Lords, from the report of the Commission, that the actual average age of the major generals appointed at the last brevet under this system was not less than sixty-one. My Lords, I say that the consequence is, that it is actually impossible under this system that you should have any number of officers who have seen service in the rank in which you want to employ them, and upon whom, being at the same time of a suitable age, you could depend for service in the Crimea. The choice of officers by the Government has, I am sure, been restricted by this system in a manner which must be most painful to them; and at the same time it has had no slight effect in producing those consequences which we so deeply deplore.

Then, let me ask you whether the instruction of our Army during peace is what it ought to have been in order to prepare it for war? Let me remind you that it is only about two years since you formed your first establishment for teaching, upon anything like a system, the use of improved firearms to the troops. The French have had establishments of that kind, in which the use of the Minié rifle was taught upon a most admirable plan, and with the utmost care, for years. The deficiency was over and over again pointed out; but it is only two years or two years and a half since such an establishment was formed for our own Army. But more than that—I have it upon the authority of the noble Viscount himself (Viscount Hardinge)—that he has ascertained that one battalion of our Guards—which ought to be one of our best, and almost model regiments—had actually never had any ball practice for a space of three years. My Lords, that is the manner in which the use of arms has been taught to your troops. But is it merely the use of their arms and drill—is it the mere knowledge of these things which makes a good soldier or a good officer? Ought he not to know something more than that? Ought he not to know how to perform outpost duty—how to take advantage of all the accidents of the ground for offence or defence—how to construct small works for similar purposes—how to build huts for his own shelter of such rude materials as are to be found wherever warlike operations are carried on? Ought he not to know all the best modern contrivances for facilitating labour and for employing the joint efforts of large bodies of men with most effect in the prosecution of any work to be carried on? Ought not all these things to be taught to both officers and men? It is quite clear that instructions of this kind would have been of the very highest value to our troops in the East. I think it was Napoleon who said that, in all the armies of Europe there was a great deficiency in this respect, in his day, and that they had much to learn from the ancient Romans, by whom no soldier was considered fit to take his place in a legion until he had been taught the use of entrenching tools as well as of his weapons. Napoleon, in expressing his admiration of this system, said that, with an army so instructed, a good general would fight as much with the spade as with the musket. How deeply has the want of this kind of instruction been felt in our army, and how much is its inferiority in some respects to the French army to be attributed to a deficiency of knowledge of this part of the business of a soldier? Why have they not known it? Simply because no attempt has ever been made to teach them. There has never been anything like a systematic attempt to teach your officers and men this most necessary and important part of their duty as soldiers. Would there have been any difficulty in teaching them? Far from it. There is no reason why every soldier in the British Army should not be as well instructed as the Sappers and Miners. I will answer for it that, in a long peace, with proper arrangements, there would not have been the slightest difficulty in devising means by which every single soldier in the British Army, before he took his place in the ranks, should have gone through a perfect system of instruction of this kind. Look at the indirect advantages which would have arisen to him from it. In the first place, we know now that the soldier, if he gets tired of a military life and buys his discharge, has often great difficulty in maintaining himself, owing to his understanding no useful description of labour. The Sappers and Miners, on the contrary, are so useful in civil life that it is actually difficult for the Government to keep them—there are such constant attempts to bribe them out of the service by persons who know how valuable they would be in any employment to which they might be turned. That instruction, therefore, costing nothing, would lead to a vast improvement in the condition of the soldier after his discharge. Nor is that all. There is another indirect advantage which would have arisen of not less importance. I believe that nothing would have so much contributed to improve the British army as to have occupied some of their spare time by some useful employment of this kind. My Lords, forced idleness and the tedium created by it have been the curse of the army. It is these which have driven your soldiers into those habits of drinking which have been the opprobrium of our service—which, though I am happy to say that they are now much diminished, still continue to prevail to far too great an extent. It is these which have driven your young officers into those irregularities of which some painful exposures have lately taken place. My Lords, I do not blame those young officers. Young men cannot be expected to submit to what are often very dry, and apparently uninteresting studies, with no immediate result, if they have not some stimulus to it. If they know that it will not have the smallest influence upon their promotion, how can you expect young men to devote themselves to studies of that description? There would have been no difficulty in inducing them to acquire a competent knowledge of the scientific, as well as of the practical part of their profession, which should be a necessary qualification for officers to obtain promotion. There would have been no difficulty in making them feel that those who took great pains and acquired all this sort of knowledge would advance their chances of promotion—but I know that the opinion in the army has been that such was not the effect of such studies. I have myself heard the remark made by officers,—"Why should we take the trouble to instruct ourselves, and get the highest place at Sandhurst, when we know that distinguishing ourselves in that way will not advance us at all, if it does not rather create a prejudice against us?" I firmly believe that they were wrong in that impression; but I cannot deny that I have heard men say, that it would even create a prejudice against them, and would make them be regarded rather as what are called "bookmen" than as practical officers. Now, my Lords, look at the advantage of instruction of this kind, for your staff particularly. In this present campaign, is it not the general cry of every man, that the want of the proper instruction of your staff officers has been one of the greatest difficulties which you have had to contend with? I fear there can be no doubt that the complaint is as well founded as it is general. In the French army we know that no officer can serve on the staff until he has passed a most severe examination as to his knowledge of every practical detail. In our army, unfortunately, that is not the case. But there is another circumstance which has increased the deficiency of your staff officers. It is this—more than twenty years ago a Committee of the House of Commons pointed out that it was very desirable that the same officers should not be engaged for too long a continuance upon the staff, and they recommended that staff officers should not be employed for more than five years at a time; assigning as a reason, not only that it would distribute more fairly to the whole army the rewards of the profession, but that it would create a class of educated staff officers who would be very useful in time of war. That was the recommendation of a Committee of the House of Commons twenty years ago. How has it been treated? It has remained from that day to this a dead letter, and the recommendation has only lately been repeated by that Commission to which I before referred, of which I had the honour to be a Member last spring. I might point out other deficiencies: I might refer to the want of improvement in the clothing of the troops, in their arms, in the artillery—to delays in adopting the latest scientific discoveries for adding to the power of our arms—and many other matters—I abstain from doing so. I think I have said enough to show your Lordships that, during a very long peace, our army has not been managed in such a manner as to fit it for the emergency of war. I know it has been said, and upon high authority, that this state of things has been produced by the niggardliness of Parliament, that it is because we have not kept up our establishments upon a sufficiently large scale that these evils have arisen; and I perceive, from the cheers which have followed my mention of this, that some noble Lords are of that opinion. For my own part, I utterly deny the correctness of such a statement. In the first place, the improvements I have pointed out would not have cost the country one single farthing; I mean to say, that every one of those improvements to which I have alluded might have been introduced with the most perfect facility without one single shilling of expense. But more than that—I deny that the House of Commons has shown that niggardliness in voting the sums necessary for the proper defence of the country which has been imputed to it. For nineteen years I had the honour of being a member of that House, and I do not believe that in the course of those nineteen years I was ever absent when military estimates were discussed. In four of those years it was my duty to submit them to the House of Commons, as Secretary at War, and I will assert that in all that time I never yet saw a single instance in which the House of Commons refused a vote of money which was necessary for the real efficiency of the service. I am by no means sure that I could say the reverse with equal confidence—that they had never made grants with injudicious liberality, which were not called for by the circumstances of the country. Well, I say, then, there has not been this niggardliness which is so often dwelt upon. I do not, indeed, pretend to say that they have kept up military establishments during peace sufficient to enable us, without large augmentations and without some time spent in preparation, to enter upon an offensive war. Certainly not; and I hope and trust that this country never will consent to keep up its peace establishments upon any such scale as would be adequate for the necessities of war. To do so would be to commit the greatest blunder which could be imagined; because, independently of the expense, of the great drain upon the resources of the country, preventing the real increase of power which the accumulation of wealth in a kingdom creates, — independently of all this, independently also of the great evils arising from the jealousy which would be excited by such armaments in foreign countries—the just and natural jealousy which would exist in those countries upon finding that our armaments were kept up on a scale sufficient at any time for offensive operations, which would drive them into a similar course, and would leave both parties pretty much where they were before—independently, I say, of all this, I assert that, if you do keep up these establishments upon such a scale, you will be in a worse situation at the beginning of a war than you actually are now,—you would be in a worse position for this reason. You would have your Army still more full than it is of officers advanced in age and without experience in war; and you would have your arsenals and harbours filled with arms, ships, and stores of obsolete pattern, and not embodying all the improvements which modern science has suggested. I firmly believe already that it would have been better for us if, on the breaking out of this war, we had been thrown to a greater extent upon the resources which we could create at the time, and if we had trusted less at the commencement of the present contest to those relics of a former war then in existence. I say, therefore, that over-economy does not account for the evils which we now have to deplore; they arise from a very different source. Let me remind you how very large have been the grants which Parliament has made for the support of our military and naval establishments during peace. By a return which was laid upon the table of the House last session, it appears that the total money spent upon our Army, Ordnance, and Navy, during the fourteen years ending in 1853, was no less than 217,000,000*l.*, giving an average of 15,500,000*l.* annually voted for our naval and military establishments; and will any man tell me that so vast a sum as 15,500,000*l.* a year, if judiciously applied, was not ample to keep up an armament quite sufficient for all peace purposes, and sufficient as a nucleus for more extended preparations when war takes place? When war breaks out you never want to commence offensive operations immediately; there is always some time for preparation. For instance, in the present war, it was not until six months after the declaration of war that the expedition sailed to the Crimea, which we must call the beginning of offensive operations. Your expedition sailed, I believe, from Varna in September, while war was declared in March. Even before these six months expired there was still more time for preparation. [VISCOUNT HARDINGE suggested, that our troops had been sent to Gallipoli some time before the end of the six months.] Yes, but Gallipoli was not an offensive operation. I say, that offensive operations did not commence until six months after the declaration of war, and until fully twelve months after war must have appeared so probable that preparations might have been commenced. That time, if well used, and if your establishments had been previously upon a proper footing, was ample for you to have made every effort which could reasonably be expected from this country. I repeat, then, it is not to over economy that we must attribute the existing evil, which has quite a different origin. The fault is that to which I have already adverted—the division of authority and of responsibility in our military departments. There is a homely saying, that "too many cooks spoil the broth;" and you have had too many cooks. What you want is something like the administration of the Navy by the Admiralty. The Admiralty performs every function with regard to the Navy which one would expect to devolve upon it. It builds the ships; it appoints the officers; it gives all the requisite directions with regard to manning, discipline, and provisions; and everything is complete within itself. What is the consequence? No doubt there have been some errors of judgment committed, even by the Admiralty, during the present war. It would not be difficult to point out some of those errors; but still, upon the whole, the Admiralty has furnished to the country a most splendid fleet, and the efficiency of that fleet has not been impaired by such mistakes as have occurred with regard to the Army. My Lords, I say, therefore, that if you wish to apply a remedy to this state of things, you must consolidate the many independent departments which have now concurrent power and authority with respect to the administration of the Army. Unless you do that, you will effect no real good, and I must say that that consolidation cannot, in my opinion, be effected by the appointment of a Secretary of State for War, and placing under him the whole management of the Army. The Secretary for War has to direct not only the Army but the Navy. He is supposed to be the organ of the Government for directing all your warlike operations. Now, it seems to me to be quite inconsistent with this function that he should have under his charge all the details connected with the management of the Army. Complaints would probably arise from the Navy that they were put under the authority of a department which had authority over the Army, and in this way jealousy might arise between the two services, as well as a conflict of authority between Secretaries of State. What is really wanted is, as I have stated before, the consolidation of the offices of the Secretary at War, the Commander in Chief, the Board of Ordnance, and the Commissariat. You ought, in my opinion, to have one single and well-constituted department, which should do for the Army that which the Admiralty now does for the Navy—that is, provide an efficient instrument to execute the orders of the Government, whatever those orders may be. If you do this, I cannot believe that a fourth Secretary of State would be necessary; for I concur with the noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough) who spoke upon this subject some time ago, that the real direction of the war ought to rest with the Prime Minister. There is no other authority in the Government who can direct every functionary of every subordinate department for the conduct of the war in the same manner as the Prime Minister, because when the country is engaged in war it naturally absorbs everything else. The business of the Treasury, of the Foreign Office, of the Army Department, and of the Navy are of equal importance in forwarding the one common object, and, except the Prime Minister, I know no one man who can have an efficient directing authority over them all.

But I know it is said that such a consolidation would be objectionable, because it would place the command of the Army and the patronage of the Army too immediately in the hands of the Government of the day. My Lords, I know how much stress has been laid by many persons upon this objection, but I am prepared to meet it. With regard to the prerogative of the Crown, which has been sometimes dwelt on, I will not repeat the arguments I addressed to your Lordships upon a former occasion with regard to this point, because, if I am not mistaken, the noble Duke (the Duke of Newcastle) gave up every ground of objection of that kind to the change I proposed, and admitted that the prerogative of the Crown was not affected by the question one way or the other—that all executive duties belong equally to the Crown, but that they are all equally exercised by means of responsible advisers, and subject to the criticism of Parliament. When you say there is an objection to putting the command of our Army too directly under the Government of the day, let me remind you that the existence of a Commander in Chief, such as he is now known, is a very modern introduction. Until after the revolutionary war, I believe you can find no instance of a Commander in Chief during peace. You never had such an officer during peace, and even during war the Commander in Chief was generally what his name implies, the commander of a certain portion of the Army directly under his orders, and of which he acted as general. The pleasure of the Sovereign upon all military business, including the granting of commissions, was then taken by the Secretary of State or the Secretary at War, and not by the Commander in Chief. The Commander in Chief recommended, but it was a Member of the civil Government who took the pleasure of the Sovereign. It was not until 1812 that the Commander in Chief's office was placed upon the footing of a public department; until then he was only an officer commanding a certain portion of the Army. At the same time, I am ready to allow that, although this change was not formally completed before 1812, yet, substantially, it took place at a considerably earlier period, and probably for fifty or sixty years the department of the Commander in Chief has been pretty much what it now is. But, further than this, I hold that, according to the duties now performed by a Commander in Chief, his title is a misnomer. He is not Commander in Chief. To my notion, the name implies an officer who is in military command of troops, who is constantly at their head, and acting as their general. Now I need not tell your Lordships that the Commander in Chief in this country is never seen at the head of troops, unless, indeed, it be at a birthday parade or a review in Hyde Park. Except at some State pageant of that kind, I say, the Commander in Chief never appears in command of troops, and his duties might be perfectly well performed without his ever putting a red coat on his back. He sits in his office at the Horse Guards, and upon him there devolves the duty of organising and superintending the British Army all over the world. It is a duty which, in every other country, is performed, not by a general commanding, but by a Minister of War. In this country the Commander in Chief is a Minister of War, but a Minister of War shorn of a great part of his proper power and authority. He is a Minister of War, with very little power over the artillery, with no authority in matters of expense, and with scarcely any as regards the provisioning, clothing, and arming of the troops. He is a Minister of War deprived of all these essential parts of his functions. I say, then, that the obvious remedy for this anomaly is to get rid of this department. Appoint a general to command the troops in England, and, under the direction of the Minister, to undertake the important duty of watching over the discipline and the training of the troops at home and of preparing them for service abroad when they are called upon. Let him be an officer who will train the troops in arms—not a Minister of War with a pen in his hands at the Horse Guards; and, as to duties of a different description, which now belong to the Commander in Chief, give them to a Minister of War—no matter what you call him—it is comparatively unimportant whether he is first Commissioner of an Army Board, or Secretary at War, with a sufficient number of officers under him; in either way you might constitute a department for the management of the Army, and to this you ought to transfer the duties belonging properly to a Minister of War, now performed by the Commander in Chief. Among those duties I do not hesitate to say you must include the patronage of the Army. I know how strong is the prejudice which exists upon this subject; I know how many persons believe that you cannot, without danger, place the patronage of the Army under the control of a Member of the Civil Government. But let me point out to you that it is impossible to invest a Minister with the power necessary for the efficient management of the Army, unless you give him complete control over its patronage. Can any Minister be justly made responsible for the conduct of a department if he is not allowed to choose the instruments he employs; if he is not intrusted with the means of rewarding those who do good and faithful service? I would ask my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he would consent to be responsible for conducting the foreign relations of this country if he had no voice in the appointment of any member of the diplomatic body, from the Attaché up to the highest Minister acting under him—if he had no means of advancing those who did well, or of recalling those who were deficient in performing their duties? Would he consent to undertake the management of our foreign relations upon these terms? I think I cannot be at a loss for his answer. But with regard to the Army, it is more particularly necessary that this power should be exercised by the person responsible for its efficiency. Upon what does that efficiency mainly depend? If there is one thing more than another upon which it depends it is upon the manner in which the patronage is exercised—upon the care taken to advance deserving officers, and sternly to refuse promotion to the incompetent. It is upon the care and zeal with which this is done that it mainly depends whether your Army is efficient or the reverse. Let me also observe that in every other department of the public service you do trust the Minister of the Crown with patronage. I have already referred to the Diplomatic service. The Naval service is the same; and throughout the whole of the Civil service the different branches are subject to the control of Her Majesty's Government. I do not deny that abuses may be committed in this way. I should be the last to deny that under every Government, and in every time, Parliamentary interest and other improper motives have influenced the appointments and promotions in the public service. Such abuses, I am afraid, have existed, and while human nature is what it is I am afraid they will continue to exist. I know no country, no form of Government in which abuses in the distribution of patronage have been avoided. The greatest and most difficult problem for the solution of a Government is to secure the appointment of the right men to situations in the public service. Upon the whole, however, admitting the abuses which have taken place in the administration of patronage, I believe that placing it under the control of a responsible Minister of the Crown is the best security you can obtain for the due discharge of this most important duty. I know that a comparison has sometimes been drawn between the distribution of patronage in the Navy and in the Army to the advantage of the latter, and in proof of the alleged benefit of removing the patronage from the influence of party politics; I should be prepared, for answer, to take issue upon that as a matter of fact. I deny that for the last sixty years the distribution of the patronage of the Army under the existing system has, upon the whole, been more pure than that of the Navy. The abuses may have been of a different character, and I believe they have. But if you will go into detail and scrutinise appointments, I will undertake to show you that the public service has suffered more in the Army than it has in the Navy during the last sixty years from injudicious appointments, and from appointments made from improper motives. My Lords, I cannot help stating that, even now, at this moment, in the Crimea, judging by results, I cannot believe that the patronage of the Army has been exercised with so much greater judgment and discretion than that of the Navy. This I know—and I see a noble Lord here present who can confirm the truth of what I am saying—this I know, that there is in the Army at this moment great dissatisfaction at the recent promotions for service; and I am told that it is the opinion of the Army—whether correctly or not I have not the means of judging—that men who were not really under fire at Inkerman, or the Alma, or at Balaklava, and who have never undergone the perils and the hardships of the trenches—that men of this kind have received the promotion which has been denied to most meritorious regimental officers. I know not whether that allegation be true; but I think it is a pregnant example of the inconvenience of the existing system that such an allegation and such complaints can be made; and that if it be true no man in this House can distinctly say, if the mistake has been made, who is responsible for it. Is it the Secretary of State for War, or is it the Commander in Chief? I think it would be one of the great advantages of the change I propose, that in these matters any future responsibility would be brought distinctly home to one individual, and thus this great and important power of promotion and reward, upon the judicious use of which the whole efficiency of an army depends, would be exercised under that check and under that feeling of responsibility which would thereby be created. Whilst touching upon promotion, I cannot avoid mentioning one other subject. Look at the medical staff and at the medical service. I believe there has been no branch of the service which has been so completely withdrawn from the control of the civil Government of the country as the Army medical service; and, I ask, does the present state of that service; and the manner in which the duties have been performed, justify you in believing that that patronage has been so much more judiciously exercised than patronage in other branches of the service? I say, then, that you have failed in preventing those evils against which the measure was directed, by withdrawing the patronage of the Army from the control of the Ministers entrusted with the government of the country. But in making a vain attempt to avoid one class of evils, see what serious evils of another kind you have incurred. As the management of the Army cannot be separated from the patronage, both have been thrown into the hands of the Commander in Chief, as a kind of independent authority. But as it is impossible, under our constitution, that any great branch of the public service can be altogether withdrawn from the control of the Ministers, who are held responsible by Parliament for the manner in which the Executive powers of the Crown are exercised, you have entrusted to the Commander in Chief only a crippled and divided authority—an authority powerful in obstruction, but powerless for action—very strong as an obstacle to the civil servants of the Crown in acting upon their own views in the management of the Army, but too feeble to enable him to act upon his own. Hence all the weakness and uncertainty of action which have characterised our military administration, and which must ever be expected from divided authority and divided responsibility.

But further, the management of the Army even in peace ought to be one of the most important of the functions discharged by the Executive Government of the country; and in time of war the management of the Army and Navy are clearly the two most important duties appertaining to the Government. If this be true—and no one will, I think, deny that it is so—is it either more or less than a palpable absurdity to say that, while we have a Government responsible to the country and to Parliament for the general line of policy which they may adopt, the whole control over the Army shall be given to military authorities, who shall enjoy a *quasi* independence in carrying on that branch of the public service? My Lords, I say that at this moment you are suffering from the effects which have been produced by that kind of independence of the Queen's Government which has for the last fifty years been enjoyed by the military authorities. I make this assertion without hesitation, because while I think I have shown that it is owing to errors in the past administration of the Army, that in the day of trial it has failed to answer the expectations of the country, and has proved less equal than it ought to have been to its duties in war, I am also prepared to maintain that these errors of administration have arisen directly from the want of sufficient power on the part of the civil Government to introduce from time to time those improvements which have been known to be necessary. I believe that most of the Governments which have existed in this country for many years have been aware of the paramount importance of introducing various improvements into our system of military administration. I can assert that such has been the case with all those Governments with which I have had the honour of being connected, and I believe it to have been the case with most other Governments which have of late years conducted the affairs of this country. It is now nearly twenty years since I had the honour of accepting the office of Secretary at War, and I had not long entered upon its duties before I discovered how many measures there were not merely practicable, but easy, by which the Army might be rendered more efficient, and how many glaring evils there were which required correction. I certainly spared no exertion of which I was capable in order to effect the reforms which seemed to me so necessary, and I hope and believe that I was not altogether unsuccessful in accomplishing some improvements, but it was slow and weary work to carry even minor reforms with the complicated and cumbersome constitution of our military departments, and I retired from that office with a painful consciousness that what had been done was a small part indeed of what ought to have been effected. I believe that other Secretaries at War have experienced the same feelings; because I have perceived that gentlemen who have successively held that office have endeavoured to carry forward the work of improvement, and that yet all that has been done falls far short of what is necessary. I am persuaded that there never will be, nor ever can be, any effectual correction of the evils which I have pointed out; you never will have a really vigorous administration of the Army until it is brought, like all other branches of the public service, under the direct and immediate control of some one minister holding office by the same tenure as the other advisers of the Crown. One great advantage of our system of government is, that while on the one hand you have the benefit of experience in carrying on the public service, from the practice which has happily grown up of allowing the great body of our public servants to hold their offices virtually during good behaviour; on the other hand, you obtain some security at least against the administration of the affairs of the nation degenerating into a mere system of routine, by placing at the head of the several branches of that administration Ministers who are responsible for the manner in which the business is conducted, who retain their places only while they possess the confidence of Parliament, who perform their duties under the constant criticism of political opponents, and who practically seldom hold their offices for many years together, so that new minds are periodically brought to bear upon the conduct of affairs, by which provision is made for introducing from time to time those improvements which the progress of society demands.

The Army alone has hitherto been an exception to this general system of our constitutional Government. Under the pretence of taking it out of the influence of party, its management has been removed from the direct control of the Government, and has been left in purely professional hands. The administration of the Army has for a series of years been intrusted to officers who have risen to high rank in their profession, and who are, therefore, generally men advanced in life, and on whom it is no reflection to say—what, indeed, may be said of those who have risen to eminence in all other professions —that they are indisposed to consent to any alteration in that system under which they themselves have risen to distinction, and which was in existence at the time when they entered the service. But you place the administration of the Army not only under professional men, but you add to that arrangement the difficulty that the chiefs of the profession to whom you entrust this duty have not their hands free to adopt any measure which they may think necessary, but they are checked at every turn by requiring the concurrence of other departments; and, from the manner in which the different offices are constituted, they can scarcely avoid being influenced by a natural jealousy of the civil departments. You are now, my Lords, reaping in the Crimea the fruits of this policy. The Army is now what it has been made by a long series of years of professional management, and I think the deficiencies it has shown have, beyond all doubt, contributed in no small degree to bring it into the condition we deplore. But let me not be misunderstood. When I say that the Army has not shown itself as efficient as it ought to be, I am far from meaning to deny its valour or its many great excellences, of which I am as sensible as any of your Lordships. No man more admires the heroic valour our troops have displayed in battle, and the still more heroic fortitude they have displayed under privations almost incredible. No man, I say, admires these excellences more than I do; but the more I admire them, so much the more do I desire to see the administration of the Army placed under a system of management which will relieve it from those faults which I have long foreseen would lead to unhappy consequences whenever we should be involved in war, though, unfortunately, I have seldom found any officer of high rank prepared to believe it. My Lords, I say that I admire the valour and fortitude displayed by our Army, nor do I doubt that their efforts, in spite of those faults to which I have adverted, might have been attended with success, had they been better directed and seconded by better arrangements for providing for the wants of the troops. It is to the confusion and almost incredible failures which have happened in all these arrangements, that the disastrous condition of our Army at the present moment is chiefly to be attributed. These errors and blunders are precisely in kind what I anticipated when, in the debate on the Address last year, I ventured to predict to your Lordships that, unless some great changes were made in our departmental arrangements, we should not be many months engaged in a serious war without meeting with some great calamities. I made those observations a year ago, and, although I felt in doing so that I was guided by reason, still I little believed that the prediction would be so soon and so fearfully fulfilled. Errors of the kind which have been committed I did expect; but I must admit that in degree those which have been committed exceed anything that I could have believed possible. They are more than can be accounted for merely by the inconvenient organisation of the military department, and therefore I think that what has occurred must form the subject of a strict inquiry. There must have been great faults committed somewhere, and those faults should hereafter be inquired into, when the inquiry can be entered into without interfering with the energetic prosecution of the war. But in the meantime your Lordships I am sure will agree with me that the position of our brave army is one which must inspire the deepest anxiety, and which requires that, without even one day's delay, there should be a complete change in the manner in which the war has been conducted. If such a change does not take place at once, the consequences may be such as I positively shudder to contemplate. My Lords, it is this feeling which induces me to ask your Lordships, as the first step towards effecting the improvements which are necessary, to express your opinion of the necessity of a change being made in the constitution of the military departments. The noble Earl concluded by moving to resolve—

> "That it is the Opinion of this House that great Evils have arisen from the present Division of Authority and Responsibility in the Administration of the Army; and that the whole of the Business connected with this important Branch of the Public Service, which is now distributed among different Offices, ought therefore to be brought under the direct Control of a single and well-organised Department."

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: My Lords, as it is not my intention to oppose the Motion of my noble Friend; and as I entirely concur with a great deal of what has fallen from him, it will not be necessary for me on the present occasion to trespass for any considerable length on the attention of your Lordships. I shall confine myself to two points, believing that this is not the proper occasion to touch upon others. A noble and learned Lord (Lord Lyndhurst) has given notice that upon this day week he will draw your Lordships' attention to the whole conduct of the war, and as it is his intention to move a Resolution strongly condemnatory of the whole conduct of the Government in that respect, I think your Lordships will agree with me that I ought not upon the present occasion to travel into those subjects which must then be discussed, but that, on the contrary, I should reserve myself for that future day, when it will be my duty to offer to your Lordships the vindication of which I believe the conduct of Her Majesty's Government to be capable. There is one point which I shall postpone with regret, as it is one of a more personal nature, having reference to my own conduct in the department to which I have the honour to belong. Under any other circumstances, I would prefer to meet on the instant any accusations against myself; and what has taken place in the other House of Parliament so recently as Friday last, would render me most anxious to trouble your Lordships with some explanations on that subject; but I am prevented doing so on the present occasion by two considerations. One of those reasons I do not think it necessary to explain; but the other is, that the Motion of my noble Friend is of such vast importance, involving, as it does, the consideration of the welfare of the army, and, therefore, at the present time, the wellbeing of the country, that I should be most reluctant to mix up with the consideration of such a subject anything relating to myself. If, however, on this occasion I avoid touching upon that topic, I trust that I may be permitted to state that, at the very next meeting of your Lordships' House, I will venture to trouble your Lordships with some observations upon it.

My noble Friend must forgive me if I say that he has not quite correctly represented what fell from me about ten months ago. My noble Friend, in the commencement of his speech, represented me as having maintained that all existing arrangements were satisfactory. I am sure that the noble Earl did not intend to misquote, but he has forgotten what fell from me on the occasion to which he has referred. I did not deny that some changes might be necessary, and I will admit that the experience of the last nine or ten months has strengthened my opinion that I was right in not making any such denial. What I really did say on that occasion was, not that all existing arrangements were satisfactory, but that my noble Friend carried his views on this subject to a somewhat extravagant length. I did not think that the moment when we were just involved in a great war, and when it was necessary to make every exertion to carry it on, was the proper time to introduce great and radical changes into our system, or that we should at such a moment throw out of gear all the departments of the army, and endeavour to introduce into its administration an entirely novel system. What I said was, that if any changes were introduced, they should only be introduced after due deliberation; and I believe that even in time of peace, when a small mistake would lead to results of comparative unimportance, that is the correct principle to act upon; and, if it be so, it surely is of more importance to act upon it in time of war, when a small mistake may lead to results the most calamitous.

The Duke of Newcastle

As it is not my intention on the present occasion to refer to any events connected with the war, I shall pass over what my noble Friend has said on that subject, as illustrating the necessity for some changes in the administration of the army, with the passing observation that I do not think that my noble Friend has proved so completely as he appeared to think he had, the connection between the distress of the army in the Crimea and the departmental system in this country. I will not enter now into any consideration as to what led to that distress, but I do not think that it has been proved that it is the constitution of the departments to which that distress is entirely owing. The noble Earl has referred to the loss of time which, he says, has taken place in giving orders for what was necessary to carry on the war, and he has produced two instances; but I believe that similar instances of delay might be found under any system, for it is impossible that delays and accidents should not sometimes occur. The noble Earl has referred to the case of delay in the orders given with regard to Mr. Nasmyth's guns; and there was, no doubt, some delay owing to a departmental misunderstanding; but that misunderstanding was not between the Departments of the Army, but between the Admiralty and Board of Ordnance. The noble Earl proceeded to deduce, from the delay that took place, an argument that the different departments were not under the proper and efficient control of one head; but in this he is mistaken. Let me state what steps I took when the circumstance was brought to my notice. Without inquiring how the mistake had arisen, or into the error which had taken place, and being desirous that there should be no further delay, I communicated with Mr. Nasmyth, directing him, on my own responsibility, to proceed with his guns, and telling him that subsequently the departmental mistake should be set right. The second instance to which the noble Earl referred was that of Price's Candle Company. I was not previously aware of some of the circumstances to which he has referred, for I had not seen the letters in the newspapers from which he has quoted; but the delay that did take place might have taken place under any system. When this ingenious invention of the candle stoves was brought under my notice, it occurred to me that it might not be so applicable to service in the field as for hospital purposes, and I ordered a quantity to be made in order that they might be tried on a somewhat extensive scale; but feeling that in a matter connected with the hospitals which might prove of so much importance I ought not to proceed without communication with the Medical Board, I directed that the matter should be referred to that department before any order was given; and in this case there arose a delay of nine days in consequence of the illness of the head of that Board. I have entered into these details, not with the view of defending the existing system, but to show that in these instances the delay ought not to be attributed to the system. I will refer, however, to the case of the *Prince*, in order to show that the system does not prevent prompt action. One morning I received a message by telegraph from Bucharest, stating that there had been a great storm on the 14th of November, in the Black Sea, and that many transports had been wrecked. The message gave the names of some ships rightly, and of others wrongly, but among the names given was that of the *Prince*. Recollecting that on board the *Prince* there was an immense quantity of stores and warm clothing, which would soon be of the greatest value to the troops, although I knew how little faith could be placed in telegraphic messages, yet, without waiting for any confirmation of the intelligence, agents were sent to the manufacturing districts to purchase similar clothing, and to the same extent as that lost in the *Prince*, so that when, some days later, we received authentic intelligence of the loss of that vessel, we had fresh supplies ready to be shipped and sent out by the first steamer that could be got in readiness. My Lords, although I mention these circumstances to show that in them the delay which has arisen cannot fairly be attributed to the system of the administration of the army, I do not deny—and I do not think that by anticipation I took a different tone last year—that great alterations in that system may be beneficial. I do not think at the present moment that the system in that department works well; but, as my noble Friend has avoided referring to any alterations which may be effected, I will follow his example, though, at the same time, I must express my belief that great alterations ought to be effected.

My noble Friend has referred to the Medical Board, and there, again, I consider great improvements ought to be made. An attempt has been made, possible in a time of peace, but impossible in a time of war, to maintain a medical system exclusively to the army. I think that it has broken down. I am ready to do all justice to the eminent and zealous men serving in a professional capacity with the army in the Crimea, but of this I am certain, that in the present state of the army and of the hospitals it will be absolutely necessary, in spite of all opposition and all professional feelings to the contrary, to introduce into those hospitals the civil element. I believe that the organisation of the Medical Board at home is also defective, and there, again, I agree with my noble Friend that alterations ought to be introduced.

But, my Lords, when my noble Friend used the term "consolidation," and stated that consolidation is absolutely necessary, I do not think that he sufficiently explained what he means by the word "consolidation." If my noble Friend means that he thinks the Ordnance Department, the duties performed by the War Office, the Commissariat, the Commander in Chief, and all the other departments which are at present separated, should be comprehended under one roof, and superintended by one head, then, I believe, it is absolutely impossible to carry such a change as that into effect. I can only say that I have found already, even under the existing system, during the short time the Ministry of War has been separated from the Secretaryship of the Colonies, that I have been overburdened and crushed by details to an extent which has frequently left me but too little time to attend to many great and paramount objects which ought to occupy the attention of the Secretary for War. If, therefore, you pursue consolidation in that sense to a greater extent, I am confident that, instead of gaining efficiency, you will render the office still more inefficient. But if my noble Friend means that he wishes to produce a greater unity of action, and to insure the complete supervision and control of one paramount authority, then I should be prepared to agree with him. I believe you may extend the system further than it has been already carried; but I beg to assure my noble Friend that, so far from its being possible in a time of war to carry consolidation further than it has been, it has been found that consolidation with reference to war time has been carried too far as it is. Already in two important points we have found it absolutely necessary to separate departments, one in the administration at home, and the other in the administration of the army in the field. My noble Friend has pointed to the advantages which have been gained by the consolidation which has taken place in the Admiralty; and I agree with him, so far as a time of peace is concerned. I believe the measure introduced in 1832 by my right hon. Friend, now, as then, at the head of the Admiralty, to consolidate the Transport Board with the Board of Admiralty, acted admirably, and worked well in a time of peace. But, my Lords, if I were to point at this moment to that which has more failed and broken down than any other part of our system, so far as the home departments are concerned, I should be compelled, notwithstanding the eminent qualities, the zeal, the industry, and the abilities of Captain Milne, who has had more especially the control of that department under the First Lord of the Admiralty, to point to our transport system as having failed more than any other during the time we have been at war. To the transport service, my Lords, may be traced many of the misfortunes which have attended carrying out the instructions which have been given at home. I could prove this to your Lordships, and upon some future occasion I will do so; but, so sensible is my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty, who introduced the system, and who would be naturally proud of what had been done and what had worked so successfully in time of peace, that it is inefficient in a time of war, that he has proposed to the Government to depart from it so long as the war lasts, and to establish a Transport Board for war service, but to revert to the system adopted in 1832 as soon as the war shall have ceased. Now, my Lords, there is another point in which I have myself found that, so far from consolidation, separation was absolutely necessary. In connection with the army in the field, I found that the Commissariat had been completely overburdened,—that step by step you had placed upon that department more than it could possibly perform, and that the result was, that you were deficient of the means of forming a proper land transport service. I believe that if you were to continue the present system of leaving the Commissariat the duty of procuring animals and all other means of conveyance, as well as the purchase and transport of provisions and stores, your army in the field would never be in a really effective and movable condition. So satisfied have I been of that fact, that I have separated the land transport service from the Commissariat, appointing a military man of great abilities to organise that service under a military system and under military rules. Though there has not yet been time to bring the alterations into play, I feel confident that when they come into full operation they will be the means of placing the army upon a better and more satisfactory footing. I am aware, my Lords, that by multiplying departments at home, there may be a tendency to increase those jealousies and misunderstandings which often lead to a want of co-operation; but, as I have said before, much of the proper working of a system depends upon the head at home, or the Board with which the direction is entrusted. In placing the transport system in the hands of the Commissariat you entrusted that department with duties of vital importance—no less than the feeding of the army; but it was impossible that those duties could be satisfactorily executed, unless the Commissariat had ample means at their command, in the shape of transports, to carry them out. I consider it highly necessary that a good understanding should exist among all parties concerned, and that it would be far better to separate the transport corps from the Commissariat than to allow it to remain as at present, overburdening a department which has quite enough to do to provide food and fuel and forage for the army.

Having explained to your Lordships the view I take of consolidation and the point in which I differ from my noble Friend upon that head, I come now to the observations which were made by my noble Friend with reference to the state and condition of our officers and men, and to that want of instruction to which he has referred, from which he states that such serious evils have arisen. This is a most important part of my noble Friend's speech, and I entirely concur with him in the importance of the subject. I do attribute a great deal of what the army is now suffering to the want of that education to which my noble Friend alluded. I mean not only the instruction of the officers, but the instruction of the men; and in co-operating, as we have now done for some months with the French army, the errors and failings of our own system have become still more perceptible. While the French soldiers—I speak more particularly of those who have gone through an African campaign—are always ready and able to help themselves in every respect, our soldiers are comparatively helpless, not because they are less intelligent or less zealous, but because they have lacked those means of instruction which our Allies have possessed for many years past. I hope that the want of instruction in the use of arms, to which my noble Friend referred, has now been, to a great extent, rectified, if not entirely removed; but in other important matters connected with the camp our soldiers went to the Crimea entirely ignorant, and all the little knowledge they possess has been picked up by experience or gained from those who had some knowledge of past campaigns. When my noble Friend referred to a want of instruction in the use of arms as one of the misfortunes under which we were labouring, he might have added, also, that upon the breaking out of war we laboured under that most serious deficiency, the want of arms themselves — not merely those improved arms to which my noble Friend has alluded, but arms of all descriptions. I rejoice to say that this evil is being rapidly removed, and that our arsenals are being quickly replenished; but, at the same time, I point out the matter as one of the errors which have been committed during a long peace. I do not mean to say that you are to have great accumulations of arms of a kind which may be superseded by subsequent inventions, but what I say is, that the armouries of this kingdom ought never to have been allowed to fall into the condition in which they were at the breaking out of war. I am now speaking of the Minié rifle, of carbines, and swords; but I may go further, and say that we had no efficient means of providing our army with shells, rockets, and other armaments of that description. So deficient were we that we have been indebted to individuals for inventions, which they have made upon the spur of the moment to remedy our defects; and I rejoice to think that we have not been found to suffer materially from that cause. I confess, however, that when I look back upon our deficiencies a year ago, I look back with horror to the absence of all provision of that description. And, my Lords, I here beg to say that I blame nobody in particular for what has occurred. Every Government in succession has been to blame for permitting our arsenals and armouries to be in such a state, and I trust sincerely that, if it please Heaven we soon arrive at peace, one of the first steps which will be taken will be to place not only our arsenals at home, but those abroad, in a state of efficiency—not overcrowded with arms likely to become obsolete, but with such supplies as would allow us to take the field, if necessary, without those disadvantages which, as I have mentioned, have occurred on the present occasion. My noble Friend said there had also been, upon every occasion during the last thirty or forty years, a great delay in adopting scientific improvements. There, again, I entirely concur with my noble Friend; and I think I may have been to some extent slightly instrumental in correcting that evil. My noble Friend, and others who have turned their attention to this subject, will be aware of the manner in which scientific improvements have hitherto been investigated at Woolwich. I believe that these investigations have been upon the whole unsatisfactory, notwithstanding the zeal and good intentions of the officers who have had the management of them. I have now entirely reorganised the scientific Committee, and I cannot but hope, when at the present moment the attention of so many individuals is turned to scientific improvements, that the reorganisation of that Committee may be found of great importance and utility.

My noble Friend, towards the close of his observations, said he found, during the four years he was Secretary at War, that it was slow and weary work to introduce improvements. I do not hesitate to say that my experience corroborates that of my noble Friend; but I believe he will admit with me that, if in times of greater leisure improvements were even then a slow and weary work, it is not surprising that in the last nine or ten months we should not have made vast progress in amending errors, which, for twenty years, every successive Government has found plenty of fault with, but has never been enabled properly to correct. My noble Friend touched at some length upon the exact constitution of the authority he would advocate. He said he thought it was a mistake to have appointed a fourth Secretary of State, and he said, also, that he thought the alterations which ought to have been made should have been effected upon the various Boards. I am not quite certain whether my noble Friend intended to repudiate an opinion which, I believe, he has expressed upon more than one occasion, that the best authority to constitute is a Board with a Minister at its head. I confess that there are considerable advantages to be derived from a Board, and particularly when it is constituted with a responsible authority at its head. That is to a great extent the principle on which I have been endeavouring to conduct the business of my department. I have had periodical meetings with my noble Friend the Commander in Chief, with my right hon. Friend the Secretary at War, and with the Lieutenant General of the Ordnance; and at these meetings various requirements have been discussed, and letters written, our proceedings being similar to those of a Board, though, of course, without any exact legal constitution. But I must frankly confess that I am not so much enamoured of the working of a Board as my noble Friend. There are assuredly certain advantages to be gained from a Board, but at the same time there are great disadvantages; and one of those disadvantages is, that it does away to a considerable extent with individual responsibility, dividing the responsibility among several persons. Even though there be a head to a Board, he does not feel that undivided sense of individual responsibility which he does under the existing system; and, moreover, the satisfactory working of a Board must depend entirely upon the character of the individual placed at its head. If he be a man of paramount abilities and authority, the Board will work well, because the members will become merely his subordinates; but if he be not such a man, then you will find that the Board will become merely a room, with a certain number of gentlemen meeting in it, each pressing his own opinions, going back to his own individual department, and preferring to carry out his own views rather than those of his chief. In short, as I said before, I believe a Board works well when it is practically under the paramount supremacy of one individual, but not otherwise. To show my noble Friend that I have not been unmindful of the advantages we may gather from the experience of others, and that the organisation of the military departments in England is by no means satisfactory, I may inform him that I have considered it advisable to follow the example set us by the French in 1820. At that time they considered our military system superior to theirs. Our allies, however, have now had the advantage of twenty-five years' military experience in Algeria, and I have therefore followed the example set by them in 1820, and have appointed three Commissioners to investigate in Paris the whole of their system, culling from it such suggestions and improvements as may be found to work satisfactorily; and concurrently with this commission, I have instructed Lord Raglan to appoint a corresponding commission of officers of the army in the Crimea, to examine the French camp for a similar object, and acting under instructions sent by myself. I do think, my Lords, that from these investigations great advantages are likely to accrue, inasmuch as we shall obtain the theory of the French system from the Commissioners in Paris, and at the same time obtain from competent officers in the Crimea the results of the practice of that system as exemplified in the field. I do not know whether it is worth while to mention that in this investigation I have instructed the Commissioners to make particular inquiries as to one department of the French system which is extremely perfect, but which in this country is not only defective, but absolutely and altogether deficient—I mean the *Dépôt de la guerre*. Since the establishment of the Ministry of War I have taken the first steps towards initiating such an institution in this country, and I have been in communication with foreign Governments, and with Lord Dalhousie, in India, with a view to obtaining a collection of maps; but of course it will take considerable time to organise such a department.

Now, my Lords, it does appear to me that my noble Friend, especially when advocating the engrafting of a new system upon the War Office, has lost sight of the financial system of the army. No one has ever touched upon that very important point, the auditing of the Army accounts. At present it is done by the War Office; and if you entirely change the character of the War Office, and give it the supreme controlling power over other departments, you must provide an entirely different system both of auditing and controlling the accounts. It might, for instance, be desirable to place the original financial control now exercised by the War Office in the hands of the Treasury, and the audit of accounts in those of the Audit Board; but there are difficulties connected with the subject to which my noble Friend has not adverted.

As I said at the commencement of the

observations which I have made to your Lordships, it is not my intention to oppose the Motion of my noble Friend. If he thinks it desirable to place this abstract resolution upon the books of the House, I am not inclined individually, or on the part of the Government, to dissent from it. At the same time, I frankly admit that inconvenience sometimes arises from placing abstract resolutions of this kind on the records of Parliament; and I submit to my noble Friend, whether it is worth while, after the declaration I have made, to press his Motion further? If, however, he does so, all I can say is, that on the part of the Government, and personally, I have no objection to it. I agree with him that material alterations are essentially necessary, and, whatever Government may have to carry them out, I hope they will be enforced with as great promptitude as circumstances will admit; but, at the same time, that they will not be carried out without having first received due consideration, without which they will, I feel assured, do more mischief than good. In consequence of the discussion about to come on next week, and certain other explanations to which I shall call your Lordships' attention at your next meeting, I do not feel disposed to extend my observations, and shall, therefore, conclude with the expression of my general assent to what my noble Friend has said; at the same time suggesting to him that, inasmuch as no particular mode of carrying out his views is mentioned in this Resolution, unless there should be an expression of dissent from any part of the House, which I do not anticipate, his object will have been attained, and that it might be better, under these circumstances, not to place this Resolution permanently on the books of the House.

VISCOUNT HARDINGE said, that the observations he should address to their Lordships would be few. He was supposed by his office as Commander in Chief to be divested of political feeling, and not to take party objections to measures proposed by noble Lords for the improvement of the Army. But he wished to remark on an assertion of the noble Earl that one of the battalions of the Guards was, in consequence of its being detained longer than usual on London duty, for three years without the opportunity of having practice with ball cartridge. I may say, that owing to circumstances such was the case; it arose from an accidental change in the stations of the battalions some years ago. He would, however, remind the noble Earl of what had been done subsequently. Not only had Minié rifles been introduced, but considerable opportunities of practice had been afforded and had been carried on with great care and attention. No recruit had gone abroad since the spring without being practised with the Minié rifle, and a school of musketry had been established, where it had been shown that the rifle in use was superior to any weapon which our army had yet had, and better than that used by any foreign army. It was therefore quite accidental that four or five years ago the battalion of Guards, by being three years on London duty, had had no opportunity of practice with ball cartridge, and would not occur again, as a practice range had been hired. There had not only been a school of musketry established, and the rifle adopted, but the excellence of the arm was proved at Inkerman, where the balls not only went through two or three men in the advancing columns of the Russians, but its efficiency in keeping down the fire in the enemies' batteries by means of its long range and great accuracy was most remarkable; and the consequence was, that now, whenever a Russian battalion was opposed to one of ours armed with the Minié rifle, they held their ground before it with much less tenacity than formerly. With regard to the superiority of the civil departments of the French army over ours, one cause of it was this—they had for twenty-five years been carrying on war in Algeria, only sixty hours' distance from the coast of France, and where from 80,000 to 100,000 men had been constantly engaged in war. This had not been the case with us, we had not had such opportunities of improving and gaining experience. He did not agree with the noble Earl that military education had been neglected. The officers at Sandhurst were now educated on the same principle as was adopted during the last war, when Sir George Murray and Sir Charles Napier were students in the senior department; and the *école d'état major* of the French, now so much eulogised, was, in fact, copied from our staff system in 1815, when the army of occupation was in Paris. When the present war broke out, he felt it so important that officers of merit should be advanced (and he denied the assertion of the noble Earl, that none were chosen for merit, for General Eyre and others were instances) that he sent to the Senior Department, Sandhurst, and directed that the ablest young men there should be selected for appointment to the Quartermaster General's department, and eight were sent to him, who were appointed deputy-assistant quartermasters general. He knew none of them, except by their credit as having passed good examinations, and none were appointed from aristocratic influence. He believed, however, that at Sandhurst the mathematical instruction was carried too far, for one of the officers in question, who had particularly distinguished himself in mathematics, had been found not to be so quick in his military duties as others who were far behind him in mathematical acquirements. It would give him great pleasure to aid in any measure by which promotion could be regulated according to the attainments and abilities of officers; but it would be very difficult to do this, and you could not test the abilities of an officer till he had been tried in the field. One or two campaigns would test his abilities, but till then it would be difficult to ascertain his merits. With regard to promotion in the Army generally, he could only say that this part of the duty of the Commander in Chief was a very disagreeable one. It was very difficult to satisfy claimants, and also to ascertain whether they were qualified to be appointed as staff officers. He understood the noble Earl to say, that the promotion for services at Alma and Inkerman was not given to proper persons, and that it had caused great dissatisfaction in the Army.

Earl GREY: What I said was, that I had heard that there was great dissatisfaction in the Army with regard to the promotions; but that I do not know personally whether that dissatisfaction was just or not, as I had no means of forming an opinion on the subject, but I thought it should be known who was responsible for those promotions.

Viscount HARDINGE: The way in which the promotion was regulated was this. The Commander in Chief in the Crimea, who had personally seen services performed, noticed those whom he wished to be marked for promotion, and if a staff officer is named in a despatch he is entitled to be promoted. The senior major of a regiment got a brevet lieutenant-coloneley, and the senior captain received a brevet majority; but there it stopped, and could go no further. If an officer distinguished himself in a skirmish or in the trenches, his conduct was mentioned by the Commander in Chief, and his claim was laid before Her Majesty, and in every instance was acceded to. If any mistakes were made, he should be happy to correct them. It was very difficult for the Commander in Chief at home to know who was the senior captain of a regiment who might or might not be at Scutari or elsewhere; but he acted on receiving such names as the Commander in Chief in the Crimea sent home. With regard to the preparation made to meet this war, he believed that, as far as the Commander in Chief could go, every assistance was afforded. When he (Viscount Hardinge) was Master General of the Ordnance, under the Government of his noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Derby), the artillery was in so low a state that there were only forty or fifty guns, and their equipments were so rotten that if four or six horses had pulled them through a rough field they would have gone to pieces. He wrote a memorandum to his noble Friend (the Earl of Derby), and he received from him every encouragement, and the result was the immediate establishment of 300 pieces of artillery and 600 ammunition waggons. As far as his knowledge had gone, the civil departments of the Army, as they had worked, had been no impediment. It was true that the Commander in Chief had very little to say to an army abroad, for as soon as a war breaks out the Secretary of State for War takes upon himself the important duty of the management of the Army. He had given to Lord Raglan the same instructions as the Duke of York gave to Sir Arthur Wellesley at the commencement of the Peninsular war, and he was directed to report all matters of discipline and promotion, and the routes by which the army moved. But the Commander in Chief at home was not permitted to correspond with the Commander in Chief abroad, for the purpose of advising him; and that system had been adopted for wise reasons; the instructions of the Commander in Chief might be opposed to those of the Government under whose control the conduct of the war was placed, and thus conflicts of opinion create much embarrassment and difficulty. He could only say, that the noble Earl knew that he had given every assistance in his power to the commission which sat on the subject of the present system of promotion in the Army. He believed the noble Earl would not say that he had done anything to oppose the scheme which he had in view. He knew the plan of the noble Earl was to make the Commander in Chief a major general, with different duties to those at present existing, but he did not think that plan could succeed. He should, of course, in the present stage of such questions, give no opinion on subjects connected with the office which he himself held, but leave that to others. He could say that it was not possible to find in any continental army a better regimental system than ours; and as to the efficiency of the British soldier, the infantry were not surpassed by any in the world, while Balaklava said as much for the cavalry. As to the artillery, it was true that the system of promoting officers by seniority caused them to reach the higher ranks when they were too old; but yet he must admit, notwithstanding that disadvantage, it was excelled by no artillery in the world. Our system had been copied by every continental Power; and most of the new inventions, such as rockets, and detonating shells had proceeded from the British artillery. He denied that the inconvenience which had attended the present war had arisen from the system of the Army itself. The defect lay in the Commissariat transport branch, which, as the noble Duke had said, had been overwhelmed, and ought not to have had the duty of transporting as well as providing the supplies of the army imposed upon it. He believed that there was not such a want of consolidation as had been spoken of; but he could only say that he should be ready to give every assistance to any Commission which might be appointed to improve the system of the Army, in the same spirit as he had done in the spring of last year for accelerating the promotion of the Army.

Lord CAMPBELL rose merely to urge upon the noble Earl (Earl Grey) not to withdraw his motion. It had been frankly met and acceded to, and he thought it highly advisable that the Resolution should be placed on the records of the House, as it was the unanimous opinion of all present. They did not presume to enter into details. They left that for the Government, but he was sure that it was of the utmost importance that it should be known that the House was of opinion that to the present system and not to the default of individuals, must be ascribed the misfortunes of the war, and he believed they might now look forward to a more auspicious day.

The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH: My Lords, I cannot agree with the noble and learned Lord who has just urged upon the noble Earl who brought forward his Motion the propriety of now pressing it. It is a Resolution of the greatest possible importance, and I do not recollect a single instance in which any Member of any House of Parliament has endeavoured to induce the House to agree to a measure of this importance while the Government was in the position in which the Government is now placed. We have to-day a noble Duke, the Secretary for War, but we do not know who may be so to-morrow—perhaps the noble Earl himself who has brought forward this Motion. He had been designated for the office, and might possibly hold it. Her Majesty's Government were at the present moment in the position of prisoners at the bar, while the jury have gone out to consider their verdict. They do not know whether to-morrow may dawn on them as a Government, or as gentlemen who may have to take their seats on this side of the House. I say, therefore, that it is contrary to all precedent, and contrary to public policy that a Motion of this importance should be made when practically there is no Government in existence to pronounce an opinion on it. Under these circumstances, I shall say very little; and I regret having even to say that I must beg to differ from the noble Earl who introduced this Motion; for I understand that he attributes most, if not all, of the ills, disasters, and errors which have affected our army in the Crimea to the conflict of departments—to the confusion that exists here in our military system—to the impossibility of doing justice to the service of the State in the condition in which the departments now are. I have frankly expressed, at various times, my opinion of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government since the commencement of the war. I have expressed my opinion that they have shown want of knowledge, want of promptitude, and want of forethought. At the same time, I must say that I think that I shall be guilty of the grossest injustice to them if I do not admit, after the fullest consideration that I have been able to give to the subject, that by far the greatest calamities by which our army is now oppressed in the Crimea have originated there, and not here at home; and that if we had had a Duke of Wellington or a Sir George Murray there, the public would never have heard of any, or only of a small portion, of the distresses which have arisen. I object altogether to any new arrangement of the system of governing the Army which should place all its patronage in the hands of the Crown. I told the noble Duke at the commencement of last year that I thought it to be his duty, under the existing circumstances, to require that the name of every officer proposed by the Commander in Chief for staff appointment should be submitted to the noble Duke before it was submitted to Her Majesty; for I consider the Minister of War to be responsible for all such appointments. I do not know whether this has been done, but I believe it to be absolutely essential. Beyond this I do not go. I do not know whether the patronage at the Horse Guards has been perfectly administered, but all will concur with me in considering it contrary to constitutional practice and to the feelings of every gentleman in England desirous of obtaining a commission in the Army for his son to have to ask it as a favour of the existing Government, That ought never to have been submitted to in this country. I must, on another point, give a decided opinion—I object to the amalgamation of the departments, and the government of the Army by a Board. A Board involves the absence of all responsibility and the creation of all inefficiency. I have seen one in another country, and do not wish to see it again. It is perfectly impossible for any man who has to perform the duties of a Minister—to attend Cabinet Councils—to receive letters which ought never to have been written—to read them so far as to understand what they contain, and to write something by way of an answer—that that Minister should be compelled by the practice of the country or the courtesy of office to undergo interviews which appear never to terminate, and which have no public object in view, and are often only sought to gratify the personal vanity of those seeking them—that that Minister should be bound to give his attendance in this House, or, if he were a Member of the other House, he would have to attend during a very large portion of the week in his place, to vote or to answer questions that ought never to be put, or to take part in debate; and thus one-half, at least, of whose busy period of the week is subtracted from the service of the country by this useless and pernicious arrangement—to impose on him the necessity of looking into all the details of accounts, to oppress him with business of a most trivial importance—it is impossible that such a man should have time to consider matters of the very greatest moment to the country—would be a system the most injurious that could possibly be adopted. I know this, my Lords; for I have served in this country, as well as in another country, where no letter is received, where no man is admitted to an audience, where the sixteen hours of every working day are, day after day, devoted to the public service, and in which ten times more work is done well than is here very indifferently performed. I object, therefore, altogether to the amalgamation of Boards, and I deplore the position of the Secretary of State for the War Department, on whom has been thrown the Commissariat Department, of which all the awful details have been described by Sir C. Trevelyan in a paper which I have endeavoured to understand. It is contrary to the public interest, and utterly unnecessary that the War Department should be oppressed by all these idle and useless details. My Lords, I say so, because I know it; and I trust your Lordships will not think me guilty of pedantry in referring to what happened to me in another country where I conducted a war department, and at the same time, a financial department, as well as the whole diplomatic concerns of a great empire without the slightest difficulty. No one there ever resisted an order; it ran at once through the country, and was obeyed; but never did I look into details of account, nor did I attempt to do all those things which are paraded before your Lordships' eyes in the paper of Sir C. Trevelyan. What is the consequence? Here we have a small military force, in India we have a large military force. The necessities of the case have compelled the Government to adopt a suitable expedient there, by investing in the Governor-General, alone, all the powers of the Governor-General in Council, who thus made orders which his absolute will made respected and obeyed throughout the country. There, wars are carried on with success—overwhelming forces well equipped are concentrated on the cardinal point of the theatre of war, and success certainly and speedily follows. Therefore in this country in war time, when I find a General telling people who came to congratulate him on success, that you must wait two or three years before you can expect to obtain a decisive success, I say "No" to the system. I believe that, if you could only do what common sense suggests—make an order of the War Minister sufficient in every department, a complete authority in every case, and a justification for every officer in obeying it, you would give all the efficiency you desire to your military system, and at the same time would avoid breaking up departments whose aid might be valuable. I am sorry to have said so much just now, for I should regret that your Lordships should place on the records of the House an abstract Resolution which, after all, means nothing, and which at the present time certainly ought not to be pressed on this House. Can any one doubt but that, if any idea had existed of any important question being discussed to-night, we should have had a different attendance from that which we now have? But now, with literally no Government at all, the House is called on to agree upon one of the most important principles—how the government of the Army is to be carried on.

EARL GREY, in reply, said, that after the appeal which had been made to him he felt it impossible to press the Resolution. He would, however, make a few remarks with reference to some observations of the noble Earl. With respect to the patronage of the army, the noble Earl had said it would be a bad system when a gentleman, wishing to obtain a commission for his son, had to seek it as a political favour; and in that he (Earl Grey) quite agreed. But the First Lord of the Admiralty felt it his duty to give commissions to applicants according to his best ability, and was restrained from allowing personal motives to interfere by the power of public opinion. He believed that if the same system were adopted in the Army—the patronage being under the control of the Government—the bad effects anticipated by the noble Earl would not follow, as the very efficient control of public opinion would prevent abuse. Even granting, however, that there might be some abuse, he repeated that we were not now safe from the same evil, and there would be this great additional one from acting on the views of the noble Earl, that while the patronage remained beyond the power of the person who was responsible for the efficiency of the Army, it would be impossible for that person properly to do his duty. So long as an independent authority continued to be given to the Commander in Chief, it must necessarily be an imperfect and incomplete authority; because, according to our constitution, the Minister of the Crown was responsible for the manner in which the money voted by Parliament for military purposes was expended. Hence, under the existing system, responsibility was divided, between the Ministers who were changed as the Government changed, and the Commander in Chief who was considered a permanent officer, and the consequence was that the affairs of the Army had not been managed as they should have been. The noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough) appeared to imagine that he (Earl Grey) had imputed all the mistakes that had occurred in the Crimea to the present constitution of the departments at home. If what he had said bore that construction, he must have ill expressed his meaning, for nothing could be further from his intention. He agreed with the noble Earl, that much of the evil had arisen out there, but then that only took them one step further, for it showed the necessity of a better supply of general and staff officers, who would have prevented the occurrence of such mistakes. The noble Earl had given an amusing description of the interruptions to which a Minister was subject, and he (Earl Grey) could not deny but there was much truth in it; but this did not appear to have much bearing on the question of what would be the best substitutes for military departments. He concurred in thinking the transfer of the Commissariat Department to the Secretary for War as that department was at present constituted, was a grave and obvious error, but it did not follow that the Commissariat business might not be united with the rest of the military business in an office properly organised for the purpose. He believed it would be by no means impossible to constitute a Board, the chief of which should bear the responsibility of all that was done, and yet not be required to do everything himself. By a proper system, and by a judicious division of labour, the Chief of a department, without being unduly burthened with details, might ascertain whether all the business was properly performed. It could not be necessary for the head of that department to look into minor details, or inquire personally into matters of account; but, at the same time, he thought it was possible, by a proper system of supervision, for the chief authority to be satisfied that all the business of his department was properly done. No doubt no department of the service could be carried on if the head of it attempted to do all the work himself, but what was required was, that he should make good use of those under him, and at the same time maintain that general supervision which would enable him to ascertain whether all matters were proceeding properly, and, if otherwise, that he might interfere himself. He could only repeat his opinion that, while it was true that much of what had gone wrong in the Crimea had been from errors committed there, yet he adhered to the statement that those mistakes had been aggravated by our defective system at home. Several causes, no doubt, contributed to our failure, and among them was the circumstance that we had entered upon a war with an army not properly qualified to deal with the difficulties which they were called upon to meet. However, in accordance with what appeared to be the wish of the House, he would beg leave to withdraw the Resolution.

Motion (by Leave of the House) *withdrawn.*

House adjourned to Thursday next.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Monday, January 29, 1855.

MINUTES.] PUBLIC BILLS.—1° Public Health.

ALLEGED NEGLECT OF SICK AND WOUNDED MEN FROM THE CRIMEA AT PORTSMOUTH—QUESTION.

MR. MONCKTON MILNES said, he had given notice of a question which he wished to put to the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty, whom, however, he did not see in his place. The question of which he had given notice was, whether any correspondence had taken place between the Admiralty and the authorities at Portsmouth, with respect to an alleged neglect by them in landing the sick and wounded soldiers and seamen who had recently arrived from the East in the *Himalaya*, in consequence of which neglect one of the seamen was reported to have died; and whether, in the event of any such correspondence having taken place, there would be any objection to its being laid upon the table of the House?

ADMIRAL BERKELEY said, in replying to the question of the hon. Member, he could assure him that it was not through any neglect of his right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty that he was not present to answer the question for himself, for he regretted to say that his right hon. Friend was extremely unwell, being confined to his bed. In regard to the question now put, he could only say that the seaman Williams did not belong either to the army or the navy, and was not returned by the captain or the surgeon of the *Himalaya* as being on board that vessel either in a naval or military capacity, but, in fact, was sent on board and intrusted to the care of the master, in the character of a distressed British subject. After he was landed he was conveyed to the Sailors' Home, and further than that the authorities had no knowledge of him. No public correspondence had taken place on the subject, but the right hon. Baronet at the head of the Admiralty had written a private letter to the superintendent of the Dockyard at Portsmouth, desiring him to make an immediate and searching inquiry into the matter. It appeared that from the Sailors' Home the seaman in question was carried to the workhouse, where he was admitted; and it was but justice to say that the surgeon of the ship had written a very strong letter, denying that the man was in any way neglected while on board the ship. There were, therefore, no papers in the shape of public correspondence upon the subject which he could lay upon the table; but he had not the slightest objection to produce the private letter of which he had spoken, as well as the answer which was received in reply to it.

MR. MONCKTON MILNES said, that his hon. and gallant Friend had confined himself entirely to the case of the man Williams, but he (Mr. Milnes) intended his question to apply generally to the case of the sick and wounded men landed at Portsmouth from the ship in question. It had been alleged that when that steamer arrived there was no one to receive them excepting the people congregated about, and that the poor suffering men were left for hours together on the shore, and were also treated without proper consideration by the Custom-house officers.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT said, he could answer the question of his hon. Friend up to a certain point. When the statement that no preparations had been made for the reception of the sick and wounded men at Portsmouth appeared in the newspapers, he lost no time in writing to Lord Hardinge to beg he would institute an inquiry, which he found that nobleman had already done. He also wrote to the Treasury, inquiring whether or not there was any truth in the statement of the conduct of the Custom-house officers, and whether, if it were true, some change ought not to be made in consequence. He was assured, in reply, that there were no papers or correspondence in reference to the subject which could be properly laid before the public; that, on a strict inquiry into the circumstances of the case, it appeared that the facts had not been quite correctly stated, for, although it was true there might have been some detention of the men who were not wounded by the Custom-house officers, no such detention took place in the case of the wounded soldiers and seamen, nor was any examination made of their effects. The error which had been committed arose in this way: The officer deputed to receive the sick and wounded men went out in a small vessel to Spithead to the *Himalaya* to make arrangements for the landing of the men, directing that, instead of landing them in boats, the *Himalaya* should proceed to the quay. Unfortunately, the *Himalaya*, instead of allowing the officer time to get back, steamed into the harbour at once, and arrived so soon that the officer was not able to make the necessary preparations for their reception. He (Mr. Herbert) would, however, ascertain all the facts, and lay them before the House.

THE PATRIOTIC FUND—QUESTION.

COLONEL NORTH said, he wished to ask the noble Lord the President of the Council whether the widows and orphans of those men who, serving under the Foreign Enlistment Bill, might fall during the present war, were to participate in the advantages of the Patriotic Fund; also, if the widows and orphans of the officers of our army, navy, and marines who might fall in this war, were to participate in the advantages of that fund?

MR. SHAFTO ADAIR said, that as a member of the Financial Committee of the Patriotic Fund, he could give an answer to one of the questions asked by the hon. and gallant Gentleman. The case of the widows and orphans of officers was before the consideration of the Finance Committee, who thought it might be treated as exceptional, some small assistance being given as a temporary grant, in the first place, to the orphans to the extent allowed by the Queen's regulation; and next, that to the widows of officers below the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Army, and captain in the Navy, a provision might be given not exceeding one-third of the pension allowed them. With respect to the widows of officers in the lower grades, where the pension did not exceed 60*l*., the Finance Committee considered that one-half of that amount might probably be given. None of these temporary grants had yet been made, and all these cases must be considered as exceptional, and not finally decided on; and they must be considered as subordinate to the claims in reference to which the Patriotic Fund was primarily responsible, namely, the claims of the widows and orphans of the non-commissioned officers and privates in the army, navy, and marines now employed in the war.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT said, with respect to the first part of the question asked by the hon. and gallant Gentleman, he apprehended that the subscribers to the Patriotic Fund intended to devote their money exclusively to the widows and orphans of those serving in the English army, and it would not be possible, in his opinion, to divert any sums subscribed for one purpose to another. The Foreign Enlistment Act was not in existence when the greater part of the Patriotic Fund was subscribed.

COLONEL DUNNE said, he wished to know whether, in the case of the widows of officers receiving money from the fund, their title to the pension ordinarily granted would be prejudiced?

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT said, he should think not.

THE CAVALRY CHARGE AT BALAKLAVA —QUESTION.

MR. H. BERKELEY said, he begged to ask the right hon. Secretary at War, firstly, whether any correspondence, and what, had taken place between Field Marshal Lord Raglan and Her Majesty's Government on the subject of the melancholy disaster which occurred at the battle of Balaklava, where the lives of so many of our gallant men of the light cavalry were lost, and whether there was any objection to lay such papers on the table; secondly, whether due inquiry had been made, or was contemplated on the subject?

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT said, that, before replying to the questions of the hon. Gentleman, he thought that in referring to the charge of the light brigade at Balaklava another term than "melancholy disaster" might have been used. Lord Raglan had certainly made a communication to the Government on the subject, but he was not in a position at the present moment to lay the despatch on the table. He hoped, therefore, the hon. Gentleman would not press for it now, being assured that the matter to which he had alluded had not escaped the attention of the Government.

Mr. CRAVEN BERKELEY said, he also wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman two questions—first, whether the order which had been published in all the newspapers, as emanating from Lord Raglan to Lord Lucan for the light brigade of cavalry to make the disastrous charge at Balaklava, was the correct order or not? It ran thus—

> "Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front; follow the enemy, and try to prevent their carrying away the guns. A troop of horse artillery may accompany. The French cavalry is on the left. Immediate."

The second question was, why the remnant of these brave men were not to have a clasp to their medal with the word "Balaklava" upon it, in addition to "Alma" and "Inkerman."

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT said, he believed that the words quoted by the hon. Gentleman were an accurate transcript of the order given by Lord Raglan; and with respect to the second question, that a clasp was granted by Her Majesty to the men engaged in the charge referred to.

Mr. H. BERKELEY said, he would give notice that he should move an Address to the Queen, praying that an inquiry should be instituted into the conduct of Lord Lucan for ordering the charge of light cavalry under circumstances which precluded the possibility of success, which made disaster inevitable, and which consequently led to a wanton sacrifice of human life.

THE CORRESPONDENTS OF THE PRESS IN THE CRIMEA—QUESTION.

Mr. BERESFORD said, he would now beg to ask the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War, whether, during the present campaign in the East, rations had been supplied by the Commissariat to any of the correspondents of the daily press; and, if so, by what authority had the issue taken place, and had it continued up to the latest returns furnished?

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT, in reply, stated, that it had been brought to the knowledge of the Government that rations had been given by the Commissariat to the correspondents of the daily press. This, however, had not been done by the authority of the Government, and he apprehended that it had not been continued up to the present day, because the Board of Audit in examining the Commissariat accounts disallowed these expenses, as they did not find any sufficient authority, or indeed, any authority at all for them. He had been asked, in reference to a statement made elsewhere upon this subject, to read the following letter from Sir Charles Trevelyan, who wished to place before the public the truth of the matter so far as he was concerned. Sir Charles Trevelyan says—

> "Observing that a question had been asked in the House of Commons relative to the issue of rations to any of the correspondents of the daily press during the present campaign in the East, I beg to state that in May last I requested Commissary General Filder to enable Mr. Russell, the correspondent of the *Times*, to provide himself with food for himself and his servants, on condition that he paid for it at the full contract rates, and that Mr. Filder had no reason to suppose that Lord Raglan would disapprove of the indulgence; and I observed to Mr. Filder, that the letters of the *Times'* correspondent did not appear to me to be open—as, indeed, they were not at that time—to the charge of giving information, or even of containing speculations upon the probable plans of operation, which would be objectionable in a military point of view. This was in the month of May last, when the army was at Constantinople under orders for Varna. The only application I received was on Mr. Russell's behalf, and I thought it very likely that if he were not allowed to purchase his food from the Commissariat stores he would be subjected to great privations. I did not submit the matter to any Member of the Government, because it did not at that time appear to me to be of sufficient importance."

It appeared, however, that a few days after that permission was given—namely, on the 29th of May, Sir Charles Trevelyan wrote to Commissary General Filder to the following effect—

> "It is said that Lord Raglan has refused to permit the correspondents of the newspapers to accompany the force into the field. Of course, anything I may write to you on such a subject must yield to his Lordship's expressed wishes and intentions."

Commissary General Filder stated that—

> "He gave directions that any of the reporters for the London daily press with the army, who might be so circumstanced that they could not purchase provisions, should be allowed to draw rations on paying their value."

The result of what had occurred showed that, at any rate, in this instance the machinery of the Treasury was sufficient for the purpose, because the irregularity had ceased as soon as detected by the Audit Board, by whom the expenses were most properly disallowed.

MR. BERESFORD said, he wished to inquire whether Sir Charles Trevelyan could issue such an order to the Commissariat in the East without its being sanctioned by the Treasury?

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT replied, that he had already stated that the order was not sanctioned by the Treasury.

COLONEL KNOX said, he wished to ask whether rations had been given to any other reporter but the reporter of the *Times?*

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT said, he had read an extract from Commissary General Filder's communication on the subject, which was all the information he possessed.

COLONEL KNOX: Does the right hon. Gentleman know that the correspondent of the *Times* got a free passage for himself and three horses from Varna to the Crimea, when only one horse was allowed to each field officer?

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT: I am not aware of anything of that kind.

ARMY (CRIMEA)—THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR, AND CONDITION OF THE ARMY.

ADJOURNED DEBATE.—(SECOND NIGHT.)

Order read, for resuming adjourned Debate on Question—

> "That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the condition of our Army before Sebastopol, and into the conduct of those Departments of the Government whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of that Army."

Question again proposed;
Debate *resumed.*

MR. A. STAFFORD said, the claim which he had upon the indulgence of the House upon this occasion was his being able to state things which he himself saw in the neighbourhood of the war, and some of the transactions in which he had borne a part. When he was witnessing those transactions, he little anticipated the strong feeling that evidently existed in England upon this subject; and still less did he imagine that it would come before the House in the shape in which they were now called upon to consider it. The noble Lord the Member for London, in his speech the other night, informed the House that the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton was at this moment, in effect, the War Minister, and if he (Mr. Stafford) did not call him the Minister for the Home Department, it was because he really did not know what office the noble Lord at present filled. The noble Lord the Member for Tiverton, in his reply, did not attempt to contradict that statement of the noble Lord the Member for London, but seemed to say that whatever was the result of the present Motion, the Ministry would proceed to reconstruct itself as quickly as possible. The Colonial Secretary, however, who spoke at a later period of the evening, stated that the Government had no idea of remodelling itself, and challenged the House to come to a decision upon the question at once. Meanwhile the noble Lord the Member for London occupies a Prussian position of neutrality upon this occasion, and refuses to vote at all. The Members of the House of Commons have not to discuss the responsibility of this Minister or that, but they have to discuss the conduct of those who had been appointed to act as Ministers during the progress of this war. It was, therefore, impossible for the secession of the noble Lord at the eleventh hour to relieve him from the responsibility which properly attached to him as a leading Member of this Government. It was no great defence of the Secretary at War to say that the Government had issued a Commission on the spot, of gentlemen not connected with the Government, to inquire fully into the state of affairs at Scutari and at the hospitals of Constantinople. That Commission might be so far satisfactory or otherwise, but its appointment could not absolve the Government from the slightest portion of their responsibility, but would only enrich the world with what was next in value to a successful experiment, namely, the real causes of a most complete and unhappy failure. He trusted that the House would excuse him if, in the statements he was about to address to it, he seemed in a little degree to incur the charge of egotism. He could not avoid frequently referring to himself; but in all that he had done he could assure the House that he was actuated by no party motives whatever. Whoever might be Ministers—whoever might be Minister of War—he (Mr. Stafford) would be willing at any time to wait upon him at his office, or where he chose, for the purpose of giving him the result of his experience, of his observations abroad, and he only asked that that Minister would use the details he would communicate to him in the spirit in which they were given, namely, for the common good. He was delighted to hear that the Government were to open a large hospital at Smyrna. He (Mr. Stafford) had recently gone over the barracks selected for that purpose; and, though they were not so large as those at Scutari, they would be still more valuable for the purposes for which they were intended. He hoped that such orders would be immediately given as would render those barracks available, as all the atmosphere of the coasts between the Archipelago and the Euxine was reckoned by those medical men acquainted with the district, to be very unfavourable to the healing of wounds. While referring to the latter hospital, he might remark that it was very desirable that arrangements should be made by which the invalids under treatment might have the same facilities for sending remittances home to their friends as were enjoyed by seamen and by soldiers with their regiments. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War had, indeed, stated that the subject had engaged the attention of the authorities as long ago as August last; but that statement only filled him (Mr. Stafford) with grim despair, for he had heard of so many paper pellets from the War Office falling unheeded in the East. He trusted, therefore, that the War Office would have some placards printed in large type, and posted up through all the wards of Scutari, Smyrna, and Abydos hospitals, stating distinctly that after a certain time the sick and wounded would be permitted to make remittances to their families. He would now come to the new hospital at Abydos. It was a well-constructed hospital, and, if proper stores were supplied, he believed that it would not turn out a failure; but when he was there, for 400 soldiers there were only two bottles of port wine, and most of those men required a strengthening regimen. Well knowing what the fate of applications made to the authorities would be, he had addressed a letter to the gentleman who had the distribution of the 10,000*l*. fund under his care, and he thought it due to that gentleman, occupying a most difficult and delicate situation, calculated to give rise to much envy, to say that he had distributed that fund so judiciously, and had so much promoted the comforts of the poor soldiers, whom the authorities had neglected, that he deserved the gratitude not only of those who had subscribed to the fund, but of all those who had received the benefit of his aid in the hospital. The occupation he had undertaken was most invidious, but he had executed it with boldness and decision; officials were often told that if they neglected to furnish this or that requisite, the *Times'* Fund would be applied to, and it would be got there. By the skilful management of that gentleman, therefore, every pound of money which he had distributed had been made to equal nearly five. He (Mr. Stafford) regretted that the fund was nearly at an end, because it provided comforts for the sick and wounded which he was afraid they would not otherwise obtain. Next he came to the great hospital at Scutari, which, no doubt, had been very greatly improved since public attention had been called to the subject; but there were radical evils at the commencement of the system which never could be cured. It was said that the hospital had become unhealthy; but it had never been anything else, and never could be. On visiting the place he had found that all the corridors and a greater part of the wards were floored with porous unglazed tiles. On these the mattresses were placed, there being no bedsteads, and, in consequence of the absence of vessels of all kinds, the poor creatures were obliged to discharge feculent matter on the tiled floor, which never was washed, and which never could be washed, because it was feared that the quantity of water required to wash it would be so great as to cause an amount of evaporation which would endanger the health of the patients. These details might be disgusting, but the time was come when they must be mentioned. Over and over again the floor had been swept, but the original taint remained; the atmosphere was surcharged with unwholesome gases, and no one entered that hospital, whether chaplain or doctor, but was certain to catch the prevailing disease. The doctors were not entirely to be blamed for the state of the hospital. In the first place, it was necessary to take into consideration the state in which the patients were when they arrived there—whether the original condition of the hospital was such as to be within the reach of the doctor's care, and whether the other departments acted up to their orders? On two occasions he had been himself obliged to offer his own money for the removal of evils the existence of which the doctors had not only acknowledged, but to get rid of which they had thankfully availed themselves of his assistance. He felt convinced that whoever might be Secretary of War would find himself obliged to absolve particular individuals from almost all responsibility, and to impute the blame to the want of proper instructions from home, which could assist them in the difficult circumstances in which they found themselves. He came now, still speaking from his own experience, to the case of a ship filled with "convalescents," as they were called, going across the Black Sea to join the camp at Balaklava; he himself being with them. There were 300 men on board that ship, and finding officialism in a perfect state of collapse, for no official seemed to know from hour to hour what he or anybody else was going to do next, and as they were all willing to accept help from any one, he took upon himself to examine as well as he could those convalescents. Seven of the number having been sent back to Scutari because the captain declared he would not be responsible for their lives during the voyage, he (Mr. Stafford) went among the rest to see what supplies of clothing and what means of warmth they had. He found them most lamentably deficient, and nearly the whole of them without knapsacks. Some of the Fusiliers were on board, and, observing their shoes more than ordinarily ragged, he asked if they had no others? "No," they answered; "the others are in our knapsacks." "Where are the knapsacks?" "There, in that ship," said they, pointing to a vessel moored about a hundred yards' distance. "Why do you not get your knapsacks?" "We should be glad to do so," was the answer; "but we have no boat for the purpose." With the consent of the captain of these draughts, and the captain of the ship, he (Mr. Stafford) obtained a boat, and some of the men went to the vessel for their knapsacks. Of the whole number of knapsacks on board, however, they returned with but two. What was the history of the knapsacks? The Fusiliers, it appeared, when they landed in the Crimea, did so without their knapsacks, and for this, he understood, there were excellent military reasons; but the knapsacks, after having performed one voyage across the Black Sea already, were carried back to Scutari another. There, instead of being placed in store, they were left in the vessel, and performed a third voyage across the Black Sea, as was hoped to the Fusiliers; but they could not be landed near where the Fusiliers lay, and again, for the fourth time, they crossed the Black Sea and entered Scutari! It was on this last occasion of their being at Scutari that the poor convalescents applied for them, and got back two. Of the other knapsacks they certainly did obtain a glimpse, but so overloaded with bales of goods that the captain declared he could not, and would not, unload the whole ship in order to reach them; so, whilst the Fusiliers steered eastward to the Crimea, the knapsacks steered westward over the Sea of Marmora, and, as he understood, to Liverpool. He had stated that seven of the convalescents, as they were called in the playful irony of official language, had been landed because they were not in a fit state to be sent on; some of the others were also taken ill again, and one of them by what was thought to be cholera. The ship's doctor evinced every possible anxiety for the poor man, and, owing to his care, the choleraic symptoms passed away, and when he arrived in the Crimea nothing was left of the incipient disease but some degree of low fever, which, with a little care, the doctor said would soon disappear, and the man be well again. He should have something further to say respecting this man in a future portion of his narrative. He now came to a place which was associated in his mind with two classes of things which were very different; one, a glorious victory achieved by the indomitable valour of our troops—the other, a case of confusion, misery, and death, which perhaps in the same space had no parallel in the history of the world. He came to Balaklava, and visited the hospital there, and found no ventilation, no cleanliness, not a single sheet, not a pillow-case, within its walls. Men who were afflicted with one disease caught another as soon as they entered the hospital, by being wrapped in blankets from which a corpse, dead, perhaps, of a fever, had just been removed. No medical comforts were properly made. Fourteen men in one room, and nine in another, were lying on the bare floor, whilst in the passage which connected the two were excellent bedsteads, that would not have taken more than three minutes to put together. Of course he made some strong remonstrances upon the subject. Next morning he went again to the hospital, and conversed with some of the patients alone, for he found that it was in vain to attempt to ascertain what their real feelings were in the presence of the officials. The orderlies denounced the doctors, and the doctors denounced the orderlies, and between the two the patients were dying fast. He had referred to a soldier who had been seized on board ship with choleraic symptoms, and been landed at Balaklava with other soldiers among the convalescents. One day he (Mr. Stafford) discovered that soldier sitting on a stone in the street near the hospital. Recognising him, he asked him where he was going? The man replied, that he had nothing to eat, was at the point of starvation, and almost ready to drop. He (Mr. Stafford) led him to the hospital, and asked the doctor what was to be done. The doctor replied that he would "take a note of the case." "Take a note of the case! Why, whilst you do that the man is dying!" He (Mr. Stafford) assisted him into the ward, therefore, and got something for the man himself. A short time afterwards he found the poor fellow delirious, and in his paroxysms he fancied himself subject to a frightful punishment; in short, that he was being flogged, and very shortly death put a period to his sufferings. He was then buried in the low marshy ground of Balaklava, and was for ever placed beyond the reach of official neglect. A favourite corps (the right hon. Gentleman knew which he meant) was lately raised and sent out to Balaklava, and seeing one of the members of the corps surrounded by two or three of his comrades, he (Mr. Stafford) inquired what was the matter? The man replied that his stomach refused to retain any food except a mixture of sago. He said, "I am allowed a half pint of the mixture once a day, and I asked for it three times a day, but they have refused me. I have money of my own to pay for it, and they will not even allow me to buy it. I am not so ill; I am positively starving." He (Mr. Stafford) proceeded to an orderly, and asked if he might be permitted to get the sago for the poor man? The answer he received was no: that no other dietary could be introduced than that which had been ordered for the men. He then went to the doctor, mentioned the corps, and the circumstance which rendered it desirable that it should not get into disrepute, and asked permission, as he (Mr. Stafford) was going back in a ship with the sick, for this man to go with them too. "No," said the doctor, "he has not been ill long enough, and if we allow the men to go who have not been long ill, we shall empty the whole camp." An hour or two afterwards he saw the man again, and, judging from the rapidity with which he was sinking, he could not doubt that ere this he was far beyond the reach of the doctors of Balaklava. He came next to the embarkation of our sick and wounded soldiers at Balaklava, and here again he spoke of what he saw, and of soldiers whom he himself had personally assisted. One day he had just set off to ride around the camp, when the most horrible sight exhibited itself to his eyes that he had ever seen, and the like of which he hoped he should never see again. A man was lying by the side of the muddy road, evidently in the last stage of diarrhœa, and as he (Mr. Stafford) was passing, the poor creature cried out, "Will anybody take me away or kill me?" He (Mr. Stafford) asked him what was the matter, and he said, "They have been moving me from camp to put me on board ship, but they have left me, and I am now in such pain that my only wish is to die." Removing the man to another part of the road, he discovered four or five others in a still worse state than he; and, looking in the direction of the camp, he saw a procession, the end of which could not be discerned, of wounded English soldiers, who were being brought down on French mules, and in some instances on French ambulances. And he would do the French soldiers the justice of saying that no countrymen could have behaved more kindly to these poor fellows than they did. But no arrangements had been made for the reception of these sick and wounded men at the waterside. No huts were provided for them, but, huddled together on some fascines and heaps of stones, they waited in the rain until the boats came to carry them to the ship. He believed there was no doctor with them, and no means of providing them with medical or other comforts of any kind; and although the distance they had travelled was only five miles, yet the bullocks in the arabas with patients being conveyed to the hospital were so exhausted, that wretched men had been out often exposed to the inclement weather the whole night. In the streets at Balaklava there was a stall at which was sold tea. Nothing remained for him, then, but to get some hot tea and pour a little spirits into it, for these unfortunate people, who had nothing but their greatcoat and a blanket, stained and rotten with ordure. So he found them on board the Avon, lying on the bare boards—no mattresses, no sheets, no bedsteads of course—with nothing to cover them there but the same filthy blanket. One of the most remarkable symptoms, it was well known, of this particular disease, was the extreme chilliness felt by the patients, so that, however filthy the blanket, however swarming with vermin, the last effort of the dying man always was to keep fast hold of it, lest it should be taken from him as his knapsack had been before. He had examined, too, into the kitchen arrangements for this vessel, and he found that, while the sailors of the vessel had split peas served out to them, which manufactured pea soup thick enough for the spoon to stand upright in, the poor sick men's soup was made of hard whole peas, which though they had been boiling all the day long, were as hard as ever, and this soup with the greasy pork swimming at the top and the peas sinking like bullets to the bottom, was the diet served out to these diarrhœic patients. It was the mortality on board the Avon which had attracted the attention of that truly good man Mr. Osborne to the subject, and had produced from him some strong and urgent representations to the Government; but the mortality would have been much greater had it not been that many of the men happened to have a little money with them, and were able to buy better provisions from the ship's company. The case of the Candia, too, showed the deficiency of the arrangements. The Candia and the Ripon came, he believed, from Marseilles, with French troops on board; and here he must say that he never saw a finer illustration of the alliance between this country and France than the landing of the French troops in Kamiesch Bay from these two vessels. The French readily admitted that we beat them in our magnificent transports; and in the case of these two ships the troops of our Allies were landed as ready for conflict, and in as healthy and strong condition as it was possible for troops to be. He must say he never witnessed a sight which gave him more satisfaction than the disembarkation of their 61st Regiment of the line and the Chasseurs de Vincennes from these transports. The Candia, having performed this service, was ordered to go back with our sick to Scutari. For this purpose she first proceeded from Kamiesch Bay to Balaklava, and having a quantity of medical comforts on board, the captain offered to leave them with the authorities there. The authorities, however, declined; whereupon Captain Field said he would deliver the comforts to any man holding Her Majesty's commission who would give a receipt for them, and by this means he contrived to leave some behind him. Captain Heath, of the Sanspareil, was a good officer, and most anxious to perform the duties of his situation; but were it not that Captain Field had written to the authorities at Balaklava to the effect that no medical stores were on board the Candia, and which application did elicit the supply of a medical chest, the sick would have been aboard that ship without any medicine at all. As it was, and notwithstanding the humanity of Captain Field and his officers, it was still a miserable spectacle to witness the state of the poor men. There were no mattresses of course, because there never were any mattresses, and no sheets or pillows; but every man had his one miserable filthy blanket, which so swarmed with vermin that he had seen the crew of the merchant vessel take it and throw it overboard into the sea. The sick men lay on deck, their bones protruding through their skin, with six orderlies set to watch over them. He (Mr. Stafford) went round to examine the men, and expressed to Captain Field the horror he felt at finding them in such a state. Captain Field said he had some blankets on board, and although it would not be regular, yet if he (Mr. Stafford) would persuade the doctor to give a certificate that he wanted the blankets, he would issue them on his own responsibility. The result was that the doctor gave an order for ninety-six blankets, the remainder of the sick soldiers being chiefly supplied with those which had belonged to comrades who had died. But what became of the six orderlies of whom he had spoken? The blankets being issued, he next found that the orderlies, as they were called, were two of them seized with fever, two sea-sick, and the other two engaged in preparing the food. Then there was nobody left but him (Mr. Stafford) and his servant to distribute the ninety-six blankets to the poor fellows, and in many cases to spread and tuck up the blankets around them. One great evil of the transport service was, that if they had not orderlies who were used to the sea, those men were taken ill on the voyage, and the unfortunate sick and wounded soldiers were in consequence completely neglected. What ought to have been done at first, then, and what certainly ought to be done now, was to have hospital ships at whatever cost, with orderlies on board accustomed to the sea. Let them pass to and fro on the Euxine, and be dedicated to no other service, and be interfered with by no other branch or department. There was nothing more dreadful, he believed in the whole of their arrangements in that unhappy district than the existing state of the transport service; and in the Bosphorus he remembered that the first intimation he got of the arrival of a transport ship with sick on board, was his seeing dead bodies washed on shore at the foot of the quay at Scutari Hospital. He had visited the French hospital at the other side of the Bosphorus early in the morning—the worst time for viewing such an establishment, because the impurities of the night had not then been removed, and the air was therefore generally foul. He went without any previous notification or introduction, being desirous to ascertain if the evils of our hospital at Scutari were really inevitable or capable of remedy. His visit took place on the 20th of November, and he found such a system, such cleanliness and ventilation, such supplies of beds and blankets, and conveniences for the sick, that he felt deep shame at the contrast thus presented to the condition of the English Hospital. It was, indeed, aptly remarked by a person present with him on the occasion, that it seemed as if the French had been there for ten years, and that the English came only the day before, so different was the state of the hospitals of the two armies. Gloomy as was the picture he was now drawing, he must congratulate the Secretary at War on the sending out of the female nurses last autumn. Success more complete had never attended human effort than that which had resulted from this excellent measure. They could scarcely realise, without personally seeing it, the heartfelt gratitude of the soldiers to these noble ladies, or the amount of misery they had relieved, or the degree of comfort—he might say of joy—they had diffused; and it was impossible to do justice, not only to the kindness of heart, but to the clever judgment, ready intelligence and experience displayed by the distinguished lady to whom this difficult mission had been entrusted. If Scutari was not altogether as we could wish it to be, it was because of the inadequate powers confided to Miss Nightingale; and if the Government did not stand by her and her devoted band, and repel unfounded and ungenerous attacks made upon them—if it did not consult their wishes and yield to their superior judgment in many respects—it would deserve the execration of the public. A French officer, alluding to our Commissariat and other departments, remarked to him that we seemed to follow the system of the middle ages rather than the principles of modern military science, and that his nation regretted our backwardness the more because they saw what noble lives it caused us to sacrifice. This observation was perfectly true, and was made in no hostile spirit. He (Mr. Stafford) was arrested, while in the French camp, for a Russian spy, so many and so unusual were the questions he asked; and when, after being examined, he was set at liberty again, the French officers evinced a desire to afford him every information, and observed that, as the two nations were in such close alliance together, the best thing they could do was learn from and teach each other as much as possible. With regard to our own officers, he must say that, while engaged in writing soldiers' letters in our hospitals, he never heard, much less was he asked to write, a single word of complaint against any officer. Indeed, the men's expressions of gratitude to their officers were highly honourable to the men themselves, and no less so to their officers. One name in particular was mentioned with enthusiasm, admiration and gratitude —he meant that of His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, who seemed to possess the happy art, even in the din of battle, of saying a kind word or doing a kind act, which his men would remember to the latest hour of their lives. But how should he describe to the House the loyalty of these brave and suffering fellows towards their Sovereign? or the enthusiastic feeling with which they listened to the autograph letter of the Queen? He was in the hospital at Scutari the whole of the night of its arrival, and whenever he observed a poor fellow restless, or two men talking together, he went and read to them in a low tone of voice those gracious words of sympathy and admiration, and he did not believe there had been spent within those walls so happy a night before. Even in the midst of their sickness and weakness the men wanted to give three cheers for their Queen, and it was with the utmost difficulty they could be restrained. He had no notion what noble qualities these poor fellows possessed till he lived among them. Frequently there broke from them expressions of piety and penitential sorrow, which, because humble, would not the less be received by that Great Being who was ever near. Unceasing pain, increasing weakness, approaching death, all failed to unman those gallant spirits. It was only when they charged him with their last message to those they loved that their voices faltered. And in the letters that were received from fathers, mothers, sisters and cherished ones, there was always advice to go forward and fight for their Queen and country. When it was found that half our army was in battle destroyed by the enemy, it might be borne could it be said that the other half was burning with emulation and bravery, but not so when that other half was found debilitated by weakness and disease; and still more so when the feeling forced itself upon the mind that much of that suffering might have been spared. A brave fellow, who bore the highest character, said to him on his death-bed these dreadful words: "Had I been better treated, I might have gone back to my duty, and then I should have been ready to meet a soldier's death; but England does not care for her wounded." Then he turned his face aside and died, his heart bursting with anguish. These words caused to his (Mr. Stafford's) mind the deepest pain, but he felt convinced that England did care for her soldiers; indeed, from what he had seen of the feeling of this country since his return, he believed that there was comparatively nothing else for which the people of England now cared as much as for the welfare of those who fought their battles; and of this fact assurances would reach them through the medium of that public press which some now denounced. He was not there to vindicate the Government from the statements of one particular journal or one particular correspondent, nor, on the other hand, would he venture to assert that all that the leading newspaper had printed was true, or all its comments on what it discovered wise; but he did say that but for the efforts of that journal the horrors of our army's situation would never have been revealed, and, never being revealed, they would never have been remedied even to the extent that they had been. He must, therefore, express his solemn conviction that that press, on the whole, had faithfully discharged a sacred and imperative duty; and this he said, because he had been asked if the representations of what he had seen at Balaklava and elsewhere were correctly given in the chief organ of the British press. From his own experience he was able to confirm and endorse those representations. It was said that the Emperor of Russia learnt too much from the statements published in the newspapers; but the Emperor could not learn too much if he learnt all. In autocratic Governments diseases afflicting the body politic could not be known until their exposure was hopeless and a remedy impossible. The English plan, on the contrary, was to lay the disease bare to open day—to examine, and discuss, and grapple with it, and thus to conquer it. The Czar knew, not from the British press, but from its deeds at the Alma, at Balaklava and at Inkerman, of what materials a British army was composed. The Czar knew—and let none give their vote that night in forgetfulness of the momentous fact—he knew that we had, and could have, no compulsory conscription, but must depend on the free will of free men to maintain our supremacy in arms by flood and field. And this led him to ask,—did they suppose that the hideous details of the last few months had not reached every cottage in this country? Would not those free men who were waiting to rally round our flag wish to know whether they would have not only to face the attacks of the foe, but to pine and die from the neglect of their country? Did the House think that, with their ignorance of the technical forms of that assembly, those men would regard the issue raised in the present debate as any other than whether the system which had engendered such disasters and misery should be abolished or be suffered to continue? A little while ago Parliament unanimously voted its thanks to our army in the Crimea for its gallant conduct; and when the news of that vote reached the troops they felt the honour awarded them to be great, and the boon invaluable—invaluable, that is, unless the subsequent proceedings of Parliament tended to prove it to have been a mere mockery, and showed that, while it praised the courage our soldiers had exhibited before the enemy, it had not the moral courage which dared to burst the fatal trammels of routine in order to save an army. If, on the other hand, the House pursued the path of straightforward duty that evening—if they would affirm the Motion, as he hoped they would do, they would give young recruits the greatest encouragement to rally round their country—they would pay the best tribute to the memory of those who had gone down to their untimely graves—they would express their earnest sympathy with sorrowing relatives—they would tell the nations in their alliance that the heart of their land was bold and buoyant—they would offer to those unconquerable men who yet survived the best pledge that they would be respected, sustained and comforted by a generous and grateful country; and that when England sent forth other armies to their aid, it would be to imitate them in all but their misfortunes.

Mr. BERNAL OSBORNE: Sir, I did not collect from the interesting and panoramic view submitted to the House by the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, that he at all intended to include the naval administration, as it is at present constituted, in the obloquy which he has thrown upon various branches of the military service. It has been some consolation to me in the course of this debate to feel that, though this Motion necessarily includes the department with which it is my pride to be connected, no hon. Gentleman, however dissatisfied with the general management of the war, has made any direct charge against that Board over which my right hon. Friend (Sir J. Graham) presides with so much credit to himself, and, I believe, satisfaction to the country. Even the discursive and somewhat splenetic Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard), who has recently returned from his "colonelling" in the Crimea, and who is so unsparing and amphibious in his criticisms by land and water that he has detracted from the merits of both generals and admirals, has not yet ventured to arraign the conduct of the Admiralty. I might be content to rest the vindication of my vote in opposition to the Motion of my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Roebuck), whose state of health no man deplores more sincerely than I do—I might be content, I say, to rest my vote simply on the ground that the Board with which I am connected had done its duty; but, Sir, I am not content to rest my opposition to the Motion on such narrow and personal ground as that; I cannot reconcile it with my sense of justice to sacrifice one Minister to the faults of a system which has been well defined by an hon. Gentleman on the other side of the House as a system of the middle ages. This system has been sanctioned and confirmed by this House and by former Ministries—sanctioned and confirmed in spite of numerous Motions by the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume), and others, in spite of deliberate reports years ago for a reform of the whole military system. Will any man tell me that our military system, as existing at present, has tended to develope or bring forward military talent or genius? I deny it. Look, Sir, in the first instance, how the staff of the British army is composed. It is all very well for hon. Gentlemen to come down and talk of consolidation of the offices of the Ordnance, the Horse Guards and the Commissariat under one head, and the substitution of one Minister for another; I maintain, whatever may be the inherent vigour of that man, whatever may be his experience, a mere consolidation will not be sufficient—you must entirely reconstruct your whole military system. The time has arrived when you cannot expect an army, besides winning battles in the field, to go through the vicissitudes of a campaign under the present state of things. You must lay an unsparing hand on that building adjacent to these premises—you must see whether, in fact, you can find a modern Hercules to turn the Serpentine through the Horse Guards and all the ramifications of the War Office. I have alluded to the appointment of the staff. An hon. Member has said that we must speak out on this occasion. I fully agree with him. Not only must we not object to listen to filthy details, but we must listen also to stern and practical truths. Look, I say, at the constitution of the staff. In France the staff is regarded as the head of the army, and officers only are placed on it who possess a knowledge of military science and display fertility in expedients. Is that the case in the British army? No, it is not. In England every one knows that it is not merit and capacity for which an officer is appointed to the staff, but interest and connection. Let any hon. Gentleman move for a return of the officers employed on the staff in the Crimea, showing how many speak French, how many can trace a common military field plan. I will venture to say not one-third of them can do either the one or the other. It would of course be invidious to mention names. I attack no individual, I attack the system. I say, you must not be satisfied with the mere consolidation of departments, you must reform the army and the Horse Guards. Why, if anything were to happen to Lord Raglan, will any Gentleman tell me where we are to select a general for the chief command? It has certainly been suggested to borrow one from the French army. How can you possibly have a succession of generals when the first thing you do is to debar any man who has any peculiar talent for command from entering your army unless he can lodge a large sum of money and purchase every step? The regulation price—and no man gets it for the regulation price—of the commission of a Lieutenant-colonel of cavalry is 6,175*l*. I have known instances in which 15,000*l*. have been paid for that step. The regulation price for the commission of a Lieutenant-colonel of infantry is 4,500*l*. How is it possible, then, that any but a rich man can enter the army. ["Question!"] I think this is speaking to the question—this is going to your system, which I maintain is rotten. I say it is unfair to sacrifice a Minister of War to the faults of your system, which this House has so often sanctioned and confirmed. I know it is not agreeable to hon. Gentlemen to hear these truths; but I think we have arrived at a crisis when these truths ought to be spoken. If we are to have any reform in the British army, with a stern hand you must do away with the practice, and put the whole staff arrangements on a different footing. I have entered on this subject with some demur. I have been told it is not proper for a person in my situation to speak; but, in my mind, the safety of our whole army is at stake. If you constitute another army on the same footing, I do not think it will do any better. It is not enough that they should win battles, they must go through campaigns; and we have seen the lamentable and disgraceful way in which this war has been conducted. I say, in this, I impute no inefficiency to the men. They are the victims of the system, and this House is to blame for having so long submitted to it. We were warned of this long ago. I do not go back to the Walcheren expedition in 1809, I only go back to the Kafir War. We had regiments sent out to the Cape with the clumsy old musket, "Brown Bess," while some of the Kafirs were actually armed with the improved French rifle. We had some heavy Dragoons sent out to conduct a campaign in a country where it was impossible to take horses, and we were told that the Dragoons were supplied with bullets that would not go into the rifles with which they were armed. No remark was made. The old system went on. That war was concluded, and improvements were not made. Improvements are only effected when some terrible calamity occurs near your own doors, and then you set about to condemn a Minister, who is really destroyed by this system. The noble Lord (Lord John Russell) who, I regret, has retired from the Government, alluded to the Commission of 1837. We have been upwards of eighteen years talking of the consolidation of these boards. In 1848 and 1849 two direct Motions were made, urging the Government of that day to consolidate those departments. The noble Lord, lately Lord President, was at the head of the Government on those occasions, and the late Duke of Wellington was at the Horse Guards. When a Motion was made, not only for the consolidation of the departments, but for the alteration of staff appointments, we were told that the Duke of Wellington was opposed to any innovation of the military system, and consequently no improvement took place. Recently we have armed our troops with the Minié rifle, but I am informed there are three different sorts of firearms still in possession of the soldiers in the Crimea. The fact is this, that you never will have any reform till you commence with the Horse Guards, and are not satisfied with the mere consolidation of offices. It is very painful to me to make this statement, but I have a superior duty to perform. I represent a constituency. It is not the first time I have made these representations to the House, and I do say now, with the most perfect sincerity, that I feel I am performing a most sacred duty. I cannot resume my seat without alluding to the course taken by the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) on a recent occasion. There is no man in this House who feels greater respect, nay, attachment to the noble Lord for his past services than myself, and I do deplore his loss to the Government, not on its own account, but as a national loss. I think it is a great European calamity; and, regarding the state of feeling with which it will be received at Vienna and St. Petersburg, I tremble to think of the consequences. [*Laughter.*] This may be a subject of laughter to hon. Gentlemen on the other side of the House, but I can assure them it is no subject of laughter to the people of this country. I grant that the secession of the noble Lord has destroyed the Government, but what the position of any future Government is to be it is extremely difficult to say. They must be very much in the position of the distracted Roman, who said to his fascinating and capricious partner—*Non possum vivere tecum, nec sine te.* When I think that Lord Aberdeen is placed in a position in which no Minister was ever placed before, and entertaining, as I do, the most sincere conviction that Lord Aberdeen is not only a good Liberal but a honest and conscientious politician, I for one, humble as I am, will not desert him on this occasion. I thank the House for listening to what I know must be unpalatable to a great portion of it—to those connected with the aristocracy and the army. I have ventured to speak unpalatable truths, and wish to state that I, humble as I am, shall, by my vote, support the Government. I leave the fate of the Motion in your hands.

Mr. HENLEY said, he should have doubted that the hon. Gentleman who had last addressed them was still a member of Her Majesty's Government, if it had not been so stated by himself. The hon. Gentleman and the right hon. Secretary at War seemed to have agreed upon the parts they were respectively to take in the debate before the House. On Friday night, when great fault was found with the mal-administration of the army, the right hon. Secretary of War expatiated at length on the provision which had been made for transporting troops and stores; and now the hon. Secretary for the Admiralty defended the Secretary at War, by impugning the military system of the country. That system, however, existed when the Government took office; and yet the hon. Member for Middlesex would make out that the troops died because the Horse Guards was unchanged, and because the staff of the army was not composed according to his fancy. There was, however, one plain question which they had not answered, though often put—why had not transports been provided in due time to bring necessaries to the army, from the want of which they had perished by thousands? What answer had been given to the complaint—that waggons, and huts, and clothing had not arrived in the Crimea in time? The hon. Gentleman had commenced his speech by sneering at the remarkable statement made by the hon. Gentleman the Member for North Northamptonshire (Mr. Stafford). [Mr. Osborne intimated dissent.] Why, did not the hon. Gentleman speak of the "panoramic description of horrors" drawn by his (Mr. Henley's) hon. Friend? He would, however, come to the real question. Had the Government made the best use of the means for carrying on the war at their disposal? Had they not known when they undertook the war, that there was, as the right hon. Secretary at War had described it, only a collection of regiments, like an armed police, and not an army? Did the right hon. Gentleman only just now find that out? At all events, it was strange that he had not given expression to his opinion upon this head until the Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Sheffield was brought forward. What was the use of the right hon. Gentleman knowing the existence of the evil, since he had taken no means of remedying it. Where were the waggon-trains when they were needed? They all knew they were allowed to go down. But why were they? They might have had, with the means of transport possessed by the Government, any amount of conveyance they thought fit—but the truth was, the Government was so careless of its duty that it sent troops abroad without the commonest necessaries. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War, and the hon. Gentleman the Member for Middlesex (Mr. B. Osborne), said there was no staff corps. Then why, he asked, was there not a staff corps? In the Peninsular war, if highly-educated men were wanted who had been trained to particular duty, they could not be had, except in the Engineer corps. It was no such thing now. He asserted there was any number they required of highly educated, competent men — men capable and in the practice of making bridges, &c. ["Hear, hear!"] Yes, they could obtain such men to any requisite amount. The first public despatch of Lord Raglan's, after the landing in the Crimea, stated that means of transport were wanted, and he could not get horses necessary to draw the tents of the army. That was the first public statement of neglect. The hon. Gentleman took credit for the Admiralty in the matter. Did not this touch the Admiralty? Why were not transports provided? There was no lack of them for hire: as many might have been had as the Government desired. What was the result of this primary neglect? Why, that the army, which brought with it from Varna the seeds of four deadly diseases—cholera, diarrhœa, dysentery, and fever—by which they had been almost decimated at the latter place—were compelled to lie out in the Crimea without cover from fourteen to eighteen days and nights, whereby the seeds of these diseases were developed, and the diseases aggravated. Was not that the fault of the Admiralty? Well, what was the next result of this negligence? The army so weakened was not reinforced, and the line to be secured was so extensive that the men were one night in the trenches and another on duty in the camp, and Lord Raglan had to retire his line from beyond Balaklava. What happened then? Down came the Secretary at War with an array of figures to bear out the Admiralty, and spoke of 260,000 tons carried here and there, to the Baltic and the Crimea. The gossip of private life, however, and the talk of the City, was as to how much the transport service had been mismanaged. He heard it on all hands. The Government had chaunted their own praises for what they had done, just as if these doings were something like the expedition of Xerxes, or the preparations against the Invincible Armada. Why, what went on every day under our very noses? Had not the Government Emigration Commissioners in one year removed 27,000 out of 60,000 emigrants to Australia, a distance of 12,000 or 16,000 miles, without finding any want of transports? And yet Government made a boast of having removed 30,000 or 40,000 men a few hundred miles from Varna to the Crimea, leaving, at the same time, their baggage behind. Then came the Secretary of the Admiralty, who said, "Oh, nobody dares to say anything against the Admiralty; we have done wonders." Then the hon. Gentleman goes out of his way to magnify the Board with which he was connected, when nobody attacked it. The question, however, more immediately before the House, was to inquire into the state of the army in the Crimea, and the causes of the distress that had occurred. He, for one, saw no force in what had been stated by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Morpeth (Sir G. Grey) as to the alleged inconvenience to be apprehended from the form of the Motion. He could not understand that there existed any necessity for bringing Lord Raglan home to bear witness to the state of past and existing distress. There could be neither doubt nor difficulty about getting at that fact. It was next said, instead of this Motion, that a vote of want of confidence ought to have been moved. Had the Motion come from his side of the House, there might be something in that objection. But the Motion came from the Government side of the House, and the Motion must be dealt with, whether or not it was brought forward in the most desirable form. He would ask the House to consider first, what would have been the answer of hon. Gentlemen on the Government benches had a vote of want of confidence been proposed; and next, what was the composition of the House to which such a vote was proposed? The Treasury bench, on the proposition of a vote of want of confidence, would have cried out with one voice, "What injustice! you bring forward a charge without specifying the complaint; you give us no time to answer the allegations; we have had no copy of the indictment; and we cannot answer it. You only bring forward this Motion from factious motives." And then the Government side of the House, having agreed to merge all differences for the sake of supporting a Government composed of discordant elements, but supposed matchless talent, would have dealt with the question as one proper to gather the whole party together into one harmonious whole. But as every one did not, like hon. Gentlemen opposite, recognise the amazing ability of the Government—at least that ability did not work well, if they might judge from the present state of the affairs in the Crimea —he, for one, should support the Motion as it stood, because he believed it expressed the general feeling of the country. The universal cry from one end of the country to the other was, "Why are things so mismanaged?" The conversation in railway carriages, on board steam-boats, among high or low, rich or poor, whatever might be their politics, was all in the same strain—one universal shout of mismanagement. Was it any answer to assert that this vote would afford an inconvenient precedent. He agreed, however, with the noble Lord (Lord John Russell)—the only point, by the bye, in which he did agree with the noble Lord — that the House ought not to stoop to evade such an inquiry on the paltry consideration of the form of the Motion. Not one Member of the Government had risen to state that proper and sufficient measures had been taken. Instead of showing where the error was, they rode off from the main question, and set up questions about staff appointments and shortcomings, merely to divert public attention from the real evils. He believed that it was essential for the House and the country to mark their entire disapproval of the existing mode of carrying on affairs. It was perfectly inexplicable how all this misery had occurred to our army. They might call it want of system if they pleased, but that was not all. He did not dispute any of the wisdom or weight to be attached to the military or naval opinion of the hon. Member for Middlesex

(Mr. B. Osborne)—he did not dispute the hon. Gentleman's knowledge of both services; but he could not forget that a man quite as great as the hon. Member for Middlesex, and with quite as much military knowledge—he meant the Duke of Wellington—did not take the same view of the matter. The hon. Member for Middlesex might be right, and the Duke of Wellington wrong; but what the hon. Gentleman had stated about the faulty system was not a complete answer to all the mischief and misery that had occurred. The far more natural answer was, that having this system, Government had not made the best use of it; and had not availed themselves fully of the resources of the country. They had undertaken a hostile expedition without having provided the means to carry it through successfully. That was the question before the country, and it was a question which must be answered. He did not think any answer had as yet been attempted to be given. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War stated the evils that existed, and showed them how this or the other branch of service was organised, but he had not told them that the defects had been attempted to be remedied—he did not pretend to say Government had not the means to remedy these defects. Twelve months ago the expedition was contemplated, and Government must have known for weeks or months that the army was to be sent out before it was sent. Why, then, was not proper provision made for moving that army? In this country there could be found plenty of people to tell them what 20,000 or 30,000 men wanted. Whatever was required in the way of carriage by land or sea for the transport of baggage or troops could have been got in this country; the material resources of the country were so great that nothing whatever ought to have been wanted. Government had all the country at their back, and no money that was wanted was denied them. All the country said was, if you go to war carry it on vigorously, and never mind the expense. Government could not allege a want of money—all they could allege was, that the system was bad. Why, then, did they not make the best of a bad system? Why allow these horrors to take place? The troops could not get at the stores—stores were not provided at the proper time, and the excuse was, that no sufficient means were at hand to provide the army with what they required. He would undertake to say he could find 100 men at least who would have been prepared to send out and deliver any quantity of stores to the army, in any given time, and deliver them day by day. The only reason why the army could not get the stores which lay within six miles of them was, because of official dilatoriness and too much self-sufficiency, which refused, or was too proud to ask one of the thousand capable men to have been had, to arrange the affairs for them. To charge the evils on want of order and system in such a country as England was the greatest libel that could be uttered. Look at the vast private commercial system of the country; look at the 10,000 tons sent out day by day from many of our ports—to which the paltry efforts of Government were in comparison as nothing. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War libelled the people of England in his remarks; and though he might desire to throw blame on the staff of the army, yet he could not point out any failure in fighting. The soldiers shot away all their ammunition at the Russians, they then poked them with the bayonet, and then hurled stones at them. This showed, at least, there was no want of resources exhibited, and yet the Secretary at War told the House that the men were so civilised they could not help themselves to anything. It was neither fair nor generous to turn round on the army in that way. The Motion for inquiry, he considered, was a national affair. If carried, it would have the effect of setting the evil to rights, to cause the reconstruction of the Government, and to prevent errors which had been committed from being repeated in future. He must say one word more before he sat down. There was one man in the Government who certainly had not appeared competent to fill the office in which he was placed—it was an unfortunate appointment—and yet this Minister was the most ill-used man in England; he referred to the Duke of Newcastle. There was not, he asserted, a man in England so ill-used as the Duke of Newcastle. It was most unfortunate to put him in the office he filled; it was not kind on the part of his colleagues to let him go there. And yet the greatest piece of unkindness was the not letting him know what was going on in November. Yet his colleagues did go on, and this obliged him to say that the Duke of Newcastle was a most ill-used man. That was the way to destroy a man—to get him in a fix and then to leave him. It was a bad example, and an unfortunate way in which to carry on the public service.

ADMIRAL BERKELEY said, he felt it necessary to rise in order to repel the unjust attack which had been made by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Henley) on the Admiralty, as to the mode of carrying on the war. He would defy the right hon. Member to show any one letter or complaint of want of transport, or want of means that were to be furnished by the Board of Admiralty, since the commencement of the war. The right hon. Gentleman had evidently got out of his depth when he talked about transports and the manner in which the army was moved to Varna, and from thence to the Crimea. Lord Raglan did not complain of the deficiency of transports; he complained there were no baggage mules or horses in the Crimea to carry his army. The right hon. Gentleman said there were no tents. [MR. HENLEY said, he did not say that.] He begged the hon. Gentleman's pardon if he had misunderstood him. The horses were not there, but the horse transports were filled with horses, soldiers, and artillery; and to show there was no deficiency, part of the French army, which was left behind because there was not sufficient transports to bring them over, our transports went back to assist in carrying them. Sir Edmund Lyons, who had exerted himself throughout in a very energetic and distinguished manner, superintended for the first three weeks the landing of the stores, and everything else which came into the port of Balaklava; but to attempt to feed an army of 30,000 or 40,000 men from such a place as Balaklava would be about as practicable as attempting to feed the whole population of London from St. James's Square. At the port of Balaklava there was only a small beach, at which it was impossible to lay ships in tiers. As one vessel went out, another came in, and they were obliged to lie by the side singly, in order to give ingress and egress. But all the complaint appeared to fall on the Admiralty, as if they had not availed themselves of all the resources of the country, whereas there were letters from Liverpool and other mercantile ports, which stated it was impossible for them to find more transports than the Admiralty had already taken up, and then they had been obliged to go abroad to look for additional ships to carry horses. It was very easy for hon. Gentlemen to state erroneous matters as facts, but he (Admiral Berkeley) believed there was no one service carried out with greater efficiency, with more satisfaction to the army, and in every way worthy of this country, than the transport of that army from this country—first of all to Varna, thence from Varna to the Crimea, and that the communication had been kept up—the stores had been landed. He only referred to the Admiralty service. There had been an abundance, he might say a superabundance, of stores in that small harbour of Balaklava, and they had been obliged in several instances to re-ship them, sooner than they should be spoilt. From the first moment the army landed in the Crimea, it had been pressed upon the Commander in Chief, Admiral Dundas, that their wants should be fully supplied under all circumstances. He would further mention that batteries before Sebastopol were manned by sailors. Let the country inquire in what way it would how the Admiralty had acted, he pledged himself that the Board would come out of any investigation triumphantly.

MR. BERESFORD observed that the hon. Member for Middlesex and the hon. and gallant Admiral who had just sat down had defended the Admiralty, to which department both of them belonged, and had declared that everything there was conducted with order and despatch; but the hon. Member for Middlesex at the same time said he was constrained to admit that at the Horse Guards everything was wrong and rotten to the core. How was it that the hon. Gentleman should have belonged for upwards of two years to an Administration which suffered such rottenness to exist in so important a department of the State, and that, too, under the control of Government? He (Mr. Beresford) did not, however, think it necessary to enter upon a defence of the army in reply to the hon. Gentleman. He thought the conduct of that army spoke sufficiently for itself, and justified itself. As to the statement of the hon. Gentleman that the army of England was rotten from top to bottom, he hoped that England might ever possess an army which, in that hon. Gentleman's estimation, was rotten from top to bottom. He, though he intended to vote for the Motion of the hon. and learned Member, must acknowledge that he did not approve of the first paragraph of that Motion. It was a work of supererogation, for all too well knew already the actual condition of the army before Sebastopol. The noble Lord the Member for London had declared that their condition was "heart-rending."

The remainder of the Motion was all right; it demanded, properly and justly, an inquiry to see how and by whom that "heart-rending condition" had been brought about. Now what he required was such an inquiry as would enable them to fix the saddle on the right horse, and in voting for this inquiry he should do it with the more alacrity, because he believed that when all the circumstances of the case were fully investigated, the character and reputation of Lord Raglan, as commander of our forces, would stand far higher than before, and that the more rigorously the case was scrutinised, the more unsullied as a soldier the conduct of Lord Raglan would appear. He felt that the country owed a deep debt of gratitude to that noble Lord, and what reward, he asked, had he received but bitter calumny and vituperation, the offspring of petty spite and paltry revenge. For himself, as an Englishman, he was proud of Lord Raglan, and, as an old soldier, he felt for him an affectionate regard; besides which, having had the honour of being joined in duty at the Horse Guards with him, he had had an opportunity of knowing his estimable character and of appreciating his great administrative ability. Look to his antecedents. Lord Raglan was, during the whole of his European career, the chosen and confidential secretary of the immortal Wellington, his constant companion in every battle-field, and in every winter quarter his observant pupil, and one who had proved to the world that his instructions had not been thrown away. Now, what was the character of Lord Raglan? Cool and cautious in counsel, bold and decisive in action, and never calmer than when in the thickest of the fight. Even in the Peninsula he won the approbation of the Duke of Wellington for this quality; moreover he has the kindest and best of hearts—he may be said to have almost created the army which he now commands, and to have mainly officered it during the twenty-five years that he had been military secretary at the Horse Guards, and, therefore, to love it as a parent would; and yet this was the man who has been constantly exposed to vituperation of all kinds; who was said never to show himself to his troops, and to have acted as one who cared nothing for them. There was an old saying, that one witness who gave positive evidence was more valuable than a dozen who gave only negative evidence. He had himself seen letters from officers who entirely contradicted the fact that Lord Raglan was never seen about the camp, notwithstanding it had been so frequently alleged and stated. Now it was possible that many who wrote these unfavourable statements might be detained in other spots by duty, or their own avocations, or "Our Own Correspondent," even, might be disposed to turn away his eyes if he happened to know that Lord Raglan was passing. Let them give their commander facilities of transport and provision, and they would find that, so far from neglecting the soldiers, he would be but too anxious to provide them with every necessity. They had heard something tonight in answer to his question, which would give them a clue to the reason why Lord Raglan had been so maligned and misrepresented. The reason was explained at the same time, why Sir Charles Trevelyan was so strongly recommended in the *Times* as the proper person to be sent out as Chief Commissioner to the Crimea, because, forsooth, of his services in the Commissariat Department in the Treasury, where by his reform in that branch he had proved his fitness for others. One great advantage of such an inquiry as the one proposed by this Motion would be, that it would place Lord Raglan's character in its proper position: but he hoped it would go further, and enable them to fix who were the real originators of this expedition at so late a period of the year to take Sebastopol. He believed it was true that that expedition was undertaken against the judgment and contrary to the advice of Lord Raglan, and that with respect to the operation in the Crimea, he had expressed the strongest opinion against it. He listened the other evening, as he was bound, with the greatest attention to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War, and, although the right hon. Gentleman undoubtedly exhibited considerable talent in that lengthened oration, he entirely failed to carry conviction to his (Mr. Beresford's) mind, for the more he argued the more apparent did the necessity for inquiry appear. The Secretary at War made then, in a most philosophical manner, a very critical analysis of the English army, and with all the advantages which his official position afforded him, he came to the conclusion that it contained a number of extremely fine regiments, but that was all its merit, for, otherwise, it was useless and quite incapable of any joint action or combined effort. Moreover, the right hon. Gentleman made a statement that, unless an officer had been in India or in Dublin, he had had no opportunity of knowing anything of brigade duty. Now, on that point, he decidedly denied the statement of the right hon. Gentleman, and the answer he should give to that part of his statement, that brigade service was to be witnessed only in Dublin or in India, was, that in this very City of London there were hitherto during the summer constant brigade field-days, at which an officer could learn something of the combined action of regiments; the same had occurred till last year under General Simpson, at Portsmouth, the same at Plymouth under Sir Harry Smith. Then, again, at Gibraltar there were four regiments who were brigaded together, and the same at Malta. Was it not, he asked, most extraordinary that a Secretary at War should not be aware of such facts? But the ignorance or the oblivion of the right hon. Gentleman was still more extraordinary with respect to the Cape of Good Hope, where he seemed to have totally forgotten that within two years a considerable army had been on active service, having four brigades in the field, and of which two brigadiers were at this moment in command of brigades in the Crimea; and yet the Secretary at War could get up in his place and say there were no commanders, except those who had seen service in India or in Dublin, who knew anything about the action of regiments in brigade. He must say he had no confidence whatever in the head of a War Department who evinced himself so ignorant on such a matter. Now, having disposed of the fact that no other officers but those who had served in India or Dublin knew anything about brigades, he came to the argument which the right hon. Gentleman had adduced, that without frequent practice in brigade movements no lieutenant colonel was fit for the post of brigadier. He quite admitted it would be far better if our regiments were more frequently brigaded together in this country, and nothing had prevented it but a dirty paltry economy; still he did not believe that an officer, having gone through all the junior ranks in his regiment till he attained to the rank of lieutenant colonel, if he was raised to the position of a brigadier general, was not perfectly competent to command a brigade. What was a brigade after all? Why a brigade of infantry was very much like a very large regiment of the line, and at present it was often not so large. Look at the brigades now in the Crimea; not one of them could bring into the field the number of men equal to a good-sized regiment, so reduced had they been by neglect, by sickness, and the sword of the enemy. Positively, the brigade of Guards could not bring into the field 750 men. A battalion of Guards—not a regiment (for a regiment consisted of two battalions)—ought to number over 1,000, and yet the whole brigade was not more than 750 strong. The Secretary at War wishes to persuade him that our officers, unless they have served in India or Dublin, could not command a brigade, but he had been told by old officers that it was an easier thing to command a brigade than a regiment, because there were less of details to attend to, and there were so many good lieutenant colonels to assist the general. But, supposing what was totally incorrect, that the officers who arrived at the rank of brigadier general were deficient from having had no means of seeing the combined action of regiments, how could the right hon. Gentleman possibly connect that deficiency with the present state of the army in the Crimea? Did the right hon. Gentleman expect that brigadier generals and lieutenant colonels were to turn themselves into commissaries and purveyors, and provide food and the means of transport? That was the work of a totally different department, and it was the duty of those who had the control of that department to take care that such means were provided. Brigadier generals did their duty, and lieutenant colonels did their duty, and provided the British army was well fed and properly treated it would face the whole world and conquer. Now the most unfair part of the argument of the Secretary at War lay in this, that he had endeavoured to draw attention away from the real question, by putting forward the pretended inefficiency of brigadiers, while up to this moment there had not been the slightest complaint of them or their conduct, and yet the right hon. Gentleman now tried to throw dust into their eyes, and attempted to conceal the utter inefficiency of the War Department by bringing forward an unfounded charge of inefficiency against the brigadier generals. The right hon. Gentleman seemed perfectly satisfied with everything in the War Department, but he (Mr. Beresford) could not agree with him in that opinion, or that the only merit which could be found in the British army was regimental perfection. No one denied that a most noble army had left our shores and had been sent to the Crimea, and it was equally notorious that the Admiralty had sent out an enormous mass of stores, but the Government had utterly failed in providing the necessary adjuncts, without which not only was our army utterly useless, but liable to be, as it had been, reduced to the greatest distress. No efficient means of transport had been provided, and there had been a most deficient Commissariat. There was our army before Sebastopol, and there, at Balaklava, were immense stores of everything they wanted; but six miles intervened, and no means had been found of surmounting the difficulty. Every Government which in these days undertook the management of the war was bound to be acquainted with what had occurred in previous wars, so that it was really no justification whatever for the Government, when accused of its inefficiency, to turn round and say, "Oh, we have had forty years of peace; we come quite fresh to this sort of work, and how is it possible for us to conduct it satisfactorily at first?" But there were in this country vast stores of information left to us from the very best sources. In 1834 was published, in twelve volumes, a work that ought to be in the hands of every soldier and on the table of every Minister—the Duke of Wellington's despatches. He had lately, during the long winter evenings, been engaged in re-perusing those despatches, and he found that the Duke of Wellington always laid the greatest stress on an army possessing the means of transport in perfection to render it thoroughly efficient. Sir Arthur Wellesley, writing from Delcytosa, to Lord Wellesley, in 1809, says—

> "It is necessary that arrangements shall be adopted to enable the troops to take advantage of our success in offensive operations and even to maintain a defensive position."

What those arrangements were he stated immediately afterwards—

> "First, the formation of magazines of provisions; and, secondly, the means of transport to enable them to move forward the same."

He then says that—

> "There ought to be attached to the magazines from 3,000 to 4,000 mules, and to go with the divisions of the army in connection with them 1,500 other mules, and 100 carts."

Where, he demanded, were those 5,500 mules and 100 carts in the Crimea, and which forty years ago they were advised to provide? On another occasion Sir Arthur Wellesley threatened to leave Spain if the means of transport were not provided. In 1811, when, for his great services, he had been raised to the rank of Lord Wellington, he wrote to Sir C. Stuart, our Minister at Lisbon, from Villa Major, on the 8th of April, saying that when—

> "The supplies were provided, half the business only was done; the other half consisted in providing the means of transport."

Now, what was the case here? They had no means whatever of transporting the supplies from Balaklava to Sebastopol, and had taken care to provide none, notwithstanding the lesson so forcibly impressed upon them by their most illustrious general. Again, in 1812, after the failure of the attack on Burgos—the only failure that ever marked the career of the great Duke—having retired to Ciudad Roderigo, he wrote to the Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool, dated Ciudad Roderigo, 23rd November, 1812, to give an account of the whole campaign; and in that account he came to the conclusion—

> "That there were ample means for the siege of the strongest fortress, but what they were wanting in was the means of transporting the military stores and the ordnance to the position where they would be made use of."

Therefore, time after time, the Duke of Wellington had reiterated his opinion that one of the most necessary adjuncts to the success of an army was providing an efficient transport service. He (Mr. Beresford) did not say the Government had taken no means to organise a waggon train, but he saw none. He did not say they had no Commissariat, but it was a most wretched one; and what they had heard that night was enough to convince them all that their medical staff was totally inefficient for the work it had to do. These were facts, and required either inquiry or censure. He was for inquiry; but the Government said, "If you have cause why do not you censure us?" But if they had attempted to censure them, then they would have cried out for a fair hearing. England, from one end to the other, was most anxious about its army, and, therefore, when an inquiry into the causes of its present disastrous condition was proposed in that House, they, as the representatives of the country, were bound to vote for such an inquiry. The noble Lord, the late leader of that House, in making his explanation on Friday, certainly did not speak in high praise of the Duke of Newcastle's administration of the War Department, but he did characterise his determination to undertake that responsibility as a laudable ambition, which did not fail to bring to recollection in his mind the tale of the ambition of Phaeton, who was determined to drive the chariot of the Sun, and when he could neither restrain nor guide the steeds of Phœbus, fell miserably and perished deservedly. Under this laudable ambition the War Department had exhibited the singular combination of a lamentable inefficiency, aggravated by a certain degree of self-sufficiency, a practical illustration of the great administrative powers of the section of the Coalition Government, which chose to monopolise to itself the whole conduct of the war.

MR. RICE said, he quite agreed with the last speaker that it would be of great service to the army if its officers should have occasional opportunities during peace of studying military movements in the field; but he must at the same time remind him that the present was the first Administration who attempted to give such practical instruction in staff and brigade duties. It was under the auspices of the present Secretary at War that the camp at Chobham was established, but nothing of the sort was attempted by the former Administration, of which the right hon. Gentleman was a Member. He had heard the statement of the hon. Member for North Northamptonshire (Mr. Stafford) relative to the distress of our countrymen at Scutari and elsewhere with the deepest pain; but it was satisfactory to know that they had the consolation and advantage of individual sympathy such as our suffering countrymen never had in former wars. With regard to the Motion under discussion, he quite agreed with the right hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley), that inquiry ought not to be refused on account of its terms, and it was not its words that would induce him to vote against the Motion. He knew the strong feeling that existed in the country with regard to the sufferings of the army, but would any inquiry remove that suffering? Would the proposed Committee be productive of good or evil? That was the real question for them to consider. He apprehended it would be practically impossible for a Committee of that House sitting upstairs to inquire into the state of the army before Sebastopol. But there was no doubt about the sufferings of the army; that was patent to everybody; and what was required was, not an inquiry, but an immediate and decisive remedy. Well, then, what he had to ask was this, would a Committee supply that remedy? On the contrary, he thought it would do much to prevent it, because it would impede the Executive in carrying on the war, and prevent them from making those reforms in the departments connected with our military administration which were so much needed. In his opinion, a Committee dragging its slow length along from month to month, promising everything and performing nothing, would be a delusion to the people, and a disappointment to their just expectations. At the same time, he hoped the military administration would be reformed, and placed in able and willing hands. Nothing less than that would satisfy the country, and it was to be regretted that the advice of the noble Lord the Member for the City of London was not taken in November last. The noble Lord should have enforced it then as he was doing now, for he believed the present Government contained the very best materials for the formation of a new Government, and with the noble Lord back again, and his colleague the noble Lord the Home Secretary at the head of the War Department, he was convinced the country would be satisfied with the Administration. It was just what the country wanted, and while it would give confidence to our Allies, such a change would convince the people that the war would be carried on with increased energy. There could be no difference of opinion about carrying on the war with vigour; it was the wish of the people, and no matter what Government might be in, they would have to gratify it.

MR. MILES said, he had no wish to go into a consideration of what had been the conduct of our generals, or to discuss the bearing or movement of our army, because that was not embraced in the Motion before them. No; what he wanted the House to consider was, whether the Commissariat, Transport, and Ordnance Departments had been conducted as they ought to have been by the present Government. That was the issue upon which the debate must be taken, and upon which alone the conduct of the Government could be questioned. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War said that the Government had been subjected to much censure and obloquy in this matter, but it was not from that side that they had experienced opposition. On the contrary, they had done everything in their power to assist the Government in carrying out the object they all had in view, and to bring the war to a happy and prosperous issue. In no way had they ever interfered with their war measures, or objected to supplies. It was their duty now to ask whether Government had conducted the war successfully, and whether it was not owing to their failure in important details that the present miserable state of things at Sebastopol and Balaklava was to be attributed? That literally was the only issue they had to discuss. The hon. Member who spoke last seemed to think that everything had been done by the Government which could be done; but he must call to the hon. Member's mind the oft-repeated warning given in the Report of the Committee of 1850–51, as to the necessity of doing away with the different separate departments in the administration of the army. He would also refer to the Commission of 1832—to the Report of 1837—and also to the Report of 1851. The Committee expressed an opinion that greater simplicity in the administration of the civil departments of the army might be attained, and they urged on the Government to adopt measures to consolidate, economise, and simplify the civil administration of the army in all its branches. Now, he asked, what had the Government done? The Commissariat had certainly been transferred from the Treasury to the War Department, but he understood that that had only been done at the commencement of last autumn. If that were so, he hesitated not to say that the War Department was responsible for all the negligence and misfortunes that had taken place between Balaklava and Sebastopol. The want of mules, carriages, and fresh meat, must all be attributed to the War Department. He had done everything to uphold the Government. In December he had gone away satisfied with the explanations of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War, but they had now arrived at the 29th of January, and the reports from the camp still showed the same want of energy, the same want of means of transport and of fresh provisions as existed in December last. It was said that a Committee would paralyse the efforts of Government; but what efforts had they made? Why had not the right hon. Gentleman stated the remedies that had been, or were about to be, applied. That very morning he had received a letter from an officer at the camp, stating that his regiment was reduced from 790 to 240 bayonets, and that he had gone with fifty volunteers and eighteen ponies to Balaklava for boards to construct a field hospital, and that up to that time there was no place for invalids at the camp but a muddy tent. The writer added that he had got the hut up that morning, and that it would be the first accommodation of the kind at the camp. With regard to want of fuel, that also required explanation. Their first duty was to take care that the gallant men who were fighting our battles should not perish miserably through our neglect. He believed that many were looking anxiously for their decision that night, not as it affected this or that Administration, but as it would affect the future condition of our army. Finding the Government incompetent to assist the army, the country expected its representatives to enter upon an inquiry, not only to remedy present evils, but to prevent their recurrence in the next campaign. He heartily supported the Motion.

Sir FRANCIS BARING said, he wished to say a few words in explanation of the vote he was about to give, because there were many reasons why a searching inquiry should take place. They had heard from the hon. Member for North Northamptonshire (Mr. Stafford), who spoke only of what he had himself seen, statements which must have caused pain to every mind, and which of themselves would have been sufficient to induce hon. Members to vote for inquiry; but if the object of the House was to put an end to the evils that now existed, the real question was, would the proposed Committee effect that object? If he thought the proposed inquiry would effect that object, he should vote for it at once, whatever might be its effect on the Government; but he did not believe that an inquiry at the present time, and in the present circumstances, would have any beneficial effect. Now, what was it they wanted? Better administration of their military affairs—immediate decision—and an immediate infusion of energy into the working of every department. Now, he would ask any Gentleman who had ever been on a Select Committee of a similar nature, whether its first effect had not been to paralyse the action of whatever department was under consideration. The whole business of the department to be inquired into would have its attention taken up; the time of the clerks would be engaged in preparing returns; the chiefs would be looking after the progress of the inquiry, and the real business of the office would be suspended for a time. Therefore, by an inquiry of this sort they would be completely frustrating the object which all had in view—the relief of our army in the Crimea. He knew that when time was not an object, such Committees were often attended with beneficial results, but he feared that such would not be the case should the present Motion be successful. An hon. and gallant Member had expressed a wish to put the saddle on the right horse —to find out who was really to blame. They would not do that by such an inquiry as that proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield. So far as the departments at home were concerned, their defence to an inquiry would be, that they had done all they could to send out stores of all kinds to the army abroad; and, if the inquiry stopped there, and the departments at home were acquitted, the natural conclusion would be that it was those abroad who were to blame. But were they to be condemned unheard? Such a course could never be consented to; but then, to carry on an inquiry as to their conduct, it would be necessary to call home the chiefs and all the parties concerned; so that, after paralysing the departments at home, they would then proceed to paralyse the army abroad. Therefore, feeling perfectly certain that the appointment of a Committee would be the very worst step they could take, he should not shrink from the responsibility of voting against an inquiry which he knew was much desired by the country at large. Some hon. Gentlemen admitted that they intended to vote for the Motion because it implied a censure upon the Government. To those hon. Gentlemen he would say, Why do you not move your vote of censure directly? And do not, in order to damage the Government, take a step which must necessarily be injurious to the army in the Crimea, and go far to destroy its efficiency. He had heard it said, also, "We will move this Committee, and when the Government is condemned, we will get rid of the inquiry." He would say, for the sake of the character of the House of Commons, if for no other reason, avoid appointing a Committee with any such view. Let it not be said that the indignation of the House of Commons was poured out only while one set of men were in office, but the moment they were removed and another set of men substituted in their place, that all their humanity, all their sympathy for the sufferings to which our soldiers had been exposed evaporated, and the inquiry stopped. So much for the Motion, and he wished he could here close his remarks; he was sorry, however, to say that the case had been put before the House in a manner which compelled him to trouble them with a word or two more. The question had been put before them as a vote of censure upon the one side, and upon the other as a vote of confidence. Now he was bound to say that the disclosures which had come out during the late few days had given him, as an habitual supporter of the Government, very great pain. He deeply regretted those disclosures, not only on account of the loss which the Cabinet had sustained in the secession of his noble Friend the Member for London, but because circumstances had in the course of the explanations which had been given come out which led him to doubt very much whether he could longer repose confidence in the administration of the army by those who were now at the head of the War Department. It appeared that his noble Friend (Lord John Russell), in the month of November last, expressed to the noble Lord at the head of the Government his dissatisfaction at the mode in which the business of that department was administered, and his noble Friend proposed that the administration should be transferred from the hands of the noble Duke (the Duke of Newcastle) to those of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston). He was most anxious in what he was now saying not to be understood as throwing any imputation or saying the noble Duke had failed from any other cause than the great difficulties of the department which he was called upon to administer; but while he thought, from the high character and position of the noble Duke, that he might render valuable service in some other department, he thought, under the circumstances, that some such arrangement as that suggested by his noble Friend had become imperative. He had no wish to lay more stress than was fair on the particular expressions in the answer of Lord Aberdeen to his noble Friend's (Lord John Russell's) suggestion, but it was undoubtedly a distinct refusal to adopt it, and that upon grounds which appeared to him (Sir F. Baring) to be wholly insufficient. No doubt there were painful duties attaching to high office —no doubt it was extremely painful to disappoint the expectations of friends, and to transfer from their hands the duties of an important office, to those of others who we have reason to believe will conduct them more to the public advantage. There might be times when, and there might be offices in which, personal feelings might be allowed to have their play; but, at a moment like the present, when the interest of our army, the safety of our brave troops, and the honour of England and her allies also, were at stake, private friendship or personal feeling ought to weigh as nothing in the scale; and it was the imperative duty of Lord Aberdeen to place the administration of that which was believed to be the most difficult and important office in the Government in the most competent hands. He thought his noble Friend (Lord J. Russell) had with much generosity relieved the Prime Minister from what he might have considered an invidious task, by pointing out the deficiency in the conduct of the War Department which, he had reason to believe, existed; and he should have been glad to have heard that his noble Friend had been supported in his representations by other Members of the Cabinet. His noble Friend's proposition, however, was met by a refusal on the part of the Premier. Again, his noble Friend suggested that the arrangements for the administration of the War Department were not sufficient, and proposed certain changes, but with no better success. If he (Sir F. Baring) were asked to do so, he would scarcely venture to state his views of what arrangements should be made for the conduct of that department; but his impression was, that no single man could be competent for the efficient administration of all the various duties connected with it, and he would recommend his noble Friend the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston) or whoever else might undertake the office, to apply to his right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty (Sir J. Graham), whose great experience in the management of the Naval Department would be of the greatest assistance. He would not enter into the question whether the arrangement proposed by his noble Friend (Lord J. Russell) was, under the circumstances, wise in all respects or not, but he had a right to inquire what really had been done in the way of reforming the War Department. The only change, it appeared, that had been made, was the transfer of the Commissariat from the Treasury to the War Department. That was undoubtedly a step in the right direction; but when was it done? By the statement—which had it not been made by the noble Duke himself he would not have believed—it appeared that, whereas the noble Duke was appointed Secretary for War on the 12th June, it was not until the middle of December that he took upon himself the duties of the Commissariat, the reason being that he had no office in which to put the Commissariat clerks, and that he had only two rooms, lent to him by the First Lord of the Treasury, in which to carry on the whole business of the department. He thought the noble Duke was right in not undertaking the responsibility of the Commissariat while the control remained with the Treasury. But could he have confidence in the conduct of the war, when he saw that the only improvement, the only step in the way of consolidation of offices taken, had been delayed from June until the middle of December, the excuse being that Government were unable to obtain in London an office sufficiently large for the accommodation of from twenty to thirty clerks? Under these circumstances, however much he objected, on the grounds he had stated, to the appointment of the proposed Committee, he must not, in voting against it, be understood as expressing anything like confidence in the Government in reference to the conduct of the war, either past, present, or future.

Mr. BENTINCK said, he would beg to trespass upon the House for a few minutes in order to explain the motives by which he was actuated in voting as he proposed to vote with reference to the Motion under their consideration. His experience of the proceedings of that House was sufficient to demonstrate to him that hon. Members were frequently called upon to vote ostensibly upon one question, while virtually that vote must be recorded upon a question totally different. In such a position were they placed with reference to the subject immediately before them; and in dealing with that subject, he must express himself as agreeing to a certain extent with the right hon. Baronet who had just resumed his seat, when he said that as an abstract question he could not give his support to the proposition of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield. He so far concurred with the right hon. Baronet, because, in the first place, he believed that the first sentence of that resolution proposed a course which was totally impracticable. If the Committee which the Motion demanded were granted, they would be obliged to summon from the Crimea those military men who there held high and important posts, in order to be enabled to obtain such evidence as would empower them to furnish a satisfactory Report to that House; or else the Committee must at once go out in a body, and hold their sittings at Balaklava. Now, both those courses, he maintained, were absolutely impracticable. Another exception which he had to the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield was, that it was not sufficiently explicit. In his opinion it implied the existence of a doubt as to the incompetent manner in which the war had hitherto been conducted, a point upon which no doubt could exist in the mind of any man, either in or out of that House, with perhaps one or two exceptions. The conduct of that war had been condemned upon evidence which, unfortunately, was unimpeachable; it had been condemned by the evidence of those who were eye-witnesses of the destruction of thousands of the best and bravest of our troops. No stronger proof that such was unhappily the case could be found than those facts which had already so repeatedly been brought before the House. He was sorry, therefore, that the Motion had not been put in terms more clear and explicit, and he should, for his own part, have preferred the language in which the Motion of a noble and learned Lord in another place was couched. But the only doubt which he could for a moment entertain with respect to the vote which he should give had been removed by what had fallen within the last few days from the noble Lord the Member for the City of London, and the noble Lord the Secretary for the Home Department. After the language to which those noble Lords had given expression, it could scarcely for a moment be matter of hesitation as to whether the vote of that House that evening should be regarded as one of confidence or no-confidence in Her Majesty's present advisers, with reference to the conduct of the war. For his own part he thought they had in that respect exhibited the utmost incompetency, and he should feel that he would be, to a certain extent, sharing the responsibility of those who had been the cause of those disasters which had of late befallen the country if he were to vote against the Motion before the House. Therefore it was that in voting for the appointment of the Committee he wished distinctly to be understood as taking that course upon the ground of want of confidence in the Government, and with the hope that the result of the division might be the removal of the Executive from office. He was not of course insensible to the inconvenience which might result from a change of Government at this particular moment, and, as an independent Member of that House, he should always be happy to give his individual support to any Administration, whatever its composition, whose Members possessed the energy and the ability to retrieve the losses which this country had sustained, and to repair the disasters which our army had unhappily suffered. It was not, of course, his province to reconcile the conduct of the noble Lord the Member for the City of London with his duty to his country. That noble Lord had had some practice in the art of resignation, and they might presume that in the course which he had taken within the last week he had acted as he thought right. It was not his misfortune to be a political associate of the noble Lord, but if such had been his position, he was bound to say that he should have regarded the conduct of the noble Lord as savouring more of the foresight and adroitness of political scheming than of the impulses of political patriotism. One thing that might be learnt from the disclosures which the noble Lord had made was, that the course of the Coalition Government had been one continued struggle for place and power between the discordant elements of which it was composed. The object of the noble Lord had been, not to insist upon what he deemed to be indispensable for the due administration of the affairs of the country, but to regain the lost political ascendancy of his party; while the object of that portion of the Cabinet of which Lord Aberdeen was the head had been a struggle, not to vanquish Russia in the Crimea, but to overcome the Whigs in the Cabinet. He had heard it said by many hon. Members in that House that they found some difficulty in giving their votes in favour of the Motion before them, because they conceived that its terms implied a censure upon the conduct of the gallant nobleman who commanded our forces in the Crimea. Now, he was perfectly at a loss to understand how such an idea could enter the mind of any hon. Member. He, for one, should say that if he for a moment thought the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield could be justly so construed, he should be the very last person to give it his support. So far from that being the case, however, he was of opinion that the best thing which could happen to that noble and gallant Lord was, that the fullest inquiry should be instituted into all the occurrences which had taken place in connection with the present contest. An attempt had been made by the supporters of the Government to endeavour to relieve Ministers from some portion of the odium which their incompetency had entailed upon them, by trying to cast blame upon the commanding officers in the Crimea, and he maintained, therefore, that it was for the interest of those brave men that the fullest information upon the subject of the Motion should be laid before the House. When that was done he believed that it would be found that the sad disasters which had attended our army were to be ascribed almost solely to the jobbery and incompetency of a Coalition Government.

Mr. RICH said, he thought that, as the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War had been compelled to address the House before the case for this Motion had been fully opened, owing to the indisposition of the hon. and learned Mover, it would be but fair that the right hon. Gentleman should have an opportunity of replying to the different allegations that had been subsequently made. Many personal and party considerations, no doubt, entered into the question now before them, but he hoped the House would decide it upon higher grounds. The military reputation of the country in the eyes of the world, and, perhaps, the existence of the remnant of our gallant army, were involved in their vote that night. It was when thus viewed the country would appreciate the conduct of the noble Lord the Member for London, which had been so unfairly animadverted upon. That noble Lord had been charged with throwing over his colleagues and deserting his post at the approach of danger, but his whole career was an answer to such unworthy aspersions. It was well known that his nature rather courted than shrunk from danger, and so now, while his late colleagues resisted, he was courting inquiry into his own and their conduct. The noble Lord had felt that his duty to his country was superior to mere considerations of party or of delicacy for the feelings of his colleagues, and in that spirit he had patriotically acted on this principle. He had been accused by the hon. Gentleman who last addressed the House of an adroit facility for resignation, but the plain fact was, he wisely chose to resign rather than continue to uphold by his countenance weak counsels and half measures. When nothing had been done to redeem the pledge given for the re-organisation of the military departments beyond the barren appointment of a War Minister, and when from this inaction, mischiefs, which in war soon become disasters, might be expected, the noble Lord represented to the head of the Government, in terms as civil as he well could, the necessity of further active improvements, and of replacing the Duke of Newcastle by a man of pre-eminent energy and decision. What was Lord Aberdeen's reply to this proposition? Substantially this—that it would hurt the feelings of the noble Duke and his friends if he were to adopt it, and he could not therefore honestly submit it to the Queen. It was said, "Why did not the noble Lord then resign?" But it should be borne in mind that he was pressed to remain in office by the urgent solicitations of all his colleagues, and if he had obstinately resisted those solicitations, those who reproach him for resigning now, would have then censured him, perhaps even more severely, for quitting office, when by continuing to hold it he might have averted the dangers which his wisdom foresaw. It may be that we can now see that it would have been better that he should have then resigned, but we perceive this only by our experience of subsequent events. It had also been asked, why the noble Lord did not renew his proposition in the Cabinet on the Saturday before his resignation, when a project of reform in our military administration was discussed? It would have been better if he had done so, he would have stood verbally and technically right; but it must be remembered Lord Aberdeen had already declared that he could not honestly admit his proposition, and that all his colleagues had united in rejecting it, so that practically its revival would have been but a proposition to dissolve the Cabinet. No doubt his resignation had placed his colleagues in an unpleasant position, as their rejection of his counsels had placed him, but there could be no doubt that the country would gain this advantage from the noble Lord's step—that his secession from the Ministry would force on that reform in our military administration which he sought, and that now must take place. Now, upon what grounds had this Motion for inquiry been resisted? It was said it would prove nugatory, and prejudice and retard our operations in the Crimea. In fact, the usual stereotyped objections that are invariably offered to every proposal for inquiry were revived and repeated on this occasion. In the presence of such fearful disasters as had occurred, it was incumbent on that House to exercise its functions as the great inquest of the nation. If any safer or more expeditious mode of inquiry could be devised he would not refuse it, but inquiry there must be, full and satisfactory. Having served in the army, he could not sit quietly by when he heard a gallant Member say that the army under the present system was made for defeat. It ought to have been in the recollection of that gallant Member that in the early part of the present century, and, in fact, in the present campaign, our army had achieved brilliant successes. The hon. Member for Middlesex (Mr. B. Osborne) had told them that these disasters were the fault of the system. That assertion was contradicted by facts. He did not defend the present system; on the contrary, he had laboured to reform it. But still he could not forget that under the present system the Duke of Wellington had organised one of the most efficient armies that ever had, under great difficulties, secured for years constant success. But his objection to our war policy was, that we had endeavoured to force our army to accomplish what it was incompetent, alike by its numbers, its armament, its commissariat arrangements, or its means of transport, to perform. The inquiry now sought for was not without precedent. The circumstances of the unfortunate and disastrous Walcheren Expedition were investigated at the bar of that House—a proceeding attended, no doubt, as all similar proceedings must be, with certain inconveniences, but which grew out of the essential open freedom of discussion of a representative Government. The effect of such an inquiry as that now proposed was analogous to that of the freedom of the press. No doubt the influence of such a press produced inconveniences, but they were infinitely more than counterbalanced by its attendant advantages. And here he felt bound to say, that but for that free press in the Crimea our army might have suffered even greater privations and miseries than those which it had endured, and the public would have been kept in comparative ignorance, and so its relieving hand stayed, and its inquiring, redressing disposition stifled. By that press, also, an excellent national feeling had been excited in every hamlet and fireside of the country by the publication of those letters, from all ranks of the army, which did such honour to their writers. He had no hesitation in saying that they owed thanks to the leading journal of the day for the vigorous truth (he used the word advisedly) that it had shed on this most painful subject—our misconducted war. It was the first to rouse the public mind to a sense of the impending peril, instead of allowing it to shut its eyes in a blind credulity, from which it would only have been awakened by disasters still worse than had already befallen us. A *primâ facie* case was made out for inquiry. The noble Lord the Member for the City of London told them that the condition of the army was "horrible and heart-rending," and avowed that, with all his highest official means of information, the causes which had produced such a state of things were inexplicable—he could not unravel them. Would the House of Commons, then, shut its ears to such a declaration from such an authority? Would it shrink from its bounden duty through a fear to disturb a few weakly-cemented interests? If they refused this inquiry now, heavier disasters, which he prayed God to avert, might compel them to concede it. Now, if they stifled investigation, in three weeks or a month hence one universal voice of indignation might reform further than their better judgment would approve. It was said that this Motion would be tantamount to a vote of want of confidence in the Ministry. Now, he had lately professed confidence in many of the leading Members of the Government, and that confidence was still unshaken. The noble Lords the Members for London and Tiverton were great pillars of the State, and he admired the splendid administrative abilities of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and of the First Lord of the Admiralty; but he could not approve the mode of conducting the war, nor consequently of those departments on which it depended. He could not help expressing his reprobation of the aspersions that had been cast upon our admirals by certain hot-headed individuals who complained that our fleets had not achieved impossibilities in the Baltic and Black Sea. Our admirals had shown a higher order of courage in resisting the allurements of false glory which might have tempted other men to rush upon disaster. Sir Charles Napier had taken one of the finest fleets we had ever sent to sea, yet where all guides and landmarks were effaced he had blockaded the enemy's powerful fleet, sealed up his commerce, protected our own, and having destroyed a strong and menacing fortress had brought that fleet back, manned by raw and undisciplined crews, through the most intricate navigation, without the loss of a single vessel. We should remember also, that fleet was not only the Baltic fleet, but our Channel fleet, the one buckler between ourselves and the enemy. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli) had said that the country did not love coalitions: but there must be certain compromises of opinion in all Governments; the misfortune of the present Government was, that it consisted of too nicely-balanced an arrangement of forces, necessarily producing that indecision, weakness, and inaction which have, unhappily, too much characterised the negotiations which preceded and have attended the operations that have followed this war. He trusted that, whatever reconstruction might take place, a Government would be formed which would be guided by one governing principle. Any Government that would prosecute the war with vigour should have his support, and come what may, he should vote for this inquiry, as the sound constitutional mode of satisfying the public mind of the anxious desire of the House to avert for the future the frightful misery which had been undergone by our fellow-countrymen before Sebastopol.

Sir BULWER LYTTON: Sir, I shall dismiss very briefly that part of this discussion which refers to the abstract propriety of appointing the Select Committee of Inquiry moved for by the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck). I shall leave the Government to direct their answer upon that point not so much to us as to their late colleague, who resigned office rather than resist that inquiry, and who, I conclude, would vote for it but for the natural delicacy of his position towards the Cabinet he so lately adorned. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War and the right hon. Baronet the Secretary for the Colonies have dwelt on the danger of establishing such a precedent as the appointment of this Committee might furnish. They may dismiss that apprehension, for nothing but the extremity of the case can justify this Motion, and I trust, for the honour of the country and the sake of humanity, that a case so extreme may never occur again. If it does not, the Motion will be no precedent; if it does, a similar Motion will be understood to bear the same interpretation that the common sense of the House puts upon this; for I agree with Ministers that they cannot grant this Committee without a virtual transfer of the power and responsibilities of the Queen's Government, and the question therefore simply is—Has the conduct of Her Majesty's Ministers in this war been such that this House should quietly acquiesce, not only in the continuance of their power, but in the mode by which their responsibilities have been discharged? I, for one, feel that such an acquiescence would be to make us the servile accomplices in the sacrifice of what remains of that noble army of whose deeds the country are so proud, and of whose sufferings, so touchingly described by the hon. Member for North Northamptonshire (Mr. Stafford), the Government should be so ashamed. The noble Lord the Member for London has refused to make himself that accomplice, although the pain of deserting his colleagues in the hour of their imminent need must have been almost intolerable to so gallant a spirit, and I give him the more credit for the pain on account of the Spartan fortitude with which he has concealed its pangs. Shall this House be more complaisant than the noble Lord, although it has not the countervailing scruples which must have weighed upon a Cabinet Minister, the late organ and leader of the Government in these walls, now standing alone in his abandonment of office? If we could not feel for the public calamities, we must still be roused by our own private anxiety and sorrow. I, myself, have two near relations in this war; many of us have near relations among the sufferers. It is our boast, as a portion of the gentlemen of England, that, wherever danger is to be braved or honour is to be won, there some of our kindred blood is flowing or may flow; and after the miseries so simply told by the hon. Member for North Northamptonshire, shall we be deprived of a remedy for the evils you admit, of an inquiry into the abuses you deplore, because of some paltry technical objections to the words of the only Motion that promises relief — because it is a vote for inquiry, when the Government assert that it should be a vote of censure? Take it, then, as a vote of censure, and let it so stand as a precedent to other times, if other times should be as grievously afflicted under a similar Administration. I shall not enter into all the details on which the Secretary at War always tries to rest the case of the Government, partly because I have been here anticipated by those who so ably preceded me, partly because I wish to lay clearly before the House the broad principles of the charge which we make against the Ministers. And first, we accuse you of this—That you entered, not, indeed, hastily, but with long deliberation, with ample time for forethought, if not for preparation, into the most arduous enterprise this generation has witnessed, in the most utter ignorance of the power and resources of the enemy you were to encounter, the nature of the climate you were to brave, of the country you were to enter, of the supplies which your army would need. This ignorance is the more inexcusable because you disdain the available sources of information. This is the fundamental cause of our disaster, and not the comparatively petty and collateral causes to which the Secretary at War would assign them. The ignorance, indeed, on a former occasion, the Government confessed; and when we were convened on the 12th of December we heard that synod of veteran statesmen—those *analecta majora* of the wisdom and genius of Parliament—actually make their ignorance the excuse for their incapacity. We might accept that excuse for the sake of its candour; but the Government have asked more, for, as I will undertake to show, they have asked us to acquit them of disasters when they took no pains to acquire the information that was necessary for success. It has, indeed, been said that the public were no wiser than the Government—that the public underrated the power of Russia, and demanded the premature siege of Sebastopol. If this were true, what then? Why do we choose Ministers—why do we give them salaries, patronage, honours—if it is not to have some men wiser than the average of mankind, at least in all that relates to the offices they hold? It may be a noble fault in a people to disregard the strength of an enemy when a cause is just. Who does not love and admire this English people more when they rose as one man to cry, "No matter what the cost or hazard—let us defend the weak against the strong?" But if to underrate the power of an enemy was almost a merit in the people, it was a grave dereliction of duty in a Minister of War. But I deny that the public, fairly considered, were not wiser than the Government, and there is scarcely a point which you have covered with a blunder on which some one or other of the public did not try to prepare and warn you. I shall first notice a subject hitherto little touched on in this House, but which seems to me intimately connected with the condition of our troops in the Crimea. The war had begun—our fleets were on the seas—the noblest fleets that ever left these shores, and it was on those fleets, much more than our land force, that the public relied for any advantage over Russia. Well, the ships were on the sea, and Odessa lay before them, surprised and almost defenceless—Odessa, the great depôt of the Russian enemy, the depôt of ammunition, provisions, troops for that Crimea which you had already resolved to invade, and you content yourselves with the holyday bombardment of a single fort. And we may judge of your private instructions to your naval commanders, when for the audacity of that notable achievement your Admiral almost makes an apology. Is Odessa, I ask, spared for the sake of humanity? Humanity! Why, you were told that Odessa was the feeder of Sebastopol. You have found it to be so, to your cost. The Secretary at War expressed his amazement at the celerity with which Russian troops were moved from Odessa to Sebastopol, and to spare the arsenals, the granary, the market, the nursery ground of an hostile fortress was the grossest inhumanity to the army that now rots before the walls which your own *laches* has manned and supplied against it. If you were influenced by care for the British trade connected with Odessa, you knew little, indeed, of your countrymen if you did not feel that you might have come to Parliament with confidence for the most liberal compensation to all British subjects whom the occupation of Odessa—there was no occasion to destroy it—might have injured. This first proof of feeble incapacity links itself with all that has followed. You thus forbear the easiest and the wealthiest conquest of all, in order afterwards, in the very worst time, at the very worst season, to attempt an achievement the most difficult in itself, and which that forbearance to Odessa rendered more difficult still. Why, Sir, how the whole fortunes of the campaign would have changed if Odessa had been your depôt instead of the Russian—nay, if when you found you could not invade the Crimea before the end of September, you had postponed that expedition till the spring, and instead of sending your troops to moulder piecemeal, ragged, and roofless before Sebastopol. But if you had some reason which we cannot divine for not prosecuting the attack at that time, why did you not later effectively blockade Odessa and the Sea of Azoff? You have thirty ships of the line, forty steamers on the Euxine, and you do not so much as blockade the great magazine of the enemy! Well, your troops went to Gallipoli. I must here contradict the statements both of the Minister and of the Secretary at War. I will show you even there, at the first, how utterly you had failed in the simplest provisions of which the Secretary of War has so vainly boasted. I have here some short extracts from the letters of an officer, written to his father, not intended for publication. I read them because I can, if necessary, state his name to any member of the Government, without, alas! the fear of injuring him in his profession. He is now no more. His father came to me and said, through his tears, "I would proudly have given my son's life to the service of his country, but he was murdered by the neglect of the Government, and without any real aid to his country." This young man had just bought a step in his profession; he was full of life, health, and ardour; athletic in his habits, no raw recruit, but accustomed to military hardship, the last man in the whole army to murmur without a cause. He belonged to that band of heroes famous even in the ranks of English warfare—the Welsh Fusiliers. His first letter is from Gallipoli, April 23. Here let me observe, that on the 7th of April the Duke of Newcastle had declared that never was an army so well provided for—in food, in all necessaries, even in articles that might be considered luxuries. On the 23rd of April an officer at Gallipoli writes thus—

> "There are 20,000 French troops encamped a short distance from our troops. They are in every respect better equipped and provided for than ours. Their Government have provided their officers with mules for the conveyance of their baggage and everything else they require. We have to buy mules for ourselves, which cannot be done at Gallipoli, as the French Government have already bought them all up."

Sir B. Lytton

Why was this? If the French could find mules, even at Gallipoli, why were you less active than the French?

> "The French soldiers fraternise freely with ours, and to-day we saw them giving ours some of their bread, of which they have a most bountiful supply, while ours have not enough."

At Gallipoli, in April, at the opening of the campaign, the soldiers of the Queen of England eating the bread of our ally! Is that a position which is worthy her throne, or our pride as a nation, and how does this agree with the Duke of Newcastle's statement of the 7th of April? Now let us pass on from Gallipoli. You proceed to Varna, not to fight, not to assist the Turks at Silistria—you have not, indeed, the necessary transports for that—but because Omar Pacha says that the presence there of your army will have a moral effect upon the Russians. Now, Sir, I think that this was a request on the part of Turkey which, so far as the selection of a site to encamp, we had a right to refuse. We came to defend them and to fight, but not to remain stationary, and melt away by pestilence in a climate notoriously pestilential in that special time of the year—pestilential, not from an accidental cause, but from one periodical and invariable—and which, if your Minister had asked any traveller, or consulted any authority, he must have known. Well, Sir, from the camp there, this officer writes, July 28—

> "I hope something will be done soon, as I should look forward with horror to another summer in this country. We have now considerable difficulty in getting supplies, and frequently have to live on bread and cheese for a day or two, as ration meat cannot be eaten, though the officers eat it when the men will not."

Now comes the reason why that climate was pestilential, and why you ought to have known it.

> "July and August," says the officer there encamped, "are unhealthy months, as they are all dry and very hot, and the deposits from the lakes, which overflow in the spring, dry up and create miasma. Nearly all our cases of cholera occur in the night, and are mostly fatal in six hours."

This young man has the cholera himself—he partially recovers—he rouses when the report comes that something is to be done—something, no doubt, which it was necessary to do; but was it the impression that that something should be the siege of Sebastopol? Then hear what he says:—

> "Of course they keep secret where we are going; but we believe that it is to take Odessa, which is full of corn granaries, &c. I think this is the best thing we could do, and winter there

both army and navy. It is too late in the year to attack Sebastopol."

That could not have been the solitary notion of that young soldier; it must have been the talk of his comrades—"too late in the year to attack Sebastopol!" But no! out of all the twelve months in the year you had taken the worst to encamp at Varna, and it was of course equally consistent to take the worst to besiege Sebastopol, that Gibraltar of the East. You take the worst time not only for military operations, but for sanitary conditions. Open even so common a work as *M'Culloch's Geographical Dictionary*, and you will find it was the unhealthiness of the Crimea which frustated its colonisation by Germans; open the *Gazetteer of the World*, and you will find that it is in autumn the climate is more especially unhealthy, and subject to the epidemics you have found there. Yet there you land without ambulances, without waggons, without hospital provision, without even tents. Here ends this young soldier's correspondence. Scarcely saved from cholera at Varna, cholera seized him at the first breeze from those new and more fatal shores—seized him while his comrades were landing in the Crimea. Without common comforts, without common medical aid, he died —calling out in his delirium to be set on shore, so that he might, at least, perish in the field. I charge you then with this — that twice in one campaign you expose your army in situations notoriously pestilential at the precise seasons which you choose for both encampments. Considering this alone we need not pause to weigh the reasons for disasters alleged by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War—namely, that our staff-officers had no experience of active command, and that our soldiers, selected from the peasantry, had not learned to take care of themselves. The main cause is this—the situations in which the army has been exposed, and the destitution in which it has been left; and the fault is the worse for the reasons that have been stated, namely, that our officers were not accustomed to invent resources, nor our soldiers inured to encounter hardships and disease. The defence of the Secretary of War has been chiefly directed to show that, wherever omissions were discovered and blunders made, he hastened to repair them. That excuse may avail for his department, but I maintain it is the duty of the Government, taken as a whole, not only to repair but to foresee—to provide beforehand what may probably be wanted, and not to wait till the consequences of their own neglect start up and defy reparation. You cannot repair the loss of life; you cannot repair constitutions ruined for ever, because men were exposed to disease and deprived of proper medical attendance—because men were sent to brave all the rigour of a dismal climate, without clothing to cover and roofs to shelter them. Now even with regard to a road from Balaklava, early in the campaign we read every day in the papers that the whole region between Balaklava and Sebastopol was exposed to columns of dust. A moment's reflection would have told you that dust in the summer becomes mud with the first rains of winter, and when, after the battle of Alma, it became clear that you would have to invest Sebastopol, you should have seen to the construction of a road between your camp and your harbour. Here indeed, at first glance, Lord Raglan may seem chiefly to blame. But he told you in his despatch after the battle of Alma, that he wished he had more men; and it might have occurred to you that with young recruits—many of them mere boys weakened by disease, and not enough for the heavy work of the trenches—Lord Raglan might have no force to spare for the supplementary labour of roads, and also that he was deficient in the necessary animals and vehicles, and you ought not to have waited for Mr. Peto's offer—your patriotism should have been no less inventive than his. It has been said, "How are Government to blame for winds and hurricanes, rains and mud?" But you are to blame for taking no pains to learn that your army would be exposed to a climate that is subject to winds and hurricanes, rains and mud. You are to blame for not resorting to the ordinary inventions of art to counteract the hostile operations of nature. When the clouds gather, a prudent man takes out his umbrella; when the wind sets in the east, he will see that his coat can button; and a man attacked by cold and disease for neglecting such every-day precautions, might as well exclaim, "How could I foresee that it would rain, or that it would blow?" as you exclaim, "How could we foresee that there would be winds, rain, or mud?"—in a climate in which winds, rain, and mud are the ordinary phenomena of winter. Attempts have been made elsewhere to fix blame upon our military commanders. It was wisely as well as generously said on this score by the Secretary at War—

> "What generous man would indeed attack the absent agent not here to answer for himself, when there sit before us, face to face, the employers responsible for his errors so long as they continue him in office?"

But here what Lord Grenville said on the subject of the Walcheren Expedition is so apposite that I will venture to quote it—

> "I am disposed," said Lord Grenville, "to believe that in the situation of the commander he did all that could reasonably be expected, or was possible to accomplish. The error was in the plan, and the want of foresight and information on the part of His Majesty's Ministers. . . The place, the situation, nay the season of the year, were chosen by them. There is a season of the year when the air of that place is most pestilential and dangerous; yet, to that place, and at that time, say His Majesty's Ministers, we will send the flower of the British Army—we will not send it at a time when its operations may be advantageous, but we will send it when from every information it will be destroyed more by disease than by the sword." [1 *Hansard*, xv. 19.]

Does this apply? But it is said in defence of the War Minister, that the fault is not in himself, but the nature of his office. I am too happy to accept any palliation for his errors. But if I accept that excuse for the Minister of War, it becomes another grave charge against the collective Government, for you created that office, and why did you leave it so imperfect? Here you had no want of advice and information. You had the recommendations of a celebrated Commission, the advice of some of the ablest men, who had thoroughly examined the subject, and your excuse for not grappling with the question was, that the commencement of war was not the proper moment for a thorough reform in the War Administration, and that the proper time to make a War Office efficient was the moment of returning peace. But, at all events, the reform, as far as it went, was, according to you, an improvement on the old system, and yet, under the old system, we fought the wars of the Peninsula and gained the victory of Waterloo. But if the complications of this office were so mischievous, you must have discovered it long ago. Why, when you summoned Parliament for the 12th of December, could you not have reformed the office, even if you did not change the Minister, and propose to us that reform for which you are now prepared? That would have been worth calling us together for; but no, you then completed your cardinal sin of short-sighted incompetence by confining all your exertions to save the remnant of your army to two Bills, for which you said not a day was to be lost, and one of which has remained a dead letter to this hour. Here again, the same eternal want of information! You go to Germany for foreign troops, and Germany declares your overtures illegal, and rejects them with scorn. I ventured to tell you that, if you carried the Foreign Enlistment Bill, you would never be able to use it. And now Parliament meets again, meets with fresh accounts of almost incredible suffering—9,000 of our surviving soldiers enfeebled, I fear, by disease, the huts that should shelter the rest still at Balaklava, and Lord Raglan, according to the despatch we read this morning, still without men and vehicles to land and fix them. Men look to us, half with hope, half with despair. "What is to be done?" is the cry of every voice. No man is a more shrewd observer of public opinion than the noble Lord the Member for London, and his resignation significantly tells us what ought to be done. But if this Motion succeed, if this incomparable Ministry retire, and, like the hon. Member for Middlesex (Mr. B. Osborne), lose a place and find a constituency, who is to replace them? Where can we find their equals, in the unity of their councils, the foresight of their policy, and the good fortune that attends their measures? Let us compose our terrors, and face the possible calamity of such a loss with manly courage. The hon. Member for Richmond (Mr. Rich) chides my right hon. Friend the Member for Midhurst (Mr. Walpole), because, on Friday night, he condemned the Government for basing its existence on the principle of coalition. The hon. Member for Richmond is historically correct. Looking through our modern history I find that most of our powerful, even popular Administrations, have been more or less coalitions. Both the Administrations of Mr. Pitt were coalitions; and the last was very remarkable, for he first turned out the Addington Government, and then coalesced with six of its Members. Nay, he was not contented till he had netted the expelled Prime Minister himself, and made him Lord President of the Council. But then there is one indispensable element of a coalition, and that is, that its Members should coalesce. Now, Sir, it is that element which seems to me wanting in the present

Cabinet. It has been an union of party interests, but not a coalition of party sentiment and feeling. It was a jest of Lord Chesterfield's, when a man of very obscure family married the daughter of a lady to whom scandal ascribed a large number of successful admirers, that "nobody's son had just married everybody's daughter." If I may parody that jest, I would say of this Government, that everybody's principles had united with nobody's opinions. It is dimly intimated that the noble Lord—now in a state of transition, but, after all, he is equally illustrious as the hon. Member for Tiverton—it is intimated that the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton is intended for an appointment that some months ago would have satisfied the country, and possibly have saved the Government. I fear now that it may be too late, and among his greatest dangers will be the armed neutrality of his unsuccessful advocate and noble Friend. The noble Lord the Member for London, on Friday last, attempted, not very triumphantly, to vindicate the Whigs from the charge of being an exclusive party that required all power for itself; and he found a solitary instance for the refutation of that charge in the magnanimity with which the Whigs had consented to that division of power which his desertion now so emphatically recants and condemns. But, in plain words, his vindication only amounts to this—that where the Whigs could not get all the power, they reluctantly consented to accept a part. Now, Gentlemen opposite will, perhaps, pardon me if I say, that I think the secret of Whig exclusiveness and Whig ascendancy has been mainly this—you, the large body of independent Liberal politicians, the advocates for progress, have supposed, from the memory of former contests now ended, that, while England is advancing, a large section of your countrymen, with no visible interest in existing abuses, are, nevertheless, standing still; and thus you have given, not to yourselves, not to the creed and leaders of the vast popular body, but to a small hereditary combination of great families, a fictitious monopoly of liberal policy—a genuine monopoly of lethargic government. It is my firm belief that any Administration, formed from either side of the House, should we be so unfortunate as to lose the present, would be as fully alive to the necessity of popular measures, of steady progress, of sympathy with the free and enlightened people they might aspire to govern, as any of those great men who are demagogues in opposition and oligarchs in office. But to me, individually, and to the public, it is a matter of comparative indifference from what section of men a Government at this moment shall be formed, so long as it manfully represents the great cause to which the honour and safety of England are committed, and carries into practical execution the spirit that animates the humblest tradesman, the poorest artisan who has sent his scanty earnings to the relief of our suffering army. It has been said, as the crowning excuse for the Government, that all our preceding wars have begun with blunders. Were this an arena for historical disquisition I should deny that fact; but grant it for the sake of argument. How were those blunders repaired and converted into triumphs? I know a case in point. Once in the last century there was a Duke of Newcastle, who presided over the conduct of a war, and was supported by a league of aristocratic combinations. That war was, indeed, a series of blunders and disasters. In vain attempts were made to patch up that luckless Ministry—in vain some drops of healthful blood were infused into its feeble and decrepit constitution—the people, at last, became aroused, indignant, irresistible. They applied one remedy; that remedy is now before ourselves. They dismissed their Government and saved their army.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I do not know that I can recollect an occasion on which there has been before the House—I will not say so great a question, but I must say, so remarkable a combination of questions, each of which is great. In this country even the dismissal of the Government is enough to constitute a great party conflict, and to attract immense public interest; but the fate of the Government, though it be an element in this discussion, is the smallest among the elements that it involves; because, Sir, along with the fate of the Government is involved the far exceeding question of the condition of your army, and along with the condition of the army is involved that which, if at the present moment it be regarded with less lively interest, is always of the deepest interest to the people of England—namely, the duty and functions of the House of Commons to consider and apply a remedy to great national evils. With respect to the Government, what they desire and what they have a right to ask is, that their position should be perfectly clear and perfectly defined in the face of this House. Sir, the hon. Baronet who has just resumed his seat says that the present Government was formed upon a union of interests, but not of opinions. Sir, the judgment of the present Government belongs to a higher tribunal—[*Laughter*]—I speak it with no disrespect—than any individual Member of Parliament or any Parliament that now exists, because this is a question in which personal feelings and prejudices are so much involved that it is viewed by us with heated eyes. But there is a tribunal that will deal with this question with even-handed justice—I mean the enlightened opinion of the country. After what has happened during the last few weeks, and what we have heard during the last three days from my noble Friend, the Member for the City of London, I beg to enter my respectful protest against the declaration of the hon. Gentleman (Sir E. B. Lytton), that the combination out of which the present Government proceeded was a community of interests, and not of feelings and opinions. I beg to render this testimony, as far as I am concerned, in the face of the world to my noble Friend (Lord J. Russell), that in all the measures in which I have been concerned with him, whether in their preparation for this House, or whether in their conduct through this House, I have received from him great cordiality and harmony of support, and he, I trust, has received from me a correlative amount of support. The history of the Government will remain in its acts, and by its acts let it be judged. With reference to the present position of the Government, I must recur, in the first place, to the explanation of my noble Friend, for the purpose of acknowledging the tribute, so far beyond my merits, which my noble Friend was pleased to pay to a portion of my political conduct. He is in a position in this House in which it is his rare privilege that by the eulogies he confers he can confer distinction, but that he cannot receive it in return. I will, therefore, content myself with owning his kindness in that and many other matters, and in expressing the hope that it may be never effaced from my recollection. But with regard to the position of the Government with reference to my noble Friend, it is not to be wondered at if persons viewing the facts from different points of view do not find them presented in precisely the same light. I hope I may not be thought to controvert anything stated by my noble Friend, if I respectfully state to the House that, at the time he announced the resignation of the office he lately held, his colleagues were entirely unaware, so far as I am acquainted, of any difference of opinion between him and themselves. My noble Friend did not make any contrary statement; but, at the same time, I think that those who listened to the statement of my noble Friend, and had no other acquaintance with the facts, might justly suppose that he, having made a proposal at a given time for a change of office in the Government, though he had been dissuaded from pressing it at a particular time, had continued to keep that proposal alive, and that only at the last, when he had lost all hope of its acceptance, had proceeded to place his resignation in the hands of my noble Friend the First Lord of the Treasury. Sir, I venture to state, so far as my knowledge goes, that if such were the impression recently conveyed to the House, that impression was totally unwarranted by the facts. At the time of the resignation of my noble Friend we were not conscious of any the slightest difference of opinion between him and ourselves with reference to the conduct of the war. My noble Friend has called attention to a correspondence between himself and the Earl of Aberdeen, in which he urged that the present Minister of War should give place to my noble Friend the Member for Tiverton, and in which the Earl of Aberdeen declined to accede to that proposal, acting on that occasion in concert with every one of his colleagues. It has been stated this evening by the right hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir F. Baring) that he considered that Lord Aberdeen was not justified in declining that proposal on grounds of private and personal regard, when it was deemed such a change would be beneficial to the country. Why, certainly not, Sir; he would not have been justified in such a case. But it was not on grounds of private and personal regard that my noble Friend Lord Aberdeen declined to accede to that proposal. It was on the 17th of November that the proposal was made, and those who wish to appreciate the circumstances should go back to that period. Sentiments of discontent among the public with reference to the conduct of the Minister of War were not rife in the country at that period. (*Cries of* "Oh, oh!") I will venture to say more (because if I stop here it may seem to imply that opinions out of doors ought to settle this question)

—that the great exertions made by my noble Friend the Minister of War, in conjunction with the Commander of the Forces and the other military departments, in order to send out the army to the East, were exertions that deserved and had won the approbation of the country. Such was the opinion, I believe, of the country, and such was the opinion of my noble Friend the Member for the City of London; for it may be in his recollection, that in the early part of November he addressed a letter to the Duke of Newcastle, in which he stated to his Grace, with that handsome appreciation of his conduct that might be expected from such a man, that he had done in his office everything that it was possible to do. Well, Sir, on the 3rd of December the correspondence with the Earl of Aberdeen was brought to a close, my noble Friend adhering to his opinion, and the Earl of Aberdeen declining to act on that opinion. But from the close of that correspondence till the time of the meeting of Parliament on Tuesday last there is a vacuum that requires to be filled up. I may be wrong—I cannot tell what passed in the mind of my noble Friend—but I venture to say that, with regard to my knowledge, and according I believe to the view of his colleagues, his proposal was not in existence during that period. On the 3rd of December, as I have said, my noble Friend adhered to his opinion that the office of Secretary at War ought to be abolished or absorbed, and that of Secretary for War ought to be held by the Secretary of State for the Home Department. But shortly after that Parliament met—on the 12th of December—and a debate took place on the Address, which may be in the recollection of the Members of this House. On the 16th of December a Cabinet Council was held, and discussions were entered into with respect to the proceedings of the Government and the measures of the coming Session. The impression made, I think, on the colleagues of the noble Lord by the conversations at that Council was, that it was impossible he could retain his intention of proposing a change in the War Department; but it was not left to impressions, for on that day, as I am authorised by the First Lord of the Treasury to state, Lord Aberdeen, being in some doubt as to the meaning of the President of the Council, did himself take an opportunity of ascertaining what his opinions were, and asked him whether he adhered to his proposal with reference to a change in the War Department. I was not present at the conversation. I speak only from what Lord Aberdeen has informed me, and what I believe at the time he communicated to such Members of the Cabinet as happened to refer to him on the subject. He stated to me that when he then asked my noble Friend whether he adhered to his plan, my noble Friend distinctly announced to him that he had changed his intentions. He attributed that change to a conversation which he had had with a distinguished person, a friend of his—I need not name—not a Member of the present Cabinet, but versed in the affairs of military administration, and very friendly to the reform of the military department. My noble Friend then on the 16th of December stated that he had changed his intentions, chiefly in consequence of a conversation with this friend, who, though a great military reformer, had convinced my noble Friend that the present was not a fitting time for the proposed changes. Well, Sir, that being the case, it was obvious that all his colleagues who took the pains to inform themselves on the subject regarded that proposal of my noble Friend, not as a proposal that was awake and alive, or one that was to be pressed upon them, but as a proposal which he had given up and definitively abandoned. Nor was there anything that occurred in the following month that induced the Government to think otherwise, because from time to time, as Cabinet Councils met, measures were discussed, and on Saturday week my noble Friend himself called the attention of the Government to the subject of the formation of a War Board, and asked what had been done with regard to developing the views of the Government as to the war, and at that very Council a plan was agreed upon for giving form to measures which had, for some time, been practically in operation for combining the heads of the various War Departments with a view to the more speedy and prompt transaction of the business of the war. My noble Friend, on that occasion, was a concurring and consenting party in that conversation, and he subsequently went to Lord Aberdeen, I think on the day before the meeting of Parliament, and stated that he intended to prepare modifications to that plan, with the details of which he was not altogether satisfied. These Amendments we never had the opportunity of considering. But my noble Friend said, the other night, he had no reason to suppose they would be adopted by the Cabinet. I venture, however, to say that he had no reason to suppose they would not have been adopted by the Cabinet. I am unaware, and my right hon. Friend the Secretary at War, who has seen that memorandum, is totally unaware, of any question of principle that could be raised on it, or of any difference of opinion that could grow out of it, with regard to my noble Friend on the one hand or the Government on the other. Therefore, Sir, if it be thought that there is something of audacity in the Members of the Government when they meet Parliament and challenge a vote on their fate after they have lost the strength and the ornament of the presence of my noble Friend, I trust it will be recollected that up till Tuesday last his colleagues—I will not say every one of his colleagues, for I cannot speak for all personal and private communications, but his colleagues at large—were not aware either that my noble Friend had any intention to revive his defunct proposal, or that in any respect there existed any difference of opinion between him and them in regard to the conduct of the war and the constitution of the administrative departments. I hope the House will forgive me for having stated in this manner what appeared to me to be desirable in order to clear the views which the House might entertain—I do not say of the position of my noble Friend, for I do not question one syllable that fell from his lips—but to clear the view that the House might entertain of the position of the Government when, on Wednesday, it was called on to deliberate in consequence of the resignation of my noble Friend. Now, it may be thought that the Government, as I have said, are guilty of a reckless disregard of opinion in meeting Parliament and taking the opinion of the House of Commons on the Motion that is now before them without any change in their own composition, and deprived of the leader under whom they have acted in this House. I beseech those who are disposed to come to such a conclusion to consider what was the position of the Government on Wednesday and Thursday last. It is very easy to describe that position as a disagreeable position. In that description I am myself not wholly unprepared to concur.

> "At once, as far as angel's ken, he views
> The dismal situation waste and wild."

Those blasts that come from the Opposition side of the House are not always agreeable; but if I turn for comfort to some portions of this side of the House I see a quarter where sits the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard), and I am bound to say that from that quarter issue the coldest and most bitter blasts of all. And all the comfort I have with respect to him is, that I can see no difference between the tone of his speeches he addresses to the House now, when he avows he has withdrawn his confidence from the Government, and the tone of his speeches, on various occasions, when he assured the Government of his steady allegiance. I think the House will agree with me that those who are charged with the responsibilities of office have something else to do besides considering the pleasures of their position. They have something else to do even in ordinary times, but still more in times like these, under the pressure of events such as now beset your army, and, in connection with it, the country. Now, the question is, what course was it open to us to take? Were we to attempt some modification or interchange of offices that should enable us to present a more acceptable or popular front to the House of Commons? I agree with the hon. Member for Aylesbury, who says that such a change, wrought under such circumstances, could have earned no favour for Government, but must have enhanced and accumulated suspicion upon them, and placed them in a false and unworthy position. That is the part of the mariner, who, under the pressure of a tempest, sets about appealing to the mercy, and commences bargaining with his gods—

> "Ad miseras preces,
> Decurrere et votis pacisci,
> Ne Cypriæ Tyriæque merces
> Addant avaro divitias mari."

It was not compatible with the position of the Government to offer terms to the House of Commons. It would not have been compatible with the position and character of the House of Commons to accept terms from a Government so circumstanced. Then, on the other hand, if it was not open to us to modify the composition of the Government, was it open to us to abandon office under the pressure of a hostile Motion? There may be a majority here, for all I know, who are determined this night to pass a vote of censure on the Government; but I think there are few that have within them the spirit and justice of Englishmen who will not be free to own that it was the duty of the Government, having conducted public affairs up to the time when they were made the subject of a notice of censure, not to shrink from that censure. It has been well said by my right hon. Friend the Secretary for the Colonies that we were determined to meet it as we stood, without forecasting the future. It would have been audacious — it would have been altogether unjustifiable either to form a conclusion or even a design with respect to the future existence of the Government till they got the sentence and judgment of the House of Commons with respect to that existence; and if we had shrunk, after notice was given, from asking for judgment on our past actions, I ask in what terms we should hereafter have been described? What sort of an epitaph would have been written over our remains? Why, Sir, I think I should have phrased it somewhat thus myself, "Here lie the dishonoured ashes of a Ministry which found England at peace and left her at war—which was content to enjoy the emoluments of office and wield the sceptre of power so long as no one had courage to question its existence. They saw a storm gathering over the country—they heard grievances and afflicting news of the state of the sick and wounded in the East. These things did not move them; but when the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield raised his hand to point the thunderbolt at them, then they were conscience-stricken with a sense of their guilt, and, in thinking to escape from punishment, they abandoned duty." It is, therefore, from no mere desire to court the condemnation of Parliament, and from no mean desire to cling to office, that Her Majesty's Government have thought it their duty to invite you to pass judgment on the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield without a single circumstance to draw you from the path either to the right or to the left so far as depends upon them. So much, then, for the state of the Government here; but what is far more important in the view of the country is the state of the army. And it is not only the state of the army in the Crimea this House has to consider, but they must look to the causes of that state, and the means of applying a remedy. I will not attempt to alleviate or weaken the sense of interest felt in this House and throughout the country with respect to the condition of that army. It would be a vain attempt, and not only vain, but doing violence to the nature of every one who has the feelings of a man. It is, in truth, the absorbing question of the time. My hon. Friend the Member for North Northamptonshire (Mr. Stafford) is right when he says, not only that England cares for the army, but that she may now almost be said to care for little else. And I, for my part, will offer no resistance, and will interpose no impediment to any measure whatever that can be shown that will contribute one jot or tittle to benefit that army. What, then, is the state of this army? Here we must recollect that it is our duty to endeavour to put a check on feeling, and to come to a very different affair—namely, an appreciation of the real state of the case. Of course, it will appear to all that the evidence which the public journals render us is, on the whole, and from necessity, far from being complete in its character. It must and does proceed mainly from those who have suffered those evils of which I do not now inquire what portion were unavoidable, or what portion could have been avoided. There are some of the difficulties of the army with respect to which we may venture to hope that they are now in course of diminution; for instance, if I take some points in connection with those accounts that at the present moment the public have been made acquainted with in the most authentic form, I find that large portions of warm clothing have been issued, and that the troops are now in possession of these comforts. I do not know if there are any individual exceptions, but I make no doubt of Lord Raglan's general accuracy. The huts have begun to be taken up to the encampment and to be issued to the men. The sickness which prevailed to so fearful an extent, according to the latest accounts which the military authorities gave me today, has begun to show a slight diminution. I may also mention that, out of ten vessels which sailed from this country with the stores and men necessary for the construction of the railway, by this time nearly the whole have arrived; and I believe it was the estimate of the intelligent and public-spirited men who were entrusted with the construction of the railway, that within about three weeks of the time of fully commencing it that railway would be completed. What, however, is more material to the present state of facts is, perhaps, this—that an arrangement, which has long been the object of desire in both the allied camps, has at length, by the efforts of the generals, been completed, and General Canrobert has been able to place at the disposal of Lord Raglan—or rather has been able to apply to the discharge of duties for which Lord Raglan has hitherto provided—such a force of French as to diminish by 1,600 men the number of English permanently in the trenches. Of course I need not acquaint the House that the number of 1,600 men by no means represents the amount of relief; but my meaning is, the number permanently in the trenches: and I apprehend I am not wrong in stating that, so far as the labours of the siege are concerned, that arrangement is equivalent to an addition of from 4,000 to 5,000 healthy and well-ordered troops on the spot to the British army, in reference to the works which it had to undertake. I hope the House will think that I have not stated these things as cancelling the case which is before us—that I have not infused into the statement of them a tincture of exaggeration. My sole object is, that the facts shall be placed clearly before the House, and an impartial judgment passed upon them. Now, with respect to the number of the army, that is a question to which, I think, it is desirable to refer, because, undoubtedly, either the statement which goes abroad among the public, or, at any rate, the mode of making that statement, is fallacious; so that calamities, in themselves great and serious, are magnified far beyond their just proportions. For example, it is said that 54,000 men have been sent to the East, and that 12,000 bayonets is the whole force we have there at our disposal. This, of course, is a matter of fact. I do not speak of the army before Sebastopol as if it consisted of men fresh from our climate, having undergone no pressure of fatigue, but I speak of the number of those, including the auxiliary marine force and the naval brigade, engaged in military duties before Sebastopol, excluding the whole of those who, whether at Balaklava or elsewhere, are on the sick list. Now, Sir, the number of those engaged in military duties before Sebastopol, according to the latest returns, must somewhat exceed 30,000. I do not pretend to give the precise figure, because I have not the precise returns for the naval brigade, or for the marines, but that is an affair which cannot exceed 300 or 500 one way or the other. 28,300 men under arms, or in active service of one kind or another, were the force before Sebastopol at the latest moment of which we have the returns, and to that must be added, on account of the auxiliary naval force, about 3,000 or 4,000 men. I have spoken of the statement that the army consists of only 12,000 men, and that statement goes abroad, and is received as gospel by well-intentioned members of the community. Indeed, it was my lot yesterday morning to hear it preached as gospel before a large congregation. A most meritorious clergyman, addressing one of the most intelligent flocks in London, stated that the army sent out to the East was, at present, represented by far less than one-third of its numbers before Sebastopol. I hope, however, we are not driven to that melancholy and miserable conclusion, that our army of 1854 is gone, and that we have nothing to do but to consider of the formation of an army of 1855. There have been many calamities, there have been many faults, there have been many great and glorious actions attended with loss; in some instances the hand of Providence has descended in a manner which could not be foreseen. There has been delay of our best hopes—agony has been brought to our tenderest feelings, but we are not driven to the conclusion that the army which left these shores, the finest ever despatched from England, is numbered among the things which are past. Now, Sir, though I have said that I do not intend to attempt to get quit of the case in that manner (although those things I have stated are strictly true), I believe much remains behind, and there is still one other subject to which I must venture to advert. Persons in this country, necessarily ignorant of military matters, are in the habit of giving their judgment of them in a great degree by comparison. It is common to revert to the state of the French camp and the French organisation, and to draw inferences highly unfavourable to those engaged in the conduct of our own; and, Sir, so far from endeavouring to detract from what is stated to the advantage of the French as to their organisation, I rejoice to have this opportunity of bearing testimony to the high state of military art and science, and those best parts which relate to the care of the soldier, displayed by our gallant neighbours and allies. But I wish to point out to the House the necessary imperfection as to the means of information. It is natural—I do not complain, and I do not think any one will complain, not even those who suffer by them—that these comparisons should be drawn. I only suppose a case of possibility. If it were only to happen that, in any material points, the organisation or arrangements of the British army should be superior to the French, you would not think it justifiable in us to make that statement. You would say, on the contrary, they were matters on which we ought not to enter. But I will not press it further, and I only press it as a reason for suspension of judgment, and caution and circumspection in considering a matter of this kind. But, after all this, the case is a case which absorbs your attention, and, after every effort you can use, every assistance you can render the Government, and whatever sacrifice you may choose to make, with a view of improving the state of the army. I accede and agree to the justice of the picture which has been drawn by my noble Friend the Member for the City of London. I admit, though I trust improvement has begun, and although it is clear the great weight of excess of labour is now materially lightened, there is much in the general arrangements of the government of that army which calls for amendment. I agree that, in some important particulars, it is so defective—whether from fault or necessity—so defective, that the accounts received are—I will use the language of my noble Friend—they are horrible, they are heart-rending. If that be a fair outline of the state of the army, we come to the question, what is the cause of that state? And the first duty I apprehend you have to perform is to endeavour to make some separation between the inevitable incidents of war, and especially of an arduous and difficult enterprise in war, and the faults and miseries which human care might have avoided. As far as those causes are unavoidable, I am not here to discuss them; but I must plainly say, there are some Gentlemen who do not take a just estimate of the unavoidable causes of misery in our army. Why, the right hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley) says the matter of providing for an army 3,000 miles off is a matter of no difficulty at all; that nothing but the self-sufficiency of some Members of the Government prevented their seeking advice in the proper quarters; and that, if that advice had been sought and the proper measures taken, every man would have had his breakfast table regularly served in the Crimea—I almost thought he was going to say with *The Times* newspaper served along with it, such was the idea which the right hon. Gentleman appeared to have of the facility of this operation. In that respect I think the right hon. Gentleman has not taken a true or fair measure of the case. But now let us ask the question, which of these causes have been avoidable? The right hon. Gentleman made another observation for which I mean to tax him. [*Laughter.*] I used the word "tax" unconsciously. I hope it will be understood I mean nothing of a personal character in it. But the right hon. Gentleman made another observation, for which I shall take him to task. The right hon. Gentleman seemed to be under the belief that due supplies have been withheld from this army, and that the army has been, what is called, starved from motives of economy. [Mr. HENLEY intimated dissent.] Well, I am glad that is not the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman. It is an opinion, however, which I have heard on more than one occasion stated in this House. It may be very unfashionable and unpopular to refer to the word "economy" at all; but, at the same time, if it be the duty of no other man, it is my duty, and no period can, in my opinion, be unfitting to declare that to the best of their power the Government of the country, and the representatives of the people in this country, should respect and study economy. But, so far from supposing that economy has been the cause of those miseries, I am afraid we are rather open to the charge that, in our endeavour to mitigate them, we have been driven into profusion. At any rate, I hope the House will be content to suspend its judgment on that part of the case until we come to the time when I, or some worthier person, will have to submit proposals connected with the financial arrangements of the coming year, and, in so doing, to present with them an account of the transactions of the past one. I am bound to enter my protest likewise on behalf of economy with respect to another matter. I do not believe that it is the parsimony of Parliament which has rendered our military establishments liable, so far as they are liable, to the charge of ineffectiveness. I am not prepared to admit that a sum of 14,000,000*l.* annually, which is about the average sum which has been bestowed during the peace, is not sufficient to provide this country with the necessary means of defence. It may be true that, in certain instances, you have had ill-judged parsimony, but, if it is so, I venture to say it is easy to find other instances in which the fault has not been that of parsimony, but of a very different kind. And I frankly own I should do injustice to the people of England and to the House of Commons, if I allowed it to be supposed either that the people were unwilling to bear the necessary burdens, or that the generosity of Parliament has failed in providing those supplies which should be adequate for the country's defence. So much for economy. I will not dwell on that subject further, because I know you do not mean to lay the principal part of the burden on that ground. The hon. Baronet who has just sat down takes to task the policy of Government, and this he does on the authority of a young gentleman who is an officer in the army, and who, writing his opinions home, is quoted by the hon. Baronet as an authority, in deference to which he calls on you to pronounce what should and should not have been done. The hon. Baronet says it was monstrous to go to Sebastopol, because we ought to have known that the climate of the Crimea was so pestilential it was certain ruin to any army which went there. Now, Sir, I join issue with the hon. Baronet, and tell him that he was misinformed. The hon. Baronet refers us to *M'Culloch's Geographical Dictionary.* I am not so deeply read in the articles of that useful work, but I cannot help believing that, in the summary of information it affords, it states that the climate of the Crimea is totally different in different parts of the Crimea, and that on the southern line of the Crimea, where Sebastopol is to be found, there is nothing in the climate which ought to prevent its becoming the scene of military operations. But the real truth is this—you cannot carry an army into those countries without risk to health. Not the climate alone, but all the incidents of military life added to the climate, must be reckoned among the causes of ill health to the army. Then the hon. Baronet says, „Why spare Odessa?" Are you going to condemn the Government by vote to-night because they spared Odessa? Suppose you are so indignant at the Government for sparing Odessa that you vote against it to-night, and find at a subsequent period that the Government took the opportunity of having the matter of the destruction of Odessa fully considered by the commanders on the spot, and that these commanders gave them the advice upon which the Government acted—I ask what would be the position of those who had passed judgment on the Government for sparing Odessa? The hon. Baronet says we ought to have taken Odessa, which was open to us, and would have been very comfortable quarters to our troops; but he forgot to tell us that Odessa is an open town containing 140,000 people, perfectly accessible to Russian forces on all sides, and with 300,000 or 400,000 men within easy reach of it. What, therefore, would have been the condition of the British army if they had taken the advice of the hon. Baronet and gone into those comfortable quarters? Then, says the hon. Baronet, you sent to buy mules in Spain and Egypt—why did you not buy baggage animals at Gallipoli? This is different from the complaint of the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard). The hon. Baronet, who is the great orator of his party, having devoted much time and mind to inform himself with respect to facts, recommends as a great mart Gallipoli—which is no place of traffic, but a small village situated on a narrow strip of land—and contends that we should have trusted to Gallipoli for mules, and not have trusted to Spain and Egypt. But how does this agree with the other and much more rational charge of the hon. Member for Aylesbury, who says that we did not send anywhere for mules—that we had no mules or horses, not only in the Crimea, but even at Varna? I leave these two champions to join issue and try the quarrel between themselves. But I must take issue here, in the first instance, with the hon. Gentleman the Member for Aylesbury. He stated the other night, not only that we had no transport animals when we landed in the Crimea, because after all that was not at the moment so very surprising a matter, but that we had no means of transport at Varna. And yet I have to acquaint the hon. Gentleman that we had 5,000 horses and mules at that period at Varna for the purposes of transport. But, said the hon. Gentleman, those horses at Varna were the horses of the officers, who were forced to take out with them three or four horses, although many of them could ill afford the expense. What, however, has the hon. Baronet (Sir E. B. Lytton) to-night said? He has asked, "Is it true that you carried out three horses for the correspondent of the *Times*, whereas you have not allowed the officers to send out more than one?" From one side of the House we are charged with compelling the officers to send three or four horses to the East; and from the other side we are charged with only allowing them to send one. But, be that as it may, I beg to state to the House, upon good authority, that there were means of transport to the amount of 5,000 animals at Varna at the period of the expedition to the Crimea. With respect, then, to the military criticisms of the hon. Baronet, I think I may venture here to leave them. But, though these may be his specific grounds for supporting the motion, they may not be the grounds on which the votes of other hon. Members may rest, or on which their opinions as to the true causes of the evils which exist in the Crimea may be formed. Now, Sir, it may be convenient to say a few words first of all with regard to my noble Friend who is supposed to be more especially responsible for the conducting of the war, and to be specifically pointed at by the Motion, as Secretary of State for the War Department; secondly, with regard to the administration of that department; and then also with respect to the administration of the army in the Crimea. Now, as regards the second point—namely, the administration of the War Department—it is admitted on all hands to be defective. But it is not admitted, in the first place, that nothing has been done to cure those defects, or that, on the other hand, they are such defects as are deserving the censure of this House. Your War Department may be in a very imperfect state as compared with the similar department of France, which has had a standing army of from 60,000 to 80,000 men engaged in war for the last twenty-five years in Algeria; but I believe it is the opinion of competent men that the present state and the performances of your War Department are in no degree inferior to what they were at the close of the last war. ["Oh, oh!"] I hear murmurs, as if it was thought that the department and its operrations ought to be improved since the close of the last war. Theoretically, no doubt it ought to be; but surely it is something to have lost practice during a forty years' peace. But the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley) says, "You have sent an army to the East, and you have sent it unprovided with necessaries." That is his charge; and it is a very intelligible one; and if there were any grain of truth in it, then you may vote whatever vote of censure you please upon us. But I beg leave to join issue with the right hon. Gentleman, and to say that, instead of our having sent an army to the East unprovided with necessaries, we have sent it supplied with ample necessaries of every description. I will not enter into a statement of details, but I will refer the House to the fair and candid statement with which the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield opened this debate, when he said—

> "You have sent an army to the East in numbers and efficiency such as never before left these shores; an army likewise unequalled in its equipments; but that army is perishing for want of food, while upon the shores of the port of Balaklava there are rotting stores of every possible description sufficient to provide for the wants of two such armies."

I believe I have given the substance of the hon. and learned Gentleman's statement correctly. Now, although the statement of the hon. and learned Gentleman may, perhaps, in some points be beyond, yet upon the whole, it is not very far from the truth. Surely, then, this is an answer as far as regards the charge that our army has been sent from England unprovided with necessaries. It is an answer to the charge that your military department here has failed to supply that army with all the necessaries it required. Nor is it true to say that nothing has been done to improve the War Department. On the contrary, measures were taken by my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty, to re-organise the Board of Transport, and by my noble Friend the Secretary of War to organise transport corps separate from the Commissariat. It may be said, as has been stated by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Portsmouth (Sir F. Baring), that the Commissariat has only recently been transferred to the Secretary of State for War. That may be true; but from the time of the commencement of this war the direction of the Commissariat has been in the hands of the Secretary at War. All these things have been done, and at the time they were adopted they were considered to be the best measures that could then be devised. Since then the principle of concentration has been practically carried into effect. For some time past the heads of the different Boards have met—informally till lately, and now they meet more formally—for the purpose of giving to the military department of the State as much of unity in its operations as its various functions are capable of. Well, so much for the military department. But I must point out to the House that if the present heads of the military department are to be selected for objects of censure, it will be well to consider upon whom that will recoil. Within the last three years the Government of the noble Lord the Member for the City of London first proposed a Bill for raising the militia. That Bill was taken up in a modified form by the Government of the Earl of Derby, much to its credit, and passed this House. From the time that Lord Hardinge has been the Commander in Chief, much has been done towards the improvement of that arm. Is the Minié rifle nothing? Is the improvement of the Minié rifle nothing? It is due to Lord Hardinge's administration that every measure for the purpose of promoting the re-arming of the army has been taken. That most important weapon, the Minié rifle, was first introduced in 1851, and its improvement was effected in 1853. By it the weapon is reduced three pounds in weight, while it is in every respect superior to the old musket of the British army. It is a weapon capable of the most astonishing execution, as was very remarkably demonstrated at the battle of Inkerman, where it inflicted the greatest slaughter which had been known for many years. That was, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary at War has justly called it, "the soldiers' battle," but it would not have been fought in the way it was if it had not been for your War Administration, first of all, employing that effective weapon, and thereby changing altogether the character of your infantry, and converting them from mere machines, who fired without thinking or looking, into good and effective marksmen, as the hosts of Russia soon found. Since that time, also, your field artillery has been all but created afresh. In 1852 you had no field artillery. You had no guns or gun-carriages at that time fit for the service. But is that all? Was it not an indication of improvement when the British corps were collected the year before last at Chobham, with a view and an endeavour to combine them into one army? And when that plan was found to work so satisfactorily, was it no mark of improvement that it was determined to follow it up during the last and the present year? Government, I have the gratification of saying, have been so successful as to procure, in a convenient situation, a large piece of ground, with a view of establishing a permanent encampment, and enabling you to make a better and more effective use of your army than you have hitherto done when you employed them so much for purposes of police regulations both at home and abroad. But if you intend to censure your military department of the Government, you must perceive that that censure will fall upon the members of several successive Governments of this country, as well as on the Parliaments whose confidence they possessed. But I know it is not intended to cast censure upon the department, but it is upon the Secretary for War that you intend to discharge your ire. Now, there are states of opinion with which it is in vain to contend. There are duties which it is beyond the power of man satisfactorily to discharge. I confess, it is my own belief that the duties of all the departments in this country are of such a nature that no man can discharge them without being sensible that much fault may justly be found with the manner of his discharging them. I have not the least doubt that this truth applies to my noble Friend the Secretary of State for War. I am far from saying that my noble Friend enjoys such an exemption from all the infirmities of human nature, that he is able to devise everything wisely, and do everything in the right manner, and at the right time. But if you think that my noble Friend has not devoted himself with assiduity and attention to the duties of his office, then I tell you, you are mistaken. You may pass a vote of censure on my noble Friend; you (the Opposition) may shelter yourselves behind this vote for a Select Committee to make your attack upon him and upon the Government, but I venture to tell you that you know not the true character of my noble Friend, and that every man who gives his vote against him this night, though he may swell the majority against and succeed in throwing obloquy upon my noble Friend, will find, before twelve months have passed away, and when the true state of the facts shall be declared, there will be among the just and generous minds of the people of England a reaction in his favour. But now, what are the grounds of this Motion? You are going to condemn my noble Friend on account of the condition of the army in the Crimea. I believe that is the statement. You have an impression that there were no roads, no clothing, no houses, but little food, a want of ammunition, and dreadful confusion at Balaklava; and, I must not forget to add, that it is your opinion also that the hospitals are most defective. Now, I must beseech the House to reflect how long these complaints have been rife in this country. I think, if you go back, it was in the middle of the month of December that they were first heard of, ["No, no!"] Why, Parliament met in the middle of that month, and the then state of the army was fully discussed in this House. The House heard the statement of my right hon. Friend the Secretary at War. They believed that statement, and I believe they were justified in giving their credence to it. Complaints there were at that time, and complaints there ever must be, both in the Army and the Navy. But I think you will agree with me that it was not the duty of my noble Friend the Duke of Newcastle, in the case of every complaint, to write to Lord Raglan, who was engaged in such gigantic duties, and having on his mind matters of such vast responsibility, and call upon him to put the matter right, as if he were some officer of a department at Somerset House. The duty of my noble Friend was to give credit to such complaints, and when they assumed the character of some general neglect, arising, in all probability, from want of energy or prudence on the part of some one in office, then was the only time for my noble Friend to entertain such complaints. Well, a discussion on the state of the army took place in this House on the 12th of December, when my right hon. Friend stated the condition of that army, and the House in general was satisfied. Since that time these complaints have become more rife, and, I am sorry to say, redundant. Now, what was the duty of my noble Friend under those circumstances? What was the utmost he could do? Was he to recall Lord Raglan? ["Hear, hear!"] Well, I hear a solitary cheer; but I apprehend that it does not indicate the real sense of the House. Lord Raglan either deserves your confidence or he does not; but if he is to have your confidence it is necessary that he should have it whole and entire. It is impossible for any man to discharge the duties incumbent upon Lord Raglan—such duties as have rarely been combined in the hands of any individual—unless he has the full confidence and the full support of the Government and of the Parliament at home. Is the choice of Lord Raglan to be blamed? Did the Government err in that choice? Did the incompetent Minister at War, as he has been termed, did my noble Friend the Duke of Newcastle show his incompetency in that choice? Why, it was approved by the universal voice of the country. Were the events which followed that appointment of a nature to shake the confidence which the Government reposed in Lord Raglan? On the contrary, you have voted him your unanimous thanks — not only your unanimous but your enthusiastic thanks—for his brilliant services in the field. Her Majesty has conferred upon him the highest military honours which it was in her power to bestow. I know this also, that besides the difficulties which a general in the field has to encounter, Lord Raglan has had the further duty—not less essential—to perform, over and above the ordinary duties of a soldier, of giving life and practical vigour to that alliance between England and France, of which it is all very well for us to speak in this House—for, so far as we are concerned, it is a matter very easy to deal with—but it has been upon Lord Raglan practically that the task of successfully maintaining that alliance has fallen. I believe there cannot be two opinions as to the way in which Lord Raglan has maintained that alliance. I believe it has been—indeed I know he has said it has been—almost the great object of his mind to maintain and to confirm that alliance, and not to confirm it in its form only, but to animate it with the warm spirit of generous affection and attachment. Well, I think there cannot be two opinions as to the manner in which Lord Raglan has discharged that part of his duty. Then I suppose you would not have recalled Lord Raglan when complaints appeared in the newspapers, or when an article appeared, written by some editor, stating that he should have been recalled. What, then, would you have done? Because the practical question before us turns to a great extent upon this point. I want to know whether, when these complaints became rife, you would have recalled the subordinate officers of Lord Raglan? Would you have recalled the heads of the Medical department, of the Commissariat, of the Quartermaster-general's, or of the Adjutant-general's department? I name these departments because they include the principal persons engaged in the administration of the Army. I fully admit that facts have been made known to the Government, especially since the beginning of December, of such a character as it was impossible for them to overlook. I think, however, that it was not their duty to recall Lord Raglan's subordinate officers without communicating with him on the subject. The confidence which the Government reposed in him made it their duty—their absolute duty—in point of common justice and decency, to ask him to investigate these charges. It was their duty to apply to him—to remind him of the powers lodged in his hands—to let him inquire into these complaints, and then act accordingly. I venture to say that that is the course which my noble Friend the Minister for War has pursued. He has received from Lord Raglan statements in answer to the representations which were made in the month of December, and measures have been taken which he trusts will lead to a great improvement in the condition of the army. Some hon. Gentleman has said—I think it was the hon. Baronet who preceded me—that it is not our duty to cure evils, but to prevent them. It is our duty, he says, to prevent evils in an army. I admit that it is our duty, to the best of our power, to do so; but the hon. Baronet has not shown that these evils could have been prevented by anything that depended upon my noble Friend the Minister for War, or upon Her Majesty's Government. I apprehend that the state of the case is this:—The officers of Lord Raglan are responsible to him; Lord Raglan is responsible to the Government; the Government is responsible to the House of Commons. You may say, "It takes a long time to follow out this responsibility, and in the meanwhile the mischief is going on." That is perfectly true, but the question is, can you find a shorter way to a remedy? That is the whole question. The Government could not find a shorter way to a remedy by recalling Lord Raglan, and if they had done so the country would have cried out upon them. The Government could not have found a shorter way to a remedy by recalling the officers of Lord Raglan without previous communication with him, and without affording him an opportunity of making a fair statement of the facts. They could not have pursued either of these courses; and are you to determine whether you will dismiss the Government or not, before they have had the opportunity of bringing these grave matters to issue in the only way open to them in reason and justice? You may say this is a slow process. [Sir E. B. LYTTON: The speech is a slow process.] The hon. Baronet says the speech is a slow process, and I admit it is so, but the matter is an important one. I know that the hon. Baronet, when he speaks, is remarkable for conciseness, but all men have not the same talent; and I beg to assure the hon. Baronet that my object is to put the point as well as I can, and as shortly as I can, to the House. You say you wish to shorten the process by the course you are about to take, and I want to know what you really mean by the inquiry which you contemplate. It has been said, that this is a question of confidence, or no-confidence, in the Government. My answer to that is, that the House of Commons is not called upon to vote confidence in the Government at the present moment. When the Government produces its measures to the House, then, no doubt, it calls upon the House, either directly or indirectly, for a vote of confidence; but, at present, the question is not whether you shall adopt a vote of confidence or not, but whether you shall pass a vote of censure or not. That distinction between the two measures is a plain one, and it happens to have been brought out in a very marked manner at one period in the history of this country. During the existence of the Shelburne Administration, a question arose whether an union should be formed with Lord North or with Mr. Fox, the party of Lord North and that of Mr. Fox constituting the Opposition of the day. I find in the *Memoirs and Correspondence of Mr. Fox* this passage—

> "The preliminaries of peace had been signed, and were laid before Parliament on the 27th of January, 1783. The terms were not, in general, approved of, and the Ministers thought a vote of approbation by Parliament absolutely necessary for their continuance in office. Lord North declared that he would oppose any vote of censure, but that he could not concur in a vote of approbation. 'If they come for an address,' said he, 'they make us judges, and they must make out their case.'"

Lord North declined to support the Address which the Government wanted, though he would not support a vote of censure, and in consequence of his declining to support the Address he lost the alliance of the Ministers, and was induced to attempt to form a coalition with Mr. Fox. Now, this is the question at the present time. The Motion now before the House is a disguised vote of censure. In saying so, I mean no disrespect to the hon. and learned Member by whom it was proposed, for I am quite sure there is no man in this House less capable of adopting deliberately a disguised mode of action than the hon. and learned Gentleman; but I mean that, though the Motion purports to contemplate inquiry, it is in fact a vote of censure upon the Government. We have been told that it is a technical objection to say that this is a proceeding without a precedent. It is proposed to commit to a Select Committee of this House the duty of examining into the state of the army in the Crimea, and into the conduct of the War Department at home, and the right hon. Member for Midhurst (Mr. Walpole) quoted what he called a precedent for this proceeding in the case of the Walcheren expedition. Now, I must confess that I think I never heard a more unhappy comparison. The right hon. Gentleman admitted that there were some points of difference. I declare that, as to points of resemblance, I do not think there is more than one, which was not referred to by the right hon. Member for Midhurst — namely, that curiously enough the Motion for the Walcheren Inquiry and the Motion now before the House were both brought forward on the 26th of January. With regard to the Motions themselves, my right hon. Friend could scarcely have been serious when he said that the Walcheren Inquiry was a precedent for this, for they differ in the most essential respects. I will mention one of those points of difference. The Walcheren Inquiry was an inquiry into an expedition which we had undertaken singlehanded; the people you had to examine were your own people; the measure was your own measure; the failure was your own failure. Now, is this a singlehanded expedition—can this be a singlehanded inquiry? If my right hon. Friend inquires—and I do not envy him his task if he is a Member of the Committee—into the conduct of the War Department, in connection with the expedition, and into the state of the army in the Crimea, I want to know whether he will be able so to shape his inquiry that he will have no evidence upon any question touching the conduct and the policy of the French nation? What will be the position of the right hon. Gentleman if he has to propose to this House that we should require the assistance of witnesses from over the water, in order to illustrate certain points in which the question is common to the two nations? The policy of the expedition to Sebastopol is to be censured. We ought to have wintered at our ease at Odessa. If the right hon. Gentleman wants to inquire into those points, it is plain that he must have French as well as English witnesses. But my right hon. Friend forgets this, which is the most vital distinction that can be drawn between the two cases—that the inquiry into the Walcheren expedition was an inquiry after the fact. That was an inquiry within the legitimate scope and office of the House of Commons. The Ministers had adopted a course of action, you were dissatisfied with the results, and you placed the Ministers upon their trial. Your business is not to govern the country, but it is, if you think fit, to call to account those who do govern it. For such a purpose it is perfectly reasonable to inquire into a past expedition, but how does that apply to the present case? How can you inquire into the past of the Sebastopol expedition without examining into the present and the future? How is it possible that you can conduct the inquiry with respect to what you may call the past, without — not damaging, but absolutely ruining, the present and the future? The real truth is this, that if this Motion be anything—if the inquiry into an actually proceeding operation be anything—it is a Motion that the House of Commons cannot pass without violating the laws which fix its place in the constitution, because, if the Motion means anything, it means taking the conduct of the expedition out of the hands of the Government. The Walcheren Inquiry was an investigation which was conducted by the House at the bar. The inquiry now proposed is to take place before a Select Committee upstairs. It seems to me that, when a Motion is made for a Committee of the whole House upon a great national question, what you mean to imply is, in a legitimate form, your want of confidence in an existing Administration, and any proceedings which you take in consequence of such a Motion you take with the whole weight and power of the House, in the face of day, and before the country; but is it really to be supposed that the inquiry now proposed is to be entrusted to a Select Committee? That is a part of the question that can hardly be limited. I think every man must be prepared to say "Yes" or "No" to that question. My right hon. Friend (Mr. Walpole, says that a Select Committee is to undertake this inquiry, but that is not the prevailing sentiment. The hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) says that it is perfectly absurd to think of entrusting such an inquiry to a Select Committee. Then, why does he vote for the Motion? Because he thinks it will despatch the Government. The hon. Member for Aylesbury, I must say, is not nice in the choice of his instruments. The priest of old, when he was about to sacrifice, washed his hands and put on his sacrificial garments before he plunged the knife into the heart of his victim; but it seems to me that the hon. Gentleman does not much care in what condition his hands are. The merits of this Motion, in the view of that hon. Gentleman, is simply that it will despatch the Government. He does not recommend it—he does not defend it—he abandons it; he condemns it; he says it is unworthy and ridiculous, and he is right. You cannot, I maintain, entrust your inquiry to a Select Committee. It is vain to say that there is no limitation of your powers written in your Journals. No doubt you may, if you please, decline to transact any business in this House. You may appoint a Select Committee to transact the business of the House, and you may take the votes of the Committee in lieu of your own. You may, if you please, split yourselves from your honoured functions, and devolve them upon a few of your Members, but will that answer the purposes of those who seek to save the army? Will it answer the purposes of those who wish to maintain the dignity and honour of the country? Does the hon. Member for Aylesbury, a man of ability and honour, really think that the people of England will allow him to deal in this way with such questions as the present? Does he think the despatching of a Government, however he may dislike it, is a matter so simple that the people of England do not care one pin how it is done, provided only the knife reaches the heart? If the hon. Gentleman thinks so he is totally mistaken. We have been told, to-night, that if we rejected this Motion we should cause disappointment to the country. Then, if you are to cause pleasure by adopting this Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, I want to know what kind of pleasure it will be? It will be a pleasure dependent upon the belief that you are going to inquire into the existing state of things. The country will not understand your doctrine. that you are so short of means for attaining your ends, that, in order to despatch the Government you dislike, you are obliged to vote for a Motion you cannot defend. If the House of Commons say they will have an inquiry, depend upon it the country will believe you, but what you wish is that the country should not believe you. Now, if the country does believe you, and if the country would be disappointed by your rejecting this Motion, what, I ask, will be the disappointment of the country when they find, first that you have voted for inquiry, and then that you never meant that inquiry to take place? Well, I really should venture, with great respect, to submit upon this question the opinion of Lord Porchester, who moved the appointment of the Walcheren Inquiry. What was the language that he used? He said—

> "I cannot consent to delegate the right of inquiry on this occasion to any Select or Secret Committee, by whom the course of investigation might be misdirected, or its bounds limited,—before whom, possibly, garbled extracts, called documents, might be laid by Ministers themselves, in order to produce a partial discussion. But I will not expose the case to such a risk. It is in a Committee of the whole House alone we can have a fair case, because, if necessary, we can examine oral evidence at the bar."—[1 *Hansard*, xv. 162.]

Sir, I therefore submit to this House, if they think, as they may think, that the time has come when it is fit to put a period to the existence of the present Government, that they have no difficulty, and need make no difficulty, in the choice of legitimate means for effecting that purpose. The Government cannot continue a week in office without submitting to you proposals for measures which are required for the service of the country. Why, then, do you not meet them in the way in which the constitution points out? Can you give any example, in the whole of your history, of a time when the House of Commons has thought it worthy of itself to put a period to an Administration by means such as this—by means of a character so indirect, and so tending to deceive and delude the country? Sir, I venture to say this in conclusion:—You may deprive us of the character of Ministers, but we remain Members of Parliament, and, as Members of Parliament, we have a common interest with you in the character and in the dignity of the House of Commons. Now, Sir, what is the foundation of that character and of that dignity? Your power is a gigantic power; but it is gigantic on account of the prudence—on account of the sense of justice and of propriety with which you are commonly content to wield it. Rely upon it, the House of Commons, in this free country, can no more afford to disregard the rules which former prudence has laid down, or stoop to the use of indirect means to delude the country with promises which it does not mean to fulfil, than can any other body, however inferior. It is as needful for the House of Commons as it is for anybody in this country—I would say that it is more needful for it—to remain within the limits which are marked out for its province, if it wish to continue on the proud eminence to which the labours of those who preceded you have raised it. If this Motion be passed to-night, as it is quite possible that it may, no doubt it will bring great relief to the Members of the Administration, but it will impose upon you a corresponding responsibility which you cannot get rid of. You may not feel it. I see here many who have had but a short experience in this House, and who are called upon to vote on a great question without, perhaps, having the means of fully seeing all that it involves. For my own part, this I say—that I am sensible, whatever Government may arise out of the ashes of that which may be about to fall, that it will be the duty of every patriotic citizen to render to it every support which he conscientiously can give to it. Further, with respect to those who may vote for the Motion which is now, perhaps, about to pass, I venture also to say that it will be their duty—the duty of the men, the duty of the party, be they who they may—if they should be called upon to assist in filling the vacuum which they have gone to such lengths to create—I mean by supporting this Motion—not to shrink from that task. Whether they do so or not, however, I earnestly hope that the House, in the vote which it is about to give, will recollect its respect to the country, and will reflect on the mode of proceeding which it is about to adopt. For my part, I believe that mode of proceeding to be worse than useless so far as regards the army in the Crimea. Your inquiry will never take place as a real inquiry; or, if it did, it would lead to nothing but confusion and disturbance, increased disaster, shame at home, and weakness abroad; it would convey no consolation to those whom you seek to aid, but it would carry malignant joy to the hearts of the enemies of England, and, for my part, I ever shall rejoice, if this Motion is to-night to be carried, that my own last words, as a Member of the Cabinet of the Earl of Aberdeen, had been words of solemn and earnest protest against a proceeding which has no foundation either in the constitution or in the practice of preceding Parliaments, which is useless and mischievous for the purpose which it appears to contemplate, and which in my judgment is full of danger to the power, dignity, and usefulness of the Commons of England.

MR. DISRAELI: Sir, after the remarkable admissions which have been made in the course of this debate by Members of the Government, it is unnecessary for me to-night at all to indulge in that "slow" process which the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer has been reminded of by an hon. Baronet, and to which he so good-humouredly alluded. Sir, this debate was commenced by an hon. and learned Gentleman to whom we always listen with attention and respect; and when he suddenly ceased from addressing us, remembering that he was an accomplished orator, I almost at first supposed that it was an artifice of rhetoric when he merely moved the Resolution which he has now, Sir, placed in your hands; for if there ever were a Resolution upon a question of national interest submitted to the House of Commons which required no arguments to support, and no arts of oratory to enforce it and recommend it to the adoption of the House, it was, in my opinion, the Resolution which the hon. and learned Gentleman submitted to us on Friday last—because, before the hon. and learned Gentleman had risen, in pursuance of his notice, to bring that Resolution before our consideration, a noble Lord, who had been but within a few hours the chief Minister of the Crown in this House, had admitted the case of the hon. and learned Gentleman—had made a public declaration which, in my mind, rendered the step taken by the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, not only justifiable, but necessary and inevitable; and it appeared to me impossible, after the admission, or rather the declaration, of the noble Lord, that any Gentleman in this House could have found himself justified in opposing the Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman. This, therefore, brings me to the closing observations of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The right hon. Gentleman has taken the instance of the inquiry into the Walcheren expedition, and has said to my right hon. Friend (Mr. Walpole), "You have urged upon us what is a false resemblance between the present state of affairs and that which existed at the time of the investigation into Walcheren; and I will show you points of difference which you cannot contest." I entirely agree with the Chancellor of the

Exchequer that there are points of difference between the present case and that of the inquiry into the expedition to Walcheren. No Minister of the Crown, in the case of the Walcheren expedition, had come forward and said that the state of affairs in his mind demanded inquiry—that, with all the advantages of official position and of his accumulated Parliamentary experience, there was in that state of affairs something inexplicable to him. Now, in the case of the Walcheren expedition, instead of the First Minister of the Crown in this House making such admissions, you had him urging the inexpediency of the course, and telling us that information was not required in many particulars, and that in others it was inexpedient and impolitic to give it. After all the arguments of the Chancellor of the Exchequer upon this parallel between the present circumstances and those which attended the inquiry into Walcheren, let us for a moment remember what really are the circumstances which we have to consider, and let us take that broad and common-sense view of them which the people of this country have for some time adopted. You do not deny that a great army has perished in a distant country to which it has been sent. The Chancellor of the Exchequer says that the amount of our loss has been misrepresented and exaggerated. He says that it was an army of 54,000 or 56,000 men, and that there are 30,000 still bearing arms, and that only 24,000 or 26,000 therefore have perished. Is not that then, I ask, a subject worthy of inquiry? But the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the same time dilates upon the contradictory accounts which exist upon the subject. Well, then, is there not some ground for inquiry, when it is a question whether 20,000 or 30,000 British troops have disappeared, when the First Minister of the Crown in this House tells us, with the advantage of his official experience, that the causes of that loss are inexplicable to him, and when the Chancellor of the Exchequer tells us that the greatest misconceptions and misrepresentations exist upon the subject? I ask you, is not that a fair ground for inquiry into a subject so interesting to the people of this country? But, says the Chancellor of the Exchequer, still harping upon the instance of Walcheren, would you justify yourselves in the present case by having recourse to means and measures which in that instance might have been justified because the transactions to which they referred were concluded? But the Chancellor of the Exchequer has misconceived, or has for a moment forgotten, the nature of the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield. The Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman is not to inquire into the conduct of the war; it is not a Motion which requires us to call before us French and English witnesses, the authorities of rival armies, persons connected with different countries, and owning a different allegiance. The Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman is to inquire into the condition of the army before Sebastopol, and whether that condition has been occasioned by the mal-administration of the Government departments connected with the army. Now, Sir, that is a simple issue; but I doubt whether it is an issue which can be raised and investigated at the conclusion of the war. Suppose that the present war were to last as long as the late war, could you at the end of twenty years pretend to inquire into the condition of the army "now" before Sebastopol? It might be a legitimate course to postpone to the conclusion of the struggle the discussion of the principles and policy upon which it had been conducted; but the present question appears to me to be of an instant and urgent character, and which, if ever inquired into, can only be inquired into at this moment. Then the right hon. Gentleman dwells upon the inevitable character of an investigation of this kind by Parliament into the administration of those in office, and he says that it is a mockery whether before a Select Committee, or before a Committee of the whole House—the investigation is a mockery, because, he says, that carrying the Motion for inquiry is clearly a censure upon the Government. But that was not the opinion of Sir Samuel Romilly in the debate upon the Walcheren expedition—I quote a name, Sir, still remembered and respected by the Whig party—Sir Samuel Romilly meeting an objection of this kind, said—

> "If you lay down that doctrine, you may as well lay down the doctrine that a man is condemned because he is put upon his trial."

Well, Sir, we have now before us the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, to which there appear to be, so far as I can collect the course of the debate, three main objections. The first objection is that of my hon. Friend the Member for West Norfolk (Mr. Bentinck), that it is a censure upon the Commander of the forces in the Crimea. Now, Sir, if I thought that by any ingenuity the language of the Motion could be construed into a censure upon the conduct of Lord Raglan, or of any general officer in the Crimea, I should be the last man who would vote for it, or who would in any way sanction it; but I cannot, I confess, in any way apply to it such an interpretation; and I declare, if I had written the Motion myself, entertaining those feelings towards Lord Raglan to which I have referred, that I could not have devised language which I should have imagined would be less likely to be supposed to convey the slightest imputation against the noble Lord. The Motion refers to the condition of the army, to its physical condition, in that country. It wishes to inquire how far that condition, which we so much deplore, and which we believe to be so calamitous, has been occasioned by the conduct of any department of the Government. How, therefore, can such an interpretation be placed upon it? Nor do I believe that it is one which can, for a moment, be entertained. The second objection to this Motion is, that it is of an unconstitutional and inconvenient character. That I have already touched upon in adverting to the instance of the expedition to Walcheren, which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has introduced to our notice to-night. I confess I do not think that any inconvenience would occur from the Committee of the House of Commons visiting the heights of Sebastopol. We have to consider whether there shall be an inquiry into a specific subject—the condition of the army. Such an inquiry I believe to be perfectly constitutional, and, in my mind, it would not be inconvenient. But then, Sir, comes the third and main objection to the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, and that is, that it conveys, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer says, a censure upon the Government, or, as a colleague of his who preceded him stated, it implies a want of confidence in the Administration. Now, Sir, let us endeavour to understand what is meant by the want of confidence which this Motion is said to carry. I think we have a right to ask from the Government, who are resisting the Motion, on the ground that it implies a want of confidenee—I think we have a right to ask them this question—In what Government does it imply a want of confidence? Does it imply a want of confidence in the Administration which existed forty-eight hours ago? But the noble Lord, late the First Minister of the Crown in this House, has quitted that Government; and he has quitted it with a happy description of the feelings that prevailed among its Members, and of the cordiality which animated their councils. I do not think, therefore, that the Government will resist this Motion on the ground that it is a want of confidence in the Cabinet as it existed with the noble Lord the Member for the City of London as a Member of it. Well, then, is it a declaration of want of confidence in the Cabinet as it now exists? But we are told almost from the Treasury bench that whatever may be the effect of this Motion—whether the Government win or whether they lose—the event is to be followed by the abdication of all self-confidence on their own part. Do they, then, object to our voting a want of confidence in an Administration which tells us that the moment it is over, whatever may be the result of the Motion, they will consider themselves as no longer worthy the confidence of Parliament? Well, then, is the objection to this Motion that it implies a want of confidence in the Government that is to be? That is a question we have a right to ask. Hard has been the fate of the House of Commons of late years. It has often been called upon to vote confidence in men with whose principles it was unacquainted, but it never has yet been called upon to vote confidence when it did not know either the principles or the men. Well, then, when we are asked to pass a vote of confidence in the Government, or to convey censure, the right hon. Gentlemen opposite who have addressed us have always argued this case as if the present Motion was an attack upon an individual Member of the Cabinet. The whole of this case has been argued by the Government as if this were a personal attack upon the Minister of War. Now, Sir, for my part, I beg to disclaim, in language as clear as I can express my meaning in, that I entirely protest against that Parliamentary conduct which signals out one Member of the Cabinet, and, on the pretence of criticising the Administration of his department, visits him with a censure from which the other Members of the Cabinet—his colleagues—are to be exempted. I have had occasion, in other instances, to maintain these opinions, and I have ever acted upon them. I have been asked myself—it was not an appeal made to me in confidence, and, therefore, though I will mention no names, I think I am not doing wrong in speaking of it here—I have been asked, of course by Members of the party opposite, whether I could support a vote of censure upon the Duke of Newcastle? Now, there must be many who now hear me who must be cognisant of the truth of what I am stating. This, I believe, was some time before the period to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred as the first inauspicious day when he heard the administration of the War Department was in disfavour. I say then I have been asked by hon. Gentlemen who sit on the other side whether I would support a vote of censure upon the Duke of Newcastle, and I have been assured by those hon. Gentlemen that such a Motion, if proposed, would be sure to be passed by a decisive majority. But I said, as I say now, that I never will, directly or indirectly, be a party to any Motion in this House, the object of which is to select one Member of the Cabinet, and make him the scapegoat of a policy for which the whole of his colleagues are equally responsible. Now, Sir, it is the fashion, in order to make this management of the case palatable for those who are opposed to the Duke of Newcastle—it is the fashion to say, that this is a vote against the mal-administration of his office. Well, it is not for me to defend the Duke of Newcastle. We have had the character of the Duke of Newcastle painted by his colleagues, and I have no doubt their expressions are still fresh in the ear and memory of hon. Members. I do not subscribe to their justice. I only refer to them as coming from an authentic quarter, and which, therefore, must be supposed to draw a character which at least deserves attention. It is not merely the colleague who has quitted him who gives us an interpretation of his official shortcoming, but his yet remaining colleagues bear equal testimony in an elaborate manner, that the Duke of Newcastle is alike deficient in energy and in experience. Well, Sir, it is not for me to dispute the judgment of a Minister made by his own colleagues; but, so far am I from wishing to argue this case, or to conduct this debate in any unfair spirit to the Duke of Newcastle, that I am bound to say that, though I cannot but ascribe to the mal-administration of the affairs of his office many of those disasters the existence of which no one can deny, and few can palliate—although I cannot but do this, yet I am bound to say, I am not at all certain that there was one other Member of the Cabinet who, placed in the same situation, would not have carried on affairs equally unsatisfactorily. If we come to the administration of offices, so far as the conduct of the war is concerned, the Duke of Newcastle is not the only Minister who, in the administration of his office, is, in my mind, entitled to the notice of Parliament. There is another Secretary of State, who, from the nature of his office, is much concerned in the administration of affairs with regard to the conduct of the war. It is the noble Lord the Secretary of State opposite (Viscount Palmerston), whose energy and experience, we are told, are our only compensation for the disasters we have experienced, and the calamities which the Duke of Newcastle has brought about. Sir, the noble Lord, from having the militia entirely under his superintendence, exercises, of course, considerable influence over the conduct of the war. Now, what has been the administration of the noble Lord's office? What has he done? On the 6th of last February the noble Lord gave notice to this House that he should ask leave to bring in Bills for the establishment of the Irish and Scotch militia. There was not the slightest resistance offered to measures so wise, so important, so urgent. Well, February passed, and the Bills were not introduced, though unopposed. They were not introduced by a Cabinet which must at that moment have known that war, if not inevitable, was, at least, impending. February passed. March arrived. On the 28th of March war was declared.* One would have supposed that Ministers who had declared war, who must have known that a militia was the only sure basis of a reserve in this country, would not for a moment longer have delayed the introduction of these important Bills respecting the Scotch and Irish militia. But these Bills, promised in February, promised in March—on the 28th of which month, as I said, war was declared. April passed, and these Bills were not introduced. May passed away, June passed, and these Bills were not introduced, and not till after Midsummer did the noble Lord the Home Secretary, who, we are told, is the only man who can conduct the war, introduced these two Bills for the establishment of the Scotch and Irish militia. The consequence was, we were at war; the regiments of the line were taken from Ireland, the English militia was sent to garrison Ireland, and this country was left quite undefended, while, at the same time, the means of supplying our resources were proportionately diminished. I should like to know, if the Duke of Newcastle had done this, whether his colleagues would not have been pretty sure to have blazoned it forth in his catalogue of misadventures and mal-administration? It happens, however, to be in the department of another Secretary of State, who, in the administration of his office, is such a paragon of Ministerial adroitness and ability that we are told he is the only man who can make up for the *laches* of his colleague. Sir, I say this with sincerity, and I believe in the spirit of constitutional justice. I will not doubt that the Duke of Newcastle was placed in an office which he was not equal to, for all his colleagues, with the exception of one right hon. Gentleman, have assured the House in the most elaborate manner that that was the case. But, Sir, I say the Duke of Newcastle has done nothing for which his colleagues in the first place are not as responsible as himself. He was placed in a new office, with the most laborious duties; and at a period of such crisis and difficulty, it peculiarly became the colleagues of the Duke of Newcastle, who must have been well aware of what he was doing, to have sustained him with their counsel and their sympathy; least of all did it become them, when he was involved in a difficult position, as he is at present, to have quitted him; or, if they remained with him, to have risen in the House of Commons in order to decry his abilities and denounce his administration. I have no personal or political relations with the Duke of Newcastle. I need not remind the House that there are many reasons why that is not a very popular name on this side of the House. The Duke of Newcastle, as a politician, was trained and bred on the Conservative benches; he owed his introduction to, and his success in public life to, this party; and, in our opinion, he conducted himself to this party, at a particular moment, with an acerbity of feeling and an ambiguity of conduct, which, in his present forlorn condition, we can well afford to forget. But, Sir, I protest against the convenient method which now is brought into a habit, of placing all these disasters upon either the mal-administration of an individual or the ill-working of a system. Whatever may be the faults of that system, when worked by able men, it has accomplished great things. At this late hour I shall not enter into that branch of the question, because I believe that the calamities which we all deplore have not been brought about only, or even principally, by faults of administration, but rather by an erroneous policy, for which certainly the Cabinet must have been responsible, and not a solitary Minister. I think the designs of the Cabinet were hastily conceived. I think they attempted to accomplish them with inadequate means. I think that they were insufficiently advised of the nature of the enterprise in which they had embarked; and that they showed throughout the whole conception and management of their scheme a want of foresight, of firmness, of depth of energy, and of all those resources which became a Ministry who had embarked in an enterprise of such vast importance. Why, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer has been this very evening referring to the Walcheren expedition. I remember those debates, and I am sure the noble Lord the Secretary of State opposite (Viscount Palmerston) must also remember them. I am only a reader of those debates, but he was a listener. I remember it was pointed out by very able Members of this House, that the Government of that day were so ignorant that they had endeavoured by a *coup de main* to take one of the strongest fortresses in Europe, and were surprised to find, when about to accomplish that project, that the fortress was defended more strongly than they had been led to believe. Substitute, Sir, Sebastopol for Antwerp, and you have the whole history of the present expedition. But it was held to be a great misdemeanor on the part of that Ministry to have undertaken a scheme which involved the siege of so strong a fortress without having previously obtained ample and accurate information as to its defences. Why, we now hear from the Ministers themselves that they were surprised at the resistance which had been experienced there, and the strength of the place before which our army under their directions have sat down. And then we are told the ill administration of an individual Minister easily accounts for the disastrous consequences which must necessarily result from such a gross want of statesmanlike sagacity. The noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) the other night defended himself on account of his conduct during an autumnal tour. But it is not so much of autumnal tours that we complain as of winter campaigns. The Secretary of State for the Colonies to-night, and the Secretary at War the other night, taunted us with our timid opposition to the Government. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, when he acceded to office some months ago, made his first appearance in that capacity by taunting us for not bringing forward a vote of want of confidence in the Government. He has returned tonight to his suggestion of that political remedy. I think we have had quite enough of these taunts from the right hon. Secretary. I am not ashamed to say we have exhibited a timid opposition to the Government. That has not been because we were afraid of the Government or the consequences of our opposition if we undertook it; but because we were timid on account of the unparalleled disasters which we found accumulating over the country. We did so because the country was involved in war, and whatever might be our opinion as to the impolicy which occasioned that war, we felt it our duty cordially to support the existing Government in carrying on that wär with vigour and efficiency. And if we now offer no longer "a timid opposition," it is because we find that, notwithstanding the support we gave them—notwithstanding the fact that there has been no vote, either of money or of men, which we have not cordially supported—notwithstanding the fact that during all this agitating period there has been only one measure connected with the war which the Opposition has resisted, and that was a measure universally condemned by the country—notwithstanding the Parliament and the country alike have upheld them, have placed in their hands unlimited means, and have offered at no time a criticism on their acts, the Ministry have so mismanaged affairs that they have broken up from their own incapacity, and have placed the army of England in the perilous and calamitous condition it is at the present moment. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer commenced his speech by dilating on the terms of perfect confidence which have prevailed from the first among all the Members of the Coalition Government. The House listened with tender surprise to the revelations of the right hon. Gentleman, and, with that admirable consistency of which the Chancellor of the Exchequer is so consummate a master, he concluded his description of this affectionate and perfect confidence existing between all these Gentlemen by assuring the House that neither he nor his colleagues were aware, twenty-four hours before it was known to the public, of the important secession of the noble Lord the leader of the House of Commons. Notwithstanding this unbroken confidence, it seems that some of the Cabinet had to walk down to this House, and, from their accustomed places, hear for the first time that their leader had quitted his post. The most important speech made during this debate, which it is impossible to pass over unnoticed, was the speech of the noble Lord the late President of the Council, in which he explained to the House the reasons which had induced him to quit office. I listened to that speech with a feeling shared, I am sure, by the vast majority of the House. I listened to that speech with amazement. It seemed to me I was listening to a page of *Bubb Doddington.* Such an all-unconscious admission of profligate intrigue is not to be matched in that record which commemorates the doings of another Duke of Newcastle, who was a Minister of England when the House of Commons was led by Sir Thomas Robinson, and when the Opposition was actually carried on by the Paymaster of the Forces and the Secretary at War. We are perpetually told that it is our blessed lot to live in an age of progress, and yet we have this confession in our purer days of a new morality, that the noble Lord the late President of the Council goes to the Prime Minister, and tells him that, in consequence of, I will not say his "antiquated imbecility," as the noble Lord opposite (Viscount Palmerston) might, but in consequence of his incapability and incompetence—in consequence of not being "the active spirit of the whole machine," he (the Lord President) proposes that one Secretary of State should be dismissed, and another colleague, the right hon. Member for South Wiltshire (Mr. S. Herbert), should be superseded altogether and his office suppressed. But that is not all. We all remember the combination by which Mr. Canning and Lord Wellesley conspired successfully to eject Lord Castlereagh from the Cabinet, and the recollection of those deeds is still a stain upon the memory of Mr. Canning. But there was this in the last instance which exceeds the conduct of the Cabinet which conducted the affair of the Walcheren expedition, there was this difference—the colleague for whose behest and benefit the conspiracy was intended was not at least selected as the authority to rebuke with Spartan severity, with more than Lacedemonian rigour, the illustrious conspirator who had sacrificed himself to the disinterestedness of friendship. The noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Viscount Palmerston) performed his part in a feeling manner. The noble Lord was sincerely shocked at the conduct of the Lord President of the Council quitting his colleagues without due notice. I should have thought the memory of the noble Lord might have softened his language of rebuke; for, if he could only recall a period some twelve months ago, if I recollect aright, the noble Lord equally as suddenly—at as perplexing a moment—when the question of peace or war hung in the balance—quitted his colleagues. The only difference is, that on that occasion the noble Lord did not condescend to give us an explanation as candid as that offered to the House by the noble Lord the President of the Council. That noble Lord appeared to take great credit to himself because he has increased the area of his party, and has always been ready to receive men of ability who have chosen to enlist under his standard, and he seemed to urge that point as if he were vindicating himself from attacks upon the existence of a Coalition Government; but no one objects to a combination between public men who have acted in different parties. The noble Lord the Secretary for the Home Department was once a member of the Tory party; Lord Derby, on the other hand, was a member of Earl Grey's Administration. There is no stain upon the character or honour of public men, nor inconvenience to the public service, in statesmen, however they may have at one time differed, if they feel themselves justified in so doing, acting together in public life. All that the country requires of public men when they do so act together is, that they should *idem sentire de republicâ*—that upon all great questions they should entertain the same views, that in subjects of policy, whether foreign or domestic, they should be animated by the same convictions and the same sympathies. But, with regard to the existing Government—that is, if it still be an existing Government—all have seen that, during their career, it does not appear that upon any great question, whether domestic or external, they have been animated by the same spirit and sympathies. It is to that circumstance that we must attribute the fact that they have been so unsuccessful in carrying their measures or prosecuting their policy. What has been the theory that seems to have kept together the various elements of the Cabinet? The balance of power in the Cabinet is the theory which both sides have attempted to support. That this is so appears from their own admission. The late Lord President is breaking up the Cabinet, because from the first he anticipated injurious consequences in the conduct of the war from the want of experience and energy of the Duke of Newcastle, and yet he never objected to the office of Minister for War being conferred on the Duke of Newcastle, because it gave him the means of saving the balance of power, and introducing as Secretary for the Colonies a supporter of his side. Thus, in the struggle to preserve the balance of power the noble Lord was victorious, but he got bolder, and, not satisfied with his success, he invaded the Principalities, and attempted to drive out the Minister for War also. That expedition has, however, been no more successful than was that of the Russians some few months since, and what are the consequences? We are called on to decide upon the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, which Her Majesty's Ministers tell us they consider a vote of want of confidence. Well, Sir, that Motion is before the House, and we must vote upon it. The vote which I shall give is one which, I believe, will be the vote of the majority of the House. Personally, I care nothing for the consequences, but I feel called upon to decide on an issue which Ministers have interpreted into a question of approbation or confidence. I care not by what name it is called, and I must decide according to the opinions I entertain. Sir, I have no confidence whatever in the existing Government. I told them a year ago, when taunted for not asking the House of Commons to ratify that opinion of mine, that as they had no confidence in each other, a Vote of want of confidence from this side of the House was surplusage. I ask the House of Commons to decide if twelve months have not proved that I was right in that assumption, although its accuracy was then questioned. What confidence has the noble Lord the late President of the Council in the Minister for War? What confidence have this variety of Ministers in each other's councils? They stand before us confessedly as men who have not that union of feelings and of sympathy necessary to enable them successfully to conduct public affairs. The late President of the Council, in scattering some compliments among the colleagues he was quitting, dilated upon the patience and ability with which the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had conducted the duties of his department. I am not here to question those valuable qualities or that patience, but I say that all the patience and all the ability with which the Earl of Clarendon may have administered are completely lost by scenes like this, and when the Ministers of this country have themselves revealed their weakness to foreign Courts, all the ability and patience of that statesman cannot make up for the weakness which is known to prevail in the councils of England. At all times such a circumstance must be injurious, but at the present moment it may be more than injurious. Two years ago England was the leading Power in Europe, but is there any man in this House who can pretend that she holds that position now? If this be the case—if we are called upon to decide whether the House of Commons has confidence in the Ministry, when the debate is commenced by the secession of the most eminent member of the Government—when affairs are in a calamitous state, and when we are told by the late Lord President that the conduct of the war is entrusted to a Minister who he thinks is unequal to the task—I ask the country—I ask this House—I ask the Ministers themselves, whether they can complain that a member of the Opposition should give his vote according to the belief which he entertains that the affairs of the country are intrusted to a deplorable Administration?

Lord JOHN RUSSELL: Mr. Speaker, I have not, as I have stated on a previous occasion, the smallest intention of entering upon the general subject of debate; but some personal allusions have been made to myself which I cannot altogether omit to notice. I do not mean to enter further into the question of the differences I may have had with the Earl of Aberdeen, or into the foundation of the statement made by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I do not contest the accuracy of any one statement made by him, but I must say that I think that if I were to enter into various particulars as to the letters I wrote in the beginning of October to the Duke of Newcastle, to which reference has been made, and the answers which I received, and as to the circumstances attending my subsequent representations upon that and upon various other subjects with respect to the conduct of the war—I think I could show that the circumstances stated by the right hon. Gentleman do not complete the history of the transaction. It appears to me that, laying aside any notion of my own vindication, I am opposed to anything which might tend to a practice which, I think, would be productive of inconvenience—I mean the practice of stating on subsequent occasions what has passed between Members of the Cabinet. I should not, however, have risen for the purpose alone of making these observations, but I cannot pass by a phrase used by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli) in which he said that the transaction in which I have been engaged with the Earl of Aberdeen would, in the language of the last century, have been called "profligate intrigue." Now, if the right hon. Gentleman means that the habit of invective and the form of words which were used by Parliamentary statesmen against each other would have led to this transaction being so characterised, I have no objection to say that false imputations abounded in the last century, and it would have been no wonder that such an imputation should have been made. But if he means to say that a true character would have been given to that transaction by application to it of that name, I beg leave most solemnly to deny that imputation. It has happened on more than one occasion that the Prime Minister of the day has been called upon to state to one of his colleagues that the office which he held might be more efficiently held by another Member of the same Cabinet. I remember a transaction, in which I was not myself engaged further than in being a spectator of it, of which the history may be easily had by the right hon. Gentleman, and it referred to one whom he, at least, respects—I mean the Earl of Derby. When the Earl of Derby was Secretary for Ireland in Earl Grey's Administration, and when a great question was pending—a question of no less importance than the emancipation of the slaves in the West Indies—it was thought desirable that the office of Secretary for the Colonies should be held by a man possessing influence and weight in this House, and who could exert that influence with the eloquence known to be possessed by the Earl of Derby. Now, Earl Grey had no hesitation in stating that to Lord Goderich; and Lord Goderich, giving way to that opinion, accepted the office of Lord Privy Seal in the same Cabinet, but I never heard that termed "profligate intrigue;" if it were a profligate intrigue, it must have been a profligate intrigue on the part of the Earl of Derby to get possession of the Seals of the Colonial Office; but instead of a profligate intrigue it was a transaction for the public benefit, and enabled the Earl of Derby to bring forward with ability, which all who recollect it admire, the plan for the emancipation of slaves, of which he was the author. But the right hon. Gentleman has alluded to another transaction—namely, on the occasion of the Walcheren expedition, the conduct pursued by Mr. Canning towards Lord Castlereagh, which he says still remains a stain upon the memory of that distinguished statesman. The conduct of Mr. Canning towards Lord Castlereagh was this—He did not conceive he was well qualified to conduct the Walcheren expedition, and he stated his opinion to the Duke of Portland, then Prime Minister, and also said that the communication might be made to Lord Castlereagh; but it was not so made. He was informed months afterwards that the communication had not been made, and in the end it appeared to Lord Castlereagh that Mr. Canning had connived at the suppression of that communication, and a duel took place in consequence. Now, was there anything similar in this conduct? Without imputing blame to Mr. Canning—for that is a question which is somewhat intricate—my own impression is that Mr. Canning was not to blame, and that it was rather owing to the weakness of the party, and more particularly of its chief the Duke of Portland, than to any intentional concealment on the part of Mr. Canning—I ask is there any kind of similarity between the conduct of Mr. Canning on that occasion and that which I pursued towards the Duke of Newcastle? I wrote immediately after the first letter to beg that that letter might be shown to the Duke of Newcastle; and, accordingly, in the very next letter I received from the Earl of Aberdeen, which was two or three days afterwards, he stated that both the Duke of Newcastle and my right hon. Friend the Secretary at War had been fully informed of the purport of my communication, and they stated to him, as, indeed, I fully expected, that they were perfectly ready and willing to concur in any arrangement that might be made which had for its object the good of the public service. Whether the arrangement which I proposed was a good one or a bad one for the public service, there was no concealment on the subject; I never desired to conceal, and did not conceal, from them the opinion that I held, that it was a proposal which some might call advantageous and others disadvantageous—to impose a very onerous burden on my noble Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department, who was not even informed of the subject. So far from there being any intrigue, it was, as I thought, conducive to the public service, and when my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer says that at that time there was no general impression against the Administration of the Duke of Newcastle, I beg leave to say I think that will prove a strong reason in favour of the arrangement I proposed. If a change had been made at that time it would have been merely said that the Duke of Newcastle, who had not hitherto had experience in an office which had become of so much importance at the beginning of the war, had taken another office of Secretary of State, and that the arrangement was made for the public benefit, whereas now any change that might be made, such as that hinted at the other day, would be considered as the effect of public clamour, and the Duke of Newcastle would be represented as the victim of public opinion. I believe, if the arrangement had been adopted by my noble Friend at the head of the Government at the time it was proposed, it would have been for the reputation of the Duke of Newcastle, who must always be considered a man of sound judgment in public affairs, and well qualified to fill a public office, although, as I stated at the time, I did not think he had authority sufficient to conduct the vast operations which a war against Russia must involve. I have nothing further to say, but I deemed it necessary to make this personal explanation, to show that the term "profligate intrigue," attributed to me by the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, was not applicable to my conduct.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: There is, Sir, one point in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) in which I have reason to express my cordial and entire concurrence. He has stated that the present Motion does not single out the Duke of Newcastle as one Member of the Cabinet for special and distinct condemnation, but that the whole of the Cabinet who are his colleagues at the present time are also with him responsible for those matters upon which his conduct appears to be brought into question. It is upon that principle that we stand here to submit to the decision of the House our conduct. We have stated that we consider ourselves to be jointly and in common responsible for those matters; and therefore I disclaim, on the part of the Government, that unworthy proceeding which the right hon. Gentleman has imputed to some one or other of us in the course of the debate, that we had endeavoured to throw upon one Member that which upon every principle of the constitution should be equally shared by all. With respect to the noble Duke at the head of the War Department, I must in justice say this—that I think public opinion has done him great injustice, and I am sure the day will come when a more correct and juster estimate will be formed of the ability and devotion of that noble Duke in the service of his country. Much has been said about a coalition Government, and it is the common opinion that the Government which now stands here, being formed of persons who were not always of the same party, retained in itself that principle of division which belonged to its original elements, and that we were always thinking of the balance of party, and ranging ourselves according to the party to which we might respectively belong. Sir, I can amply confirm what was stated by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that in all the discussions that have taken place among the Members of the Government in regard to those matters with which they had to deal, we never thought of what party we originally belonged to, but each man expressed himself according to his own honest opinion of the matter, and there was only that diversity which must arise between men of the same party when any number of individuals consider one common subject. I warn you against giving encouragement to vulgar clamour against a coalition, because I will venture to say that in the present state of political parties in this country you will never be able to form a Government, strong enough to carry on its affairs with the support of Parliament, that is not founded more or less upon the principle of coalition. We do not deny that there are circumstances connected with the state and condition of our army in the Crimea which have been most afflicting, and which to a certain extent have been calamitous and deeply to be deplored. These difficulties, however, have very much arisen from circumstances, in some respects, independent of the control of man—in other respects from that inexperience which must necessarily be found amongst the instruments of a Government who are called upon, after a long period of peace, when the different branches of the military service, which have had no practical experience, are called upon to perform duties of the utmost importance and difficulty in great military operations. I admit, undoubtedly, that there is much in the domestic distribution of our military departments which not only admits of great improvement, but urgently requires it. There is much also in the arrangement of those branches of the service which have been connected with the execution of the detail of our operations abroad which also may be susceptible of great and material improvement. But it could hardly be expected that after so long a period of peace, when our army had never been in a condition to act, and when it was impossible to train up persons in different branches of the service, so as to be instructed in the performance of the duties which they were called upon to perform in the field—it could hardly be expected that, under such circumstances, mistakes and confusion, to a certain degree, should not have arisen, and that, in consequence thereof, great evils must necessarily be encountered. With respect to military criticism, I can only say that there is no foundation for a great portion of that which we have seen. We have been told that our army ought to have gone to Odessa and passed the winter there, instead of being sent to attack Sebastopol. You might as well have proposed to an enemy intending to invade England to pass the winter at Brighton, and wait there, until the summer, before it marched to attack London. What would have been the position of our army at Odessa, an open and unfortified town, within the reach of all the military resources of Russia; whilst, on the other hand, Sebastopol would have been much more difficult to approach than it has proved to be? If hon. Members of this House meant to call in question the conduct of the war in this respect, the Motion ought to have been directed to that object. That would have been a fair and legitimate object of discussion. You might then have justly impugned the policy of the Government in regard to the operations of the war, and we should have been prepared to go into our defence on that question. But I most humbly submit that the course which has been pursued is one which is likely to set a most dangerous and inconvenient precedent in Parliamentary proceedings. We have been told that the course now proposed is similar to the proceeding which took place with regard to the Walcheren expedition. Now, the very great difference between the two cases has been over and over again most fully and completely shown. The inquiry into the Walcheren expedition was made by the whole House, and not to a delegated authority upstairs. But the great difference consists in this—that that expedition was over—that the persons to be examined were here—that it was an inquiry into the conduct of the Government, and not into the condition of an army many thousand miles off—an inquiry which cannot be conducted unless you bring home the persons whom you wish to examine, or unless you send a Committee of this House to interrupt and control the operations of the army. I say, then, that the question which we now have to consider is one of the most important that has almost ever occupied the attention of Parliament—not because it involves the existence or overthrow of a Government, but because you are about to set a precedent, dangerous if you carry it out, and disappointing to the nation if you let it drop and merely use it as an instrument for overthrowing the Government of the day. If this House thinks that the existing Government is not deserving of the confidence of Parliament—if this House is determined to withdraw its support from the Government and wishes to see the reins of Government placed in other hands—why the more manly, the more direct, the more constitutional course would have been to affirm the proposition that the Government no longer possesses the confidence of Parliament, and ought to resign its power into the hands of the Sovereign from whom it received it. Such a course would have been simple and direct —such a course, if it had been adopted, would have led to no inconvenience—such a course would have been conformable to the principles of the constitution—and if such a course is in unison with the sentiments of the House, the sooner it is adopted the better for all parties concerned. But I must say that the course which is now about to be followed is one which I think does no honour to the House which adopts it, and one which I think will not only set a bad example here, but will be attended with inconvenient results abroad. We are engaged, Sir, in a great and arduous contest. Whatever may be the decision of the House upon the Government that now stands before it, I think it is just, at least, that the dissensions which prevail may be confined to the overthrowing of the Government, and that whatever Government may succeed we shall not exhibit to Europe the melancholy spectacle of a country interrupting by party and political struggles the conduct of great national interests. I trust that Parliament will take example from the nation which it represents, and that as this nation is unanimous in its determination that the war shall be carried on with vigour and energy—as the nation is convinced of the justice of the cause, and is firmly satisfied that the war ought not to be concluded without such a termination as may secure our future safety against the occurrence of those dangers to avert which we have been driven to take arms—so, I trust, whatever may be the fate of the Government, whatever may be the decision of this night's debate, that when the House has settled what Government it will have—when the House shall have given its confidence to any set of men who may be hereafter entrusted with the conduct of public affairs, they will give their support to that Government—that they will enable it to carry out the wishes and determination of the nation, and that they will not show to Europe that a constitutional Government is less able to conduct the affairs of a country than a Government founded upon different principles, and that we shall not discredit Parliamentary institutions by letting the world believe that we are not capable of meeting the difficulties of a great crisis, or that a nation can only display its energies and act with perseverance, and consistency, and vigour when it is deprived of those constitutional representative forms which have been the pride, the glory, and the foundation of the prosperity of this country.

MR. MUNTZ, amid loud cries of "Divide!" observed, that as he had been so unfortunate as not to catch the Speaker's eye during the course of the evening, although he had frequently risen, he hoped the House would allow him a few minutes to explain the grounds upon which he should give his vote in support of the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield. He would previously observe that if the House were to follow the advice of the noble Lord, and to act according to the wishes of the country, the first thing they would do would be to turn out the Ministry. So far as he himself was concerned, he was prepared either to give a vote of censure upon the Government or to vote for the inquiry now proposed. When he had the honour of addressing the House in December last, he suspected how the case stood, but now matters were altered. They had now the evidence of the noble Lord who had just retired from the Ministry that the war had not been carried on with sufficient energy or spirit, and they were bound to believe the testimony of the noble Lord with regard to the disastrous circumstances which had attended it. As the noble Lord had left the Ministry because he could not induce the Government to do what he thought necessary for the interests of the country, and as the Ministry now remained in precisely the same condition as when the noble Lord left it, he (Mr. Muntz) would ask the House and the country what they were to expect from such a Ministry and such a Government but the same bad management and miserable inefficiency? Much had been said as to the impossibility of carrying out the proposed inquiry; but he (Mr. Muntz) saw no difficulty in doing so, as he did not wish to inquire into what was going to be done, but only into what had been done. It was useful now to look to the past, that at all events they might provide better for the future. The eyes of all England were upon them that night, for the nation looked to that House in hopes of being relieved from, to say the least, a weak Administration, as one that had sacrificed their best blood, wasted their dearest treasure, and disgraced their country. He would, therefore, only remind the House, in conclusion of these few remarks, and, in the words of one never to be forgotten, that "England expects every man to do his duty."

Mr. T. DUNCOMBE said, he wished to put a question to his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sheffield. The noble Viscount the Secretary of State for the Home Department had told the House that they were called upon to sanction, not only a most dangerous precedent, but also a Motion that could not be carried out; and that if not carried out, the public would be disappointed, and that the real object of the Motion was certainly different from what its terms purported. Now, if that were the case, there could not be a greater fraud on the public, and he, therefore, wished to ask his hon. and learned Friend whether, in the event of his carrying his Motion, he meant to nominate a Committee for the purpose of actual inquiry? Were they to have a Committee upstairs, so that the people might know who were the parties really to blame for the disasters which had occurred? Such an inquiry was due to the friends, to the relations, to the memories of those who had fallen—it was due to the character of this nation—it was due to the working classes from whom the ranks of our Army were recruited. If the effect of carrying the Motion would be only to displace the Gentlemen on the Treasury benches, and make room for another set—if it were to be only a shuffle of the cards, let the people know it at once, but let them not disgrace themselves by such a sham of voting for an inquiry that was not to be carried out.

Mr. ROEBUCK: Sir, I will answer, as it is my duty to do, the question which has been put to me by the hon. Member for Finsbury; and I may say, in reply, that when I framed the Motion before the House I intended to carry into effect the inquiry as expressed in the words under your notice. Nothing which I have seen or heard during this debate has induced me to alter my original determination, and in that determination I still continue. If the House will only grant the Committee, I promise to proceed to its nomination. I hope the House will pardon me if I now proceed to say a few words in reply to some observations which have been made during the debate. The objections which have been made to my Motion, if stripped of the verbiage in which they were couched, amount to this—that, if the Motion be carried, the action of the Government will be paralysed; that inquiry will render inefficient the action of the Minister of War, and will interfere with the command of the army. Now, what are the circumstances under which this inquiry is proposed? Hon. Members themselves admit that the disasters, to which the Motion relates, have occurred. The Ministers themselves acknowledge that the condition of the army is, to use the words of the noble Lord the Member for the City of London, "heart-rending." This House has given Ministers the powers necessary for carrying on the war, and has given to them also an unlimited command of money. In fact, Ministers have made upon this House no demand for the vigorous prosecution of the war to which we have not readily acceded. But what, notwithstanding all those facilities, is the condition of our army, and what the condition of Ministers themselves? Paralyse them! Why, have they not been acting under one continued paralysis? Can they possibly do worse for the future than they have been doing? Judging of the time to come by the experience of the past, can this Resolution, if carried, add in a single degree to the incapacity, the ignorance, and the inefficiency by which the conduct of the war has hitherto been characterised? Ministers, as I have said, not only acknowledge the present disastrous position of the army, but endeavour to defend themselves against the charge of being the authors, in a great measure, of the existing evils, by the declaration that they had sent to Balaklava sufficient stores to maintain our army in comfort. But I want to know whether the statement which was made a few nights ago by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War, to the effect that although we could successfully send our supplies over the 3,000 miles which intervene between this and Balaklava, yet that the obstacles which are opposed to us in the six miles, which the camp is distant from that town, have failed to be overcome—is to be accepted by this House as an excuse for the inefficiency of Ministers? Shall such obstacles be said to have prevailed against the energy and the resources of the people of this country—a country that has covered itself with a network of railways, in which active exertion of every description exists as a law of its inhabitants? We have confided to Her Majesty's Government the destinies of a gallant army and of a great nation. They have betrayed that confidence, and the hopes of the people are now directed to this House. Shall we, too, betray them? To inquire into the condition of our army becomes our duty; and shall it be said that we—when confusion and incapacity upon the part of Ministers have caused that army to melt, as it were, away—refuse, in consequence of some purely technical objection, to take the course which duty imperatively demands? But I am sure, Sir, that this House will not hesitate to grant the proposed inquiry. Let us recollect that for every disaster which for the future may take place we shall be responsible, if the present inquiry be denied. If we refuse this inquiry, we shall be abdicating our functions as the representatives of the people. But we are asked to put off this Committee until the expedition to the Crimea shall be brought to a close; that means, in other words, until not a remnant of our gallant army remains. I say, inquire at once; inquire and save that army which is in jeopardy. The country looks to us for aid in this extremity. Let us not disappoint the expectations of the whole English people.

Question put; The House *divided*:—Ayes 305; Noes 148: Majority 157.

List of the AYES.

Adderley, C. B.
Alcock, T.
Alexander, J.
Arbuthnott, hon. Gen.
Archdall, Capt. M.
Arkwright, G.
Atherton, W.
Bailey, Sir J.
Bailey, C.
Ball, E.
Baldock, E. H.
Barrington, Visct.
Barrow, W. H.
Bateson, T.
Beckett, W.
Bective, Earl of
Bellew, T. A.
Bennet, P.
Bentinck, Lord H.
Bentinck, G. W. P.
Beresford, rt. hon. W.
Berkeley, hon. H. F.
Biggs, W.
Blandford, Marq. of
Boldero, Col.
Booker, T. W.
Brady, J.
Bramley-Moore, J.
Bramston, T. W.
Brocklehurst, J.
Brown, H.
Bruce, C. L. C.
Bruce, H. A.
Buck, L. W.
Buller, Sir J. Y.
Burghley, Lord
Burke, Sir T. J.
Burroughes, H. N.
Butt, G. M.
Butt, I.
Cabbell, B. B.
Campbell, Sir A. I.
Carnac, Sir J. R.
Cavendish, hon. G.
Cayley, E. S.
Cecil, Lord R.
Challis, Ald.
Chambers, M.
Chambers, T.
Chandos, Marq. of
Chelsea, Visct.
Child, S.
Cholmondeley, Lord H.
Christy, S.
Clifford, H. M.
Clinton, Lord C. P.
Clive, R.
Cobbett, J. M.
Cobbold, J. C.
Cocks, T. S.
Codrington, Sir W.
Cole, hon. H. A.
Coles, H. B.
Collier, R. P.
Colvile, C. R.
Compton, H. C.
Conolly, T.
Corry, rt. hon. H. L.
Craufurd, E. H. J.
Crook, J.
Cubitt, Ald.
Davies, D. A. S.
Deedes, W.
Dering, Sir E.
Devereux, J. T.
Disraeli, rt. hon. B.
Dod, J. W.
Duckworth, Sir J. T. B.
Duke, Sir J.
Duncan, Visct.
Duncan, G.
Duncombe, T.
Duncombe, hon. A.
Duncombe, hon. O.
Duncombe, hon. W. E.
Dungarvon, Visct.
Dunlop, A. M.
Dunne, Col.
Du Pre, C. G.
East, Sir J. B.
Ebrington, Visct.
Egerton, Sir P.
Egerton, E. C.
Elmley, Visct.
Farnham, E. B.
Farrer, J.
Fellowes, E.
Filmer, Sir E.
Fitzgerald, W. R. S.
Fitzwilliam, ho.C.W.W.
Fitzwilliam, hon. G. W.
Floyer, J.
Follett, B. S.
Forester, rt. hon. Col.
Forster, C.
Forster, J.
Franklyn, G. W.
French, F.
Frewen, C. H.
Gallwey, Sir W. P.
Galway, Visct.
Gardner, R.
Gaskell, J. M.
George, J.
Gilpin, Col.
Gladstone, Capt.
Goddard, A. L.
Goderich, Visct.

Gooch, Sir E. S.
Graham, Lord M. W.
Granby, Marq. of
Greenall, G.
Greene, J.
Gregson, S.
Grenfell, C. W.
Guinness, R. S.
Gwyn, H.
Hadfield, G.
Hale, R. B.
Halford, Sir H.
Hall, Gen.
Hamilton, Lord C.
Hamilton, G. A.
Hamilton, J. H.
Hanbury, hon. C. S. B.
Harcourt, Col.
Hayes, Sir E.
Headlam, T. E.
Henley, rt. hon. J. W.
Herbert, Sir T.
Heyworth, L.
Hildyard, R. C.
Horsfall, T. B.
Horsman, E.
Hotham, Lord
Hume, W. F.
Hutchins, E. J.
Hutt, W.
Jolliffe, Sir W. G. H.
Jones, Capt.
Keating, R.
Keating, H. S.
Kelly, Sir F.
Kendall, N.
Kennedy, T.
Kerrison, Sir E. C.
King, hon. P. J. L.
Kinnaird, hon. A. F.
Knatchbull, W. F.
Knight, F. W.
Knightley, R.
Knox, Col.
Lacon, Sir E.
Laffan, R. M.
Laing, S.
Langston, W. G.
Langton, H. G.
Laslett, W.
Laurie, J.
Layard, A. H.
Lee, W.
Lennox, Lord A. F.
Lennox, Lord H. G.
Leslie, C. P.
Liddell, H. G.
Liddell, hon. H. T.
Lindsay, hon. Col.
Lindsay, W. S.
Lockhart, W.
Lowther, hon. Col.
Lowther, Capt.
Lytton, Sir G. E. L. B.
Macartney, G.
MacGregor, J.
M'Mahon, P.
M'Taggart, Sir J.
Maddock, Sir H.
Maguire, J. F.
Malins, R.
Mandeville, Visct.
Mangles, R. D.
Manners, Lord G.
March, Earl of
Martin, J.
Massey, W. N.
Masterman, J.
Meux, Sir H.
Miall, E.
Miles, W.
Mills, T.
Milner, W. M. E.
Milton, Visct.
Michell, W.
Mitchell, T. A.
Montgomery, Sir G.
Morgan, O.
Mowatt, F.
Mowbray, J. R.
Mullings, J. R.
Muntz, G. F.
Murrough, J. P.
Neeld, John
Neeld, Jos.
Newark, Visct.
Newdegate, C. N.
Newport, Visct.
North, Col.
Oakes, J. H. P.
Ossulston, Lord
Otway, A. J.
Packe, C. W.
Pakington, rt. hn. Sir J.
Palk, L.
Palmer, Rob.
Paxton, Sir J.
Peacocke, G. M. W.
Pellatt, A.
Percy, hon. J. W.
Perry, Sir T. E.
Phinn, T.
Pigott, F.
Portal, M.
Powlett, Lord W.
Pritchard, J.
Ramsden, Sir J. W.
Reed, J. H.
Ricardo, J. L.
Ricardo, O.
Rich, H.
Robertson, P. F.
Roebuck, J. A.
Rolt, P.
Sandars, G.
Scholefield, W.
Scobell, Capt.
Scott, hon. F.
Seymour, H. D.
Seymour, W. D.
Shafto, R. D.
Shelley, Sir J. V.
Sibthorp, Col.
Smijth, Sir W.
Smith, J. A.
Smith, M. T.
Smith, W. M.
Smyth, J. G.
Spooner, R.
Stafford, A.
Stafford, Marq. of
Stanley, Lord
Strickland, Sir G.
Stuart, W.
Sturt, H. G.
Sullivan, M.
Swift, R.
Taylor, Col.
Thesiger, Sir F.
Thornhill, W. P.
Tollemache, J.
Tomline, G.
Townshend, Capt.
Trollope, rt. hon. Sir J.
Tudway, R. C.
Tyler, Sir G.
Tyrell, Sir J. T.
Uxbridge, Earl of
Vance, J.
Vansittart, G. H.
Verner, Sir W.
Vernon, L. V.
Villiers, hon. F.
Vyvyan, Sir R. R.
Vyse, Col.
Waddington, D.
Waddington, H. S.
Walcott, Adm.
Walmsley, Sir J.
Walpole, rt. hon. S. H.
Walsh, Sir J. B.
Walter, J.
Warner, E.
Watson, W. H.
Welby, Sir G. E.
Whatman, J.
Whiteside, J.
Whitmore, H.
Wilkinson, W. A.
Williams, W.
Willoughby, Sir H.
Wise, J. A.
Woodd, B. T.
Wyndham, H.
Wynn, Sir W. W.
Wynne, W. W. E.
Yorke, hon. E. T.

TELLERS.

Drummond, H.
Berkeley, C.

List of the NOES.

Acland, Sir T. D.
A'Court, C. H. W.
Acton, J.
Adair, H. E.
Adair, R. A. S.
Anderson, Sir J.
Ball, J.
Baring, H. B.
Baring, rt. hn. Sir F. T.
Baring, T.
Barnes, T.
Bass, M. T.
Berkeley, Adm.
Berkeley, C. L. G.
Bethell, Sir R.
Bonham-Carter, J.
Bouverie, hon. E. P.
Brand, hon. H.
Brockman, E. D.
Brotherton, J.
Bruce, Lord E.
Buckley, Gen.
Byng, hon. G. H. C.
Cardwell, rt. hon. E.
Cavendish, hon. C. C.
Cheetham, J.
Clinton, Lord R.
Cockburn, Sir A. J. E.
Cowper, hon. W. F.
Crossley, F.
Currie, R.
Dalkeith, Earl of
Denison, E.
Denison, J. E.
Dent, J. D.
De Vere, S. E.
Drumlanrig, Visct.
Duff, G. S.
Duff, J.
Elcho, Lord
Ellice, rt. hon. E.
Ellice, E.
Elliot, hon. J. E.
Emlyn, Visct.
Fagan, W.
Fenwick, H.
FitzGerald, Sir J.
Fitzgerald, J. D.
Fitzroy, hon. H.
Foley, J. H. H.
Fortescue, C. S.
Freestun, Col.
Freshfield, J. W.
Gladstone, rt. hon. W.
Glyn, G. C.
Gordon, hon. A.
Goulburn, rt. hon. H.
Gower, hon. F. L.
Greene, T.
Grey, rt. hon. Sir G.
Grosvenor, Lord R.
Grosvenor, Earl
Gurney, J. H.
Hall, Sir B.
Hankey, T.
Hanmer, Sir J.
Harcourt, G. G.
Hardinge, hon. C. S.
Hastie, Arch.
Heathcote, Sir W.
Herbert, H. A.
Herbert, rt. hon. S.
Hervey, Lord A.
Heywood, J.
Hogg, Sir J. W.
Howard, hon. C. W. G.
Hughes, W. B.
Ingham, R.
Jackson, W.
Jermyn, Earl
Johnstone, J.
Johnstone, Sir J.
Keogh, W.
Kershaw, J.
Labouchere, rt. hon. H.
Locke, J.
Lockhart, A. E.
Lowe, R.
Luce, T.
Lushington, C. M.
Mackinnon, W. A.
M'Cann, J.
Marjoribanks, D. C.
Marshall, W.
Milligan, R.
Milnes, R. M.
Molesworth, rt. hn. Sir W.
Monck, Visct.

Moncrieff, J.
Morris, D.
Mostyn, hn. T. E. M. L.
North, F.
O'Connell, D.
O'Connell, J.
Osborne, R.
Owen, Sir J.
Paget, Lord A.
Palmer, Round.
Palmerston, Visct.
Patten, J. W.
Peel, Sir R.
Peel, F.
Peel, Gen.
Phillimore, R. J.
Pilkington, J.
Pinney, W.
Price, Sir R.
Rice, E. R.
Roche, E. B.
Russell, F. C. H.
Sadleir, J.
Scrope, G. P.
Seymour, Lord
Shelburne, Earl of
Sheridan, R. B.
Smith, J. B.
Smith, rt. hon. R. V.
Steel, J.
Stephenson, R.
Strutt, rt. hon. E.
Sutton, J. H. M.
Thompson, G.
Thornely, T.
Traill, G.
Tynte, Col. C. J. K.
Vernon, G. E. H.
Villiers, rt. hon. C. P.
Whitbread, S.
Wickham, H. W.
Wigram, L. T.
Wilson, J.
Winnington, Sir T. E.
Wood, rt. hon. Sir C.
Wortley. rt. hon. J. S.
Wrightson, W. B.
Wyndham, W.
Wyvill, M.
Young, rt. hon. Sir J.

TELLERS.
Hayter, rt. hon. W. G.
Mulgrave, Earl of

The House adjourned at a quarter before Two o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Tuesday, January 30, 1855.

MINUTES.] NEW MEMBER SWORN.—For Antrim, Thomas Henry Pakenham, Esq.

PUBLIC BILLS.—1° Royal London Militia; Fisheries (North America); Passengers Act Amendment.

MINISTERIAL INTERREGNUM.

VISCOUNT **PALMERSTON**: I rise, Sir, to propose, considering the present state of public affairs, to which I need not more particularly allude, and, under the circumstances of the House of Lords having adjourned till Thursday, that, consequently, no statement can be made by the head of the Government until that day, that this House should also adjourn until Thursday. Under these circumstances, I do hope that, if there is any public business on the paper, hon. Gentlemen will have the kindness to postpone anything likely to raise a discussion until that day; and I now move that the House at its rising do adjourn till Thursday. I had almost forgotten that there is a Bill which my right hon. Friend the Secretary for the Colonies is anxious to bring in, of great and pressing public importance, inasmuch as it has for its object to carry into effect the treaty lately concluded with the United States relative to the fisheries; the purport of which my right hon. Friend will explain at another opportunity. It is of great importance with a view to colonial arrangements that no time should be lost in bringing in the Bill, and I trust, when it is brought in, the House will pass it as quickly as possible. If my right hon. Friend obtains permission to introduce the Bill, he will fix the second reading for Thursday next.

Question, "That the House at rising do adjourn till *Thursday*" put and *agreed to.*

FISHERIES (NORTH AMERICA) BILL.

MR. **FREDERICK PEEL** then obtained leave to bring in two Bills—namely, a Bill to carry into effect a Treaty between Her Majesty and the United States; and the other a Bill to amend the Law relating to the Carriage of Passengers by Sea.

Bills read 1°.

The House adjourned at a quarter before Five o'clock till *Thursday.*

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Thursday, February 1, 1855.

MINUTES.] PUBLIC BILLS.—2ª Cathedral Appointments Act Continuance.

RESIGNATION OF MINISTERS—EXPLANATIONS.

THE EARL OF **ABERDEEN**: My Lords, after the vote of the House of Commons on Monday night, your Lordships will readily imagine that Her Majesty's Ministers at once resolved to place their resignation in the hands of Her Majesty. I therefore was commissioned by all the Members of the Cabinet to take their resignations for the purpose of laying them before Her Majesty, who was graciously pleased to accept them. We therefore now only hold our places until our successors shall be appointed.

My Lords, I wish to say that in opposing the vote of Monday night, and in thinking it in some degree unconstitutional and otherwise liable to many objections, it is not my object, nor was it our desire, to preclude any inquiry into our conduct. An impartial inquiry, I believe, will fully establish that no indifference has existed to the wants of our army in the Crimea, or any absence of exertion in preparing for the supply of those wants and for promoting the efficiency of its condition. That, I believe, will be the result of an impartial inquiry into this subject; and especially I must consider that my noble Friend, the noble Duke near me (the Duke of Newcastle), has met with great injustice. It is my conviction that his conduct, the more it is inquired into, will be found marked by a degree of assiduity and labour, attention and interest for the duties of his office, which has never been exceeded, nor indeed can be. My Lords, I am not at all surprised at the feeling which generally prevails throughout the country. The public, although they may not always reason justly, yet always feel deeply and strongly. They see that misfortunes have occurred beyond the ordinary course of the calamities of war, and they very naturally turn to the Government as the object of censure, as it is to it that they look for the efficiency of the army and the right management of the war. I make no complaint of this. I think it perfectly natural, and submit to the natural consequences. But, my Lords, admitting the sufferings and privations which our troops have endured in the Crimea, I must say that the representations which have been made have been very greatly exaggerated. I do not mean as to individual suffering—far from it—for I know that that has existed in a degree that has been most painful and heartrending; what I mean is, that the inference that has been drawn as to our military position has been grossly exaggerated. My Lords, I see no cause whatever for discouragement or dismay in looking at that position; on the contrary, I see every reason to indulge sanguine hopes of ultimate success. My Lords, in the first place, the condition of our forces has recently greatly improved; stores, provisions, and all appliances have been recently increased, and very much tended to improve the actual condition of our own soldiers. Again, our great Ally, the Emperor of the French, has told his Legislative Body, and through it has told Europe, that his army consists of 581,000 men; and since then he has ordered an additional levy of 140,000 men. With such a force as this, animated by the determined zeal with which he has espoused the cause in which we are both engaged—I say that with such a force as this, if employed in any degree in the same proportion in which we have devoted our own army to this service, we are entitled to look with great confidence to the result of the war. My Lords, we have very recently concluded a treaty with the King of Sardinia, by which is placed at our disposal, for immediate embarkation to the Crimea, a force of 15,000 admirable troops to be placed under the command of Lord Raglan. That is a most valuable and important addition to our forces in the Crimea. Further than this, my Lords, we have concluded a treaty with Austria, which is now brought to a point from which the most important advantages may be confidently anticipated. My Lords, we have come to an understanding with the Austrian Government upon the terms of peace to be proposed to the Emperor of Russia. The Austrian Cabinet happily has agreed to adopt those proposals; and the Russian Minister has accepted, or proposed to accept, those conditions, as proposed and understood by the Allied Powers. Now, my Lords, Austria has also engaged that if those terms be not accepted, and do not lead to the conclusion of a peace, she will be prepared to join her military efforts with our own. Now, my Lords, I say we have then, the alternative of a peace by which we shall acquire all the objects for which we are contending; or we shall receive the assistance of that great military Power whose army is now raised to the amount of 500,000 men. With these prospects, my Lords, it is impossible for me to entertain apprehensions—unworthy apprehensions—notwithstanding the casualties to which war is always subject. This, my Lords, is our military prospect. I shall not at this time detain your Lordships by any review of the state in which the country at the present moment stands with respect to its internal condition. I may advert undoubtedly to what has been accomplished in the course of the last two years, in which many measures of high importance have been adopted. Especially I may advert to that solid system of finance, established by the wisdom and supported by the unrivalled eloquence of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, by which the prosperity of this country, notwithstanding the outbreak of war, has been maintained undiminished; and all the transactions of commerce have subsisted uninterrupted to a degree hitherto utterly unknown in a state of war. I may also refer to the condition of Her Majesty's Navy, and the excellent Administration by which it has been brought into the admirable condition in which we now find it, and against which not a single well-grounded objection can be alleged. My Lords, I have already instanced as examples of political success the advantageous treaty we have concluded with Sardinia for the immediate acquisition of such a valuable force, and the important treaty with Austria. That is enough to show your Lordships the fruit of the exertions and ability in negotiation of my noble Friend near me, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs (the Earl of Clarendon). It has been especially his duty to attend to these important matters, and I may say, my Lords, that the treaty with Austria has been throughout conducted with a degree of ability, caution and prudence, that really, as far as my experience has extended, is quite unprecedented. And here I cannot but say that we have full reason to place the most entire confidence in the consistency and good faith of the Austrian Government. From the first, without disguising their ardent desire to preserve peace, they have never proposed to do it by the sacrifice of any of those great European interests for which we are both contending; and, therefore, having proceeded with such prudence and caution as they have done throughout the whole of the transactions, I feel that we have a good right to rely upon their firmness and good faith in the course they have taken. My Lords, I have said that I would not particularly advert to any of the legislative measures passed in the course of the last two years—which was not certainly so fruitful of legislative measures as some preceding years, although many most valuable measures were adopted last Session, quite sufficient to have illustrated any Session of Parliament, and they will be appreciated by the calm judgment of after times. My Lords, the present want of the country is a strong Administration, and how that is to be supplied it is not for me to say. Rumour has pointed very confidently to the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) as having been commanded by Her Majesty to undertake the formation of an Administration. Seeing him in his place, I presume this is not the case. But be this as it may, the necessity exists, and I trust that by the patriotism of those who may be called upon it will ultimately be effected. I can only say for myself, and I believe for my colleagues, that any Administration that is formed, which shall be presented by the Queen for the approbation of Parliament, shall receive from us that support which in the present crisis is so urgently required by the great interests of the country. I conclude by declaring solemnly to your Lordships that no views of mine shall be allowed to stand in the way of any Government that may be deemed fit to cope with these exigencies, and that to the new Administration, as soon as it shall be formed, I will give every support in my power. My Lords, I do trust that whatever Government may be formed will carry on this war with vigour and effect, and with a view to the only legitimate end of the war—a speedy arrival at a state of peace. I trust that, keeping steadily in view the real objects of the war, not being diverted by wild and imaginary objects, or animated by merely vindictive feelings, such a Government will, as soon as the real objects of the war shall be attained, listen to the dictates of humanity and of true policy, and lose no time in realising the advantages of peace, as soon as they can honourably attain that object. My Lords, I do not know that I have any reason for detaining you further; I rose to announce a fact which your Lordships are all acquainted with already—that we only hold our offices till our successors are appointed.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: My Lords, I can assure your Lordships that I most devoutly wish I could upon this occasion follow the usual course of Ministers who have tendered their resignations, and content myself with the explanation that has just been given by my noble Friend who was lately at the head of the Administration. But, my Lords, there are two reasons why I wish for a short time to trouble your Lordships whilst I depart from this usual practice. In the first place, it would have been my duty, under any circumstances—as I will presently explain—whatever might have been the result of the division in the House of Commons on Monday night, to have made a statement on my own behalf to your Lordships. But there is another reason which induced me in answering the speech of my noble Friend (Earl Grey) the last time the House met, with respect to the constitution of the War Departments, to state to your Lordships that on another occasion I should wish to make a personal explanation. It is in consequence of statements which have been made in the other House of Parliament by the noble Lord the late President of the Council, which I cannot but feel have so materially affected my position as a public man, that I feel it incumbent on me, however inconvenient, or however personally painful it may be, to make some explanation to your Lordships.

My Lords, no man can feel more than I do the inconvenience of thrusting upon Parliament or the public what I may call domestic differences between colleagues in a Cabinet, even at the moment of its separation; but in the speech to which I have referred, the noble Lord placed the justification of the course he had taken so almost exclusively upon my acceptance of, and subsequent continuance in, the office of Secretary of State for War, that I feel it necessary to state to your Lordships some omissions which were made by the noble Lord, and to offer some explanations consequent upon words which fell from him. The noble Lord said, in one of the letters he addressed to my noble Friend (the Earl of Aberdeen), and which he read to the other House of Parliament, that when the two Secretaryships of State were divided, he yielded to my "strong wish" that I should occupy the War Department; thereby undoubtedly implying that he had been opposed to that course, that he had remonstrated against it, and had been overruled. My Lords, I venture to say that such was not the case; and if I now enter into any explanations with respect to what took place in the Cabinet, I beg to say that I have followed the proper course, and have applied to my Sovereign for permission to refer to those occurrences—without which permission, undoubtedly, by the oath which, in common with others Her Majesty's Councillors, I have taken, I should be precluded from doing so.

My Lords, in the Cabinet at which it was decided that the two offices of Secretary of State for the Colonies and Secretary of State for War should be divided, a discussion took place, in which I felt it my duty to point out to the Cabinet the difficulties which would follow upon that separation, unless, before it took place the duties of the new secretaryship were accurately defined and some determinate plan laid down. I stated to the noble Lord at that time that I thought that he, in advocating that measure, ought to have presented us with such a definite plan. I told him that I, incumbered at the moment as I was with the business of two such laborious offices, had really no time to consider the organisation of departments, and that I regretted that, before the measure was proposed, some distinct plan had not been matured. But the noble Lord expressed his opinion that, in deference to the wishes of Parliament, that change should be immediately adopted. The measure was, therefore, determined upon by the Cabinet; and I am sure the noble Lord cannot have forgotten that, so far from his being compelled to yield to my wishes—I am confident, moreover, that none of my late colleagues who sit near me can have forgotten—that at the conclusion of that discussion my last words were—"The Cabinet having now decided that the two secretaryships shall be divided, all that I can say, as far as I am personally concerned, is, that I am perfectly ready to retain either or neither." So much, then, was my "strong wish" as to the occupation of the office of Secretary for War referred to by the noble Lord. My Lords, I can only say that in any discussion of which I heard, I never understood for one moment that the noble Lord had expressed any desire whatever that my noble Friend (Lord Palmerston) should occupy the War Department. I did hear—and I was so informed by my noble Friend lately at the head of the Government—that, for a time at least, the noble Lord himself had contemplated the possibility of his taking that department; and most undoubtedly, if that had been the case, I should never for an instant have thought of standing in his way. But, my Lords, I do wish that this may be completely understood—that I not only did not express a "strong wish" as to one particular office, but that I did express a perfect readiness to retain either of those offices, or neither, according as my colleagues might think best for the public service to advise Her Majesty—I do not at the same time hesitate to say that when, to the best of my belief and knowledge, no other Member of the Cabinet was put forward to occupy the department of Secretary for War, I did not shrink from the duty of assuming it, and I certainly did feel that I should act very unworthily, having then held these seals for three months, if I shrunk from what I knew to be the post of difficulty and danger. My Lords, when I use this expression—when I say "the post of difficulty and danger"—I may appeal to many of my private Friends in this House and elsewhere as to the observations I made, when told by them, as I frequently was, that I had done unwisely in leaving a department where they were kind enough—perhaps partial enough—to say that I had formed some slight reputation. My answer to them was—"In leaving the Colonial Office I am well aware of what I have done; I know that in this new department, whatever success may attend our arms, I shall never derive any credit; and this, too, I well know, that if there should be disaster, upon me alone will come the blame and the public indignation." My Lords, that I said this there are many of yourselves who can testify. [The Earl of HARDWICKE: Hear, hear.] My noble Friend is generous enough to cheer, and I recollect, though I did not a moment ago, that he was amongst those to whom I made this observation. Well, my Lords, I think I have said enough to show to your Lordships how unjust have been the imputations that have been cast upon me in Parliament and elsewhere, that my presumption, my self-love, induced me to insist upon taking the Secretaryship for War. I hope I have sufficiently explained to your Lordships the conduct which has been described by some as "arrogance," and by the noble Lord, to whom I have referred, invested with the more patronising phrase of "commendable ambition."

I will pass over, in the correspondence which took place between my noble Friend lately at the head of the Government and the noble Lord the late President of the Council, the letter which he addressed to my noble Friend on the 18th of November last, as to which he says—

> "It was my intention in writing the letter to avoid throwing any blame upon the Duke of Newcastle; indeed, I think he deserves very great credit for the exertions he has made."

My Lords, I do not wish to dwell upon that letter, or attach any importance to it, because the noble Lord has himself intimated, in the speech to which I am referring, that the light in which I must consider that letter is one which our friends on the other side of the Atlantic are pleased to designate by the name of "soft sawder," since he now states that at the very time when he spoke in those terms of me his primary object was my removal from the office I held. This was his object:—"*si possis, suaviter; si non, quocumque modo.*" Then, my Lords, the noble Lord had read extracts from those letters which make it absolutely necessary for me both to make some comments upon them and to read further extracts in explanation. And I cannot but express my surprise—when the whole gist of that speech was to represent my determination to hold the office of Secretary for War and my resolution to retain it—that the noble Lord did not quote the following sentence of the letter of my noble Friend (the Earl of Aberdeen) dated the 21st of November, in answer to one which he, that day I think, received from the noble Lord the President of the Council. The very beginning of that letter is in these words—

> "I have shown your letter to the Duke of Newcastle, and also to Sidney Herbert; they both, as might have been expected, strongly urged me to adopt any such arrangement with respect to their offices as might be thought most conducive to the public service."

My Lords, I have shown you, first, that I did not insist upon keeping the seals of the War Department; and I have to state to you now, that when my noble Friend placed that letter of the noble Lord in my hands, what my answer to him was. I cannot, perhaps, state precisely what my answer was, but it was to this effect:—"Don't give Lord John Russell any pretext for quitting the Government; on no account resist his wish to remove me from that office; do with me as is best for the public service; in that way you will gratify me most—in that way you will be serving the Queen best."

My Lords, the next incident to which I have to refer in the speech of the noble Lord is that where, after having read a portion of one of the letters of my noble Friend, he used these words:—"I then went on to show some instances of errors that had been committed," and then he proceeded to read other extracts. Now, my Lords, the impression upon the public mind must, of course, be that those errors were of some grave character—that they involved the safety of the troops in the Crimea—and that as a consequence to them is, perhaps, to be attributed the disastrous sickness that has prevailed. The noble Lord did not read the complaints he then made of these errors; but, with your Lordships' permission, I will read them now. The letter is dated the 28th of November, and in it he says—

> "I will give you an instance but too pregnant with warning. Early in October I wrote to the Duke of Newcastle on the subject of transferring the 97th Regiment, then at the Piræus, to the Crimea. He informed me in answer that he had also wished to do so, and that he had also wished to send between 2,000 and 3,000 men, the drafts of various regiments, to the Crimea. Now, why was he not able to carry his intentions into effect? Because he could not remove the obstacles put in his way by other departments, and because the Prime Minister did not at once overcome those obstacles. At a much later time the 97th has moved, and it is only to-day that I see by a telegraphic despatch from Lord Stratford, dated on the 18th instant, that the *Orinoco*, which conveys that regiment, had left Constantinople for the Crimea. But, in the meantime, Lord Raglan had reported that he wished he had been able to place in the position of Balaklava, on the 26th of

October, a more considerable force; and, also, that on the 5th of November, the heights of Inkerman were defended by no more than 8,000 British infantry. What can be done by a single British regiment was seen on the 5th of October, when the 93rd alone saved the position of Balaklava by their firmness and gallantry. Had 5,000 more men been at Lord Raglan's disposal on the 25th of October, and the 5th of November, how much more fruitful, though not more glorious, might have been those memorable days."

My Lords, these were errors which I was supposed to have committed; and now let me give you an explanation of those errors—let me give to you the explanation which I gave in writing, I believe by return of post, in answer to this accusation of the noble Lord. I informed him that, as regarded the 97th Regiment, a long while—several days at any rate—before I received his letter it had been my desire to send forward that noble regiment to the aid of Lord Raglan in the Crimea, and that I had applied to my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to know whether, in his opinion, it would be safe to remove that regiment from the Piræus, and whether the objects for which it had been sent there had been sufficiently attained to do so. In answer my noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) produced a communication he had received, I think, on that day, but, at all events, very recently, in which the greatest stress was laid upon the maintenance of the English and French forces in the Piræus, and we were told that if the forces were withdrawn the consequences, to prevent which we sent those forces there, would immediately occur. That, my Lords, is my explanation; and I ask will any man maintain that a Secretary of War would have been justified, after such a statement from his brother Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in saying, on his own *ipse dixit*, that he would remove the regiment at all hazards from the Piræus, and send it to the Crimea? The noble Lord says the regiment was subsequently removed; it was subsequently removed—and why? Because a few weeks afterwards I pressed again on my noble Friend to inform me the first moment that a change could be effected; and he having written in answer to my question on the day I made the application, that it was almost utterly impossible to part with the whole of the military force in the Piræus, yet that that force might be somewhat reduced, I immediately sent directions to Malta that one of three regiments there—whichever the general commanding might consider best fitted for the purpose from the qualifications of the officers, and which should be 600 strong—should be sent to the Piræus, in order that the 97th, which was 1,000 strong, might be sent to the Crimea.

With regard to the second error attributed to me—that I was pressed to send 2,000 or 3,000 men who were ready to proceed as draughts to the different regiments in the Crimea, but that I declined to do so—there were two reasons for declining to do so, which I also explained in answer to the noble Lord, to show him why those draughts were not sent. One was that Lord Raglan himself reported that the men in the last draughts sent out were composed of such young men that on being exposed to the cholera, which at that period was raging, they had fallen sick and died rapidly; and he said, that unless subsequent pressure should ensue, he deprecated the practice of sending those young soldiers out before they were made fitter for service. There was another reason, however, for the course which I pursued, and it was this; that at that moment we had exhausted all the steam transports which could at that time be obtained in the country; of course, others were expected from the Colonies and from other parts of the world; but my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty was not able at that moment to supply me with any but sailing transports for the conveyance of those troops to the Crimea. My Lords, the statement, therefore, is perfectly correct that these errors, as the noble Lord has called them, were laid before me, but the charge of committing those errors was also answered; and although, on the 28th of November, those errors were brought forward as a reason why I ought to leave the War Office at a date anterior to that, but subsequent to my answer, I had the better fortune to satisfy the noble Lord; for in the last letter which I received from him before he returned to town he wrote the words which I am now about to read. This letter, let me observe, was written at a time when the noble Lord, as he has stated, and other Members of the Government, had retired to different parts of the country for the purposes of health. I do not complain of any of my noble Friends for having done so, or of the noble Lord for having done so; but it was not my good fortune to be able to resort, for the purposes of health, or for any other purpose, to any part of the country. Day by day and hour by hour, during the whole of the year 1854, it was my duty to remain in town, and exert myself to the best of my ability. I shall now read the conclusion of the letter of the noble Lord which finished the correspondence with reference to these errors. The date is the 8th of October; and he writes to me, "You have done all that could be done, and I am sanguine of success." The noble Lord was sanguine of success, and he thought I had done all that could be done.

Now, my Lords, let me explain why, after my proposal to my noble Friend (the Earl of Aberdeen) with reference to my readiness to leave office, he did not accept my proposal. I did not say that I refused an exchange of office, disagreeable as it undoubtedly would have been to me to take such a course—inconvenient as I believe, under ordinary circumstances, it to be for the country's services to do so, implying, as it would, arrangements that are not perhaps very obvious to the public—I then made no exception on that ground. I say, then, my Lords, what was the reason my noble Friend (the Earl of Aberdeen) did not avail himself of the offer I made? He did not act—as would appear from the statement that was made in the House of Commons—on his own mere responsibility; he did not take upon himself to act from any private feeling, or any anxiety with regard to me, although I knew his kindly feelings towards me;—he did not take upon himself, on that ground, to reject the proposal, but he laid the subject before the whole of our colleagues, and the proposal was—it is not for me to say whether rightly or wrongly—disapproved of by the whole of them.

My Lords, the last letter of the series that passed between us is dated the 3rd of December, and the purport of that letter is that the noble Lord retained his original opinion, and that he would again bring the subject before the Cabinet. I should add it was not, however, brought formally before it. Parliament met about ten days afterwards, on the 12th of December, and it was my duty to make a long statement to your Lordships in vindication of the conduct of the Government, and more especially of the department which had been under my administration. My right hon. Friend the Secretary at War made a similar statement in the House of Commons. A debate took place in each House; and the consequence was—though probably noble Lords opposite will not entirely agree with me in that opinion—to leave undoubtedly the impression upon the minds of the Government, and of the friends of the Government in both Houses, that the result of the debate was satisfactory as regarded the conduct of the Government.

Three days afterwards, on the 16th of December, a Cabinet was held, and at the close of that Cabinet I exchanged observations with one, two, or three of my colleagues, who said that from the conduct of the noble Lord in the Cabinet that day, and the interest he had shown in all the matters discussed before us, they felt very confident that he had abandoned the opinion he had before entertained and expressed. But we were not long left, my Lords, to conjecture upon this subject; for in the course of that very afternoon, in a conversation with my noble Friend at the head of the Government he told him expressly that he had changed his views, and abandoned any wish for a change. Well, my Lords, I really would not wish to go further, or to carry the matter further, but my noble Friend (the Earl of Aberdeen) reminds me that I have made an omission, to which I beg to refer, though I feel that in a matter which is so personal to myself, and which is perhaps more interesting to me than to your Lordships, I am hardly justified in trespassing at such a length on your indulgence. My noble Friend reminds me that the reason the noble Lord assigned for his abandonment of his proposal was, that not being satisfied perhaps with the opinions he had heard from the faithful and attached friends he had in the Cabinet, he had consulted another friend—and I can only say that, from my knowledge of the noble Lord he consulted (Lord Panmure?), a better adviser he could not possibly have taken—the noble Lord consulted him on the subject, and he told my noble Friend at the head of the Government that he was convinced by the arguments that noble Lord had laid before him that he was satisfied, and that his views were changed.

My Lords, having thus disposed of the personal part of the question, the noble Lord proceeded to discuss in his place in the other House the question with reference to the measures that have been taken. He said he would have been glad to have opposed the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck), if he could have said that measures had been taken, or that arrangements were in progress to remedy the evils complained of. I will read to your Lordships his own words. The noble Lord declined to oppose the Motion "because he could not say that measures had been taken, or that arrangements were in progress, by which those evils would be remedied, and by which the administration of the war would be vigorously prosecuted." Now, my Lords, I think the just and fair inference from that statement is, that the noble Lord had proposed to his colleagues measures that had been objected to, or that he had suggested arrangements which his colleagues were unwilling to adopt. I can only say, my Lords, that to the best of my belief neither was the case. I know of no measures proposed by the noble Lord that were objected to; I know of no proposals that he made which were not accepted—unless it be one. That proposal he refers to himself in this form. He said that at a Cabinet which was held on the Saturday preceding the Tuesday, the day of Mr. Roebuck's notice and the noble Lord's resignation, arrangements were made by the Cabinet by which the mode in which the business of the War Department had been for some time conducted, and to which I referred on Monday last—namely, by calling together the heads of the military departments at my office, and conducting the business somewhat in the form of a Board, though not with the formalities and strict rules of a Board—should be altered. A discussion having taken place in the Cabinet, and an arrangement having been proposed, by which greater formality would be given to these Boards, and that they should be regularly constituted either by a Minute or by an Order in Council, I assure your Lordships, that, though I differed a good deal in opinion, as I stated the other night, from my noble Friend (Earl Grey) when he brought forward a Motion on the subject, I consented to the proposition made in the Cabinet; the opinion in favour of the constitution of the Board prevailed, and it was agreed that, either by a Minute or by an Order in Council, the Board should be constituted. It was understood that that Board was to consist of the Secretary of State for War, the Secretary at War, the Commander in Chief, and the Master General of the Ordnance. The noble Lord said that this question had been brought before the Cabinet, and he implied that it had been decided upon adversely to his opinion. That was not exactly so expressed by the noble Lord, but that, I think, is the inference which is to be

The Duke of Newcastle

drawn. Now, my Lords, the proposal was brought forward by the noble Lord himself, and, as I said before, it was agreed to after some discussion and argument, and we had every reason to believe that the noble Lord was entirely a consenting party; but in the course of the evening he sent to my noble Friend at the head of the Government a communication, to which he also referred, though he did not quote it; but, as it is of some importance to my case, I am afraid I must trouble your Lordships with it. It is as follows—

"ARMY DEPARTMENTS.

"Jan. 22, 1855.

"The Committee of the House of Commons on Army and Navy Expenditure recommended that the Army departments should be simplified and consolidated. What is now proposed is, that there should be a Board consisting of—1, Secretary of State; 2, Secretary at War; 3, Master General of Ordnance; 4, Commander in Chief; 5, Inspector General of Fortifications.

"It is contemplated that there shall exist at the same time a Board of Ordnance, consisting of —1, The Master General; 2, The Storekeeper General; 3, The Surveyor General; 4, The Clerk of the Ordnance; under whose direction the Inspector General of Fortifications will remain. It seems obvious that these two Boards, acting at one and the same time, instead of consolidation and simplification, would produce complication, disorder, and delay. There are but two modes by which unity of direction and rapidity of action can be procured. The one is to give the Secretary of State the entire direction of all existing offices and boards connected with the Army; the other is, to make a Board, with the Secretary of State at the head, absorbing the Board of Ordnance, and controlling the whole civil and military management of our military force. The constitution of this Board and its functions would be—

"1. The Secretary of State, to preside over the Board and be responsible to Parliament.

"2. The Secretary at War, to pay the Army and control its finances.

"3. The Master General of the Ordnance, to arm the Army and the Navy.

"4. The Commander in Chief, to command the Army.

"5. The Clerk, Storekeeper, and Surveyor of the Ordnance, all in one, to lodge the Army.

"6. The Commissary General, to clothe and feed the Army.

"This is nearly the Duke of Richmond's plan.

"J. RUSSELL."

My Lords, the noble Lord said in his statement in the other House, that he had no reason to think that his views would be adopted. He informed my noble Friend that he would bring forward the proposal at the Cabinet that would sit on the day subsequent to the day he eventually resigned. This we expected; and I can only say that when the noble Lord says he had no reason to think his views would be adopted, I most positively say he had no reason to think his views would be rejected; because the first step my noble Friend took, on receiving the communication I have read, accompanied by the intimation from the noble Lord that he should propose it on a subsequent day, was after having shown it to my right hon. Friend the Secretary at War, to send it to me. My answer to it was this—that there are two proposals in this paper that differ from the arrangements of the Cabinet on Saturday. One was, to do away with the Board of Ordnance, in consequence of the constitution of the superior Board; the other was, to add two additional members to the Board beyond those proposed in the Cabinet. I said, as to the first proposal, I thought it manifestly right. It was obviously according to my views, who am not much attached to Boards, and I added, that if you constitute a superior Board, there could be no fear in doing away with an inferior one; and I approved of the noble Lord's proposal. I said, with regard to the second proposal, of having two additional members on the Board, that I thought it would be unadvisable. I did not think one of the officers named to be necessary; and with regard to the sixth member—the Commissary General—proposed to be added, no such officer exists, the office having been abolished several years ago. I presume that by Commissary General the noble Lord meant Commissary-in-chief, for there was formerly such an officer to feed our army, but the office has been abolished some time since, and there is no officer now called a Commissary General, except those, of whom there are many, whose functions are to feed the army in the field. Therefore, so far as the main and principal portion of the noble Lord's proposition was concerned, it met with entire approval; and, as regarded the second portion, the only reason against its being carried into effect was, that, with respect to one of the appointments, it was impracticable, because no such officer as that referred to existed. My Lords, I believe that, so far from the noble Lord having reason to complain of his views connected with the war not being carried out, I know, as I have already said, of no proposal of his that was rejected; and I may say, with equal truth, that I know of no objection which was made by him that was overruled. My Lords, I need hardly say that, on such an important question as the conduct of the war, difference of opinion on incidental matters of course took place; but this I must say, that if I were to point out the member of the Cabinet from whom I have received the most general assent to my views when discussions took place, it was the noble Lord. I should say, that I received the most kind and generous support from all my colleagues on all occasions—but as regards identity of views, I would be inclined to say there was more identity of opinion, on any question that was raised, between the noble Lord and myself than between me and any other Member of the Cabinet.

My Lords, I have stated the ready way in which I consented to yield up my office, and even to the abandonment of views I entertained as to the constitution of the Board. Perhaps your Lordships may think that, entertaining the opinion I did, I ought to have resisted more strongly. In the first place, I cannot say that I should, under any circumstances, have felt bound to do so; but, in the next place, I was in a position that rendered it peculiarly improper for me to interfere against the general views and feelings of the Cabinet. My Lords, notwithstanding the arrogance, the self-love, the presumption, which I am supposed to have exhibited, I was not unaware—God knows it would have been strange if I had been—that the public feeling had been aroused strongly against my administration of the war. Shortly before Parliament met, on Tuesday, the 23rd of January, I was convinced that the feeling in the public mind would become so strong that it would be impossible for me, in justice to the public service, to continue to occupy the office I held. My Lords, the meeting of Parliament was close at hand; and I felt that if I had read rightly the history of constitutional government, it was not proper at such a moment to anticipate the verdict of Parliament, and to run away from the responsibilities and duties which I had undertaken. The noble Lord, in his statement in reference to the course he had taken, said, that until the notice was given by Mr. Roebuck, he had not fully considered the course which he ought to take. My Lords, I had. I had maturely considered it; and whilst I made up my mind that my official career was practically brought to a close, I resolved also that I would face the ordeal of censure in your Lordships' House, and would submit my conduct of the administration of the War Department to the judgment of the House of Commons. But, my Lords, I thought it was right that I should announce my determination; and a few days before the meeting of Parliament I told my noble Friend at the head of the Government—I did not tell my other colleagues, because I did not think it right to do so; and I think, my Lords, you will appreciate my feelings and motives in taking that course—that whatever might be the result of the discussion in this House or in the House of Commons—whether the Government should succeed by large majorities in overcoming resistance and reproach, or whether they failed—I should equally tender my resignation as soon as that judgment should be given and the verdict of Parliament should have been pronounced. My Lords, this, no doubt, was the origin of the rumour to which the noble Lord referred at the close of his statement, when he said he had heard that that arrangement which my noble Friend at the head of the Government had found it impossible to recommend in November he had found it perfectly consistent with his honour to adopt in January. I am sorry that any such statement should have been made, because, if any such rumour existed, it was not correct. It was true, as I have stated to your Lordships, that I had announced my intention to resign my office; but, so far from having announced any intention to be a party to any such arrangement as that referred to, I told my noble Friend in the first instance, and I told also my noble and right hon. Friends in the Cabinet, when the secession of Lord John Russell made it necessary that my intentions should be declared, that I had made up my mind that I would retire and that I would not take another office; that I would not either change offices with my noble Friend (Lord Palmerston) nor assume that which had just been quitted by Lord J. Russell; that I would leave the Cabinet; but as to changing offices I positively and entirely refused it. And why? I admit that, undoubtedly, personal feeling might to some extent have influenced me, but I hope that I was also actuated by a higher and more important consideration. I was confident the public interest would be served by the course I resolved to take; because, after the obloquy that had been heaped upon me, it was undesirable that I should continue to be a member of any Cabinet, and that my presence in the Government would be a cause of weakness, and not of strength. I announced, therefore, that if the Government should succeed in the discussion in the House of Commons, I in future should take my seat on one of the benches not occupied by those in office, but that I would be here night by night when discussions took place, ready to defend the policy to which I had been a party; because, of course, I felt myself as much bound to do so as if I had continued to occupy my office.

Now, my Lords, I have done with the statement of the noble Lord which has led to this explanation on my part. My Lords, various accusations are made against me, of which one of the most prominent is that of incapacity. My Lords, I am the last man who ought to express any opinion on that point. I am ready to leave that in the hands of others, perfectly conscious of many defects. I know that this charge of incapacity is with the public a favourite explanation of every political misfortune; and whether it may be peculiarly justified in my case, or may be attributable to the cause to which I have referred, I leave to the verdict of others. But, my Lords, another charge has been made against me—a charge which I confess I have felt deeply, and which I continue to feel. I have been charged with indolence and indifference. My Lords, as regards the charge of indolence, I have only to say that the public have had, at all events, every hour and every minute of my time. Not one hour of recreation or of amusement have I presumed to think I was entitled to take. My Lords, the other charge, that of indifference, is still more painful to me. Indifference, my Lords!—to what? Indifference to the honour of the country—indifference to the success and to the safety of our army! My Lords, I have myself, like many who listen to me, two dear hostages for my interest in the welfare of the military and naval services of the country to allow of such a sentiment. I have two sons engaged in those two services, and that alone, I think, would be sufficient to prevent me from being indifferent; but, my Lords, as a Minister—as a man—I should be unworthy to stand in any assembly, if the charge of indifference under such circumstances could be truly made against me. Many a sleepless night I have passed, my Lords, thinking over the evils which the public think and say I could have cured; and which, God knows, I would have cured if it had been within my power. Indolence and indifference are not charges that can truly be brought against me. I deny the charges; and I trust that my countrymen will before long be satisfied, whatever they think of my capacity, that there is no ground for fixing this unjust stigma upon me.

As regards what I have done during my official administration, I believe — I trust and hope, at least — that I shall be one who will derive some advantage from the investigation of the Committee which the House of Commons has decided to appoint. I wish the Government may derive advantage from it, and I wish I could think that the public also would derive some advantage from it; but I can only say that, so far as I am individually concerned, I shall rejoice to lay before it, or any other tribunal, everything I have done, with perfect fairness and openness.

My Lords, I am not now about to enter into any defence of the conduct of the war. My noble and learned Friend opposite (Lord Lyndhurst) has a Motion on the subject for Monday next; and though the circumstance of a Government being in existence on that day may be doubtful, he will, I presume, still persevere in that Motion, and on that occasion I shall be prepared to meet it. I am as little inclined to shrink from an attack now, when I have quitted office, as I was when I held it. I will not shelter myself, whenever that Motion comes on, by the circumstance of my resignation. I will, if I have health, be here to make an answer to my noble and learned Friend, on whatever side of the House I may sit, and he may be assured I shall not shrink from meeting him. I shall be ready to defend, whenever it is assailed, the conduct of the Government—the conduct, in the first place, of my own administration—and the conduct, as involved with me of the whole of the Cabinet, Lord John Russell included. My Lords, your Lordships shall not hear any complaint from me with reference to the treatment I have met either in Parliament or out of it. In reference to that, I have only to say, that whoever may be my successor in the office which I have held, he shall meet with no ungenerous treatment from me. My Lords, I know that I have in both Houses of Parliament many bitter political opponents; I trust I have few, if any, personal enemies. But if I have a personal enemy, I do not except him from the promise I now make; and to him, in the same manner as to a friend, I will offer every assistance in my power. My Lords, even if the office should be held by that Gentleman who—as we were informed the other night in the other House of Parliament, went over from the Ministerial side to the right hon. Gentleman the leader of the Opposition—went over some weeks ago to him and asked him whether he would be a party to a vote of censure, not on the Government, but on me as an individual member of that Government—even if, I say, that hon. Gentleman should be War Minister, him will I treat with the utmost possible consideration, and my best assistance will I tender to him who prompted that message. Whatever may be my feelings towards the man, I shall be ready, as in duty bound to the public, to render every assistance in my power to the Minister. Whoever may succeed me, I will endeavour to make his path as easy in this House and out of it as it may lie in my power; and if my past experience can be of any value to my successor, here in my place in Parliament I frankly and unreservedly tender it to him. If my past experience can be of the slightest value to him, he shall have it, whether he takes my acts as a warning or as an example. He shall meet from me no petty feelings of jealousy—I am conscious that the crisis is too important, and the interests at this moment involved too great, for the indulgence of any such contemptible feeling. Out of office, I shall rejoice in the success of any man who shall succeed me as War Minister, whether that success be achieved in consequence of better fortune or of greater ability than I possess.

My Lords, I shall conclude this, I fear too long a statement—the last speech which I shall address to your Lordships from these benches—with the earnest wish that he who may receive from the Queen the seals of the War Department, may bring to bear on its arduous duties abilities far greater than I can pretend to, and equal zeal, earnestness, and devotion with him whom he succeeds. I repeat the expression of my earnest hope that the man, be he who he may, who follows me, may meet with that success for which I have laboured, and, in meriting and securing that success, that he may also receive from his countrymen the approbation which it has been my anxious desire, but has not been my good fortune, to obtain.

THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, whatever may have been the Parliamentary irregularity of the course pursued by the noble Duke opposite, in making the statement which he has just made, and in the pointed reference and answer to the speech made by a noble Lord, his colleague, in the other House of Parliament, I have great reason to admit, and I am sure your Lordships will allow, that the statement was one the substance and circumstance of which, despite its irregularity, afforded sufficient apology for its delivery. I can easily understand the feelings of the noble Duke, and that he considered it necessary to offer to your Lordships, as a Minister of the Crown, a vindication of himself against charges such as must have materially affected his character, not as a man, but as a Minister; and I cannot therefore complain if he found it necessary to make reference to proceedings in the other House of Parliament; nor should I allude to that did I not feel it incumbent on me, at the outset of the few observations I shall have to submit to your Lordships, to reply to something which fell from the noble Duke towards the close of his speech, and which to me, and which I apprehend must to your Lordships, be utterly unintelligible. The noble Duke, in speaking of the assistance which it was his duty to afford to whomsoever should succeed him, made an allusion to some Gentleman, who, he intimated, had crossed over the floor of the House of Commons to my right hon. Friend the leader of the Opposition, and asked him whether he would be a party to some intended motion, which was not to impugn the Government, but to censure an individual—namely, the noble Duke himself. My Lords, of that statement—of that unknown individual—of that fact—or of anything like such a fact, I can assure you that I am, up to this moment, most completely ignorant. If the noble Duke means that, in the decision lately come to by the House of Commons, that expression of opinion, not on the conduct of the noble Duke but of the Government, was the consequence of an arrangement, and if the noble Duke conceives that that vote was the result of concert, or of previous communication with any party whatever, to the best of my belief and knowledge the noble Duke is absolutely and entirely in error.

The Duke of NEWCASTLE: The noble Earl has entirely misapprehended what fell from me on that point. I meant precisely the reverse of that which he infers I meant. What I said was entirely founded on the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons. That right hon. Gentleman, in his place in the House, made a statement to the effect that there had been such a communication made by a gentleman to him. This is my authority for the fact, but the right hon. Gentleman expressly said that he had repudiated the offer made to him.

The Earl of DERBY: It will be unnecessary, then, for me to proceed further with the observations I was about to make on that point. But, notwithstanding the statement which the noble Duke has just made, I hope he will forgive me if I do say here in the most emphatic manner that the vote of the House of Commons proceeded the other day not from any one party, more especially not from the party in direct opposition to Her Majesty's Government—nay, more, that it was the earnest recommendation, as I know, of those who are intrusted with the confidence of that party to abstain from bringing forward any Motion which should be equivalent to casting a censure upon the Government, or that would tend in the slightest degree to embarrass them in the administration of the public affairs. Now, the noble Duke's statement this evening, so far as I could infer from what fell from him, consisted in part of a vindication of his own character, and partly of a reply to the statements made by his late colleague. I and others, I am afraid, have been compelled to differ from the noble Duke and from his colleagues with regard to many points affecting the conduct of the war; and I have on more than one occasion expressed my opinion on the subject to the noble Duke and to your Lordships—not uncourteously, I hope, but with that frankness which I think ought to be exercised in this House. But I never heard any one deny to the noble Duke the merit of having been laborious in the discharge of his duties, and of having devoted himself most assiduously to his office; nor have I heard any one—I know not, of course, what may have appeared in some newspapers, or what conversation may have taken place at their clubs—I say, I have never heard the noble Duke charged in Parliament, or by any responsible authority, with indifference to the sufferings of the army. [The Duke of Newcastle: Certainly not in this House.] It has been said, indeed by some, and I have been of opinion myself, that when the right thing was done it was not done always at the right time, and that the neglect of the Government in not doing the right thing at the right time had led to increased sufferings and privations on the part of the army. But God forbid that any one of us should have imputed to the noble Duke or to any Member of your Lordships' House that he was in the slightest degree indifferent upon such a subject, or was sparing of his labours in the discharge of the arduous and responsible duties of his office. I am not, my Lords, about to enter upon any discussion—this is not the occasion on which to do so—as to the conduct of the Government or any Members of the Government. Nor am I disposed in the slightest degree to diminish the effect of that "Picture of an Interior" which has been drawn with such graphic power by the noble Duke. It is really one of the most effective pictures which I have seen presented to Parliament—the Cabinet *peint par soimême;*—and when, after having gone through all the correspondence and conversation and friendly communications which have taken place between him and some of his colleagues, the noble Duke wound up the whole picture by saying that he believed that colleague whom he had so much reason to complain of was the one of all whose opinions seemed to have most of identity with his own, the effect was heightened and a complete view afforded of the beautiful internal harmony of that Cabinet. My Lords, I am bound to say that I think the noble Duke is quite excusable for his statement in this House to-night; and, as far as I can learn, although, perhaps, it is contrary to the Horatian motto to decide now—for we are probably always more strongly impressed by what we see and hear than by what we read in the newspapers—I confess I think that between the two noble colleagues the noble Duke has considerably the best of the argument. Certainly I do not know what I might say if I "heard the other side;" but that, at all events, is my present impression. If, however, these discussions are constantly to take place in this House—if these representations are to follow one another so quickly—I can suggest only one mode by which to secure perfect impartiality. The Members of the two Houses should meet in the large central hall between this and the other House of Parliament, the Lords on one side and the Commons on the other, and there, the champions meeting in the centre, there might be, according to the expression of the noble Duke, an exchange of words, and I only hope it might not lead to the exchange of anything more dangerous than words. I will, however, leave the picture of the interior of the Cabinet—this picture of the relations between the noble Duke and his colleagues—entirely as a matter to be settled between themselves. Nor do I think this a fitting occasion for comment upon the picture which the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Aberdeen), at the commencement of the evening, drew of the general state of the country. That funeral oration which he pronounced upon himself and his colleagues—that general and complacent laudation of each and every one of the Members of his Cabinet—first, of his War Minister; next, of his Chancellor of the Exchequer; next, of the First Lord of the Admiralty; next, of the noble Lord opposite, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—I have no doubt all these encomiums were exceedingly well deserved, and that it was equally satisfactory to the noble Earl to have the opportunity of making them, and to his colleagues to receive them at his hands. The noble Earl also touched upon the general state of the nation, and although, perhaps, he introduced some debatable grounds into his observations with regard to the general and abundant prosperity which, according to him, prevails in every district of the country at the present moment, this is not the fittest occasion on which to enter upon the debatable grounds he has introduced. Nor, I think, should I have risen to address your Lordships at all on this occasion, had it not been that the noble Earl did not think fit to confine himself to the usual announcement on such an occasion—namely, that he and his colleagues had resigned office, and only held their present position until Her Majesty should have appointed their successors—I say, I probably should not have risen if, in making that statement, the noble Earl had not thought it necessary to make a personal reference to me as having been charged by Her Majesty with the formation of a Government. The noble Earl, undervaluing and underrating the source from which he derived his information, stated as a matter of general rumour that there had been some communication between Her Majesty and myself on that subject. The noble Earl has, I say, certainly underrated the source of his information, because not only general rumour may have informed him on the subject, but previously to entering into this House I had, under my own hand, given the noble Earl information as to the result of this communication; and consequently, the notoriety and general rumour which led him to believe it might be possible that I had had some communication with Her

Majesty are phrases which must have been employed by the noble Earl in his usual care to guard against exaggeration and to avoid overstating any part of his case. As your Lordships may not be all in possession of such information, I can inform your Lordships on this subject that, for once, the noble Earl is not mistaken. Upon the resignation of the noble Earl, it is perfectly true, and was known to most persons, that Her Majesty commanded my attendance yesterday morning, at half-past eleven o'clock; that I had a long audience in which I need hardly say I met with that which every person admitted to the presence of Her Majesty invariably meets with—the most condescending kindness, the most perfect frankness and openness, and a manner of dealing with all public subjects, a consideration for all personal feelings, which all who are called upon to communicate personally with Her Majesty know to what extent she possesses, and which must increase the affection and loyalty that every person who has had a knowledge of those qualities must feel for Her Majesty. I do not think it would be for the public interest that I should at this time—even if I had the permission of Her Majesty to do so, which I have not—avail myself of this opportunity to state all that passed upon that occasion, as well as all that subsequently occurred. I do think it would be inconvenient to the public service if, while negotiations are going on, and the steps taken by public men should be prematurely detailed. I think to do so might lead to serious inconvenience to the public affairs of this country. When I say that negotiations are going on, I mean that previously to the formation of a Government I think it is extremely inconvenient that there should be a public discussion day by day of communications which may take place between different parties tending to the formation of such a Cabinet.

I think it is the duty of every public man, whether he accepts or whether he abstains from accepting office, to be prepared to give at the proper time a full explanation both to his own Friends and to the country of the motives which may have induced him so to accept or abstain. But, my Lords, I think that that explanation should never be given until a Government is actually formed, and the state of affairs is decided. I therefore, upon the present occasion, content myself with saying that feeling deeply grateful to Her Majesty for the confidence which She reposed in me, and feeling deeply conscious of my own inability to discharge the duties which this arduous position would have imposed upon me,—feeling at the same time that, with the probability of success, the very difficulties with which the country is surrounded would be an additional inducement to any man of honour and character not to leave Her Majesty without a Government to grapple with these difficulties—I yet felt that in the present state of parties and in the present condition of the House of Commons, I was not enabled to offer Her Majesty that assurance of being in a position satisfactorily to conduct the affairs of the country which would induce me, at the present moment, to accept the task which Her Majesty was pleased to confide to me; and consequently at this time I have no charge from Her Majesty to attempt the construction of a Government. Further than this, my Lords, I think it would be impossible for me to say, except that I concur entirely with the noble Earl opposite that, whatever may be the composition of the Government (while I concur also with him as to the difficulty of obtaining it), the great object which this country looks for and requires in the present moment of difficulty, of embarrassment, and I will say, of peril, is, if it be possible to obtain it, a strong Government. And my Lords, whatever Government may be intrusted with Her Majesty's confidence to carry on the affairs of the great war and the great political questions in which this country is now involved, that man is undeserving of the character of a patriot, or of an honest man, who does not to the utmost extent of his power give to the Government of the Queen for these objects a disinterested and, as far as he can, a conscientious support.

House adjourned to Monday next.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Thursday, February 1, 1855.

MINUTES.] PUBLIC BILLS.—2° Fisheries (North America); Passengers Act Amendment.

PACKAGES FOR THE CRIMEA—QUESTION.

MR. A. STAFFORD said, seeing the hon. Member for Hertfordshire (Mr. Cowper), a Lord of the Admiralty, in his place, he wished to ask him whether the Government had made any recent arrangements in reference to the delivery and consignment of packages at Balaklava and Scutari; and whether they were willing to take charge of such packages as were addressed to any of our officers and men at the seat of war; and whether any such arrangements included establishments, or places about to be established, for the delivery of packages when the hospital at Smyrna was opened; and whether it was true that Captain Heath was appointed permanent superintendent of the port at Balaklava?

Mr. COWPER said, that the Board of Admiralty, being very anxious to give effect to the desire that was so prevalent of forwarding packages to the Crimea, containing such comforts and luxuries as could not be procured in any other manner, had given instructions to the authorities at the dockyards at Deptford, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, to the effect that all packages directed to any officer or person engaged in Her Majesty's service in the Crimea or at Constantinople should be received, and, as occasion offered, that those packages should be placed on board such vessels as were employed for the conveyance of Government stores. A special bill of lading was to be made out for each package given by a private individual, and the package itself would be delivered to the senior naval officer at Balaklava, or at any other port in the East. At the same time, he must remind the hon. Gentleman that the power possessed by the Government of sending out such packages or parcels was limited by the number of ships they had under their control, and by the number they were able to hire. Renewed efforts would, however, be made for procuring fresh vessels. There was another limitation, which, however, was of a more serious character—namely, the size of the harbour at Balaklava, and the power of arranging those vessels when they did arrive at that place. In reference to Smyrna he had to inform the hon. Gentleman, that nothing had as yet been done upon the subject. When it became necessary, steps would be taken to place it in an efficient state for the reception of such packages. With regard to the appointment of Captain Heath, he could only say that Sir Edmund Lyons had full authority to make such arrangements as he thought necessary for the public service.

RESIGNATION OF MINISTERS.

Viscount PALMERSTON: Mr. Speaker, I rise to make, in the usual manner, the communication to the House naturally expected from Her Majesty's Ministers, which is of course no new information to them, and which would have been made on Tuesday, but that from accidental circumstances the House of Lords had been adjourned over that day. I have now to state, that in consequence of what passed in this House on Monday night, Her Majesty's Government felt it to be their duty to tender to Her Majesty the resignation of their several offices; that that resignation has been graciously accepted by Her Majesty; and that we only hold our offices for the transaction of public duties until our successors are appointed. From this circumstance, the House will naturally feel it to be inconvenient to proceed to the despatch of any public business. I shall, therefore, propose, that this House at its rising should adjourn until to-morrow. My reason for not proposing a longer adjournment—which under existing circumstances would be more natural—is this. I understand from you, Sir, that an hon. and gallant Member of this House, the Member for Westminster (Sir De Lacy Evans), who is to receive the thanks of this House in his place here, has announced to you, Sir, as Speaker, that he will take his seat to-morrow. I am sure that I should be doing violence to the feeling of this House, if I proposed by any longer adjournment to deprive them of the earliest opportunity of testifying to the hon. and gallant Member the sense which they entertain of his brilliant and distinguished services. There is also the Bill which my hon. Friend the Under Secretary for the Colonial Department introduced two days ago—a Bill to carry into effect the treaty recently concluded with the United States. And if there be no disposition on the part of anybody to oppose the second reading, it will be convenient to the public service, and tend to promote the interests of the country, if the House would allow that measure to proceed a stage. With these circumstances before them, I hope that the House will understand that in proposing to meet to-morrow, we simply meet for the purposes I have mentioned. In the present state of public affairs I am sure the House will agree with me in thinking that any other questions, or Motions of any other kind, are not at the present moment proper subjects for our consideration. I therefore move, Sir, that the House at its rising do adjourn until to-morrow.

Motion *agreed to.*

Viscount EBRINGTON said, he could not avoid expressing his regret that no statement had been made as to the prospect that might exist of any Government being formed to replace the one just resigned. In the present crisis of public affairs, and with the troops in the Crimea in that lamentable condition in which they were known to be, not only from the statements of eye-witnesses, but, also, upon the high official authority of one of the Cabinet Ministers who had lately resigned office, he trusted that it would be borne in mind that days, and almost hours, were of importance, and that in no quarter, from the highest downwards, would any feeling of past favour or aversion be allowed to interfere with the desire to procure for the country the best and most efficient Ministry to carry on the war to a successful issue. He rejoiced very much that the noble Lord the Home Secretary had only adjourned the House until to-morrow, and he confessed he wished that some other reason for that had been assigned than the perfectly satisfactory reason. [*Laughter.*] The perfectly satisfactory reason, he repeated, considered by itself, of the thanks of the House having to be given to the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster for his distinguished services. He could have wished that some allusion might have been made to the urgency of the present crisis; to which, having lost relatives in the war, and having still some of those nearest and dearest to him engaged in it, he might, perhaps, attach more importance, though he hardly thought he did, than the country at large.

The House adjourned at a quarter before Five o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Friday, February 2, 1855.

Minutes.] Public Bills.—1° Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes.

THE VOTE OF THANKS TO SIR DE LACY EVANS.

Lieutenant General Sir De Lacy Evans, Knight Commander of the Most honourable Order of the Bath, being come to the House, Mr. Speaker (sitting, and uncovered) acquainted him with the Resolution of the House of the 15th day of December last, which he read, as followeth—

Resolved, Nemine Contradicente—

"That the Thanks of this House be given to Lieutenant General Sir De Lacy Evans, Knight Commander of the Most honourable Order of the Bath, and to the several other Officers therein named, for their zeal, intrepidity, and distinguished exertions in the several Actions in which Her Majesty's Forces have been engaged with the Enemy."

And then Mr. Speaker gave him the Thanks of the House accordingly, as followeth—

"Sir De Lacy Evans—I have to inform you that on the 15th December last the House agreed, *Nemine Contradicente*, to the following Resolution, 'That the Thanks of this House be given to Lieutenant General Sir De Lacy Evans, Knight Commander of the Most honourable Order of the Bath, and to the several other officers therein named, for their zeal, intrepidity, and distinguished exertions in the several Actions in which Her Majesty's Forces have been engaged with the Enemy.'

"Lieutenant General Sir De Lacy Evans, it is with feelings of pride and satisfaction that this House welcomes the return of one who has borne so conspicuous a part in the brilliant achievements which have characterised the present War.

"At the Battle of the Alma you encountered and overcame with admirable coolness and judgment the most insuperable difficulties which opposed the advance of the gallant Second Division against the position of the Enemy.

"Your repulse of the formidable attack of the Russians on the 26th of October, and the energy and valour with which you led the Troops upon that occasion, have been honourably recognised by Lord Raglan.

"But it was on the Heights of Inkerman that you displayed that undaunted courage and chivalrous generosity which have called forth the admiration of your Country, when, rising from a bed of sickness, you hastened to assist with your counsel and experience the gallant Officer in temporary command of your Division; and you refused to withhold from him the honours, whilst you shared with him the dangers, of that Battle Field.

"Your conduct throughout this memorable Campaign has been marked by the same intrepid gallantry which distinguished your early military career, and has justly earned for you the highest honour which it is in the power of this House to confer.

"It is therefore my agreeable duty, in the name and by the command of the Commons of the United Kingdom, to deliver to you their unanimous Thanks for your zeal, intrepidity, and distinguished exertions in the several Actions in which Her Majesty's Forces have been engaged with the enemy."

Sir DE LACY EVANS: Mr. Speaker, I beg to assure you, Sir, and this House, that I appreciate most deeply the very high honour which has now been conferred upon me. I am quite aware, and deeply impressed with the conviction, that there is no honour to which a British Subject can look with more ardent desire or be more proud of than the recognition of his services, whatever they may be, by the

Representatives of his fellow-subjects in this Kingdom.

Sir, I hope I shall be pardoned if I very imperfectly express my feelings on this occasion. It is almost a novelty to me to be received in this manner in this House; with reference to my Military Services.

Sir, I am equally and indeed still more grateful to you for the reference which you have made to the Second Division, which I had the honour to command. I should not have had the most remote chance of obtaining the kind and honourable distinction which I have this day received at the hands of this House, had it not been for the noble gallantry of that Division, from the first Officer under my command to the humblest Soldier in its ranks.

I know well, Sir, that my position here at this moment is almost exclusively attributable to the noble conduct and devotion to their duty of that Division.

I must at the same time confess that I am under the necessity of saying that when the Vote of Thanks which I am now here to receive at your hands was moved by the noble Lord lately representing the Government in this House, the noble Lord's official statement made on that occasion very much astonished me, because he appeared to take a totally different view of the operations of the army, or, at all events, of the particular part acted by the Division I had the honour to command, from that taken by the Commander of the Forces. I am sorry to be obliged on the present occasion to allude to this subject, but when nearly one-half of that division has perished from the chances of battle, or by other causes, I think I should be wanting in gratitude to them if upon this occasion I did not endeavour to place the matter upon a more just footing. The noble Lord gave a sort of theatrical description of the battle of the Alma, which reminded one of the opinion of the witty Sydney Smith, who we all know said that the noble Lord considered himself capable of commanding the Channel fleet. Now, it is evident that the noble Lord considered himself a better judge of the transactions of the battle of the Alma than Lord Raglan. The noble Lord described this battle rather minutely, and seemed to imply that the battle was exclusively won by the First and Light Divisions, for he omitted all notice of the conduct of the Second Division. Now, the fact is, that Lord Raglan has represented in his despatch that the two leading divisions on that occasion were the First and Second. It is quite clear that the noble Lord passed the Second Division by from a total obliviousness of its services, and thus caused inferences to be drawn, perhaps, which might reflect most grievously upon it. The noble Lord then went on to speak of the two lesser actions of the 25th and 26th of October. He gave all due credit and honour to the gallantry displayed on the 25th of October, but he entirely passed over the much more successful action which took place on the subsequent day—an action that was deemed worthy of the highest approbation by Her Majesty, and by the Commander of the Forces, and also deserving of notice in a despatch from the General in Chief of the French army. The noble Lord, however, in his official statement to this House, took no notice of that action. With respect also to the battle of Inkerman, in which the Second Division was engaged as much as in any other of the battles, in which, too, it suffered so severely, and where it had to stand for some time the brunt of an attack from about 20,000 men, not the slightest reference was made by the noble Lord in his speech to the conduct of that division on that occasion, though it was the only division prominently engaged in three general actions. I, therefore, think that that division and myself have some reason to complain of an official statement of that kind coming from the noble Lord. I beg pardon for this unpleasant digression, but I think I have some claim to indulgence. It is not on my own account that I have done so, but on account of the men whom I had the honour to command.

I feel deeply grateful for the honour which has been now conferred upon me. I should certainly like to say a few words, but I think this is not the proper time for it, as regards the position of those who are still struggling gloriously in this contest. I do hope that, although I am not completely prepared perhaps to take an arduous and constant part in the transactions of this House, I may have some opportunity of expressing my feelings on that subject. I will only further say, that I am deeply convinced that the manifestation of the approbation of the House upon this occasion to so humble an individual of the army as I am will have a considerable effect upon the feelings which animate my brother soldiers. I again say, Sir, that I am most deeply grateful for the kind expressions which you have used towards me.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: I rise, Sir, to perform an office in respect to which I am satisfied I shall receive the unanimous and cheerful concurrence of this House. Sir, there is no function belonging to the individual who fills the Chair which you so worthily occupy that can be more agreeable or more honourable in its discharge than that which you have just performed—namely, the function of conveying the thanks of Parliament to men who have distinguished themselves by noble exploits in the field, and who have earned by a long career of military services the gratitude and admiration of their country; and I will venture to say that there never was a Speaker who had the opportunity of being more completely the faithful organ of the feelings and opinions, not only of this House, but of the nation at large, than it has been your good fortune to be on the present occasion. Sir, the eloquent and feeling expressions in which you have conveyed to the hon. and gallant officer the thanks of this House ought to remain a perpetual record for the encouragement of others to pursue the same career as my hon. and gallant Friend has nobly followed, and for the satisfaction of those brave comrades in arms whom he has so ably headed on the field of battle. I beg, therefore, to move that the words spoken by Mr. Speaker, in conveying to Lieutenant General Sir De Lacy Evans the thanks of this House, together with so much of the observations which have fallen from the hon. and gallant Member as contains his expression of gratefulness for those thanks, be printed in the Votes of the House.

MR. WALPOLE: Mr. Speaker, in seconding the Motion of the noble Lord, I do so in the heartiest desire to concur with him in every word which he has said; and also in the words used by you, Sir, in conveying the vote of thanks to the hon. and gallant officer whom we are so happy to see amongst us again. I feel, Sir, that I can add nothing more to what has been said than my cordial concurrence.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: My hon. and gallant Friend (Sir De Lacy Evans) adverted to topics not immediately connected with the occasion. The Motion I would wish to make is, that so much of his speech as related to the vote of thanks passed to him should be printed in the Votes.

Ordered, Nemine Contradicente—

"That what has been now said by Mr. Speaker in giving the Thanks of this House to Lieutenant General Sir De Lacy Evans, together with so much of his answer thereto as relates to such Thanks, be printed in the Votes of this day."

The House adjourned at Five o'clock till *Monday* next.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Monday, February 5, 1855.

MINUTES.] PUBLIC BILL.—1ª Fisheries (North America).

Reported—Cathedral Appointments Act Continuance; Bills of Exchange.

THE VOTE OF THANKS—THE FRENCH NAVAL FORCE IN THE CRIMEA.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House, That he had received the following Letter from Vice Admiral Dundas, enclosing a Letter from Vice Admiral Hamelin in return to the Thanks of this House, communicated to his Excellency in obedience to an Order of this House of the 15th of December last—

"Paris, 1st February 1855.

"MY LORD—I had the Honour of transmitting from Malta the Thanks of the House of Lords to Admiral Hamelin and the French Naval Force under his Command in the Crimea that your Lordship had entrusted to me to communicate to my esteemed Colleague.

"I now beg to enclose to your Lordship Admiral Hamelin's Letter to me, acknowledging the Honour that has been conferred on himself and his Fleet.

"I have the Honour to be,
"Your Lordship's most obedient humble Servant,
"J. W. D. DUNDAS, Vice Admiral.
"The Right Hon. The Lord Chancellor."

"Paris, le 18 Janvier 1855.

"Monsieur l'Amiral—J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre lettre du 6 de ce mois, qu'accompagnait la résolution votée par la Chambre des Lordes, pour remercier et la Flotte Française et moi-même de la cordiale entente qui n'a cessé de regner entre la marine des deux nations pendant la course de leurs opérations de guerre dans la Mer Noire et en Crimée.

"Un témoignage aussi éclatant de la Chambre haute d'Angleterre ne peut que resserrer encore les liens qui unissent les deux Flottes, comme les deux Armées; et je vous prie de vouloir bien être auprès le leur Seigneuries l'interprête de mes rémerciments les mieux sentis.

"Je seus personnellement heureux, mon cher Amiral, que la noble Chambre vous aît choisi pour me transmettre ce haut témoignage; vous, mon cher collègue, avec lequel je n'ai cessé d'agir de concert chaque jour, j'allai presque dire chaque heure, pendant dix-huit mois.

"Récévez, Monsieur l'Amiral, la nouvelle assurance de ma haute considération et de mon bien sincere attachement.

"L'Amiral HAMELIN."

"Monsieur le Vice-Amiral Dundas."

The said Letters being read, were Ordered to lie on the Table; and to be entered on the Journals.

CONVOCATION.

THE EARL OF SHAFTESBURY wished to ask his right rev. Friend (the Archbishop of Canterbury) a question with respect to the meeting of Convocation, which was fixed for to-morrow. It was well known that that body was not authorised to enter upon the discussion of any business without the sanction of Her Majesty. Now, as there was at present no Minister through which that sanction could be conveyed, he wished to know whether it would not be desirable to adjourn to some future period, when a Minister should have been appointed by Her Majesty, who could be authorised by Her Majesty to give the necessary authority for the transaction of business.

THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY said, that he did not think it would be necessary either to prorogue or adjourn Convocation further; because it was not intended to initiate any new business, but simply to proceed with what had been commenced, and to consider the reports of Committees which had already been appointed.

THE BISHOP OF LONDON said, that Convocation had at their previous meetings appointed Committees, who had prepared reports, which had been laid upon their Lordships' table, and the recommendations contained in which had received the almost unanimous assent of clergy of almost every shade of opinion. It was intended on the following day to consider, not whether it would be desirable to adopt the measures recommended in those reports, but simply whether Convocation would so far sanction them as to make them the basis of an Address to Her Majesty, praying Her to empower Convocation to deliberate upon them. He certainly thought they ought to be allowed, at any rate, so far to discuss the reports of their own Committees. He must say that, looking to the example afforded by the meetings of Convocation last year, and to the temperate conclusions to which they had come, he did not think that any apprehensions could possibly be entertained with respect to the consequences of their meeting to-morrow.

THE MINISTRY.

THE EARL OF ABERDEEN rose and said: I am under the necessity of moving the adjournment of the House; but I think it right to inform your Lordships that my noble Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Viscount Palmerston) has been commissioned by Her Majesty to propose to Her an Administration for Her consideration. As he is now engaged in that work, I will only propose to your Lordships to adjourn till to-morrow.

House adjourned till to-morrow.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Monday, February 5, 1855.

MINUTES.] PUBLIC BILLS.—2° Royal London Militia.

3° Fisheries (North American).

THE HARBOUR OF BALAKLAVA—QUESTION.

MR. DEEDES: Mr. Speaker, seeing the hon. and gallant Admiral who is a Member of the Board of Admiralty in his place, I beg to ask him a question of which I have not given notice. It having been stated not only by private channels of communication, but also in the public journals, that very great confusion and mismanagement existed at Balaklava among the shipping, and that no arrangements were made for the landing of the cargoes when the ships arrived there, I wish to ask the hon. and gallant Admiral whether any information has been received by the Admiralty on the subject, and whether the case is as stated; and, if so, whether any and what steps have been taken to put an end to such a state of things?

ADMIRAL BERKELEY: Sir, I am quite prepared to answer, and, I trust, satisfactorily, the question of the hon. Gentleman by reading, with the permission of the House, some extracts from letters which have been received from Admiral Lyons and from the captains of transports on the spot. The Board of Admiralty wrote to Sir Edmund Lyons, stating that the reports to which the hon. Gentleman has referred with respect to the harbour of Balaklava had been published in this country, and requesting a statement of the facts. Admiral Lyons replied as follows on the 13th of January—

"But to revert to the inside of the harbour, the responsibility for the first three weeks rests with me, for I had the superintendence, and all I will say of myself is, that I naturally did my best to promote the success of an object I had so much at heart; but of my assistants I may say that no man ever had a more able one than I had in Captain Mends, for the details of landing the cargoes, or a more efficient one than I had in Captain Heath, for all the duties relating to the ingress, berthing, and egress of the shipping. Thanks, in a great measure, to the zeal and foresight of Rear Admiral Stewart, boats were not wanting, and their Lordships may be assured that the best use was made of them by Captains Davies and Heath and Commander Powell, whose praiseworthy conduct has won for them the admiration of the army and the goodwill of all. I observe that it is alleged that quantities of hay and firewood were allowed to float about the harbour when both were in much request, and I freely admit it must have appeared so to passers by; but the truth is, the hay had become so saturated with salt water in the late hurricane that the animals would not eat the innermost part of the trusses. The wood was only fit for firewood, and it was considered that the best means of preventing its being pilfered was to let it float out of the reach of the strand until measures could be taken for collecting and distributing it."

The next extract I beg to read is also from Admiral Lyons. It is dated the 20th of January, off Sebastopol—

"With reference to your letter of the 18th ultimo, addressed to my predecessor, and to mine of the 13th instant, in reply thereto, I beg to transmit some documents which I have received from Captain Heath, of the *Sanspareil*, by which their Lordships will observe that many of the accounts of the confusion in Balaklava harbour, if not altogether untrue, are at least greatly exaggerated."

I will now read the answers from thirty-six masters of transports to Captain Heath—

"Balaklava Harbour, Jan. 13.

"It is with much pleasure that, on the eve of your departure, we bear testimony to your unceasing endeavours to regulate the berthing and insure the safety of the ships in this harbour. We are, &c. [Signed by thirty-six masters of transports."]

I have several other answers to the statements referred to by the hon. Gentleman; couched in equally strong language. The following is an extract from a report of Captain Robert Methuen, of the steam transport, *Colombo*, of 1,800 tons—

"The gale threw everything into confusion; but, by great exertions, a rearrangement was effected, and since then the most watchful care of the shipping in all cases, which seemed to require interference, seems to me to have been afforded. The pilotage of the port, under Captain Powell, requiring the largest ships to be handled, under critical circumstances, has caused me repeatedly to express my most unqualified admiration. This duty has called for incessant labour, and it has been bestowed with the most untiring zeal, temper, and cheerfulness, and with an ability not to be surpassed by the most practised hand. On such occasions, when Captain Powell could not himself attend, or when two heads were better than one, I observed that Captain Heath was himself always present. For some weeks past (say four) large bollards have been placed for securing moorings of a light description; and in other respects, having three times entered and departed from this port, I have to state that every application for assistance to either Captain Heath or Captain Powell has been responded to, and I consider the present state of the harbour a marvel of exact arrangement, and the amount of accommodation afforded only to be exampled by one of the crowded docks of Liverpool."

THE MINISTERIAL INTERREGNUM.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Sir, in consequence of a message which I have received from my noble Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department, I wish to propose to the House that the Orders of the Day, with the exception of that relating to the Fisheries Bill, should be read, for the purpose of being postponed. My noble Friend has communicated to me that the same reasons which induced the House on Friday last to waive proceeding to the discussion of several measures are still in their full force; and, therefore, as I have stated, he desires me to propose that the Orders of the Day should be postponed. I beg to move that the House at its rising do adjourn till the usual time to-morrow.

Viscount EBRINGTON: Mr. Speaker, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether the statement he has just made is intended to express to the House that no progress whatever has been made in the formation of a Government, and that we are as far off as ever we were from the prospect of a stable Administration?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: I have received no communication from my noble Friend the Secretary of State upon that subject.

MINISTERIAL EXPLANATIONS.

On the Motion for the adjournment of the House,

Lord JOHN RUSSELL: Sir, I have been very anxious that there should be no necessity for any further statement on my part with respect to my resignation of the office which I lately had the high honour to hold, and I therefore refrained, in the debate on Monday night last, from replying in any way to the statements made by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the

Exchequer, although some of those statements were calculated to produce an effect injurious to myself. The only statement which I added at that time to those which I had formerly made was, that the Duke of Newcastle and my right hon. Friend the Secretary at War, at the time when the correspondence to which I had alluded took place, had expressed their desire that the offices which they held should be disposed of as should seem best for the service of the country. But, Sir, since then there has appeared a publication of what is stated to be a speech of the Duke of Newcastle, made elsewhere, which I cannot refrain from noticing, unless I were content to allow what I think grave errors to be established and settled in the public mind. I beg to say, in the outset, that I think that speech places this question rather too much as a personal dispute between the Duke of Newcastle and myself than on the broad grounds on which I endeavoured to place it. It appeared to me, Sir, at the end of last Session, that the composition of the Government was such that, not relying upon party support, it did not create any great attachment or enthusiasm towards it in the public mind, and frequent defeats, in consequence, attended the propositions which were made by it. Under ordinary circumstances, I should have thought those defeats a sufficient reason to allow me to state to the Earl of Aberdeen that it was not advisable that such a Government should continue, and to justify me in declining to conduct any longer the business of the Government in the House of Commons. But, Sir, there was a great question then pending — a great question, which, indeed, is still pending — namely, that of the prosecution of the war. Upon that subject the House of Commons gave the Government its confidence, and I stated then—and I thought I was justified in stating—that, so long as there was a prospect of the war being conducted in a vigorous and efficient manner, in my opinion we should be justified in holding office in spite of the defeats which I have mentioned. There is, Sir, another consideration of a general nature which I wish to place before the House—namely, that it is of the utmost consequence into whose hands the conduct of a war is intrusted. My belief is that, if Lord North had conducted the seven years' war, we should not have had to boast of the conquest of Canada, and that, if Lord Chatham had conducted the war of American independence, we should not have had to deplore the capitulations of Saratoga and of Yorktown, nor the humiliating spectacle of the triumphant fleet of an enemy riding in the Channel. Of so much consequence do I conceive it to be in whose hands the conduct of the war is placed. Now, if this be so, I am sure the House will not think it an unreasonable anxiety on my part, being the principal member of the Government to answer in this House for the conduct of the war, that, not relying on measures of internal improvement (upon which we had the undoubted confidence of the House), I should watch with the greatest care the prosecution of that war. I come now, Sir, to the particular statements which have been attributed in the public journals to the Duke of Newcastle. In the first place, the Duke of Newcastle objects to the statement which I made, that there was a "strong wish" on his part to hold the office of Secretary of State for the War Department. I made that statement from the language which I have heard from various members of the Cabinet who had so stated it to me, and I must say I consider it was extremely natural that the Duke of Newcastle, having fitted out an expedition with considerable rapidity, should wish to see it carried, as he, and I believe all of us, expected it would be, to a triumphant issue, while he held the seals of the War Department. But, Sir, upon this subject I am not left merely to the general belief which I was induced to hold, because, in one of the letters from which I read an extract the other night from the Earl of Aberdeen to myself, the noble Earl thus expresses himself—

> "But I must observe that at the formation of the Government no such office as the War Department was contemplated; and when, subsequently, the Colonial Office was divided, no objection whatever was made to the choice of the War Department by the Duke; nor, as far as I am aware, up to this moment, to his management of the office."

Now, Sir, these words appear to me to be exceedingly clear and to have a very definite meaning. The noble Earl does not say that no objection was made to the choice of the Duke of Newcastle for the War Department, but that no objection was made to the choice of the War Department by the Duke of Newcastle. Well, Sir, it is perfectly true, as has been stated by the noble Duke, that, when it was proposed to divide the departments, he declared himself ready to take either or neither, as might be thought best for the public service; but my noble Friend at the head of the Government, who had great confidence in the noble Duke's abilities, was not likely to treat him with any want of generosity upon this point, and I believe that, according to the statement I have read, and according to all I have heard on the subject, the Earl of Aberdeen proposed that the Duke of Newcastle should have the choice of the two departments which were then about to be separated. That, Sir, is the first point with respect to which I have been stated to have been in error, and I think it will appear that what I have said is borne out by the letter of the Earl of Aberdeen to myself. The noble Duke says that I wished to have had the office of the War Department myself. If the Earl of Aberdeen had requested me to hold it, I certainly should have considered it my duty to accept it, but far from wishing for it, it was an office totally alien to any habits of business which I may have acquired, and I should have accepted it with very great reluctance. The next statement is, that there were errors imputed by me to the Duke of Newcastle. Now, Sir, what was the reason why I mentioned in my letter to the Earl of Aberdeen what I conceived to be errors with regard to the 97th Regiment and some drafts for other regiments then in the Crimea? It was in order to show that there was not a complete efficiency in the system adopted. My opinion was—and I stated it to another colleague of mine at the time—that, had the Duke of Newcastle felt any want of power, he should have applied immediately to the Prime Minister, and that defect could have been supplied. In short, my own impression was, not that the Duke of Newcastle was unfit for the War Department, but that, as I have stated, either the Prime Minister himself should constantly exert himself to hurry on and hasten preparations, or else that the War Minister should be a person of extraordinary authority, power, and energy. My belief is—and I will state it now—that, had the Prime Minister been a man whose persuasions and dispositions would lead him to hasten on with eagerness the preparations and arrangements for war, the Duke of Newcastle would have been found perfectly competent for the department which he held; and I think, also, that if the Earl of Aberdeen had had for a War Secretary a person of pre-eminent energy and authority, from the offices which he had before held, the noble Earl would have been a Prime Minister quite fitted to conduct our affairs to a successful issue. But I did not think, from what had happened, that the combination of the two did insure the efficiency of the public service. Now, Sir, it was in perfect conformity with what I have just stated that I addressed a private letter on the 8th of October to the Duke of Newcastle, in which I said, "You have done all you could do," meaning thereby that he had proposed the measures which he thought necessary, and that having been overruled by other departments it did not depend on him to do more. But, at the same time, I wrote to another colleague of mine, to whom I stated that it appeared to me very desirable that the Prime Minister should from time to time lend to the War Department all the authority which from time to time might be required.

I come now, Sir, to a more important question—namely, to the statement that, on the 16th of December I had withdrawn my proposition altogether, and, in fact, had changed my opinion on the subject. I must, in the first place, point out that there were two different questions contained in my letter which I had carefully divided, treating one after the other, but stating that one was of very much greater importance than the other. One was as to the constitution of the War Department—whether the Secretary of State and the Secretary at War should both remain, whether there should be a consolidation of one office with the other, or whether there should be a Board of a nature to be afterwards settled. The other question related to the efficiency of the War Department, and the person in whose hands the department should be placed. The House will see that these two questions are totally distinct. Upon the first of these two questions I consulted a noble Friend of mine, who had discharged with respect, and to the satisfaction of the House, the office of Secretary at War—I mean Lord Panmure, and I think I could go to no better authority with respect to the constitution of the office. I had had some conversation with him on that subject last year, for I wished to know his opinion on what I considered to be a matter of no inconsiderable importance. My noble Friend told me that, in his opinion, there ought to be a Secretary at War, charged with the finances of the army, but subordinate to the Secretary of State; and, above all, he advised me not to bring about a rupture in the Government on this question. But with respect to the other question, I was under the firm impression—and it has been confirmed since by my noble Friend—that I never said a single word to him as to the office being held by the Duke of Newcastle or by my noble Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Viscount Palmerston). That was a question which I never touched upon at all to him, for, while I considered that the constitution of the department was a perfectly fit subject on which to ask the opinion of any person out of the Cabinet, I should have thought it highly improper for me to consult any such person as to who should and who should not hold the office. What I stated on the 16th of December, then, referred entirely to my proposal that the two offices should be consolidated. I may have stated then—for I know I have stated it more than once before—and, therefore, I may have stated then to Lord Aberdeen, that, after he had said he could not honestly recommend to the Queen that the office of Secretary of State for the War Department should be taken out of the hands of the Duke of Newcastle and transferred to my noble Friend the Home Secretary, it was not my intention to bring that question before the Cabinet, since, if it were decided there adversely to Lord Aberdeen, the effect would be equivalent to driving him from the Government over which he presided. I, therefore, left that question entirely in abeyance, not changing my own opinion, but, at the same time, declining to incur the risk of breaking up the Government upon it. Now, Sir, I am ready to confess that it is very likely that I was in error in that determination; it is very likely that, having formed an opinion that it was for the welfare of the country that some change should take place, I ought to have submitted it to the judgment of the Cabinet, and, if the Cabinet had decided against me, I ought then and there to have resigned. I admit that it may be so. I own I was very averse to bringing the question to such a decision, and that I waited as long as possible, particularly with reference to the relations that I held towards Lord Aberdeen, and, having told him that I would accept office under him, and wished to maintain his administration, to avoid the necessity of going to that extent. As events went on, various questions arose with respect to the war, and on all of these I endeavoured to give my best assistance to Lord Aberdeen, to the Duke of Newcastle, and to the Cabinet, with a view of improving the condition of our army and of providing for its future success. With respect to some of these questions—with respect, for instance, to a question raised during the short sitting in December by my hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) namely, that of holding some consultation and of making some provision for the next campaign, I was not satisfied. My hon. Friend pointed out the danger that might be incurred if the Russian army were increased on the Asiatic side, and he spoke of the necessity of providing some force to meet any invasion of Russia in that quarter. That was a most important subject, and it occupied my mind very much; but I could not find that I received from Lord Aberdeen that support which I had hoped for when the subject was under the consideration of the Cabinet. I still, however, Sir, continued a member of that Cabinet. My noble Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department said the other day, in anwer to the statement which I made, that I had not taken the right time and the right mode; that I ought to have brought before the Cabinet, before Parliament re-assembled, the question of how any motion here for inquiry was to be met—that I ought to have stated the deficiencies which I still thought existed in our military arrangements, either with regard to the office of War Secretary, or as to the General conduct of the war. I think, Sir, my noble Friend was entirely in the right upon that subject. I am quite willing to admit that when I perceived the error I had committed I regretted it. I have no hesitation in saying that it was an error on my part not to have fully considered the position in which I should be if a Motion for inquiry should be made after the opinion I had expressed, and the dissatisfaction which I felt. But, be that as it may, having committed that error, I felt I should be guilty of a still greater error—that I should be guilty of an error in morality—and there can be no sound politics without sound morality—if I stood up in this House and opposed inquiry, telling the House to be perfectly satisfied with the arrangements which were then going on, while at the same time, in my own mind, I was not satisfied, and did not agree that those arrangements were likely to be satisfactory. Well, Sir, it has been said the Government might have been defeated, that I might have stood by my colleagues, and that on the defeat of the Government we should have resigned our offices. I cannot say that that suggestion is satisfactory to my mind, for it supposes that I was to take a course, which in my conscience I could not take. But there is the other alternative to be considered. The Government might have been beaten, and I, with the rest of my colleagues—who, be it observed, held a different opinion from me, and who might very properly and honestly have met the Motion with a negative—might have resigned. The event, however, might have been different. A majority in this House might have declared in favour of the Government partly in consequence of my assurances that I was not dissatisfied with the conduct of the war. Sir, after all the obloquy I have sustained, I am very glad that I did not incur the obloquy of pursuing such a course. While mine has been called a hasty resignation I must say I have been struck by a statement, which was totally new to me, in what purports to be the speech of the Duke of Newcastle—namely, that some days before the meeting of Parliament he had placed his resignation in the hands of the noble Earl the First Lord of the Treasury, and had stated that if no censure was passed upon him—if censure in any form was resisted successfully—he would retire from the office which he held, and would desire that it might be otherwise filled up. Now, Sir, I wish to say that I was totally ignorant that any such resignation had been offered, and, as my resignation was accepted, I must say I think my noble Friend's advice to the Queen immediately to accept it, without any further communication with me was somewhat inconsiderate and hasty. I certainly think it was due to me that the noble Earl should have informed me of the letter or communication he had received from the Duke of Newcastle, and we might then have considered together whether the Motion for inquiry could be resisted upon good and sufficient grounds. Be that, however, as it may, my resignation was laid before Her Majesty, and on the following evening I received a letter from the Earl of Aberdeen.

And now, Sir, you will, perhaps, permit me to observe that, having been subject to many slanderous attacks on account of the course which I then pursued—having been made a mark for obloquy for the last week on account of the hasty step which I took—I have only to say that

Lord J. Russell

if my past public life does not justify me from the charges of selfishness and of treachery, I shall seek no argument for the purposes of refuting them. It is not that I propose to live down such calumnies, but I do hope that I have anticipated them by the course which I have pursued during a somewhat extended public life. I may here, perhaps, be allowed to observe upon one phrase which is said to have been used by the noble Duke to whose speech I have more than once alluded, namely, that he had said to the Earl of Aberdeen, when my first letter was received, "Do not give Lord John Russell any pretext for leaving the Government. Accept my resignation." Now, I must say, considering that for nearly two years I had been a subordinate Member of the Earl of Aberdeen's Government—that I had consented, after holding the office of Prime Minister for five years and a half, to serve under the Earl of Aberdeen, and had done my best to promote the success of his Administration—that I had consented to the diminished importance of the great party to which I belonged, I must say, I think such a sneer on the part of the Duke of Newcastle was somewhat misplaced. I wonder it should not have occurred to him, "These objections to my continuing to hold this office must be sincere. It may even be possible that there is some deficiency in my management of this great department." But it does not seem to have occurred to him as within the range of possibility that he might not be absolutely faultless in his conduct of the office which he held, and that I should have had any other than some indirect motive in wishing for a change in the department which he administered. Sir, I referred the other day, in answer to a right hon. Gentleman, to what had taken place under a former Administration, in order to show that such an arrangement as I had suggested had not been quite without precedent. I have lately seen a letter from the person to whom I alluded—a man whom all who know him must esteem and respect—I mean the Earl of Ripon—in which he gives an account of that transaction which entirely concurs, I must say, with what I stated to this House. He says—

> "Lord Grey informed me that it was very desirable for his Government to have the advantage of Lord Derby's talents and services in a prominent situation in the Cabinet; and he proposed to me, in order to effect that object, to vacate the seals of the Colonial Department, and to accept the Privy Seal, which Lord Dur-

ham intended to give up. I cannot pretend to say that the proposition was very palatable to me, because it was liable to be misunderstood by the public. But, when it was put to me as a great advantage to Lord Grey's Government, I felt no disposition to allow my personal feelings to interfere with an arrangement which was so described, and finally acquiesced in its adoption; and I informed Lord Derby that I had done so, without any feeling of annoyance or anger against him."

Now, Sir, this is a perfectly true and simple account of that transaction, and, as I think, it did the highest honour to the patriotism of the Earl of Ripon. I believe the noble Duke in question might have acted in the same way—that the Earl of Aberdeen might have proposed to my noble Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department to accept the War Department in his place; and I think that if, in the month of November, that change had been made, the Ministry would have presented itself to this House with far greater prospects of obtaining their confidence and support than it could do in the way in which it continued to be constructed. I did not urge that motive upon the Earl of Aberdeen. I thought, when he said that good faith and justice prevented his agreeing to the arrangement, that no prospect of the success of his Administration was likely to lead a man of the highest honour and probity to adopt a course which he would not otherwise have pursued.

And now, Sir, having finished this statement so far as relates to the Duke of Newcastle, I have to state to the House that Her Majesty was pleased, on Friday night last, to call upon me to undertake the formation of a Government. I felt that there were two reasons which made it incumbent upon me to obey Her Majesty's commands. The one was, that I had been partly instrumental, perhaps, in leading to that decision of the House of Commons on the previous Monday night which led to the resignation of the Government. It had also been attributed to me that I was disposed, from some cowardly feeling, to shrink from the vote of this House, and from the responsibility of an adviser of the Crown. I therefore felt it incumbent upon me, if I could form a Government with any prospect of success, not to shrink from a task the most honourable, but, at the same time, the most arduous, in the present situation of public affairs, which any man could undertake. I found, however, that there were insuperable obstacles to my forming such a Government. I was not surprised at it, and I concurred in the objections which some of my Friends made to the formation of a Government. I therefore—within twenty-four hours after I had commenced the task—humbly submitted to Her Majesty that I had not succeeded in my attempts, and that I had done all that was in my power to accomplish Her Majesty's wishes, and that I must resign that honourable task into Her Majesty's hands. I think, whoever may be able to accomplish the task in which the Earl of Derby does not seem to have been more successful than I was—namely, that of forming a Government which, in his opinion, and in the opinion of his colleagues, is fitted to cope with the difficulties of the present crisis—will receive the support of this House, and that this House will feel it is their duty at the present time to support the Executive Government in any measures they may think necessary.

I have only a word more to say, Sir, on the present occasion, and that refers to a report I have received that, at the time when I was absent from this House, a gallant General (Sir De Lacy Evans) remarked upon an omission which I had made in proposing a vote of thanks to the divisions of the army engaged in the late victories in the Crimea, and in alluding to the circumstances in which they had been placed. I am exceedingly sorry if I omitted to do justice to that Second Division which won its laurels upon the fields of Alma and of Inkerman, as well as in the gallant repulse of the enemy's attack on the 26th of October. I hope, however, the gallant General will remark that, in moving the Vote of Thanks, I said that I did not mean to give any account of those battles, because the details had been given in a clear and masterly manner by Lord Raglan himself, the Commander in Chief, and that, under the circumstances, I only wished to bring under the notice of the House the more striking achievements of our troops. No one could feel more anxious to do ready justice to that gallant Second Division than myself. Its fame is recorded in the despatches of Lord Raglan, and will be ever remembered in the annals of this country. I may say, further, that I omitted—an omission which I much regret—to mention the heroic efforts of Sir De Lacy Evans to attend himself at the battle of Inkerman, while he refrained from taking the command of the division from the officer next below him in rank who was then in command. That act showed his devotion to the good of the service, by his wish not to detract from any merit or fame which might be due to his second in command. I could wish that the Minister of the Crown, whoever he may be, whatever is the fate of that siege upon which the attention of the whole country is concentrated—whether or not success crowns our arms—I could wish that the Minister of the Crown may be able to propose a Vote to this House by which the House will acknowledge its sympathy with that gallant army which, for so many weeks, has been suffering every privation. My belief is that there is nothing in the heat of conflict which is so honourable to an army as their patient endurance, day after day and night after night, of every privation to which men can be subjected —maintaining, amid the want of food, of shelter, and of clothing, that spirit of honour which distinguishes the British soldier, and which will always be an inseparable quality of that soldier. I trust, therefore, Sir, that the time may come when thanks may be given, not only for their successes, if there be successes, but also some acknowledgment of the privations to which the army have been subjected, and of the heroism with which those privations have been endured. I could not refrain from saying these few words, as my personal conduct has been alluded to in late debates. I am sorry that I have been obliged to make a fresh statement to the House with regard to my conduct, but the House will feel that any imputation upon the honour of a public man must require explanation, and I trust that, whatever errors of judgment I may commit, I shall not, while I am in this House, be deprived of the character of a man of honour, endeavouring to serve his country.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, the closing remarks of my noble Friend do not, I think, call for any observation on my part. I will only venture to say that I am quite certain it required no assurance from him to convey to our minds the most distinct conviction that, if there has been any incompleteness in any portion of a statement in which he, as a civilian, was charged with describing military operations of great importance, the very last motive to which that omission would be ascribed would be indifference on his part to the exertions of the army. With respect, Sir, to the observations which preceded that portion of my noble Friend's remarks—namely, the explanation he has given of the part which he has been called upon to take in transactions connected with the formation of a Government, it must be obvious, I think, to the House that my noble Friend had no object in that course except to strengthen the hands of the Executive power at this important crisis, whoever may be the persons charged with the duties of Government. On the other hand, however, I believe that it is true that there is—as a general rule—inconvenience in these references, during the period when there is no responsible and efficient Government, to what may or may not happen, or to what has or has not happened, since the time when the Parliamentary existence of a former Government was terminated. I shall, therefore, think it no part of my duty to follow my noble Friend in his remarks upon that subject. I cannot wonder, Sir, when we consider the freedom, and even the licence, with which the conduct of all public men is discussed in this country, and particularly with regard to matters which may seem to involve personal feeling, or even personal honour, that my noble Friend should have thought it right—if he considered that the facts connected with his recent resignation did not stand fully and fairly before the public —to make a statement in addition to that which he had already submitted to this House. Nor would it become me to complain, even though it be true, that my noble Friend, in making that statement, has not altogether confined himself, in the strictest sense, to matters of fact, but has likewise intimated opinions, and has entered into what may be called partial discussions of great and important subjects with reference to the late Government and the proceedings of its Members which it would be quite impossible for us now to discuss in a satisfactory manner. If I feel it my duty to refer to certain observations made in the course of my noble Friend's speech, I assure him that I shall do so, confining myself, in the first place, most strictly to matters of fact, and, in the second place, with a conviction, which I think he shares, of the very great inconvenience of discussions of this nature, continued from period to period, between persons of great eminence who have recently stood in the confidential relation of colleagues, and who do not meet upon the floor of this or of the other House of Parliament, where the discussion might be brought to a speedy issue, but who must reply to one another without the advantages which personal encounter undoubtedly confers.

Sir, my noble Friend adverted, in the

first instance, to what took place at the period of the assumption of office by my noble Friend the Duke of Newcastle. On that point I think it not necessary or just to carry the matter further than this—that the assumption, or rather the retention of that office, after it had been separated from his former functions, by the Duke of Newcastle was a retention which took effect with the full, unqualified, unhesitating sanction of the entire Cabinet. Therefore, under these circumstances, it would not be fair or just to lay the responsibility of that retention anywhere except upon the entire Cabinet of the Earl of Aberdeen. I have heard to-day from my noble Friend that if it had happened to be proposed to him that he should assume the functions of the War Department, he might have been willing to listen to that proposal. I believe that such a nomination would have given great satisfaction to the country, but at the same time I am sure my noble Friend will see that I do no more than justice to the late Secretary of State for the War Department when I say that he had no means, at that period, of knowing that such a willingness to take that office existed on the part of my noble Friend. My noble Friend has said that he did not think the combination of the Earl of Aberdeen, as First Minister of the Crown, with the Duke of Newcastle as Secretary of State for War, was a combination adequate to the exigency in which the country was placed. No doubt that is an opinion which my noble Friend has made known on a former occasion to this House; but it is at the same time to be recollected that the question is material at what date that opinion was made known to the Government. I do not think my noble Friend intends it to be understood that he had made known that opinion to the First Lord of the Treasury, or to the Secretary of State for War, or to the Cabinet at large, until the middle of the month of November. [Lord JOHN RUSSELL: Certainly not!] So that matter stands quite clear between us. Then, my noble Friend referred to a note which is quoted in the publication to which he has alluded, and in which he wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, "you have done all that you could," and my noble Friend added these words, as if they had terminated the sentence, "but you have been obstructed or overruled by other departments." I am aware my noble Friend did not purport to quote that sentence, but the words of his note are remarkable and emphatic, and I think it is obvious, from the words themselves, that they were general in their application. That, however, may be a matter of opinion; but, at any rate, it may be well that those words should be borne in remembrance. I think they are—"you have done all that could be done, and I am sanguine of success. [Lord JOHN RUSSELL: Hear, hear!] Well then, Sir, my noble Friend next came to what he represents as a matter of great importance with reference to the case between himself and his colleagues—namely, the supposed change of opinion which, as I stated in this House, had been announced by my noble Friend on the 16th of December. My noble Friend states that there were two questions open, the one with regard to the arrangement of departments, the other with respect to the choice of persons to fill those departments. This latter question, my noble Friend has acquainted us, he never opened in conversation with Lord Panmure. If I understand my noble Friend aright, it appears that he had changed his opinion at that date with respect to the subject of the arrangement of departments, but not with reference to the alterations he would have proposed in the individuals filling those departments. Sir, of course it is not for me to say what was the state of my noble Friend's mind at that date. His own evidence, his own testimony upon such a subject, given either in this House or in any other place or form, must be absolutely conclusive. But what I wish to point out is this, that my noble Friend late at the head of the Government and the colleagues of my noble Friend the late Lord President had not the means of ascertaining the nature of the distinction that was thus drawn. For, in the first place, there was a material connection between these two questions. I need not enter into the detail, but it is known to those who hear me, and will be perceived by those who refer to the arrangements of the Government, that the question of the reorganisation of departments was not an abstract question, but necessarily involved a change of men, and that, on the other hand, the change of men could hardly be separated from the rearrangement of the departments. However, it is not for me to argue with my noble Friend as to whether he is correct in supposing that these questions can be disjoined the one from the other. But, as he has described the state of his mind, so, in venturing to address the House on this subject the other night, I thought it but just that I should describe to them, from an authentic source, the state of mind of my noble Friend the late Prime Minister, and the impressions which he received from my noble Friend, he (Lord Aberdeen) being the medium of communication between my noble Friend (Lord J. Russell) and the Cabinet.

Now, Sir, in that respect I am bound to say that I have nothing to change or to modify in what I then stated. It did not appear to my noble Friend lately at the head of the Government that there was any distinction between the views and intentions of the late Lord President of the Council, such as he has described to the House to-night. I have in my possession, from having received very early—I think within two or three days from the period of the occurrence—a communication from (Lord Aberdeen) on the subject—I have the means of speaking with the greatest confidence as to what my noble Friend Lord Aberdeen supposed and believed he had heard from the mouth of my noble Friend (Lord J. Russell); and it was to the effect which I have stated—namely, that Lord Aberdeen took an opportunity on the 16th of December, in conversation with my noble Friend of referring to the correspondence which had taken place between them, and to the notice that had been given by my noble Friend behind me, to be announced to his colleagues, of his intention to make his continuance in the Cabinet contingent upon the adoption of a certain arrangement, or, rather, of his intention, in the event of the non-adoption of a certain arrangement, to withdraw from the Government. Now, admitting that my noble Friend behind me, as he says, had not changed his intention — for I know nothing, and nothing was stated to me;—in fact, Lord Aberdeen could state nothing on the subject whether the abstract opinion of my noble Friend behind me had been changed or not—yet the statement made to me by Lord Aberdeen was, that the late President of the Council had changed his intention, and, so far as Lord Aberdeen's recollection of his impression at the time is concerned—and we have the written testimony of Lord Aberdeen also on the point—the late Prime Minister certainly was not cognisant of any distinction like that drawn by the noble Lord to-night between arrangements with regard to departments and arrangements with respect to the persons who should fill those departments. And I think that my noble Friend behind me will feel that, with the impression which he conveyed to the mind of the late Prime Minister, and with the suppositions entertained by the other Members of the Cabinet, his conduct, up to the 23rd of January, was entirely in harmony with his colleagues. On many occasions questions of all kinds—questions relating to matters civil, matters legislative, matters Parliamentary—had been discussed in the Cabinet, and on none of those days did there appear the slightest symptom of the retention on the part of my noble Friend behind me of his proposal or his wish that a change should take place in the person to whom the administration of the War Department was confided.

My noble Friend has referred to-night to a speech of the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard), and to what, I think, he called the unsatisfactory position in which we stood with reference to the new campaign. It appears that my noble Friend was of opinion that certain provisions should be made and certain measures adopted in prepartion for the new campaign, none of which were taken. Well, Sir, my noble Friend, I am quite sure, will acquit me and the rest of his colleagues of any responsibility in that matter. It was impossible, in deference to any opinion of his, that we could have made such preparations or taken such measures, for the simple reason that we had no knowledge whatever that he required such preparations to be made. My noble Friend adverted again to a point which has been already mentioned—namely, the publication of a fact which, he says, has more or less the authority of the Duke of Newcastle. He says he finds that the Duke of Newcastle, a few days before the meeting of Parliament on the 23rd of January, placed his resignation in the hands of Lord Aberdeen, and stated to Lord Aberdeen that, if his conduct were to be defended by the Government, and if no vote of censure upon it was passed, he then intended to make that resignation absolute, and to retire from the office which he held. Now, I must confess that I think my noble Friend has not quite accurately gathered the nature of the statement made by the Duke of Newcastle. The words that I find imputed to the noble Duke, and which I believe are correct, are these:—

"The noble Lord (Lord J. Russell), in his statement with reference to the course which he had taken, said, until the notice was given by Mr. Roebuck he had not fully considered the course which he ought to take. My Lords, I had. I had maturely considered it; and, while I had made up my mind that my official career was practically brought to a close, I resolved at the same time that I would face the ordeal of censure in your Lordships' House, and would submit the conduct of my administration to the judgment of the House of Commons. But, my Lords, I felt that it was right that I should announce my determination; and a few days before the meeting of Parliament, on the 23rd of January, I told my noble Friend at the head of the Government—I did not tell my other colleagues, because I felt that it was not right that I should do so, and I think your Lordships will appreciate my feelings and motives in that course—that, whatever might be the result of the discussions in this House or in the House of Commons—whether the Government succeeded by a large majority in overcoming resistance and reproach, or whether they failed—I equally should tender my resignation as soon as that judgment should be given and the verdict of Parliament should be pronounced."—[*See* 3 *Hansard*, cxxxvi. 1250-51.]

I think, Sir, that my noble Friend behind me, in his version of this affair, has fallen into two errors. In the first place, he unconsciously represented the case as if my noble Friend the Duke of Newcastle had made some bargain with his colleagues that his conduct should be defended in Parliament. [LORD J. RUSSELL: "No, no!"] That that was not the impression of the noble Lord I am sure from this authentic expression of his views; but that was the impression which was likely to be conveyed. I do not impute it to my noble Friend as a statement; I speak of it only as a notion that might naturally grow out of his representation. ("No, no!") Well, I am perfectly satisfied, and will now pass on to another point which I wish to notice. My noble Friend the Member for the City of London said that the Duke of Newcastle placed his resignation in the hands of the Earl of Aberdeen. Why, Sir, if the Earl of Aberdeen had had the noble Duke's resignation placed in his hands, I think it would have been incurring a very heavy responsibility—a responsibility which, I should say, could hardly have been justifiably assumed—for the Earl of Aberdeen to have concealed the fact of that resignation from his colleagues. But the Duke of Newcastle, I beg leave to say, did no such thing as place his resignation in the hands of the Earl of Aberdeen. He gave the Earl of Aberdeen no option as to the course he should pursue. He intimated to the Earl of Aberdeen—whether the act was right or wrong does not affect the fact—the intention he had formed, and which he proposed to carry out at a future period. You may think the noble Duke would have done better to keep that intention to himself, or that it would have been wiser to make it more widely known. I will not enter into the discussion of that point. I think, however, that his motives were honourable, and that his judgment, on the whole, was sound, and that to have mentioned the intimation made to him by the noble Duke to his colleagues would have placed my noble Friend (the Earl of Aberdeen) in a false position towards the Government, and the Government itself in a false position towards Parliament. I am quite certain of this, that nothing would have been so incompatible with the character and feelings of my noble Friend the Earl of Aberdeen as to make that intention known to the Cabinet and to his colleagues, and yet to keep it from the knowledge of my noble Friend the Member for London.

There is only one other point to which I wish to allude. My noble Friend behind me referred to a letter which he said was from Lord Ripon, and he bestowed on Lord Ripon a eulogy which I, for one—and not only I, but, I think, the whole House—will admit to have been well deserved. I regard the conduct of Lord Ripon, in the year 1833, in respect to the arrangements which then took place, as being in thorough consistency with the high honour and many other public virtues of that nobleman. But, Sir, I demur to the contrast which my noble Friend has drawn between the conduct of Lord Ripon on that occasion and that of the Duke of Newcastle in the present instance. Lord Ripon, if I read his letter aright, did not say that the arrangement, the transfer then made, was one altogether agreeable to him—he did not say it was one that he had pressed—he did not say it was one that he had volunteered—I think, indeed, he stated, or at least gave it to be understood, that he had made no profession whatever of his readiness to have his office dealt with according to the convenience and the exigencies of the public service, but that, when the proposal was made to him by the proper and responsible individual, Lord Ripon, like a gentlemanly, upright, and honourable politician, gave way to the proposal, it being one that was perfectly straightforward and aboveboard from beginning to end. Well, did the Duke of Newcastle resist any proposition of that kind, made by the regular and responsible persons to make it? Did his course differ from that taken by Lord Ripon? Is he to be exposed to an invidious contrast with that nobleman, as if he had for one moment hesitated to accede to a proposition emanating from the head of the Government? No such thing. Why, Sir, my noble Friend (the Duke of Newcastle) went further than Lord Ripon did, for Lord Ripon, as he fairly tells the public, made no offer, but acceded to a proposal that had been made to him. The noble Duke, in a written form—in a letter addressed to the Earl of Aberdeen—requested the Prime Minister, on his own part and on the part of my right hon. Friend the Secretary at War, to make such disposition, of both their offices as might be best for the advantage of the Government and the benefit of the public service. I must say, therefore, that on this point I think my noble Friend behind me, in his anxiety to do full justice to Lord Ripon, has really done scant justice to the Duke of Newcastle. I have said, Sir, that I thought it obviously most desirable that this subject of controversy should be wound up; and, in confining myself only to matters of fact, I trust that I have kept my promise honourably. At any rate, I hope I have not wilfully wandered from it. I trust that nothing has fallen from me which makes me a party, by connivance or otherwise, to the charges of treachery or cowardice that have been brought against my noble Friend (Lord John Russell). The man deserves contempt who can make such charges; and from those who have been his colleagues my noble Friend knows that they have never received credence. I only rose, Sir, to supply those corrections which it appeared to me my noble Friend's narrative seemed to require, and, having accomplished that task, I do not think it fit for me further to trouble the House.

Viscount EBRINGTON said, he must express his surprise that no announcement had been given of any progress having been made towards terminating that state of Ministerial interregnum which was affecting so seriously the interests of the country, and presenting such a melancholy spectacle of the defects of our much-vaunted representative system to the eyes of the world. While the explanations and counter-explanations and the intricacies of reasoning to which they had been listening were going on, he could not help fancying what the feelings of our army in the Crimea must be, suffering, as we all knew it was, every privation and hardship, upon learning that at home there was no Government absolutely existing; and what must be the feeling excited throughout Europe—what the exultation of all despotic Governments, and what the discouragement caused to those, alas! not too numerous newly-formed constitutional Governments to which the example of this country had long been held up for their admiration and imitation? He did trust that public men would look to the great crisis in which the country now stood, and endeavour, somehow or other, to compose and arrange their differences, so that we might, before long, have an efficient Government to carry on the war (which he might say for himself now constituted his only politics) with due vigour, and bring it to a speedy and successful issue.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer

Motion *agreed to.*

The House adjourned at Six o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Tuesday, February 6, 1855.

Minutes.] Public Bills.—1ª Purchasers Protection against Judgments.
2ª Fisheries (North America),
3ª Cathedral Appointments Act Continuance; Bills of Exchange.

FISHERIES (NORTH AMERICA) BILL.

On Motion that the Bill be now read 2ª,

The Earl of DERBY said, he did not wish to offer any opposition to the second reading of this Bill, as it was one of pressing importance, its object being to enable the Crown to carry into effect a treaty which had been already concluded between the United States and this country, and which had already received the sanction of the various Colonial Legislatures, except that of Newfoundland. If, however, they were then discussing the terms of the treaty, he should find some difficulty in admitting that the principle of reciprocity between the two countries had been fairly carried out by it. He doubted very much whether for the free navigation of the St. Lawrence obtained by the United States they had yielded a fair equivalent in the concession to us of the right of navigating Lake Michigan. But the concession on our part, for which he was unable to see that we had obtained any reciprocal advantage, was the right granted to American fishermen of taking fish, not only within certain limits, but in the very bays, harbours, and creeks of certain British

North American Colonies; for it was idle to say that the concession to our fishermen of the right of fishing on the coasts of the United States was worth anything, for it was notorious that the only fisheries of any value were those possessed by the British Colonies. The only advantage that we had obtained in return for this concession was, in fact, that fish imported from the coast of Nova Scotia, whether in British or American vessels, should be admitted free of duty into the United States. He thought these terms were unduly favourable to the United States; but still, as the treaty had received the sanction of the various Colonial Legislatures, he was not disposed to enter further into their discussion. He wished, however, for information on two points on which some apprehensions were entertained. One point was as to whether the jurisdiction of the mixed Commission to be appointed under the treaty was to be confined, as he hoped, to the settlement of disputes that might arise as to whether particular parts of the coasts of our Colonies were or were not within the limits to be reserved for British fishermen. Another point was this: It appeared by the treaty that the American fishermen were to be allowed not only to fish upon the coasts and shores of the British Colonies, but were to be allowed to land there for the purpose of drying and curing their fish. Now, he thought that the utmost care should be taken that this right should not be extended so as to permit the erection of permanent buildings, or the maintenance of permanent establishments, the property of citizens of the United States; for if one thing more than another was likely to give rise to disputes between two countries, it was the granting territorial rights (secured by treaty) on the part of one country to the inhabitants of another. The result necessarily was, that on points guaranteed by the treaty questions continually arose between the two Governments, and their interference was invoked in disputes between the inhabitants of the two countries which might have been easily settled by an ordinary magistrate. He trusted that his noble Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster would be able to give him a satisfactory assurance that his apprehensions on these points were unfounded.

EARL GRANVILLE was not able to give the requisite explanations. His noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, within whose department the Bill fell, was now detained at his office by a pressure of public business; but would take a future occasion to give the noble Earl the information he required. Under these circumstances, he would suggest that further observations in reference to the treaty should be postponed till the House went into Committee on the Bill.

Bill read 2ª, and committed to a Committee of the whole House on *Thursday* next.

THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS—PURCHASERS PROTECTION AGAINST JUDGMENTS BILL.

LORD ST. LEONARDS *presented* a Bill for the better Protection of Purchasers against Judgments and *Lis pendens* and Life Annuities. The noble and learned Lord stated that one object of the Bill was to remedy certain anomalies and doubts which at present existed as to the law of the registration of judgments, another was to place the counties palatine of Durham and Chester on the same footing with respect to that law as the rest of the kingdom; another object had reference to the registration of annuity deeds. These deeds were formerly directed to be enrolled, in order to the protection of grantors of annuities against usurious transactions. When the usury laws were repealed last year, the Act for enrolment of annuities was very naturally repealed also. He proposed now to re-enact the registration of these deeds; and he did so for this reason. Although he was opposed to the registration of mortgages, purchases, and settlements of land, he drew a wide distinction between dealings with the estate and the title deeds thereof, and such incumbrances as were created upon it by *lis pendens*, judgments, &c. He thought the latter class of incumbrances should be registered; and he proposed now to enact that no life annuity should be a charge against lands, tenements, and hereditaments unless it was registered. The reason why he proposed to include this with the other classes of incumbrances to which he had referred was, that they were general incumbrances, that the title deeds of an estate never went along with the annuity, and that, therefore, it was such an incumbrance as a purchaser ought to have the means of being protected against.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR said, he was by no means opposed to the Bill which his noble and learned Friend had just laid on the table. He was, however, sorry to hear that he still retained his objections to the registration of assurances, because it was his (the Lord Chancellor's) intention to introduce a Bill during the present Session, not for the general registration of assurances, but for carrying it one stage further by establishing a registration of mortgages.

Lord BROUGHAM entirely concurred with his noble and learned Friend on the woolsack in approving highly of the measure introduced by his noble and learned Friend near him. He must at the same time say that he thought it would be of very great advantage to the jurisprudence of this country if we had such a functionary as a Minister of Justice. Had we had had such an official, it would have been perfectly impossible that such anomalies as those pointed out by his noble and learned Friend should have occurred.

Lord CAMPBELL also expressed his concurrence in the principle of the Bill, not despairing of a general Bill on registration.

Bill read 1ª.

THE ADMINISTRATION.

The Earl of ABERDEEN: My Lords, in moving the adjournment of the House, I think it right to express my confident hope and belief that, before the next meeting of the House, the present state of anxiety and embarrassment as to the condition of the Government will be brought to a happy termination.

House adjourned to Thursday next.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Tuesday, February 6, 1855.

MINISTERIAL INTERREGNUM.

Sir GEORGE GREY: Sir, I have to state to the House that my noble Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department has received a Commission from Her Majesty to undertake the formation of a Government. Under these circumstances he has requested me to move that the House at its rising should adjourn till Thursday next, not thinking that it would be necessary for the House to meet to-morrow at twelve o'clock; but I have been informed since I came into the House that it would be attended with great inconvenience if the House were to adjourn over to-morrow. I understand that there is some business, not likely to occupy much time, which it is desirable should be transacted to-morrow; and, therefore, I have to propose that the House at its rising should adjourn as usual till to-morrow at noon.

Mr. BENTINCK: I do not know, Sir, whether the course which I am about to take is in accordance with the custom, or will be in accordance with the wishes, of this House, but I think, at least, my justification may be found in the very anomalous, and, I may add, the very disastrous state of public affairs at the present moment. For it is impossible, I think, to imagine a state of things more disastrous than the present, both for the prospects and the character of the country. It is now more than a week since a Vote of this House compelled the resignation of the Ministry upon the ground of their inadequacy for the duties which devolved upon them—that incompetency having been admitted even by portions of the Ministry itself. Now, I would ask, what has occurred during the time that has elapsed since the Vote that compelled the resignation of office by the late Government—time, every hour of which is invaluable, and upon the proper distribution of which may depend the lives of thousands of our countrymen in the East? If we are rightly informed—I am speaking, of course, from public rumour, but when we have nothing else but public rumour to guide us, I believe that is a sufficient ground on which to offer a few remarks to the House—if, I say, we are rightly informed, we know that in the first instance the Earl of Derby was commissioned by Her Majesty to form a Ministry. It is rumoured that the Earl of Derby made the attempt, and that he applied in the first instance to the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Home Department. That noble Lord is stated, in the first instance, to have assented to the arrangements proposed to him; but the noble Lord is stated subsequently, and very shortly afterwards, to have declined those arrangements to which he originally assented. The noble Lord will doubtless be able at the proper time to explain to the House and to the country a course of conduct which, if correctly reported, savours somewhat of vacillation. We hear it further stated that Lord Derby, upon learning the disinclination of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Home Department to join him, found it impossible to form a Government with which he could hope to obtain the confidence of a majority of this House. He therefore abandoned the task which he had undertaken and gave up the attempt. We then hear that the noble Lord the Member for the City of London (Lord John Russell) was called upon by Her Majesty to attempt to form a Government. We are told that the attempt on the part of that noble Lord failed after a very few hours; and certainly, after the proceedings of the last few days, nobody can feel surprise that public men should hesitate before they consented to become the associates of the noble Lord in the labours of office. We are then told that the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Home Department was sent for by Her Majesty, and that he has been for some days attempting—but, so far as we know up to the present time, attempting without success—to form an Administration. And we are further told—speaking still from public rumour—that the difficulty which the noble Lord has encountered arises from the determination of certain public men to force a preponderance of their own party into the formation of the new Government. Now, I would ask if this is a fitting or a creditable state of things for the country to find itself in at such a time? Is it right that we should be listening night after night to personal recriminations between noble Members of the other House and noble Lords and hon. Gentlemen in this House, and that public men should be employed in forcing upon others a preponderance of their own party interests, whilst public affairs are in this dangerous—and I may repeat disastrous—condition? It is impossible to conceive anything more discreditable or more disadvantageous to the country than the delay which has occurred during the last few days in the formation of a Ministry capable of carrying on the affairs of the country. I have been induced to make these remarks in the hope that, having done so, others who have far more weight with this House than I have, may be induced to take up the subject, and to call upon this House for an expression of opinion, which may lead to a better state of things, and to some onward progress in the negotiations that are now going on for the formation of a Government, so that the country may no longer waste such valuable time as that which has been lost during the past eight or nine days. I need not remind the House that the lives of thousands of our countrymen may depend upon every hour that is misemployed at the present moment. I trust that an expression of opinion from this House will lead to the discontinuance of a delay which is fatal in every respect, and that we shall no longer see the country brought to discredit by the continuance of a state of things which must weaken its character both at home and abroad.

SIR CHARLES WOOD: Sir, I may appeal to the experience of the older Members of this House if the course which the hon. Gentleman has followed upon the present occasion is not altogether without precedent. The hon. Gentleman has expressed his decided opinion that the present state of the country is one that calls for explanation, and I have no doubt that when the proper time arrives for asking that explanation it will be given by those whose duty it may be to do so, and that, moreover, at the earliest possible moment. I apprehend, however, that in the present posture of public affairs, it is not fair to call upon the Members of the late Government, who are certainly not responsible for what has occurred, to explain the reasons why so much time has been consumed in the formation of an Administration. When the new Ministers, whoever they may be, take their places in this House, then will be the proper time to ask for explanations, and I think I may assure the hon. Gentleman that an opportunity will be given to him to repeat the statement which he has just made to the House.

MR. WHITESIDE: Sir, the right hon. Baronet has entirely misunderstood the remarks of the hon. Member for West Norfolk (Mr. Bentinck). My hon. Friend did not venture to ask for an explanation of a thing which, I suppose, cannot be explained; but he addressed a few practical and sensible observations to the House, in the hope that the House might express an opinion which would be valuable in accelerating that which, if the House do not interpose, does not seem likely ever to approximate to a satisfactory termination. Perhaps, after all, the only thing possible to be done, as you have passed a Bill to import a foreign army, is to bring in a foreign Ministry also.

MR. F. SCOTT: Sir, when the right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Control refers to precedent, he must allow me to say that the position in which this country stands at present is quite unprecedented. He has alluded to the want of experience of the hon. Member for West Norfolk; but my hon. Friend sat in this House during the years 1853 and

1854, and, in common with every other Member of the House, he recollects that, during the whole of the unfortunate Session of 1853, when questions were asked in this and the other House, which, if they had been properly answered by a Government capable of doing its duty, would in all probability have obviated the war in which we are now engaged, the occupants of the Treasury benches refused to answer them, and took refuge in silence. Further, if the questions which have been so repeatedly asked by the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) had led to a debate during the last Session of Parliament, I do believe that this war either would not have occurred, or it would have been conducted with vigour and success by an efficient Ministry—a Ministry fully competent to the conduct and prosecution of the war. I think my hon. Friend the Member for West Norfolk was quite right in the course he has taken; and when he asks this House to express an opinion upon the present position of public affairs, he asks nothing more than what the whole country expects of its representatives. The general feeling out of doors is, that the chief of the late Government was a mere *caput mortuum,* totally unfit to conduct the war. He and his colleagues perpetually told us during his administration not to ask questions, and called upon us to pass a vote of censure upon them. We did no such thing, but we passed a vote of inquiry upon the very just motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck)—an inquiry into the sufferings of our brave soldiers in the Crimea. The Government chose to say that that vote was not complimentary to themselves, and construed it into a vote of censure. So be it; but is it to be said here that the voice of the country is to be silent? Are we to have cast back upon us the very men whose incapacity, according to the most influential of their late colleagues, has brought about the present disastrous state of things? Are we to be told that we are not following a constitutional course—that we are hampering the Queen in her choice of Ministers—because, having waited for more than a week, at length our patience has become exhausted, and we ask who are to be our rulers? Not that I believe that the country has not gone on just as well during the past week as during the last two years. I think, however, that this House and the country should express their opinion before the statesman who is charged with the formation of a Government has fixed upon the men whom he is to place in office. If I saw here the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) I should be disposed to apply to him some observations suggested by the remarks which fell from him last night; but, in his absence, I shall not further trespass upon the House, and have only to say, in conclusion, that I trust this House will express a very decided opinion upon the situation in which we have been placed during the last eight or nine days, and upon the manner in which a small section of statesmen are opposing their own importance to the welfare of the country and the safety of our army in the Crimea.

Mr. LABOUCHERE: I confess, Sir, that in the present posture of public affairs there is no consideration that bears so strongly on my mind as a desire that this House at least should, by its demeanour and conduct, hold that position in the estimation of the country which is of the utmost consequence at all times, but more especially at a moment like the present. I am far from saying that the time may not come when it may be the duty of this House in the most constitutional manner, by an Address to the Crown, to express its opinion that as speedy a termination as possible should be put to the present situation of affairs. But I am of opinion that the character of this House will not be raised, or that the termination of the negotiations which are now in progress will not be promoted in any degree, by a discursive discussion of this kind. If this House does interfere at all, let it do so with dignity, with effect, and upon due notice given. I do not say that, if the present situation of affairs is protracted even for a few days, it may not be our duty to interpose in a proper manner—and I address myself to Members on all sides without distinction — but in the meantime I do implore the House not, by listening to public rumours, or what appears in newspapers — not, by attempting to make speeches in favour of this or that set of candidates for office—not, by exhibiting a spectacle of this kind to the country, to take a course which would not promote to any extent any public object, but which, on the contrary, would have the effect of exhibiting this House in a discreditable and humiliating posture before the public at large. But the principal inducement I had to rise was to implore the House not to allow itself to be led into a discussion of this kind. At the same time I by no means wish to deny—on the contrary, on a proper occasion I should be ready to assert and vindicate—the right, nay, the duty, of this House, if the present state of things be long protracted, to interfere, by an Address to the Crown if necessary, in order that an end might be put to so injurious and inconvenient a delay. But I put it to the good sense and good feeling of every Member of this House whether discussions of this kind are calculated to do us credit or promote any useful or beneficial object. I do not wish to express any opinion upon what has occurred. The time will come when, with responsible Ministers sitting in this House, we shall be entitled to require and receive explanations; but we must wait till that time arrives, and not more than waste our time by entering into a discussion of this kind at the present moment.

MR. MUNTZ said, he could not agree with the right hon. Gentleman, for he thought the House was already in a very humiliating situation, and the country too. What had they been doing here but wasting their time for several days past, pretending to govern the country, whilst the Gentlemen who were seated on the Treasury benches were no Government at all. The fact was that the country believed they were waiting for two or three aristocratic families to adjust their differences before they could form a Government. That was what the people were saying; and they were also beginning to say that it should not last much longer. They were inquiring, and they would soon know, whether there were not men enough to govern the country as well as it had been governed during the last thirty years, without entering the charmed circle of these aristocratic relationships. Hon. and right hon. Gentlemen might shut their eyes to these facts; but if they went into the world and heard the remarks that were everywhere made, they would soon be convinced that was the feeling of the people at this moment. They thought that time was wasted and that the existing state of things was injurious and disgraceful to the country; and if it continued much longer, it would end in the disgrace alike of the Government and that House too.

MR. MALINS: Sir, I am very reluctant to interfere in the present discussion; but sitting here as an independent Member, caring for neither one party nor another, and having only the interests of my country in view, I must say that I am unable to perceive the justice of the observations of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Taunton (Mr. Labouchere) that this House is not properly employing itself in directing its attention to the subject introduced by the hon. Member for West Norfolk. I cannot, I confess, look at the present state of things without serious alarm. I agree with the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Muntz) that it is anything but satisfactory to the country. I, for one, do express an opinion that these things have now gone too far, and that it is time for the people to take the matter into their own hands. It is not for the people of England to sacrifice themselves to the differences of one or two aristocratic families. These families must settle their differences among themselves; for day after day cannot pass in this way without our knowing whether there is any more prospect of forming a Government now than there was eight days ago when Ministers were compelled to resign office upon that which they regarded as a vote of censure, and which I for one in giving my vote intended should be a censure. Is the House, I ask, to meet in this way day after day only to pass the Motion for adjournment? and is this to pass in one of the most disastrous contingencies in which the country was ever known to be? To-day, again, we assembled in the hope of receiving the announcement from the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Home Department, that he had succeeded in forming a Government. I, for one, came in the expectation that the noble Lord would announce to us either that he had or that he had not been successful in his endeavours; and I think the time is now come when it is incumbent that that announcement should be made one way or the other. I beg, therefore, to ask those Gentlemen sitting on the opposite side of the House, who represent the late Government, whether at this moment there is any reasonable prospect of a Government being formed. To-morrow, it is said, we are to meet for a few minutes and then adjourn, and on Thursday, again, the same proceeding would possibly be repeated. Where is the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer? Why is he not here in his place? Is he the cause of the difficulties the noble Lord has to encounter? What are those difficulties? Why cannot those Gentlemen on the opposite side settle their differences among themselves? If there cannot be a man found to undertake the

Government of the country, why do they not give it up; and if there really can be found such a man, if a Government really can be formed, why do they not announce it? The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Taunton thinks that we ought to go on acquiescing in the present state of things for the present; and that if the present state of things should continue too long, he will then agree in an Address to the Crown to put a stop to it. I say, Sir, that the present state of things has gone on too long already, and it is past endurance that it should be continued day after day as it now is. There is, however, another matter which is independent of any Government, and which I counsel the House to proceed with. This House, on Monday last week, by a majority of 157—the numbers being 305 to 148—resolved to appoint a Committee to inquire into the present state of our army in the Crimea. Why should not the House at once proceed with that matter? Why should we not ask the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) to proceed with the appointment of his Committee? Let it be proceeded with at once, let it sit, and let us find out on whom the blame of all the disasters that have befallen the army in the Crimea is to be thrown. I myself, although I have not sat very long in this House, know something of what is due to the House and to the nation in a case like the present. It is now forty-eight hours since the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Home Department was called upon to form a Government. Is he to form a Government out of those elements which have been so condemned by such a majority of the House of Commons? I believe what the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer said yesterday was true, that we did not attach particular blame to particular individuals, Members of the late Cabinet; but that individually and collectively we condemned the whole Cabinet. It was not intended by me, and I do not think it was intended by hon. Gentlemen sitting on this side of the House, to lay any particular blame on the noble Earl, the head of the late Government, or on the noble Duke the Minister of War, or upon any other individual Member of the Cabinet; but we condemned them all, *en masse*, on account of the blundering nature of their proceedings. I may be permitted, perhaps, to say a word with reference to what fell on a recent occasion from the noble Lord the Member for the City of London. The noble Lord desired to take credit to himself, inasmuch as he had disapproved of this matter at a particular time, thinking that something else should have been done at another time. I listened very attentively to all that fell from the noble Lord on that occasion, and it appeared to me that, whatever might be the disasters that had arisen from the mismanagement of the war by the late Government—upon that noble Lord's head as much as upon any other must fall the blame of those disasters, because if the appointment that was made of a War Minister in the month of June last did not then meet with his approbation, it was his duty to have then made known his disapprobation and prevented the appointment taking place. It seems to me that the noble Lord need not then have scrupled to make known his objections, especially after what we know of the squabbles that have taken place in that Cabinet. To the Duke of Newcastle, the late Minister of War, I give all credit for having done everything that it was in his power to do. I give the noble Duke credit for his great industry and application to business, at a time, too, when he was deserted by all his colleagues, and left alone at his post to manage this war by himself, while they were amusing themselves in all parts of the country. I am fully disposed to give the noble Duke credit for having exerted himself to the utmost; but I blame him for his rashness in having undertaken an office for which he had had no previous experience, and to which he ought to have had diffidence enough to know that he could not bring the qualities necessary for a proper administration of its duties, and I also blame the noble Lord the Member for the City of London for having acquiesced in that appointment. The noble Lord says that in the month of November it occurred to him that it would be for the good of the country that the office of Secretary for War should be transferred to the hands of the Secretary of State for the Home Department. Now I cannot understand why in the month of June last when the noble Lord the Member for the City of London knew so well that all through the Peninsular War the office of Secretary at War was held by the noble Lord the Home Secretary; that that noble Lord during all that time was in constant communication with the Duke of Wellington, and that he was also Secretary at War at the time of the battle of Waterloo; one wonders that in June last these ideas should not have presented themselves to the mind of the noble Lord. I hope the House will excuse me these observations. I rose for the purpose of impressing upon the House my desire that they should not tolerate this state of things any longer; and if the noble Lord who has been entrusted with the formation of a Government does not shortly come down to the House, and announce to us that he has been successful in forming a Ministry, I trust that some influential Member of this House will take the matter in hand, and that an humble Address will be moved to Her Majesty, praying Her Majesty to put an end to the existing state of things. I trust I may be allowed to make one more observation. There is now, for the first time, presented to this country this most extraordinary state of things. In making these observations, Gentlemen on the opposite side of the House may suppose that I am actuated much more than I am by party motives; but I am not at all actuated by any such motives, for I have no party objects to attain. It is admitted on all hands that there is in this House a party that is very much larger than any other, large enough almost to constitute a majority of the House, and yet the fact is that that party is to be excluded from any share in the Government of the country. [*Ironical cheers.*] I am not surprised at this manifestation of feeling. I know the readiness of hon. Gentlemen to attribute my reference to this subject to a desire to promote party politics; but I have no party object to promote, and no personal seeking in the matter. But hon. Gentlemen cannot gainsay the justice of my assertion, that there is a great effort being made on that side of the House to get possession of the reins of Government, to the exclusion of those by whom properly those reins should be held. Hon. Gentlemen on that side of the House seem to have got an idea that, because by certain combinations among themselves they can get certain aristocratic families to unite together and to come forward, and therefore they, although in a minority in this House, are to assume all the offices of Government to the exclusion of the majority of the House. To what are we to attribute this lamentable state of things? This state of things, Sir, is to be attributed to that lamentable breaking up of political parties which took place in 1845 and 1846. I, for one, occupying at that time a humble position, but observing all these things with minute attention—I saw clearly that that breaking up of political parties must lead to that state of things in the midst of which we now live, when it has become all but impracticable to carry on the Government of the country on Parliamentary principles. Look at the present state of things—here is the most powerful party in the country, and because we have not an absolute majority over all the other parties combined, therefore we can have no voice in the management of the affairs of the country. On the opposite side of the House is to be seen a very small party, numbering not more than thirty or forty Members. They are the relics of that great party which was broken up in 1845–6; and in consequence of their having belonged to that great party they think themselves entitled to take all the prominent positions of the Government to themselves. When the noble Lord the Member for the City of London found that he could not have all the power to his own party, he took to himself credit for taking as much of it as to make the giving up of the rest a matter of very small moment. Now, that is the state of things to which that party of thirty or forty has arrived. Refusing to act with that old party, who are their natural allies, and allying themselves with individuals with whom they cannot act on satisfactory principles, they stand alone between two parties, and yet it is to that party that it now devolves to govern the country. But to confide the Government of the country to individuals condemned by an overwhelming vote of this House, I pronounce to be unconstitutional. I go further, and I declare that to attempt to reconstruct a Government with such elements will fail, and will be found to be an attempt which never can succeed.

MR. STUART WORTLEY: Sir, I am not going to follow the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite through all the party politics he has submitted to the House. I rise on this occasion to look, not to party interests, but to the interests of the public, and to ask whether the continuance of this conversation at this time can be of any service to the country. I entirely agree with those who have expressed their deep regret at the position in which the country is placed at this moment. We all regret the period that has elapsed, and the difficulty that has occurred in giving a new Ministry to the country; but if there is any difficulty more than another that can be thrown in the way of the formation of a new Ministry, it must be the continuance of a discussion such as that in which we are now engaged. There is absolutely no Government at this present time—when it is said that every hour may be of importance to our army in the East, when the sufferings of our troops require all the attention of the Government; and the country with almost one voice points to one Member of this House as having the power to form a Government which will command the confidence of the nation. Now, we have been informed by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Morpeth (Sir G. Grey) that the noble Lord is at present engaged in the formation of such an Administration, and there is no Member of this House, I apprehend, who entertains the slightest doubt but that he will succeed in his task. Is this, then, I confidently ask, a convenient moment to enter upon a discussion of this nature, which can but embarrass his course and increase his difficulties. I therefore appeal to the House whether it will not be convenient to come at once to an agreement to the Motion for adjournment. If this period of interregnum should last to an unreasonable extent, it will then, of course, be the duty of this House to vote an Address on the subject to Her Majesty; but, in the meantime, let us not be accused by the nation of throwing difficulties in the way of the very man the nation has selected as the most likely to preserve their confidence.

Mr. ROEBUCK: I rise, Sir, on this occasion on account of my having been particularly alluded to by the hon. and learned Member for Wallingford (Mr. Malins). Before I address myself to the matter personal to myself, I will make one observation with reference to what has fallen from him. The hon. and learned Gentleman complains that that party which constitutes very nearly a majority of this House has been excluded from the formation of a Government. That is, I think, a most incorrect way of stating the facts of the case, for that party have been called upon to form an Administration, and have confessed their inability to do so. That inability has been confessed by the hon. Gentleman the Member for West Norfolk (Mr. Bentinck), who says that they were called upon by their leader, and that he had since declared he had not been successful in his endeavour to construct a Cabinet. Therefore, it cannot be said to the House that to us belongs the blame of creating this inability. The hon. and learned Gentleman says he thinks the House ought now to proceed with the Committee I originally moved for. I think I owe it to this House to explain why I have not ere now moved for the appointment of that Committee. In naming that Committee, I naturally was led to wish that it should attain the confidence of the country. For that purpose I was of course induced to wish some of the leading Members of this House to form a part of that Committee; but while the House is without a Government I did not know who should form the Government, and, therefore, I was totally unable to perform an essential part of my duty, as some of the Members who might be placed on that Committee might also be selected to form part of a new Administration. I hope the House will allow me to say one word more. It has fallen from the right hon. Baronet the Member for Morpeth (Sir G. Grey) that upon the noble Lord who is called by courtesy the Secretary of State for the Home Department has fallen the task of forming a new Administration, and it has been stated by the hon. Gentleman the Member for West Norfolk that he has found some difficulty in the performance of that duty. Now, if I know anything of this House or of the country, sure I am that that noble Lord will not feel any difficulty about the matter. The country has chosen him as the head of the new Government, and upon the country I am confident he may rely. If anybody should throw difficulties in his way, it is in his Lordship's hands to put aside that difficulty, and say to the persons so attempting to create it, "Stand aside—I will put into office those who, if they have attained the attention and confidence of the country, will continue to enjoy that attention and confidence, and who, if they have not yet attained the confidence of the country, will, through me, attain it. I will do for the country that which the country demands I should do. I shall form an Administration at once, regardless of party considerations, and regardless of personal considerations." If the noble Lord acts upon these principles, sure I am he will obtain the confidence of the country, and obtaining that, he may be content.

Mr. BENTINCK; Sir, I have only one word now to say, and that is, that, after what has fallen from the right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir G. Grey), I do not wish to press the matter further upon the

House. What I thought it my duty to ask was, an expression of opinion from the House on this subject; and I did so ask an expression of opinion because I believed that to be the only means of putting a stop to a state of things which, if I am correctly informed, is not creditable to the public men of this country, and will be disastrous to the fortunes of the nation.

The House adjourned at half after Five o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Wednesday, February 7, 1855.

MINUTES.] NEW WRITS.—For Tiverton, *v.* Viscount Palmerston, First Commissioner of the Treasury; for Wilts (Southern Division), *v.* Right Hon. Sidney Herbert, Secretary of State.
PUBLIC BILLS.—1° Bills of Exchange.
2° Public Libraries and Museums.

SUPPLY—ORDNANCE SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Sir, I propose to move that you do now leave the Chair, for the purpose of going into Committee of Supply, in order that I may then ask the Committee to give a Vote on account, being part of the Supplementary Estimate for the Ordnance Department, of which my right hon. Friend, who has now accepted the office of one of Her Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, gave notice yesterday. I presume the Government are of opinion that it would be the wish of the House that we should not proceed with any business, except such as is of absolute necessity, in order that those who have accepted office, or who have changed their offices, in Her Majesty's Government—at least, the principal members of it—may have an opportunity of submitting themselves to their constituents for their re-election. It would, perhaps, be inconvenient to proceed to important business in the absence of these Gentlemen. At the same time, as far as the Government is concerned, it would be perfectly convenient for them to go on with those Bills which already stand upon the Votes of this House; and if the expression of opinion should make it evident that such is the wish of the House, we shall be prepared to do so; but, estimating as well as we can what may be the probable wish of the House, we apprehend that it would not be thought convenient to proceed in that manner, and consequently the intention of the Government is to propose that the first important public business to be taken up in this House should be the Navy Estimates, and to fix Friday week for going into that question. It would not be possible, I am afraid, for my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty, who has been seriously indisposed for some short time, to be in his place for the purpose of moving those Estimates before that day; but we do hope that he may at that time be present, or, if not, we shall endeavour to make some arrangement for bringing, at all events, a portion of the Estimates before the House upon that day. With respect to the Vote which we shall propose to-day, it is only necessary for me to remind the House of the restrictions that are laid upon the Government by the rules and regulations of this House in regard to the disposal of public money. The House will bear in mind that it is not only necessary that all money which is to be raised for the public service should be raised by the authority of Parliament—that it is not only necessary that the money so raised should be appropriated to particular services by the authority of Parliament, but the wisdom of this House—or, at any rate, the usage of this House—has added a further restriction, namely, that no money, although legally raised and legally appropriated or assigned to particular services by this House, can be used without the sanction of a Bill of Ways and Means. It has become necessary for us to propose, in consequence of the amount of expenditure in the Navy and Ordnance departments, a supplemental estimate for the present year—in the first place, to authorise a further expenditure of money for those services, and, in the second place, to authorise the issue of that money. We are not in a condition, unfortunately—I say so because, in this instance, the rule is attended with some public inconvenience—we are not in a condition to issue that money, though it be voted in Supply, without a Bill of Ways and Means. On that account, and because, in point of fact, we have now come rather near the margin given to us by the Ways and Means Bill passed last Session. I am afraid that it will not be in the power of the Government to propose that which undoubtedly would be most for the convenience of the House, if I estimate the inclination of the House aright, namely, an absolute adjournment of the House till Friday week. But what we propose now is, that we should go into Committee of Supply, and take a Vote on account for the Ordnance service, leaving a residue to be afterwards brought before the House, so as not to interfere with the liberty of hon. Members to discuss the whole subject if they think fit. The remainder of the Vote will afford that opportunity for discussion, and I hope, therefore, that the House will make no objection or difficulty to what I now propose, but will at once allow the House to go into Committee of Supply, and vote on account the means which are necessary, in the meantime, to meet the exigencies of the public service, as I am sure it is not the wish of the House that any portion of the public service should be crippled or impeded for want of the necessary resources. If, as I presume, it shall be the pleasure of the House to grant a Vote on account to-day, that Vote will be reported to-morrow, and during the interval we shall carefully examine whether it is possible for us, agreeably to the present law, to provide for the necessary issues of money without putting the House to the trouble of meeting from day to day for merely formal business, and we shall then announce the result to the House. It may, perhaps, be supposed that, even although that matter may be satisfactorily adjusted, it will still be necessary or convenient for the House to meet for private business; but, at any rate, to-morrow, I presume, we shall be able to tell the House what arrangement may be made with reference to that subject. In the meantime, if I propose this Vote now—and I trust it will be given, notwithstanding the absence of my noble Friend the First Lord of the Treasury—I propose it without the slightest limitation of the liberty of hon. Gentlemen to discuss the whole subject at a future time. Therefore, a residue will remain which will bring the whole question of that expenditure under the notice of the House, and that which will be taken now will be taken only to meet the necessary demands of the public service.

Sir HENRY WILLOUGHBY said, he could not do otherwise than characterise the proceeding of the right hon. Gentleman as exceedingly irregular. The House was, in fact, completely taken by surprise, because the very first intimation of the proposed Vote appeared in that day's paper, in the name of Mr. Secretary at War, and that right hon. Gentleman was no longer a Member of the House. With such a notice as that, therefore, he put it to the House and the right hon. Gentleman in the Chair, whether it was competent for the House to go into Committee of Supply then, and vote what he anticipated would be a large sum of money. Another point to which he desired to call attention was the circumstance that two Bills had been placed on the table, according to which it appeared that in two departments alone there had been an excess of expenditure amounting to no less a sum than 3,340,000*l.*, and he wanted to know if there was also to be a Supplementary Estimate for the Army Department as well, or was this the whole of the extra expenditure, for the House would bear in mind that he was speaking of the expenditure for the financial year ending April next, and not the forthcoming year. He wished particularly to draw the attention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to his own declaration made on the 12th of August last, when the right hon. Gentleman distinctly stated that sufficient supplies for the war expenditure had been voted. Those supplies amounted in round numbers to 25,247,000*l.*; but if that were so, what was the meaning of this unforeseen expenditure of 3,340,000*l.* in two departments alone? The item was so astounding, that, before Mr. Speaker left the Chair, he considered that House ought to be informed if this was the full extent of outstanding liabilities, or whether there was to be a still further demand on account of the army. Last year the right hon. Gentleman made an original Estimate, a second Estimate, a Supplementary Estimate, and a Supplementary-Supplementary Estimate. In that way he contrived to run up his bill to 25,247,000*l.*; but he gave the House an assurance that that was all that would be required. Suddenly, however, the House was called upon to enter into a new question, and to vote on account of two items alone, the Navy and Ordnance Departments, no less a sum than 3,340,000*l.* He should like to know, therefore, whether the Government could constitutionally require the House to vote such large sums on account without notice, and at a moment when there was no responsible person present to answer for the expenditure. And, in the next place, he should like to know what was the meaning of the two Supplementary Estimates; if it was intended to have yet another Estimate for the Army; and when, in short, the House was to be made acquainted with what other supplies were required for the current year.

Mr. MUNTZ said, he fully concurred in the remarks which had fallen from the hon. Baronet, but he had a still stronger objection to the Vote than any which the hon. Baronet had stated. There were two exceedingly objectionable items in the Ordnance Report. One was a sum of 25,000*l.* for a shell manufactory at Woolwich. Now, he spoke advisedly, when he said that there was no such establishment at Woolwich, or anywhere else. It was merely a job perpetrated for the advantage of one person at Woolwich. The other item was that of 15,000*l.* for small arms. He would like also to know what had been done with the grant of 25,000*l.* voted last year for the same purpose. He knew that it had not been expended for the object for which it was intended, and therefore it was necessary that they should be told what had become of it before they were asked to vote more money. If the Chancellor of the Exchequer assured them that they would not pledge themselves to an approval of the two items to which he had referred, he should not oppose the Vote on account, but otherwise he should give it all the opposition in his power.

MR. WALPOLE said, the Chancellor of the Exchequer in asking the House to go into Committee of Supply, had assured them that it was for the purpose of taking a Vote that was absolutely necessary to the public service. That being so, he thought nobody could refuse, on the part of the House, to grant to any Government that which was required to meet the exigencies of the public service, and for this purpose to go into Committee, as moved by the right hon. Gentleman. When in Committee it might be reasonable and proper to call the attention of such Members of the Government as were present in the House to the nature of the several items contained in the Vote, and to require explanation upon them. He also understood that the Chancellor of the Exchequer intended to report the Vote, if taken, tomorrow. He (Mr. Walpole) was glad that that was the intention of the right hon. Gentleman, because when the House broke up yesterday it was under the impression that no business was to be undertaken to-day, but that it would meet on Thursday for purposes of necessary business. This being the impression, there were not now so many Members in the House as he should desire to give an opinion with regard to the question of adjourning until Friday week. It would be premature, therefore, to enter into the discussion of that question at this moment; but he would observe that it had occurred to his own mind, that in the absence of the noble Lord who was now at the head of the Government, it would not be advisable to enter into the consideration of matters of importance until his return to that House.

SIR CHARLES WOOD said, he wished to point out that this was merely a Vote on account, and, a residue being left, there would, of course, be an opportunity on a future occasion for the fullest discussion with regard to it. No one, in fact, was bound by this Vote to the Estimate itself. The hon. Baronet the Member for Evesham (Sir H. Willoughby) was mistaken in thinking that this was a Vote to raise money from the people—it was merely to authorise the Government to apply money which had already been raised. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had certainly expressed an opinion that the money voted last year would be sufficient for the expenditure of the year, and he continued still to think that that money then raised would be sufficient to meet the expenditure up to the 5th of April. That, however, was quite a different thing from the Government taking power to apply money already raised to certain purposes. It turned out that the Ordnance expenditure had been greater than was anticipated, and it was therefore necessary for the Government to apply to the House for authority to expend money to meet the excess. The hon. Baronet (Sir H. Willoughby) said he thought the House had been taken by surprise. Why, the Estimate had been lying on the table of the House for more than a week, but the invariable practice was to give notice the night before that a Vote of Supply was to be taken. His right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer had explained that this was simply a Vote on account, to meet the pressing demands on the public service, and, therefore, no more than the usual notice was required. Of course it would be open to any hon. Member to raise a discussion in Committee, but it would not be very convenient for any such discussion to take place upon a Vote on account. The first important public business which had to be transacted was the passing of the Navy Estimates; but, as his right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty was seriously ill, and as his noble Friend the First Lord of the Treasury could not attend the House for several days, the Navy Estimates could not well be proceeded with before Friday week, it being desirable that when they did come on for discussion both those Members of the Government should be present, as some important questions might possibly be raised.

The Navy Estimates would be laid upon the table to-morrow, and the usual interval of about a week would be allowed to elapse before they were moved. On the whole, he thought the course most convenient for the public service would be for the House not to meet while the Government was in abeyance, and its Members could not appear in their places to answer questions that might be put to them.

Mr. A. STAFFORD said, he did not rise to oppose Mr. Speaker leaving the chair, nor to raise any discussion upon the forms and usages of the House, which perhaps they had already discussed too much; and, if the statement that he had to make and the suggestion he had to press on the attention of the Government were of a nature that would admit of any delay, he would be the last person there who would offer any obstacle to the raising of the necessary means for carrying on the services of the country. But the question now before them could not be confined within the limits of the mere forms and usages of the House. Relating as it did to a Supplementary Ordnance Estimate to be proposed in Committee of Supply, it led them at once to the question of the state of our army. He therefore begged the attention of some Member of the Government to the statement he was about to make. He had received that morning a letter from Scutari, representing that the difficulties of the hospital there, instead of diminishing, were actually increasing. He (Mr. Stafford) could give the authority of the writer for a statement which would carry its own weight with it—namely, that, on an average, there were rather more than forty deaths occurring daily in that hospital, whereas when he (Mr. Stafford) was there the average was about half that number, and, further, that orders had come down from the Crimea directing the authorities of Scutari to prepare for the reception of 500 sick every week—that was, 500 independent of those who were sick and those who died at the camp. Now, coupled with these statements, there was an announcement made by a Gentleman whom he had never found to be wrong—substantially wrong—in the information he furnished—he meant the Gentleman who was engaged in the task (which he was sorry to see was about to terminate) of administering the *Times* Fund, which had been dispensed so admirably and so judiciously. The announcement which he made related to the removal of the medical inspector of transports from his office. Now, the matter of transports certainly exhibited the most disgraceful of the many disgraceful details connected with the arrangements for the wounded and sick soldiers; but Dr. M'Grigor was at last appointed as inspector of the transport ships, which he had fitted out in a more satisfactory manner than was done before, for the conveyance of these unfortunate men from Balaklava to Scutari.

Sir CHARLES WOOD said, that the hon. Member must be aware that there was no Member of the Government then present to answer him.

Mr. A. STAFFORD said, he was not putting any questions to the Government, but wished to point out that this was a matter really depending on the next mail, and he besought the Government not to regard it as one of slight importance. If they did not confer on Dr. M'Grigor a signal mark of their approbation for the course he was pursuing in regard to the hospital service, they would do more to discourage the efforts of the younger surgeons, and more to perpetuate that system of routine which had proved fatal to hundreds and thousands of our soldiers, than they would do by any other step they could possibly adopt. He did not expect any Member of the Government to answer him on that occasion, because there was no one connected with the departments concerned then in his place; but as he (Mr. Stafford) might not have an opportunity of speaking to-morrow, and as the idea had been held out that the House might not meet until Friday week, he wished, in his place in Parliament, to appeal to whoever might be appointed to the highly responsible office of Secretary of State for the War Department and to point out to him that one thing which ought to be done without the least delay, and which would tend to the salvation of the army, or, at all events, to the alleviation of its distresses, was to bestow some signal mark of confidence upon Dr. M'Grigor. Having personally witnessed Dr. M'Grigor's labours by night and by day, and seen how sedulously he exerted himself to assist the ladies and the nurses when they first arrived, as well as how forward he was before all others to break through the trammels of routine when they obstructed the good working of the service, he could not refrain from expressing his conviction to the Government that unless they gave the countenance and encouragement he had indicated to that

Gentleman, instead of daring to remove him, the greatest blame and guilt would rest upon them. He had felt constrained to make these observations, because when he learnt the treatment to which Dr. M'Grigor had been exposed, and when he found that the dispenser of the *Times* Fund, through whose agency they had been made cognisant of the abuses that had existed and were still existing in the hospital at Scutari was about to return home, he could not but look with dismay towards the future, and he thought it his duty to raise a voice of warning in Parliament.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: I trust that, after the statement which my hon. Friend has considered it his duty to make, after, by the favour of the House, I had last the opportunity of replying, the House will extend their indulgence to me, and, without pretending that I rise to explain anything that I said before, will permit me to refer to what has fallen from my hon. Friend. I must remind my hon. Friend and the House that these times of great difficulty—times when feelings are deeply moved—are also the times when it is most necessary for the public service that both this House and individual Members of this House should observe that discretion in their proceedings by which those proceedings are made to operate for the advantage of the country. My hon. Friend says that he feels it his duty in his place in Parliament to refer to that which seems to him of material importance—to questions so greatly interesting and so important as those involved in the condition of the army. —[Mr. A. Stafford: And so urgent.] And so urgent. I entirely agree with my hon. Friend; but he must allow me to say that there are two modes of proceeding, either of which he might wisely have followed, according to his own discretion, but neither of which he has adopted upon the present occasion. One is, upon receiving statements of the kind which have reached him from Scutari, to carry them to the proper department of the Government.—[Mr. A. Stafford: There is no department.] The other is, to call to account the Members of the Government in this House, in case the subject-matter to which those statements refer has been neglected. Now, I apprehend that as my hon. Friend received the statements in question only this morning, he has not carried them to the proper department of the Government.

Mr. A. STAFFORD: What is the proper department?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: My hon. Friend interrupts me by asking what is the proper department. That is not a question very difficult to answer. I apprehend that if my hon. Friend went to any department of the Government connected with the administration of the war, he would find every disposition to forward his inquiries; and I should say, if I am to give a suggestion to my hon. Friend, that his proper course would be to apply to the Minister who is charged with the superintendence of all those departments, namely, the Secretary of State for War. The other course, I think, is, to call to account the Members of the Government in this House; but my hon. Friend has not taken that course either, because he has made a statement in the absence of every Gentleman connected with the War Department, and without giving any notice to those who are connected with them, which would have enabled them to supply him with an answer. I would ask my hon. Friend whether he thinks it can be desirable for the public service, or can promote the purpose which he has so much at heart, that he should produce a statement of this kind, with the authority of a Member of this House in his place, fresh as he has received it from the Crimea, in the absence of the possibility of any satisfactory reply being made to him. I make that appeal to the good feeling of my hon. Friend himself. At the same time, although I have received no notice from my hon. Friend upon this subject, I beg leave to say that my own recollection enables me to repudiate the inferences that would too naturally be drawn from the statement of my hon. Friend if it remained without an answer. He speaks of the state of things with respect to the hospital at Scutari, and of demands for additional accommodation there. Well, was my hon. Friend to infer that no provision had been made by the proper department of the Government? [Mr. A. Stafford: Certainly not.] I am not in a condition to state fully that provision; but what I want to point out to my hon. Friend is, the mischief of making statements in this House from which, if they stand alone, such inferences would be drawn as should not only wound the feelings of the country, but would not correspond to facts, and consequently greatly prejudice the public service. But by the kind indulgence of the House, and availing myself of my own most imperfect and casual recollection, I am in a condition to state that if, unhappily, from the course of circumstances, those enlarged demands have been made upon the hospital at Scutari, my right hon Friend, the late Secretary at War has not been behind his duty in making the best provision in his power to meet such demands. I am enabled to say, in the first place, that he has applied himself to devising the best means for making use of the army medical staff to the utmost extent to which its provisions could be stretched—a work of no small difficulty and labour; but, not content with that, he next considered in what way he could arrange a scheme for making the civil medical profession of the country available for the wants of the army, and only recently at the Treasury we gave our sanction to a plan devised by the late Secretary at War, under which he has organised a civil medical establishment, which will be sent out with the greatest rapidity, for the purpose of hospital superintendence [Mr. STAFFORD: That is at Smyrna!] Now my hon. Friend has previously made some remarks on the propriety of seeking for hospital accommodation at Smyrna; but he knows that it was quite right on the part of my right hon. Friend the late Secretary at War rather to trust to that place where there was ample means placed at his disposal by the Turkish Government than to go on seeking for insufficient extensions of temporary accommodation elsewhere. Therefore I hope my hon. Friend will see that there is no reason why he should not have made direct communications to my right hon. Friend the late Secretary at War; and I hope he will believe that, when he makes such communications, they will all be attended to with that diligence, with that readiness, and with that thankfulness to which they are justly entitled. And I hope he will believe further that every department of the Government will be ready to accept of his aid, as a ready and able co-operator in that great work in which the heart of every Englishman is so firmly engaged. My hon. Friend concluded his speech by some remarks, into a consideration of which I must beg the permission of the House to enter. He entered at some length into a consideration of the case of Dr. M'Grigor. He urged upon the Government the propriety of rewarding Dr. M'Grigor; but above all, said he, let not the Government dare to remove Dr. M'Grigor from the post he so ably fills.

Now what does this really amount to? I will not say now that the necessity of the case justifies it at all; but it really is neither more nor less than for individual Members of Parliament to take into their own hands to direct the Executive Government with respect to those duties which, as long as you have an Executive Government, you cannot possibly detach from that Government; and if my hon Friend really would consider what is necessary to maintain the discipline of any service, I am sure he would see that deprecating removals from offices and invoking appointments to offices in any service by any Member of this House must paralyse entirely the Administration—must deprive punishment, where punishment is necessary—must deprive reward, where reward is necessary, of all their force and efficiency. I am sure my hon Friend, who himself has been in an official position in the superintendence of one of the great departments of the State, will see that, upon this occasion, he has under the influence of feelings with which every man must sympathise, a little overstepped the fair line of discussion. At all events, whether I am right in that opinion or not, I am sure my hon. Friend will be content to acknowledge that that matter with respect to the appointment or removal of particular persons in particular situations had better remain in the hands of the Executive Government. The Government will form, and will act upon, their own judgment in the first instance, and then it will be for any hon. Member who may object to the course they have taken to call them to account for their conduct.

MR. A. STAFFORD said, he wished to say a word in explanation. His right hon. Friend had said that he ought to have applied to the proper authorities; but he had thought—on seeing it announced in the Notice Paper that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War was to move certain Supplementary Estimates—he had thought he should see that right hon. Gentleman in his place, and that he would then be prepared to answer the interrogatories that might be put to him without notification on his (Mr. Stafford's) part. As far as the hospital accommodation went, he had never by any implication stated that the right hon. Gentleman who was recently Secretary at War, had not met the circumstances of the case as far as it was in his power to meet them. On the contrary, he knew that the right hon. Gentleman had exerted himself in the most praiseworthy manner to provide ample hospital accommodation. With respect to providing additional hospital accommodation at Smyrna, he was the very person who had strongly urged that subject on the consideration of the Government.

Mr. WHITESIDE said, that nothing had surprised him so much as the calmness and composure with which every Member of the Government had spoken of the state of things at present existing. At a time when the public mind was excited to the last degree by the disasters that were befalling our army day by day, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had his feelings perfectly under control, and could speak of a perishing army with a degree of tranquillity that was most astonishing. Last night, by accident, an hon. Member of that House came into a place where he (Mr. Whiteside) was, and gave him a description of the sufferings of our troops in those hospitals—sufferings which he had witnessed with his own eyes. That was the reason of his addressing the House on the present occasion. He did not think that any Member of the House was bound to apologise for venturing to open his lips there, or that they ought rather discreetly to visit a Secretary at War upon whom the censure of the House had fallen. He had heard an hon. Member of that House, whom he did not now see in his place, describe the wretchedness and horrors of that hospital at Scutari. He heard him say, that at one and the same time he saw sixty of the bodies of our unhappy soldiers stitched up and arranged ready to be carried out for burial. And he said he had heard from the lips of the unhappy men, taken in what are called transport ships to Scutari, that they rejoiced in being able to lie down on the deck of the vessel, in order that they might have the miserable satisfaction of dying where they could have rest. He (Mr. Whiteside) was persuaded there was nothing regular at Balaklava or at Scutari but confusion. In that the Government shone. In that every department of the State had been pre-eminent. In that respect it had justly earned the censure of Parliament, and he must admire the principles of our Parliamentary constitution, which, after a Secretary at War had been, according to his own statement, formally censured for misconduct in the administration of the department confided to his care, placed him, by a shuffling of the cards, in another and a higher department of the Government. And, according to the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, we were now to apply deferentially to the head of a department who had been censured for misconduct, and in whom we had no confidence, and to say to him, "Sir, be so good as to consider the state of things at Scutari." He should like to ascertain correctly whether the right hon. Gentleman was perfectly accurate in certain of the statements he made on a recent occasion. He said that there were 30,000 effective men before Sebastopol. He knew that the right hon. Gentleman was in general mathematically correct in all the statements he made; but, being under impressions derived from some of his friends who had shared the dangers of the campaign, he had certainly listened to the right hon. Gentleman's statements with the utmost astonishment. That House had, however, resolved to have an inquiry into this matter, and he said, let it be a *bonâ fide* and searching inquiry. If the result should be to acquit the Ministry, well and good; but if, on the contrary, it should prove adverse to them, as he thought it would, he trusted that there was sufficient spirit left in the House of Commons not to rest content with a mere vote of censure, but to follow it up by further steps to its legitimate conclusion.

Colonel KNOX said, that having been connected with the army for more than five-and-twenty years, he thought he might venture to say a word on the present occasion. He considered that the hon. Gentleman the Member for North Northamptonshire need offer no apology to the House for having brought under its notice the circumstances to which he had called its attention; and although the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer read them a lecture, having only a few minutes before told them that probably they must adjourn for ten days, he thought the circumstances needed no explanation. In a letter which he had just received from the Crimea there occurred the following words—

> "Can it be believed? The sickness in the camp is most dreadful. We bury a thousand a week, and, including all the reinforcements, the strength of the English army is not more than 11,000 men. Everything is mismanaged by the authorities here."

The right hon. Gentleman the late Secretary at War had told them distinctly, in his place in Parliament the other night, that the army was 30,000 strong. He (Colonel Knox) denied that that was the fact; and he put it to the House was there any time to be lost while right hon. Gentlemen were shuffling the different departments, and the Gentleman who was responsible for the War Department was thus absolved and was to be placed in another office. Then they were given to understand that they were to wait for ten days, and those facts were not to be urged upon the persons temporarily holding office, and they were not at all to apply their minds to the remedying of the great evils that were pressing upon them. He had no wish to hamper the Government on these facts, but he spoke as a soldier. He could not contain himself on such a subject, for it was notorious that their army was perishing, and it was only a matter of days for the thing to be brought to a climax. Under these circumstances he thought that the lecture the right hon. Gentleman had just read to his hon. Friend (Mr. Stafford) was very ill-timed and much misplaced.

Colonel DUNNE said, he could not as a soldier allow the discussion to close without saying a few words. He was certainly not disposed to receive any lecture from the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Our army consisted of but 11,000 men, and not of 30,000, as had been stated by the right hon. Gentleman, and out of these 11,000 he believed only about 2,000 to be able to take the field. There were 6,000 men in the hospitals at Balaklava, and it was so impossible to get any assistance that only the most prompt and vigorous measures could put a stop to the disasters of our army. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that if they had any complaints to make they ought to apply to the Executive Government. He thought it most unreasonable that that course should be forced upon them. The Executive Government had been accused, tried, and found guilty of incompetence by an immense majority of the House of Commons within the last few days; and yet it was to these Gentlemen, incompetent for the performance of their duties, that they were expected to apply. When the Committee of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) came on, he hoped that free scope would be given to those persons who were acquainted with the state of the army. They wanted no generals from the Crimea as witnesses; they had abundance of evidence already in this country to show what was the state of the army. To say now that a new medical staff was to be organised, after the half of the army had been lost, was far from being any remedy or satisfaction. He saw with despair Gentlemen pronounced incompetent again resuming office. More than half an army had been destroyed, and the rest would never be fit for service, even in England. Sebastopol, he had no doubt, would be ultimately taken by the French army, whose wants were properly attended to; but he predicted that, if the late Government returned to power, the surviving part of our army would soon suffer the same unhappy fate as that to which their previous mismanagement had already consigned hundreds and thousands of their brethren in arms.

Sir WILLIAM MOLESWORTH said, he rose, not for the purpose of prolonging the debate, but for the purpose of correcting some of the misstatements that had fallen from the hon. and gallant Member for Portarlington (Col. Dunne), and others. It had been stated by the hon. and gallant Member for Marlow (Col. Knox), that the deaths in the army amounted to so large a number as 1,000 per week. The amount of sickness prevalent in the army was certainly very great; but he could assure the hon. and gallant Member that that statement was altogether incorrect. He (Sir W. Molesworth) had carefully examined the official returns from the army, and he could assure the hon. and gallant Member that his statement was essentially wrong. It had been asserted that the Government had misrepresented the facts; but the Government were perfectly prepared to substantiate by official returns that the statements they made were accurate. The hon. and gallant Member for Portarlington had confused the number of men under arms with the total number of men in the army. The total number of men of all ranks in the army in the Crimea and fit for service, including men under arms, cavalry, artillery, engineers, and the naval auxiliary force, was not less than 30,000, according to the last official returns. As Her Majesty's Government had resigned, he hoped this debate would not be continued, because the responsible Ministers who could answer these questions were absent, and it was impossible for those who were not acquainted with the specific details to reply to them completely.

Colonel DUNNE said, he must beg to explain that he had not included the naval auxiliary force. He had only mentioned the number of British soldiers under arms.

The House then resolved itself into Committee of Supply.

On a Vote being proposed of 1,200,000*l.* to be granted to Her Majesty to defray the excess of war expenditure,

In reply to a question from Mr. Henley,

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, that, in agreeing to the Vote on account, no hon. Member would stand committed when the discussion occurred on the proposal that the House should vote the residue.

Sir HENRY WILLOUGHBY said, he thought the House was rather taken by surprise by this Vote. It was not only a very large sum, but the noble Lord the Member for the City of London had distinctly stated that the Navy Estimates would be taken first. And then it was rather too much to move a grant for the Ordnance department when the Secretary at War was not in his place. The House last year was led into some great error or miscalculation by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, for they had now to provide for 3,340,000*l.* more than had been stated by him. He wished now to know whether there was to be any supplementary estimate for the army, or whether, adding this 3,340,000*l.* to what had been appropriated by the Act of last year, there would be enough for the whole war expenditure of the year in the particular departments of the army, navy, ordnance, militia, packet service, &c.?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, he was anxious not to detain the Committee, but the hon. Baronet had asked him two distinct questions, to which he hoped he might be permitted to reply. He had been asked first, whether there was to be any further supplementary estimate for the war; and secondly, whether he was prepared to justify the expectations he held out to the House in the month of August last, or to excuse himself for not having fulfilled those expectations? He begged leave to observe, that on all occasions when he had adverted to the expenses to be incurred in the war, he had declined the responsibility of giving any assurance to the House. He had stated that the House was entitled to the best calculations and conjectures he could make; but as to making assurances with reference to expenditure in time of war, that was a responsibility which he would under no circumstances assume. But, in the present case, he would venture to say this much, that he was sure no supplementary estimates would be required for the year 1854–5. With respect to the second question, the right hon. Baronet had entirely misunderstood the assurance he gave to the House last summer. What he then did was this:—Having urged the different departments to raise their estimates to an outside point, so as to cover their expenditure, if they could, he then proposed to the House a vote of credit to the amount of 3,100,000*l.*, which was placed at the command of the Legislature, so as to cover all the supplementary estimates, with a margin of 3,000,000*l.* further, in case additional funds should be required. He therefore thought that the hon. Baronet should be satisfied, and that he should feel that when he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) took a margin for 3,000,000*l.*, and now demanded 3,340,000*l.*, he had not grievously fallen out in his calculations.

Colonel DUNNE said, he wished to know whether any estimate had been taken for money to be laid out in quartering the militia in Ireland? The Government were still going on in the old expensive and extravagant system of billeting the militia, while it was known, and had been pointed out to them, that an enormous saving to the country could be effected by building houses for the men—a saving of not less than 10,000*l.*

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, the matter to which the hon. and gallant Colonel referred was no doubt one very well deserving of consideration, but it was in no way whatever connected with the Vote before the Committee.

Vote *agreed to.*

Resolved—

> "That a sum, not exceeding 1,200,000*l.*, be granted to Her Majesty, on account, towards defraying the estimated Excess of the Ordnance Expenditure beyond the Grants for the year ending on the 31st day of March 1855."

Mr. WILSON said, there was a notice before the House for a Supplementary Estimate for the Naval as well as the Ordnance Department, and that paper had been also referred to a Committee of Supply. It would be very desirable that a Vote should be taken on that Estimate as soon as possible, in order that it might go to the House in the same way as the Vote on account of the Ordnance. He therefore hoped the House would agree that to-morrow the orders should take precedence of the notices of Motion.

Motion *agreed to,*

The House adjourned at a quarter before Two o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Thursday, February 8, 1855.

MINUTES.] PUBLIC BILL.—*Reported*— Fisheries (North American).

CONDUCT OF THE WAR—LORD LYNDHURST'S MOTION.

LORD LYNDHURST requested their Lordships' attention while he made a few observations respecting the notice of Motion, relative to the expedition to the Crimea, which he had placed on the paper of the House. The following were the terms of the Motion:—

> "That in the opinion of this House the expedition to the Crimea was undertaken by Her Majesty's Government with very inadequate means, and without due caution or sufficient inquiry into the nature and extent of the resistance to be expected from the enemy; and that the neglect and mismanagement of the Government in the conduct of the enterprise have led to the most disastrous results."

Their Lordships would observe from the terms of that Motion that it applied to the late Government generally, and was not intended to bear exclusively on any single Member of it. This was in accordance with a statement made in the other House by a principal officer of the Crown, the noble Viscount, now at the head of the Government, who said that he considered every Member of the late Government responsible for the conduct of the war. That doctrine, he believed, could not easily be controverted. Now, looking at the list of what was supposed to be the new Administration, he found that it consisted of thirteen Members, and that twelve of them, including the noble Viscount himself, were Members of the late Government, and consequently involved in the responsibility for the conduct of the war. Nevertheless, considering the present state of affairs, and considering also that it seemed impossible to form any other than the present Administration, he felt it would be wrong to take any step calculated to disturb in any way whatever the first movements of the new Administration; but, on the contrary, he thought that every one ought to endeavour in the present state of things to unite, heart and soul, for the purpose of assisting the Administration in retrieving past disasters and restoring the lost credit of the country. He therefore felt that, under these circumstances, he should best discharge the duty he owed to their Lordships and the country by abstaining from proceeding with his intended Motion.

THE MARQUIS OF CLANRICARDE said, that he entirely agreed with every word that had just fallen from his noble and learned Friend. He wished, however, before the Motion was withdrawn, to take the opportunity of making a suggestion which he thought was worthy of consideration, especially to the noble Lords connected with the Administration. His suggestion is this—that if, as is to be presumed from the reports that have appeared, this House, upon its rising, is likely to adjourn until this day week, during that interval Her Majesty's Government shall be prepared to lay upon your Lordships' table, upon the re-assembling for business, a statement of the actual condition of the army in the Crimea at some certain date—up to as late a period as such information can be conveniently supplied. He ventured to make that claim because he thought, if such a statement was made upon authority which could be depended upon, it might save many Motions for returns, and many not very profitable discussions in reference to that subject. He knew that to ask for information as to the state of an army, and the condition of the effective force of an army, engaged in operations before an enemy, would be, under ordinary circumstances, a very unusual, and, he might add, a very improper proceeding. But, at the same time, under the circumstances in which we were now placed—under the circumstances in which the army was placed—it was manifestly absurd to say that any information whatever would be conveyed to the enemy by the production of some such statement as that he had alluded to. It was notorious that on comparing the accounts, more or less authentic, which had proceeded from private sources in reference to the state of the army in the Crimea, with the statements which had been made by Ministers of the Crown, a very fair estimate may be had of what that condition was. At the same time, he thought it was right that Parliament, before it proceeded to take measures in reference to the army—which must be framed, more or less, upon an estimate of its military condition—should be accurately informed on the subject. He had read with some surprise, and with considerable pleasure, on Tuesday last, and on the authority of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that the effective force under Lord Raglan's command amounted to 30,000 men. He sincerely hoped that that was the case; nor was he about to dispute the fact, though he must say accounts of a very different kind had appeared in the papers. Now he did not think those matters could be satisfactorily discussed if they were to proceed first upon one authority and then upon another. On the contrary, he believed it would be equally advantageous, both as regards the deliberations of Parliament, and satisfactory to the country, if a statement were given of the real effective force of the different arms under the command of our general in chief in the Crimea, so that they might know in what condition things actually stand. He thought that this suggestion, if acceded to, would save some discussions; and that if Motions were to be made, they would be made on better grounds than was possible with the information at present possessed. He left it to Her Majesty's Government to determine whether they deemed it worthy of consideration or not; but, at all events, he had thought it his duty to make such a suggestion in the present posture of affairs.

MINISTERIAL STATEMENT.

Earl GRANVILLE: My Lords, in rising for the purpose already alluded to by the noble Marquess—namely, to move your Lordships to adjourn this House to some future day—I trust your Lordships will with your usual kindness and courtesy allow me to make a few remarks on a subject personal to myself. During the two last Administrations it has happened that the Prime Minister has had a seat in your Lordships' House. During the Administration of my noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Derby), so undoubtedly the leader of the party he represents both in and out of Parliament, his presence here gave great interest and importance to our debates. Since then, we have had the Administration of my noble Friend, the noble Earl near me (the Earl of Aberdeen), who, being a Peer, was, of course, the mouthpiece of his Government in your Lordships' House. I do not know whether I may be allowed, seeing my noble Friend on the bench below me, to take this opportunity of saying that during the two years of his Administration, I, as one of his colleagues (and I believe I speak the sentiment of all the noble Earl's colleagues now sitting near me), having had the opportunity of appreciating the qualities of the noble Earl, regard him as one of the most generous-minded, liberal, just, and courageous men with whom I ever had the opportunity or good fortune to be associated. His past services and his great experience gave great weight to all that fell from him. We are now arrived at a time still more eventful and critical than that when my noble Friend assumed office; and I do feel it to be something of an incongruity that I should be the mouthpiece of the Government, even as a matter of form, owing to the accidental precedence given me by the office I occupy. I can only say, that I feel I should be acting unfairly towards myself, and certainly towards those able men within the Government, and out of the Government, sitting on this side of the House, and almost disrespectfully towards your Lordships, if I were to undertake this duty without being able to go for support, advice, and guidance to that noble Marquess (the Marquess of Lansdowne), whose pre-eminent qualities, as the leader of this House, have not only secured to him the devoted attachment of his own friends, but even during his life have become proverbial on every side of this Assembly.

With a great deal that has passed since the resignation of the late Cabinet I am not acquainted; but some of those more particularly concerned in those transactions are now present, and may take either this or some future occasion to offer any explanation they think necessary to your Lordships. All I can say is that, from what I gather respecting the proceedings of public men and political parties, I do not think they have laid themselves open to the charge of any want of self-negation, or of any want of public spirit on the occasion. Lord Palmerston was commissioned by Her Majesty about three days ago to form an Administration, and he has been successful—the list which he submitted has been graciously approved by Her Majesty. With respect to the principles of that Administration I have very few observations to make; and I may briefly state that the principles which will govern the Administration in respect to all internal matters will be identically the same as those which guided the late Cabinet, and which, I believe, generally met the approbation of the country. Whenever any reasonable opportunity occurs for effecting improvement in our internal affairs, we will most assuredly not neglect it; but we do feel that the one paramount object to which the energy of the Government and the wisdom of Parliament should now be applied is the active and vigorous prosecution of the great war in which the country is engaged. My Lords, I believe that the most ardent lovers of peace—that those who thought the war unnecessarily entered into, and who most anxiously desire its immediate conclusion—must feel that it is absolutely requisite for the honour of this country that, while the war does last, it should be carried on with all the energy and power possible. We do feel that while to a certain degree all parties in this country, including perhaps ourselves, gave way to some exaggerated feelings of exultation at one moment, we are now in the opposite danger of giving way to too much despondency. In saying this, I assure your Lordships that no Member of the Government wishes to deny the great calamities to which the army has been exposed, or to diminish the ardent sympathy we ought to feel for the exemplary fortitude with which that army has met those evils. It would naturally be out of place for me this evening to discuss in the slightest degree how far those calamities may be attributable either to natural causes or to the rustiness of a system which has become worn out in time of peace. But there is no doubt that discomfort, sickness, and death have prevailed to a very large extent among the army in the Crimea. What we do feel is, that it is not becoming in the Government or the people of this country to indulge in feelings of despondency, which, I am informed on the best authority, that brave army, in the midst of sickness and death, does not itself share. We do not like to allude in anticipation to any event, for the future is in the hands of Providence; but we derive some hope and comfort from the knowledge that the resources of this country are almost unlimited. We are now at the very beginning of those resources, and the spirit evinced by the country will enable us to draw upon them so long as the necessity exists, and so long as they are properly and efficiently administered. We derive also confidence from the fact that, notwithstanding the disasters to which I have alluded, we have yet achieved more than this country ever achieved before in any great continental war at the outset of the war. We rely with confidence that, with the direction of our foreign affairs remaining in the hands of my noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon), France will continue with this country those intimate and cordial relations which have been maintained, so much to the advantage of both nations, up to the present moment; and we believe that the same friendly feeling will exist on the part of Austria, on account of the straightforwardness of our relations with her. It is with these views, and benefiting by the lessons which experience has taught us, and which, I must say, experience alone could have taught us, that Lord Palmerston and his colleagues mean to take every measure in their power to carry on the present war with all possible vigour and energy until that day, and not one day later, when a just and honourable peace, providing for both the interests of Europe and the honour of this country, shall be attained. With these sentiments we appeal to your Lordships and the country for support; and it is with these sentiments that we can accept with thankfulness such support as the noble and learned Lord opposite has offered us to-night. This is our case, and we leave it in your hands. The noble Earl then moved that the House at its rising do adjourn till Friday, the 16th of February.

THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, the Motion with which the noble Earl has concluded affords me the opportunity, while the announcement with which he has accompanied that Motion imposes on me the duty, of taking the earliest opportunity of giving an explanation of those transactions to which the noble Earl has alluded, as far as I was personally concerned in them. I think it right that at the earliest possible moment, consistent with public duty, your Lordships, my own political friends, and the country at large, should have the opportunity of judging of the course which I felt it my duty to pursue, and of the motives which actuated me in taking that course. I think that such an explanation is due from every man who aspires to, or upon whom circumstances may have thrown, a high place in the councils of the nation. The country has a right to know that the duties and responsibilities of Government have not been lightly assumed, or lightly or from slight causes shrunk from. The country has a right to know, and it is good that it should know, what are the motives which actuate public men, whose characters are public property; and the country which alone can remove those embarrassments which often occur in the formation of a Government, should know what are those embarrassments and what is the nature of the difficulties which frequently prevent the constitution of an Administration. For myself, I have nothing whatever to conceal with respect to the course I took; and, without further preface, I will lay before your Lordships as short a statement as I can, not only of the course which I felt it my duty to pursue, but, in order to make that course understood, of my view generally of the position in which affairs stood on the resignation of the Government of the Earl of Aberdeen.

At the commencement of the present Session, and in the face of the difficulties and disasters that were taking place, and which the noble Earl opposite has not sought to conceal, I and those in whom the confidence of the great Conservative party has been placed felt it our bounden duty to abstain from bringing forward any Motion which should imply censure or blame upon the Government, and which, by challenging the opinion of either this or the other House of Parliament, might possibly tend to increase the embarrassments which were known to exist. Here I must be permitted to say, that those who on principle are opposed to the Government have, in such circumstances, no very easy task to perform; for, if they bring forward a Motion that may by implication be regarded as a censure with reference to some matter on which they feel strongly the Government is to blame, they are immediately called on to move for a vote of want of confidence with a view to the removal of the Government from office; and if, on the other hand, a vote of direct censure be moved by the party habitually in opposition to the Government, then the answer always is that the Motion is brought forward for party purposes, that it is only intended for the promotion of party objects, and not for the benefit of the country. If neither of these courses is taken—if those who, I may say, by the constitution of Parliament are intrusted with the duty of watching over the conduct of a Government in whom they cannot place confidence remain altogether silent, then they are charged, and with some justice, with being indifferent to the enforcement of public opinion, and being accessaries after the fact to the faults of the Government. Yet, notwithstanding these difficulties, it has been the policy, as we have felt it to be the duty, of the great Conservative party to bring forward no Motion of censure against the Government. But immediately after Parliament reassembled, after the recess, notice was given of a Motion by an hon. and learned Gentleman in the other House, who I suppose would desire to be considered a supporter of the Government and a Member of the Government—party you can hardly call it—but of that great body split into various ramifications of parties, and who pass by the name of the Liberal party in this country. My Lords, I confess I do not understand the distinction which seems to have been drawn by the noble Lord the late President of the Council, in which he stated that, looking at the course which, in the event of such a Motion being brought forward, he ought to pursue, he had to consider not only what the nature of the Motion was, but what was the quarter from which it came. It appears to me that this is a distinction founded on no just or sound principle. If the conduct of the Government was defensible, then, whether the attack was made by friend or foe, it appears to me to have been the duty of the Government to vindicate its policy. If, on the other hand, the conduct of the Government was, as the noble Lord seemed to consider, wholly indefensible, then, my Lords, I cannot conceive that it would be a right and justifiable course for one who could not defend the conduct of the Government on its merits to resist the Motion because that Motion proceeded from a particular political quarter. But from whatever quarter that Motion proceeded, the result was such as, I must say, is wholly unparalleled in the history of this country. Such is the extent to which the party habitually in opposition to the Government carried their resolution not unnecessarily to interfere with the Government, that I believe that even on that Motion, if the division, instead of being postponed till Monday, had taken place on the Friday, little more than one-half of the party would have been in their places to pass the vote of censure on the Government. But when a Motion was brought forward, from whatever quarter, which implied a want of confidence in the Government, and which the Government themselves took care to explain was a vote in which the confidence or the absence of confidence of the House of Commons was to be tested, the circumstances were changed—it was impossible that the limits of moderation and prudence could be carried to such an extent that, being invited by the Government to express an opinion on the question of confidence or no confidence, this party should avoid giving expression to the views which they entertained. My Lords, the result of that Motion, as I said before, is one without a parallel;—not only that on a vote involving a want of confidence in the Government, and in the Government as a whole—not a censure directed against one or two individual Ministers, who might have become particularly obnoxious to the public—there should have been in the House of Commons a majority exceeding two-thirds; but that on a question involving confidence or no confidence in the Government, as a whole that Government was unable to muster as a minority in its favour a greater number than 148 out of the 650 members of the House of Commons. My Lords, I believe that such an event is wholly without a parallel, more especially when we recollect that, by the confession of many who voted for the Motion, it was one against which there were valid and well-founded objections with reference to its technical terms, and that it was disapproved of by many who supported it, on the ground that it was accepted by the Government as a test of the confidence or no confidence of Parliament in the Administration. The majority on that occasion, singularly enough, happens to be, in point of numbers, to a unit the same with the majority by which, two years ago, the Government with which I had the honour to be connected was also ejected from office—namely, a majority of 305—though on the former occasion it was a majority of 305 to a minority of 286, while on the present it is 305 to 148. Of these 305, I believe that the great Conservative party, who have acted together for a considerable period with perfect and uninterrupted union, constituted something like 200; with regard to the different liberal sections of the House of Commons, I believe that they were pretty equally divided, in this way—that 100 of these Gentlemen voted on one side and 100 on the other, and that another 100 altogether abstained from voting on the occasion. Such being the result of the division, and such the composition of the vote, and looking at the usual course of Parliamentary proceedings and the doctrine of the constitution, I was not surprised, my Lords, when, on the following evening, I received—though I acknowledge I did so with deep anxiety—Her Majesty's gracious commands to wait upon Her on the following morning, perfectly well knowing and understanding for what purpose I had received such a communication. It became then my duty carefully and anxiously and maturely to consider the position of the country. Under ordinary circumstances and in ordinary times I should at once have felt it my duty to accept the responsibility thrown upon me; for, though the Gentlemen who honoured me with their confidence were not those who had incurred the first responsibility by bringing forward the Motion, yet, as it was mainly carried by the instrumentality of their votes, I felt that it would have been my duty to accept the consequences of their acts; but, under existing circumstances, I felt that I was bound to consider carefully and deeply, without thinking of personal considerations, and without reference to party objects, what course it was for the interest of the country that in such circumstances I should take, and what advice I should tender to Her Majesty. My Lords, I can conceive no object of higher or nobler ambition, none more worthy of the anxiety of a true patriot and lover of his country, than to stand in the high and honourable position of the Chief Minister of the Crown and leader of the councils of this great Empire, assisted and supported by colleagues combined with him by unity of sentiment and mutual and personal respect, and with the knowledge that this and the other House of Parliament would give to such a Minister the assurance that, except on most extraordinary and unusual occasions, he would be enabled with life and energy to carry out his plans and to mature and accomplish his objects, and practically as well as nominally, control and govern the legislation and internal economy of this great country. On the other hand, to hold that high and responsible situation dependent for support from day to day upon precarious and uncertain majorities, compelled to cut down this measure, and to pare off that—to consider with regard to each measure not what was for the real welfare of the country, but what would conciliate some half-dozen men here, or obviate the objections of some half-dozen there—to regard it as a great triumph of Parliamentary skill and Ministerial strength to scramble through the Session of Parliament, and to boast of having met with few and insignificant defeats—I say this is a state of things which cannot be satisfactory to any Minister, and which cannot be of advantage to the Crown, or to the people of this country. But, my Lords, to enter on the duties of office, not with a precarious majority, but with a sure minority of the other

House of Parliament—to be aware that from day to day you were liable to defeats at any moment by the combination of parties, amounting to a sure majority, and only waiting for the moment when it would be most convenient to introduce Motions for the attainment of such an end; to be a Minister on sufferance; to hold such a position without any security for enforcing your own views; with the fear of exposing your own friends and the country—your friends to perpetual mortification, and the country to constant disappointment—to undertake the responsibilities and the duties of office under such circumstances, and in such a state of things, would be such an intolerable and galling servitude as no man of honour or character would voluntarily expose himself to, and such as no man willingly would submit to, except from motives of the purest patriotism, and on proof of the absolute necessity of such self-sacrifice. My Lords, I considered it then my duty deliberately to consider before I assumed the responsibility which I understood it to be the wish of Her Majesty I should discharge, in what position I should be with regard to Parliamentary support—how I should stand in this and the other House of Parliament—more especially in the other House. It is true, my Lords, that I could have filled several of the offices of the Government in a manner that would have commanded the approbation alike of my own supporters and of the majority of my political opponents. I had reason to be assured that in one of the offices which, above all others, is at the present moment that of paramount importance, and on the proper settlement of which rests the greatest responsibility, I should have had the support of a noble Friend of mine, not himself a military man, but possessed of a mind eminently military—a noble Lord of vast experience, practically versed and conversant with the operations of war in distant countries upon a large scale, and who has proved himself to be an able and successful Minister of War on an extended scale—a noble Earl whose energy, whose ability, and whose eloquence, would have given ample assurance to the country of the efficiency of the manner in which he would have performed his duties—and who, if he has one characteristic that is more universally recognised than another, it is that under him the country would have a guarantee that corruption and improper influence would have no place. My Lords, it is true that in the other House of Parliament, as well as in this House, in addition to those Friends whose aid and assistance I had formerly obtained, I might have had recourse to a class whom, when excluded from office on the formation of a Government, it is usual to characterise as a necessary infusion of new blood, but who, when introduced into office, are called an enlistment of raw recruits. And, when I speak of new blood, I am sure not one of my Friends in this or the other House will deem it invidious in me to say that I should have received—and in a high office of the Administration I should have been proud to have received—the support and assistance of the unrivalled eloquence and commanding talents of Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton. At the same time I was compelled to look not only to those Gentlemen of great capacity who might have filled important offices, but I was bound to look to that more vulgar, but not less important consideration, the numerical strength of the supporters of the Government. My Lords, I have been honoured—and it is one of the proudest recollections of my life to look back to that period—I have been honoured, and am still honoured, with the confidence of a body of the most respectable and highly-qualified gentlemen of this country; a body amounting to from 270 to 280 Members of Parliament, bound together by that which is the only sure bond of all political union—namely, mutual confidence in each other and perfect identity and unity of principle, and full of mutual personal esteem and regard for each other. But, my Lords, when we looked at the numbers of that party at the close of the last general election, the Government then existing found that it had the avowed support of about 300 Members of the House of Commons. I state it to the credit of that great party, and as a proof of the fidelity which they have exhibited to their engagements, that at the present moment, after the expiry of two years, the number who were prepared to support me in the Government is hardly at all diminished, and that I could reckon at this moment on the cordial support of about 280 Members of the other House. But what happened when I had the same right to rely on the assistance and support of about 300 Members of the House of Commons? My Lords, the Government fell before a combination of parties; and my Government would still be exposed to fall before such a combination of parties, such as took place before, and might occur again at any moment. What reason had I to suppose—

what reason had I to feel satisfied that the same combination would not arise within a week? It is the same House of Commons; there are the same persons; and there are the same parties; and so far as I can judge from the construction of the late Government, and so far as I can infer from the reputed construction of the present, they present the same combination of parties by which I was formerly assailed. I do not mean to say that I saw as certain the combination of these parties for the same object, but I say I had no security for a day or for an hour that that combination would not take place, and I knew that if it did I had no means of overcoming it. My Lords, I know it has been said that, in the present circumstances, any Government accepting the responsibilities of office and prepared to carry on the war in which we are engaged with vigour would have received the support, or at all events the neutrality, of all parties in the House of Commons. I think that, in some circumstances, that might have been the case; but I have great reason to doubt whether, if I had at the first moment accepted the responsibility sought to be placed on me, I should have found in the House of Commons that general acquiescence under the influence of which there would have been an abstinence from opposition, on which alone I could rely to carry on the Administration. My Lords, it is no secret that the moment the Administration of the noble Earl opposite was dissolved a cry was raised by a portion of the press, exercising no insignificant influence over the public mind, that whatever might be the future composition of the Ministry, one thing at least was clear, namely, that what was called a Derby Administration was out of the question, and that another thing was not less clear—that Viscount Palmerston was the man called upon by the voice of the country to take the management of affairs. My Lords, I speak not only of the language of the press; but, also, as the language of Members of Parliament, for both within and without the Legislature this view of the situation was extensively adopted. There was a universal impression in favour of the noble Viscount—who somehow or other appears to have enjoyed a peculiar exemption from the censure passed on the whole of his colleagues relative to the conduct of the war; though I must be permitted to say that in the conduct of the war one of the greatest defects that appears to have existed was a defect that arose in the office presided over by the noble Viscount himself—namely, in the organisation and embodiment of the militia. But, be that as it may, in the public mind the noble Viscount was excepted from the censure imposed on his colleagues in the Administration; and the hon. and learned Gentleman who brought forward the Motion by which the Government was overthrown, if I mistake not, declared his opinion that Viscount Palmerston was the only person who was fit to succeed to the Government of the country. But a higher authority still was one of the noble Viscount's colleagues, who considered the case of the late Government indefensible, and their conduct to be such as to compel him, prematurely, to secede from them—that noble Lord generously and disinterestedly sacrificed himself to a colleague, and declared that in his opinion the only person to conduct the military affairs of the country was his late colleague, Viscount Palmerston. Now, I put it to your Lordships and the country whether, with that feeling prevailing in Parliament—with a general declaration in favour of a very distinguished Member of that House—a declaration made by a large portion of the press, and by a considerable body of the Members of the House of Commons, and sustained by the high authority of the noble Lord the late President of the Council, I ask what prospect of immunity from attack, or what prospect of a sustained majority, a Government could expect which should be formed to the exclusion of that individual? I would not be misunderstood as saying that these considerations were those alone which prompted me to be anxious to obtain the co-operation of the noble Viscount. I merely wish to show how any one standing in my position must have considered that co-operation to be essential to the success of a Government. I readily acknowledge, as every one must, the great advantages to be derived from the great abilities, the great Parliamentary experience, the long official experience, of not less than thirty-seven years of office, of the noble Viscount. I readily admit the advantage of his personal popularity. I readily admit also,—though it is not a usual ground to be stated in Parliament, yet the circumstances of this case are so peculiar that I may state it,—though the jealousy of this country—the reasonable and well-founded jealousy—is against qualification for office, arising out of connection with foreign States or foreign Governments, yet I must be permitted to add that in the present circumstances, it must be viewed as a great and legitimate qualification on the part of Lord Palmerston, and should not be omitted, that he was generally supposed to exercise no inconsiderable influence over the councils of that noble nation with whom we are now on terms happily of the strictest and closest alliance,—that he has enjoyed to a great extent the confidence of that great man, who, by his superior abilities and powers, not less than the name he bears, was enabled to grasp and hold firmly and vigorously the imperial sceptre of that country. I say, my Lords, in times like these, and at a time when we are engaged in a formidable and perilous war,—when we have France,—though I hope it will not be long so—as our only assured ally—it is a peculiar qualification for holding office in this country that the Minister in question should possess the confidence of those between whom and ourselves these cordial relations subsist; and I will add that no party could be insensible to the great advantage which would be gained from the noble Viscount's presence in any Cabinet now formed which should be otherwise unacquainted with all the details and intricacies of that tangled web of diplomacy which has been woven within the last two years, or unaware that the noble Viscount would not be of peculiar advantage to any Government of which he might be a member, having an intimate knowledge of all the transactions of the last two years, of the difficulties and embarrassments that have occurred, and, at the same time, a correct knowledge of the feelings and views of those foreign connections with whom during that busy time we have been more or less engaged. Under all these circumstances—from all these considerations—I came to the conclusion that with the unassisted numerical strength of those who placed their confidence in me, it was impossible that I could feel any assurance of forming—that which I concur with the noble Earl opposite in deeming most desirable and necessary for this country at the present period—a strong Government. It was impossible for me, without some extraneous aid, to flatter myself with the expectation that I could secure a strong Government for this country.

My Lords, it was impressed with this idea and conviction that, on the following morning, I obeyed Her Majesty's command. I laid before Her Majesty without reserve my views with regard to the state of parties, with regard to the composition of the House of Commons, and with regard to the balance of parties in that House, and the probable mode in which those parties might apply their powers. I did not conceal from Her Majesty that there might be circumstances under which the House of Commons would give to such a Government as I was enabled to form, even without extraneous aid, a generous assistance and a generous and liberal support; but I think such circumstances could only be those in which there would be no alternative between the existence of the Government which I was about to form and no Government at all, and that there could be no security whatever for the formation—nay, not only that, but no prospect of the formation—of a Government commanding a majority in the other House, as long as there was a large party united in favour of some persons excluded from the Government who, if they were included in it, would have brought to it the weight of their counsel and assistance. After my statement, to which Her Majesty listened with most gracious attention, I concluded the humble recommendation it was my duty to submit to Her Majesty with the request that I might be enabled to communicate with Viscount Palmerston, for the purpose of obtaining, if possible, his concurrence and assistance in the duty which I was about, with Her Majesty's permission, to undertake to perform. I stated also to Her Majesty that I could not expect to obtain that concurrence on the part of the noble Viscount unless he were permitted to bring with him one or two of those with whom he had recently acted. I felt, notwithstanding some personal and political differences, that the abilities of some of those Gentlemen might have added materially to the strength of the Government, and its power of debate in the House of Commons, and that it would be most desirable to associate them in the Ministry, not only on account of the support and countenance which they would give to the noble Viscount in joining the Administration, but also on account of their own individual, and personal merit and experience. I stated to Her Majesty that, in my humble judgment, without such assistance—without some extraneous assistance—I did not feel myself in a condition to promise to Her Majesty that strong Government, assured of a majority in both Houses of Parliament, which I thought at the present moment it was most desirable, if possible, that Her Majesty should have. I was bound in this to consider, not personal or party feelings, but that which was for the interest of the Crown and the welfare of the country; and first and prominently for the welfare of the country and the honour of the Crown I placed the necessity of having, if possible, a strong and united Government. I therefore submitted to Her Majesty my humble advice that, failing my endeavours to form such a Government as could hold out a promise of strength as well as of unity, Her Majesty should carefully consider whether it was possible to form any other combination of public men by whom that object was more likely to be achieved. Where these men were to be sought for, what that combination was to be, was a subject upon which, of course, I did not presume to offer an opinion to Her Majesty. In venturing to offer that suggestion, as one which I believed to be for the good of the country, I concluded by assuring Her Majesty that, strongly as I felt the difficulties of the position, if such a combination—giving greater strength than any which I could hope to bring to Her Majesty's support—were found to be impracticable, then, at all hazards and under all circumstances, Her Majesty should not be left without a Government; but that when such other combinations should have been tried and found to be unsuccessful, then with better hopes of Parliamentary support—but whether with or without better hopes—I would answer for myself and for those noble Lords and hon. Gentlemen with whom I have the happiness of acting, that, at all events, the country should not be without a Government, and that at all hazards, at all risks, and at all sacrifices, our humble services should be placed unreservedly at Her Majesty's command.

My Lords, I may take this opportunity of making a statement which I am sure, so far as your Lordships are concerned, is quite unnecessary, but in consequence of rumours which have gone forth, that upon that occasion Her Majesty sought to fetter my discretion by some restriction. Those who know the respect which Her Majesty has for the constitution, and the strict and rigid manner in which She walks in the light and in the paths of that constitution, will be well aware that such a report is unfounded; but I feel myself bound in duty to state, for the information of those who have not the same means of becoming acquainted with the facts, that not only no obstacle whatever—that not only no restriction was set to my proceedings, but that not the slightest difficulty was made as to any one subject or recommendation, either with regard to men or measures, which I felt it my duty to submit to Her Majesty.

My Lords, in consequence of this interview, which lasted from half-past Eleven until nearly One o'clock, I called upon the noble Viscount (Viscount Palmerston), whom I found at his house. I immediately communicated to him the invitation with which I was charged upon Her Majesty's part. I found, as I anticipated, that the noble Viscount would have been exceedingly unwilling—nay, indeed, that he felt it would have been impossible, without the concurrence and co-operation of some of his friends—to give to me that assistance and support which otherwise he did not express himself disinclined to afford. I stated at once that I anticipated that feeling on his part, and that I deemed it perfectly natural; and I named to him the two among his late colleagues with whom I thought he would most readily consent and desire to act, and who might have the least difficulty, from their previous connection with the great Conservative party, in joining the Administration, although between them and that party there had been, and there might still be, some points of difference. I named to the noble Viscount the two men with whom I conceived he would be most desirous of acting, and who might have the least difficulty, from their antecedents, in connecting themselves again with the Conservative party. I found—for the noble Viscount was good enough to state to me—that, with regard to any personal considerations, he could have no objection to act in a Government of which I should be the head; and he accompanied his observations with obliging expressions towards me, with an allusion to the long acquaintance and friendship which had subsisted between us. We went so far as to discuss the particular position in the Government in which the noble Viscount should be placed; and I stated to him then, with perfect frankness, that which I am about to state to your Lordships. I stated to him that I did not think it was possible for any Minister to combine with the lead of the House of Commons the duties of an extensive and laborious department; and I obtained from him his concurrence in that opinion—that, with the lead of the House of Commons, the arduous and important duties of Minister for War were wholly incompatible. I was enabled, by an act of self-abnegation and forbearance for which I think my right hon. Friend deserves the highest credit—I was enabled to state, upon the part of my right hon. Friend Mr. Disraeli, that, with regard to the lead of the House of Commons, with which he had been honoured upon a former occasion, in the presence of the noble Viscount, he would waive all claim and pretension to that position, and would willingly and readily act under the direction of a statesman of the noble Viscount's ability and experience; and my right hon. Friend added, what I think is hardly less to his credit, that, not only was he willing and ready to waive a right to which—considering his relationship with the Conservative party—he was fairly entitled, in favour of the noble Viscount, but that he hoped such a surrender might render more easy the accession of two of the friends of the noble Viscount, who might be willing to act under the noble Viscount, though they might be less willing to act under the leadership of my right hon. Friend. I quitted the noble Viscount after about half an hour's interview. Her Majesty was awaiting the result of that interview, and I informed him that Her Majesty, on her return to Windsor, would leave a messenger in waiting to receive, at the earliest possible time, the result of the communication which he undertook to make to Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Sidney Herbert. I certainly retired from the interview with a very strong impression upon my mind that the noble Viscount was ready and willing, if he should obtain the concurrence of his late colleagues, to join, in unison with them, the Administration which I was endeavouring to form; and the statement he made to me was, that of course he could give no definite answer till he had had the opportunity of communicating with them, but that he hoped in a very short time, probably before the post went out, but at all events in a very few hours, to convey to me the final decision at which he arrived. I did not hear from the noble Viscount until half-past nine o'clock at night—my interview with him having ended shortly before two o'clock—but at half-past nine, just as I had written to the noble Viscount that it was impossible for me longer to detain the messenger if he was to arrive at Windsor that night, I received with considerable surprise a note from the noble Viscount. I am not going to trouble your Lordships with the precise terms of that note, but it certainly did surprise me to receive from the noble Viscount, after a delay of so long a time, a note merely stating that, upon full and complete reflection, he had come to the conclusion that if he were to join my Government he could not give to it that support which I was good enough to think his presence would insure—that he had communicated with Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Sidney Herbert, according to my desire, but that they would write their own answers to me, and he thought it better that they should do so. At half-past twelve that night I received a note from Mr. Gladstone, and between seven and eight the following morning I received one from Mr. Sidney Herbert, both written in kind and courteous terms—terms of which I certainly could have no reason whatever to complain; but I certainly was struck with this expression in Mr. Gladstone's note—after stating that Lord Palmerston had communicated to him the wish I had expressed that he should form part of the Administration, he added —"I also learned from him (Lord Palmerston) that he is not of opinion that he can himself render you useful service in that Administration." Now, my Lords, I confess I received that intimation with some surprise, because I had reason to suppose that when, at two o'clock, I left the noble Viscount, his consent depended in a great measure upon the concurrence of his late colleagues; but at half-past twelve the same night I received this note from Mr. Gladstone, stating that the noble Viscount, in communicating my message to him, had stated at the same time that he did not think he should be able to lend effective concurrence and co-operation to the Government to be formed by me. My Lords, in that state of things—having received from the noble Viscount and his two friends the answers to which I have referred, declining to form any part of my Administration—the noble Viscount having made no objection upon any political grounds, or on account of any contemplated measures, or on account of the position which it was intended he himself should hold, or with reference to any of the colleagues with whom he was about to be connected—I was then in a position to state to Her Majesty that, the first contingency to which I had adverted having taken place, I thought it was for the interest of the country and for Her Majesty's convenience that She should adopt the subsequent course which I had advised—namely, that of ascertaining whether it was possible to form any other stronger or more effective Administration. My Lords, further than that I have no personal knowledge. I quitted Her Majesty with deep and very sincere expressions of regret on my part that, under existing circumstances, it was not possible for me to do Her that service which I would gladly have rendered—that I could not assure to Her Majesty that strong Government which it was absolutely essential for the interests of the country that She should have; but that, in the event of no further combination being able to be made, I was then, as I had stated, ready to offer to Her Majesty my humble and devoted services.

My Lords, I may be asked why, having referred merely to the noble Viscount, who had been designated by public opinion as the person entitled to the first consideration and possessing considerable influence in the House of Commons, I did not seek for possible assistance and co-operation in some other quarter. In the presence of the late, and, as I understand, the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (the Earl of Clarendon), I will state to your Lordships precisely the advice which I took the liberty of addressing to Her Majesty upon that head. I stated to Her Majesty that I conceived it would have been an immense advantage to any Government to have among its Members one who is perfectly conversant with the whole diplomacy of the last two years, and with the feelings and proceedings of the various Courts of Europe. I stated that, with that view among others, I had suggested to Her Majesty that I should apply for the co-operation of Viscount Palmerston. I took the liberty to add, with regard to my noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs (the Earl of Clarendon), that I entertained the highest opinion of the ability, the industry, and the zeal with which he had discharged the duties of his office. I added also a hope—what I believe the noble Earl will say I was justified in adding—that no personal feeling existed which might upon any occasion offer the slightest impediment to the possibility of our acting together in the same Government, but that, on the contrary, I believed there existed between us a sincere and mutual regard; but I felt it my duty to say further, that, desirous as I might have been of obtaining the co-operation and assistance of one so experienced and able as the noble Earl, the political connections of that noble Earl—the political relation in which he stood towards most of those with whom I was in the habit of acting, and his political connection with others with whom I was not acting, or about to act—did not justify me in making any direct application or overture to him, even if I had reason to suppose those overtures would have been likely to be favourably entertained; and that I did not feel myself justified in making such overtures in such a quarter—whatever might be my personal esteem for the noble Earl—unless I could do so under Her Majesty's express injunction, sanction, and command. Whatever might have been the consequence of such an application, I must say that the only part of the course I have pursued to which I look back with the least doubt or incertitude is with respect to the propriety of my abstaining from making any communication either to the noble Earl directly or to the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Lansdowne) near him, from whom I am sure that, whatever the features of the conjuncture, the part I took will receive a dispassionate and generous construction.

My Lords, I have now explained to you the circumstances under which I felt myself compelled to resign undertaking the responsibility of forming a Government, for the strength and permanence of which I could see no security. I have nothing to do with subsequent transactions. The noble Viscount, it appears, has found himself justified, and has thought himself enabled, to submit to Her Majesty the names of a Cabinet which he thinks is more likely to secure and to command the confidence and support of a majority of the two Houses of Parliament. It is not for me to express an opinion how far the noble Viscount has judged correctly in that inference or not. I will not for a moment suppose he does not believe that he was able to recommend to Her Majesty a Government possessing that strength and entitled to that confidence, because any other supposition would lay the noble Viscount open to an imputation which I am sure is most unfounded—that in declining to join the Administration I had formed he was rather influenced by personal considerations affecting the position he might hold than by an earnest and anxious desire to form a strong and united Administration. Of such motives I wholly and absolutely acquit the noble Viscount, and I cannot doubt that he has full confidence in the degree of public support and approval which the Government, as now formed, is likely to obtain. I have now offered to your Lordships—perhaps at too great length—but I thought it desirable not to omit the slightest details which might throw light upon my motives—an explanation of the circumstances under which I abandoned my endeavours to form an Administration. I endeavoured before I came to that conclusion, and in acting upon it, strictly and impartially to examine—as in the presence and with the aid of the Searcher of all hearts—the motives which influenced my whole conduct—to satisfy myself that I was influenced by no desire of unduly grasping at office, and to satisfy myself, on the other hand, that I was not timidly shrinking from the responsibility which fairly ought to rest upon me. My Lords, I should shrink from no responsibility except from that which I felt to be a responsibility I was likely to incur—that of having offered to Her Majesty a Government which had not in itself sufficient elements of strength and firmness, thereby subjecting my friends and the country to mortification and disappointment, and adding at this critical moment to the embarrassment of the country. My Lords, I may have erred. If I have so erred, I bow to the decision of my friends, my party, and my country. I may have exhibited a too great timidity in taking upon myself responsibility, though I think that, whatever errors may have been imputed to me in political life, they have been rather in the opposite direction. I may have disappointed the over-sanguine and over-zealous expectations of those over whose interests I am bound to watch, with whom I am connected by every tie of political and personal friendship, but whom, much as I desire to please and to gratify, I desire still more effectively and conclusively to serve. It was my opinion that, under the circumstances, the great Conservative party should not prematurely and rashly undertake the responsibility of administering the affairs of this country at the present portentous crisis. Upon that belief I acted honestly, conscientiously, and to the best of my judgment. My justification or my condemnation must rest in the minds of those among my friends and among my countrymen whom I have alike desired, if not to gratify, at least to serve; and all I have to add now, after thanking your Lordships for the patience with which you have listened to me, is my hope that, to whatever hands at the present moment the destinies of this great Empire may be intrusted, they may be such as will deliberately, efficiently, and with the full and justified confidence of the country carry on the great and awful war in which we are now engaged, and bring it at no distant period to a conclusion which may be alike honourable to the arms of the allied forces, and may, at the same time, permanently secure and effectually guarantee the maintenance of the independence, the integrity, and the tranquillity of Europe. I will only add further, with reference to what has fallen from the noble Earl at the head of the present Government in this House, that there will be a deep responsibility attaching to any Minister who shall conclude a peace, however earnestly called for, which does not secure to this country and to Europe these great results. My Lords, a responsibility as deep, if not still deeper, will attach to him who, after such results shall have been obtained, shall continue for a single moment the miseries and horrors of an unnecessary war.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, after what has fallen from the noble Earl I feel that it is incumbent upon me to address a few words to your Lordships; partly because, although I have not been placed in a situation precisely similar to that of the noble Earl, it has been so far similar that it has connected me in some degree with the transactions of the last few days, in which imperious circumstances—at least, circumstances which I considered imperious—namely, commands emanating from the highest authority in the realm, compelled me to take a part which otherwise I should have been glad to decline, in combination with others, with reference to the formation of a Government. I should not be disposed, under any circumstances, but still less after the conclusion of the speech of the noble Earl who has just sat down, to attempt to review those motives of which he has thought it right to give a very full description as having actuated his conduct. I am not disposed to analyse or to impugn motives which, whether appreciated or not, I am confident had their origin in an earnest desire to assist Her Majesty in the crisis which had occurred, and which induced the noble Earl to decline the task which Her Majesty had intrusted to his hands, and intrusted to him, unaccompanied, as the noble Earl has properly and fairly stated, by anything like restriction; still less, my Lords, do I think myself competent to examine or analyse the motives which induced what I must consider a most extraordinary majority in the other House of Parliament, to combine in support of what I must consider a most extraordinary vote, which had the effect of compelling Her Majesty's late Government to tender their resignations to Her Majesty. My Lords, that that majority should have existed may be a matter of surprise to the noble Earl, and may be a matter of surprise to others; but it was undoubtedly a majority composed of a large number of those whom the noble Earl boasts, and not unnaturally boasts, constitute his permanent strength in the House of Commons, and which permanent strength was exerted without exception to make up that majority. It was aided undoubtedly by a strong feeling in the country, of which I do not complain, operating upon its representatives, and which was produced by the amount of distress that had unfortunately befallen the army in the Crimea. All of these motives operating together has produced a vote in the other House of Parliament, which I am much disappointed, if, at some future period, that House itself does not regret. I have no desire, however, to impugn that transaction and the motives which led to it, or to discuss the principles and views upon which, combined, that large number of Gentlemen were brought on that night only to vote. I now come, my Lords, to that which would have compelled me under any circumstances, to address a few words to your Lordships. The noble Earl has given you a detailed and, I have no reason to doubt, an exact narrative of all the part he took in this transaction; and that which I have to state to your Lordships commences where the statement of the noble Earl ends. My Lords, it was not till after the noble Earl had been understood distinctly by Her Majesty to have declined the task of forming a Government at this moment, and without holding out to Her Majesty the hope that he saw any means by which he might be enabled to form a strong Government—it was not till after that information had been distinctly conveyed to Her Majesty that it was Her Majesty's pleasure to invite me to Windsor for the purpose of conversing with me upon the state in which the country was placed, and of learning whether it was in my power to do that which, if it had been in my power to do I could not have brought myself to decline—namely, to undertake the task of endeavouring to ascertain, from the views, opinions, and conversation of others, what were the prospects of Her Majesty being extricated from a situation, not only painful to Herself, but directly and immediately injurious to the best interests of the country. My Lords, in the course of the conversation in which that task was intrusted to me I had frequent occasion to ask this question of myself—of what use can I be to Her Majesty? and the answer which rose to my mind was that, though situated as I was I could undertake nothing of myself, it was due to Her Majesty to give Her the best advice in my power, and to endeavour to open some channels of communication for the purpose of leading as early as possible to the formation of a Government. I therefore took the opportunity of communicating with many eminent persons, all of them persons essential, in my opinion, to the formation of an efficient Government, and some of them the very persons to whom the noble Earl himself, at once, and in the first instance, looked as essential to the formation of such a Government as this country ought to have. After I had reported to Her Majesty the result of the conversations I had had with these various persons, Her Majesty took into consideration the state of the country, the state of parties, and, above all, the composition of that majority by which the crisis was produced which had put a termination to Her Majesty's late Government. She had already looked to the composition of that majority. She had already, perceiving that that majority was composed not merely in a great part, but that the actual majority of that majority was composed of the political friends of the noble Earl—She had already, pursuing that constitutional course to which the noble Earl has borne so just a testimony, and which in every crisis, has characterised Her Majesty's proceedings—She had already had recourse to the noble Earl, and had satisfied herself that he, as the representative of that majority, was not prepared at the moment to form a Government which he could recommend as fit to carry on the affairs of the country with success and with the support of Parliament. My Lords, Her Majesty then, advised of the state of feeling existing among those gentlemen, naturally looked to the next person who had contributed, though in a different way, and by a different course, to the crisis which had occurred by the part he had taken in withdrawing from Her Majesty's service previous to the date of Mr. Roebuck's Motion. My noble Friend—I am now alluding to the noble Lord with whom I have long been politically connected, and connected also by ties of the warmest friendship—my noble Friend, when he withdrew from the Government, did not endeavour to carry with him any of its supporters, or seek to exert his influence to diminish the majority by which the Government with which he was associated was supported ; still the mere withdrawal from the Government of one so honoured and so justly distinguished in the councils of Her Majesty, did certainly point attention to him as a person to whom Her Majesty should have recourse in the difficulty in which She was placed, for the purpose of ascertaining if he could form a Government, and extricate Her Majesty from the difficulty in which She found herself. My noble Friend took time to reflect upon the matter ; and when I say that he took time for reflection, I mean that, whatever his first impression was, he took time, and very properly, to consider the course he ought to adopt. In the same manner I think my noble Friend at the head of the Government now forming was also right in taking time for reflection before he declined the proposition of the noble Earl, because, in the state in which the country now is, I think there is no public man who ought rashly or hastily to decline any offer which might be supposed by persons for whom he had respect, and much more by the highest person in the realm, to be the best fitted to provide for the present exigencies of the country. But after a time my noble Friend also declined the task of forming a Government. I, then, think that Her Majesty exercised a wise discretion in sending for my noble Friend the noble Viscount at the head of the present Government, and charging him to undertake, by such a combination as Her Majesty had been led to imagine might be entered into, the formation of a Government, not wanted alone by Her Majesty, but by the country as well. My noble Friend the noble Viscount undertook that task, and he has undertaken it successfully. When I say successfully, I do not mean with any certainty of that success at home or abroad which a man would indeed be bold to predict in these times for any Government whatever—even, I may say, for a Government conducted by a person of the great talents and the great experience of the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) himself. But, although the character of the times and the state of parties involve us in a state of uncertainty, the noble Viscount has undertaken the formation of a Government with that degree of confidence in success which justified him in making an attempt to supply the great chasm in the Government of the country which has been created by the circumstances of the last few days.

My Lords, the noble Viscount did me the honour, and he did others the honour, to ask our advice as to the course he would be justified in pursuing ;—whether, with the persons who were prepared to act with him and under him, he or they ought or ought not to undertake the task. I am bound to state that as far as I am concerned, I gave my advice without hesitation ; because, my Lords, the question that presented itself to me was, not what Government the country was to have, but whether the country was to have any Government at all ; and that, too, at a time when the state of public affairs, the state of all the public departments, and the state of all our foreign relations require not only a Government but one that shall be formed instantly and act efficiently. My Lords, I gave that advice ; and having given it, I undoubtedly feel that the Government of the noble Viscount is entitled to any humble assistance and feeble support that it may be in my power to give it, and that support and that assistance I shall undoubtedly give. That support and assistance I should have gladly given to any Government ; but I submitted to my friends whether any aid I could give would not be more effectually rendered by consulting my own taste, my own inclination, and my years, and allowing myself to form no part of the Government about to be constructed. My Lords, they judged otherwise — whether right or wrong, they judged otherwise, and I have bowed to their decision. It remains for me therefore only to state, on their behalf and on my own, that they have undertaken their task at this moment with no undue confidence in themselves, and with no undue hopes as to the support they are to receive from the country ; but they have undertaken it in firm reliance on the patriotism of the country at large and of the two Houses of Parliament. My Lords, the necessity to which I have alluded, that some immediate arrangement should take place, has every day manifested itself more and more, and the evils of any long delay, added to that which has already existed, would, I can confidently state, have materially impaired the confidence of Europe in this country. For what, my Lords, could have been a more shameful spectacle to present to the eyes of the world than that at a moment of greater unanimity of opinion in the country than has ever occurred before upon any great question with respect to the prosecution of this war, there should not be found the means in England of carrying on a Government by which that war could be prosecuted? I say it was due to the policy of the country to have a Government, if formed at all, formed speedily and as effectually as the materials at hand admitted. My Lords, I feel that it is scarcely necessary for me, after what the noble Earl opposite has already said, to add that Her Majesty's Government will rely not only upon their own exertions—not only upon the support they may derive from partisans—but that they will rely upon the feeling and patriotism of those who are their nominal opponents. My Lords, there will be no difficulty in giving to Her Majesty's Government that support which is necessary for carrying on the war without abandoning that right which noble Lords in this House and hon. Gentlemen in the other House of Parliament have to express their opinions upon particular subjects as they arise in connection with the mode in which the war has been conducted. Her Majesty's Government will rely upon the assistance of all parties in both Houses of Parliament, and they hope that any discussions upon the policy of the country will be carried on with that temper and that caution which I am sure it must be their disposition to exercise. But, my Lords, it is not in the field of politics alone, it is not in this House alone, nor is it in the other House of Parliament alone, that a great duty has to be performed. Every person in this country has a duty to perform at this moment. In a great measure we must, undoubtedly, depend for the issue of the great cause in which we are engaged with one of the greatest and most powerful empires in the world upon the courage of our soldiers, the courage of our seamen, and the ability of our commanders. But be it remembered that it is not they alone who are actively engaged in the contest—that the contest is one of representative government against despotism, and that if we are not enabled to oppose to the energy of that despotism those peculiar powers which a representative government contains, or ought to contain, we shall fail in that contest. If we do not procure that unanimity by patriotism, by argument, and by similarity of opinion which despotism is able at all times and in all periods to command, despotism will be too powerful for liberty, and the moral to be learnt from the transactions of these times will be the feebleness and the vices of a free and representative government. The only mode by which that can be prevented—the only mode by which a different view can be presented to the eyes of the world of the character of the constitution of this country is by the united effort of every man in it; and it is the duty, not only of Members of this House, not only of Members in the other House of Parliament, but also of persons exercising influence out of it—of those very eminent and distinguished persons who, by their talents, are connected with one of the noblest institutions of this country—the free press of this country—it is the duty of these individuals, and it is the duty of all persons who by any accident of position or talent command the confidence and the approbation of the different circles, great or small, in which they live—it is the duty of all these, by every act, word, and deed, at this moment, to take care that they say nothing, that they do nothing, that they write nothing that can have the effect of impairing the national strength, or of interrupting the action of the national cause in the great contest in which it is engaged. And, my Lords, if this country shall succeed in this struggle, I trust that no man, on reflection, will forego his share in the national triumph, when that triumph is established, by having done anything that could retard it; or if, unhappily, there should be a failure, that he will be aware of having done nothing that can saddle his own conscience and his own mind with the reproach of having by any act, or word, or deed, contributed to that failure. I hope, my Lords, we have more prospects of success than of failure; and I agree with my noble Friend (Earl Granville) in the excellent statement he has made to your Lordships, that we may have gone, and may at the present moment be going, too far in despondency, as we undoubtedly have gone too far in anticipation of success. Whatever may be the state of the Government—composed as it now is without possessing the assistance of noble Lords for whom I entertain both affection and respect, and for whom I must say that, whatever may be the public injury and the public objection to inquiries such as that proposed to be instituted, personally they will have to gain from that inquiry, as far as it will be found that they have nothing at all to fear from all that has been falsely, rashly, unjustly, and partially attributed to them—whatever may be the constitution of the Government, whether constructed as it now is, and relying upon the support of this House and the country, I trust that it may establish the means of prosecuting the war with vigour and of carrying it forward to a successful termination. I believe, my Lords, that even should the Government be unable to carry on this war to a successful issue, those Gentlemen who form part of it will have done their duty to the country at the present moment by stepping into the gap, and showing the enemy on the one hand, and the Allies of this country on the other, that in England there is no absence of power to form an Administration; and I will add, before I sit down, that that which has also governed me in the advice I have ventured to give to Her Majesty has been the prospect of securing by the arrangement which has now been completed the uninterrupted continuation and maintenance of those negotiations with our Allies which have been for the last two years conducted with increasing success, from month to month, under the auspices of my noble Friend near me (the Earl of Clarendon), unimpeached and unattacked—which are in a fair way, I believe in my conscience, more and more to unite the whole of Europe in that cause which is the cause of the whole of Europe—and which, by bringing other Powers into union with this country, cannot fail, whatever may have happened hitherto, to effect the great object for which this war, with the unanimous consent of this country, was undertaken—a war entered into solely for great national objects, and pursued solely for the purpose of obtaining a permanent peace. Before I conclude, I wish to do justice to the motives which have actuated the noble Earl opposite, and to the conciliatory spirit which he has throughout expressed towards individuals; and I trust that in the present situation of the country that spirit of forbearance will continue to animate the noble Earl, and will continue to be exhibited in this House and in Parliament.

THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: My Lords, I cannot consent to the Motion for the adjournment of this House without expressing my cordial concurrence with the noble Marquess who has just sat down in the satisfaction he has expressed that that interregnum in the Government is over, which could not have lasted much longer without inflicting most serious injury upon the public service. I congratulate your Lordships that the time has passed away in which we have witnessed, and the nations of Europe have witnessed, such unseemly scenes as have recently been displayed in this country. We have exhibited to the nations of Europe the spectacle of a Government carrying out a great war with a noble Ally against a most colossal Power without any inherent vigour and unanimity—on the contrary we have shown them a Government divided against itself, and carrying on a civil war within its own camp. Those days have passed away, I hope not again to recur; and I congratulate your Lordships, with the noble Marquess opposite, upon that satisfactory circumstance. My Lords, the noble Marquess, whenever he addresses your Lordships, has so much experience in elocution and so much clearness of diction that it is almost impossible to misunderstand his meaning; but yet there was one passage in his speech which I think is open to some misconception, although I believe it has been understood as he intended it should be understood upon this side of the House. It is just possible that the noble Marquess may have been understood to mean by the expression to which I refer that the present war is a war of Representative Governments against Despotism. Now, I understood him, as he followed this remark up by subsequent observations, to have made it merely in speaking of the unseemly and unfortunate position in which our Government—a constitutional Government—stood in comparison with despotic Governments, while the unfortunate scenes to which he referred were taking place here. That is what I understood him to mean, and not that this war was one in which the principle of constitutional Government was arrayed against despotism.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: Allow me to explain my meaning. What I meant to say was, that the principle of Representative Government was now undergoing an ordeal, and that we ought to be showing to the world the advantages which we claim as the peculiar merit of a Representative Government, and which I hope it has, as contrasted to a despotic Government.

The Earl of MALMESBURY: Yes, so I understood the phrase, but it certainly seemed to me open to misapprehension, and I thought it right to give the noble Marquess the opportunity of explanation. My Lords, I am glad to see that Her Majesty has been able to obtain, with the assistance of the noble Marquess and others, a Government which will carry on the affairs of this country. There is one, and only one, Member of this House (Lord Panmure) who is added to the list of Cabinet Ministers having seats in this House; the remaining Members of the Cabinet in your Lordships' House are the same as have for a long time held office. I must congratulate your Lordships upon having now, as a leader of the Government in this House, a noble Friend of mine (Earl Granville), who, I know, will conduct the debates of this House not only with ability, but with that temper and dignity which should never be lost sight of in this place. With respect to the new Member who has been introduced by the recent changes into the Cabinet (Lord Panmure), it would be unfair in any way to prejudge his intentions or his capacity for the most important position which he has accepted, and the affairs of which he is about to administer. But, whatever his qualifications may be, he cannot have taken that office without a firm conviction that the eyes of the entire country, and not of this country alone, but of all Europe besides, are fixed, and will be fixed, almost exclusively upon him. His is the office which at this moment attracts the attention of all the nations of Europe. Upon him and upon his very first acts they will fix their eyes with intense anxiety; and I trust that the noble Lord who has had the courage—and a most laudable courage it is—to accept at this moment such an office will carry out his duties with a vigour without which there must ensue almost ruin instead of benefit to the nation. Entertaining these views of the important duties of his office, the noble Lord will excuse me for making a few observations, so soon after his acceptance of office, upon what I think—perhaps erroneously—may take place before long with respect to facts which may be brought before him. The other night a noble Earl who sits on the second bench below the Government (Earl Grey) addressed to your Lordships, as he always does, with great ability and great knowledge of the subject upon which he spoke, a very elaborate speech upon the faults of the present constitution of the army, and he told your Lordships how those faults might, in many instances, be remedied. I did not rise when that noble Earl sat down, because, after him, a noble Lord (Ellenborough), addressed your Lordships who was far more worthy to be heard upon this subject than I could be. But it must not be supposed that, though silent, I approved all the noble Earl's suggestions—that is, supposing I rightly understood his meaning. I believe I am not wrong in supposing that it has been for a long period the tradition of the party of which the noble Earl is an ornament that the constitution of the army is not only faulty in many of its details, but that the very principle upon which it is governed requires reform. Now, my Lords, the principle upon which the army is now governed is one, I think, which cannot be remedied and cannot be altered to the advantage of the public or of the army itself. The army and the patronage of the army are now under the power of the Crown, and the Commander in Chief of that army is appointed by the Crown. He is removable, or supposed to be removable, by no ephemeral Ministry, and, being not liable to any such removal, he is almost in the situation of a judge, sitting independently and impartially to administer the patronage of the army. If my impression is an accurate one, the noble Earl would reform the army in that respect, and would assimilate its government more to that of the navy. This is what I understood the noble Earl to mean, and I think any such reform would be the most damaging which this country ever entered upon. If such a case as this occurred—if a Minister ever proposed such a change—I do not think any Conservative in this country would do his duty if he did not oppose such a reform, however and wherever it might be proposed. My impression and conviction are, that if such a change took place—if the administration of the patronage of the army were assimilated to that of the navy, it would become the same hotbed of jobbing and trickery which has been, unfortunately, for many years a reproach to the Admiralty of this country. I say, it has been a reproach, and a just reproach, to the Admiralty; and I myself can recollect that one of the earliest steps I took in public life showed me without doubt how far that system of corruption prevailed under the peculiar administration of the navy. If I may be excused for speaking of myself, I may mention that in the year 1836—I think it was the year in which Her Majesty came to the throne—I, accompanied by a most distinguished Admiral, Sir George Cockburn, proceeded to Portsmouth upon a requisition of the electors to stand for that borough. At that time your Lordships will remember that a Whig Administration was in power. I mention my colleague, Sir George Cockburn, because it was impossible to find throughout all England a man more popular, more respected—I may say, more adored—than he was by all the persons and in all the places connected more immediately with the naval service. If you had chosen a candidate throughout all England to represent a town containing a great arsenal and great naval establishments, it would have been impossible to find a man more fitted than Sir George Cockburn. What happened? At the very first house we entered at Portsmouth in the course of our canvass, the voter, with more sincerity than civility, almost laughed in our faces. He said—"You come down here upon the Tory interest! You come here to oppose the Government candidates! Why, it's perfectly absurd! The Government interest in this borough, arising from the dockyard and arsenal, is so immense that it is quite impossible you should have the slightest chance." We were told the same wherever we went, and we naturally lost the election; and I remember, as a young man, my impression was that, whatever advantages our constitutional government possesses, an election in an arsenal town like Portsmouth certainly furnished as good an exemplification of its disadvantages as any one could conceive. Since that time I have heard nothing which could alter my opinion with respect to the disadvantages of the naval administration; and, therefore, if the present Government, or if the Secretary for War, connected as he is with the party to which the noble Earl belongs—if he should ever listen to such a proposal—or if he should initiate such a proposal, I trust your Lordships in this House, and I am sure the Conservative party throughout this country, will oppose it to their utmost. My Lords, a great deal has been said lately, and naturally said, about the army. It is a department of the service which at this moment attracts public attention in a high degree. The noble Lord who is now intrusted with this department, in common with most of his colleagues, perhaps pays more deference than I should think it right to pay to what is called the fourth estate of the realm, a very able and active journal—I mean the *Times*. My Lords, I believe that journal to have been the first promoter of the expedition to the Crimea, at the time when it was made, at an improper season of the year, and before the army was properly provided with transports and other necessaries. I believe that journal urged the Government—a weak and feeble Government—to enter upon that expedition; and therefore entertaining that opinion, and with that conviction, I think I do not overrate the power of that able journal upon the present Government, which is almost the same as that to which it has succeeded. Well, what has been the endeavour of that journal with respect to the constitution of the army? It has directed one unvaried torrent of abuse against every part and parcel of that army, excepting against that great part of it which nobody attempts to find fault with—I mean the gallant soldiers who have fought in its ranks. But it has constantly abused its constitution as regards the officers; and here I may say that I was sorry to hear the noble Earl the other night make some observations which, I hear, have been received with pain at the military circles in this town. The noble Earl appeared to find fault with the officers of the army, thinking them not as efficient as they ought to be and might be. Now, I confess I cannot understand how any man can find fault with the regimental officers of the army, for it appears to me that they have in every way done their duty, not only exhibiting the bravery inherent in our race, but also carrying out their administrative duties faithfully and well under the most painful circumstances. But, to revert to the observations of the journal to which I am referring, and which I believe has such influence with the Government, the song has been the same in it for the last week—that the constitution of the army is too aristocratic; that the regiments are given over to the aristocracy; that the aristocracy swarms in the army? and that that is the fault and that is one of the principal causes of the misfortunes which we have to lament. Now, my Lords, before you enter into an argument, it is certainly your duty to see that your premises are the same as those of your opponent. At the present moment I am under a difficulty, which is, to understand what the journal in question means by the word "aristocratic." The word has various meanings. At the beginning of the French Revolution, under the Reign of Terror, every man was an aristocrat who wore a pair of breeches; a little time afterwards the term was only applied to those who were decently dressed; but it was always maintained as an offensive term in that country during that period, and a person had only to be pointed out to the crowd as an aristocrat, and he was pretty sure to be summarily dealt with. What, then, does the *Times* mean by the term? Does it mean, when it speaks of the aristocracy, to refer to the Peerage and to the sons and brothers of Peers? That is the common acceptation of the term; because to go into the nobility of ancient families and trace distant relationships would be quite impossible in such a case. I take leave to suppose, then, that the *Times* means by the aristocracy the Peerage—their sons and their brothers. Now, the statement of the *Times*—no longer ago than yesterday—is that Lord Somebody—they give a nickname—is able to go into a regiment and buy himself from one rank to the other, and not only one, but any number of noble Lords. This induced me to take up the *Army List* and see how the case stood, and whether the army really swarms, as is said, with your Lordships' sons and brothers. I thought the fairest way would be to take the first regiment which stood on the list—the Grenadier Guards—consisting of three battalions and numbering about 100 officers. I took the period when our forces were sent to the East, and the *Army List* I quote from was, therefore, of May last. I find that, out of the above 100 officers in Her Majesty's First Grenadier Guards, only eighteen were connected by blood directly with your Lordships. That is a proportion of about one-sixth, which I do not think will be considered a very great and disproportionate number in a regiment particularly charged with guarding the throne of an ancient monarchy. I say, I do not think there is anything striking or alarming in such a proportion. Well, I went on and took the first ten regiments of infantry—the pith and marrow of your army. In the first ten regiments of the line there were altogether only seven sons and brothers of peers; in the seven regiments of heavy dragoons there were but three officers connected with members of this House. Commanding the 1st Royals was Sir James Kempt, now, unfortunately, no more, who was certainly one of the most distinguished officers ever seen in the British army, and at the same time sprung from the humblest order of the people. Well, in this regiment, comprising two battalions, how many peers and sons and brothers of peers were there? One. In the 2nd regiment of the line there was one; in the 3rd, none; in the 4th, none; in the 5th, none; in the 6th, none; and in the 7th there were four. And, now, with respect to the point of their being so soon able to get promotion. Among those four was Captain Hare, who was killed at Alma, and who was forty-five when he met with his death on the field of battle. In the 8th regiment there were none of the brothers or sons of peers; in the 9th there was one; and in the 10th none; so that in the first ten regiments of the line there were only seven sons or brothers of peers connected with your Lordships' House. In the first seven regiments of heavy dragoons there were only three such officers; and in the last ten regiments of infantry there were still fewer—only five sons or brothers of peers. This, I think, is sufficient to show that, if I am right in supposing the *Times* to mean by the words "aristocracy of England," the immediate blood relations of your Lordships, there never was a greater misrepresentation made before the face of any country; and if they argue that the army is to be reformed and improved by any change which may banish these few men from the regiments of the army, they are entirely deceiving the people they address, and the Government, who may possibly put faith in their representations. But it appears that it is not the infantry or other regiments which may or may not have officers belonging to the aristocracy which want reform. There are other departments who require it. There are the medical and the Commissariat departments, and I do not think in either of those there are any members to be found connected with your Lordships' House. My Lords, I mention this, because I know that a pressure will be put upon the noble Lord opposite, who has just succeeded to the important office of Secretary for War; and I have therefore ventured, on the first day of his appearing in this House, to make these observations, hoping and trusting that the noble Lord, when he undertakes to make those important reforms in the constitution of the army which are undoubtedly necessary, and which should be made without loss of time, will, above all things, respect that main principle of keeping the army and the patronage of the army in the hands of the Crown, and that he will not be misled by any popular cry—however his colleagues may have been so during the last year—in meeting those difficulties with which he will certainly have to cope, and which no man more than myself hopes and trusts he will successfully overcome.

LORD PANMURE: My Lords, after the observations of the noble Earl who has just addressed your Lordships, I feel it would be impossible for me to avoid making a few observations—(and they shall be but a few)—before the Motion for adjournment is put to the House. I perfectly concur in an observation which has fallen from the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby), to the effect that no man should undertake the duties of an office of great responsibility under the Crown without endeavouring to satisfy the public as to the grounds upon which he has undertaken that office. I admit that, in the present state of the country, the eyes of the country will be turned upon the person holding the office I have the honour to hold more than perhaps upon any other Member of the Government; and I confess that I shrank from assuming the responsibility attached to my office until I was informed that an opinion was entertained that the experience which I had had in the administration of military affairs might be conducive to the advantage of the Sovereign and the country at the present emergency. I am well aware that the eyes of the people, not only of this, but of other countries, are upon the department which I have the honour to represent, and that my position is not only conspicuous, but attended with great responsibility—and necessarily so, as exercising so great an influence over the military affairs of the country. But I must be pardoned for saying that I look to the Ministry of which I am a Member—I look to the Ministers of the Crown generally, who will share with me the responsibility in those military affairs which I have taken upon myself to direct. I am quite aware that much is required in this department, and that many reforms must take place, and that at as early a period as possible; but I must be pardoned for saying that I am not prepared to enter with the noble Earl into this discussion. I am not prepared at this moment to state to your Lordships to what extent, or with what speed, or in what order and precedence, I can take upon myself to enter upon carrying into effect these reforms. I concur in what has been said by the noble Earl with reference to the aid for which I may look to this House, and, I trust I may add, to the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby). Nor am I insensible of the great talents which the noble Earl would have brought to the task of administering our military affairs had he succeeded in forming an Administration. In eloquence in addressing their Lordships I will at once yield the palm to that noble Earl. Another noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough) has also the advantage over me in having had to deal with great military combinations whilst at the head of affairs in India, and for whose ability and experience I entertain due deference. But there is one qualification which I trust to bring to the administration of the military affairs of this country, and for which at least I hope to establish a character, and that is in the purity of my motives in all that concerns the administration of military affairs. I shall endeavour, if I can do nothing else, to give the country at least this confidence—that none shall be employed under my Administration whom I do not consider the fittest for the employment to which I shall recommend him to my Sovereign, or employ upon my own responsibility. And if, in carrying on the affairs of that department, I shall at times feel compelled to take a course painful to my own feelings, but which are yet necessary, in my opinion, for the promotion of the public service, I trust I may be enabled to perform those duties in a manner which will show that, when the necessities of my country call for it, I can even sacrifice my own feelings in the performance of the duty which I think incumbent upon me. I shall endeavour to do that which I think necessary for placing the administration of military affairs upon the best footing as rapidly as I can, and I trust that too much may not be expected of me, as I have so recently succeeded to office. I succeeded to office without any antagonism to my noble Friend who has left it, and I do not know that I can bring to it more zeal, more industry, or more honesty of purpose, than that with which his whole political career has been marked. I may, perhaps, possess the advantage of bringing to it several years of administration of military affairs under a former Government; and I may also bring to it the advantage of a circumstance of which I shall never cease to be proud—that for twelve years of life I served in the ranks of the regimental service of the army; and having so served I can give my fullest testimony to the high encomium which the noble Earl has bestowed upon the regimental system of the British Army; and I would take this opportunity of stating, that whatever may be the defects of our military system in other respects, I believe our regimental system to be as perfect and as satisfactory as that of any army in the world. We may fail in the higher branches of our service through the want of proper schools, and be deficient in what is called the "staff" of the army; but, so far as the regimental system is concerned, I believe it to be placed upon a good foundation, to be carried on in a perfect manner, and I know of very little which is required to improve the army in that direction. Having made these explanations, and craving that kind consideration the House is always disposed to give to those anxious to perform their duty to their country honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their ability, I hope I may not be out of place in craving eleswhere, and out of doors, that forbearance which is necessary to all who undertake a position so responsible as that which I have undertaken; and I can only say that, should I find myself from any circumstances unequal to the due performance of the task which I have undertaken, I will have the honesty at once to confess that inequality, and will be prepared at once to surrender to other and better hands that important charge, which, by withholding from the hands capable of discharging its duties, I might act most injuriously to the public service and best interest of the country.

THE EARL OF RODEN was sure the country would appreciate the motives of the noble Lord who had undertaken the arduous duties of so responsible a post at so momentous a time, and give credit to the noble Lord for patriotism, and a desire to serve the public. Every one in England—not only from national pride, but from relationship in one way or another with our brave soldiers—felt a deep, almost a personal, interest in the success of our troops; and he appealed to the noble Earl (Earl Granville) whether the occasion was not a fitting one when that country ought, by a simultaneous and public act, to supplicate that Almighty Power in whose hands was the fate of nations? He believed that such an appeal would be responded by the nation as it ought to be, and would be the surest and best mode of ensuring success to our army now suffering so much.

Motion *agreed to.*

FISHERIES (NORTH AMERICA) BILL.

THE EARL OF CLARENDON, in moving that their Lorships do go into Committee on this Bill, said, that he would take that opportunity of answering a question which had been put on a previous occasion. The present Bill gave no power to American fishermen to erect permanent buildings on British soil. It gave them leave to land during a certain part of the year to dry their nets and cure their fish, but it gave them no power to erect permanent buildings.

House in Committee. Bill *reported;* without Amendment; and to be read 3ª on Friday the 16th *Instant.*

House adjourned till To-morrow.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Thursday, February 8, 1855.

MINUTES.] PUBLIC BILLS. — 1° Education; Mines (Ireland).

LONDON AND SOUTH-WESTERN RAILWAY BILL.

Order for Second Reading read.

Motion made and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."

MR. HILDYARD said, it was his intention to move that the Bill be postponed for a month. This was not a mere squabble between railway companies; the question involved was one which concerned that House, and before he had finished his observations he should appeal to the House to say whether it was so or not. It happened that the district which, in the West of England, had Exeter as its apex, and Salisbury and Dorchester as its base, was at this moment less supplied with railway accommodation than any other portion of the kingdom, whether regarding its local or national requirements. But this was not the fault of Parliament. In the year 1848 Parliament sanctioned the construction of a railway by a local company, assisted by the company whose Bill was now before the House, and the latter company was authorised to raise a considerable sum of money towards carrying the under taking out; and a large portion of that money had, he believed, been raised, though not one farthing had yet been employed for effecting the purposes to which the sanction of Parliament was then given. But what he more particularly desired to call the special attention of the House to was that which happened in the year 1853. In that year the Great Western and Bristol and Exeter Companies proposed to construct a line of railway running out of the Wilts, Somerset, and Weymouth Railway at a place called Maiden Newton, passing through Axminster to Exeter, and that Bill was opposed by the South-Western Company, whose traffic it would have materially prejudiced had it passed into a law. They did not contend that there was no necessity for such a railway; their plea was that the line proposed was not, as regarded either local or national requirements, the proper line; and to prove this position they called before the Committee on the Bill the heads of the principal military and naval departments of the country, who all concurred in stating that the line was not a right line, and that a better one was capable of being laid down. The Committee, in their Report to the House, stated that they were reduced by this evidence to great perplexity. They felt, to use their own terms, the urgent want of railway accommodation in the district, so far as the local interests were concerned, and yet that the evidence which had been given by the public authorities was such as they could not possibly disregard. They, therefore, asked the South Western Company what guarantee they would give them that if the Committee threw out the Bill before them, they would construct that other line which the company contended was the right line to be laid down? At that time the chairman of the South Western Company was his hon. Friend the Member for Berwickshire (Mr. F. Scott); and his hon. Friend went before the Committee, being authorised so to do by a unanimous vote of a meeting of the shareholders, and distinctly pledged himself that if the Bill before the Committee were thrown out, the South Western Company would next year introduce a Bill and carry into effect the line which they asserted was the right line. He also wrote a letter by the same authority, to the Committee; that letter the Committee made a part of their Report, and it was accordingly placed upon the records of that House. As soon as the South Western Company, however, had by these means got rid of the other Bill, they called their shareholders together, and—he did not say unanimously, for, happily, there was some shame remaining among them—but by a majority determined not to redeem the pledge they had thus solemnly given; and the consequence was that this important locality had been deprived of the accommodation which it would unquestionably have obtained but for the interposition of the South Western Company with these false pretences. Unhappily up to this time Parliament had not been able to get at them; for it could not compel a company to introduce a Bill, even though that company had pledged themselves to do so. But generally speaking there was a day of retribution for railway companies as well as for other people; and the day of retribution had at last arrived. This same company were at length driven to come to Parliament with a Bill for another object. He begged it to be distinctly understood, however, that he had no wish to obstruct that measure. On the contrary, it was a Bill which would further the very object he had in view—namely, the extension of the line in the direction in which the South Western Company had in 1853 pledged themselves to carry it. For this reason he did not oppose the second reading, but merely proposed that it should be adjourned for a month, because within that period the company would assemble together at its annual meeting, when the directors would have the opportunity of receiving authority from the shareholders to redeem their pledge. If, when the company assembled, they gave their chairman, who was a Member of that House, distinct authority to say, that if the Bill proceeded, a clause should be introduced so worded as to compel them to redeem the pledge they had given, then no Member of that House would support the Bill more readily than he (Mr. Hildyard) would do. If, however, they declined to do that, it would then be for the House to consider what it was most becoming that they should do. If it were once admitted that railway companies might come before Parliament, and influence the decisions of its Committees by the most solemn engagements, having it, nevertheless, in reserve to throw over those engagements so soon as they had obtained the object for which they were given, all he could say was that Parliament would be suffering itself to be treated in a manner that was alike unsuitable to its own dignity, and contrary to the interests committed to its care. He was happy to say that the Chairman who, in the name of the company, gave the pledge to which he had referred, when he found that he was not in a condition to perform it, instantly, as became a man of honour, resigned his place at the board.

Mr. G. BUTT seconded the Amendment.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words, "upon this day month."

Question proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."

Mr. CHAPLIN said, as the mover of the second reading of the Bill now under consideration, he would beg to state that he was not chairman of the South Western Company when the transactions referred to took place in 1853. He had no doubt that his predecessor was authorised to give a pledge to the Committee; but when the time came for fulfilling it the shareholders thought they would not be justified, under the adverse circumstances which then existed, in adhering to the promise which they had given. But he would like to know how an error or a wrong committed in 1853 was to be rectified in 1855, when the Bill before the House referred to a different matter altogether? Moreover, the feeling which prevailed among the shareholders in 1853 was five times stronger in 1855, and for his own part he despaired of effecting any change in favour of the scheme proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Whitehaven (Mr. Hildyard). He should not give any promise on the subject, because he did not mean to commit himself; but he thought it hard that a railway company should be censured at one time for constructing new lines and branches, and at another for refusing to plunge headlong into works of the same description. The present Bill was merely a Bill for the better regulation of the traffic of the company, and he hoped hon. Members would not feel themselves justified in refusing to read it a second time.

Mr. BECKETT said, he thought the South Western Company had forfeited all claim to confidence, not only by failing to undertake the construction of the line for which they had obtained powers in 1848, and applying the money subscribed to other purposes, but by refusing to redeem the pledge given by the hon. Member for Berwickshire (Mr. F. Scott), in consequence of which the scheme supported by

the Great Western and Bristol and Exeter Companies was rejected. Parliament, in his opinion, would consult its dignity by refusing the present application.

Mr. LABOUCHERE said, the question before the House was one of very considerable importance. There were, he believed, no doubt about the facts of the case:—A railway company induced a Committee of that House to throw out a Bill proposed by another railway company (which, if passed, would have supplied the wants of the inhabitants of a large district), upon the authority of a general meeting that they would undertake to make this line. The Committee considered that the line proposed would, from the representations of men in high office, be of great public benefit. The Committee, however, rejected a Bill which they would have adopted, with a view of passing a Bill which the South Western Company promised to bring in. That company afterwards repudiated their own acts, for another meeting was called which disavowed the proceedings of the former meeting, in consequence of which the directors at once resigned. The company repudiated engagements, and acted against the commonest principles of honesty. He believed the House would give a useful lesson to railway companies by refusing to read on the present occasion the Bill a second time. The adjournment for a month would give the present directors of the South Western Company time to consider the course they ought to pursue. He (Mr. Labouchere should vote for the Amendment; and, in doing so, he need scarcely say that he was totally unconnected with the companies of both districts.

Mr. DEEDES said, he would vote for the Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Whitehaven, on public grounds. In the year 1848 he had had the honour of presiding over a Committee of that House before which this question was brought, and which spent fifty-seven days in endeavouring to ascertain what would most completely satisfy the wants of the part of the country affected, and the interests of the public service. The decision of that Committee was that certain things undertaken to be done by the South Western Railway Company would best attain that end, and on that account their plan was preferred to that of the Great Western Railway Company. The result, however, of that fifty-seven days' inquiry was that not a single thing was done which the company had undertaken to do; every promise had been broken, and the proceedings of that House had been set at nought.

Mr. HUTCHINS said, he did not see that any good would be done by postponing the Bill. He had always spoken in the strongest terms of the transaction which had been referred to, and he was not now about to defend it, but he must remind the House that persons standing very high in this country had voted in favour of it. An ex-Chancellor and two or three of the Judges had sent their proxies in favour of the repudiation. This Bill, however, referred to an entirely different matter, and he certainly thought the House ought not to refuse to proceed with it.

Mr. HENLEY said, he could see very considerable advantage to be derived from the postponement of the Bill. The breach of faith on the part of the company was not denied, and that the House should now enter into dealings with this company without taking notice of such a transaction was a thing not to be thought of. The hon. and learned Member for Whitehaven had given a very excellent reason for postponement. He wished to afford the offending company, which, it appeared, was to have a meeting within the month, an opportunity of seeing what the House of Commons felt with regard to the gross breach of faith which had been committed by them—to give them a *locus penitentiœ*, so that finding they were not to be trusted again on their bare word, they might have the option of inserting in this Bill some clause which should bind them by a stronger obligation than was usually demanded from men of honour. Certainly, if the House allowed this Bill to pass without taking any notice of the former transaction, they would be opening the door to all sorts of trickery, dishonesty, and chicanery.

Mr. F. SCOTT said, that as he had been Chairman of the company at the time when the transaction referred to took place, he might be expected to have some feeling in the matter; but he could assure the House that he had none other but that which he trusted every Gentleman present had—that of morality, truth, and propriety. Being still a shareholder in the company, his bias would naturally be in favour of the Bill now before the House, which was a very important one, but, as the Motion before the House was one for its postponement, and not for its rejection, he would not oppose it, thinking that, as the half-yearly meeting of the company was about to occur, the proprietary would have an opportunity of deciding whether they valued this Bill so much as to make it worth their while to put themselves in the position of coming into court with clean hands. He should not fail to attend the meeting, whether he were hooted or cheered, and he should tell the shareholders of the light in which their conduct was viewed by that House.

Mr. JAMES M'GREGOR said, he would wish to point out that the present position of the House with regard to this company was to be attributed to its injudicious, ill-considered system of railway legislation.

Mr. CHAPLIN said, that as the feeling of the House was so strong, he should not oppose the Motion for postponement.

Amendment and Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

THE ARMY IN THE CRIMEA—ADJOURNMENT OF THE HOUSE—QUESTION.

Mr. RICH said, he wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whether he was prepared to lay on the table a copy of the official document on which he founded a statement which was most satisfactory to the public—namely, that the latest official reports received from the Crimea at the time when he addressed the House, enabled him to assert that there were under arms 28,200 men, independently of the naval brigade and the marines, and exclusive of all the men in hospital at Balaklava or elsewhere. If the right hon. Gentleman would furnish that statement, he would afford great satisfaction both to that House and to the country.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, he thought he need hardly acquaint the hon. Member that, in making that statement, he was acting upon Returns which were not under his own control, but which had been furnished him by the military departments, and he would rather not give any answer with respect to the production of those Returns until the Members of the Government more particularly interested had had time to consider the question which plainly involved matters of great consequence. The hon. Member was, however, entirely mistaken in the expression that he had attributed to him, and had represented him as having said that there were 28,200 men under arms. That was not the expression he had used. What he had really said was that there were 28,200 men in the discharge of military duties before Sebastopol. He might now, perhaps, be permitted to advert to what was stated yesterday with respect to the order of business in the House. He thought there had then been a general impression in the House, if he could recall its right feeling, that it would not be desirable to proceed to any important business until his noble Friend the Member for Tiverton, who had accepted the office of First Lord of the Treasury, should have had an opportunity of submitting himself to his constituents after vacating his seat in that House. If his noble Friend should be re-elected, he could not with any certainty be expected to make his re-appearance in the House before the middle of next week. He thought, also, that the feeling was, that it would be very inconvenient that the House should meet merely for the purpose of despatching business of form, it being understood that no substantial business was to be brought before them during the time between the present time and the period at which they should re-assemble for the transaction of important business. He had said yesterday that there was a probability that, on account of the necessity of passing a Ways and Means Bill, to authorise a further issue of money for the services of the Navy and Ordnance, it might be requisite for the House to meet from day to day in a merely formal manner; but being anxious to spare the House that inconvenience, and also to relieve Mr. Speaker, on whose time and patience they had to make heavy draughts, the Government had looked carefully into the matter, and found that they would be able to make the necessary provision for the services, supposing that the House did not adjourn for a period more distant than next Friday week. What he proposed, therefore, was this—to give notice for the order of business for to-morrow week as follows:—The first subject to be taken should be the Navy Estimates; second, the Army Estimates; and then there should be notice of a Committee on the subject of the newspaper stamp. He put these three matters on the notice paper although he did not expect the House to get through all of them in one day. He had a confident expectation that the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty would then be in his place to move the Navy Estimates. It would be, he hoped, not inconvenient for the House to meet to-morrow for the purpose of pressing forward the money votes they had been obliged to submit for the immediate exigencies of the service; but as to-morrow was a Friday, it had appeared to them that it would be more convenient for the House to meet at twelve o'clock, as the business was purely of a formal nature. He should, therefore, move that Mr. Speaker do take the Chair to-morrow at twelve o'clock, and he should on that occasion move the adjournment of the House until Friday, the 16th of February.

Motion *agreed to.*

SUPPLY—EXCESS OF NAVAL EXPENDITURE.

Order for Committee read.

House in Committee of Supply.

Mr. COWPER said, he had to ask for a vote not exceeding 1,615,600*l.* on account of the Excess of Naval Expenditure for the year ending the 31st of March, 1855; and said, that as it had been agreed that there should be no discussion at present, he would leave such explanations as the House might require to be given by his right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty when he moved the Navy Estimates on Friday week. The total amount of the excess estimate was 1,938,104*l.*, and the Government now asked for 1,615,600*l.* of that sum.

House resumed. Resolution to be *reported* To-morrow.

SUPPLY—ORDNANCE ESTIMATES.

On the bringing up of the Report on the Ordnance Estimates,

Mr. W. WILLIAMS said, that he had been that morning informed by letters received from Plymouth, that a company of Sappers and Miners, lately embarked there on board the Princess Alice, had been so embarked in a state of mutiny, caused by starvation, because the authorities would not allow them to eat anything inside the victualling-yard, although they were detained many hours before their embarkation. He had received a letter from a gentleman of the highest position in Plymouth, stating that he had inquired into the facts of this case, and found that the men reached Plymouth by an early train, and were marched to the victualling-yard in order to embark, but that they did not do so until a late hour of the day, and during the delay which thus occurred they had no food until the circumstance became known in the town, when, through the kindness of Mr. Harris, a respectable tradesman in Stonehouse, they were provided with bread and cheese and beer at a hotel. Now, the neglect of the Admiralty at our seaports reflected great discredit upon them. These men, he believed, were about to embark for the Crimea to join our army there, and they were treated with gross neglect, if not with downright inhumanity, by the dockyard authorities. Only a few days ago we had an account of their unfeeling conduct towards sick men who landed from the East at Portsmouth, without there being any officer to receive them, and the poor creatures, who were in pain and could not sit down, remained exposed in the cold air while their baggage—a few miserable rags, no doubt—were ransacked by the Custom-house officers. Why were not these dockyard officers, in the receipt of large salaries from the country, there to receive these poor men? Only two days afterwards the Queen went to Portsmouth, on her way to Osborne. There was no lack of officials in attendance on that occasion, but if Her Majesty had been aware of their conduct towards the poor soldiers and sailors who had suffered in Her service, and in whom, we all knew, She took a warm interest, he believed that She would have driven those officers, decorated as they were, from Her presence with disgust, and perhaps have ordered them to be dismissed from their situations. Now, he did not object to this Vote, though certainly the greatest waste of public money had been caused through the most culpable negligence. The country ought to know how much money had been expended in providing comforts for our brave, but neglected army. From the Supplementary Ordnance Estimate it would be seen that there had been supplied greatcoats, boots, and shoes for the troops, warm and waterproof clothing, and other waterproof articles to the value of 649,500*l.*; in addition to which, under the head of stores, there were the items for camp equipage, &c., 234,860*l.*; huts for troops, 54,800*l.*; stable huts for 5,000 horses, 19,041*l.*; and hospital huts for 2,000 patients, 12,969*l.*; making together a total of 971,170*l.* By the vote of that House last Session upwards of 600,000*l.* were also given for the same purpose; thus showing that 1,570,000*l.* altogether had been expended in providing comforts for our soldiers in the Crimea. The country would not grudge the outlay required for the benefit of its soldiers; but our army was actually perishing for want of food, clothing, and shelter, while these enormous sums were wasted by the most disgraceful mismanagement. He believed that the main fault lay with the men whom the Government had appointed as their instruments, and for whose conduct the Government was, therefore, equally responsible. The Ordnance department was the worst managed department in this country, bad as they all were, and he hoped it would be included in the new Secretariat of War. The head of that department was in command of an army 3,000 miles off. Had he been at his office in Pall Mall, instead of in the Crimea, he (Mr. Williams) believed the lives of many thousands of our men, as well as the honour and character of the country, would have been saved. Our disasters were much more to be attributed to the want of common sense and common management than to any other cause. How was it that this country could send the necessary stores to an army 3,000 miles off, and the general commanding that army in chief could not find the means of transporting them over the six miles lying between the sea and the camp? Had he taken the advice of any sergeant of the line, instead of consulting only some aristocratic officers, all these misfortunes would have been avoided, for the commonest sergeant of the line could have told him how. Lord Raglan apparently did nothing. He only wrote to the Admiralty in despair. Had he written to our Ambassador at Constantinople 2,000 labourers might have been immediately sent him, who would have constructed a road in forty-eight hours. The manner in which our brave army had been left without raiment, food, or shelter, had disgraced the nation, and lowered it in the eyes of the civilised world. He hoped the new Government would act with energy and courage sufficient to remedy and remove these evils. He hoped the House also would support them. If they would only relieve our troops effectually, they would earn the thanks of the nation. He wished to know also from the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether this was money that had been expended or that was to be expended?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER replied, that it was a vote for money to be expended.

Resolution *agreed to.*

EDUCATION BILL.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL: Sir, I rise to move for leave to bring in a Bill on the subject of education. I do not wish to enter into any explanation of the Bill, or any statement with reference to its provisions. It is of importance, however, that the Bill should be brought before the House, in order that it should be printed, and then that people in the country may see the objects it proposes to attain. I shall therefore only move that the Bill be now brought in.

Leave given. Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Lord J. Russell and Mr. Hastings Russell.

Bill read 1°.

THE ARMY IN THE CRIMEA.

On the Motion for the adjournment of the House,

COLONEL SIBTHORP said, he deeply regretted that in the present state of public affairs any Motion should be proposed to the House such as the Motion of which the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer had given notice—namely, that the House should adjourn till Friday, the 16th instant. He was very well aware that those Gentlemen opposite felt very uncomfortable in their seats, and wished for time for re-election, and repentance he hoped. He did not think this country would submit to such an indiscreet postponement under the existing circumstances in which they were placed. He thought they ought all to offer their thanks to the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) for the inquiry he had promised to bring forward, and of the result of which there could be no doubt whatever. He wished the Government had a little more consideration for the brave soldiers and sailors composing our army than they appeared to have. He had last night, to his deep regret, seen upon the Treasury bench smiles that he thought most unbecoming, unfeeling, and indecent; and had not the House been in the state in which it was, he should have risen in his place and directed its attention to the subject. Now, when every hour was of importance, all the House had to look to was a shabby Ministry in a state of disgrace, who, he regretted to say, had not been finally excluded from office. He had, he hoped, the feelings of a soldier; and with such feelings he begged to ask in what state our army now was? Do let them know what was to be done—do let them be up and stirring; this sort of disgraceful apathy had already lasted far too long, and ought to be put a stop to. They were getting nothing done, and this Motion for adjournment was only a shuffling pretext to shelter a Ministry who had been guilty of ignorance, who did not know where they were, nor what they should do; but he trusted the time was not far distant when the House would send them off, never to return.

MR. G. BUTT said, he wished to call the attention of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer to a statement made by him yesterday, and which had had the effect of considerably cheering the people out of doors. The right hon. Gentleman was reported to have said that at the time to which he referred, the effective force before Sebastopol, including, of course, as was understood, the naval force serving on shore, amounted in round numbers to 30,000 men. This statement had also been repeated by the right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Works. Now, that statement had created considerable surprise in the minds of many who had friends in the Crimea, with whom they correspond. His attention had been drawn to it from the fact of having seen letters addressed to other gentlemen, and one received by himself, which did not agree with such a statement. The letter he had received came from a gentleman high in rank, capable of forming an opinion, and one whose statement might be relied on, and agreed with that read from day to day in the *Times*—namely, that the effective British force before Sebastopol did not, unfortunately, amount to more than 12,000 men. There was no party feeling in this question, and the right hon. Gentleman might take his (Mr. Butt's) word for it, that in calling attention to this he was influenced by no other feeling than that of the deep anxiety which he felt in common with the whole country for the remainder of that army which had achieved so much, and which, if possible, had suffered so much more. When the right hon. Gentleman had stated that the effective force of the army was 30,000 men, it was expected that such statement was based on returns which were made from time to time to the Horse Guards from the army, and his object in rising was to beg that the right hon. Gentleman would give to them the information which would assure them of the contrary of that which he must know was daily stated in the papers, and in the letters of those who wrote from the army. He trusted that the right hon. Gentleman would be able to satisfy the country that his statement was one on which they could rely, for if they found that they could do so, it would give great relief to the country. When they read from time to time in one of the most influential papers of the day—the *Times*—that the remainder of the army was wasting away, and that—he would not use the strong expressions employed in that paper, but they amounted to this—that some frightful catastrophe was at hand—this was a state of things in which they could not count on the existence of 30,000 men; and he wished that they could with confidence count on the number mentioned in the letter he had received, which gave from 12,000 to 13,000 men for the effective force—he wished they could reckon on this, but, excepting the statement of the right hon. Gentleman, not one could he find which did not point almost to the annihilation of the army. The Committee of Inquiry would show who were to blame for the state to which our army had been reduced, but the country felt that the soldiers had been sacrificed to neglect and incompetence, which had, besides the sufferings occasioned, endangered the very security of the country. He trusted, therefore, that the right hon. Gentleman would, if possible to-morrow, furnish the House with a statement from returns on which they could rely, that at the time to which he referred the effective force of the army amounted to 28,000 men.

Mr. STUART WORTLEY said, he did not know whether the right hon. Gentleman was about to give any promise for a future day, but for his part he did most earnestly deprecate the repetition of statements of this kind on the benches of that House. Those statements were not only read and heard in that House and in the country, but they were read and heard elsewhere also. Hon. Gentlemen ought therefore to feel the very deep responsibility that was laid upon them as Members of that House. For his part he could not understand that patriotism which indulged itself in repeating what he believed to be exaggerated statements of the weakness of our forces before Sebastopol. He could not understand what good it was to serve. Was it supposed by any man that what the noble Lord the Member for the City of London described as the "horrible and heart-rending" sufferings of the army were subjects upon which any Government could be indifferent, or that the existing wants of the army were not ever present to the mind of the Government? Was it not the fact that the House had insisted upon a substitution of the men engaged in the supervision of the War Department, for the very purpose of endeavouring to effect an alteration in the existing state of things; and was there any advantage, or any national object, to be gained by repeating, day after day, those melancholy statements—statements which, he again said, he believed to be grossly exaggerated? He believed there were few of them who had not friends and relatives in the Crimea. He himself had blood relations there, shedding their blood and doing their best in the service of their country. They all received private letters from their friends there. He knew that those letters spoke with feeling and pity of the sufferings of the soldiers, but he had still to learn that any officer had yet written from that camp in terms of despondency. Everything he had seen and heard confirmed his belief that the officers' letters from the camp, while they lamented the hardships our brave soldiers so heroically underwent, contained expressions of the utmost confidence in the result of the enterprise. A comparison had been drawn between the state of our army and that of the French army. He asked, was it fair to draw any such comparison? It was not for him to state what was the exact position of the French army; they heard very little about that army, because it was very little spoken of; but he was certain that the condition of that army would be much worse than it was if there were in France opportunities of making statements like some that were made in that House. But was this all? If these statements did not serve this country, whom did they serve? In making statements so well calculated to discourage their own soldiers—if it were possible to discourage them—they did everything it was possible to do to give spirit and encouragement to the enemy. He would venture to say that if another attack should be made upon our position, and another battle of Inkerman should be fought, those who made such statements would have incurred a fearful responsibility. He believed that the Russian army had suffered quite as much as it had been represented to have done, for on no other supposition could he account for its inaction. If hon. Gentlemen desired the present state of things to be remedied, let them have a strong Government—let them sanction the selection of the Crown, if, as he believed was the case, a strong Government could be formed; but let them not, night after night, make statements of facts which, in his belief, were greatly exaggerated, and would assuredly incite the enemy to attack the army. He had very lately seen statements in the French newspapers which were well known to be inspired by high authorities in that country, expressing their astonishment and shame at the tone assumed by certain Members of the House of Commons. They pointed out the pregnant fact that since the year 1815 this country had asserted that it was a non-military Power, and had tried to forget the art of war, resting upon the laurels which it had already won; they pointed out, also, that since 1815 France had been anxious to retrieve the position of her army by every means in her power; that for twenty years they had had campaigns in Algeria, as the best school for their army, and that the English army was at that moment reaping the fruits of the experience which they (the French) had acquired under the walls of Constantina.

Mr. H. BAILLIE said, the right hon. and learned Gentleman opposite had thought it right to volunteer a lecture to an hon. Member on his (Mr. Baillie's) side of the House. Yet the right hon. and learned Gentleman's lecture ought rather to have been directed to the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as it was in consequence of a voluntary statement made by that right hon. Gentleman that all this questioning arose. He could very well understand the inconvenience of a Minister making statements and giving information on such subjects—he could very well understand the right hon. Gentleman saying, when questioned, that he ought not to answer the question, as it would be inconvenient to the public service; but the right hon. Gentleman had done no such thing. The right hon. Gentleman had in his speech made a voluntary statement the other night, and another voluntary statement had been made by another Minister—the right hon. Baronet the First Commissioner of Works last night. But when those voluntary statements turned out to be quite different to the private accounts—for he himself had read a statement describing matters to be far worse than those represented by the Ministers—then he thought hon. Members had a right to ask on what grounds those statements had been made; and he thought it would be well if the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer gave some explanation on the subject; for there could be no doubt that the right hon. Gentleman had included in his return, not only the effective British troops before Sebastopol, but the Turks under the command of Lord Raglan, and the sick and wounded. [The Chancellor of the Exchequer: No, no!] There appeared to him, however, to be no other way to account for the statements made to the House. He knew that accounts had been received at the Horse Guards, and he believed that the latest return sent to this country did not give more than 10,365 as the number of effective British bayonets before Sebastopol.

Lord JOHN RUSSELL: I do not wonder, Sir, that my right hon. and learned Friend (Mr. S. Wortley) wishes to deprecate a discussion of this kind, but at the same time there is one statement which has been so commonly put forth, that I am not surprised that hon. Gentlemen opposite ask for some explanation, and that they are surprised that there should be a discrepancy between what is ordinarily circulated as the state of the army and the official account which they hear from the Ministers of the Crown. The statement usually put forward fixes the number of men before Sebastopol at about 12,000 or 14,000, and it is generally understood that 54,000 have been sent out. It is then asked, how is it possible that, having sent out 54,000, you have now only 12,000 remaining, and how comes it that so enormous a number as 40,000 or 42,000 men have been lost to the army. Now the House ought to be informed that this is not a fair comparison. If you take 54,000 on the one side as the number sent out, you ought not to take 12,000 as the number remaining in the Crimea. The 54,000 men sent out includes all the cavalry and all the artillery; it includes every commissioned and every non-commissioned officer; it includes every man present under arms, every one employed as an orderly, upon hospital duty, or in any way whatever. Hence, when you have taken away all the artillery and all the cavalry, all officers whether commissioned or non-commissioned, and all men employed in various other duties not strictly military, you will then get at a fair number with which to compare the amount of men now spoken of as actually under arms in the Crimea. If you add all these men—all those officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, you will find that, instead of 14,000 or 12,000 men, you have a force of some 28,000 or 30,000 men, and adding 14,000 for sick and wounded, the number of 44,000 will be accounted for. I admit that the mistake is a very reasonable one for hon. Gentlemen to make, but it is a mistake which I think ought to be corrected; and I cannot but think that it will be a comfort to the House and the country to know the real truth. Of course the state of our troops has been lamentable, and I should be the last person in this House to say that hon. Members should not feel deeply upon the subject. At the same time I think it right to state that only yesterday I happened to meet a gentleman, a civilian, who had just returned from the Crimea, and that I took the opportunity of inquiring into the actual state of the army before Sebastopol, and whether it was the fact that the men were so emaciated and failing in strength as has been represented. He told me that a great many men had died, and that a great many were still sick, but with regard to a great portion of the troops who were of stronger constitutions, he said that they appeared to be in possession of all their strength, and ready to perform any duty which might be required of them. The House will permit me also to call attention to the fact that ours is not the only army before Sebastopol. There is the considerable force of our allies before that place, so that in fact not less a number than 80,000 men are there collected. I cannot but take this opportunity to say that I have seen, with some disgust, the attacks which have been made on the gallant commander of the British part of that force. I am sure Lord Raglan is not only an experienced soldier, but that he is as feeling and attentive to the sufferings of those under his command as any man who ever wore the British uniform. I hope, I believe, that he will rise above the attacks which have been made upon him by a ribald press, and that he will long continue to enjoy the respect of his country. I must also take this occasion to say a word upon the present position of the Executive. My right hon. and learned Friend the Recorder of London has very properly placed before the House that we now have a First Lord of the Treasury who has great experience upon all these subjects, whose vigour and ability are undoubted, and who has always satisfied Parliament and the country by the declaration of sentiments most patriotic, and by the manner in which he has discharged the duties of the important offices with which, at various times, he has been intrusted. I am also glad to hear that another noble Friend of mine (Lord Panmure) has accepted the office of Minister of War. My noble Friend was for a long time Secretary at War in this House; he is a perfect master of the principles which regulate our army, and he will, I doubt not, turn his immediate attention to any improvement which can be suggested. He will not, I believe, be induced to adopt, under the name of improvement, innovations which might be destructive to the very existence of the army; but he will adopt, I am sure, every plan which the science of the present day, and the skill which enterprising men have brought to bear upon every kind of arms placed within his reach, for the purpose of raising the condition of our soldiers. I believe that my noble Friend the present Secretary of State for the War Department will be ready to place that army, which has suffered so much, not from want of discipline, or of military organisation, but from the failure of the civil departments, in a position to sustain the reputation of the British soldier. I have heard suggestions made that the whole military organisation of this country is defective. I do not pretend to speak as to the details of that organisation, but this I know perfectly well, that when the Duke of York fitted out regiments for service which the Duke of Wellington commanded, there was then no want of organisation—there was then no want of a force ready to sustain at any moment the reputation of this country. Nor can I think that there is so much of faultiness as it is now the fashion to impute to our system. I have no doubt that, in the years of peace which we have passed through, many parts of our system may have got out of use. It may be that in the first year of a war you cannot be able to furnish all those means of transport and all those civil services by which an army is supplied—the want of which has occasioned those grievous misfortunes which the country now deplores; but I really think that the services and establishments which are required to be regulated by my noble Friend will be adequately supplied, and no doubt the House will vote the means requisite for the restoration of those services and establishments to a state of complete efficiency. I will add, before I resume my seat, that I have every confidence in the Ministry named by Her Majesty, and I am sure that a majority of this House will give it their cordial support—but, of course, retaining the power of interfering at any time if they find the interests of the country neglected or disregarded. The House, I am sure, will give the new Ministry an opportunity of carrying into effect, by means of the executive, all the measures which may be required, without any undue interference on its part which might be prejudicial to the best interests of the country.

Mr. RICH begged to assure the House that in asking the question in the early part of the evening which had been so frequently alluded to in the course of this conversation, he had not had the slightest intention to impugn the statement that had been made by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer. His only object in asking that question was to afford to the right hon. Gentleman an opportunity of stating the facts as they really were. There was undoubtedly a very great discrepancy between the two calculations — that which described the forces in the Crimea as amounting to some 12,000 or 14,000 men, and that which estimated them as amounting to as large a number as 28,000; nor, to speak the truth, could he altogether understand how the discrepancies could be reconciled even by such explanations as the noble Lord the Member for the City of London had just submitted. However, that was a matter for the House to determine. It was greatly to be desired that there should be laid upon the table of the House such official returns as would enable the country to understand how the case really stood. There was no use in concealing the facts. No good purpose could possibly be served by concealment; on the contrary, he believed that a true statement of the facts as they really were would best conduce to our interests. He believed that it was desirable that the truth should be known to England, to France, and even to Russia. He was not one of those who had any misgiving as to the ultimate success of the campaign. He did not believe that there was any reason for despondency as to the eventual result, but he thought it of the highest importance that there should be such an official statement of our position as would enable the country to comprehend the true state of our case.

Mr. STUART WORTLEY said, he must beg to explain that he had not intended to animadvert upon the question which had been put by the hon. Gentleman, but he confessed that the language with which it had been accompanied by the hon. and learned Member for Weymouth had excited him to make a few observations.

Mr. G. BUTT said, he had put no question, but had merely pointed out to the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer that he should give an explanation of the fact he had stated.

Mr. VERNON HARCOURT said, that one of his nearest and dearest relations was with the army before Sebastopol, and therefore he felt a deep interest in what was taking place there. He thought he should be neglecting his duty if he did not state that the private letters he had received were of a very different complexion from those to which the hon. and learned Member for Weymouth had alluded. He admitted that his letters contained many statements of hardships, of pain, and of suffering, of occasional bad weather, although not nearly so bad as had often been described, but their language throughout was that not only of hope, but of confident expectation. There was no desponding. Many of the statements they saw were certainly not borne out by many of the letters they received.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, after what had been stated so well by his noble Friend (Lord John Russell) with respect to the explanation of the apparent discrepancy between the statement he had made and the account contained in the public journals, he should have felt that it was almost unnecessary for him to address a single word to the House, if it had not been for the imputation which had been thrown out by the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. H. Baillie). His noble Friend had pointed out the difference in the mode of estimating the forces of an army, which would really account for nearly the whole of the apparent discrepancy between those statements. Not only in the statement referred to were the officers excluded, and all the forces except the infantry excluded, but a considerable portion of the rank and file themselves were excluded, because, in every army, a large portion of the rank and file were perpetually employed from day to day in duties, not military duties, which portion was not included in that statement. But he desired more particularly to contradict the observation of the hon. Member for

Inverness-shire, who said that in the number of 28,000 men, who, according to the statement he had made, were discharging military duty before Sebastopol, were included a force of Turks, and the wounded and sick. Now there was not a single sick man, a single wounded man, a single Turk, or any other person except members of the British army included in the numbers he had stated to the House when he said that there were 28,200 men engaged in the discharge of military duty before Sebastopol. This was strictly true; of course he meant it was strictly true at the time when he had made the statement; but ten days had since elapsed, and of the changes which had occurred in that time, although he had no reason to believe they were great, he could not speak without more correct and recent information. He must confess that he could not wonder that statements of this kind should be made in the House, nor could he venture to complain of them. The tide of feeling ran so strong when those who were possessed of all our sympathies were in a situation of so much hardship, privation, and suffering, that we should be either more or less than men if the anxieties that were so intensely felt did not find for themselves some, even although it were rather an irregular, channel of expression. He therefore did not presume to read any lecture, or to make any complaint to any one. All he did say was this—he would beseech and entreat hon. Members to place upon their feelings as much restraint as they possibly could. It was hardly necessary to say that he entirely acquitted the hon. and learned Member for Weymouth (Mr. G. Butt) of being actuated by any spirit of party in the remarks he had made. No man in that House would be guilty of such a thing; but when the hon. and learned Gentleman said it appeared from private accounts that a great disaster was at hand—[Mr. G. Butt: I said, I had read the statement in the newspapers of to-day.] Those statements were, of course, founded upon private accounts. He would entreat the hon. and learned Gentleman to bear in mind that, although he might have made the statement in that House not as his own opinion, it would yet go forth to the world as his own opinion. Nor was this all, for that which was spoken in the House of Commons, when it went forth to the world, was carelessly and loosely examined by promiscuous readers of imperfect reports, and was supposed, in some vague and indefinite sense, to carry with it the authority of the House of Commons. On that account, reports of this kind, if taken up and promulgated by Members of the House, really became productive of great practical mischief; and without presuming to complain of hon. Members, he would venture to ask of all of them to use the utmost caution, and to place as much restraint on themselves as their natural interest in the fate of the army would allow, before they gave what may be considered as currency and authority to such statements. It was a perfectly rational course to put questions and to ask the Government for information, and it was a more useful and a less dangerous method than to deal in intelligence of this more or less questionable description, and to give it an authority which it did not otherwise possess.

Mr. DUNDAS said, he had but lately returned from the Crimea, and he could state from personal observation that there was no feeling of despondency amongst the soldiers of the British army. In a note which he had received in December from an aide-de-camp in the Second Division, it was stated that out of four battalions there were only 1,200 rank and file, fit for duty, the nominal amount on paper being 2,714. These 2,714 were in existence, but were not at that time available for the trenches or for action, many of them having been sent to Scutari, and others having come home. But notwithstanding this, he did not take quite so desponding a view as some hon. Gentlemen were disposed to do, although he admitted that matters were very bad. When he was in the Crimea he saw that the men suffered very much from exposure, from cold, and from want of proper clothing; but he had left in the latter part of December, and since then large supplies of clothing had arrived at the camp. One of the greatest difficulties with which the men had to contend was the want of fuel, without which they could not cook their provisions; and when he was at Malta he had observed with great pleasure that a public company—he believed Price's Patent Candle Company—had devised a scheme and submitted it to the Secretary at War, by which six pounds of composition would be sufficient to keep a tent warm. The men for want of fuel, had frequently been obliged to eat their rations raw: and a man who had nothing to eat but a slice or two of raw pork could not be expected to do any work. He had no doubt of the ultimate success of the expedition; for when two such countries as France and England combined to carry out a great work, nothing on earth would stop them; but it would be attended with a great loss of life. For the last forty years but little thought had been concentrated upon those contrivances in the art of war which in the other arts had been brought to such a pitch of perfection, and he had been told by an officer of artillery that many lives had been lost in the batteries by the bursting of our own cannon. But the talent of the mechanic would now be brought into play, and the energy which England would put forth would no doubt ultimately bring success. He might perhaps at a future time have an opportunity of telling a plain unvarnished tale of what he had witnessed, and any information in his possession he should at any time be most happy to communicate to those to whom it might be useful.

Mr. JAMES MACGREGOR said that every vote which the Government had proposed for the carrying on of the war had passed unquestioned.

Motion *agreed to*.

The House adjourned at half after Six o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Friday, February 9, 1855.

Their Lordships met, and having transacted the business on the Paper,

House adjourned to Monday next.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Friday, February 9, 1855.

Minutes.] New Writ.—For Windsor, *v.* Lord Charles Wellesley, Steward of Hempholme.

Public Bill.—1° Schools (Scotland).

DEPORTATION OF IRISH PAUPERS—QUESTION.

Colonel DUNNE: Sir, seeing the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Poor Law Board in his place, I beg to ask whether it is the intention of the Government to introduce a Bill to put a stop to the revolting cruelties practised in the deportation of paupers long resident in England to Ireland?

Mr. BAINES: Sir, with reference to the question put by the hon. and gallant Gentleman, I beg to remind him that, towards the latter part of last Session, a Select Committee was appointed for the purpose of investigating the whole subject of the operation of the present law of removal of Irish paupers from England and Scotland. In consequence of the lateness of the period at which that Committee was appointed, the number of the points raised before the Committee, and the very conflicting nature of the evidence given before it, the Committee resolved unanimously, at the close of the Session, simply to report the evidence they had taken, and to accompany it by a recommendation to the House to resume the inquiry as early as possible in the present Session. I beg to state, therefore, to the hon. and gallant Gentleman, that it is my intention, within a fortnight from this time, to move the reappointment of that Committee, so that they may proceed to complete their inquiry as soon as possible. The hon. and gallant Gentleman will see, however, that until that inquiry has been completed it would be quite impossible for the Government to pledge itself to any particular measure relating to the removal of paupers.

Colonel DUNNE: I beg to give notice that if the Government do not act immediately, and without waiting for an inquiry, I will myself bring in a Bill to effect the object in view.

SIR CHARLES NAPIER AND THE ADMIRALTY—QUESTION.

Mr. CRAUFURD said, he regretted the necessity under which he felt himself placed in putting a question to the Senior Naval Lord of the Admiralty, whom he then saw present. The question was one of extreme importance, and related to the statements which had recently been made at a public dinner by the late Commander in Chief of the Baltic fleet. He wished, therefore, to inquire whether it was true that the Board of Admiralty had censured or dismissed Sir Charles Napier? what instructions were given to that gallant admiral respecting the performance of his duties in the Baltic? and whether such instructions had fettered him in any way in carrying out his operations there?

Admiral BERKELEY: Sir, no one can regret more than I myself do the necessity the hon. and learned Gentleman feels in putting this question. No one can regret more than I myself do that my old and gallant Friend, Sir Charles Napier, should have been so highly indiscreet as to have made the speech which he has been reported to have made at the late dinner at the Mansion House. Having expressed these regrets, it is my duty to inform the House, in reply to the question of the hon. and learned Member for Ayr, that Sir Charles Napier has not been censured by the Admiralty; that Sir Charles Napier has not been dismissed from his command; that Sir Charles Napier was not goaded into improperly attacking any one fortification in the Baltic; that Sir Charles Napier was not restricted in any way from attacking those fortresses, if he had so thought proper; and that Sir Charles Napier was informed by the Admiralty that the country expected everything that such a fleet could perform to be carried out and executed against the enemy. I regret extremely that Sir Charles Napier is setting so bad an example to those officers whom he would command. I regret extremely that it is my duty to state, as the Senior Naval Officer of the Admiralty, how highly we must disapprove of such conduct in any officer in Her Majesty's service. While Sir Charles Napier is complaining of the want of confidence in the Board of Admiralty, Sir Charles Napier should reflect whether, by such conduct—whether, by the conduct he is pursuing towards his superiors—he is showing an example which is fitting for those who are under him to follow—whether he is able, by such conduct, to secure the confidence of those officers who are under him, if such confidence they have in him; and whether such conduct is becoming in an officer who assumes to command a fleet in conjunction with our allies the French.

CLOTHING FOR THE ARMY— QUESTION.

On the bringing up of the Report of the Committee of Supply,

MR. W. WILLIAMS said, he put a question to the right hon. Gentleman the Exchequer yesterday which he was afraid the right hon. Gentleman misunderstood. He asked him whether the sum which the House had just voted for warm clothing and other comforts for the army in the Crimea had already been expended, and whether the money was required for the payment of articles already furnished to the troops. He understood the right hon. Gentleman to state, in reply, that the amount just voted was for the purpose of supplying the army with the articles mentioned; but in that he must surely have misapprehended the statement of the right hon. Gentleman, because the troops would not require winter clothing to the amount of 1,000,000*l.* in the summer, which was so near at hand, and it could hardly be said that the articles were wanted for the next winter. He therefore begged to ask the same question again, with the view of clearly understanding whether he was mistaken or not.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, he was very sorry there was any misunderstanding between the hon. Gentleman and himself respecting the question he had put yesterday. What he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) intended to state was, that all the payments that had been made by the Ordnance Department up to the present moment had been made out of grants which had already received the sanction of Parliament. That, he believed, was strictly and literally true. He now understood the hon. Gentleman to ask him whether any obligations had been contracted by the Ordnance Department, to the fulfilment of which the vote granted yesterday would be applicable. He had no doubt that the necessities of the service had compelled the Ordnance Department, upon their own responsibility, subject to the sanction of the Treasury, to contract obligations to which the Vote of yesterday would be applicable.

MR. W. WILLIAMS said, the explanation of the right hon. Gentleman was perfectly satisfactory.

Resolution *agreed to.*

SUPPLEMENTAL CIVIL SERVICES ESTIMATE.

Order for Committee read.

MR. WILSON said, he intended to have proposed that the House should go into Committee of Supply to-day on a Supplemental Estimate for the Civil Services. The Estimate was laid on the table yesterday at an early hour, and it ought to have been printed and in the hands of hon. Members within a short time afterwards; but he was sorry to say that, in consequence of some mistake on the part of the printer, it had not yet come down to the House. He was not disposed, unless the House should wish it, to proceed with the Votes in the absence of the printed documents; but he might just state what the different items were. The first was a sum of 120,400*l.*, 70,000*l.* for an excess of stationery supplied to the army in the East; the second was a sum of 56,000*l.* for the printing of patents, which, however, was not an expense to the country, the money being paid into the Consolidated Fund in the shape of stamps; and the third was a sum of 8,000*l.* for the extraordinary expenses of Ambassadors at Foreign Courts, incurred in consequence of the large number of messengers employed during the last six months.

Sir HENRY WILLOUGHBY said, that, unless there was an absolute necessity for going into Committee of Supply to-day, he hoped the House would defer it till after the adjournment. It appeared to him that 120,000*l.* was a very large sum for an excess of stationery. Besides, only one stage could be taken to-day, and he did not think any inconvenience could result from delay.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, his hon. Friend the Secretary of the Treasury had put himself at the disposal of the House with reference to this matter. The casual error of the printer, of course, gave any hon. Gentleman a right to object to going into Committee of Supply at that time, and he should not think of forcing such a measure by the vote of a majority. It was true that only a single stage could be taken that day, but it was material that that preliminary stage should be taken. The hon. Baronet (Sir H. Willoughby) would remember that two days ago a Vote was taken for the Ordnance Department. Upon that Vote, and the Vote taken yesterday for the Navy, a Ways and Means Bill would be founded. Now, the great object in taking the proposed Vote for the Civil Service that day was, that it would enable his hon. Friend the Secretary of the Treasury to include the whole three Votes in the same Ways and Means Bill; and he might remind the hon. Baronet that he would have, in Committee on the Ways and Means Bill, precisely the same opportunity of discussing the details of the Votes as he would have in Committee of Supply.

Mr. W. WILLIAMS said, he thought that to propose going into Committee of Supply now was a deviation from the ordinary practice of the House; but in the present state of affairs they should not adhere too strictly to forms. They must, however, on this occasion trust the Government, hoping they would apply the public money beneficially and economically, as far as circumstances would permit, for the public service.

Mr. A. STAFFORD said, he did not oppose the House going into Committee of Supply, but he could not help noticing that when hon. Members on his side of the House called attention to matters of urgency connected with the state of the army in the Crimea they were immediately met by objections grounded on the forms of the House; while, on the other hand, whenever those forms stood in their own way, the Government had no scruple in asking the House to waive them. As to the item of 70,000*l.* for stationery for the army, it might appear a large sum, but he thought that, instead of being too large, it was, perhaps, not large enough, because, when he was in the East, he was informed that there was a difficulty in the way of the soldiers sending home remittances of their pay to their friends from the want of sufficient paper for the purpose.

House in Committee of Supply.

Resolved—

1. "That a sum, not exceeding 176,400*l.*, be granted to Her Majesty to defray the estimated excess of expenditure for Printing and Stationery of Public Departments beyond the grant for the year ending on the 31st day of March 1855."

Resolved—

2. "That a sum, not exceeding 8,000*l.*, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the estimated excess of extraordinary expenses of Ministers at Foreign Courts, beyond the grant for the year ending on the 31st day of March 1855."

Resolutions to be reported on *Friday* next.

House resumed.

WAYS AND MEANS.

Order for Committee read.

House in Committee of Ways and Means,

Mr. WILSON said, he would now beg to move the following Resolution—

"That towards making good the Supply granted to Her Majesty for the deficiency in the Grants for the Service of the year ending the 31st day of March, 1855, the sum of 2,000,000*l.* be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland."

Resolution *agreed to.*

House resumed.

THE ARMY IN THE CRIMEA.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Sir, there stands upon the notice paper for to-day a question put yesterday by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Richmond (Mr. Rich) with respect to a statement made by me in a speech in this House, and although the hon. Gentleman is not now in his place, it may perhaps be convenient that I should give an answer to that question. The question is, whether I have any objection to lay on the table of the House a copy of the official papers on which I founded my statement that, exclusive of sick at Balaklava and elsewhere, there was an effective British force of 28,200 men, independently of 3,000 or 4,000 marines and marine brigade. Now, my answer is to this effect. There is a great deal of objection, founded upon general principles, applicable to times of peace as well as times of war, to producing statements declaring the number and distribution of military forces. It has never been the practice of this House to call for such statements even in times of peace, and I need hardly say that, under present circumstances, great inconvenience would arise from the adoption of such a practice. I therefore hope that there will be no disposition in this House to press the Government to produce statements of this character, and thus set an injurious precedent. It is not a thing which should be encouraged; but if the hon. Member for Richmond or any other hon. Gentleman desires access to that information in order to satisfy his own mind as to the correctness of the statement made by me, that access will be most freely given to him by the Government.

COLONEL DUNNE thought it would be most dangerous to expose the positions and numbers of our forces to the enemy; but the fault lay with the Government itself, in mentioning the number of effective troops before Sebastopol.

The House adjourned at One o'clock till Friday next.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Monday, February 12, 1854.

Their Lordships met, and, having gone through the business on the Paper,

House adjourned till Friday next.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Friday, February 16, 1855.

MINUTES.] PUBLIC BILLS.—1ª Army Service Act Amendment.
2ª Purchasers Protection against Judgments.
3ª Fisheries (North America).

ARMY REFORM—ARMY SERVICE ACT AMENDMENT BILL.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH rose to call the attention of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the War Department to what took place in their Lordships' House two or three weeks ago—when the noble Lord himself was not present—when a pledge was given on the part of the Government that a clasp should be given to the troops who fought at Balaklava, and also that the Secretary at War should communicate with the First Lord of the Admiralty, with the view of ascertaining what had been done, or was intended to be done, by them for granting medals especially to the seamen who were engaged in the batteries of Sebastopol. As he could not say that he saw much difference between the present and the late Government in other respects, he trusted he should not be driven to the conclusion that there was this difference between them, that in a matter so intimately connected with the feelings and interests of the army the present Government would neglect to do what the late Government had promised. A promise was also given on the same occasion which would, perhaps, take rather more time and consideration to perform; and all that was necessary for him then to do, was to call to the noble Lord's recollection the fact that such a promise had been made. The promise to which he alluded was, that an Order of Merit should be instituted upon the model or principle of that of Maria Theresa and of the St. George of Russia, to include the common soldier as well as the officers of the army who had distinguished themselves in the field. He was quite aware that a good deal of consideration must be given in framing the rules and regulations for the government of such an order; but he trusted that no delay would take place in establishing the order, because, as a question of time, the matter pressed, inasmuch as our troops were at this moment engaged fighting side by side with the French troops; and whilst the French troops had the very next day after the actions in which they had borne a part received from their commander General Canrobert, the military decorations which rewarded them for their valour, our troops would be left entirely without any reward until the new order should be established. Just before the noble Duke the predecessor of the noble Lord quitted the War Office, an alteration was made that appeared to be one of very great value and importance; and he (the Earl of Ellenborough) mentioned the matter now, because he thought the noble Duke ought to have credit for the advantage which would be derived by the army from that alteration. The noble Duke had separated the provision of animals of the army from the Commissariat, and placed it under a new department, to be called the "Land Transport of the Army Service." Some little time ago, on the Motion of one of their Lordships, a paper written by Sir Charles Trevelyan had been laid on the table, explaining the details of the Commissariat as then transferred to the Secretary for War. Perhaps the noble Lord would not object to lay upon the table the warrant or memorandum by virtue of which this new department had been constituted. He would not then move for it, because he was not aware of the proper designation to give to it. Their Lordships and the public had often observed that promotions had been granted for "distinguished services." He would venture to suggest to the noble Baron the War Secretary, that in future in all cases where promotions or honours were granted specifically for distinguished services, the nature of those services should be specified. He urged this the more strongly because some very painful doubts had arisen as to the correctness of the judgment with which some of those promotions, nominally for distinguished services, had been given. Indeed, in more than one instance, questions had been raised whether an officer who had received promotion "for distinguished services" had actually been under fire in the action for which promotion was given. Of course it was impossible for him to say how far this representation was or was not correct. He knew very well, that, let the honesty of a Minister be what it might, or let his exertions be what they might, to discover merit and reward it, his award would not in all cases be ratified by the public opinion of an army; at the same time, no doubt every exertion should be made in order that the promotions and honours granted by the Government should be entirely in conformity with the feeling of the army itself; and with a view to carrying these promotions and honours somewhat further, and enabling the Government to award them with greater satisfaction to the troops, he would suggest that the Government should do that which was done by all foreign Governments in a state of war, and which had recently been done, not only by the Emperor of Russia, but by the Emperor of the French—namely, that the noble Lord at the head of the War Department should depute an officer to inspect the army, to see, return and report; and this not only once, but from time to time, so that they might ascertain what was the real state of things in the country in which the army was engaged. If this plan was adopted, it appeared to him that it would be productive not merely of general but of particular advantage in the matter of promotions. Their Lordships could not be ignorant that a very unpleasant feeling had been created with respect to the promotions being granted almost indiscriminately to the staff, rather than to officers of the regiments of the line. He believed there was no doubt that, generally speaking, the officers of the staff were less exposed to personal danger, certainly much less exposed to personal privation and discomfort, than the officers of the line. On the other hand, their services might, perhaps, be of a superior and somewhat more intellectual description; but there were services performed by the officers of the line which were essential to the very existence of the army; and it was, therefore of the highest importance that Government should possess a knowledge of the manner in which those services were performed. There was another point on which he would trouble their Lordships for a moment. Their Lordships could not have failed to observe, that whilst the army was subject to sickness, the sick among the officers bore a great disproportion to the sick among the privates; and with regard to death it might be said to be the same. When the army was engaged in fighting, no doubt the deaths and wounded among the officers were greatly out of proportion. Whether it was owing to their dress, or their being more forward in the fight, he could not say; but, at all events, the killed and wounded among them were greatly more in proportion than among the privates. But very different indeed had it been under the circumstances which had of late prevailed in the Crimea. There could be no doubt that the sickness and deaths among the troops had infinitely exceeded the proportion which they ought to have borne, according to numerical proportion, to the sickness and deaths among the officers; and although some obvious reasons might be assigned for this difference, no reason with which he was acquainted seemed properly to account for the extraordinary difference that had appeared. Upon sending out such an officer as he had suggested to inspect and report, this circumstance should be one of the first objects of his inquiry. But there was not only this discrepancy between the officers and men, there was also as extraordinary a discrepancy between regiments placed apparently in circumstances that were precisely the same. That, he thought, was a subject of the gravest importance, and it seemed to him quite impossible that regiments could be reduced to the situation in which one or two were at this moment represented to be—that was practically extinguished, the privates all gone, the non-commissioned officers all gone, but the commissioned officers apparently still remaining—without the greatest want of management or much failure of duty on the part of the officers in command. That, again, was an important subject for inquiry by the officer to whom he had alluded. Further, not only should one regiment be compared with another regiment in similar circumstances, but one company should be compared with another in each regiment; and should it appear that in one company there had not been the same amount of sickness that had prevailed in another which was placed in exactly similar circumstances, then he should say that the captain of that company was a man who had recommended himself in the strongest manner for promotion, and that that promotion he ought to have. On the other hand, if it should appear that, through the neglect of the officers a regiment, like the 63rd, had been totally destroyed, whilst the officers had been saved, though there were no peculiar circumstances which should have saved them and destroyed the regiment—if on inquiry this should turn out to be the case, it was incumbent on the Government to mark, in the strongest manner possible, their disapprobation of the conduct of the officers of that or any other regiment similarly circumstanced. Having offered these suggestions to the noble Baron at the head of the War Department, there was one other point upon which he was sure the noble Baron would not be unwilling that he should say a few words. He perceived that the noble Baron had appointed to the command of a division of the army in the Crimea General Simpson, and he (the Earl of Ellenborough) thought it right to state what he knew of that officer. In the beginning of the year 1843 the late Sir Charles Napier commanded in Scinde. He (the Earl of Ellenborough) had great apprehensions, in consequence of the accidental illness of Sir Charles—a stroke of the sun—that the army might be suddenly deprived of his services; and he was in great fear lest through the system of seniority prevailing in the army, the command of that army, at a most critical period might fall into hands that were totally unequal to it. It became his duty, therefore, to look through all the various regiments, and all the departments in India, to select the person he thought the fittest to be sent at once to Scinde, as the person upon whom the command might devolve in the event of such a calamity occurring. The officer he selected from all India was General Simpson; and Sir Charles Napier afterwards told him that he thought a better man could not have been chosen; that he was a perfectly safe officer, that he knew he would on all occasions do exactly that which he ought to do, and that he might be entirely depended upon. This much he (the Earl of Ellenborough) thought it right to state in justice to the gallant officer. Undoubtedly twelve years had elapsed since that, and twelve years were a considerable period in a man's life. But presuming that the noble Baron had had a personal interview with the gallant General, and that the result of that interview was satisfactory, he did not think that the noble Baron could have made a better selection, supposing it to be determined that the command of the army should remain in the hands of persons of that age. If a different system were adopted, his appointment would, of course, have been out of the question. As it was, when he first saw who were the officers originally appointed to the various divisions of the British army in the Crimea, it was a matter of surprise and regret to him not to see the name of General Simpson among them.

Lord PANMURE: My Lords, in replying to the observations of the noble Earl who has just sat down, I must take leave in the first instance to point out to your Lordships the great inconvenience of the course which the noble Earl has taken, inasmuch as he has questioned me on several points with regard to which I had no notice given me beforehand, so that I might be able to give more satisfactory answers than I can possibly give off-hand. I only notice the course which my noble Friend has taken for the purpose of saying that on all occasions when information is required by your Lordships with reference to any matter connected with the important department over which I preside, it will be for the advantage of your Lordships and of myself that notice should be given of these inquiries, in order to their being answered more completely and correctly than otherwise could be done.

Now, with reference to the different subjects on which the noble Earl has touched, I quite concur with him in the general views he has taken as to the distribution of honours and rewards for gallantry in the field or good conduct in the army—that the sooner these honours are conferred, the more weight they carry with them in the estimation of those on whom they are bestowed. And, in so concurring with my noble Friend, I can assure him that no time shall be lost in redeeming the promise made by my noble Friend (the Duke of Newcastle), as the representative of the Government of which he was a Member, and with reference especially to the new class of honours in the army to which the noble Earl has referred. It is quite true that much consideration is required to be given to the manner in which such honours ought to be conferred, and that we may derive advantage from considering the mode in which they are conferred in foreign countries into whose armies they have been introduced; but I can assure him that in that direction also no time shall be lost in enabling us to reward immediately, and on the scene of action, the gallant deeds of our army.

The next point to which the noble Earl has alluded is with respect to a measure as to which I am ready to give the full credit to the noble Duke who preceded me in the office I now fill; and I trust, my Lords, that in no act of that noble Duke, whether in a matter merely shadowed forth by him for future consideration, or already adopted, and conducive to the well-being of that army whose comfort he has had so much at heart, I shall be found for a moment to hesitate in giving him full credit for the good he has effected. It is my anxious desire, if possible, to do away with the impression which I am afraid may exist in the public mind, that my predecessor had neglected, or rather, had not carried out to the fullest extent, the interests of the army committed to his charge. My noble friend did his utmost to conduct the affairs of his army efficiently; but, from various reasons, one of which was that we were hurried into a war at a time when our army was only upon a peace establishment, neither the noble Duke nor any other individual, not even the noble Earl himself, could have administered the affairs of the army with much more success than he has done. There is much more yet to be done, no doubt; but in what the noble Duke has done, he has already laid the ground-work for further proceedings—I am not disposed to detract from the merit of what is undoubtedly a great improvement in the army—I mean the establishment of the Land Transport Corps, which will supply the place of the waggon attached to the Duke of Wellington's army. That corps owes its existence solely and entirely to the exertions of the noble Duke. On Monday last the officer in command of the Land Transport Corps embarked for the scene of operations in the Crimea, and as quickly as possible his officers and men will rally round him. He will have charge, distinctly and separately from the Commissariat or any other department, of the whole and entire land transport service in connection with Lord Raglan's army, and he will be responsible for finding ambulances for the sick and wounded, and for the conveyance of provisions and stores.

The next subject to which the noble Earl adverted was the step, which has been adopted by the Emperor of the French, of sending to the army an officer to see with his own eyes, to inquire into the whole position of the army, and, having made a full and complete survey, to report the results of his inquiry. It is my duty to inform the House that the Cabinet have already determined to follow that course. They have determined to send out an officer who shall report to them the whole state of the army, and its condition, physical and moral, who shall communicate with Lord Raglan, and be able to inform the Government with respect to his views, not only with respect to the army, but with respect to all matters concerning operations in the Crimea. For this appointment will be required an officer of some standing, in whom the greatest confidence can be reposed, and an officer between whom and the Commander in Chief of the army no jealousy can exist. We hope at an early period to secure the services of such an officer, and I trust that when the appointment shall be made the Government will be put at an early period in possession of his report, and will be enabled to act with reference to the army with more effect and success than hitherto.

I now come to the subject of promotions, which is a very difficult and delicate subject for those to deal with who are at home, and who are not, therefore, perfectly aware of the services that have been performed. I believe that the promotions that have taken place have been for "distinguished services in the field," and not merely, as the noble Earl said, for "distinguished services." When Lord Raglan, or the commander of any army, recommends an officer for promotion for "distinguished services in the field," I do not see how the Government at home could go into further details with respect to the services of that officer. It must be assumed that the services which have been rendered are such as to warrant the Commander in Chief in recommending the officer for promotion; and whether the services rendered may have been in storming a battery, in heading the troops in a gallant charge, or in performing gallant deeds of any other description, they are services rendered in the field, are good and gallant services, and are grounds for promotion. I think it would be difficult and somewhat dangerous to interfere with the discretion of the Commander in Chief in describing such services, and we at home, 3,000 miles from the scene of action, can know nothing of what the services are. With reference to rewards having been distributed in much disproportion to the staff and regimental officers, I am inclined to believe, with the noble Earl, that there have been on some occasions discrepancies in the allotment of rewards. It is my determination, my Lords, to look into this matter, and particularly with regard to the rewards given to regimental officers; for I have always been struck, in the numerous recommendations which have been made on great occasions, by the omission of the names of regimental officers of the lower rank where their services were in my opinion almost equal to any performed in the field.

In reference to what the noble Earl has stated, and to the comparison which he has made between the sufferings of the officers in the army and the sufferings of the men, I must say I am afraid that such comparisons will not tend to benefit that army. I am quite certain the noble Earl does not mean to insinuate that the officers in the army have refused in any way to share the privations of the men. I believe, my Lords, that there never was an army which had a more devoted band of officers than that at present in the Crimea; and whatever hardships have been undergone, whether in the field or in the trenches, or in whatever duty they may have been called upon to perform, they have cheerfully shared with the men in all the privations to which they have been subjected, and in all the difficult and onerous duties which they have been required to perform. I cannot certainly, my Lords, account for the disproportion with regard to the sick in the number of officers and men. That is one of those questions which cannot be answered now, and which must be subject of investigation; and, in regard to the sickness which has occurred in the 63rd Regiment, it is a case which has attracted much attention, and is one to which further attention will be very particularly directed. I cannot conceive what could have been the reason for the sickness and mortality which has taken place in that regiment, except it was that, being very young men, they had been suddenly called upon to perform very severe duties, from the more laborious part of which the officers would necessarily be, to a very great extent, relieved. The subject is one, however, which has engaged my attention, and I have already directed Lord Raglan that, under any circumstances whatever, whenever a regiment is so reduced by casualties as to induce him to send that regiment away, he is at once to send it home to this country, and not to depôts in the Mediterranean, where its presence might dispirit others, and give a false and exaggerated impression of the hardships which have been endured. My Lords, the only other point to which I have to refer is that to which the noble Earl also alluded—namely, the care which an officer takes of his regiment, or which a captain takes of his company. I entirely agree that an officer is as much, or perhaps even more, entitled to credit and reward for taking due care of his regiment or company as he is for leading that regiment or company on to gallant services in the field. I think that inasmuch as the commanding officer is rewarded for the distinguished services of his regiment in the field, so should the colonel of a regiment who exhibited a disposition and capacity for taking care of the men under his charge be entitled to the notice of his superiors, and also to a reward for the services which he may thus have rendered. An analogy is drawn by some persons between the commander of a regiment and the commander of a ship. If a ship meets with the smallest accident, the commanding officer is made responsible and is called to account. So, if a regiment happens to get into bad order, either through sickness or from any other cause, my apprehension is that the commanding officer should be called to account for the state his regiment is in; and, if that regiment is in a superior state to others placed in a similar position and under similar circumstances, I think the conduct of that commanding officer should be noticed for commendation.

Another point to which the noble Earl alluded was the appointment of General Simpson for service in the East, and to whose claims and character he has done no more than justice. The noble Earl seems to share in the report which has been circulated that General Simpson has been sent to the army for the purpose of taking the command of one of the vacant divisions. My Lords, that is not the object for which his services have been required. It has struck me forcibly, in looking over all I have heard and learnt as to the state of the army, that the general staff of the army requires to be inspected from its head down to its lowest member; and, likewise, that there ought to be an officer in our army in the situation of chief of the staff, who shall communicate and convey to the heads of the departments the orders of the general—whose duty it shall be not only to convey to the heads of departments the orders of the general, but who, having given those orders, shall see that they are strictly, implicitly, and immediately carried out. He will be an officer corresponding to one that exists in the French army. I believe that post was instituted by the Emperor Napoleon, who was compelled to institute it from being utterly unable to convey from his own mouth to the different heads of the departments in his army the orders which he thought requisite. General Simpson, therefore, will be chief of the staff. It will be his duty to take Lord Raglan's orders, and to convey them to the Quarter Master General and the Adjutant General; and it will be his duty, as I said before, to see that these orders are strictly and implicitly obeyed. It will be his duty also to inspect and to review each of those staff departments throughout all their ramifications, to report to Lord Raglan his opinion of the fitness or unfitness of the various officers composing those departments for the positions they may fill; and I am quite sure that, from General Simpson's character for uprightness and impartiality, from his knowledge of the duties which a soldier ought to perform, and of the men who are capable of performing those duties, he will speedily make both the Quarter-Master General's and the Adjutant General's departments far more efficient than I am sorry to say they are represented to be at present. I have great confidence in General Simpson's abilities to perform these duties. I have represented to him the hardships he may be called upon to endure in common with other officers of the army; I have represented to him the duties which will be expected from him by the Government; I have questioned him with reference to his physical capacity to perform those duties: and he has assured me that, though age has crept upon him since he was engaged in the service to which the noble Earl has so handsomely referred, he believes himself still capable of rendering good and efficient service to his country—and upon that assurance he has been appointed.

While upon this subject, I beg now to be permitted to proceed to a duty which I intended to have performed had the noble Earl not put these questions to me—namely, to present to your Lordships a Bill (which I shall endeavour to have carried through as speedily as possible) for enabling Her Majesty to alter still further the period of service in the army. Your Lordships are aware that the period of service was limited, by a Bill which I had the honour of introducing in the other House in 1847, to a term of ten years. That Bill has not yet been in operation sufficiently long to enable us to judge of what the effect of that shorter period of enlistment will be; but in the present emergency, with a view to obtain a class of men who will be better capable of enduring the hardships of service than those boys of eighteen who are now in the habit of enlisting, I propose to introduce a Bill which shall enable Her Majesty in Council to declare that she will accept the service of any man who may choose to enlist in the army for any period under ten years; that is to say, we may enlist men for one or for two, or for three years, taking those men at the ages of not under twenty-four and not above thirty-two. That will enable us to obtain a class of men for short terms of service who will be immediately fit to undergo the hardships of a campaign — whose constitution will fit them to undergo immediately the hardships of the field, and who, having served during the period for which they have enlisted will not find themselves tied to a profession in which they may not desire to remain. Your Lordships, I think, will feel that, in bringing forward this Bill, we are taking one more step in the right direction for recruiting our army from the right class of men; for, however well those boys of eighteen turn out, yet two or three years must elapse before they are well drilled, well fed, and properly trained, and, as to sending them within six months after enlistment to represent the valour of this country in the field of war, it is evident that they must at that period be totally unfit to compete with the enemy against whom they are sent. I feel sure we shall be enabled by this Bill to obtain for Her Majesty's service a better class of recruits, whose constitutions will permit them to endure the hardships they may have to undergo.

In introducing this Bill, it was my intention—and I trust your Lordships will allow me to trespass upon your attention for a few moments longer—to state the course I mean to pursue with reference to several subjects which of late have engaged the public attention. Great complaints, my Lords, have been made—with what justice I am not able to say, for I have not yet received the explanations which were required by the Government from the officers charged with neglect, and I should be sorry to condemn any man without a hearing—I say great complaints have been made against the commissariat department of the army in the East. It has been said that it has been lax in obtaining supplies, and lax also in distributing those supplies when obtained; and that it has to a very great extent failed in maintaining the army in the condition which we had reason to expect. Now, my Lords, I have determined to send out a commission to inquire into the whole of this matter. I have obtained for the services of that commission a gentleman whose name I have only to mention to prove to your Lordships that I have endeavoured to find out the best man I could, from his connexion with that country and the former services rendered by him in the East—I mean Sir John M'Neill. That distinguished gentleman has undertaken to leave the employment which he has filled hitherto with so much credit to himself and so much usefulness to his country. He has agreed to leave his charge in Scotland, and, at the head of this commission, to make a searching inquiry into all that has taken place; and with his full knowledge of the sources from which supplies can be afforded in connection with our army in the East, I have not the smallest doubt that he will be of the greatest use to that army, and will render important, as I know he will render useful, services in the East. With reference to the hospitals, we have taken, within these two days, great pains to inform ourselves, as far as possible, upon the exact state of these establishments. We have already taken means to clear the hospital at Scutari, and to put it upon a better and more healthy footing, and I have given directions to remove out of that hospital a depot of the army which was quartered there, together with the women and children attached to it, so that the barracks they occupy may be given over exclusively to the control of the medical department; and, above all, I have put an end to that which struck me as one great source of many of the evils of that hospital—I mean the sale of ardent spirits within its limits. But we have done more. We have established an hospital for convalescents at Smyrna, solely and entirely under the control of civil practitioners. We have also taken means for providing hospital offices at Scutari, containing accommodation for 5,000 men in detached buildings and in huts, which will also be put under the charge of a staff of civil practitioners; for I regret to say that the army medical department is scarcely able to supply the demands made upon it for the service of the army in the East. These, it will be admitted, are great and important improvements, which will be carried out with the least possible delay—for I am aware that there may be a demand made at any moment for hospital accommodation for the wounded and sick which, unless we can provide it with vigour beforehand, may lead to most unhappy results.

My Lords, another great danger has forcibly struck me with regard to the state of the camp. Stationary as that camp has been for many weeks, although the inconveniences arising from a stationary camp may not be perceived at this moment, when everything is locked in the hard and icy embrace of winter, yet the instant that the sun begins to shine and the earth to give out its warmth, fermentation will take place, and the steam of the camp will create plague and pestilence, unless speedy measures be taken to prevent it. Upon Friday last, therefore, in a despatch which I addressed to Lord Raglan, I desired him, as it was perfectly certain that the pioneers of his army could not cope with these difficulties, immediately to take steps, in conjunction with our Ambassador at Constantinople, to form a corps of scavengers, whose duty it would be at once to perform all scavenger work in the camp. In order to give a proper direction and superintendence to these operations, I have determined to avail myself of the services of three gentlemen connected with the sanitary operations of this great city, and to send one of them to the hospital at Scutari, another to Balaklava, and the third to the camp, in order to give such directions and make such suggestions for the sanitary care of the whole camp and hospital as shall save us from the effects of pestilence, should such unfortunately break out. In adopting this course I have taken, I think, one of the most important steps in order to save many lives in prospect.

The only other point to which I shall advert is, that inasmuch as my noble Friend has turned his attention to the land transport of the army, so my right hon. Friend at the head of the Admiralty has directed his attention to the sea transport for the same purpose; and he has thought it right —and I entirely concur with him in the view which he has taken of the matter— to establish a Transport Board, which, during the war, shall be charged with the conveyance of all the army and other stores, and which shall be in immediate communication, in the first instance, with myself, or whoever may be Minister of War, so that no delay need occur, when an expedition is undertaken and stores and supplies are to be sent, in giving full notice of the tonnage required for the purpose of sending out that expedition or forwarding those stores without loss of time to the port to which they are to be sent.

My Lords, it will of course be satisfactory to the House to be made acquainted with everything which is proceeding in relation to this subject, and, so far as a due regard to the interests of the public service will permit it, I shall be happy to afford every information in my power. I may add that, having no longer any occasion for the services of Sir John Burgoyne in the camp—General Harry Jones having now gone out there to take the command of the Engineer department — I have thought it my duty to recall Sir John Burgoyne to the office which he before filled with so much public advantage in this country—that of Inspector General of Fortifications, attached to the Ordnance Department.

With these observations, I have only further to say that there is another great subject which has attracted my attention, and which is only of secondary moment to the condition of the army itself now serving in the East—it is the subject of a reform in the military administration of all the civil departments of the army. My Lords, to that subject the Government are turning their attention; but until I am in a position to say that everything has been done, or is being done, in order to remedy whatever may have gone wrong with the army in the Crimea, to bring into good order the working of the Commissariat, to remove the evils which have existed in the hospitals, and to set the whole thing in such a state as to give me a satisfactory assurance that it will go on in a proper manner for the future, subject to no other casualties than those over which human power has no control—until that is done, I say, I cannot promise to lay before your Lordships any scheme for the administration of the civil branches of the army. I hope, however, that the period is not distant when I shall be enabled to do so; and that I shall succeed in drawing such a distinction as shall meet with public approbation between the two branches of the army, and point out the method by which, under the control of one Minister, all the civil administrations of the army may be easily concentrated and carried out, and by which, under the control of the Commander in Chief, the discipline of the whole may also be properly administered. But, before I consider such a scheme, it is my desire to direct my efforts more particularly to bringing the army under Lord Raglan into a proper condition, so as to hold out the promise of a permanent improvement.

My noble Friend behind me (the Marquess of Lansdowne) has reminded me of one other point which I have undertaken, and which is a very important one. It is, that as soon as we can obtain a sufficiency of transports, it is the intention of the Government to establish a communication every week or ten days direct between Scutari and England, by means of steamers fitted up as hospital ships, which shall bring home from Scutari to England every week or ten days 300 or 400, or perhaps 500, of our wounded or sick, who will be far sooner restored to the service of the army—or, certainly, far sooner restored to health, if not to the service of the army—

in this country, than they can possibly be in the place where they now are; for I have been informed by medical gentlemen and others that such is the state of the atmosphere in those regions that wounds scarcely ever heal properly there, and that, fever supervening upon them, are hardly curable. Under these circumstances, it appeared to us actually necessary that some such means should be taken to save those poor men who had been wounded and struck down—and it appeared to us to be one of the surest, as well, I may add, as one of the most economical courses which could be adopted, with a view to saving the lives of the men, to remove them at once to their homes in this country, so that they may have the benefit of comforts procurable here, and recover much more speedily than they would in hospitals abroad. Thanking the House for the patience with which it has listened to these observations, I now present the Bill, and move that it be read a first time.

A Bill to amend the Act for limiting the Time of Service in the Army, *presented* by the Lord Panmure.

The Earl of SHAFTESBURY said, that the statement which had just been made by his noble Friend, at least afforded some grounds for hope that there was a probability, under God's blessing, of mitigating, if not of averting, the great disasters which appeared to be hanging over our army. He was apprehensive, however, that we had not yet by any means reached the maximum of the danger; for, great as had been the difficulties, the privations, and the mortality under the influence of the cold weather, they were nothing compared with those which would be developed when the sun exhibited some warmth upon that saturated soil where thousands of human beings had been enencamped during the last three or four months. It was very well known—and if their Lordships would refer to that excellent work by Sir John Pringle on the *Diseases of the Army*—that in all great campaigns the fevers which had decimated the troops had broken out, not during the winter months of their encampment, but when spring began to dawn, and the sun to shine with some power. If, then, something were not done to obviate these consequences we might depend upon it that scarcely one man of our gallant army would return to these shores alive. Hundreds upon hundreds were sent daily from the Crimea; and they were dying in the hospitals—not from the effect of wounds, but from dysentery and diarrhœa and similar diseases, which were occasioned by the pestilential atmosphere in which they were placed. It was next to impossible that any one who was wounded and carried into these hospitals should recover—it was almost impossible that any one struck down by a common simple disorder could recover. He had heard it stated, upon the authority of medical men, that if those young men whom we were sending out in such numbers, and who must be subject to some sickness until they were acclimatised, could go to a proper hospital, where every sanitary arrangement was complete, they would in a very short time return fit for active service; but that they might as well be sent to a charnel-house at once as to the hospitals in their present state, for that there was no hope whatever of their recovery. He had only that morning seen a letter from a physician, stating that the hospitals at Balaklava were more filthy than any knacker's yard in the city of London. Of course, more sickness and greater casualties were to be expected, and it was therefore necessary that due preparations should be made to receive those additional cases. If that were done he believed that we might still entertain a hope that the larger part of the army might be saved; but if it were not done, he believed, from all the evidence which he had received—and it was not inconsiderable—that it would be a positive miracle if one-twentieth part of that army which had gone out in such force to fight our battles in the Crimea ever returned to their native shores. He felt assured that the country would feel gratified at the decided interest manifested by the noble Lord by the new arrangements which he had proposed. He could assure him that the commission which was to be sent to the East would be most effective, as being distinct from the medical staff, and not interfering with that body, but having absolute control over the sanitary regulations and full power to carry into effect such arrangements as might appear most desirable. He believed that from the very hour that commission was appointed there would be a visible and permanent improvement in the welfare of the army.

The Earl of HARROWBY said, that there was one point to which the noble Lord had not referred, and which was of great importance, and that was the state of the harbour of Balaklava. It was most essential that effective arrangements should be made for the distribution of stores when they arrived at Balaklava. It appeared that Admiral Boxer had been appointed to the superintendence of that harbour; and, however invidious it might be to mention names, still he was sorry to say that that appointment had not been viewed with satisfaction by the public. The name of that officer had been associated with all that had proved deficient in the communication between the two sides of the Bosphorus, and the alleged want of sympathy he had displayed did not lead to the belief that his appointment was one which was calculated to give any assurance to the public that those errors which had been committed would not be committed again. He wished to ask the noble Lord the Minister for War, if, among the other improvements to which he had referred, he was prepared to announce, on the part of the Admiralty, that that great key to all the calamity of the army had received the attention of the Government.

Lord PANMURE could answer the question of the noble Earl in a very few words. Admiral Boxer had been appointed to the immediate control of the harbour of Balaklava, but instructions had been given to Lord Raglan, and more especially to Admiral Lyons, to take every possible step to bring the confusion existing in that harbour into something like proper order. He could only add, that several officers attached to the Customs, who had been in the habit of superintending landing in the docks and the landing of stores, had been sent out to assist in putting things in a proper condition.

The Earl of HARROWBY thought that one of the greatest faults which had been committed was that months ago persons accustomed to deal with such matters as the shipment and landing of goods had not been consulted. He was convinced that such gentlemen as Messrs. Peto and Brassey could have pointed out means of landing stores which, if they had been resorted to six months ago, would have secured the army from the sufferings it had undergone. The Government in time of peace had no opportunity of becoming acquainted with such matters, and it was to their interest, when the necessity arose, to have recourse to the commercial energy of the country.

The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH wished to know if Sir John M'Neill would have full authority to remove any obstructions

and redress any grievances he might discover, or only to report as to their existence. It appeared to him that one great source of error and delay was to be found in the system of accounts, with its various checks and precautions. However excellently these might work in time of peace, it was vain to expect that they could be efficient in time of war, when certainty and despatch in the execution of orders were the great requisites.

Lord PANMURE said, that the Commissioners sent out would not have power either of dismissing or appointing persons; they would be called upon to make reports, both to the Government and the Commander in Chief, as to any change which might seem necessary. It would then be in the power of the Commander in Chief to make such changes on his own responsibility before the report reached the home Government; but whether the Commander in Chief did or did not make those changes, the reports would reach the home Government, and it would then be their duty to consider them, and to take such steps as might appear necessary.

Bill read 1ª.

THE VOTE OF THANKS—THE FLEET IN THE BLACK SEA.

The LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House that he had received the following letter from Rear Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, Bart., G.C.B., in return to the Thanks of this House communicated to him in obedience to an Order of this House of the 15th of December last—

"*Agamemnon*, off Sevastopol.
30th January, 1855.

"My Lord,

"Having succeeded Vice Admiral Dundas in the Command of this Station, the Honour has devolved upon me of communicating to Rear Admiral the Honourable Montagu Stopford, and to the several Captains, Officers, and Seamen of Her Majesty's Fleet in the Black Sea, the unanimous Expression of the Thanks of the House of Lords for their Services during the present War, and the high Sense which it entertains of the Value of their Services:

"These Expressions of the Thanks and Approbation of the House of Lords are deeply felt throughout the Fleet, and encourage us all to make increased Exertions for the Honour and Glory of our Queen and Country:

"By the Terms in which your Lordship has been pleased to communicate these Resolutions we all feel highly honoured and gratified:

"I have the Honour to be,
"My Lord,
"With much Respect and Regard,
"Your Lordships most obedient, humble Servant,
"Edmund Lyons,
"Rear Admiral and Commander in Chief."

The said Letter being read was Ordered to lie on the Table; and to be entered on the Journals.

LORD CAMPBELL said, that their Lordships must have observed that the Thanks voted by their Lordships to Members of their Lordships' House, who had distinguished themselves, had not been communicated in person by the noble and learned Lord on the woolsack to the illustrious individuals to whom the Thanks were voted. He knew that the noble and learned Lord had followed precedents, and that, if precedents had allowed it, he would have done so. As, however, some blame had been attached to the noble Lord for not having done so, and as he knew it was undeserved, he was glad to give the noble and learned Lord an opportunity of explaining why the course followed in the other House had not been adopted here.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR said, he was obliged to his noble and learned Friend for giving him an opportunity of explaining what had been done. When the noble and gallant Earl (the Earl of Cardigan), whom he was glad to see again in his place, returned to this country, it occurred to him that the same course which had been taken by the other House of Parliament ought to be taken by their Lordships, and he had immediately inquired into what had been done on other occasions. He had referred to what had taken place from the commencement of the last century, and he found that a Vote of Thanks agreed to by their Lordships had never been personally delivered to a Member of their Lordships' House, unless he had been Commander in Chief, and then only upon a special vote of their Lordships, directing it to be done. When the House of Commons voted Thanks to officers, the resolution usually went on to say that it should be communicated by letter to all to whom the Thanks were given, except such as were Members of that House, and that to them the Speaker should communicate them in person. Such had not been the custom in their Lordships' House; and, independently of any other objections, he (the Lord Chancellor) had no authority from their Lordships to communicate their Thanks without special directions. It was not for him to say whether their Lordships ought to diverge from the ordinary custom, but he had had the matter looked into, and was happy to be able, in the presence of the noble Earl, to show that no blame was attributable to him (the Lord Chancellor) that the course adopted in the other House had not been pursued in their Lordships' House.

LORD BROUGHAM wished to add that there could be not the slightest objection to depart from the ordinary practice beyond the obvious and powerful reason that it would tend to throw discredit on all former Members of that House who had received the Thanks of the House otherwise than personally.

LORD CAMPBELL could not see the force of the observation of his noble and learned Friend who spoke last. He thought it would be much better to change the course which they had hitherto pursued and adopt that taken by the other House. He could not see how it would reflect in the slightest degree on those Members who had received the Thanks of the House when a different system prevailed.

House adjourned to Monday next.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Friday, Februry 16, 1855.

MINUTES.] NEW MEMBERS SWORN.—For Tiverton, Viscount Palmerston; for Wilts (Southern Division), Right Hon. Sidney Herbert; for New Windsor, Samson Ricardo, Esq.

NEW WRIT.—For Cardigan Borough, *v.* Pryse Loveden, Esq., deceased.

PUBLIC BILLS.— 1° London Necropolis and National Mausoleum; Consolidated Fund (£2,000,000).

2° Friendly Societies.

THE VOTE OF THANKS—THE FLEET IN THE BLACK SEA.

MR. SPEAKER acquainted the House, that he had received a Letter from Rear Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, in answer to a Letter communicating the Thanks of the House of the 15th and 18th December last, relative to the operations of the Fleet in the Black Sea:—Letter read, as followeth—

"*Agamemnon*, off Sevastopol,
30th January, 1855.

"Sir,—Having succeeded Vice Admiral Dundas in the Command of this Station, the honour has devolved upon me of communicating to Rear Admiral the Honourable Montagu Stopford, and to the several Captains, Officers, Seamen, and Marines in Her Majesty's Fleet in the Black Sea, the unanimous expression of the thanks and approbation of the House of Commons for the services rendered by them during the present War, and of communicating to them also the unanimous acknowledgments of the distinguished valour and conduct of those who have perished in the struggle, and the deep sympathy felt for their relatives and friends.

"All are deeply impressed with the honour conferred upon them. All are encouraged in the performance of their duty to their Queen and country, and the Seamen and Marines more so, I believe, than on any former occasion, for the blessing of education enables them to appreciate, better than their predecessors, the thanks and approbation of Parliament.

"I have the honour to be,
"Sir,
"With the highest respect and regard,
"Your most obedient, humble Servant,
"E. Lyons,
"Rear Admiral and Commander in Chief.
"To the Right Hon. Charles Shaw Lefevre,
"Speaker of the House of Commons."

Mr. SPEAKER also acquainted the House, that he had received a Letter from Vice Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, transmitting a Letter from Vice Admiral Bruat, in answer to the Thanks of the House of the 15th day of December last:—Letter read, as followeth—

"*Agamemnon*, off Sevastopol,
"30th January, 1855.

"Sir,—I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a Letter which I have received from Vice Admiral Bruat, who has succeeded Admiral Hamelin in the command of the French Fleet, showing how highly the French Navy feel honoured and gratified by the Thanks of Parliament.

"I have the honour to be,
"Sir,
"With much respect and regard,
"Your most obedient, humble Servant,
"E. Lyons,
"Rear Admiral and Commander in Chief.
"To the Right Honourable Charles Shaw Lefevre,
"Speaker of the House of Commons.

"V$^{\text{au}}$ le *Montebello*, le 21 Janvier 1855.

"Monsieur l'Amiral,—Je transmets aujourd'hui même aux équipages de l'Escadre de la Méditerranée les remercîments publics qui leur ont été votés par les deux chambres du parlement d'Angleterre. C'est un honneur insigne et rare qui leur est décerné. Je l'accepte pour eux et pour le digne chef qui les commandait au début de cette grande expédition, comme une précieuse récompense de leurs services, comme le gage d'une alliance plus intime encore, et comme l'heureux augure de nouveaux succès.

"Veuillez agréer, Monsieur l'Amiral, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

"Le Vice Amiral, Commandant en Chef
l'Escadre de la Méditerranée,
"Bruat.
"To Rear Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, Bart.,
"G.C.B., Commander in Chief, &c. &c. &c."

THE BRIBERY ACT—QUESTION.

Colonel SIBTHORP said, that he wished to ask the law officers of the Crown, whether, in consequence of the Act passed 10th August, 1854, c. 102, *anno decimo septimo et octavo Victoriæ Reginæ*, entitled "An Act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to bribery, treating, and undue influence at elections of Members of Parliament," there is any prohibition to a candidate, who has hitherto exercised what he did consider a duty, by giving certain assistance or relief to persons resident in or near the city or borough which he represents, by the distribution of coals and other articles of relief and assistance, though among those individuals so assisted and relieved there are and may be some persons, more or less in number, who have voted for, and may possibly continue to vote for, such candidate or representative; and whether there is any danger that such course of proceeding may affect the security of his seat in the House of Commons, if returned thereto?

The SOLICITOR GENERAL said, he would endeavour to give the best answer in his power to the question of the hon. and gallant Member. He should be very sorry if there was anything in the Act of Parliament referred to against the exercise of charity, generosity, and kindness; and if the hon. and gallant Gentleman dispensed his bounty indiscriminately to all, without showing any preference to voters or persons who could influence the elections in his borough, and did not time it with reference to his return so as to give it the character of corruption or undue influence, he need not be afraid if, in the career of his charity, he should bestow it on individuals who happened to be voters. The Act of Parliament was only directed against things that were done corruptly, and certainly was never intended to operate against those done in a *bonâ fide* spirit of charity.

Colonel SIBTHORP said, he also wished to ask whether, if a poor elector, being greatly distressed by sickness or accident, should be assisted by an occasional donation of a small sum of money from his representative, or a friend of his representative, such a proceeding would be deemed an infringement of the law?

The SOLICITOR GENERAL said, that if the donation were prompted by a feeling of commiseration for the person's poverty and distress, it would not come within the meaning of the Act.

NATIONAL EDUCATION—QUESTION.

Sir JOHN PAKINGTON said, he wished to put a question to the First Lord of the Treasury, of which he had given him notice. He desired to ask him whether he could allow him (Sir J. Pakington) a day for bringing forward the Motion on the subject of education which had stood for some time on the paper in his name. He would remind the noble Lord that this Motion stood first on the paper for the 25th of January, but it was then postponed in compliance with the noble Lord's request. He had subsequently fixed his Motion for the 15th of February, but the House had adjourned over that day also for the convenience of the noble Lord. He had no party feeling or object in this question, and he (Sir J. Pakington) might have taken the same course with regard to it as the noble Lord the Member for London (Lord J. Russell), and laid a Bill on the table embodying his views. But the subject being a very large one, and embracing points to which it was desirable to call the attention of the House and the Government before either his Bill or that of the noble Lord the Member for London should proceed to a second reading, he hoped that the noble Lord at the head of the Government would be able to grant him a day for bringing forward the question.

Viscount PALMERSTON said, he should feel great pleasure in affording the right hon. Gentleman every facility consistent with the claims of other important public business for introducing his Motion. Tuesday week appeared to be a convenient day for such a purpose; but perhaps, before fixing a day, the right hon. Gentleman would allow him hereafter to communicate with him on the subject.

MINISTERIAL EXPLANATIONS.

On the Motion that Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair,

Viscount PALMERSTON: In rising, Sir, to move that you do now leave the Chair, I feel it is generally expected that a person who fills for the first time the situation I have the honour to hold, especially under circumstances such as those which preceded my appointment, should state very shortly to the House what led to his holding the office he holds. Sir, that which I have to state will be very brief—brief because it has been anticipated by statements which have been made by a noble Lord in another place and by a statement subsequently made by a noble Friend of mine in this House. It has been already stated, and correctly stated, by the Earl of Derby, that when he was commanded by Her Majesty to endeavour to form a Government, he did me the honour to come to me and to propose to me that I should belong to the Government which he was about to form. He at the same time expressed a wish that I should communicate the same desire on his part to my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer and to my right hon. Friend who now holds the position of Secretary for the Colonies. I stated, as was correctly stated by that noble Lord, that those habits of long personal friendship which co-operation in office had engendered, and the high esteem which I felt for his personal character and statesmanlike habits, would render me anxious to co-operate with him in a public emergency, when it was of the utmost national importance that a Government should be formed. I said, however, that I could give him no answer till I had had an opportunity of communicating with friends of mine; but that one thing I was prepared to say, which was this, that in the present state of our foreign relations I should be reluctant and unwilling to belong to any Government in which the conduct of the foreign affairs of this country did not continue in the hands of my noble Friend the Earl of Clarendon, who had shown such great ability and success in the management of the department confided to his care. The communication, as stated by Lord Derby, was made a little before two o'clock. I communicated as soon as I could with my right hon. Friends; I communicated also with that noble Friend of mine, upon whose judgment I place the most implicit reliance, and whose opinion will guide me in every important transaction of my life—I mean the Marquess of Lansdowne; and the result was, that I wrote to the noble Lord to say that I did not think that by accepting the proposal he had done me the honour to make me I could give to his Government that strength he was pleased to think my acceptance of office would have afforded. It was remarked as somewhat unexplained, that that reply of mine was quoted by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his answer given at a later hour to the Earl of Derby. The fact is, that that opinion of mine was formed upon a full consideration, and communicated to my right hon. Friend before he wrote in reply to the offer that was made to him also, declining to join the Administration of the noble Earl. Sir, that endeavour to form an Administration on the part of the Earl of Derby having failed, Her Majesty was pleased to call upon my noble Friend the Member for the City of London (Lord John

Russell), and to charge him with the task of forming an Administration. My noble Friend did me the honour, immediately after that command was given, to come to me and ask me to afford him my assistance. Sir, my great personal regard and esteem for my noble Friend, the perfect similarity of political opinions which existed between us, led me at once, and without hesitation, to say that, feeling impressed with the full importance of the crisis in which we stood, any assistance it was in my power to give him should, without any hesitation, be unreservedly given; and if he had succeeded in forming an Administration, I should have felt the greatest alacrity in giving him any assistance it might have been in my power to render. Sir, that attempt did not succeed, and it was the pleasure of Her Majesty then to commission me to endeavour to form a Government, if I thought I could succeed in submitting to Her a list of Administration likely to command the confidence of Parliament and adequately to carry on the public service of the State. Sir, I received the commands of Her Majesty about six o'clock on the Sunday evening, and I was fortunate enough to be able, on the Tuesday afternoon, to report to her Majesty that I had obtained the assistance of such colleagues as I thought Her Majesty might fairly approve, as answering the description she had been pleased to give in the commands she gave me to make the attempt to form a Government. Sir, the Government then was formed, and I trust that that Government contains sufficient administrative ability, sufficient political sagacity, sufficient liberal principles, sufficient patriotism and determination to omit no effort to fulfil the duties which each Member has undertaken, and to justify me in appealing to this House, to Parliament, and to the country, for such support as men may be considered entitled to receive who in a period of great difficulty and of national emergency, have determined to undertake the responsibility of endeavouring to carry on the business of the country. There is one great department—the Foreign Office—which will continue to enjoy the ability, the experience, and success of my noble Friend the Earl of Clarendon. We have had the good fortune to obtain for the conduct of the War Department the Services of my noble Friend Lord Panmure, who combines all the energy, the firmness and perseverance which are required for the conduct of that important branch of the public service in the present emergency. I am happy also to have the assistance of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the conduct of that most important branch of the public service, and my right hon. Friend (Sir J. Graham) who sits by me, and who is going immediately to propose the estimates for the naval service, needs no panegyric on my part as to the great ability with which he has discharged the duties of the department entrusted to his care.

Sir, we begin then the task which it has been the pleasure of Her Majesty to confide to our care. In undertaking that task it is useless to dissemble that there is one difficulty which immediately meets us, and which, I may say, stares us in the face; that difficulty, I mean, which arises from the notice which my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Roebuck) has given for Thursday next. Sir, I will not attempt to disguise the fact that I feel the same objections to the appointment of the Committee of which he has given notice which I had the honour of stating when the subject was before the House on a recent occasion. My opinion is, that such a Committee would in its action not be in accordance with the true and just principles of the constitution; and that for the effectual accomplishment of its purposes it would not be an efficient instrument. Sir, I should hope that this House, when it came calmly to reflect upon the principles involved in the appointment of such a Committee—when it came calmly to reflect upon the cumbrous machine and the tardy result which must be expected from its action, might be inclined, at all events, to suspend the appointment of the Committee which my hon. and learned Friend proposes to move for. But, Sir, I feel that the only ground upon which they could be disposed to agree to postpone the appointment of that Committee would be the belief that the Government itself intends to do those things which the Committee if appointed might, at the end of a long period, recommend to be done. And as we all remember the old case of that young monarch of England who, in meeting a body of discontented subjects, and finding that they had lost their leader, rode boldly up to them and exclaimed, "You have lost your leader, my friends; I will be your leader," so I should say to the House of Commons, if they will agree not to appoint this Committee, the Government will be their Committee; and we will leave you to decide whether by the results of our energies and labours, you will be satisfied with the inquiries and the improvements we shall make, or whether you will then think fit to appoint a more formal Parliamentary inquiry. Now, Sir, as for the objects of that Committee, they must have been the correction of abuses that exist at home and abroad. I imagine, Sir, that the object the majority of those who voted for that Committee had in view was to compel the Government to make certain administrative changes in our military departments at home, and, by inquiries and improvements abroad, to restore order and regularity in those services which unfortunately have been marked by circumstances of a very different character in the Crimea and in the East.

Now, Sir, that which we propose to do I will shortly sketch out in detail, but simply as indicating the intentions which the Government contemplate carrying into execution. Sir, the House must be aware that I have not felt it my duty to recommend to Her Majesty to appoint a Secretary at War. The reason why I have abstained from doing so is, that I think an amalgamation can be made between the offices of Secretary at War and that of the Secretary for the War Department, which will greatly contribute to the efficiency and simplicity of the public service. My opinion is, that in regard to the Ordnance great improvements may be made; that, speaking generally, but without of course pledging myself to specific details, the discipline of the artillery and of the engineers may be transferred to the Commander in Chief, like the discipline of the rest of the army, and that the civil department of the Ordnance may be placed under the superintendence and control of the Secretary for the War Department. What may be the collateral arrangements which, when matters are examined into in detail, it may be thought best to make, I cannot presume to say; but that is the general outline, and I do not think there can be any very material difficulty in carrying it into execution. My right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty has established a Board to superintend the transport service at sea, a service of the utmost importance, and one which has grown into the character of a great national institution—a service upon which our alliance with France has made it necessary to call for great and increased efforts for the transport and conveyance of French troops as well as English troops. And just it is that such should be the case. We are engaged in warlike operations in conjunction with France as an ally. We have not the means of contributing the same amount of soldiers and men for the prosecution of the war which the larger military establishments of France enable her to send into the field. It is but fair, then, that we should bear our share of the expenses of the war, by affording to France those naval means of carrying her troops which her more limited naval establishments do not enable her to supply. These arrangements involve a much more complicated mass of details than can well be carried on by that limited department over which my right hon. Friend presides, and he has therefore established a separate Board for the purpose, and I am convinced that that Board will tend both to the increased economy and the increased efficiency of that department of the public service.

Sir, great alarm and well-founded complaints have been made on the subject of the accommodation provided for our sick in the hospitals at Scutari and in the Crimea. Sir, we are going to send out a commission composed of civilians — men not swayed by the bias of professional habits, nor yet military men; but men who have been accustomed to deal with sanitary questions not only at home, but who have been employed in similar duties abroad, one of them having been so employed upon a service of this nature in the West Indies. We are going to send those three civilians out with ample power to examine the sanitary condition of the hospitals, of the camp, and of the ships. There was one sent out some time ago, but there are three persons now going out simply and solely for the purpose of reviewing those sanitary arrangements. I own that I anticipate the greatest advantage from their scientific labours. I am sure that medical men, whose time is daily occupied in all the details of their profession, have not leisure enough to consider those great sanitary arrangements upon which the health and comfort, and the lives, even, of many thousands of men must inevitably depend. Lord Raglan has been authorised and instructed to send to Constantinople, and to procure from thence a corps of labourers, whose sole duty will be to cleanse the camp—to cleanse it from that accumulation of various things, which every man who knows anything of the habits of a camp, and of the calamities which have befallen us in the Crimea, must know are perpetually accumulating, and which, when the warm season comes in, might, if precautions were not taken, be attended with most disastrous results to the health of the troops. Then, again, Sir, many complaints have been made, and I am afraid not without some foundation, of a want of system in the Commissariat department—of mistakes and defective organisation—both as regards the supply and as regards the issue of things requisite for the army. A commission is going out, at the head of which we have placed a very distinguished man, well known for his abilities and habits of organisation—I mean Sir John Macneill—once our Minister at the Court of Persia, and now connected with the poor-law department of this country. He will be the head of that commission, and he will have colleagues competent to act with him. That commission will go for the purpose of examining into all the defects to be found in the Commissariat magazines in the Levant, and will have full power to organise them on a more efficient basis. In the British army there has not hitherto existed an officer of that description, who in foreign armies bears the title of chief of the staff. The consequence has been, that all the details of the Quartermaster-general's and Adjutant-general's departments have been brought to the Commander in Chief, much to his inconvenience, and abstracting his attention, perhaps, from matters of more serious and greater importance. Major General Simpson, an officer of distinguished merit and great experience, who is well known for his services in the Peninsula, at Waterloo, and in India, is going out immediately as chief of the staff, to have the control and command of the Quartermaster-general's and Adjutant-general's departments, and with power to recommend to Lord Raglan any change which he might think ought to be made in the different persons belonging to those departments; and Lord Raglan will no doubt think it his duty to adopt any recommendations which Major General Simpson may make to him as to those matters. There has been also a complaint, and I believe a just one, that the medical establishment of the army has not hitherto furnished a sufficient supply of medical officers for the wants of our hospitals abroad. A hospital is going to be erected at Varna, which will be placed entirely in the hands of civilian medical men; and civilians will be invited to offer their services in any other part of the arrangements abroad in which their medical services may be wanted. My noble Friend the Secretary for the War Department is going to remodel entirely the medical departments at home. I believe that that is capable of great improvement, simplification, and probably of increased efficiency; and I am confident that the labours of my noble Friend in that direction will not be less valuable than in other departments of the Administration which have been confided to his care. My noble Friend also proposes very shortly—I believe this evening—to present to the other House of Parliament a Bill to enable Her Majesty to enlist as soldiers men of a more advanced age; I need hardly say more advanced, but somewhat older than the limit hitherto fixed, men still in the vigour of life, but older than the ordinary range of recruits; and to enlist them for a shorter period than is assigned to the general enlistment of soldiers under the present arrangements of the army. I have omitted to say, that hitherto the Commissariat abroad has been charged not simply with the supply and issue of provisions and all other things wanted for the service of the army, but has also been charged with providing the means of transporting those articles. That has been the source of very great difficulty, embarrassment, and inconvenience, and a separate department of land transport has been established, which will correspond in some degree with the ancient waggon train, only upon a larger scale, and it will be instructed immediately to set to work, and to collect in Asia Minor the animals necessary for the service of the army, and no doubt sufficient means of transport will thereby be provided.

During the short period that has elapsed since the formation of the Government, these things have been done, and are doing, and I should trust that the House will be disposed to see the effect which these different improvements and arrangements will produce. I am myself perfectly convinced that the results would be known in a much shorter period than would be sufficient to enable a Committee even to make a Report they could recommend to the attention of this House. Sir, so much as regards the arrangements for the prosecution of the war, though I should state that, in addition to those improvements of system, no efforts will be omitted to provide reinforcements for the army to enable it to take the field, when the season shall admit, with increased numbers and augmented efficiency; but similarly charged as we are with the interests of a great nation, I have felt that it was our duty, not simply to look to the best means of carrying on with vigour and efficiency that war in which we have unfortunately been compelled to engage, but that it is our duty also to make every effort which could honourably and safely be made for the purpose, if it were possible, of putting an end to the war by an adequate treaty of peace. We have learned that certain conditions to serve as a basis of negotiations, which had been concerted between the Governments of England and France, had been concurred in by the Government of Austria; and having been presented to the Government of Russia, we were informed that the Government of Russia had acquiesced in them as principles upon which negotiations for peace might be commenced. We deem it our duty, therefore, to embrace the opportunity thus afforded us for at least ascertaining whether peace could now be obtained upon safe and honourable terms. Negotiations were to be opened at Vienna; but being desirous to give to those negotiations a most solemn, serious, and earnest appearance — being desirous that no man living should question whether we entered into them with a sincere desire to make peace, pretending that on our part it was merely a pretence to steal away time and to wait till the successes of war might bring to us a better condition in which to treat—we pressed upon my noble Friend, I will name him—Lord John Russell—to undertake the duty of representing the interests of this country at these negotiations. We felt convinced that any negotiation that might be placed in the hands of a man so eminent in his own country, so distinguished in their eyes and in the estimation of all Europe, so conversant with the matter to be discussed, so fully acquainted with the details of all the negotiations which had preceded, and so deeply imbued with a feeling of the importance of the matters to be discussed —we felt convinced, I say, that if Lord John Russell would undertake that task, we should have a security on the one hand that if peace were obtainable upon honourable terms, no failure arising from the want of judgment or knowledge on the part of our negotiator would prevent our obtaining it; and on the other hand, we should feel that, if, unfortunately, our efforts to obtain peace should not prove to be successful, no possible effort on our part had been omitted, to come to an honourable arrangement of the quarrel. My noble Friend consented to undertake the task, and I must say that no man ever did himself a higher honour than my noble Friend did in accepting that under circumstances of such great—I will not say national—but European emergency. My noble Friend, I believe, will proceed in the early part of next week. Of course, he will pass through Paris, to have a confidential communication with the French Government. He will also pass by Berlin, in order to communicate with the Government of Prussia; and whatever delays those visits may interpose to his arrival at Vienna, I think the time he spends in these capitals will not be misplaced. Now, Sir, if we should succeed in obtaining peace upon terms which would afford a security for the future against the recurrence of those disturbances of the peace of Europe, which have led to the war in which we are engaged, we should think, Sir, that our first acts in undertaking the Government, will be as satisfactory to the country as they will be gratifying to ourselves; but, Sir, if we fail, why then I think that the country will feel that there is no alternative but to go on with the war; and I am convinced that this nation will then with greater zeal, with greater alacrity, if possible, than ever, give its support to a Government which, having made every possible attempt to obtain peace, should have failed in doing so, and is compelled to carry on the war for the attainment of that peace—a war which the sense and judgment of the country have pronounced to be virtually indispensable and necessary. We shall in that case throw ourselves upon the generous spirit of Parliament and the country; that generous spirit I am confident we shall not ask for in vain. I am sure that in that state of things all our minor differences and mere party shades of distinction will vanish, that men of all sides will feel that they are Englishmen, and that they ought to support their country in its great emergencies. I am confident we shall show the noble and glorious spectacle that, as a free people and under a constitutional Government, there is a life, a spirit, an energy, a power of endurance, and a vigour of action which are vainly to be sought for under despotic rule or under arbitrary sway.

Mr. DISRAELI: Sir, I was under the impression that upon the present occasion it would not have been necessary for me to refer to the conduct of individuals condected with the transactions which preceded those in which the noble Lord has been engaged, but, as the noble Lord has introduced the name of a noble Friend of mine, I am sure the House will not think it unreasonable on my part if I make one or two remarks upon that part of the noble Lord's speech. It is true, as is well known, that when the Earl of Derby was honoured by the command of Her Majesty to attempt to form an Administration he was influenced by only one consideration, which was the expediency, at the present moment, of forming a strong Government in this country. Considering the emergency, the Earl of Derby was of opinion that the first duty of a statesman, consulted by his Sovereign under such circumstances, was to advise Her that every effort should be made to form an Administration which should have the confidence of Parliament and the country. Sir, it was with that view that the Earl of Derby opened a communication with the noble Viscount, and I am sure that unintentionally on the part of that noble Lord he has, in my opinion, conveyed an impression to the House that may induce the House to misapprehend the motives of the Earl of Derby and the object that he attempted to accomplish. The House will bear in mind that this was not the first time, under similar circumstances, that Lord Derby had felt it his duty to open communications with the noble Lord upon the formation of an Administration for Her Majesty. Upon a previous occasion, at a time not far distant —namely, about three years ago—there had passed those communications between the noble Viscount and the Earl of Derby which convinced the Earl of Derby that between the noble Viscount and himself there was no difference of opinion upon all great subjects of policy which could prevent them from acting together to form that which they alike desired—a strong and efficient Government. Sir, the noble Viscount, on that previous occasion, said, with becoming frankness, that it was impossible for him alone to join any Cabinet that my noble Friend might form, and it is, perhaps, impossible for a statesman of the noble Viscount's eminence and experience to quit the body of men with whom he has been acting, and suddenly to combine with another body of public men, however pure, however patriotic his motives, without, if he acted alone, being subject to misconceptions which would mar, and justly mar, his influence as a public man. Upon that occasion the noble Viscount said he could not join the Cabinet of Lord Derby alone, and that he had Friends whom he should wish to accompany him, and their names were mentioned. Therefore, when these proposals to the noble Viscount were recently renewed, the Earl of Derby anticipated his objections, and continuing, so to speak, the conversation of the previous occasion, my noble Friend was prepared to meet the views of the noble Lord, and, that there might be no difficulty with regard to the Gentlemen in question, the noble Viscount named the two right hon. Gentlemen who had been referred to. Had the noble Lord joined the projected Administration there would have been no obstacle, probably, to the selection by the noble Lord of the two right hon. Gentlemen to whom he has referred. But certainly it never could have been supposed by the Earl of Derby that if the noble Lord, after reflection, considered it was not in his power to join his Administration, he was at liberty to make application in his name to two other right hon. Gentlemen. I must say that if the noble Lord, having received the proposition of my noble Friend with such encouraging friendliness, had found upon deliberation that he could not accept the offer of my noble Friend, then I think the frank and straightforward course of the noble Lord would have been to apprise the Earl of Derby of that result of his deliberations, and not to continue these negotiations with his Friends, accompanying that negotiation with a simultaneous declaration that he himself could not form part of the Administration.

Sir, it was not my intention for a moment to have adverted to these particulars. It is the noble Lord who has introduced the subject, and it is in vindication of the conduct of the Earl of Derby that I have thought it necessary to allude to circumstances which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has, in a most marked manner, according to my interpretation of his note, mentioned in a communication which he made to the Earl of Derby, and which has been read in another place. Notwithstanding, however, the encouraging reception of his overtures by the noble Lord, the attempt of the Earl of Derby to form an Administration, which he thought the exigencies of the time and the feelings of the people, the interests of the Throne, and the advantage of the country alike demanded, has failed. But let it not for a moment be supposed that the Earl of Derby at any time refused to form an Administration with such power as he might possess, provided no other party of public men, except his followers, were ready to serve their Sovereign. Under no circumstances did the Earl of Derby for a moment refuse to accept the post offered him, provided no other combination could be formed which could command a greater support in Parliament. The attempt of the Earl of Derby to form a strong Government has failed; the attempt of the noble Lord to form a Government has succeeded, but whether it be a strong Government—whether the noble Lord has formed a Government such as the country had a right to look for, is a secret at present in the womb of time. The noble Lord has to-night felt himself justified in entering into a panegyric upon the great qualities of his colleagues. According to the noble Lord, they are gifted with administrative abilities of the highest calibre, they possess great political sagacity, they are distinguished by truly liberal opinions. Well, Sir, there are Gentlemen below the gangway who are better judges of the political opinions of the present Government than myself, and upon that subject I need not touch, but I may at least, with the advantage of experience, form some opinion as to the administrative abilities and the political sagacity of the noble Lord's colleagues, upon which he has so much dilated. One would have supposed, from the language of the noble Lord, that the new Administration, which has to-night presented itself for the first time to Parliament, consisted of a body of distinguished and experienced statesmen who had for some time been withdrawn from public affairs, who had been remote from the observation and from the criticism of their contemporaries and their country; but when we recollect that the Administration, which the noble Lord says is so distinguished by its administrative abilities and its political sagacity, consists of the same Ministers who, only a few days ago, in the opinion of Parliament, were remarkable for their deficiency in administrative abilities, were less conspicuous than any other body of public men for their political sagacity, I say I think it was an unfortunate introduction for the noble Lord to dilate upon those qualities, and thus to render it necessary for me, upon an occasion like the present, to remark upon his language. I should have thought that a solemn silence would have been more becoming the occasion. If I had been the noble Lord I should have dwelt more upon the future than upon the past or the present, and I do not think the noble Lord has exercised a very wise discretion in recommending himself to the confidence of Parliament upon the strength of the administrative ability of men who have been so very recently condemned for the want of that quality, and of the political sagacity of colleagues whose deficiency of political sagacity has brought upon this country very great, and now universally acknowledged calamities. But, Sir, what was all this allusion to the failure of some and the success of others in forming a Government, this dwelling upon the distinguished personal qualities of his colleagues and companions by the noble Lord—what was all this a preface to? The noble Lord does not appear to me to have been very happy in his first address in the House, which he has now to manage, for he has compared the House of Commons to the rabble of Wat Tyler. That seems to be a very strange compliment from one who ought to be almost as proud of being the leader of this House as of being the chief in the Councils of his Sovereign. But the noble Lord says to us, you have been successful in your sedition, the time has now come when you must return to your allegiance and repose a renewed confidence in the new Ministers of the Crown, although they are only the Ministers you have so recently condemned. And what a strange string of reasons has the noble Lord given as arguments to the House for rescinding the resolution they arrived at after prolonged debate, and in full assembly. The noble Lord gave us a catalogue of what he described as improvements in administration which the newly-constructed Cabinet has decided upon. Of course it will be much more easy for us to gauge the merit of those measures when we have them more in detail before us, and have had the advantage of examining a little into their matured arrangement. But admit, for argument's sake, that they are all improvements, that they are necessary improvements, urgent improvements, inestimable improvements,—what a satire are these improvements upon the late Government! If these improvements are so necessary, if they are of so urgent and inestimable a character, if they are the means and methods to extricate us from our difficulties, what are we to think of the predecessors of this Cabinet—what are we to think of the men who, for so long a period, not only neglected to fulfil these necessary duties, but who, to the last hour of their existence, appealed to this House that these changes were not necessary, that no circumstances were in existence which demanded any improvement or any investigation, and who declared that a desire on the part of the House of Commons to inquire into the causes of mismanagement—which is now not only confessed, but which is to be remedied—was a want of confidence in their Administration, and condemnatory of their character as public men?

Why, Sir, let the House of Commons well consider what they are now asked to do. One of the finest armies that England ever sent forth mysteriously disappears—not by the sword of the enemy, for that we could endure, and could meet again and vanquish; but by means so mysterious that a most experienced statesman, with all the advantage of a knowledge of the interior secrets of the Cabinet, confessed and announced to this House that he could not penetrate the cause of, or understand, that mystery. The House of Commons must recollect that the position in which they were placed was not that of a public calamity having taken place, which suddenly urges and stimulates some independent Member, from a feeling of patriotism, although, perhaps, not of prudence, to call for inquiry and to echo the voice of an anxious and agitated nation. No, Sir, the First Minister of the Crown in this House, the man of whom, as a Member, irrespective of all party politics, this House is the most proud—the man who had previously been Prime Minister of England for a long period of years—the man whose qualities, whose sagacity, whose wisdom, whose statesmanlike mind have been just eulogised by the First Minister on the Treasury bench—a man of such qualities that, although he had intentionally destroyed his late colleagues, they have already employed him upon an august mission—this eminent person comes down to Parliament and tells you that, although a Minister of the Crown, he cannot, with all the advantages of official experience, penetrate the mystery of the national calamity that has occurred, and that he thinks inquiry ought to be granted, as the plea for it is irresistible. Acting on that intimation, supported by that grave authority, echoing the universal opinion of the people of Great Britain, the House of Commons, not in haste, but after a debate which occupied days, with unusual numbers present, with its Members hastening from every part of the country, by a majority almost unprecedented in the records of Parliament, declared that an inquiry is the first duty of those, whoever they may be, who may be intrusted with the government of the country—that an inquiry by a Committee of the House of Commons is the only mode by which the necessary improvements can be indicated—and then we are told to-night that the House of Commons is to stultify itself!—that this House of Commons, which only ten days ago, under circumstances of such unmistakeable conviction, and sanctioned by the high authority of the leader of the House, arrived at this solemn decision, are to recede from the ground which they then so triumphantly occupied, are to rescind the Resolution which they so solemnly affirmed, and are to inflict a blow on their reputation and their public influence, such as, in my mind, a long period of years will not counteract. Now, what is the strange argument of the noble Lord and his reburnished colleagues to induce the House of Commons so to stultify itself? Why, the noble Lord has shown us to-night already the advantage of that Vote of the House of Commons. The mere vote for inquiry has produced a long series of highly vaunted improvements. If, then, we get these rich fruits already from the mere vote for inquiry, what may we not obtain from the inquiry itself? I do not know what Gentlemen may choose to do on this subject, but I know what is the course which I shall take. I shall endeavour to support in every way the decision of the House, and what I believe is the strong and wholesome opinion of the country. I am for inquiry—I am for Parliamentary inquiry into the condition of the army before Sebastopol, and into those branches of the Administration which should have prevented the present lamentable condition of our troops.

Sir, we hardly know what is to be the consequence of our adhering to the solemn resolution at which we have arrived, but I cannot suppose that the noble Lord is about to commence his career as First Minister of the Crown by attempting to control and menace the opinion of Parliament, which has been given in so unequivocal a manner. All I can say is, that if I have to face my constituents and vindicate my conduct as their representative, I shall never seek a happier opportunity than when I can declare to them that, at a moment of unparalleled disaster, when one of the greatest blows ever experienced by England has occurred, following the advice of a great Minister of State, though he did sit on the opposite bench, I did support the resolution of the House, that the circumstances demanded inquiry, and that inquiry they should receive. The noble Lord has, I will not say flattered—but the noble Lord has held out hopes to the House and the country that there may yet be a chance of that peace which has been so often promised, but has hitherto evaded accomplishment. I need not assure the noble Lord that the possibility is one which will be received by the country and by all the Gentlemen who sit on this side of the House with cordial satisfaction, because we feel that neither the noble Lord nor any one who occupies that position will ever consent to terms of peace which are unworthy of the occasion, and which will not accomplish those objects which alone could justify a recourse to arms. The noble Lord has stated, if those attempts to obtain peace should fail, he will appeal with confidence for the support of this House and of the country. The noble Lord, Sir, will not appeal in vain. But the noble Lord can receive no support from this side of the House for the prosecution of the war which his predecessors have not already received. There never was an Administration who received from an Opposition so cordial a support, a support so sincere and hearty, as that which was received by Lord Aberdeen's Ministry from the Opposition in Parliament during the time he was in office. There never was a Minister or Ministry which ever entered into war with such advantages as, I cannot say the late—there are two Dromios which confound me—but I will say the late Ministry and their present faithful representatives—their identical representatives. There never was a Ministry which entered into a great war with such advantages—with a unanimous people, a unanimous Parliament, an overflowing treasury, valiant troops, magnificent fleets, and, as they tell us cordial, and as we know in one instance, not only cordial but powerful allies. How men with such advantages could have realised such disasters—how, on such vantage ground they should have so mismanaged the affairs of this country that with a unanimous Parliament they yet contrived, by the aid of their own principal supporters, to be overcome by a crushing majority, the future historian, probably, will only be able to explain. But, Sir, let us, on this occasion, at least, express a hope that, although we have the same individuals in a new form regulating our affairs, those men, who a fortnight ago were voted to be unparalleled blunderers, may now fortunately be transformed into expert statesmen. Let us hope that those, who with unprecedented resources have realised no other results than disastrous consequences, may now open a new and unexpected scene of success, of prosperity, and of triumph; and let us assure them that, as long as they attempt to do their duty in the conduct of this war, they may reckon, so far as the Opposition is concerned, upon the same support as their identical predecessors received; and, I doubt not that if disaster be their lot, if maladministration be inseparable from their condition, when they fall they will, like the late Government, not be able to impute that fall to the faction of those who sit opposite them, but to the recognition by the country of a total want of those qualities which the crisis requires, and of which the country at this moment is most in need.

MR. RICH said, that the terms "reburnished Ministry" and "unparalleled blunderers" with which the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) had endeavoured to depreciate the present Government were applied to precisely those persons whom his noble leader the Earl of Derby had proposed to join and place over the head of the right hon. Gentleman. That plain and undeniable fact might account, perhaps, for some of the bitterness which the right hon. Gentleman had displayed. He was one of those who voted for the inquiry the other night, and, though he still considered some inquiry should take place, he did not object to some substitute being found for the cumbrous machinery of a Committee of that House. The noble Lord the First Minister of the Crown had pointed out how various Commissions might be sent to the spot where these great misadventures and mismanagements had occurred, and their Reports be submitted to the House in a much shorter space of time than even the first Report of a Committee. The noble Lord had devised a plan by which a recurrence of the difficulties of the last fortnight, when public affairs were left in such a critical position, might be avoided, and he, for one, was willing to accept the noble Lord's proposal.

Mr. ROEBUCK said, that having been pointedly alluded to by several speakers in the debate, he felt himself called upon to explain the course he intended to adopt. The Committee for which he had moved a fortnight ago, and the nomination of which he intended to propose next Thursday, had already obtained the favourable decision of that House. The House had placed upon solemn record the declaration of its opinion that such a Committee ought to be appointed, and the only argument that the noble Lord at the head of the Government had ventured to allege for the rescinding of that Resolution was, that there was now in office a new Administration, animated with new intentions; but he (Mr. Roebuck) confessed that he was at a loss to understand the force of this argument, and was not altogether prepared to admit the fact. A fortnight ago, the House determined that the Administration then sitting was incapable and inefficient; that under its management the army had declined, if not disappeared; that disaster and calamity had befallen us in the Crimea; and that, in consequence, inquiry was necessary. Such was the decision at which the House of Commons had arrived; yet the noble Lord now came forward and asked them—as the right hon. Gentleman opposite truly observed — to "stultify" themselves by rescinding the Resolution, and by retiring from the vantage ground they occupied, so as to afford to the present Administration the fullest possible opportunity for doing that which the old Administration were confessedly and notoriously unable to do. The only reason that the noble Lord could urge to induce the House to adopt this course was, that there was a new Administration! But was the fact so? Was there a new Administration? He doubted it. The cards had doubtless been shuffled—it might be that there were new cards, but they were in the old hands again. They were in the hands of the men who held them a fortnight ago. All the eulogy which the noble Lord had poured upon his colleagues to-night was only a repetition of what the noble Lord had said a fortnight ago, but, in spite of that eulogy, and in spite of its reiteration, it was most distinctly proved that they were totally inefficient to the discharge of the duties required of them. The noble Lord had spoken as if there was something antagonistic between the Government and those hon. Members who were for carrying on the inquiry proposed; but this was a mistake. There was nothing of antagonism in such a proceeding. The very expectation of a Committee had incited the Government to make reforms and improvements, and it was natural to suppose that the action of the Committee might be to egg them on to more vigorous prosecution of those reforms and improvements. They might get more, but certainly could not get less, by having this Committee. The Committee to whom the revision of the Civil Service had been referred had stated in their Report, that such was the disarrangement prevailing in that department, that they despaired of effecting a reform otherwise than by means of an Act of Parliament. The assent of the House of Commons would, of course, be indispensable for such a measure, and they were the best judges of its necessity. And so, too, in the present case the House of Commons were the best judges of the question, and they could afford the Government material assistance in the carrying on of the inquiry. When a political chief came into power and directed his attention to any particular department, he found that he had to address his inquiries to a permanent official. It was manifestly the interest of the political chief to keep well with that permanent official, and the sense of mutual interest produced a *vis inertiæ* which nothing short of the vigorous action of Parliament could remove. With these views he meant to persevere in his Motion, in spite of the proposal of the noble Lord, on Thursday next to continue his original proposition by moving the nomination of a Committee to conduct the inquiry which the House had already resolved should be instituted. He believed that in so doing he should really be aiding the noble Lord in effecting the object he himself proposed—namely, the remodelling of the institutions of this country, and the infusing fresh vigour and increased strength into the Administration. That vigour and increased strength which the Administration wanted the House of Commons would lend its assistance to the noble Lord to obtain. By such aid the noble Lord might possibly be able to effect the reforms he proposed, but which by his own unassisted efforts it was to be feared would never be accomplished. He (Mr. Roebuck) felt himself unequal to the task of addressing the House at any further length, and would therefore conclude by saying that he held himself pledged to the House to move for the nomination of a Committee of Inquiry on Thursday next, which pledge he certainly should redeem.

MR. MUNTZ said, that before he hailed with any degree of gratification the noble Lord's advent to power, he must have further proof of what his Administration was to be. He could not stultify himself by voting against a Resolution to-night which he had voted for only a few nights ago. When he supported the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield he thought it would be for the interest of the country that an inquiry should take place; and that, so far from its being prejudicial to the war, it would greatly advance it. He was still of that opinion. Indeed, if it were necessary to justify the vote he had given, he need only quote the speech which the noble Lord had that night delivered, for the noble Lord had admitted all that was complained of. What, he (Mr. Muntz) asked, would have been done if the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield had not moved for an inquiry, or if the House had so far betrayed its duty as to reject it? If that vote had not been carried, an end would not have been put to a most inefficient Ministry, and the people would have been delivered over to a set of men whose incompetency for rule had brought disaster on the country.

MR. T. DUNCOMBE said, he trusted that his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Roebuck) would adhere to his Resolution; for sure he was that if his hon. and learned Friend did not, he would greatly disappoint the country. The noble Lord who appeared for the first time at the head of the Government had told them that he and the Government would be their Committee. Why the House had already condemned the noble Lord and his Friends as a Committee, and did not want to have anything to do with them. They would only spoil and stifle the inquiry. What the House wanted to do was to inquire into the conduct of the noble Lord and his colleagues. The noble Lord had said he would make certain reforms, but who were the men who were to institute those reforms? Were they not the very men whose conduct had created the necessity for adopting reforms? Where was there any real practical change, he wished to know, in the Government? In his opinion, it was the *status quo ante* Roebuck. The noble Lord had taken his place as Prime Minister. He had certain advantages over, and stood higher in public opinion, than the Earl of Aberdeen. The Earl of Aberdeen was supposed to be not able to carry on the war, as he had a sort of amiable weakness of forty years' standing, inclining him towards the Czar, and making him averse to war; whereas the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) was said to hate the Czar, and to delight in war. These were the popular impressions at the present moment, and which had placed the noble Lord where he was. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) had thought it necessary to enter into a vindication of the conduct of the Earl of Derby, but he (Mr. T. Duncombe) did not think the noble Viscount had made any reflections upon the conduct of the Earl of Derby. The course taken by the noble Lord appeared to be very prudent, wise, and patriotic. He did not succeed in forming an Administration—he had no old cards to play. He went to the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston), who was nothing loth to join him; but the noble Lord said that the Earl of Derby must get one or two more of his Friends to join him too. But this could not be done, and so the Earl of Derby gave up the attempt to make a Government. Then came the noble Lord the Member for the City of London. He tried his hand at making a Government, and the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) was ready also to join him; but the noble Lord the Member for the City of London—faithless to his colleagues and faithless to that House—he said faithless to the House because, after the high complement paid him in acknowledging him as the leader of that House for two Sessions, he ought to have been able to present a better case for deserting his post than he did on a former occasion;—well, that noble Lord also failed. Indeed, it was matter of no surprise, either to that House or to the country, that the noble Lord did fail. The surprise would have been had he by any means succeeded in forming an Administration. Well, then they came to the noble Lord who had taken his seat that night. Now, he (Mr. Duncombe) had seen no less than thirteen complete Administrations—from that of Lord Liverpool down to the present newly-formed one inclusive—and the noble Lord might be said to be a rather faded gem of bygone Administrations. Of almost all those bygone Administrations to which he alluded the noble Lord had been a Member; and, therefore, it must be admitted that he was possessed of great experience as well as of high administrative talent. The noble Viscount had told the House that he had appointed Lord Panmure as a substitute for the Duke of Newcastle. Now, they had had both those men in the House of Commons, and he thought, putting all party prejudice aside, they had now got the worse man of the two. He thought Lord Panmure must at least disappoint the expectations of the noble Lord the Member for the City of London, because, in the scheme which the noble Lord submitted to the Earl of Aberdeen, he stated that it was absolutely necessary the Secretary of War should be a man possessed of great vigour of mind, and have a seat in the House of Commons. Lord Panmure had now no longer a seat in that House, nor when he once sat there did he (Mr. Duncombe) discover that the noble Lord was a man of great vigour of mind. However, they were, it seemed, to have the war carried on with great energy and vigour under this reconstructed Administration. At the same time the Government were carrying on negotiations with a view of establishing an honourable and an enduring peace. The noble Lord had not told them exactly what he understood by the vigour and energy with which he intended carrying on the war; and what the terms really meant, although in everybody's mouth, nobody exactly could explain. Now, he (Mr. Duncombe) should say that to carry on a war with vigour and with energy was in the first place to defeat the army of your enemy, to destroy his fleets, to invade and devastate his country, to burn his cities, to level his fortifications, to blockade his ports, and destroy his trade. Now, that was what he should call carrying on war with vigour and energy, and he believed that that was what the people of this country expected the Government to do. Of course, to be able to do that they must have armies and they must have fleets. They had got, he believed, a magnificent fleet, though they had been told very recently that it "was badly manned and worse disciplined." He did not believe it; but he should leave that point to be settled between the First Lord of the Admiralty and the gallant admiral who made the charge. But, if they were to judge of the insubordination of the fleet by the insubordination of one of its admirals, that fleet must be in a bad state indeed. They wanted to know a little about the army, or that portion of it that was on active service, and this was the object of the proposed inquiry. They were told by some parties that they had only 12,000 or 14,000 men before Sebastopol; but the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer estimated the number at nearly 30,000. Well, all this was a fit subject-matter for inquiry, and the discrepant statements would of course be investigated before the Committee. He did not blame the noble Lord (Lord Palmerston) for his attempt to obtain the discharge of the order for this inquiry. The noble Lord told them the other night that it was an inconvenient order; and this was the reason why he (Mr. Duncombe) put the question that he did to the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Roebuck) before the House came to a division on his memorable Motion. The hon. and learned Gentleman had now no real power in the matter of this Committee—he could only nominate the Members, and it would rest with the House itself to say whether a *bonâ fide* inquiry should be prosecuted or not. The Motion for the Committee was considered by the Government as tantamount to a vote of censure upon them. Now, for his own part, in voting for it he (Mr. Duncombe) did not mean to convey a censure upon the Government, but simply to imply distrust and mismanagement. The moment for censure had not yet arrived. What they now wanted was inquiry, and censure might probably follow that inquiry. If the Committee did its duty faithfully it would point out those who were the real delinquents. If they were military men, let them be brought before a court-martial and tried for their neglect of duty. He did not think so much of the blame really attached to the authorities at home as to those who were abroad. From the intelligence he had received, he believed that the Commissary General and the Quartermaster-General had ill supported Lord Raglan, and, if that was so, why not bring them to trial and punish them? If these persons, on the other hand, could shift the blame to other persons, whether at home or abroad, let them also be put upon their trial, be they who they might. They were told that the Committee would impede the Government in effecting the reforms that were now going on; but why should it impede them? The inquiry was to be instituted into the history of transactions that were past, and the reforms intended for the future could proceed simultaneously with it, supposing it was meant that it should be a sincere and impartial sifting of existing abuses. With regard to the peace which the noble Lord told them they were to have, they would all hear about it, no doubt, from the noble Lord the Member for London by and by, after his visit to Vienna and Berlin. But here again he must say he thought the people of this country cherished different expectations from the negotiations that were now pending from those that were entertained by the Government. He believed that the people meant one thing and the Government another, and that hence another great difficulty would arise. The people of this country entered into this war in the belief and hope that the arrangements that were made in the Congress of Vienna in 1815 would be revised, and if the noble Lord the Member for London were present he would ask him to take note of this, and not to forget the wishes of the country with regard to the wrongs of Poland and Hungary, and also with respect to the aspirations after independence of that priest-ridden land, Italy. The people of England fully expected that these questions would be mooted. Again, strange to say, not one word did they hear from the First Lord of the Treasury, or from any other Member of the Government, relative to Sebastopol. If that great fortress was to remain in the occupation and under the control of Russia, did any one suppose that any peace they could make would be permanent in its duration? If that fortress was to be left standing it would continue to overawe the whole East and every Power that might come into contact with Russia. He believed that the people and the Parliament of this country would take this question out of the hands of the Government, and would not suffer this Committee of Inquiry to be called the Government's Committee; he believed that the House of Commons, on the part of the people of England—ay! and that the Emperor of the French (who had been to us so faithful an ally, and whose regard for England had only been equalled by his devotion to his own country) also, on the part of his people, would not rest satisfied until the standards of the two great Western Powers waved triumphant over the ruins of Sebastopol, and until this Autocrat of All the Russias, this King of Poland, this Heaven-born champion of the Orthodox faith, was at last compelled to acknowledge and confess that his hypocrisy, his tyranny, and his lawless ambition must for ever cease and determine. He was convinced that if they concluded a peace upon any other terms, and particularly without the reduction of the gigantic and menacing fortress to which he had alluded, they would only lay the foundation of further calamities, and, perhaps, of ruin to this country.

MR. HORSMAN said, he concurred with the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield in thinking that there were two important subjects involved in the present question; first, the public interest as connected with the administration of the army, and next, the character of Parliament as affected by the prosecution of the inquiry. The Government that had met them that night had reappeared in a great crisis, and the responsibility that now lay upon the House was most serious. They might, if they pleased, visit the reproach for all their disasters upon the heads of the Government, but he believed that there were very few Members of the House of Commons who had not much to answer for in the past for the calamities which they were now deploring. At the commencement of that war the leader of the Opposition (Mr. Disraeli), speaking for his party, honourably declared that though they were the opponents of the Government, still the Ministry, in the prosecution of the struggle, should have their cordial and constant support as much as if they had the conduct of it themselves. This pledge, he was bound to say, had been most faithfully fulfilled. Indeed, if any mistake had been made by those who gave it, he thought it lay in the opposite direction. One of the securities for good government was, that if we had not a strong Administration, we should at least have a strong and vigorous Opposition; but during the last few months we had had neither a strong Government nor a strong Opposition; and this was the cause of many of the difficulties under which we now laboured. He must say that hon.

Members upon the other side of the House seemed to him to have regarded too much what they considered to be their duty towards their political opponents, and too little that which they owed to the English nation. Of the House of Commons generally he might say that they had gone on from day to day supporting a Ministry which they knew to be weak, and which they must have seen was disunited—an Administration of feeble conduct and fluctuating councils. The country, consequently, had drifted into war, and been dragged through disgrace and dishonour from the feeble conduct and conflicting councils of the Ministry. It was only in the imminency of a great catastrophe that at last, in a fit of public virtue, that House had aroused itself to put an end to an Administration whose history was destined, he feared, to be one of the darkest, gloomiest, and most tragic in the annals of this country. One side of the House almost became cowardly from the fear of being considered factious, and the other sank into subserviency from the fear of being regarded as insubordinate, and he (Mr. Horsman) was quite prepared to accept his individual share of the blame which was to be attributed to their conduct. The course pursued by one hon. Member, however, stood out in strong constrast with that taken by the rest. The hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) had endeavoured to do his duty throughout the whole of the period in question. He had pointed out to the House that the Government were undertaking an expedition to the Crimea at the wrong season, and without having made sufficient preparation. That hon. Gentleman had, in fact, made no statement in that House with respect to the conduct of the war in the East which had not been verified by the result, and he exhibited in making those statements an earnestness, an ability, and a foresight, which he thought merited for his words a much greater degree of attention than at the hands of Her Majesty's late advisers they seemed to have received. Our recent disasters he (Mr. Horsman) believed were mainly attributable to a want of identity of policy and of principle upon the part of the Government. It was that want of union of sentiment with respect to the war which had, in a great measure, brought about those results which induced that House to come to the decision at which three weeks ago they had arrived. Now, there was nothing in the changes which had since taken place in the Members of the Administration to justify the House in receding from the position which they had so recently taken up. Her Majesty's Government of three weeks ago had no fixed policy, and possessed within itself no efficient military administrators. The question, then, was, did the present Government come before them under different circumstances? Had they within themselves the elements of strength and union, and were they supported by the confidence of the public from without? Now, with respect to the subject of internal union, he might say that it was matter of public notoriety—and nobody had declared it more openly than the First Minister of the Crown—that there existed in the Administration of Lord Aberdeen two parties—the war party and the peace party. The advocates of peace had held by Lord Aberdeen, and those who were for war had clung to the noble Viscount now at the head of the Government. But, he would ask if Her Majesty's present advisers were more united upon the great questions of peace or war than those by whom they had been immediately preceded? The reconstruction of the existing Cabinet had been accomplished after prolonged negotiations, and those negotiations had resulted in giving the country a Government whose Members were not of one mind with respect to the great contest in which we were involved, but who had been, as it were, chosen with reference to the nicely-balanced adjustment of those antagonistic principles which could only tend to perpetuate the disasters and the dissensions of the last eighteen months. Now, with respect to the question of public confidence, he should merely observe, that when they again saw upon the Treasury benches those familiar faces which they had perceived there when the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Sheffield carried his Motion, there was but little ground for supposing that the confidence of the nation in Her Majesty's Ministers had increased. It was, therefore, that, in his opinion, the House of Commons could not, with safety or with honour, recede from the position which, but three weeks ago, it had occupied. What the country now required was that Parliament should supervise every act of the Administration, and that the interests and feelings of individuals should give way to the necessities of the nation. The great object of his hon. and learned

Friend's Motion was publicity. Disasters of the severest kind had fallen upon our army, and it was only by ascertaining the cause of those disasters that a remedy could be applied, and their recurrence for the future effectually prevented.

MR. E. BALL said, he should have expected that the noble Lord at the head of the Government, when he first came before the House in his new character, would have endeavoured to appreciate the good feeling of the public, and in giving expression to his intention to oppose that inquiry into the state of our army which a large majority of that House had sanctioned, would have advanced some very powerful reason for taking such a course. Great, therefore, had been his surprise when he had heard the speech of the noble Lord. The course which, in fact, the noble Lord proposed to take, was similar to that of a person, who, having been arraigned for certain crimes before a jury of his countrymen, should say, "I object to be tried by that jury, but I will appoint a jury of my own colleagues, whom I will make the judges of my conduct." In his opinion the country would not be satisfied with the step which the noble Viscount was desirous of taking, and he firmly believed would not give its consent to the abandonment, upon insufficient grounds, of a Resolution at which that House had formally and solemnly arrived. The public were anxious to know how it was, that an expedition which had been fitted out with so much cost had met with disasters so signal and so sad. For his own part he thought it would have been fortunate for this country if Ministers had been contented to direct their efforts to the increase of her naval pre-eminence, instead of sending out troops to make fresh conquests. But passing over that point, and taking into account the conduct of the Government with respect to the expedition that had been sent to Sebastopol, he must say that, in his opinion, it demanded a searching inquiry. Why, he would ask, in the first place, were our troops encamped at Varna, when it was well known what an unhealthy district it was, and where eventually the forces were decimated by disease, and how was it that we had sent out an army to Sebastopol at so late a period of the year without taking even common precautions for their comfort and safety? These were questions to which the people of England demanded that an answer should be given, and, therefore, it was that they would not be satisfied to adopt the course which the noble Lord had proposed. Much had been said that evening with respect to the reconstruction of a Cabinet, and he would confess that he regretted that the noble Earl at the head of the party of which he had the honour to be a Member should have made application to the noble Lord opposite to join his Government; and he believed it to be a still greater error upon the part of that noble Earl to seek to make the two other Gentlemen who had been referred to adjuncts to his Administration. He did not think that the people of England need be very solicitous upon the score of not being able to obtain men to conduct their affairs; and he maintained that those affairs would be likely to be better managed if for romantic, ethereal, visionary, and imaginative qualities, strong common sense were more generally substituted. He should also take that opportunity of expressing his regret that nobody having more weight in that House than he possessed had paid a tribute to the magnanimity and self-denial of the right hon. Gentleman near him (Mr. Disraeli) in consenting to waive his right and give up a position to which he had so just a claim if Lord Derby had become Premier, in order to facilitate the formation of a strong and efficient Government. That was an act which he felt assured would not be lost upon the good sense and feeling of the people of this country. With respect to the press, he must observe, that to it, in his opinion, we were much indebted for the service which it had done in making us acquainted with passing events, and in affording those who remained at home that information in respect to their relatives in the Crimea which they were naturally so anxious, under present circumstances, to receive. In conclusion, he should say that the present condition of our troops, the mode in which so many of them had met their deaths, and the sufferings and privations which they endured—all imperatively demanded that the House of Commons should not rescind that Resolution to which upon a former occasion they, by a large majority, had given their assent. He should, therefore, most cordially support the appointment of the proposed Committee.

MR. PHINN said, he believed that the practical question before the House was how this nation, with its representative system, might infuse into the conduct of the war the same vigour and decision as despotic and arbitrary Governments exhibited, and how we could concentrate the power and energy and determination of the people of England most advantageously, so that we might carry on that war to the earliest possible conclusion consistently with the honour and dignity of the country. Now, he did not see that such an object was to be accomplished by uttering sarcasms and casting injurious reflections against one statesman or another, or by tracing through all their complications the various circumstances which had led to the formation of the present Government. The question was, how was Her Majesty likely to be served by the present Government, and particularly by the noble Lord at the head of it, who had been called to that post by the universal voice of the country, and how could the House best strengthen the Government in carrying on the war to a successful conclusion. The right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire said that the change of the Government was only a change of the late Government; but he (Mr. Phinn) did not think that that was the case. It was necessity that had produced the present Government, and he was confident that if the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire had been in the Government, he would have made the same proposition with respect to the Committee of Inquiry as had been made by the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton. The noble Lord did not ask the House to forego the Committee entirely, but only for a time to suspend its action; and if the House should not be content with the energy with which the war was conducted, it might then institute a searching inquiry. To him, who had voted for the Committee of Inquiry, that seemed a fair and proper course to pursue. Of the two sections which supported the Motion for a Committee, one large section desired to express disgust, dissatisfaction, and dismay at the state of things prevailing in respect to the army, and felt that abstaining from voting for the Motion would not have the effect of assuring that army of the deep sympathy entertained by the highest and the lowest on account of its sufferings. Many, believing that the late Prime Minister was not in earnest in the conduct of the war, thought that a decision of the House in favour of the Committee would produce a change in the Government and substitute the noble Lord now at the head of the Administration for the late Premier. Well, the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston), asked, as a mark of confidence in his Government, that the appointment of the Committee should for a time be suspended; and, if the House should decide against him, suppose he should resign his commission into the hands of Her Majesty? Would it then be creditable, when the position of this country was trembling in the balance, to have public affairs embarrassed by miserable intrigues—would it seem dignified to be setting up one political idol and pulling down another, while the whole of Europe would be regarding with ridicule what was passing, and pointing out the inefficiency of the constitutional system in a great national emergency? He, for one, was not prepared to bring about such a state of things. He felt this matter ought not to be one of mere party consideration; and if the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) had coalesced with right hon. Gentlemen on that—the Ministerial—side of the House, and formed a Government, he should have felt it his duty to give that hon. Member his support if the right hon. Member had made a proposition similar to that announced by the noble Lord. When the late Secretary at War pointed out the enormous difficulty of carrying on the proposed inquiry, it was said, that that was a mere quibble about words, and that the vote was a censure of many of the details for which the late Government were responsible, and about 100 Members who usually voted with the Government accepted the issue in that sense. But, for himself, he must say that he was not prepared to transfer that censure from the defunct to the existing Government. Many hon. Members voted for the Committee, no doubt, because they were desirous it should be appointed, and others voted for it as affording the first opportunity of giving effect to the universal feeling of dissatisfaction at the calamities which had befallen the army in the Crimea. He must protest, however, against the expression used by the hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Horsman), who spoke of "disaster and disgrace." Disaster undoubtedly there had been, but there was no disgrace connected with the achievements such as were performed at Alma, Balaklava, and Inkerman; and, when important alliances were trembling in the balance there was great danger in using such language as he had referred to. The fortitude and patience with which our army had borne sufferings arising from a vicious system and a bad Administration reflected the highest honour on them. He thought the course proposed by the noble Viscount at the head of the Government, not to discharge the order for the appointment of a Committee, but to suspend its action for a time, was perfectly fair, and ought to be accepted by the House; and then, if the evils complained of were remedied, and if the noble Viscount would pledge his high character that the system of promotion by purchase and the employment of old generals tottering into their graves, to cope with young men chosen by a despotic Power, not for their family influences, but for the services they could render, should be put a stop to, the practical object sought for by the appointment of the Committee would be attained, and the name of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield would be honoured by posterity as a great benefactor to his country.

MR. H. T. LIDDELL said, that every Member of that House must admire the gallantry displayed by our troops in the East—a gallantry which had never been surpassed in the history of this or of any other country; but they must at the same time feel that they had but too much reason to complain of that mismanagement which had reduced those troops to so deplorable a condition, which had produced the disgraceful confusion of the harbour of Balaklava, the want of communication between that place and the camp, and the consequent deficiency in the supplies of clothing and of the very necessaries of life to the troops, although at a distance of only six miles from them there was abundance of all these things. These proceedings had suspended our operations in the Crimea, and rendered useless all the resources of this great country. They could not fail to remember that it was to our gallant allies our soldiers had been indebted, in many instances, for clothing, for sustenance, and for the means of transport. It was the duty of that House to consider whether they would rescind the vote which they had come to by so large a majority, in favour of the appointment of the Committee for which the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield had moved. It might be very well for hon. Gentlemen who had voted on that subject for a double purpose to attempt to explain away their vote; but he confessed that for his part he had voted for the Motion, not merely for the purpose of casting a censure on the Government, but also with a view to satisfy the just and natural anxiety of the country for an inquiry into the causes of that disastrous and disgraceful position to which our gallant army had been reduced. He knew no course by which an inquiry into that matter could be conducted in a manner adequate to the expectations of the country, except by the appointment of such a Committee as that which had been proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield. He had listened that evening to the address of the noble Lord the First Minister of the Crown with considerable curiosity, and many anticipations of satisfactory announcements of future policy from that noble Lord, and he readily acknowledged that that curiosity and those anticipations had not been altogether disappointed. He had heard with much satisfaction the spirited appeal which the noble Lord had made to the patriotism of the country, as well as the promise he had given to inquire into the abuses of our military and naval departments, and to reform them to the utmost of his power. He could assure the noble Lord that if he were vigorously to pursue such a policy, he should receive from him as ready and as uniform a support as he could receive from any of his most devoted political adherents. In the propriety of many of the appointments already made by the noble Lord he entirely concurred. He particularly approved of the nomination of the noble Lord the Member for London (Lord J. Russell) as the British plenipotentiary at the great European congress about to meet at Vienna. He trusted that that appointment would be highly advantageous to the public service, and he believed that it would meet with the general approbation of the country. But there were other circumstances connected with the policy of the Government, as stated that evening by the noble Lord the First Minister of the Crown, which, in his opinion, called for comment. The noble Lord had told them that the appointment of the Committee for which the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield had moved would prove detrimental to the public service; but it could not, he believed, by any possibility be so detrimental as the speech which they had heard on a recent occasion from the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. B. Osborne). He would venture to say that nothing had ever been heard in that House more scandalous and more indecent than the language made use of by the hon. Gentleman, in relation to the conduct of one department of that Government of which he was himself a Member. In the spirit of a sort of *sauve qui peut,* he had addressed himself to his constituents, and had called for nothing less than the complete subversion of the present Horse Guards system. He (Mr. Liddell) wished to know whether that hon. Gentleman still continued a Member of the Government. The hon. Gentleman had stated, in the course of his address, that no objections had been made to the manner in which the business of the department with which he was connected had been conducted. But since that time another public exposure had taken place in reference to the management of that department, and a dispute had arisen between the gallant Admiral, the late commander in chief of the Baltic fleet, and the Board of Admiralty, which it could not be expected would be left precisely where it was. He did not himself know that it could be better treated than by being sent for investigation before such a Committee as that proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, which would be quite competent to make inquiries into that as well as into other subjects connected with the administration of the war. There was another appointment to which he wished briefly to advert —that of the late Under Secretary for the Colonies to the office of Under Secretary at War. He did not wish to question the fitness of the hon. Gentleman for that office; but he wished to point out an inconvenience to which it might shortly give rise. An important measure, the Passengers Act Amendment Bill, and one in which his (Mr. Liddell's) constituents felt considerable interest, had lately been introduced by the hon. Gentleman (Mr. F. Peel); and he would take that opportunity of asking who was the person to whom he should refer for information with respect to the future progress of that measure at that moment, when the hon. Member who introduced it had been removed to a new office? He would not canvass any of the other appointments made by the noble Lord, although he thought there were good grounds for calling the propriety of some of them in question. He hoped that under any circumstances the noble Lord would institute a searching inquiry into the condition of those departments which had of late been proved so inefficient in the management of the public service, and that he would bring to the councils of Her Majesty that truly English spirit which had raised him to his present high position in the estimation of his fellow-countrymen. The noble Lord might feel assured that he would then receive an honest and a perfectly disinterested support, not only from him (Mr. Liddell), but from the Gentlemen generally on the Opposition side of the House, in his efforts to promote the honour, the dignity, and the interests of the country.

Mr. VANSITTART said, that in one portion of the speech of the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) he held out some prospect not only of an honourable, but also of a speedy peace. He (Mr. Vansittart) sincerely trusted it might be the good fortune of the noble Lord to attain that object. He had heard with great satisfaction that an individual of such high character and ability as the noble Member for the City of London had been appointed to conduct the negotiations at Vienna on behalf of the British Government, for he thought that, if this opportuity of concluding a peace were lost, not only might the present war be one of long duration, but all the States of Europe might be involved in it. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in a late debate, had said, with reference to the sufferings of the troops in the Crimea, that he thought many hon. Members attributed to the mismanagement of the Government what were, in fact, only the necessary horrors of war. In consequence of the long peace, the people of this country were almost unacquainted with the horrors of war, but they were now enabled to form some conception of those horrors, and he believed there would be a strong feeling in favour of any Government which seemed likely to be able to conclude a lasting and an honourable peace.

Mr. LAING said, he was induced to trouble the House because the Government and the House might not be aware of the feelings which induced some hon. Gentlemen on that (the Ministerial) side to vote in favour of the Committee proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield. He (Mr. Laing) did not give his vote in favour of appointing a Committee as a vote of censure, or a vote of want of confidence in the general policy of the late Government. On the contrary, he approved of the general policy of that Government, and of the reluctance to plunge into a war which had been manifested by the Earl of Aberdeen. He thought there was a certain degree of popular prejudice against that noble Earl which was altogether undeserved, and that his prudent reluctance to enter into war should have secured to him the support of public opinion not only in this country but throughout Europe. He felt, moreover, that the foreign policy of the late Government had been highly successful, and that in cementing the French alliance, and securing the Austrian alliance, they had obtained advantages of the greatest importance to this country, whether as regarded the prosecution of the war, the chances of an honourable peace, or the securities for the future tranquillity of Europe. He, therefore, had felt very reluctant to concur in any vote which might have the appearance of a general vote of want of confidence in the Ministry, but, at the same time, he was urged by a paramount sense of duty to vote as he had done, because he felt that greater interests than those of an Administration or of a party were at stake. Because there was a state of things disclosed as existing in the Crimea which they had struggled against believing to the very last moment, but which was admitted by the noble Member for the City of London, who described it as "horrible and heartrending," and at which every Englishman must have felt ashamed and appalled. It appeared that, not only had they not availed themselves of the improvements of modern science, but that their military system was from top to bottom in a state of most lamentable and miserable inefficiency. They heard of a gallant army perishing, literally mouldering away within six miles of a port where there was an accumulation of all the necessary stores and materials required for its support. They knew that that army was perishing, not in consequence of any insuperable difficulties, or even of any great difficulties, for those difficulties might have been overcome by the most ordinary foresight and administrative talent, but it was perishing, admittedly, for the want of a few wharfs and warehouses at Balaklava, and a road or tramway to convey supplies to the camp. Now, that was a job which any third or fourth-rate contractor in England, if he had been applied to at the proper time, would have undertaken and executed with the utmost facility, and thus the disasters which had occurred might have been avoided. He found also, that a system prevailed under which it was difficult to fix responsibility upon any particular party, either with the army or in this country. Now he would ask who was to blame for these terrible disasters? Who was responsible for them? Who had been dismissed in consequence of their occurrence? It was useless to mince matters in such a case. Either the head of the army in the Crimea was greatly to blame and was unfit for his position, or a great many of his principal subordinate officers were unfit for their situations, and ought to have been brought to court martial and cashiered. Now, had anything been done? Had Lord Raglan brought to trial or dismissed a single man, or taken any effective or vigorous steps to reform any of these lamentable deficiencies? With regard to the Government at home, he (Mr. Laing) was sorry to say that, from the disclosures made during the debate, it did not appear that the great majority of the late Administration had felt in their full force those evils and disasters which were wringing the hearts of the people of this country. It did not appear that there was the least disposition among them to make any vigorous effort to carry out those reforms which nine-tenths of the people of this country believed to be indispensable to the national safety—he might almost say for the national existence. It was, therefore, with these feelings and with that impression that he had felt it his duty to vote for a Committee of inquiry, because he believed that nothing short of compelling the Government to take the requisite measures would give the necessary stimulus towards remedying the administrative evils which had led to the great misfortunes that had occurred. The system prevailing in the army professed almost avowedly to exclude merit. Promotion went by money, interest, age, and anything except what ought to be the sole qualification—namely, merit. Any railway, insurance, or other company, conducting its affairs in the manner in which the administration of the war had been carried on by the Government, would meet with total insolvency in twelve months. He had felt that he should not have done his duty, had he not, however reluctantly, given a vote to urge on an inquiry, and he might, perhaps, pause now if it could be shown that new men had come in with new measures, that reform was already in progress, that the head of affairs was fully sensible of the necessity of vigorous measures, and that those vigorous measures were actually being taken. He could not see, however, after the explanations which had been given in other places, and in that House that night, that they had sufficient security for vigorous action if they were to relax the course they had adopted, and were to cease to apply that stimulus to the Government which had produced the changes which had already taken place. With regard to the first question, relative to the formation of an Administration, he confessed that it was not yet cleared up satisfactorily to his mind, why, at this great national crisis, the attempt made by Lord Derby, and he believed very patriotically and properly made by that noble Lord, to unite the leading men of different parties in one strong Administration, was not successful. They were told that Lord Derby applied to the head of the present Administration, that there was no difference in public policy which could prevent their acting together, and they found that Lord Derby, with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire, was willing to make considerable sacrifices of party feeling in order to gain the support of different sections; that they were willing to form a Government in which the noble Viscount at present at the head of the Administration, the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Colonies, should have seats in the Cabinet, together with Lord Clarendon, as Foreign Minister, and with Lord Ellenborough as Minister for War. He did not hesitate to say that, unless there were great public reasons against the appointment of such a Government, a Government so constituted would doubtless have given satisfaction to the country, and would have been strong enough to carry through the present crisis. With regard to any subsequent measures which had been announced, without knowing them more in detail, it was impossible to form an opinion upon them, but there was a reason which induced him to believe that that House was not in a position to dispense with a Committee of inquiry. He could not see that in the Administration which had been formed any attempt had been made to introduce those new elements which the majority of the people believed to be desirable to insure the successful carrying on of the affairs of the country. It was palpable that great failures had occurred from the want of practical business experience, and he was surprised that the Government should have omitted the opportunity offered them of infusing new blood into the Administration. They had now an Administration which gave them the same guarantees as the late Government, less Lord Aberdeen, the Duke of Newcastle, and Lord John Russell, but in no respect had they any guarantee for improved vigour and efficiency. With respect to the administration abroad, the conduct of the war, and the men at the head of the different departments at Constantinople and in the Crimea, they had an announcement that a Commission had been sent out, and no doubt very properly; but surely those members of the present Government who were members of the late Government must by this time have arrived at the conclusion, that certain men who had been placed in responsible positions had failed to carry out all that was required of them. Surely, then, this was a case not for a Commission, but for a positive act. The principal measure of reform which had been announced appeared to him to be purely a half measure. As he understood it, it was that a respectable general officer, but whose age somewhat exceeded sixty, should be sent out as a sort of wet-nurse to Lord Raglan, to take the administration of the army out of the hands of that noble Lord. By this time the Government ought to have made up their minds either that Lord Raglan was fit to be intrusted with the command of the army, or that he was not. If Lord Raglan was fit for the position he occupied, he (Mr. Laing) did not see the policy of the new appointment; but if he was not fit to be trusted, then, in God's name, let him be recalled. Let the Government set an example of vigorous action to the country, and then they might come to the House of Commons and ask them not to press forward this Committee of Inquiry, but not before. He had expressed these views because he thought it desirable that the Government should know the feelings which actuated those who on all points of general policy had been and still continued their supporters, but who could not, for the sake of any Government, or of any party feelings, attempt any longer, to use an expressive railway phrase, "to make things pleasant," and allow those evils to exist which had produced the miseries and disasters which had overtaken our gallant army in the Crimea.

VISCOUNT EBRINGTON said, that having formed part of the numerous majority which turned the late Government out of office, he felt bound to take an early opportunity of expressing his disagreement from the views of some other hon. Members of that majority who had spoken that evening. He had been in considerable doubt which way to vote, feeling strongly that what the present crisis required was not so much inquiry as action, or rather such inquiry only as was the indispensable preliminary and concomitant of prompt, vigorous, and remedial action; but his right hon. Friend the Member for Morpeth (Sir G. Grey) solved all his difficulties, by treating the vote as one of confidence or no confidence in the Administration. He had voted for the Motion of inquiry as a vote of no confidence, but he was anxious to say now, that he considered inquiry was most desirable and necessary, and he would not be a party to rescind a Motion that had been affirmed by such a decisive majority. But from his experience of long-pending inquiries before Committees up-stairs, he should say that an inquiry of that sort would be fraught, at this time more particularly, with difficulty and danger to the public service. He therefore hoped the House would adopt the suggestion thrown out by the First Lord of the Treasury, and suspend the appointment of a Committee, and the inquiry before such Committee, until such time as it could be carried on, not only without interfering with the redoubled activity requisite in all departments connected with the war at the present moment, but also with the advantages of having before it all the authorities at present in the East, on whom, in their absence, all the blame possible would be laid, and whose presence before the Committee was necessary to their exculpation. He desired to see a searching inquiry into every department, and he believed it would be found that in the civil service especially matters had been conducted on a rotten and unsatisfactory principle. It would be seen, he believed, that it was not to aristocratical influence only, though no doubt that had prevailed to a great extent, but to political, or what might be called boroughmongering, influence, that a great deal of the inefficiency of the civil department of the State was to be attributed. He believed that if promotions in the army to members of the aristocracy were, as in the navy, for the most part the just reward of merit, the aristocracy would by merit alone obtain in the army, as they had done in the navy on several memorable occasions in our history, a fair proportion of honours and promotions. But this he would say, that if Members of the aristocracy were not rewarded according to their merit, they had no right to occupy such positions, and the sooner they were displaced the better for the public service and the country, as well as for the order to which they belonged. The worst part of the present system was, that appointments were made not so much out of regard for the interests of the public service as from the connection of the parties promoted with electioneering proceedings, especially in small constituencies, and he really believed that such appointments had much to do with the occurrence of those calamities which all of them had such great occasion to deplore. This question was by no means one easy of solution —it was not enough merely to say that men should be rewarded for their merit, and not through interest. The task of reform in this regard was a most difficult one. In De Tocqueville' work on *Democracy in America*, there is a passage showing how injuriously, especially in a republic, other influences than those of merit, and more particularly that of seniority, operated on appointments in the public service. One of the faults of our system confessedly was, that men were appointed to high command whom physical debility had unfitted for it; for the saying in England was, that a man was not supposed to be fit for anything until age had rendered him unfit for everything. He thanked the noble Lord at the head of the Government for the luminous and satisfactory sketch he had given of the views of the Government, in a great degree to be attributed to the vigour and ability of the noble Viscount, as well as of his colleague Lord Panmure. He felt grateful, also, for the measures which had been taken for the sanitary improvement of the camp, without which the position of the army would, when warmer weather arrived, be probably still more terrible than it had been, from the pestilence which such abominations must then engender. He would conclude by saying that he voted the other evening for the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) in order to bring about a change in the Government, and more especially in the War Department. That change had been effected, and he must express his confident hope that it was a beneficial one. But he must now express an earnest hope that the House would not, at the present moment, interfere with the Government, nor in any manner attempt to fetter the action of the various departments. He trusted the motion for the appointment of the Committee would be suspended for a short time, when its labours might pave the way to a remodelling, no less of the military system than of appointments and promotions in the civil service of the country.

Mr. DANBY SEYMOUR said, he did not think the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) had made a very satisfactory statement to the House. He had looked to the advent of the noble Lord to office as to the commencement of a vigorous era in the administration of the war, but from the statement which had been made that evening he could see no prospect of any efficient change in the course which had hitherto been adopted; he could only see small improvements that ought to have been long ago carried into effect. Having the highest opinion of the noble Lord, he deeply regretted to see him surrounded by so many Members of the former Administration. When hon. Members saw the Gentlemen who now surrounded him, their thoughts naturally turned to the sad spectacle in which not our army alone, but the system of Government in this country had suffered so much. He had hoped that the noble Lord would have infused a little new blood into the high commands of the army; but when they saw an octogenarian general appointed Commander in Chief in Ireland, and the admiral who had mismanaged matters so much at Constantinople sent to arrange affairs at Balaklava, he must say he felt no little disappointment. They were told they should have an energetic man, who understood the country in which the army was engaged, in the new post to be created under the Minister of War; but that announcement had been annulled for some extraordinary reason, and a Gentleman (Mr. F. Peel) was put into the office—no doubt a man of great respectability, but at the same time one who had the reputation of being very much attached to official routine. He regretted that the appointment, as Under Secretary at War, of his hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) had been so unaccountably cancelled. From the beginning of the war his hon. Friend had given the Ministers the benefit of his great knowledge of the countries in which we are at present engaged in war, derived from official and private experience, and certainly on every point on which he had given an opinion he had been right in his anticipations. On every important particular, from the time when he urged Ministers to declare war on the Russians crossing the Pruth, his anticipations had been most remarkably confirmed. What was the use of our breeding up public servants at the public expense, for his hon. Friend (Mr. Layard) had long been employed in a diplomatic capacity by Her Majesty in the countries which were now the seat of war, if, when a crisis came, we did not avail ourselves of that local knowledge, which could only be gained in a long course of years, and which was absolutely indispensable to conduct successful operations in the East? It might have been expected, therefore, when the Ministry were turned out, in a great measure through the speeches of his hon. Friend, that he would have been appointed to a place in connection with the conduct of the war. And when he heard, as was rumoured about, that Admiral Dundas had been the cause of that Gentleman not being appointed, he must say, if this report were true, that he thought the Admiral, who had far from merited the thanks of the country upon other grounds, had a very heavy additional responsibility laid at his door in having, from personal motives, at a crisis like the present, deprived the country of the services of his hon. Friend. He trusted the noble Lord would show by his measures better than by his words that he was determined to carry on the war with vigour. He believed that Russia was far weaker than was supposed, and if the noble Lord exhibited judgment and vigour, and was not trammelled by his associates, he believed that the next six months would show us in a position very different from that which we now occupied. He believed that if at all points we used our enormous resources with the vigour that characterised the era of Nelson and Wellington, the present struggle might be quickly terminated. It was especially necessary to direct attention to the question of the stoppage of trade as a means of depriving Russia of the sinews of war. He hoped there would be no free-trade theories (right enough in other circumstances) to interfere with the vigour that ought to characterise our proceedings with regard to Russian trade. The blockade had hitherto been a mere nominal operation. He believed that the very lead which made the bullets by which so many of our brave soldiers were destroyed had been exported from this country to

Odessa since the commencement of the present war, through the negligence of the admiral in command of the fleet in the Black Sea. He had been surprised to hear the reports which had been made by the gallant Admiral (Admiral Berkeley) as to the admirable state of the harbour of Balaklava. Why, he must say that the gallant Admiral had almost trifled with the time of the House in reading a document signed by the masters of many transports as to the admirable order and regularity of Balaklava harbour. Why, who were the people who profited if that order and regularity did not exist? Why, these very masters of transports, whose evidence was brought to prove the existence of a state of things contrary to their own interests—the more disorder in the harbour, the better for them—because they received a large demurrage for every day they remained in Balaklava waiting to unship their goods. Every day they were left there resulted in so much money being put into their pockets. He heartily deplored the horrors of war. No one could wish more cordially than he to see an honourable peace concluded, but he could not say he had confidence in the present Government that they would conclude such a peace as would be honourable to the country. He thought it derogatory to this country that a statesman in the position of the noble Lord the Member for the City of London (Lord J. Russell) should have been sent to the Congress at Vienna, to meet no other statesman of equal rank. We appeared to be suing for peace from our enemy, and by such conduct we discouraged neutral Powers from declaring themselves, because they are afraid we should leave them in the lurch. The best means of obtaining peace, in his opinion, were to prosecute the war with vigour, and to stop all conferences at Vienna, until we had beaten our enemy. He considered, therefore, at such a moment as this, that the mission of the noble Lord was peculiarly inopportune. He would only add that he (Mr. Seymour) was not an opponent of the Government of the noble Lord at the head of affairs. He earnestly desired the noble Lord might succeed; but until he held out some definite intention of making a more extended system of reform in the various departments of the State than he had hitherto done, he could only give him a qualified support.

Admiral BERKELEY said, he wished to ask the hon. Member who had last spoken what higher authority he could have given for the statement to which the hon. Member alluded than that of Sir Edmund Lyons, the talented and energetic commander of the Black Sea fleet? The statement respecting the harbour of Balaklava was based upon an official letter from him, and he (Admiral Berkeley) would not have repeated it, without a downright good reason. The hon. Gentleman had alluded to a connection of his, a gallant Admiral, late in command of the Black Sea fleet, and had stated that the gallant Admiral was instrumental in keeping the hon. Member for Aylesbury out of the present Government. He (Admiral Berkeley) did not know whence the hon. Gentleman drew such information; and all he would say was, that when, the hon. Gentleman might remember, the Thanks of the House were voted to Admiral Dundas, if the hon. Member for Aylesbury then believed that the accusations which he had made against Admiral Dundas were founded in truth, it was his bounden duty to his country and his constituents, to have then stood up in his place and to have resisted that vote being unanimous.

Lord HOTHAM said, he wished to inquire whether the Government intended to take the whole of the Navy and Army Estimates; or whether they proposed to ask for a Vote of men and money, and limit themselves to these Votes? If it were the intention to limit the Votes to these points, he had not a word to say. But if the whole of the Army Estimates were to be gone into, he should say that in the absence of a most important document not yet laid before the House, it was impossible the remaining Votes could be discussed with justice to the service. The paper he alluded to was the Royal warrant issued by command of Her Majesty last year, consequent upon the Commission appointed to consider the state of promotion in the army. The Commission reported, and, though the Report was produced previous to the Christmas adjournment, it had not been printed. It was of great importance; and, therefore, he hoped Her Majesty's Government would limit their Vote at present to the points suggested.

Sir JAMES GRAHAM: If the House will consent to go into Committee of Supply, so that the Navy Estimates may be brought forward, it is not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to propose this evening any Vote with reference to the army.

ADMIRAL WALCOTT: Sir, the observations which have been made in the progress of this debate relative to the conduct of the war, so nearly affect the army and the navy at this momentous crisis that I am induced to trespass for a brief space upon the indulgence of the House. Firstly, to say that I recollect with a sorrowful satisfaction that at its outset, and during its early progress, I lifted my voice in warning in this House, and observed that the country who embarks on war with another Power, underrating its resources and undervaluing its means for resistance, is, to a great extent, guilty of the disastrous consequences which may ensue. Do we not in each instance stand self-condemned? We early lost our vantage ground and influence when we suffered the Turkish squadron to be destroyed at Sinope almost beneath our guns. Procrastination and uncertain counsels followed us from the commencement. Why did not our fleet pass the Dardanelles and enter the Black Sea simultaneously with the invasion of the Principalities by the Russian army? Why did not our fleet raze Odessa to the ground—the granary of Sebastopol? Why was the expedition to the Crimea detained so long on the plague-stricken shore of Varna with all its attendant miseries? Why did we not overlook that isthmus, by means of which so many thousand troops were poured into Sebastopol? What utter ignorance of the internal strength of that fortress and its inexhaustible means for resistance to a siege! What delay in our supplies, in siege-trains, and all the appliances by which to conduct our operations to a successful issue! Battles are not fought without great loss, nor victories achieved but at a costly price even to the successful, and yet for the wounded and sick how imperfect was the provision made. Sir, I cannot find language sufficiently expressive by which to deplore the mismanagement, the improvidence, and the dilatoriness which have characterised the conduct of this war. Our resolutions slow and feeble—our counsels made at random, halting, trusting, as it were, to some fortunate chance or fortuitous interposition by which to stave off calamity, or bring us undeserved success—our ample resources tardily supplied—the sincerity of our professions compromised by the dubiousness of our acts—our reinforcements doled out in a manner unworthy of the nation, tantalising to its chiefs, and insufficiently maintained to a standard by which to render success hopeful—our acts, in earlier instances, partaking of indisposition to offend the enemy beyond the means of reconciliation, measures proposed as if the country would not or could not give us recruits; and, to some extent, we placed ourselves dependent upon our noble and gallant ally whom we ought to have rivalled; wavering so that other nations caught the contagion and wavered also, and giving encouragement to the enemy by the incompetency of our preparations, the fluctuations in our councils, and thence the sluggishness of our operations. Let the blame fall where it may be deserved, but let us, without party spirit, hasty judgment, or the desire at random to inculpate any one individual in particular, not be hasty where so many are, I fear, to blame; above all, let us deal out to our chiefs impartial judgment and a generous confidence. If hon. Members entertain on any point a doubt, give to them the benefit of that doubt; recollect they are not here to defend themselves, that their honour is dearer to them than life itself, the verdict of their country far dearer still; they have placed their all upon the stake, their anxiety must be intense—a terrible venture for single men to bear. Let us then cherish, sustain, and animate our army and our fleet. Other battles have to be fought, and other victories to be achieved, and he who never desponded, had the full belief they would add another monument of fame to the brave names of Alma, Balaklava, and Inkerman, in that of Sebastopol. England, ever jealous of her arms, would be satisfied with no less costly a price. Not to strain every nerve and put forth every effort to achieve this object would be criminal; to pause and nicely count the cost would be ignominious. Our honour is at stake, we must redeem it. Our place in the nations is at issue, we must maintain it. The sword we had drawn untarnished, we must sheath without a stain. Sorrow and suffering are inseparable from war, but let not the mourners say their dead fell in vain, and that incompetence and timid counsels had inflicted more wounds than the weapons of the Czar. When I look on that battle-field; there standing soldier, sailor, and marine, enduring the scanty food and water, the harassing march, the perpetual alarm, the wearisome watch, the sharpness and cold, the tentless camp, the toil and dangers of the trenches—shell, shot, and sortie—men susceptible of one common nature, animated by the same hope, repugnant to the same pain, and loving life as we do, yet risking all and daring all for the honour and glory of their country—extinction in a moment, eternity in an instant, yet never dismayed, ever hopeful of success, and never faltering in loyalty—I do indeed glory in my native country and that brave brotherhood. And when I recollect how much depends on this continued constancy, how many precious lives are bound up in theirs, I never kneel me down, and other hon. Members I doubt not do the same, but I evoke the blessing of God upon their heads and arms. Our prayers are offered up that they may return to this country covered with glory and the high sense of duty done. Our interests are identified with theirs—their heroic deeds, their lofty patriotism, their enduring qualities; and I tend my hope that the Government will concentrate their undivided energies, and all of earthly wisdom, so as to ensure coming conquests at the least possible loss to the sister services, and that satisfaction may rest upon our counsels, that when England shall have attained her object in this war, and peace alike honourable to her arms and name—that by the precautions used her mourners may be few and her survivors many.

ADMIRAL SIR CHARLES NAPIER—QUESTION.

MR. A. DUNCOMBE: I wish, Sir, to put a question to the right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir J. Graham), as we are about to go into Committee of Supply to proceed with the Navy Estimates. The right hon. Baronet will be aware that the gallant Admiral lately returned from the command in the Baltic was installed in that command with the unusual ceremony of a public dinner at the Reform Club. The right hon. Baronet is also doubtless aware, that on a late occasion at the Mansion House the gallant Admiral in question (Sir Charles Napier) passed a very severe censure on the officers and men of his fleet, and added that he had received the most degrading and insulting letter ever written to an officer. Now I am aware that some of the statements made by the gallant Admiral have been contradicted by the hon. and gallant Member for Gloucester (Admiral Berkeley); but still it is due to the right hon. Baronet, to the service, and to the country, to know on which side the truth rests, as also to know what the result to the gallant Admiral will be in case the truth rests not with him—whether or not he will be scratched from the list of admirals? Therefore I wish to ask the right hon. Baronet what course he intends to take in reference to the statements lately made at the Mansion House by Sir Charles Napier?

SIR JAMES GRAHAM: If, Sir, it had been the pleasure of the House to go into Committee upon the Navy Estimates, it was certainly my intention, in the course of the few observations which it would be possible for me to address to the Committee, not to have passed altogether unnoticed the subject to which the hon. and gallant Member for the East Riding (Mr. A. Duncombe) has alluded. In any course which I may think it my duty to adopt, I shall certainly adhere to that which I think will be the most conducive to the public interest in an emergency like the present. To enter upon a complete analysis of the statement made by Sir Charles Napier would compel me to make disclosures of discussions which have taken place with that gallant officer in which the public interests are materially involved. It is impossible, consistently with my duty, to give that refutation to the statements of the gallant officer which it might be desirable for me to give without the production of correspondence and of despatches, interwoven with questions of naval preparations about to be resumed in the Baltic as soon as the weather will permit. It has certainly pleased that gallant officer to heap personally upon me much obloquy; it has been my duty to submit to the weight of that obloquy, such as it may be, rather than to endanger in the slightest degree the interests of the profession with which I have the honour to be connected. It is quite true that the gallant officer stated, on the occasion in question, that he was sent in command of the Baltic fleet with ships' companies, badly manned and worse disciplined. The Board with which I am connected used their utmost exertion in the selection of officers to command those ships endeavouring to choose those who were best entitled to the confidence of the profession. I have every reason to believe that the commanding officers of the different ships employed, without exception, did use their utmost diligence, with the greatest success, to introduce the best discipline into the vessels under their command. Sir Charles Napier certainly, in a despatch addressed to the Admiralty in the early part of his command, did make an assertion similar to that which on a recent occasion he repeated—namely, that the ships were ill-manned and worse disciplined. The course taken by the Admiralty was to call upon the gallant officer to specify the ships to which he referred, and they stated that none of the returns they had received made by the officers after inspection, or of the accounts given by the captain of the fleet of the different ships, sustained the allegation that the ships were in that condition. Sir Charles Napier was therefore called upon to specify those ships, but, in answer to that demand, no such specification was made, and the inference, therefore, I think, remains that that allegation was, on the occasion to which I have adverted, in the first instance hastily brought forward, and I regret that it should have been repeated. No better answer can be given to the allegation than the testimony of the officers themselves on whom the reflection is cast. The hon. and gallant Member who put the question refers to a speech I made at the dinner at the Reform Club when Sir Charles Napier undertook this command. I underwent due correction in this House on the subject of that speech, and I can assure the hon. and gallant Member that I am not likely to make any repetition of the offence. I hope I have improved in prudence by that correction. It is asked whether, considering the language which the gallant officer condescended to make use of, any condign punishment is about to be inflicted on him? The hon. and gallant Gentleman is aware that Sir Charles Napier is now upon half-pay; and great license is allowed, and very properly allowed, to the free expression of opinion on the part of any officer so circumstanced. It has been somewhere debated whether Sir Charles Napier was dismissed or not. My hon. and gallant Friend near me (Admiral Berkeley) assured the House that he had neither been dismissed from his command nor censured for the exercise of his power in the Baltic as Commander in Chief. Both these assertions were correctly made. Sir Charles Napier was not censured on account of any conduct pursued by him with regard to the fleet, but in his correspondence with the Admiralty he had recourse to the use of comments and expressions which were considered not to be consistent with the deference due to the authority under which he was serving, and strong censures were certainly passed on the use of those expressions. An hon. Gentleman, during the debate, asked whether Sir Charles Napier had been dismissed? Sir, he was not dismissed. He was, at the close of the service upon which he was employed, directed to lower his flag —there are precedents for that course with reference to commanders in chief of the fleet—and certainly it is not the intention of the present Board—I know not what may be the course pursued by any future Board—to call upon Sir Charles Napier to rehoist his flag. I must say that the gallant officer in question has proclaimed himself a hero. I have the greatest respect for his proved gallantry upon many former occasions, but it is not my intention to allow him to dub himself a martyr as well as a hero; and, therefore, I have no intention whatever of advising the Crown to take any further notice of the matter.

Motion *agreed to.*

House in Committee of Supply; Mr. Bouverie in the Chair.

SUPPLY—NAVY ESTIMATES.

(1.) 77,099*l.* Naval Expenditure beyond the Grants for the year ending on the 31st day of March 1854.

Sir JAMES GRAHAM: Mr. Bouverie, it is now my duty, and I can assure the Committee that I will perform it as briefly as possible, to bring under their notice the Navy Estimates. In doing so in the first instance, before we proceed to vote any sums for the charge of the navy in the year about to commence on the first of April next, it is my duty to put into your hands two Votes with reference to our past expenditure. The first of these Votes is for the sum of 79,000*l.*, which is the amount due on account of excess of expenditure upon the year ending on the 31st of March, 1854; and the second Vote is a Vote on account of excess in the current year of the sum of 1,938,104*l.* upon the entire sum voted in the course of the present financial year, being the excess which has arisen upon the Vote for the entire charge of the Navy, and which will become payable before the first of April next. Now, Sir, I have viewed with great anxiety the trial of the system upon which naval votes and accounts have been administered during the last eleven months of the war. The Committee will perhaps recollect that in the year 1832 a change was made in the preparation and system of naval Votes, and more especially with reference to the accounts of the Navy. From a very early period, almost from the Revolution of 1688, owing to the wide extent of the naval expenditure of the country, an expenditure carried on in every part of the world, and to the accounts having been remitted at uncertain periods, whenever a war took place the naval debt began to accumulate, and before the close of the war, in 1813, the naval debt, separate from the national debt, amounted to no less a sum than 8,900,000*l.* The origin of this debt is to be traced partly to the circumstance I have mentioned—to the wide area over which that expenditure is spread, and partly also to the vicious system of drawing bills at long dates, which had prevailed from the Revolution down to the year 1832. In that year precautions were taken by Parliament with reference to the system of drawing bills. Instead of payment by bills prompt payment was introduced, and additional precautions were also taken to ensure greater accuracy in the preparation of the estimates; because under the more lax system which prevailed up to that time, the estimates were generally low, the expenditure in war constantly exceeded them, and that excess was met by the creation of a separate naval debt. Now, Sir, the precautions taken were considered at the time to be ample, and I am glad to say, after twenty years' experience, they have proved satisfactory. At the same period an alteration was made in the Appropriation Act, which compelled not only the perpetual audit of the accounts, but, when there has been an excess in the expenditure of the year beyond the vote of supply for the naval expenditure of that year, it has been by law rendered compulsory that that excess shall be stated to Parliament by an independent board of audit, and that that excess shall be brought under the notice of a Committee of Supply, and the deficiency made good by a separate vote; or, if there be a surplus, that that surplus shall be carried to the credit of the year in which such surplus occurred. The first vote I have to bring under your notice is in accordance with this provision. In the year ending the 31st of March, 1854, the surplus of expenditure over the sum voted was 79,000*l.* Considering the large sums of which the estimates were composed, this amount is in itself insignificant, but the production of this excess now is a proof of the efficacy of the new system and of the careful observation of the rule laid down by Parliament. The next vote, as I have already said, has reference to the present year, ending on the 31st of March, and notwithstanding the large amount which Parliament generously voted for the naval service in the last year, amounting, independently of the cost of transports, to above 8,000,000*l.*, the actual surplus expenditure for the year ending on the 31st of March, as nearly as we can calculate it, including transports, will amount to a sum of 1,938,000*l.* Of this sum, on a former evening, a Vote was taken on account for 1,600,000*l.*, and there remains therefore to be voted a sum of 322,504. Now, the estimates for the ensuing year are larger than the estimates voted for the current year, independently of this supplementary estimate, by a sum of about 2,000,000*l.* If we take, in addition to the sum actually voted, this supplementary estimate for the current year of 1,938,000*l.*, the sum asked being about 10,000,000*l.*, is only an increase of 299,000*l.*, independently of transports, for the whole naval service of next year, as compared with the expenditure of the current year.

In former years of war the number of men voted has been infinitely larger than the number of men which I now ask at your hands. The number of men voted in 1814 was no less than 147,000 men. The proposition which I now make to the Committee is, that there shall be an addition to the present force of 6,700 seamen and boys, and of 500 marines, making the naval force for the ensuing year amount to 70,000 men. The excess now asked for over the sum voted for the current year amounts altogether, as I have already stated, excluding the supplementary estimate, which is the second Vote, to about 2,000,000*l.* This excess arises upon five Votes. It arises upon Vote 1 for men, amounting to 231,000*l.*; upon Vote 2, for victuals, amounting to 303,000*l.*; on Vote 8, for wages, 171,000*l.*; Vote 10, for stores, machinery, and ships, amounting to 1,088,000*l.*; and Vote 11, new works, 188,000*l.* As I have already stated to the House the large number of seamen voted at the end of the former war amounted altogether, seamen and marines, to 147,000 men, and I have contrasted that number with the present force which it is my duty to propose to you. But I must here call to the remembrance of the House the altered circumstances under which the naval force is now created. Throughout the last war impressment universally prevailed. I have the pleasure of stating to the Committee, that, at this moment, the full amount of naval force voted by Parliament, exclusive of marines, amounting to somewhere near 61,000 men—the whole of that force is now afloat and is available for service, by voluntary enlistment; and the whole number voted by Parliament is, indeed, slightly exceeded. The expenditure under Vote 1, which is somewhat in excess, is to be traced to causes which have rendered this voluntary enlistment comparatively easy. By the generosity of Parliament various alterations have been introduced into the pay and allowances of seamen. Some of these, I think, I have stated on former occasions to the House; some I have now to state for the first time. There was, for example, what appeared to the Board of Admiralty an unjust distinction in the pay of marines afloat as compared with the pay of those on shore. A deduction was made from their pay in consideration of the rations which were issued to them when on board, together with the seamen. That reduction has now been abolished, and a marine now receives his pay whether afloat or on shore, without any deduction, and when serving afloat is placed on a footing of perfect equality with seamen. Then, again, there was a new rating introduced towards the close of the last year—that of "leading men," with a higher class of pay, as contrasted with "ablebodied seamen." Then, again, we have introduced a system of payment infinitely more prompt than heretofore. By this arrangement ships are paid almost immediately on their arrival in port, instead of having an outstanding account lying over for some time, a principle which was introduced by the Government which preceded the one to which I lately had the honour to belong, by the Board of Admiralty, presided over by the Duke of Northumberland. In consequence of this system of prompt payment, I may mention that the Baltic fleet, which has recently returned to England, had been paid up in full, with the exception of some two months' pay. Then, again, as to allotments of pay;—there have been increased facilities afforded in that important matter—the privilege of the seaman in exercising an independent right of disposal over his own earnings. There were restrictions formerly on that right which appeared to me to be neither necessary nor just. A seaman was not permitted to allot his pay, excepting in certain degrees of affinity—relationship was necessary to constitute the right of an allottee. The Board of Admiralty have abolished that restriction, and a seaman now has a perfect right to nominate any person to whom he wishes his pay to be allotted, without reference at all to any degree of relationship, or any other consideration. Then again, in regard to another important matter, a Vote is to be taken for a considerable sum, 197,000*l.*, in excess of the vote for slops, that is, clothing issued to the seamen. The cost price of articles of that description has risen greatly, but it has not been thought expedient to raise the price of those issued to the seamen, and, in consequence, there is on the face of the estimates the sum of 197,000*l.*, which is the estimated difference between the cost price to the public and the lower price at which they are to be sold to the seamen. Then, again, as to continuous service. This principle was adopted last Session, with the full consent of Parliament, that men entering for a period of years not less than ten should receive a higher rate of pay, on account of the permanent hold which the country would possess over their services by the abandonment of the right which men hitherto had of claiming their discharge at the end of five years' service. That higher rate of pay has acted as an inducement, and it is highly gratifying to me to be enabled to inform the Committee, that at this moment nearly 20,000 seamen and first-class boys have availed themselves of this higher rate of pay, and this will form before long, I believe, the best reserve on which the country can rely for a permanent naval force.

I have also to state that we have added, within the last three years, nearly 4,000 men to the marines. I cannot too strongly impress on the Committee my earnest desire, the result of experience and of reflection, that this amount of 16,000 marines should, under any state of circumstances, whether of peace or of war, be considered by Parliament as the permanent force to be maintained. I am quite satisfied that this force is the nucleus from which a fleet can be formed in the shortest time and with the greatest certainty. There are no men who, on the whole, are of such inestimable value. They are trained as gunners, they are perfect as soldiers, they have been taught with success the light infantry exercise, they are now acting as such in connexion with Lord Raglan's army, and as to fitting out ships, they are so expert that there is a slackness on the part of seamen to enter until the marines on board have performed the heaviest portion of the work of fitting out. The marines are, therefore, perfect soldiers, accomplished sailors—their merits cannot be too highly extolled or valued, and I am quite satisfied that it is most conducive to the welfare of the naval service, and, consequently, to the safety of the State, that this should be regarded as the permanent force, and I hope that Parliament will not, even in a time of peace, hastily diminish the number of marines, and that every Government, judging from past experience, will be slow to reduce this force of 16,000 men, which has required such great exertions to raise, and which we have so successfully trained, and which, I repeat, I am satisfied is the most valuable addition to the naval forces of this country at all times and in all circumstances. Upon the other heads I have explained, so far as is necessary at present to do, the excess of Vote 1 in the number of men. I have shown that, for 231,000*l.*, you will obtain an increase of 6,000 sailors and 500 marines. The next excess arises upon Vote 2, for provisions. That is easily explained by the increased number of men to be employed—not less than 9,000; and, in addition, there has been a material rise in the prices of articles which mainly constitute the provisioning of the Navy—salt provisions, fresh meat, and spirits—the rise upon which articles has been nearly 18 per cent. These two circumstances, therefore, account for this increase. The next Vote in which there is an increase is Vote 8, for wages to artificers, &c., employed in Her Majesty's establishments at home. That excess arises mainly from an addition of 800 shipwrights, which, on account of the war, it has been thought fit to make to the establishments at home, and also from the rise in wages paid to labourers arising from the high prices of provisions, and perhaps still more from the urgent necessity for the prompt execution of works indispensably necessary for carrying on the war, which has rendered it expedient not only to increase the number of shipwrights, but also not to permit them any longer to work by daywork, but to introduce task, without any limitation of the amount of work they might be able to perform. This has enabled us, with great expedition, to fit out a very large number of ships, and, considering the work which has been done, and the rapidity with which it has been executed, I hope the increase of 71,000*l.* will not be thought excessive by the Committee.

I now come to the principal excess in the Vote for the ensuing year, as compared with that for the past year, which will be found in Vote 10, for stores for the building, outfit, and repairs of the fleet, and for the purchase and building of ships by contract in merchant dockyards. The excess in this Vote mainly consists of the following items—With regard to stores, prices have risen in some of the most important materials. I will illustrate this by five articles—timber, hemp, canvas, copper, and iron. I should state that under these heads we cover, if I mistake not, somewhere about 480,000*l.* of the entire excess of 1,088,000*l.* and that of that sum a very large portion is to be traced to the purchases of hemp which the Board of Admiralty have thought it expedient to make. It has always appeared to me of the last importance that this great naval country should be emancipated from its dependence on the Baltic for its exclusive supply of hemp. Italy produces hemp of very superior quality as compared with Baltic hemp, and the Board of Admiralty has had an opportunity of purchasing a very large quantity of Italian hemp at a lower price than Baltic hemp, a quantity quite sufficient for all the estimated requirements of the naval service for twelve months to come. This hemp will be supplied from Italy alone, and we shall thus be altogether emancipated from our dependence on the Baltic for hemp. The material, too, is of a quality, judging from our own limited experience, and still more relying on the experience of our naval ally —I mean France—vastly superior to Baltic hemp. I think the Committee will agree that an expenditure on a large scale, in order to develope the Italian market for hemp, was a provident expenditure on the part of the Admiralty. The other items to which I refer arise from the circumstance of the war. At this moment we have substituted in the Black Sea for ten sail of the line, consisting entirely, with one exception, of sailing ships, six sail of the line, one a three-decker, another of 100 guns on two decks, and four other ships of the largest class, all propelled by steam power; and it is not intended by the Government to send any sailing ships whatever to the Baltic. Our experience has taught us that the intermixture of screw and sailing ships is not conducive to the interests of the service. They cannot be manœuvred together. The Commander in Chief, not using the same arm, but having to consider the use, first, of the sailing ships, and then of the screw ships, is baffled in his arrangements, and the efficiency of the fleet is consequently materially affected. It is intended to send into the Baltic in the ensuing year vessels propelled by steam alone, and I hope before six weeks or two months are over twenty sail of the line, propelled by steam, will be ready to resume operations in that quarter. Considering the scale of those operations, the consumption of coal must be enormous. The expense, therefore, is great, though experience shows that the expense is not so great having regard to the superiority of the screw over sailing vessels. I have already told you that at the end of the French war we had 147,000 sailors and marines. I ask you only on the present occasion to have 70,000 sailors and marines. At the end of the French war, when we had really not an enemy on the sea, nor a rival, we had in commission somewhere about 100 or 110 sail of the line. According to the proposition which I now make, we shall not have above forty-six or perhaps fifty sail of the line, but I believe the smaller force, with a smaller number of men, but with all the appliances of modern art and science, will be found no less efficacious to sustain the honour of this country either for the purposes of offence or defence. And if that be so, although the proportion of expenditure may be heavy in the purchase of machinery, in the maintenance of machinery, and the substitution of an artificial propelling power for a natural one, yet, on the whole, my belief is, that, notwithstanding the extra expenditure, the balance of advantage even on the lower ground of expense will be found to be in favour of modern science and modern improvement. The excess of cost for coal is estimated at 500,000*l*. That may appear alarming, but it must be remembered that in the Black Sea we are rapidly substituting steam-vessels only for a force mainly consisting of sailing vessels, and, as I have stated, we intend to send to the Baltic twenty sail of the line, which will form part of a fleet of 100 vessels, all propelled by steam. This brings me to another explanation of this heavy expenditure. France and England have come to a mutual agreement to prepare for operations in the Baltic five floating batteries, twenty gun-boats, and ten mortar-boats, making together ten floating batteries, forty gun-boats, and twenty mortar-boats, all heavily armed, and of light draught, and all propelled by steam. In concert with France —happily our ally, no longer our rival, except in the honest and earnest endeavour to bring this contest to an honourable close by increased exertions—we have during the winter been preparing this immense armament. Parliament, in its generosity, voted a large sum to meet this expenditure, but a considerable amount for steam-engines and the construction of vessels still remains outstanding; and, having mentioned the increase of the Vote for the purchase of stores and coals, the residue of excess is made up of 650,000*l*. for steam machinery, and 350,000*l*. still outstanding for the building of floating batteries, mortar-boats, and gun-vessels, to which I have already adverted. The 650,000*l*. for steam machinery will not only be applied to vessels already launched and forming part of the naval force to be employed in the Baltic and the Black Sea, but it is proposed, in the course of the ensuing year, to launch five or six line-of-battle ships and frigates, of a most powerful description, for which steam machinery will be supplied under the Vote which I now ask. Therefore, you will observe, steps have been taken not only to increase the efficiency of the force now afloat, but to meet any reverses, should they occur—and reverses in war can never be considered as avoidable. They will occur, and precautions are taken by having ships of equal capacity and equal power to meet any loss which, in the course of the coming year, may be sustained. The next Vote of which there is any excess is Vote 11, for new works. The sum of that excess is 188,000*l*., partly to be traced to a new bakery at Deptford, rendered necessary by the large demand for the supply of biscuits to the fleets. The new mode of construction has so added to the length of ships of war as to render necessary the lengthening of the docks at Portsmouth, Chatham, and Sheerness, the expense of which is considerable; and there is also a sum expended on works at Keyham to expedite the completion of the factories there for the construction and repair of steamers of war.

Now, Sir, I have gone through briefly the principal heads of excess in the Votes of the ensuing year as contrasted with the Votes of the past, and this will probably form the effective expenditure. It will be satisfactory to the Committee to hear that what is termed the dead weight of the Navy is progressively diminishing. In

1831, when my attention was first directed to these matters, the half-pay of the Navy was 878,000*l*. For the current year, 1854, it is only 696,000*l*., showing a decrease of 182,000*l*. Then, too, with regard to civil pensions. In 1834, I had the honour of introducing a measure for the purpose of effecting considerable reductions in that branch. The difference is very sensible, and it will become more and more so. In 1834, the civil pensions of the Navy amounted to 230,000*l*. This year we ask only for 149,000*l*., showing a decrease, which is progressive, of 81,000*l*. I am warned, by recent indisposition, that I shall not find it easy to continue these remarks, even if the Committee should kindly bear with me; but I thought it my duty to appear this evening for the purpose, however imperfectly, of stating the questions now to be submitted to you with regard to the Navy expenditure. It has been said, and said truly, that to bring this war to a speedy and honourable conclusion every effort which this country can make is indispensable. I would have the Committee bear in mind we are making war on a Sovereign whose empire is great and remarkable on account of its being almost unassailable. We are carrying on that war in the neighbourhood of his resources and at a distance from our own. We have carried that war into his country—a country almost destitute of provisions—and we are carrying it on in the dead of winter in the Black Sea, which is a sea without a harbour. These are great strains on our naval power. It may be asked, what have you done with regard to your large expenditure for the Navy? Now, I really must say that, on the whole, the operations in the Baltic, as they were conducted last year, appear to me to deserve the approbation of the House. Bomarsund, a most important naval station, fortified strongly, and bearing marks of an intention to carry that system of fortification to a much greater extent, has been destroyed. The great naval arsenal of Cronstadt, close to the capital of the Emperor of Russia, was visited by a force inferior to the force there stationed. Battle was repeatedly offered, and as repeatedly declined. Up to the last moment Sweaborg, with nine sail-of-the-line, was blockaded by an inferior force of frigates only. Never were operations more successful, displaying more gallantry, more discipline, than the operations in the Baltic. In that sea not a ship was lost, and a most effective blockade was kept up, a blockade that displayed the energy, skill, and gallantry of English officers and men, and the pressure brought to bear upon the enemy was, I believe, by no means slight. Then, also, I am bound to say, with reference to the conduct of the Navy everywhere, that it has been most satisfactory. You have a commerce covering every sea, and extending to the most remote parts of the globe, and I am not aware that a single merchant ship has fallen into the hands of the enemy. I hope and believe that, as you have always done, so you will now have reason to depend upon the naval service for the support you have a right to expect. The naval service is the spear and the shield of the country, it is the weapon of attack and the buckler of defence, it is the rock upon which we may build our hopes of safety without fear of disappointment. This nation has never failed to regard that service with the partiality and confidence it deserves, and you, as faithful representatives of the people, will never do anything to injure that service. You will require a strict account of expenditure from those who administer its affairs, but you will do nothing to impair its efficiency; and I am satisfied that, in so doing, you will best provide for the national interests and the national security. I now beg to propose a Vote of 79,099*l*., to defray the excess of expenditure over the Estimates of last year.

MR. W. WILLIAMS said, he did not intend to oppose the Estimates which had been laid before the House by the right hon. Baronet, for ever since the commencement of the war he had always expressed his opinion that every facility should be afforded to the Government for successfully carrying it on, and for bringing it to a speedy and honourable termination. He wished, however, to make a few observations on what had fallen from the right hon. Baronet. The right hon. Baronet had referred to the number of men required to carry on the present war, as compared with the number required to carry on the last; but he did not think that there was any credit to be taken because the number required for the present war fell short of that required in the last. The duties of the navy were very slight now, compared with what was then the case. Now we had only to shut up the enemy's ships in two seas; then we had to protect our commerce and our colonies in every part of the globe. The right hon. Baronet had taken great credit for only requiring 6,800 men more than last year, but really, unless some greater use was to be made of our naval force, no justification could be offered even for that increase. The right hon. Baronet had taken credit for the reduction of the half-pay and retired pensions list, but he could not join with him in expressing any approbation on that account. What was the state of the half-pay list at the present time? The Committee must bear in mind that we had at present only seventeen admirals actively employed, whereas there were no fewer than 270 on half-pay; and the number of admirals was actually greater now than it was last year by nine. There was, in fact, an admiral for almost every ship we had afloat, for he doubted whether we had so many as 270 in commission. In like manner, there were 124 captains employed, while there were 480 upon half-pay; 127 commanders employed, and 897 upon half-pay; 642 lieutenants employed, and 983 upon half-pay. In other words, there were sixteen admirals on half-pay for every one on active service; and there were more than five times as many captains and commanders idle as employed. The wages of all the officers, seamen, and marines in the present Vote was 2,885,000*l.*, and the half-pay, pensions, and allowances to widows and children amounted to 1,254,000*l.*, or nearly one-half of the wages of the officers and men on service. With respect to the new works, he thought that some of them were not of such pressing importance, and might be dispensed with for the present. The right hon. Baronet had referred to the proceedings in the Baltic last summer; but if no more was to be expected from the fleet we were going to send out this year, he (Mr. Williams) thought that the Committee were about to sanction a vast amount of very unnecessary expenditure. As to Bomarsund, that was not taken by the fleet, but by the French army which had been sent out, not to accomplish that object, but a great deal more. At the same time he gave the Admiralty great credit for the energy it had displayed in fitting out the fleet last year, but he hoped that those men who had been selected from the coast-guard at a great increase of cost would be sent back, and that the Government would be able this year to man the fleet with sailors at the regular pay. Finally, he trusted that the Admiralty would carefully look into the subject of coaling the Black Sea fleet. It was reported that coals could be procured on the coast of Asia, at a very short distance from Sebastopol, for 7*s.* a ton, and that it lay, some within a quarter of a mile from the coast, and none of it more than eight miles from the sea. Any other remarks that he might have to make he would offer when the different Votes came before the Committee.

Captain SCOBELL said, that in rising to address the Committee on the important subject of the Navy Estimates, he could not abstain from expressing his regret at the absence of the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume). The right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty had drawn the attention of the Committee to the merits of the marines. As marines no one could rate them more highly than he (Captain Scobell) did; but when the right hon. Baronet stated that they were accomplished sailors as well as soldiers, he begged to demur to that proposition. The marine never went aloft, and he could neither hand, reef, nor steer; but in their own duties they were well deserving the praises that were bestowed upon them. He thought the Government were wise in proposing to have six screw line-of-battle ships in the Black Sea. Last year there was really but one, the *Agamemnon*, and although Sir Edmund Lyons would be an admirable sailor in any vessel, there was no doubt that his efficiency had been considerably increased by having that fine vessel for his flag-ship. In the course of their discussions a few nights ago upon proposed reforms in the army, they had been told about a modern Hercules sweeping away the Horse Guards. He could only hope when the modern Hercules appeared, that he would strike with his club at the Admiralty. He did not think that we ever had had a better political First Lord than at the present time; but the system was thoroughly bad. A noble Lord, who had had some official experience, had stated in another place, that if the administration of the army were assimilated to that of the navy, it would become a hotbed of jobbery and bribery. He did not go quite so far as to say that, but he did complain strongly of the system of promotion in the navy, and he recommended the First Lord to abandon that system and to determine to advance merit, and merit alone. This course had been commenced in the dockyards, and in the civil service; and if it were carried out in the navy it would lead to the promotion of active, energetic, and skilful men. At present four-fifths of the officers were ashore, not because their services had not been offered, but because the lists were all too large. There were actually lieutenants of as many as thirty-six, and of even fifty years' standing. The fault was that too many were allowed to enter as cadets. He was sorry to see that as many as 200 or 300 cadets had been entered this very year. [Sir J. GRAHAM: 150.] The fruit of the system was that some of the best officers in the service were pining in neglect, while those who had family and Parliamentary interest were rapidly advanced over them. There were men who had never lost a month after they were eligible for promotion, whereas others of thirty-six or fifty years' standing were never promoted at all after the first step. He (Captain Scobell) asked nothing for himself or for anybody else; but he said that, if the First Lord would put an end to the present system he would lay the Navy under the greatest possible obligations to him. It had been stated that the Baltic fleet had been badly manned and worse disciplined. He believed that some of those ships had been badly manned, and he knew that it was very difficult to bring badly-manned ships into good discipline. A number of landsmen and men from the coastguard and dockyards were huddled together and called a "ship's crew." A gallant officer had observed to him that however much pressed, he would not have taken the command of some of those ships, because he was persuaded that if he had gone into action with them he should have lost his reputation. He would strongly recommend that bounties should be given to sailors as well as to soldiers. Bounties were given to the marines, to the artillery, and to all other classes in the army, and there was no reason why a similar inducement should not be given to the sailor. The good effect of raising the bounty had been experienced in the case of the army, and he could not but regard it as an act of craziness to withhold it from the sailor. He had moved an Address for an Order of Merit, and he rejoiced that it was about to be instituted, attainable by men of all ranks. He was convinced that it would act as a great stimulus directly it became known, and he trusted that it would be speedily adopted and promptly awarded. A great deal had been said as to the state of the harbour at Balaklava, and he, as a naval officer, could not conceive why such confusion had prevailed there, for though the harbour was small yet the water was smooth, and the ships could lie by the side of each other. In the case of the *Prince*, he should like to know under whose superintendence she was loaded, so that the wrong things were placed uppermost, and when she had entered the harbour with a most precious freight of clothing for the soldiers, some one ordered her out, and who gave that order? [Sir J. GRAHAM: She never entered the harbour.] Why had she not entered then? She was there several days before she lost an anchor and cable or two and was wrecked. He trusted that this country would not, in carrying on the war with vigour, attempt to imitate the Continental Powers with regard to the numerical amount of the army. It was impossible that this country could compete with them in numbers; but there was no reason why the army should not be kept in a state of efficiency.

MR. COWPER said, he thought the complaints of both the hon. Gentlemen who had just spoken with regard to the lists of officers were unfounded. The Admiralty had adopted a system of regulations under which officers who were too far advanced in years to be capable of active exertion were placed on the retired list; while, on the other hand, officers now reached their flag at an age while they were in full vigour. As regarded the patronage of the navy, he must deny, in the strongest manner, that promotions were now made on account of private interest, and not with a view to the public service. Being individually unconcerned in the matter, he could bear witness to the fact that his right hon. Friend at the head of the Admiralty was not in any degree liable to such a charge; that in all the promotions which he had made he had selected those officers whose promotion would in his opinion be best for the public service, without reference to any personal, political, or private considerations. After the Government had adopted the plan universally recommended of selecting the younger officers in preference to the older ones, it was natural for the latter to complain that they had been passed over for personal or political reasons; but he repeated that there was no foundation whatever for such a supposition. His hon. and gallant Friend (Captain Scobell) complained that too large a number of naval cadets had been appointed. There again he was entirely mistaken, for the number was not sufficient. As to his hon. and gallant Friend's complaint that no bounty was offered to seamen, he would ask whether such a complaint was reasonable when at that moment they had a larger number of seamen even without bounty than was sanctioned by Parliament. The excess certainly was not large enough to call for a vote of censure, but the fact was that there were forty-four more seamen in the navy than were voted. The hon. and gallant Gentleman's remarks about Balaklava, and the loss of the *Prince*, should be a warning to persons against relying too much on reports which come from the Crimea. The hon. and gallant Gentleman was entirely mistaken in supposing that the *Prince* went into harbour. She landed the regiment that went out in her ; but as the harbour was, when she arrived, full of ships which were unloading, it became necessary that she should wait outside until her turn came to enter, and it was owing to that cause, and to the loss of two of her anchors, that she was not in a situation to weather the gale. He must observe, too, that the loss of the *Prince* could not be considered a reproach to the Royal Navy, as the captain of that vessel belonged to the merchant service.

Mr. LAYARD said, he was desirous of saying a few words on behalf of a deserving and meritorious class of men in the navy, who he thought had of late been somewhat ill-treated, and who had not been mentioned by the hon. and gallant Member for Bath—he alluded to the masters. The House was aware of the onerous duties of the masters in the navy, and, though in the Black Sea their services had not been so much required, in the Baltic the services of this class had been called forth in a very distinguished manner, and yet not a single promotion had been conferred upon them. One of the masters, Mr. Ball, had particularly distinguished himself, and had been mentioned in the despatches. He believed that the omission of this branch of the service had created considerable disappointment to that arm of the service. He trusted that the hon. Member for Middlesex (Mr. B. Osborne), in his ardent zeal for the improvement of the public service, would not overlook the claims of this very meritorious branch of it.

Admiral BERKELEY said, that the subject just alluded to by the hon. Member was under the consideration of the Admiralty. A good deal had been said about the stowage of the unfortunate ship the *Prince*. Now, a Committee had been appointed by the Government to inquire into the loss of that ill-fated vessel, and he would read an extract from the Report at which this Committee arrived. The extract in question was to the effect that the evidence adduced not only disproved the allegation that the loading of the ship was grossly neglected, but also established the fact that the captain of the vessel had no ground whatever for stating, that shot, shell, and gunpowder had been placed on the top of the medical stores. With regard to the transport service, it should be remembered that there could be no comparison made between the state of the transport service during the last war and the improved manner in which it was now conducted. The Committee might depend upon it that there was little to complain of with regard to this branch of the service.

Sir GEORGE TYLER said, that in the course of last Session he had ventured to suggest to the First Lord of the Admiralty that bounties should be offered to induce able seamen to enter the navy—a measure which, he thought, would be productive of very beneficial results. The consequence of such bounties not being given, he regretted to say, had been that the Baltic fleet was anything but well manned. There was a very marked distinction between the naval and military services in this respect, which must, he thought, tend to excite disgust in the navy, unless it were allowed to participate in the advantages enjoyed by the sister service. The bounty given in the army averaged from 6*l.* to 10*l.* per man, and the soldier also receeived his clothing free. The right hon Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty said that clothing was furnished to the seamen at a cheaper rate than its prime cost ; but why, he asked, should he not be presented with it, on entering the service, in the same way as the soldier was immediately on his volunteering for the army ? The same stamp of property might easily be placed on the sailors' clothing as was impressed on the uniform of the soldier. But the army possessed other advantages over the navy ; and if this inequality were redressed there could be no doubt that it would afford great satisfaction to the latter service. Another point that had been referred to in that discussion related to the naval-coast volunteers. He saw an item of 50,000*l.* in the estimates of the last and the present year for these coast volunteers. He thought it would be in the right hon. Baronet's recollection that he had previously pressed on his attention the propriety of establishing a naval reserve, and the right hon. Gentleman had expressed his intention to introduce a measure to effect that object. He wished therefore to ask, if the increase of 20,000 men now proposed was designed to form the reserve which it was meant to establish? [Sir J. GRAHAM: It would be the commencement of it.] He supposed that they would be kept as a mere coastguard in England and Scotland. Another item was for the additional pay of petty officers in the coastguard service. Now, he asked, if these coastguardsmen, when serving on board ship, were to be allowed to receive double pay, that was, pay as both coastguardsmen and as seamen at one and the same time? That would be unjust towards the other seamen who were doing the same duty at sea as these coastguardsmen. He thought that, when we had these additional men for a naval reserve, if the coastguard were not required for the navy, they should be allowed to return to their original employment. He had made these remarks, in the hope that the right hon. Baronet would consider them worthy of attention, and he believed that if we granted the same indulgences to the navy as were shown to the army, we should be able to secure the services of good and efficient seamen for Her Majesty's Navy.

SIR JAMES GRAHAM said, he always listened with respect to suggestions emanating from the hon. and gallant Member. As to the comparative pay of the army and navy, the remuneration of the sailor was, relatively, infinitely higher than that of the soldier. Whatever was given to the latter in the shape of bounty was reimbursed by him in the form of stoppages of pay on his first employment; whereas the sailor, from the moment he entered the service, received a higher scale of pay, which was liable to no such stoppages or reduction. The hon. and gallant Member had been misinformed if he supposed that coastguardsmen serving as sailors drew pay both as coastguardsmen and as sailors. The real state of the case was, that the coastguardsman, when on board ship, was continued in the enjoyment of his coastguard pay, but he received nothing in his capacity as a sailor. Every disposition was evinced to allow the coastguard to return to service on shore, but the bargain made with them bound them to serve on board ship when required in time of war, and a discretion must of course be vested in the ruling power to determine when their services at sea could or could not be dispensed with.

MR. APSLEY PELLATT wished to know whether that most useful class of officers the boatswains received any special reward for lengthened services, and whether their widows were entitled to a pension; whether it was the practice of the Admiralty, in making purchases of machinery, to obtain what they required through the medium of public tender or by applying to the private establishments which had the largest number of skilled workmen, and could do the work in the shortest and most efficient manner; and also whether the Government did not think it would be highly beneficial to introduce private workmen into the dockyards with a view to the adoption of improvements?

SIR JAMES GRAHAM said, that abuses had crept in under the former system of granting pensions to the widows of these officers, and therefore an increase of pay had been allowed to the men in lieu of it. The practice of placing small deposits in savings banks was fostered by every means in the Admiralty's power. As to the manufacture of the machinery required for the service, the Admiralty found by experience that there were only six or eight firms in this country that could execute this description of work; and the system pursued, when new orders had to be given, was to issue private letters to each of those firms, informing them of the nature of the machinery that was demanded, and then to leave them to compete with each other for its construction.

MR. J. G. PHILLIMORE said, he was exceedingly anxious to know whether any explanation could be offered of the extraordinary manner in which Odessa had been spared? He did not ask that question for the sake of embarrassing or censuring the Government, but a great deal of anxiety had been felt out of doors upon the point, and he thought Ministers ought to be obliged to him for giving them an opportunity of explaining it.

SIR JAMES GRAHAM said, he had no difficulty in answering the hon. and learned Gentleman's question. On more than one occasion within the last six months the attention of the Commander in Chief in the Black Sea was drawn to the state of Odessa, and in the event of its being accessible by naval means an opinion was expressed that should the opportunity offer there should be no hesitation on the part of the Commander in Chief in exercising his full authority to order a hostile visitation. Of course the attack was left entirely to the discretion of the Admiral, as well as the ordering of the means by which it was to be carried out.

ADMIRAL WALCOTT said, he had heard with much satisfaction the commendation of the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) of the class of masters in the Navy. He was glad to see the Admiralty disposed to show them every consideration; as in 1847, by an Order in Council, they were rendered eligible to be promoted to the rank of Commander for distinguished services. He thought that a certain set of policemen for seamen should be established in each seaport.

MR. DANBY SEYMOUR said, he was surprised to hear that only twenty gunboats and five batteries were required for the Baltic and the Black Sea, especially when he considered the large number of similar vessels which Russia had at her disposal, and remembering that almost every Russian historian, while commenting upon the war between Sweden and Russia last century, dwelt upon the service and importance which gun-boats were in the contest. It was by means of these same gun-boats, he was informed by merchants in the City, that Russia was now enabled on the Danube to intercept the harvest of the last three years. Now, only imagine the importance it would be to us, as tending to reduce the cost of provisioning the army in the Crimea, if, instead of blockading the mouth of the river with a large flotilla, we had a sufficiency of small gun-boats to attack the enemy in his strongholds. He hoped, then, the statement of the right hon. Baronet was only a *ruse* to deceive the enemy, and that there were at least a hundred gun-boats in the course of construction.

SIR JAMES GRAHAM said, he fully appreciated the value of gun-boats, particularly in the Baltic, but at the same time he must remind the hon. Member, that modern experience taught a very different lesson to that preached by the Russian historian; for although last year Russia had a considerable number of gunboats at her command in the Baltic, none of them were ever able to get within gunshot of any of our ships. With regard to

the Black Sea, there was already a large number of vessels out there drawing but a small draught of water, and others were to be sent out. He agreed with the hon. Gentleman that it was of the last importance that not only the mouth, but the entire rout of the Danube should be kept open; but the obstruction did not depend so much upon the presence of Russian gun-boats as upon the circumstance that on the low left bank of the river there were land batteries of such great strength that no naval force of small vessels could clear it.

LORD LOVAINE was understood to object to the destruction of the town of Odessa, as being an unfortified place.

SIR JAMES GRAHAM said, that since the commencement of the war Odessa had been strongly fortified.

MR. LAYARD said, that as gun-boats would, no doubt, be found necessary to be used in the Baltic Sea, it was important to know that they could be constructed at a small expense at Constantinople, where there was a large yard for the building of such boats. With regard to Odessa, it was an unpardonable oversight that the Government should have suffered that port to remain untouched. He had warned them of the importance of disabling that port. It was the great resource of Russia in supplying its army in the Crimea with food; for they had large stores and warehouses, in which immense quantities of grain were deposited. Odessa formed a central point, from which Russia could communicate with her southern dominions. Had Odessa been destroyed last year, it would have prevented Russia from keeping up so large an army in the Crimea, as she would not have had the means of supplying them with food. It had been said that Odessa was strongly fortified. When the *Tiger* went there Odessa had no fortifications at all; there was scarcely a garrison, and the few batteries that were there might have been silenced in two or three hours. All the fortifications which it now possessed had been constructed since then. The object of our forbearance, it seemed, was to spare a large part of the town; but the consequence had been to allow Russia to erect strong fortifications and to pour thousands of men into the Crimea.

MR. H. HERBERT said, he wished to call the attention of the Committee to a speech which he had seen published in an Aberdeen newspaper, in which the speaker seemed to rejoice at the fact, that an English ship had been beaten off Odessa by the Russians, and a sort of boast was made of the great gallantry shown by the enemy on that occasion. He must confess he was sorry that any person should be found in this country to plead for a town which formed one of the strongholds of the enemy.

LORD LOVAINE said, the hon. and learned Member was under a total misconception of what he had said on the occasion referred to; and he must say that because he had elsewhere pleaded in favour of a defenceless town, he did not expect to be met on the floor of the House of Commons, and be told that because the Russians had exercised acts of cruelty upon our troops, therefore we ought to have made reprisals upon the unoffending inhabitants of Odessa.

Vote *agreed to;* as were also the following Votes.

(2.) 322,504*l.* Naval Expenditure beyond the Grants for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1855.

(3.) 70,000 Men (Sea Service).

(4.) 2,885,567*l.*, Wages.

(5.) 1,374,081*l.*, Victuals.

(6.) 140.469*l.*, Admiralty Office.

(7.) 50,000*l.*, Naval Coast Volunteers.

(8.) 51,676*l.*, Scientific Branch.

(9.) 142,571*l.*, Establishments at Home.

(10.) 26,919*l.*, Establishments Abroad.

(11.) 1,102,222*l.*, Wages to Artificers at Home.

(12.) 57,500*l.*, Wages to Artificers Abroad.

CAPTAIN DUNCOMBE said, he wished to know what were the circumstances under which the sum of 10,000*l.* for building a screw yacht for the Emperor of Japan was asked for?

SIR JAMES GRAHAM said, he was glad the hon. and gallant Member had asked this question, as it gave him an opportunity of doing justice to a gallant Admiral on a distant station, who, in a most unassuming manner, but, at the same time, with great boldness of execution, had secured a very important advantage for this country. He alluded to Sir James Stirling, the admiral commanding on the China station, who, availing himself of an opportunity which offered, had visited Japan, where he was received in the most friendly manner, and had negotiated a treaty with the Government of the Emperor of Japan, whereby he had secured for Her Majesty's vessels the right of entry to certain ports for the purpose of refitting and victualling, the same right being also extended to all British merchant ships. That treaty was negotiated by Sir James Stirling on his own responsibility, and on being sent home for ratification it was entirely approved by Her Majesty's Government. Sir James Stirling, on sending home the treaty for ratification, had intimated to Her Majesty's Government that the present which the Committee was now asked to vote in the shape of a small steam yacht, would be very acceptable to the Emperor, and would be likely to tend to the establishment of friendly relations with his Government. The Committee would perceive the great importance of having a naval station so close to the Russian settlement at the mouth of the Amour, and he had no doubt that great advantages would be derived to this country from the treaty.

Vote *agreed to;* as were also the two following Votes.

(13.) 2,928,304*l.*, Naval Stores.

(14.) 567,568*l.*, New Works, &c.

(15.) 62,100*l.* Medicines and Medical Stores.

MR. STAFFORD said, that having visited the naval hospital at Therapia, he had the greatest pleasure in bearing his testimony to the efficient state of the hospital and the excellence of the arrangements, which certainly reflected credit on all concerned. He would also take that opportunity of calling attention to the difficulties attending the debarkation of the sick troops on their arrival in this country, which he understood had not been met in all instances as they ought to have been. He trusted that the Admiralty would devise some means by which the invalids could be disembarked at once and sent on to their destination without being kept on shipboard, which, he believed, had been attended in some instances with fatal results.

SIR JAMES GRAHAM said, he begged to express his great satisfaction at the testimony which the hon. Member had borne to the efficient state of the hospital at Therapia. The credit due must be attributed in a great measure to the excellent arrangements of Sir William Burnett, who had charge of this department. With regard to the debarkation of the sick troops, arrangements had been made for keeping open one ward at Haslar Hospital for their reception.

MR. G. DUNDAS said, he thought great

credit was due to Dr. Rees, of the *Britannia*, who had organised the hospital at Therapia.

MR. KINNAIRD said, he wished to call the attention of the Admiralty to the fact that the *Harbinger* and other vessels carrying invalids, had, as he was informed, on putting into port, been ordered to put to sea again without landing the wounded soldiers on board. He hoped that nothing of the sort would be allowed to occur again.

SIR JAMES GRAHAM said, that the Admiralty had no power of taking any steps with regard to these invalids on their arrival in port, except on communication from the medical authorities. The noble Lord, however, at the head of the Government, in his statement that evening, had intimated that the whole subject of the medical authorities and their connection with the Secretary of War was now under consideration.

MR. KINNAIRD said, the ship to which he referred was telegraphed as having arrived at Liverpool. When the communication was made to the Admiralty they said it was no business of theirs. A communication was then made to the Horse Guards, who sent it back to the Admiralty. What he complained of was, that from the want of unity of system our poor wounded soldiers were driven from pillar to post, because there was no competent authority to deal with them upon their arrival, he was, therefore, glad to hear that the attention of the Government had been called to the subject.

MR. LAYARD said, he had seen it stated that a hospital was to be established at Smyrna. Now, he wished to remind the Government that Smyrna was not a healthy place. The European inhabitants —the Franks—left Smyrna during the summer, and went to villages in the neighbourhood to seek a better climate. He would suggest that Rhodes might be a more preferable situation for a hospital.

SIR JAMES GRAHAM said, the subject had been most carefully considered by the Government. During the cold months Smyrna was healthy, but about the month of April, he believed, it was frequently visited by dangerous fevers. It would not, therefore, be prudent to erect a permanent establishment there, by which considerable expense would be incurred, and the Government had every reason to believe that Mitylene or Rhodes might perhaps be preferable situations for a hospital.

Mr. G. Dundas

MR. STAFFORD said, the barracks at Smyrna were in good condition, and as they were situated close to the seashore, if they were applied to the purposes of a hospital, the difficulty of disembarking the sick and wounded, and conveying them to the hospital—a difficulty which was experienced at Scutari and Constantinople in consequence of the distance of the hospitals from the shore—would be avoided.

MR. LAYARD hoped that, for the satisfaction of the country, the Government would state that some measures had been taken with respect to the improvement of the hospital at Balaklava.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON said, that the Commission which he had mentioned at an early period of the evening, whose duty it would be to investigate and improve the sanitary arrangements of all the hospitals, would proceed to Balaklava as well as to Scutari.

MR. KINNAIRD said, he begged to inquire whether Sir John Forbes had been appointed the head medical officer of the hospital at Balaklava? [Sir J. GRAHAM: No.] I am very glad to hear it.

MR. LAYARD said, he had seen it stated that Dr. Lawson had been appointed to one of the hopitals—he believed to the hospital at Rhodes. He wished to know whether it was true, after what had passed in the Crimea, that Dr. Lawson was still placed in a highly responsible position?

Vote *agreed to*; as were also

(16.) 73,086*l.*, Miscellaneous Services.

(17.) On the Vote of 635,497*l.* for half-pay, reserved half-pay, and retirement to officers of the Navy and Royal Marines,

CAPTAIN SCOBELL complained that the navy had no retirements of full pay under any circumstances, while in the army, and the marines there were retirements of full pay. In the army, too, there were constantly promotions on half-pay.

ADMIRAL WALCOTT: Sir, I am desirous of calling the attention of the First Lord of the Admiralty to Her Majesty's Order in Council of the 19th May, 1846, authorising the promotion of masters to the rank of commander for service of distinguished merit. In the late promotions for distinguished service I looked in vain for a promotion of this character, though I obtained, through the medium of a newspaper, the copy of a General Order issued by the late Commander in Chief of the Baltic fleet, conveying, by command of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, commendation from the Board in favour of this class of officers for their conduct in having navigated their respective ships in safety through difficult and dangerous navigation; I therefore ask the First Lord of the Admiralty whether it be the intention of the Board of Admiralty to confer a more substantial mark of their approbation on officers of this valuable and deserving class. I likewise desire to call the attention of the First Lord of the Admiralty to the present system of clothing the navy, which is, in my opinion, very objectionable. We now have a standing navy, which has reached a number of scarcely less than 20,000, and it is clearly worth while to place it on a more respectable footing in appearance, and this, it occurs to me, might be done by giving the continuous service men a distinguishing clothing, and by adding a clause to the Mutiny Act making persons purchasing seamen's clothes liable to punishment, as in the case of soldiers' necessaries. A seaman is now no sooner clothed and allowed to go on shore than he is liable to be tempted to sell his clothes, or exchange them for others far inferior, which pass muster when he returns on board, but leave him in rags in a few days. When we recollect that these men form the chief defence of the country, and consider how injurious is the present system to their comforts and interests of the service men of irregular habits such as these, constantly brought on board from leave, and charged with straggling money, and obliged to complete their clothes, becoming callous, and having no pay to receive, lose their attachment to the service, and though this has been the result of their own irregular conduct; it only proves how desirable it is to substitute prevention. This might be done by having a force, termed Naval Police, at each port of Plymouth, Portsmouth, Sheerness, Chatham, and Woolwich, composed of about a dozen men, each eligible for appointment as Masters at Arms or Ships Corporals, having a local knowledge of the ports, by which to guard and watch seamen when on shore, and having the power to take them on board their respective ships on witnessing irregularities; for many seamen, I believe, are encouraged to break their leave by designing men for the purpose of obtaining straggling money.

ADMIRAL BERKERLEY said, that the subjects named were under consideration, and in respect to the subject of clothing the navy, making penal the purchase of seamen's clothes, as indicated.

MR. WILLIAMS said, that the number of Admirals on the list was not diminished this year. On the contrary, it was greater by nine. Many of those officers, no doubt, had rendered services to their country, but a great many had never rendered any service at all. In one instance a man had been made an Admiral who never had been one hour at sea in his life.

ADMIRAL WALCOTT said, that many naval officers who were capable of rendering service to their country, and who were anxious to do so, of whom he (Admiral Walcott) was one, had been placed on the half-pay list, and that it had been their calamity and misfortune that they had not been called into active service.

Vote *agreed to ;* as were also

(18.) 469,222*l.*, Military Pensions and Allowances.

(19.) 149,558*l.*, Civil Pensions and Allowances.

(20). 5,181,465*l.*, Transport Service.

SIR JAMES GRAHAM said, he felt it his duty, in moving this particular Vote, which was to a very large amount, to make a short statement to the Committee bearing upon a matter adverted to by his noble Friend at the head of the Government in the early part of the evening. It had been his (Sir J. Graham's) duty, when at the head of the Admiralty in 1832, to abolish several subordinate boards, and among others the Transport Board. In making the arrangement which he then submitted to Parliament, he had foreseen that upon the recurrence of war it would not be possible for the victualling department and the duties of the transport board to remain united. Indeed, he had always contemplated the necessity of a subdivision, and the experience of the last nine months had convinced him that what he considered possible in a time of peace was in a time of war impracticable. He had, therefore, before the resignation of Lord Aberdeen's Government, made from the Admiralty a distinct proposition to the Treasury to reconstitute the transport board to exist only during the war, and upon a scale modest certainly as appeared by the amount of the Estimate. He proposed appointing to that board a chairman, two directors, and a secretary. He had thought it necessary that a service having under its control so large a sum as 4,000,000*l.* or 5,000,000*l.*

in a year should be intrusted to a board rather than to a single individual, though in effecting the change he had done so without intending to impeach in the slightest degree the integrity of the gentleman to whom the duties of this particular department had hitherto been confided. With regard to the constitution of the transport board, he had thought it most desirable to place at its head a gentleman who should be a captain in the navy, and to associate with him a gentleman connected with the merchant service, as well as a gentleman conversant with the details of the army. He had every reason to believe that a board so constituted, and superintended by a Lord of the Admiralty, would be a great additional security for the proper working of the service, and that it would cause the business to be better and more promptly transacted, and with more minute attention to details. He had now a few words to say in reference to the large amount of the Vote. The services which had been performed during the last eleven months were most extensive and important. They had conveyed to the East, generally speaking in steam-transports, between 50,000 and 60,000 British troops, 20,000 tons of provisions, 6,000 horses, and 14,000 French troops; and they had also conveyed 12,000 French troops to the Baltic; making, in all, about 84,000 troops and 6,000 horses, in addition to stores to an enormous amount. There were at present in the pay of the British public somewhere about 200 transports, most of them steamers of the largest size, with a tonnage of 200,000 tons. They are about to convey 15,000 men from Genoa to the East, and would be employed in keeping up that force permanently to the extent of 15,000 men; and they had also been employed in conveying between 30,000 and 40,000 Turkish troops from Varna to Eupatoria, besides undertaking to provide that force with provisions from Constantinople. The expenditure for which this Vote was required was an expenditure most indispensable and necessary. France naturally looked to England for assistance in the present contest, and while our army and the reinforcements at our command were to a small amount as compared with France, we had the advantage of increased facilities for their conveyance by sea. That was an assistance which we had it in our power to render, which France expected, and which we were bound to give. Taking all these matters into consideration, he thought no complaint could be made of the increased expenditure in this department.

Colonel KNOX said, it was well known that the department over which the right hon. Baronet so ably presided had sent out from this country a very large transport service; but what became of them when they went out? It was well known that many of the sailing transports were lying idle at Balaklava, when the wants of the army required their services, and when they required animals, the possession of which would have enabled them to get up their shot and shell to the scene of action. He trusted, however, that the right hon. Baronet would be able, by the means which he proposed to adopt, to make this department really efficient, and he begged to thank him for the statement he had made.

Mr. VERNON SMITH said, the right hon. Baronet had informed them that he had constituted a transport service board. His own opinion was, that single management was generally more advantageous, being more economical and efficient than the management of a board; and he did not see anything in this service to make it an exception. He wished to ask, however, whether in the event of peace, the right hon. Baronet had taken any measure to secure that the functions of this board should cease?—or was it a board that would hang as a heavy dead weight on the country after the termination of the war.

Sir JAMES GRAHAM said, he was much obliged to his right hon. Friend for asking this question, and enabling him to give an explanation. On principle he entirely agreed with the right hon. Gentleman. He was not generally in favour of the constitution of boards, and he thought that individual responsibility, properly superintended by a superior authority, constituted the best rule in the service, and upon that rule the whole of the subordinate departments of the Admiralty were based. He had stated, however, to the Committee the peculiarity of this department. Instead of contracts being entered into for an enormous amount, virtually binding the Executive Government, on the part of a single officer, involving temptations to improvident bargains—to use the mildest term—the best security for the public was that there should be more than one party to such transactions. Therefore, considering this an exceptional case, he adhered to the opinion that more than one person ought to be consulted, and that those persons should be men of practical knowledge, acquainted with all those details appertaining to this particular service, which an officer in the Queen's service could not well understand. Then there was the question as to the tenure of office of these gentlemen. The warrant appointing them to office bore on the face of it that they held office during pleasure, or till the termination of the war, so that, should peace be happily established, this transport board would be at an end, and their duties merge into that of the general service.

In answer to Mr. G. Dundas,

Sir JAMES GRAHAM said, that when Sir Edmund Lyons was entrusted with the supreme command in the Black Sea, it was thought desirable that the sole and exclusive control over every branch of the naval and transport service should be exercised by him as the naval Commander in Chief. He was informed that he had the complete command over every branch of the naval service in that sea; that it would be necessary the work should be done; and that he would have the choice of the officers he might employ, and, when dissatisfied with their services, the power of removing them. At the same time he was informed that the Government would look to him for the satisfactory discharge of all the duties that required to be done.

Mr. STAFFORD said, he wished to know if he was to understand that the absolute control of the whole transport of soldiers rested with Sir Edmund Lyons?

Sir JAMES GRAHAM was understood to say that the responsibility lay with Sir Edmund Lyons in the last resort.

Mr. HENLEY said, he saw two sums of 4,206,697*l.* for "freight of ships on monthly pay, including arrears of pay or transports to be discharged for 1855-6," and 2,610,200*l.* as the amount voted under the same item in the navy estimates for 1854-5. As the Vote for the present year was worded, he could not be sure how much was meant for arrears, and how much for the actual service of 1855-6.

Sir JAMES GRAHAM said, that the words used in the Vote were those which had been used from time immemorial, and that the Vote of 4,206,697*l.* would cover everything estimated to be required under this head in 1855-6. If, however, there were any excess over the estimate, it would be reported by the Audit Office, and a supplementary estimate would be required in 1856.

Mr. HENLEY said, he objected to the suspicious wording of the Vote. He was afraid that as the estimate was worded, moneys which ought to have been paid in 1854-5 might pass through the Audit Office under cover of this Vote.

Sir JAMES GRAHAM said, he would consider before the Report was brought up, whether any alteration could be made in the terms of the Vote, so as to meet the objection of the right hon. Gentleman.

Vote *agreed to.*

House resumed.

The House adjourned at half after Twelve o'clock till *Monday* next.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Monday, February 19, 1855.

Minutes.] Royal Assent.—Fisheries (North America).

THE LAND TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT.

The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH said, he understood there was no objection to his moving for certain papers to which he referred on a former occasion; and he would accordingly now do so in the shape of "so much of the Duke of Newcastle's Despatch to Lord Raglan, bearing date the 20th of January, 1855, as relates to the formation of the Land Transport Department."

Lord PANMURE said, he would have no objection to produce the document moved for by the noble Earl, though he did not know what was the object of the noble Earl in asking for it.

The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH said, there were two points which he wished to press upon the attention of the noble Baron in reference to this question. He entirely approved of the formation of a land transport corps. He thought that in all probability it would enable us for the first time to move our army; but there were two things which appeared to him to be perfectly essential. Whether they were provided for by the arrangement which had just been adopted he knew not; but he was quite satisfied that they were absolutely necessary for the efficiency of the transport service. The first was that the chief of the transport corps should himself be responsible for finding provisions for the men and animals employed in his department, and that he should not depend upon the Commissariat for his supplies. The other was that he should have entirely at his own disposal the sea transport by means of which he was to convey his animals from Asia Minor to the Crimea.

THE TURKISH CONTINGENT.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH said, he might take that opportunity of asking the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs when it would be in his power to lay on the table of the House the convention recently concluded with the Government of the Sultan for the employment of a Turkish force under British officers? He was extremely desirous of making some general observations upon that subject, and would probably take occasion to do so either to-morrow or Thursday, upon the second reading of the Army Service Act Amendment Bill.

THE EARL OF CLARENDON could not exactly say when he would be able to produce the convention referred to by the noble Earl. It would have to be ratified after being signed, and he was afraid that could not be done under six weeks from the present time.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH was extremely sorry to hear it. Six weeks was a campaign; and if the Turkish force could not be raised within that time, it would be of little service during the present year.

THE EARL OF CLARENDON was understood to say that, according to the usual form in such cases, six weeks must elapse before the convention could be ratified, but no corresponding delay would occur in the raising of the force.

PURCHASERS' PROTECTION AGAINST JUDGMENTS BILL.

On Motion for going into Committee upon this Bill,

THE LORD CHANCELLOR said, the object of the Bill, as proposed by his noble and learned Friend (Lord St. Leonards), was to require that all judgments recovered in the courts of the counties palatine of Lancaster and Durham should be registered in the particular palatine courts in the same way as judgments recovered in the courts of Westminster were registered there. Now, he saw no necessity for making two registries, and he thought the more reasonable plan would be to enact that all judgments recovered in the palatine courts should be registered in London, and thus a single search would always be sufficient. He also objected to a clause at the end of the Bill, which would have the effect of perpetuating the necessity for registering annuities. He thought that since the repeal of the Usury Laws that had become an unnecessary proceeding. Annuities were very rare now; and if they were to be registered, he saw no reason why there should not also be a registry for other matters of infinitely more importance. Under the present Bill it would be necessary to register a great many more documents than under the former law. But if the noble and learned Lord who introduced the Bill, and who was thoroughly acquainted with the subject, did not think his objections valid, he should not interfere further.

LORD ST. LEONARDS said, his noble and learned Friend seemed to have forgotten that the 1 & 2 *Vict.* had established separate registers for the counties palatine of Lancaster and Durham, and what the Bill proposed was that judgments obtained in these courts should be brought within the operation of the Act. By the law of England, although the judgments of the palatine courts only bound lands in the particular jurisdiction, yet a general judgment of the Superior Courts at Westminster bound lands in the counties palatine. The noble and learned Lord on the woolsack asked why not have one registry in London? The answer to that was, that they were not at liberty to abolish the registries which now existed in Lancaster and Durham. At the present moment lands were not bound in the palatine counties by judgments recovered in the Superior Courts, unless they were registered in the particular palatine court; but to prevent any doubt upon that subject he had added to one of the clauses words to the effect that no judgment should bind lands in the jurisdiction of a particular palatine court, unless it be registered in that court. With respect to the other remark of the noble and learned Lord, he must observe that there was a great difference between a general registry, with all its complications, vexations, and expenses, and the registry of annuities proposed by the present Bill, which merely required, in reference to annuities not created by marriage settlement or will, that, in order to give them validity upon the estate against any purchaser, a memorandum of them should be entered in a book kept for the purpose by the Senior Master of the Common

Pleas. His reason for providing for the registration of annuities was that annuitants never had possession of the deeds, and, therefore, it was the more necessary to have as complete and perfect a system of registration as possible.

House in Committee. Amendments made. The Report thereof to be received on *Friday* next.

House adjourned till To-morrow.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Monday, February 19, 1855.

Minutes.] New Member Sworn.—For Radnor, Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Bart.

Public Bills.—1° Intramural Burials (Ireland); Poor Relief (Ireland).

2° Consolidated Fund (£2,000,000).

EAST AND WEST INDIA DOCK BILL.

Order for Second Reading read; Motion made and Question proposed: "That the Bill be now read a second time."

Sir JAMES DUKE said, that this measure, though a Private Bill, very materially affected the public interest. The original Act, authorising the formation of the dock, contained clauses providing that all lighters and craft entering the docks for the purpose of receiving on board the cargoes of ships lying in dock in order to be discharged, should be exempted from the payment of any rate. It was a very suspicious circumstance to see three dock companies now coming forward at the same time to attempt to repeal those clauses, and thus to violate their original Dock Acts. No doubt they came together to intimidate and to prevent opposition by a formidable array of power. This was not a mere question between the dock companies and the wharfingers, to whose wharfs those lighters conveyed the goods taken out of ships in dock; it was an attempt to attack the trade of the port of London, and of every constituency that was represented in that House. The hon. Member for Dundee (Mr. G. Duncan) had told him, the other day, that thousands of tons of a particular description of hemp were brought to London from India, and was there shipped on board the Dundee steamers. He trusted no interference would be allowed with that or any other trade. What ground was there for such a proposal as the present? Now, had the companies' stocks fallen in value, there might have been cause for this measure; but, on the contrary, it was well known they had increased 50 per cent. It was, in fact, a most iniquitous attempt to interfere with the free trade of the port of London. The City of London never would have consented to the construction of those docks, which deprived the port of a great deal of accommodation, but on the condition that such docks should be considered part of the port. He really hoped the House would not submit to any such attempt, by indirect means, to put a tax upon the trade of the country, and he should therefore move that the Bill be read a second time that day six months.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months."

Mr. GREGSON said, he had charge of the Bill, and would, therefore, trouble the House with a few observations on the question at issue. The dock companies were at the outset opposed by the same parties who now opposed this Bill, who at the time put in claims to the extent of 3,000,000*l.* for compensation, which was eventually reduced to 600,000*l.* An Act was passed giving dock companies certain privileges for twenty years, and afterwards for thirty years more. Government made relaxations in favour of private wharfingers, and at last the restrictions on the dock companies became so onerous that they were obliged to come to Parliament to ask for relief. The dock companies had made no changes in their original compact with Government and the public; but changes had been forced upon them which acted prejudicially on their fair privileges and profits. All the dock companies asked, was to be allowed to make a reasonable charge for labour done. It was alleged that wharfingers made no charge for services that the dock companies ask to be authorised to charge for; but he held in his hand a statement in black and white, which proved that the wharfingers made charges which the dock companies were at present precluded from making. He really thought the dock companies had good ground for what they asked, and he trusted the House would not refuse to read the Bill a second time.

Mr. MITCHELL said, this was not a private, but most certainly a public Bill. It affected the trade of the country, and it was the duty of that House to affirm or not to affirm the principle of such a Bill in the legitimate stage in which that should be done—namely, on the second reading. He felt bound to do so in this case, and to give the measure his most decided opposition. For three years he had fought for the dock companies against the Board of Customs, and the trading interest of London had also supported the dock companies against that Board. It was, therefore, exceedingly bad taste on the part of the dock owners to attempt to force this Bill through the House—a Bill by which they not only wished to be paid as wharfingers, but to impose a tax upon the whole trade of the City of London. It was one of the main objects of the late Sir Robert Peel, in the debate upon the Customs, to make London the great entrepôt for the whole trade of the world, and to make London a place for transhipment by all possible means. Of course one of the modes of doing this was by a reduced charge, and giving increased facilities through the Board of Customs. The late Sir Robert Peel, he repeated, laid the greatest stress on this point. He hoped the House would not allow itself to be led away by the great names of the supporters of the Bill. Those Gentlemen were all interested in the docks. It was notorious to every gentleman engaged in commerce in London, that the dock companies were in the habit of sending touters, steam-tugs, and lighters to Gravesend, to induce captains of vessels to bring their ships into the docks. The interest of the shipowner was totally distinct from that of the merchant. It was the interest of the former to place his ship where she would be safe at all times; but it was not the interest of the merchant that his goods should thus be taken into the docks. The inducements to shipowners to go into dock were so great, that in his (Mr. Mitchell's) own experience, in hundreds of cases he might say, the first notice he got of the arrival of his goods in London was in the form of a notice that the ship they were in had entered the docks without his having given any permission to that effect, or having had any voice in the matter at all. If this measure should pass he would be obliged to pay the taxes on lighters entering the docks to fetch his goods to the spot where he might wish them to be discharged. He protested against such a system, and against a tax not only upon wharfingers, but upon the general commerce of the country. The water of the Thames was public property, which had been given to the dock companies on an express agreement that, in return for that public property, no charge should be made on lighters going into the docks. He therefore hoped the House would reject the Bill.

Mr. BOUVERIE said, he had strong reasons for not departing from the usual practice in the case of private Bills. He was anxious that no injustice should be done to the promoters of a private Bill; and he was also desirous that the time of the House should not be taken up by discussion which ought more properly to take place before a Committee. The dock companies proposed to repeal certain clauses in their original Acts. It was alleged on behalf of the commerce of the port of London—and he thought there was some reason in what they said—that such a repeal would inflict great injury on the trade of the country. The companies contended again that their circumstances to-day were quite different to what they were when the clause it was now proposed to repeal was enacted. He did not wish, however, to enter into the question, and he hoped the House would not go into it either. It was a question assuredly for the decision of a Committee; and he trusted the House would have confidence enough in the justice, integrity, and impartiality of a Committee to confide to them the settlement of the matter. On these grounds he should vote for the second reading.

Mr. APSLEY PELLATT said, the principle of the Bill was diametrically opposed to agreements which had been made with Parliament, and he should, therefore, oppose it.

Mr. CARDWELL said, that although it was not generally the practice for Government to take part in discussions on the second readings of private Bills, there were some circumstances that rendered it necessary he should make a statement in this particular case. The facts might be stated in a few words. When originally the dock companies were established, they looked for remuneration to the monopoly of the landing and warehousing of certain descriptions of goods, which was given to them for a limited time. A second source of profit was the valuable frontage given to them for warehouses, &c.; and a third was a toll levied on seagoing ships using the water of the docks; but there was at the same time an express enactment that no charge should be made for lighters or barges. There was, in fact, what was known in law as a complete dedication to the public of the newly-created water space, in as far as lighters were concerned. Now, he conceived that before a bargain of that kind was altered by the House, a very strong case should be made out by the parties seeking the alteration. Now, he certainly did not think that any such case could be made out or had been made out on the part of the dock companies, nor did he think there was that alteration in circumstances upon which they relied as the foundation of their case. The monopoly expired at the time it was intended to expire, and if altered circumstances caused some loss to the companies on one side, the great increase in trade had provided ample compensation on the other—a fact which was confirmed by the circumstance that out of the three companies two were building new warehouses, and even then did not expect to be able to meet the requirements of their extended traffic. This subject had been brought before the House of Commons two years before, in the case of the Victoria Docks. The promoters of the Victoria Docks Bill sent in their Bill without the clause in question, but the Committee thought it only fair to insert it. Other Dock Bills had been brought in during the present Session, and it was the intention of the Board of Trade to have called special attention to this clause. Let the House observe what would be the state of the case if this clause were conceded. The dock companies were in a statutory position as owners of water space, and in a statutory position as large wharfingers, in opposition to others not so circumstanced. Now, allowing the measure to become law, would undoubtedly place them in an advantageous position in competition with their rivals, and, therefore, he thought its progress should be jealously watched by Parliament. Then came the question whether they should adhere to the ordinary course, or whether they should object to the second reading. He felt very much pressed by the arguments of his hon. Friend the Chairman of Committees (Mr. Bouverie), and he should be sorry to favour that system of excitement and canvass by which it was sought to withhold a Bill from the investigation of a Select Committee, but having carefully considered the question in all its aspects, the result of this consideration was a determination to vote against the second reading of the Bill.

MR. HENLEY said, he was an owner of dock stock, and was, to a small extent, interested in warehouse property. He had, however, come to the same conclusion as the right hon. Gentleman, and thought it most unjust to attempt to do away with the bargain, made upon fair and just principles in the beginning, and which, he considered, the House ought not to depart from.

MR. T. BARING said, that the plea against the Bill was, that it would give the dock companies advantages over their competitors; the plea of the companies was, that now the competitors had all the advantages of their vast establishments and staff without giving anything by way of compensation. That was the ground upon which the Bill was advocated; and the arguments *pro* and *con* could, in his opinion, be much better discussed in a Committee up-stairs. This he would say, that the uses to which lighters were put had very much extended since the time when they first obtained exemption from dock dues.

MR. LINDSAY said, that at one time barges merely carried water and provisions to the ships in dock, but as trade extended, although ships still came into dock for greater safety, the wharfingers by offering greater inducements, got all the landing and warehousing of the goods. He could mention one wharf from which 40,000 barges went into dock in the course of last year. Under these circumstances, was it to be held that the companies were to have nothing for keeping the docks in repair? The question was, would they protect the barge owners, lightermen, and wharfingers, at the expense of the dock owners? He should give his support to the second reading, thinking that the question in dispute could be best decided by a Committee.

MR. MUNTZ said, he considered that there was another question to be decided besides the interests of the dock companies and the wharfingers, and that was the general interest of the country. He could assure the promoters of the measure that the greatest kindness they could do the country would be to withdraw their Bill. He knew of his own experience that goods were ordered to Hull in consequence of the oppressive charges in London. He had no interest in docks, but he had in the general trade of the country, and therefore felt bound to oppose the Bill.

Question put, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."

The House *divided*:—Ayes 26; Noes 249: Majority 223.

Words *added.*

Main Question, as amended, put, and *agreed to.*

Second Reading *put off* for six months.

The London and St. Katherine Dock Bills were then withdrawn.

THE INDIAN BUDGET—QUESTION.

Mr. **DANBY SEYMOUR** said, that in begging to put four questions to the right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Control, which stood in his name on the paper, he must observe, with respect to the last, that great dissatisfaction had been expressed at the lateness of the Session when the Indian Budget was brought on. He would now ask whether Mr. Marshman, the editor of the *Friend of India*, now held the office of Bengalee interpreter to the Government, and whether he had a paper contract from the Government? Also, why Mr. Marshman was allowed an access to public documents which is refused to other newspaper editors in Calcutta? And also, at what period of the Session the President of the Board of Contol proposed to bring in his Indian Budget this year?

Sir **CHARLES WOOD** said, with regard to the first three questions, which related to the state of things in Calcutta, he was unable to give any answer without reference to Calcutta. He did not know whether Mr. Marshman was interpreter to the Government, whether he had a paper contract with the Government, or whether he was allowed access to public documents which was refused to other editors. With regard to the last question, the papers upon which the statement was made were laid before Parliament, according to the Act, some time in the month of May. He should have been perfectly ready last year to make that statement at a much earlier time, but it was deferred, partly on account of public business, and partly that he might announce to the House the termination of financial operations then going on in India. As regarded the present year, he should be ready to make the statement on the earliest possible day after the papers were in the hands of Members and the state of public business would allow.

TRANSPORT OF INVALIDS—QUESTION.

Mr. **WATSON** said, he had a question of great importance to put to the noble Lord at the head of the Government, namely, what measures had been taken or were in progress for the removal of the convalescents or the patients capable of removal, in the hospitals at Scutari or in the Crimea, to England, or to some of our Mediterranean colonies, for the perfect restoration of their health?

Viscount **PALMERSTON**: A Commission was sent out by the noble Duke who held the office of Secretary of State for the War Department, to inquire into the condition of the hospitals, to recommend such measures as they might think right and proper, and to report, not merely to the Government at home, but to Lord Raglan; and Lord Raglan was requested to act on those recommendations without delay. It is the intention of my noble Friend at the head of the War Department to make arrangements for a periodical service between Constantinople and the Crimea on the one hand, and England on the other, for the purpose of bringing home such invalids as are in a condition to be transported by sea, and arrangements will be made for their reception in proper and suitable hospitals on their arrival here.

TRADE WITH CHINA—QUESTION.

Mr. **H. T. LIDDELL** said, he begged on behalf of his hon. colleague (Mr. Horsfall) to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether instructions had been sent, or were intended to be sent, to Her Majesty's Superintendent of Trade in China, to cancel the bonds taken on British trade at Shanghai betwen the 9th of February and the 12th of July, 1854; whether instructions had been given, or were intended to be given, to Her Majesty's Superintendent of Trade in China, to interdict the interference of the consular courts in China, in reference to all the bonds and securities taken on British trade since the expulsion of the Imperial Customs' authorities from Shanghai by the insurgents in 1853; whether, when disputes of a pecuniary nature, and involving questions of international law, arose between British subjects and the Chinese authorities, it was intended that such disputes and questions should be decided by the British authorities in China, or referred home to be decided by the Supreme Government; and, whether Her Majesty's Government had taken, or intend to take, any measures to enforce upon the Imperial Government of China an equality and uniformity of practice in the levying and collection of the Customs' duties at all the ports in China open to foreign trade, in accordance with treaty stipulations; or whether it be intended to forbid all consular interference in the collection of the

Chinese revenue, leaving the settlement of duties to be arranged between the native Chinese merchants and their own Custom House, according to the practice which prevails at Canton?

Viscount PALMERSTON: I beg to state, Sir, that instructions have been sent to China to cancel bonds taken at Shanghai for duties between February the 9th and July the 12th, 1854. Sir John Bowring has been called upon for a full report of all the circumstances under which the bonds were given, and generally as to the state of affairs at Shanghai at the time, and, until his report is received, Her Majesty's Government must suspend their decision. Sir John Bowring has been informed that no proceedings can be taken in the consular courts in reference to the bonds and securities given at Shanghai between the 7th of September, 1853, and the 9th of February, 1854, which bonds and securities he has been directed to cancel and return to the parties. The decision in regard to bonds subsequently given must be reserved until Sir John Bowring's Report referred to is received. It would depend upon the nature of the question which may have been raised, whether it was susceptible of decision on the spot; but, as a general rule, questions involving the construction of treaty engagements, the solution of which is attended with reasonable doubt, must be referred home for decision by Her Majesty's Government. Directions have been given to warn the Chinese authorities that they must levy equal duties with impartiality upon the trade of all nations. A state of things has lately arisen at Shanghai from which, although nothing more than what is due is taken in the shape of duties, and that from all alike, the merchants at Shanghai are placed in a disadvantageous position as compared with the merchants at other ports where a laxer system prevails. Sir John Bowring's attention has been particularly called to this state of things, and he has been directed to endeavour to remedy it, by urging the adoption at other ports of the Shanghai system, under which the duties are collected on behalf of the Chinese Government by a Committee of three foreigners; but no instructions have been given to urge the general adoption of the Canton system. The treaty with China prescribes a certain degree of consular interference for the protection of the Chinese revenue, and the consuls hold the ship's papers until proof is produced to them that the demands of the Chinese Custom House are satisfied.

RECORDER OF BRIGHTON—QUESTION.

Mr. CRAUFURD said, he begged to ask the noble Viscount, who was lately the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether it is true that the new recordership at Brighton has been conferred on a Queen's Counsel who has been refused admittance to the Bench of the Inn to which he belongs?

Viscount PALMERSTON: Sir, I appointed that gentleman to his present office, and it is not true that a gentleman was appointed to that office who was refused admittance to the Bench of the Inn to which he belongs, in the way stated by the hon. and learned Gentleman. I selected from amongst the candidates the person who appeared to me, from the testimonials of the highest legal authorities, to be the best to fill the office. I had no personal knowledge of any of the candidates. I took the opinion of the highest legal authorities, and I have no reason to believe that I erred in my judgment.

THE NEW ADMINISTRATION.

On the Motion that Mr. Speaker do leave the Chair upon the Order of the Day for going into Committee of Supply on the Army Estimates,

Mr. LAYARD: Sir, I trust the House will grant me its kind indulgence while I make a few remarks upon the present aspect of public affairs. Under ordinary circumstances I would not have made such an appeal, but I hope the House will, with its usual kindness, extend to me the indulgence I ask, bearing in mind the deep interest which I have taken in the question which now agitates the country, and my conviction that the present is a most momentous crisis. It was not my intention to raise a debate this evening, but rather to avail myself of the opportunity which would have been offered when the House was called upon to nominate the Committee moved for by the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, but I have heard that it is not impossible that some arrangement may be made between my hon. and learned Friend and the Government which will preclude the House from discussing any question that might otherwise have reasonably been brought before it on that occasion. Feeling as I do that the country would not be satisfied if, at a moment like this, an opportunity were not given, at least, to some Members of the

House of expressing their opinions upon the present state of affairs, I think that no better occasion could arise than the present, when we are called upon to vote little less than the sum of 7,500,000*l.* for the support, the maintenance, and the recruiting of our army, an army, be it remembered, for which almost an equal sum was voted last year—which had been sent out unequalled in discipline, and possessed of everything requisite to render it victorious in the field—and which has dwindled down to little more than 12,000 men, notwithstanding a statement to the contrary which has been made by some members of Her Majesty's Government. Under these circumstances, I feel it imperatively necessary to call the attention of the country to the present state of affairs, for it is my firm conviction that we may be standing upon the very brink of ruin, some may be even inclined to think that we are already falling into the abyss of disgrace. I almost feel degraded in my own eyes, that last year I did not speak out more boldly —that I was restrained from stating those convictions to the House which were working in my mind, and which I should have made known had I not been influenced by a variety of considerations. I trust, therefore, that the House will bear with me while I make one or two remarks upon the actual condition of the Government as it stands.

A short time ago my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Roebuck) proposed a Committee of inquiry into the condition of our troops before Sebastopol, and into the conduct of those who had had the management of the present war. That Motion was received on the part of the then Government, not so much as one that might be inconvenient if carried, but as a Motion that involved a direct censure on the members of that Government. That was the challenge thrown out to the House and the country, and both the House and the country accepted it. Not only was that distinctly understood, but every member of Her Majesty's Government who rose in his place upon that occasion stated that the Motion was considered not as a vote of censure upon any one individual member of the Government, but upon the Government as a whole. That challenge, also, was accepted. Now, what was the result? The Motion was carried by, perhaps, one of the largest majorities ever obtained in this House upon a question of such magnitude —it was carried by a majority of more than two to one. The country felt no doubt as to that result. I know hon. Members who voted for that Motion, who, personally, would rather have opposed it, but were compelled to support it on account of the feeling which pervaded the country. I also know there were some hon. Members who voted against that Motion, the pleasure of whose company, in consequence of that vote, we shall most certainly lose in a future Parliament. In fact, there was but one expression of opinion throughout the country. The Government consequently went out, and for some days it was found impossible to form an Administration. To the causes of that difficulty I will not now advert, although I may do so at a future period. After some days had elapsed the noble Lord now at the head of the Government succeeded in forming an Administration. What then do we see? We find that Administration composed almost identically of the same individuals as the late Government. Under ordinary circumstances, perhaps, in the straits to which the country is now reduced, such an Administration might have been accepted without much remark, but when we are called upon to trust to that Government the conduct of one of the greatest wars in which this country has ever been engaged—when we are called upon to vote large sums for the support of an army which has been reduced to but a fraction of what it was—when Parliament is thus asked to place confidence in the Government, it behoves the House to inquire what that Government is, and what it has done to merit the confidence of the country. It has been said, the same men did not fill the same offices now as heretofore. It is true some changes have been made, but others which might have been desired have not been made. Now, let the House consider how far those Members of the Cabinet who have been retained are deserving of the confidence of the country.

The House was told a few nights since by an hon. Member (Mr. B. Osborne) that even the hon. Member for Aylesbury had not dared to attack the right hon. Baronet at the head of the Admiralty. Now, that hon. Gentleman must have a very short memory, for it certainly was surprising to hear such a challenge after what had passed over and over again in this House upon two of the most important subjects which could be mentioned in connection with the war—namely, the question of blockade and the question of the transport service. Has not the question of blockade been managed by the Admiralty in such a way as to cause immense mischief, and was it not one of the principal causes of our present difficulties? As to the transport service, have not hon. Members risen over and over again in this House to complain of the utter confusion which existed in that service and the almost helpless condition of the transport system? How, then, could the hon. Gentleman say that his department, or rather the department presided over by the right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham), had completely escaped all blame? Then, as to our diplomacy. I do not wish to say anything against the noble Lord who has the conduct of our Foreign Affairs, but, when challenged, it is the duty of every Member to discharge his duty to his constituents and the country without any false delicacy. There have been most serious mistakes made, in the course of this war, which have arisen, as I have always said, and still conscientiously believe, from the mismanagement of our diplomacy. Those melancholy conferences at Vienna were a perfect disgrace to the diplomatic body. If a bolder diplomacy had been pursued we should not have been in the present state of war. With regard to the diplomatic service, I must remark that many appointments which have been made in it are not worthy of the country. I do not wish to mention names. I will only remind the House of a transaction between the Minister for Foreign Affairs, a Member of the diplomatic service, and a noble Lord who had retired from that service, whereby the noble Lord who had filled the highest post in the service, but who was from his age past service, was appointed to a mission by what the country called a "job." Such things ought not to be passed over in silence. Then with regard to the conduct of Ministers representing great departments of State in this House, the people of this country wanted a little more truth—they desired that those who were intrusted with the Government should tell the truth. The country did not want any Member of the Government to give indiscreet answers to indiscreet questions, nor to betray the interests of the country by imprudent disclosures; but, if an hon. Member rose to ask a plain straightforward question, the country expected that a plain straightforward answer should be given, when the question was an important one which the Member was justified in putting. I have frequently asked whether a blockade existed, and was always told it did; but now, months afterwards, the Government admit by a new order that there has been no blockade. An hon. Gentleman had stated that there were only 12,000 effective men left in the Crimea. A right hon. Gentleman immediately answered that the number was 30,000. The Government, however, refused to show any document to support the assertion of the right hon. Gentleman, and afterwards it was admitted that the former was the more correct number. The country would not be satisfied with such a mode of dealing with these great subjects. When it was stated that our army was starving—that our men were feeding on French bread and clothed in French garments, the reply was made by some Member of the Government who told them that the army was revelling in luxuries and perfectly protected from the weather. The country, I again assert, will not be satisfied with those statements.

Then, I would ask, what has been the general policy of the Government? Some days before Christmas, Parliament was called together upon an emergency to vote upon two measures, the Militia Bill and the Foreign Enlistment Bill. I will allude, first of all, to the second measure. Hon. Members of that House were called upon to swallow all their declarations made upon the hustings, because they were told the Bill was one of the utmost importance and must be passed at once. The noble Lord, then the leader of the Government in that House (Lord J. Russell), made a speech of two hours' duration to prove that the Bill was warranted both in principle and by precedent. I did not vote on that Bill, and I believe that there are Members who did vote for it who now regret that they have done so. The Bill was passed, but I believe that scarcely a man has been engaged under its provisions. When the Bill was brought forward—giving the Government credit for what it was said they were particularly possessed of—administrative capacity and political foresight—it was supposed that they had the measure cut and dried for immediate operation. Not so; far from it; and even up to this moment it is not known how it is to be carried out, and upon what footing those persons whose services are accepted will be placed. The result is, that France has been engaging men, Germany has been placing her armies on a war footing—if not mobilising them, placing them in what is called a state of readiness for war—by which all the horses necessary, all the ambulances, are prepared, so that the armies could take the field at fourteen days' notice. Thus, then, this country would be unable to get men at all, or, if they did get men, they would be the scum of the Continent. Then with respect to German cavalry, two or three months ago a foreign gentleman suggested to the Government where the best horses could be obtained, but not a step had been taken in consequence of that information, and now the difficulty of obtaining horses was greatly increased, and it was very doubtful whether the Government would be able to obtain such a force at all. I see that the House is asked to permit the Government to raise 14,000 men abroad, upon which point I hope some information will be given, for I do not see any money asked for on that account. Then, with respect to Asia Minor, we have been told that large contracts would be made in that country, but the very gentleman whom I mentioned as best calculated to enter upon those contracts wrote to me only two days ago to say that months ago he offered contracts to the Government, which they refused. He then went to the French Government, who accepted them, and that gentleman was now buying up all the cattle that could be got for transport and consumption on account of the French Government, so that now it would be very difficult for this country to obtain those supplies in that quarter. Last year I suggested to the Government to take measures for the employment of Turks, who were admirable material for soldiers, although I must confess their present officers are bad. Those unfortunate men who have been employed with our army have been thrown into the Crimea without provision for their wants—they have been treated by our soldiers and officers in a manner which I regret exceedingly, and which was unworthy of English soldiers and English officers—they have been driven almost to death by the treatment they have experienced in the Crimea —they were regarded only as beasts of burden—were insulted and even struck by our men. Was this statement true, or was it not? If true, was that conduct sanctioned by the authorities out there, or by those at home—and had any steps been taken to put an end to such a system? I have lately been told that 20,000 Turks have been engaged to serve under British officers, but I cannot vouch for the fact. Such has been the past conduct—the "antecedents," as they were called—of those who compose, with one exception, the present Cabinet, and it is proper, therefore, to inquire upon what grounds the House can be called upon to declare its confidence in the new Administration. Supposing that the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) pressed his Motion for the appointment of a Committee, what is to be done? I have already expressed my opinion of that Committee, to which opinion I adhere. If the Committee were honestly and fairly worked, going into full details, it must, to a certain extent, be injurious to the conduct of public business, more especially so if the conduct of those actually in the Administration is to be canvassed, because there are Members of the present Administration who were also Members of the late Administration, and who were consequently among those who were blamed for the present state of affairs. The House, therefore, would be, by its Committee, sitting in judgment on the present Administration. There is, however, one ground upon which hon. Members, perhaps, would be justified in agreeing to the withdrawal of the hon. and learned Gentleman's Committee. That would be if they saw new, untried men, in power, whilst the noble Lord at the head of the Government held out such a programme as would insure the confidence of the country. Then, no doubt, hon. Members would willingly vote with the Government, but how can they do so now, when they see the Cabinet placed on the same footing as it stood a few days since? It becomes again, then, a vote of confidence in the Administration; and am I to vote confidence to-day in those upon whom I voted censure but a week ago? It is said that there is a new programme; but is there anything in the programme which should induce the House to alter the decision at which it but a few days since arrived? What are the remedies which the noble Lord proposes? Does he propose to sweep away any existing evil; does he propose to cut at the bottom of any existing wrong; does he propose to recall any individual? No; but he proposes a series of Commissions to go out to inquire into the conduct of persons implicated. Surely we have sufficient facts before us to enable us to judge as to that without Commissions. Take the Commissariat for example—we know that we have a gentleman at the head of the Commissariat against whom I have nothing to say except that he is somewhere about seventy years of age, and that he was an eminent officer in the Peninsular war. Beyond that, we have this fact, that the Commissariat is in such a state that the men have been starved for want of food. Are not those two facts sufficient to authorise the recall of the man who is at the head of the Commissariat, without sending out a Commission to inquire who would, perhaps, allow him to continue his office with impunity for a month or two longer? Let hon. Members look at the medical department. It is nearly three months since a Commission was sent out to inquire into the state of the medical staff. The same state of things, however, still exists. Dr. Hall is still at the head of the Medical Staff; and Mr. Lawson, after being reprimanded for conduct which the Commander in Chief characterised as disgraceful, instead of being removed from his office, is sent first to Scutari, where he is put at the head of the hospital, and has since been removed to Rhodes. At least, I asked a question upon the subject the other night, and not having received an answer, I suppose that statement to be true. Well, but will you gain anything more by the proposed Commission of Inquiry into the Commissariat than you have gained by that Medical Commission? Clearly not. Whom have you appointed to conduct this new Commission? I will not say one word against Sir John M'Neill, for I believe that no man in this country has shown greater ability than he has done. He is a man of the highest ability, one for whom I have the highest respect. I have seen him, and he said, that he went out upon this office because he believed that it was a sacred act of duty to go, and he could not refuse. But Sir John M'Neill is no longer a young man. His health is so bad that he has been compelled to refuse offices of high trust and consideration for which his eminent abilities fully qualified him, and he has now undertaken this kind of second-rate duty of going out to inquire into the misdoings of the Commissariat. But how, I ask, can he go into all the corners of the camp and cold, and damp, and dirt? Why, you cannot ask him to do it. I say that it is physically impossible for him to perform the duty which will be cast upon him; and, like every other man employed by the late Government or the present Government—for they are the same thing—Sir John M'Neill will lose his well-earned reputation. He will not be able to cure the evil, and you will place upon his head the fault and the blame which ought to fall on others. You are going to send a Commission also to inquire into the transport system. I surely thought that we had evidence enough of that. Who is at the head of the transports at Balaklava? Captain Christie, an old gentleman upwards of sixty years of age—a gallant gentleman, no doubt; but he probably cannot leave his ship after dark for fear of a catarrh, which might endanger his existence. I know that he was often five or six days without being able to land at Balaklava. Are you surprised, then, that Balaklava harbour should be in the state it was; and do you want a Commission to inquire how old Captain Christie is, or what is the state of Balaklava? Why, there is not a boy in the streets of London who could not answer the last question for you, at all events. What we want are men, and not Commissions. Make up your mind to put an end to this system at once, and to cut at the real root of the evil. Depend upon it you will be obliged to do it at last, for the country will ere long compel you.

When, at the time of the Revolution, the French army was reduced to that state to which our army is reduced, what did the French Assembly do? They sent out their own Members, men who had no party considerations, who cared not for aristocratic influences, who went out determined to sacrifice those who were guilty, regardless of persons. They did so. The result was that in a few months that army achieved deeds which were unparalleled in the history of the world. Unless you adopt some more decisive measures than you have hitherto adopted—if you are to be satisfied with Commissions the country will take the matter into their own hands, have their own Commissioners, and compel you to do what the French National Assembly did. The country is sick of these Commissions; the country wants a man; do not let me be told that you cannot find a man—that is an insult to the common sense of the country. If your man, however, must be seventy years old, a member of Brookes's, and one who has always voted with the Government, I grant you that you may not find one of that class and stamp fitted for the duties which are required of him. But, when I see upon all sides of this great country works unequalled in magnitude since the beginning of the world; when I see men who from small means have risen to the position which they now enjoy; when I see around me an amount of money and internal resources which are unequalled in the history of the world—why, to tell me that you cannot find a man to put in order the harbour of Balaklava, or to bring it into a state of efficiency, is, I say, a positive insult to the common sense of this country. If you want the opinion of the army as to who ought to command them, you have only got to go to them with a ballot-box. If you went to the Artillery, for example, and said, "Now, every one write upon a piece of paper the name of the man whom he thinks most competent to command the Artillery, and put it into the ballot box;" there would be but one name come out. I would stake my existence upon it. Why, then, send Commissions to inquire whether this man is capable or that man? If you want to act vigorously do not send out despatches implying censure on a man, and then when you are asked whether he is recalled, say that he is not recalled, but that you have insulted him, and know that he must come home. Is that worthy of the country?—Is it manly?—Is it English? No. If a man is incompetent, recall him; but if he is not incompetent, let the Ministers have the manliness to say that he is not so, and stand by him. If you will do that, I undertake to say that the country will support you to a man.

Well, such are the propositions contained in the noble Lord's speech. I have perused it very carefully, and, with the exception of allowing Lord Raglan to be a kind of head scavenger, there appears to be nothing else proposed by the Government. Yes, there is one other thing. You are sending out General Simpson to look after the staff and to make alterations and reports. That is a great mistake. You cannot go on with such a system of divided authority. General Simpson may be the ablest military man that ever lived—he may be the man above all others whom you should have chosen for an appointment of this kind under other circumstances; but, I ask, is it fair to Lord Raglan—is it fair to the public service—to send out a man in the position of General Simpson? If you had in this country a regularly-organised staff, of which General Simpson was the head—having risen through all the grades of that staff, as the head of the staff in France rises—that would be another thing. But you make a new appointment; and you send out a man to look into the conduct of Lord Raglan's staff, the members of which he has appointed himself. Now, has Lord Raglan assented to this, or has he not? Does he admit that his staff is incompetent, or does he not? If he does admit that it is incompetent, why not send home the officers who compose it? But if he does not, how are you insulting him by sending out men to inquire into the state of it. Do not send out all these Commissions. If you must have inquiry, send out a man in whom you have confidence; and if he will not dine every day with the officers of the staff, but will do as I did, and go about and mix with the regimental officers and the soldiers, I will warrant that he will learn in a very few days where the real evil exists. So much for the actual measures suggested by the Government, for I see no other definite proposals beyond these. There is nothing said about the Horse Guards. I thought everybody admitted that that was a great sink of iniquity; and there is one hon. Gentleman in particular, the hon. Member for Middlesex (Mr. B. Osborne) who with extraordinary zeal made a most telling speech against the system and his colleagues upon the subject. There is nothing, however, about a thorough reform of the Horse Guards in any proposition of the Government. I do not want to look at mere facts alone, but I want to look at principles—not that I wish the Government to say that in a few hours they will carry out those principles, but that they will be prepared in a general sense to act upon them. There is the Motion of the noble Lord the Member for Huddersfield (Viscount Goderich) for instance, with regard to the system of promotion in the army; surely the Government might have said something about that. Depend upon it the country will not be satisfied with the appointment of sixty sergeants. They are no longer in a humour to take as a concession and a privilege that which they demand as a principle and a right. Unless a radical change is effected in the Horse Guards, depend upon it that the country will not be satisfied with anything that you may do. The Government themselves admit that the state of the army is desperate. I saw with considerable surprise a passage in a speech made recently by the right hon. Gentleman who till lately held the office of Secretary of War, and which is so remarkable that, perhaps, the House will permit me to read it. The right hon. Gentleman says—

> "We have had that war to wage by the instrumentality of an army which is one of the finest and noblest that ever left the shores of England—

> which never met the enemy except to conquer, but which, I regret to say, has met with an enemy more fell and more dangerous to it than the actual foe—that is, disease."

Is there nothing else which it has met with; is there no neglect—no maladministration which it has encountered?

> "By which it has been crippled to a fearful extent, and has had to undergo privations and hardships which have been borne with a heroism almost unexampled, but which may be and must be attributed to causes that require searching investigation, in order that the proper remedy may be applied, and that the blame, if blame there be, should fall upon the right shoulders. This inquiry it behoves the Government to lose no time in instituting."

This is rather a strange observation for a Member of the Government who has opposed all inquiry.

> "It has been the fashion, perhaps too indiscriminately, to heap blame upon the heads of those who are themselves engaged in carrying on the operations in the Crimea; and I say to those who may think that this is deserved, that there are others besides those who have been engaged in those operations—that there are others besides those whose business it is to minister to the wants of our army who are to blame for these transactions. It is better upon these subjects always to speak plainly the whole truth, however unpalatable it may be, and therefore I say that many of those who have been the most forward to decry what has been done, and to censure those who have been charged with its execution, have been apt to forget how much may be their own share of that blame which ought to be ascribed to those through whose errors those evils have unfortunately happened."

He then goes on to insinuate that it is to the House of Commons refusing to support an army equal to the emergencies of the public service that this state of things is to be attributed. Now, I will willingly meet that right hon. Gentleman upon those grounds. It is very easy to throw the blame from one person to another. The general in command in the Crimea says that he is crippled by the authorities at home. The Government at home say that he does not pursue the instructions which are sent out to him. He throws it upon the regimental officers. The right hon. Gentleman says that the soldiers are to blame. Every one concerned blames every one else, and, at last, all agree to blame the House of Commons. Well, let us investigate the accuracy of that charge. If it be the House of Commons that is to blame, let the people of this country force the House of Commons to do its duty. I, for one, do not believe that the blame is to be attributed to the House of Commons. I see by the Estimates that this House has, year after year, voted sums of money almost sufficient to support the armies of France, or any other of the other great continental Powers. It is not, then, the fault of the House of Commons, but it is to the maladministration of the money which has been voted by the House of Commons that the real blame is to be attributed. I do not believe that the most urgent Reformer has ever objected to a vote taken for a good purpose — no man objects to such votes; but what is objected to, is the system of favouritism and the general system at the Horse Guards. If the noble Lord at the head of the Government intends to act on similar principles, how can he ask for the confidence and support of those who feel that all this misery, that the heart-rending and horrible condition of our army, is mainly owing to the state of things at the Horse Guards? I will tell the House where the mischief lies. There is, in the first place, a general fear of taking any responsibility; every one is afraid to act with vigour, and, with the permission of the House, I will mention two anecdotes to illustrate my position: One day, as I was going up to the lines of the army, in company with a gallant officer, we met a number of carts containing men suffering from disease and wounds, some of whom had actually died on the passage down, and with that convoy there were only two or three guards—privates of the line. The gallant officer who was with me was astounded that there was no medical man in charge of so many wounded and sick men. He went and requested Lord Raglan to see that convoy. Lord Raglan expressed that indignation which every honourable and humane man must feel at such a circumstance, and he instituted an inquiry. It was found that the medical man and officers had neglected their duty, and Lord Raglan published a general order, in which he stated that the conduct of certain persons had been disgraceful, but he added that he would spare their feelings and not mention their names. I can honour and reverence those feelings in a man, but I cannot honour or reverence such feelings in a general. What was the result? Why, I will tell the House. Two days afterwards, some of the marines having been landed from the fleet and put under the command of the Colonel who had the charge of Balaklava, they were employed upon the same duty as the troops of the line. At night, while on guard, one of the men was seized with cholera, and was taken to the hospital, but the medical man refused to leave his bed, saying that the man could not be admitted, as he was a marine. He was then taken to another hospital, where he was also refused admittance, and as the guard could not leave their post, the poor fellow was left upon the shore to die. That circumstance came to the notice of Lord Raglan, and what course did he adopt? He condemned the medical officers, but said that he had recently issued a general order reflecting on the conduct of medical officers, and if he so soon issued another the confidence of the army in the medical staff would be destroyed. I do not want to say a single word against Lord Raglan. I believe Lord Raglan to be an amiable and a good man; but what I say is, that it is not for amiable and good men alone to command armies. The men to command armies should be men of iron will and unflinching determination—men ready to sacrifice relations, private friends—even all they hold dear in the world, if it be necessary to do so, in order to perform what is an imperative duty. If you go on in the way you have commenced, depend upon it—before very few months have elapsed there will be but a very small remnant of that gallant army. Commissions will only increase the evil, and shelter those who ought to be called to account for their misdeeds. Send out a man of vigour who will cut at the root of the evil, who will spare no one or nothing if he deems it to be his duty to cut it down. If you do so at once, there may be a chance of saving the survivors of your gallant army; if you do not, they will all perish, and on your heads be their blood.

I have been told by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for the Colonies that the British Army is not accustomed to great campaigns, and that we cannot, therefore, do that which can be done by the French. Well, Sir, that is not true. I do not mean to impugn the right hon. Gentleman's veracity; but what I mean is, that the assumption is false. Are not our campaigns and battles in India greater than those of the French in Algeria? Has there been a battle in Algeria to be compared with that of Sobraon, or a campaign greater than that of Affghanistan? Are the services of men engaged in such campaigns to be surpassed by those of men who have spent their lives in idleness? Through a mean and paltry jealousy you do not employ men who have saved your colonies, who have maintained the dignity of the country, and who have safely extricated armies from situations of great peril. And why not? Because they are not in the service of the Crown, but take pay from the East India Company. And for that reason you pass by men who have led their troops to glory, who have seen great campaigns, and you send out men of seventy years of age, who have never seen war, and who scarcely know how to put a regiment through its evolutions, but who happen to possess Parliamentary influence or family connection. Such a state of things in the present age is monstrous—it is intolerable. I am told that by taking this course I am pulling down the aristocracy. That is not the case. I want to save the aristocracy. What did one of the ablest men in this country write three months ago? He wrote, "If this army perishes, depend upon it it will be the greatest blow ever struck at the aristocracy of this country." This country is coming to the opinion that you have sacrificed its dearest interests because you will not allow men of talent to come between you and your nobility, and you have raised a voice that will take more trouble to allay than you may think. It is said by some that the *Times* is raising this cry, as if there were magic in Printing-house Square. Perhaps Charles I. said that the revolution which he thought was ruining the country was the result of the Puritan preachers, not seeing that it was the revolution which made the Puritan preachers. It was not Rousseau or Voltaire who made the general feeling of the French people, but it was the general feeling of the French people that made them; and so now, it is not the *Times* which is causing the public indignation of the people of this country, but it is the public indignation of the people of this country which has forced the *Times* to adopt the course it has adopted. No, Sir; it is not the *Times* which has caused this indignation, it is the mismanagement of the Administration of this country which has taken place. Do you think that the *Times* would be what it is if it met your views—if it deceived the country as you deceive the country? If you want to have the position the *Times* has—if you want to be backed by the people of this country—do as the *Times* has done. Come forward boldly, and tell us what you yourselves think of the present state of affairs, not what you want others to think.

There are many other points upon which I should like to hear the opinion of the Government. We are told—and I believe the statement to be well founded—that a noble Lord the leader of the late Government in this House is going on a mission to Vienna; that he is to take a place once filled by Lord Castlereagh, but is he going to advocate the same principles as Lord Castlereagh? Are the "four points" to be the basis of negotiations? Do the Government now take the same views they took a few weeks ago, when we were told that the Cabinet was under the influence of the supporters of the head of the late Government? The noble Lord the First Minister of the Crown might have told us whether he was willing to accept peace on any terms—whether the country was going to engage in prolonged hostilities—whether it was proposed to engage on our behalf oppressed nationalities—whether the Circassians would be assisted by us or not—he might, in short, have conveyed some notion to the House of his foreign policy. The question is of such immense importance that we have a right to ask the noble Lord for plain and distinct information upon these points. How is our position with regard to France? I do not wish to enter into any subject which it would be dangerous to touch upon in a public assembly at a time like the present; but I would ask, does it never strike you that the people of England are placed in a position to bring upon them, on the part of our neighbours, feelings which we most dislike—feelings of contempt? Do you not feel that the country may bitterly rue what has happened, not on account of our own interest, but on account of the impression—the intolerable impression—made by it upon those who are, perhaps, enemies at heart, although they may now appear in the guise of friends? Does the Government forget that we occupy this position in the face of the world, with the eyes of all Europe upon us, and then do they hesitate in taking the necessary steps, or do they permit private, party, or family considerations to fetter their course of action? To do so would be to become a laughingstock to the whole world, and to show that we can no longer hold the high place we have held, but that we shall offer an easy prey to those who may seek our destruction. I hope the noble Lord will not consider me impertinent if I refer to his present position. No man had more general sympathy throughout England, or throughout Europe, than the noble Lord. As I have previously told him, I have heard his name repeated in every variety of form throughout Europe; that name was a magic name, as the representative of the great principles of liberty. That reputation was so bright that even the betrayed Sicilians and the betrayal of the cause of Italy in 1848 could not tarnish it; it had passed through every storm unblemished. He rose as no man had ever risen before, and the whole of this House and the country were ready to support the noble Lord when he took office, because it was felt that in a moment of national difficulty he had undertaken a national task. Will the people of England now be satisfied with what has been done? It is the nature of the English people to be patient and long suffering; but the time comes when public feeling, with the force of a torrent, causes itself to be heard. It was so in the case of Roman Catholic Emancipation, of the Reform Bill, and of free trade. You may say now that the people are quiet, that the lake is still, but you have no security that it will continue so. A storm will arise, and, unless you do something to prevent it, not only you, but others besides you, will be shipwrecked. Sir, the state of public feeling at this moment I believe to be one which should be viewed with the greatest anxiety and pain by those who sit in this House. The country is not satisfied. The country, irrespective of men's qualifications at this moment, I believe, want to see whether they cannot be governed by something new. They do not wish to see the same parties in power over and over again. I have no doubt that a Cavendish in the Cabinet is a very important thing, but the public think more of 20,000 lives than they do of a Cavendish. It will not do. The people of England want thorough and complete reform, and, if the noble Lord had thought of the wishes of Englishmen, we should have had a Cabinet which at least might have appealed to the House of Commons with some confidence for its support. I entreat the noble Lord to reflect once more, for his own sake and for the sake of the people of this country. By continuing in his present course he will lose all confidence and all support. By turning from it he will save his own reputation and save this great nation.

General PEEL said, he was not in the least surprised at the general feelings of indignation which prevailed out of doors as to the state of our army in the East after the manner in which it had been spoken of by the noble Lord the Member for the City of London and the lamentable accounts which reached this country through other channels. He thought, too, it was greatly to the credit of the country that this feeling had not been confined merely to those who had friends and relations in the army there, but that it was universal. No matter whether those near and dear to us formed part of that army, we all naturally shared in its glories and sympathised with it in its distresses and its misfortunes. We asked, "Can these things be? Can a British army, almost within sight of its own fleet, be suffering every privation and be wanting the common necessaries of life?" It was their duty first to inquire into the cause of these evils, and then to condemn the conduct of those through whose misconduct they had been brought about. The House of Commons, however, had reversed that principle. They had condemned in the first instance, and now they proposed to inquire. They had sacrificed a Prime Minister and a Secretary for War; and he could not, for the life of him, understand why the rest of the Cabinet should not have shared the same fate. He had voted against the Motion for inquiry; not as a mark of confidence in the Government, because he had not supported that Government, except to give it every assistance in his power to carry on the war. He believed that evils did exist in the management of the army, but his vote on that occasion was not one of confidence in the Government, but it was a vote of want of confidence in the tribunal to which they proposed to intrust this inquiry. He thought a Committee of Inquiry on this particular subject about the worst tribunal they could possibly create. He believed it to be unconstitutional, and, moreover, he believed it to be impracticable; and not only that, but he thought that House principally to blame in those transactions. The causes of the evils which were allowed to exist, and under which the army was suffering, were so plain and evident that no Committee of that House was wanted to inquire into them. The Government commenced a great war with inadequate means, and with those inadequate means they attempted more than any army could possibly execute. The cause of those evils was to be found in this—that from Lord Raglan down to the least drummer-boy in the army they had been called upon to perform a great deal more than they could carry out. The cause of the great mortality which had prevailed was that the men had been overworked and underfed. This was entirely borne out by the circumstance of the disproportion between the deaths of the officers and of the men. The noble Lord the Secretary for War said the other day that he could not account for this disproportion, but it was easily accounted for, and proved the truth of what he was advancing. The officers naturally were not subject to manual labour, and through their own greater command of resources had been better fed than the men. The consequence was, that the mortality among them had been less. This was fully confirmed by the accounts that came home as to the condition of the troops. The climate was healthy enough for those who had plenty of blankets and warm clothing, but to those who perhaps had only one blanket the climate was killing. Overwork, and want of proper food and proper clothing were, then, the cause of the sufferings of our army. It was next necessary to inquire to what these evils were owing. During the whole of last Session, night after night, it was pressed upon the Government to send out more troops to the East. Now, his impression was, that the first great mistake arose from sending out too many troops—more than the reduced state of our peace establishment admitted of. Whether this wish to send out as large a number of men as possible resulted from false pride or from jealousy of our noble allies he would not pause to inquire. The Government sent out in the first instance 27,000 men. To do that they were obliged to encourage volunteering from one regiment of the line into another. By-and-bye they were obliged to send out those regiments, and the consequence was that they went from this country with their efficiency seriously impaired. For example, three battalions of the Guards were sent out. In order to do this they had to draw strongly upon the others; and so, when they wanted to send out reinforcements, they found great difficulty in making up the numbers of another battalion. Now, it would have been far wiser, in the first instance, to have sent out some 10,000 or 15,000 men, and only to have attempted what some 10,000 or 15,000 men were able to accomplish. Instead of doing so, the Government sent out a considerably larger number, without corresponding power in the Commissariat and the medical departments. Now, what had happened with regard to our army in the Crimea? After the glorious battle of Alma the allied forces appeared before Sebastopol. They were at that time nearly equal in point of number, and the siege operations were divided between them. Their great object was to make the attack as soon as possible, before the Russians had received reinforcements. But after the battle of Inkerman our position was very different. The English troops were conducting the same amount of siege works as the French, with a daily diminishing army, while our allies, with their superior numbers, were able so to spare their men that they probably passed only one night out of four in the trenches, while our soldiers passed three out of four there. Lord Raglan then wrote home for reinforcements, and reinforcements were sent out, but they were composed of such young and unseasoned men that they rapidly died off or became unfit for service. That, no doubt, suggested to the Government the idea of looking elsewhere for men fitted for immediate service in the field ; and they proposed the Foreign Enlistment Bill. What was the course taken by that House upon that Bill ? Why, they made it a party question. Hon. Members took advantage of the natural feeling existing in this country against the employment of foreigners instead of Englishmen, and they endeavoured to procure the rejection of the Bill. Now, he was as much opposed as anybody could be to employing foreigners, but when Englishmen could not be procured, and it was absolutely necessary to get soldiers somewhere, he would take them wherever he could possibly lay his hands upon them. The hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) had talked about the blame of the existing evils being bandied about from one to another. Now, as to the army itself, he (General Peel) thought it was impossible to speak in sufficiently high terms of it, whether it was of its bravery in the field, or of the patience and endurance with which it had borne great sufferings and privations elsewhere. Nobody found fault with the army. But then hon. Members turned round and abused the system. Among them was the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty, and, after what that hon. Gentleman had said, it certainly seemed surprising he should remain for one instant in office. Now he (General Peel) was of opinion that, as far as our regimental system had gone, and for the purposes for which it was applied, it was perfect. As far as our regimental system was concerned and our regimental officers he did not believe any army in the world could claim superiority to ours. But then it was said we had no able generals and no competent staff. Why, did not the House believe that here again it was our own fault ? Did they not believe that these men who made such good regimental officers would make equally good generals and equally competent staff officers ? To complain under such circumstances would be as if a man who kept only a gig should turn round upon his servant and complain because he could not drive four-in-hand. We never gave regimental officers an opportunity of qualifying themselves for more responsible duties, and, therefore, it was scarcely fair to complain of them. He implored the House to hesitate before sacrificing a system which, as far as it had been called upon, had, he believed, perfectly succeeded. The fact was that, if England was going to rival all the great military nations of the Continent, if we were going to pit ourselves against nations who could muster their hundreds of thousands of men, we must go to work in a very different manner. However much we admired a representative Government, the House might depend upon it they would never find anything equal to a despotic Government in carrying on a war. What General Bosquet said of the English cavalry charge at Balaklava might be said of the general result of our whole military system in the Crimea, "it is magnificent, but it is not war." He contended this war could not be adequately carried on by a representative Government. He was willing, for one, to make every sacrifice and use every possible exertion to bring the war to a happy and peaceful conclusion ; and as soon as that end was obtained the sooner they returned to their peaceful position the better.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON : Sir, I should be the last man to blame anybody who should bring under the notice of this House any part of our administrative system, whether it be at home or abroad, which he may think has failed adequately to perform its functions, and which he may think ought, therefore, in any way to be improved. But, Sir, I do protest against the language which we have heard this evening from the hon. Member for Aylesbury, who, while he performs what he thinks a public duty, in pointing out what he considers to be errors and defects in the management of the army, says we have disgraced our country, tells us that we are the laughingstock of Europe, and has thought proper to mingle with his observations and recommendations what I must call vulgar declamation against the aristocracy of this country. Sir, I lament as deeply as the hon. Member or any man the sufferings of our brave army in the Crimea.

I am as ready as any man to admit that those sufferings have in part been aggravated by a want of arrangement, and a want of proper management on the part of those who have had the administration of the details by which the wants of the army ought to have been provided for, but I must, in passing, say that it is a great mistake to suppose that these sufferings have been entirely confined to the British troops. Without speaking of our allies, who have certainly endured a great deal, I may say that I know, from pretty good authority, that in the camp of the Russians there are no less than 35,000 men in hospital, sick and wounded, in consequence of the results of the campaign. I say, then, that these sufferings, however they may have been increased by the want of arrangement and the want of proper management, have arisen in a great degree, if not principally, from causes beyond the power of man to control, considering the nature of the service in which the men have been engaged, and the inclemency of the weather to which they have been exposed. So far from feeling that the country stands lower in the estimation of the world in consequence of what has passed in the prosecution of this war, when I look, Sir, to the matchless bravery of the troops, when I look to the victories which they have achieved, and when I look to the share which the gentry and aristocracy of the country have taken in those conflicts, I say that, instead of feeling ashamed that my country stands lower in the estimation of the world, I feel proud of events from the merit of which the hon. Gentleman seeks to detract. Talk to me of the aristocracy of England! Why, look to that glorious charge of the cavalry at Balaklava —look to that charge, where the noblest and the wealthiest of the land rode foremost, followed by heroic men from the lowest classes of the community, each rivalling the other in bravery, neither the peer who led nor the trooper who followed being distinguished the one from the other. In that glorious band there were the sons of the gentry of England; leading were the noblest of the land, and following were the representatives of the people of this country. I say, if any instance be required to show that all classes of the country, from the highest to the lowest, enjoy in common those noblest qualities which dignify mankind, I would appeal to that gallant charge as an immortal proof of the glory of this country. Well, Sir, the hon. Gentleman has certainly followed a line of argument which has exceedingly surprised me. The hon. Gentleman, I believe, has consented to be a Member of the Committee proposed by my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Roebuck), and he will of course vote for the appointment of that Committee. But what was the line of his argument? One of the lines of his argument was, that we, forsooth, are trifling with the interests of the country, trifling with the sufferings, and trifling with the sacred lives of the army, by sending out Commissions to the Crimea with full powers to act, to set right and to reorganise. And what is it he recommends? He approves the appointment of a Committee to examine witnesses, and send forth their Report in a blue book; and in preference to sending out Commissioners—some, indeed, have already gone out with full powers to inquire into and rectify, if possible, the very abuses and want of arrangement of which he complains—the hon. Gentleman proposes the example of the Committee of Safety of the French Revolution, and would have Commissioners sent out with powers to execute summary justice. Why, you might take the hon. Gentleman at his word, and if you were to add this instruction to the Committee, extending its functions, so that the Members thereof proceed instantly to the Crimea, and remain there during the rest of the Session, perhaps that would be satisfactory. Then, again, the hon. Gentleman says we have in some instances abstained from obtaining supplies from Asia Minor, which the French have been enabled to procure. I protest against this invidious distinction being drawn between two portions of the allied army, but I apprehend that Asia Minor may be found sufficiently large to furnish provisions both for English and French. Indeed, as I stated on a former occasion, arrangements have already been made to secure supplies from Sinope and its neighbourhood for the army in the Crimea. The hon. Gentleman, in his own argument, furnishes us with strong reasons against the conclusion to which he wishes the House to arrive. The hon. Gentleman says, the Government ought to have stated to the House what are the terms which my noble Friend the Member for the City of London is about to propose in the negotiations about to take place at Vienna. Why, Sir, this is the first time I ever heard it asked that we should, before entering into negotiations, explain fully to the adverse parties all the conditions we may be willing to ask, and all the conditions which, under certain circumstances, we may be willing to accept. I think if that was to be the course of negotiations which the hon. Gentleman might be appointed to conduct, I would much rather intrust them into the hands of my noble Friend the Member for the City of London. I think, if the course of policy advocated by the hon. Member were acted upon we should justly lay ourselves open to censure. But, Sir, the hon. Gentleman says that I have, between Friday night and Monday afternoon, fallen greatly in the confidence of the country, and the hon. Gentleman says that arises from the fact that I have not recommended to the Queen a Cabinet of a different complexion. Now, Sir, the hon. Gentleman omitted to state exactly how that Cabinet ought to be composed; but I hope he may have the goodness, in succession to the members of the proposed Committee, to add also the members of the proposed Cabinet. The House would then be able to judge between the Cabinet of the hon. Member and the Cabinet which it has been my duty to propose to the House and the country. Sir, I am not afraid of the denunciations thus made. I am confident that when the people of this country see a Government constituted upon the failure of two other attempts to form a Government, they will feel that the men who have thus undertaken the conduct of affairs have done so because they thought that the country ought not to be left without a Government. They will consider that those who have formed a Government have acted from a sense of public duty; they will believe that they have undertaken the conduct of affairs from honourable motives, and they will give the Government credit for a desire to perform their duties so as to advance the best interests of the country. It is hardly likely, from what may have been said betwixt Friday night and Monday morning, that the public would change their opinion, if it was an opinion such as the hon. Member says existed only at the close of last week. Sir, the Government presented themselves to the country for the purpose of carrying on to the best of their means, with adequate energy and vigour, a war in which the country found itself called upon to engage. We presented ourselves to the country with an earnest and honest intention of availing ourselves of the opportunity—if the opportunity be real—which has now offered itself of terminating the war by fair and honourable means. We will not present to the country, as a means of that end, a peace which we do not think safe and honourable to the country, which we do not think calculated to secure this country from the recurrence of those events which have compelled us to draw the sword, and which the country would not be glad to accept from any Administration. If we are enabled to accomplish such an end, we shall rejoice at having been the instruments of saving the country from the further efforts and sacrifices which the continuance of war would demand. But if, on the other hand, it should appear that the adversary with whom we are contending has not yet been brought to that temper of mind which will induce him to consent to those conditions upon which permanent peace can for the future be established, why then, Sir, we shall appeal with confidence to the country for support in those greater exertions which a continuance of the contest may impose upon us as a necessity; and, whatever may be said by the hon. Member for Aylesbury, or by others who may rise after me in debate, I feel confident that this country will give its support to a Government which honourably and honestly stands forward to do its duty in a moment of emergency—a Government which has not forced itself upon the country by any vote or Motion in this House, or by any Parliamentary manœuvre—a Government which has arisen in consequence of the failure of others who might, if they had chosen, have undertaken the work, but who shrank from doing it at the time when the offer was made to them. I do not mention this as reflecting blame upon them, but simply as the fact which led to the formation of the present Government. Two endeavours having been made to form a Government, and those two endeavours having failed, I should have thought myself a degraded man if I had not undertaken the task. I feel proud of the support which my hon. and noble Friends have afforded me. I throw myself with confidence upon the generosity of the country and of Parliament, and I am convinced that, if we do our duty—and we shall do our duty as long as we have the support of the country to enable us to do it—if we are enabled by the support of the country to do that which we conceive to be our duty, in spite of temporary reverses, in spite of the momentary aspect of affairs—we shall succeed in carrying matters to a successful issue, be it for peace now, or be it for peace hereafter; but, whether by negotiations now, or whether by force of arms afterwards, we shall be able to place this country upon that proud footing of future security which its greatness and its power so well entitle it to occupy.

Mr. J. G. PHILLIMORE said, he could not agree with the opinions which had been expressed by hon. Members that the failures which had taken place were in any way to be attributed to the want of means or resources on the part of this country. He considered that if those resources had been properly managed they were more than sufficient for the purpose they were intended to effect, and he thought the country had a right to demand some explanation of the reason why, when ample stores were accumulated within six miles of the camp, 20,000 of our soldiers had been lost for want of those supplies which might easily have been afforded them. The most ordinary precautions would have sufficed to place those resources which England had exhausted herself to furnish within reach of our army. No explanation had been given of the reason why those supplies had not been afforded; no punishment had been inflicted upon those to whom blame might attach; no inquiry had been made as to the reason why the stores which had been collected remained at Balaklava, while our troops were perishing for the want of them at a few miles' distance. He considered that the country had a right to insist upon some inquiry being made as to the cause of that failure. Not only had there been gross mismanagement in the Commissariat Department, but also with regard to the medical stores. What was the cause of the scandalous insufficiency of medical aid provided for the troops? How was it, when a medical officer was censured by his commanding officer on one day, that the next he was appointed to a situation of great trust? These were matters requiring strict investigation, which, thanks to the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, there was a chance they might now receive. He did not concur in the opinion of the hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) that a country with a representative Government was ill adapted for carrying on war successfully, for the proposition was contradicted by the experience of European States. The most successful wars had been those in which the energies of free countries had been directed against overwhelming despotism. Indeed, the history of the United Provinces and of this country afforded a direct refutation of the hon. and gallant Member's doctrine. If a free country placed confidence in its Government, the people were entitled to ask how that confidence had been justified, and, when they found that the national efforts were unavailing, they had a right to inquire whether the confidence they had reposed in the Government had been abused. Would any one deny that such a right of inquiry had been exercised on previous occasions most beneficially in this country? What were the calamities of Walcheren compared with those which had recently occurred? Was there ever a time when inquiry was more loudly demanded and was more imperative than at present? He entertained no hostility to the noble Lord at the head of the Government. Indeed, there was much in that noble Lord's past conduct which he regarded with respect and admiration. He looked upon the noble Lord as having been for many years the champion of freedom and of representative institutions, but at the same time he could not conceal from himself that, with only one or two exceptions, the Government of the noble Lord was precisely that which the House had already condemned by a large majority. The noble Lord ought not to be surprised if hon. Members felt some hesitation in now reposing confidence in a Government which had been condemned by a large majority of that House only three weeks ago. Notwithstanding that, however, he would give the noble Lord the best support in his power so long as the war was carried on with firmness, vigour, and honesty of purpose, yet, seeing how the offices of the Government were filled, he could not avoid confessing that he could not place implicit confidence in the noble Lord's Administration. The right hon. Gentleman who was Secretary at War in the late Government was now Secretary for the Colonies; but he was still a Member of the Cabinet, and must, therefore, be consulted about the arrangements for carrying on the war. When he (Mr. Phillimore) recollected that that right hon. Gentleman had censured the regimental officers, and had praised the staff—when he recollected his plausible statements and the uniform contradiction those statements had received from facts, and saw him still holding an office of great importance and consideration, he felt it impossible to place full and implicit confidence in the present

Government. At the same time, he would not offer any factious opposition to the Government, but would give his best support to any measures which appeared to him calculated to bring about what they all concurred in desiring—a just and honourable peace.

Mr. WARNER said, he was ready to support the Government in carrying on the war, and the more so because the noble Lord at the head of the present Administration possessed to an extraordinary degree the confidence of the public as a War Minister; but he (Mr. Warner) could not think that the explanations given by the noble Lord the other night and the remarks he had just made would be entirely satisfactory to the country. The unfortunate events which had taken place in the East had caused great excitement throughout the country, and the people had placed confidence in the noble Lord because they believed he was prepared to act with energy, and to cut up by the root whatever in the existing system was found to be defective. The duty of the Government was not to make a few paltry reforms, which was all the noble Lord had suggested, but to reorganise and reconstruct a new army in the place of that which we had lost. He feared that the proposals of the noble Lord would not realise the hopes which the nation had formed upon his accession to power. There were evidently some misapprehensions which existed with reference to the war, and upon which he (Mr. Warner) wished to say a few words. They were constantly told that England was not a military nation, but how was this when the House of Commons every year voted supplies for the army about equal in amount to those by which the French army was maintained? France was one of the first military Powers in the world, and it was not the fault of the House of Commons if England was not a military Power; yet it had been considered necessary to call Parliament together at an unusually early period in order to authorise the enlistment of 15,000 foreign troops; our artillery, which had been the subject of so much boasting, had proved to be inferior to that of other armies; and our cavalry, he feared, had been virtually annihilated by the unfortunate mistake committed at Balaklava. These misfortunes, however, had not been brought upon the army by any false economy on the part of Parliament, therefore he must object to those observations that had been made by more than one hon. Member that the disasters in the Crimea were the fault of Parliament. They were told that the Turks, when well officered, were good soldiers, and he wished to know why, in the midst of all their need of soldiers, they had heard nothing of arming a Turkish contingent, and of placing it under European officers? He considered that the greater part of our misfortunes might be traced directly to the system of patronage and purchase of promotions that prevailed in the army; there was too broad a line of demarcation drawn between the officers and the privates, and no chance was afforded to the men of rising by their good conduct and bravery. If the Government desired to encourage a military spirit among the men, they must do so by holding out the same hopes and rewards of the same kind, though in different degrees, to all men in the army. He had voted for the Committee of inquiry becouse he believed it was absolutely necessary for some body of men or for some man, to inquire into the causes of the misfortunes and sufferings of the army. From what the noble Lord at the head of the Government had said, it appeared that he would undertake to inquire into those grievances, and the noble Lord was certainly in a better position to do so than the House of Commons could be. Whether he should give his vote in favour of the nomination of the Committee would depend on the promises which the noble Lord might make, who, he hoped, would pledge himself to the House not only to institute a searching inquiry into these grievances, but also that he would endeavour to bring to justice those who had been the cause of them.

Major REED said, he had long been of opinion that the whole system at the Horse Guards was rotten throughout, and if anything could render it more disgraceful and injurious to the country, it was the system of purchase that at present prevailed. The jobbery throughout these transactions was disgraceful in the extreme and in many instances they were in direct violation of the Queen's regulations, which stated that only a certain sum should be paid for promotions, but a considerably larger premium was often payed beyond the sum fixed. He considered that so long as this system was carried on—so long as merit and long service were not duly rewarded—they never would obtain efficient officers. He believed that in the ranks would be found men who, though, perhaps, not so well educated, or born with a silver spoon in their mouths, had yet in them sterling qualities which would make them good soldiers, enable them to take a high position in their profession, and to advance the efficiency of the service and the interests of the country more than those men whose only qualification for their positions appeared to be that they were born with handles to their names.

Mr. MURROUGH said, that the House had just heard from the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) many strictures on the manner in which the army was officered and affairs conducted in the East; but it appeared to him (Mr. Murrough) that not only there, but at home, the country was in the state of Sinbad—ridden by old men. This was not only the case with the army, but they had a Government conducted by men who were past the age when men were adequate to the calls of public life. When the Ministry was formed only three noble Lords were sent for, as if the monopoly of the talent of the country belonged to noble Lords. He was satisfied a noble Lord might be a man of the same capacity and talent as an ordinary man, when at a mature age, and capable of conducting public business; but when he was passed that age, not only was he an old man, but he was worse, and rendered more incapable when his hands were tied with red tape. The noble Lord the Member for Tiverton was three days ago that which he was not now—master of the position; and if he had thrown aside precedents and prejudices he might have formed from below the gangway on either side of the House a better and a stronger Government than they had had in that House for twenty years. There might not, perhaps, have been in it the name of a Russell, an Elliot, or a Cavendish, but they would have had men representing and possessing the confidence of large consituencies. The noble Lord had neglected the chance of having the hon. Member for Aylesbury by his side, and now the hon. Member was at his back. If the noble Lord fell, borne down by a Government which this House had condemned, he had only himself to thank, and he would not be pitied by the country.

Motion *agreed to.*

SUPPLY—ARMY ESTIMATES.

The House then went into Committee of Supply, Mr. Bouverie in the Chair.

(1.) 193,595 Men.

Major Reed

Mr. FREDERICK PEEL: Sir, in proceeding to ask the Committee to agree to the votes of money which are necessary to cover what the Government considers will be the probable expenditure on account of the Army in the course of the ensuing financial year, I must beg their indulgence, on account of the very short period which has elapsed since I entered upon the duties of my present office, and which has barely allowed me sufficient time to become acquainted with the more prominent features of the contents of these Estimates, much less with their minor and minuter points. I also feel that it is no easy task for any one to render intelligible to the Committee the complicated details of a service like the army, requiring, even in ordinary years, and under ordinary circumstances, to be kept on foot by the appropriation of a considerable portion of the whole annual expenditure which is authorised by Parliament, and which in these Estimates has been swollen to dimensions unusually large, but not, I believe, larger than are commensurate with the magnitude of the operations in which the country is now engaged. I have further to regret the absence, from indisposition, of my right hon. Friend the present Secretary of State for the Colonies, under whose superintendence the Estimates have been framed. I need not observe that I had relied very much on the presence of my right hon. Friend, because of his great familiarity with the subject, and because these Estimates had been prepared under his especial direction. The Estimates for the ensuing financial year differ from those of the current year in more than one respect. In the first place, the number of men which the Government ask the Committee to allow to be borne upon the establishment of the army greatly exceeds that which has been voted for the last year. Then, again, there is a very large augmentation in very many of those services which have always formed a part of the administration of the British Army, and have always been included in the Estimates; but, in addition to those causes of difference, the Committee will observe that these Estimates show the creation of new departments which have never before appeared therein, or been submitted to the sanction of Parliament. I will refer, for instance, to such a department as the land transport service, which it has been found from painful experience necessary to establish. The first Vote to which I shall call the attention of the Committee has reference to the number and strength of the army. Setting aside the number of the regiments of infantry and cavalry of the line which are employed in the East Indies, and paid for by the Government of India, not reckoning also the estimated force of the foreign corps which is to be raised under the Foreign Enlistment Act, passed at the commencement of the Session, and further, excluding from the present calculation the number of men who form the militia regiments which have been embodied, and for which provision has been made, the number of men which we propose to be voted for the service of the ensuing year is 178,645. When my right hon. Friend the late Secretary at War introduced the original Estimates of last year, he stated that he was desirous that the House should first have the opportunity of discussing the policy of those measures in which the Government had been concerned previous to the breaking out of the war, and that after such discussion had taken place he would then introduce further Estimates to provide for placing the army upon a war footing, and he introduced two Supplementary Estimates, which, together, provided for an addition to the force of the army of nearly 30,000 men. Comparing the Estimates of the present with the original Estimates of the last year, there is an increase of about 66,000 men; but, as compared with the whole Estimates of the year, there is an increase of but 35,869, exclusive of 14,950 men in the foreign corps proposed to be raised. The manner in which this increased number of men is proposed to be spread over the effective strength of the army is as follows:—In the first place, there will be an addition of 1,950 men to the Foot Guards. The cavalry also will be increased by 3,470 men. The remainder is to be spread over forty-one regiments of infantry of the line. A battalion of 2,000 strong is to be added to the 60th Rifles, making that regiment one of three battalions, and a battalion of the same strength is to be added to the rifle corps, making three battalions also in that corps. In the course of last year, every regiment, exclusive of those in India, was raised from an establishment of 1,000 to 1,200 men, and directions have now been given for further raising the force of those regiments—forty-one in number—now serving in the Crimea, from 1,200 to 2,000 men each. With respect to the distribution of this force, there are ten regiments of cavalry and forty-one regiments of infantry of the line in the Crimea, and the remainder of the regiments, exclusive of those in India, are employed in the Colonies and the military stations in the Mediterranean. It will doubtless be satisfactory to the Committee to be informed that in the course of the past year a considerable reduction has been made in the number of troops maintained by this country in the Colonies. There has been an addition of one battalion to the force in the Australian Colonies, but the Governments of those colonies are called upon to pay for that increased force, and credit is taken in the Estimates for a sum of 12,000*l.*, for the cost of that battalion. The whole sum payable by the Australian Colonies for the military force maintained there, is 30,000*l.* The force at the Cape still continues very large, and it has not been thought advisable at present, considering the state of the Eastern frontier, to make any reductions in the number of troops at present stationed in that colony. A very considerable reduction has been made in the West India and British North American Colonies. There were formerly three regiments in the West India Colonies; there are now only two. In the British North American Colonies, last year, there were six regiments—namely, four in Canada and two in the Lower Provinces. There is now only one regiment in Canada, exclusive of the Canadian Rifles, and one in the Lower Provinces. It must be satisfactory to know that the reduction was made almost entirely at the invitation of the colonists themselves. The people of Canada have expressed their deep sympathy with this country in the cause in which it is engaged; and with regard to the force in Nova Scotia, the Legislature of that province has presented an Address to the Crown expressing its readiness to undertake the external defence of that country, should the Government find it necessary to withdraw the troops at present stationed there. Of the two regiments in the British North American Colonies, one is now at Quebec and the other at Halifax. The whole amount of reduction in those Colonies is about 3,000 men, representing an expenditure of from 90,000*l.* to 100,000*l.*

The next Vote to which I will call the attention of the Committee includes the charge for the daily pay and daily allowance, which for the number of men I have mentioned, will amount in the course of the year to 4,500,000*l.*, being an increase over last year, if the Supplementary Estimate of

800,000*l.* be not taken into account, of about 1,500,000*l.* I am informed that since last year there has been no alteration in the rates of pay of the different ranks in the army with one exception, namely, that of the colonels of regiments. If hon. Members will compare the rates of pay to be allowed to colonels next year with those allowed last year, they will find an increase ranging from 600*l.* to the sum of 1,000*l.* in the instance of the colonels of the Foot Guards. Now, this additional pay allowed to colonels has been granted, I may say, in conformity with the recommendation of a Committee of this House, and has reference to an alteration which has taken place since last year in the mode of clothing the men of the different regiments. This alteration I will explain more fully when I come to the subject of the clothing of the army; but I will merely now observe that it is in consequence of the colonels ceasing to derive a pecuniary gain from the clothing of their men that a fixed addition has been made to their pay of 600*l.* in regard to the colonels of the infantry of the line; which, however, will be liable to be hereafter reduced, in the event of vacancies occurring to the sum of 500*l.* I have stated that the force to be maintained for the service of the year ensuing is 178,645 men, and that that is an increase upon the establishment, as voted last year in the original and Supplementary Estimates, of 35,869 men. Now, that force will, of course, require to be recruited during the year; but, in addition to that, seeing that the effective strength of the army is not equal to the establishment as voted by Parliament last year, it is discovered that it will be necessary to recruit 40,000 men in the course of this next year in order to bring the army up to the proposed strength of its establishment. Provision has, therefore, been made in the Estimates for recruiting up to that number. We have also to add about 20,000 men to supply vacancies which are estimated to be caused by casualties in the course of the year, so that provision is required to be made for the recruiting of 60,000 men. The estimated cost of raising this number of men is 513,000*l.*, being an excess over that of the Estimate of the last year, for a similar purpose, of 378,000*l.* At the beginning of the last year the bounty paid to recruits on joining regiments of infantry of the line amounted to 4*l.* In order to induce more persons to come forward as recruits in the autumn of last year the bounty was increased to 6*l.*, and, I believe, in the month of January in the present year it has been still further raised to 8*l.* This circumstance will explain the large sum required to be provided for the recruiting service. In connection with the subject of the recruiting of the Army, I may refer to the Bill which the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the War Department has, in another place, announced it to be his intention to introduce. By that measure it is proposed to authorise the enlistment of men for the army of an age above that at which recruits are ordinarily enlisted, and ranging from twenty-four to thirty or thirty-two. They are to be enlisted for a period of two or three years; and in that way the Secretary of State for War anticipates that he will succeed in obtaining men fit for service in the war, and whose constitutions will be better able to withstand the trials of climate to which our men are exposed than the recruits who have recently been raised.

Having referred to the expense of recruiting the army, I will now come to the cost of mounting the cavalry. There is a sum of 322,000*l.* taken in the present Vote for the purchase of horses. The Government propose to provide for the purchase of 7,500 horses for the cavalry force. Deducting the four regiments of cavalry that are employed in the East Indies and paid by the Indian Government, and deducting likewise the household cavalry, for the mounting of which provision is to be made in a different manner, I find that the establishment of horses for the cavalry of the line is stated to be from 7,800 to 8,000. Now, the Government proposed to obtain 7,500 horses, which will enable them, in fact, to remount almost the entire cavalry force. The necessity for purchasing this large number of horses arises in this way. There has been a considerable increase in the strength of ten cavalry regiments which have been sent out for service in the Crimea; and at the commencement of this year the effective strength of horses for the cavalry did not exceed 4,197, not including the 2,500 horses that were sent to the Crimea, which number in the course of this year have dwindled down to not more than 1,000, and which, in the course of the quarter now current, must be expected to undergo a still further diminution. So that, in point of fact, the Government have to provide for the bringing up of the establishment of horses from 4,197 to the number of 7,800, and likewise for replacing the losses that are likely to be sustained by casualties during the next year. Altogether, therefore, they estimate the number of horses that will be required at 7,500. There is also another reason for the large increase proposed in this Vote. The Committee will observe that the estimated cost of each horse is set down in the present Estimates at 40*l.*, whereas, in former years, it has been only 26*l.* Now, the cause for this increase is as follows: It has hitherto been the practice to purchase horses at the age of three years, and the regulation price for them was 26*l.* each. I am told that these horses were kept in training for a period of two years, and cost the country altogether about 60*l.* apiece, and that when about five years old they were fit to be used. Of course, under present circumstances, we require horses that will be immediately available for service, and it is, therefore, proposed to buy horses of the age of from five to nine years. Now, the cost of horses at ages ranging between the years that I have named, and trained and fit for service, is taken to be 40*l.* each, or an excess of 14*l.* per horse over the price voted last year.

Having now stated the charge for pay and allowances, as well as the sum proposed to be asked for the mounting of the cavalry force, I will now pass on to another item of this Vote—namely, that of clothing, in which there is an increase of something more than 105,000*l.* Since last year the system of clothing the army had undergone an entire alteration. The practice formerly was this—certain articles of clothing were specified to be issued to each man in the regiment; there was a regular scale of prices, and an estimate was made according to this scale of the cost of clothing the regiment, always reckoning the number of the regiment as being up to the full strength of the establishment, and the sum thus estimated was paid to the colonel. In addition, a further sum was also paid him, generally averaging about 600*l.*, which was, and was intended to be, his profit on the clothing of the regiment. In addition to this, however, the colonel had a further advantage, because, if the strength of the regiment was not up to its full establishment, he was not debited to the Government with the difference, but, on the other hand, if, at any time during the year, the strength of the regiment exceeded its establishment, and he showed that he had provided clothes for the supernumeraries, the colonel was entitled to debit the Government with the extra amount. That system, however, has been changed in consequence of its condemnation by public opinion, although it was admitted that it gave satisfaction to the men, who were fairly treated under it. The manner in which the present Estimate has been formed is by calculating the cost of the clothing for each man in every regiment, making no allowance for the pecuniary profit of the colonels; and by adding to this the cost of the number of men by which the army is about to be increased. This money will still be expended by the colonels; they will be allowed to make contracts with their clothiers, and thus they will still be induced to take an interest in the clothing of the regiment, but as the bills will be sent in to the Government, they will have no pecuniary profit whatever in the affair. There is, also, a considerable increase, amounting to 155,600*l.*, in the charge for general and regimental hospitals. In time of peace, when a man went into hospital, a deduction was made from his pay of the sum of 10*d.* per diem, and the charge for general and regimental hospitals had, therefore, in former years been very light. Last year, in consequence of the deductions of pay thus made, the net charge of the hospital was only 8,000*l.* A largely-increased Vote is rendered necessary this year, by the fact that when men became sick in the course of active service the stoppage was no longer 10*d.* a day, but was reduced to the ordinary stoppage for rations—3½d. a day, and, consequently, though the number of men in the army, and the numbers, therefore, of men who would go into hospital were very much increased, the Government have calculated the stoppages of pay at a smaller sum than last year. The principal reason, however, for the large increase in this item is, of course, the expense of maintaining the hospitals at Scutari, at Balaklava, and in the camp before Sebastopol. The Vote asked for includes the expenses of nurses and hospital orderlies, but not the pay of the surgeons, which is provided for in another Vote. To show the Committee how difficult it is under present circumstances to anticipate beforehand the probable demands of a state of war, I may refer to the fact, that since these Estimates were framed it has been determined to establish a civil hospital at Smyrna, to be placed in charge of medical practitioners taken from the civil branch of the profession. This step has been determined on since these Estimates were drawn up, and consequently the expenses of the proposed hospital are not included in them. It is also intended to establish a line of transports fitted up with every accommodation as hospital ships, with surgeons on board, to run between Constantinople and this country, in order to convey hither invalids whose treatment is more likely to be successful at home, and thus to make room in the hospital at Scutari for the men who were brought down from the camp before Sebastopol.

In the Vote for Divine service there is an increase of 9,200*l.*, which is caused entirely by the charge for chaplains appointed to attend the army in the field. The number of chaplains already sent out is forty-two, of whom twenty-four are of the Church of England, eight Presbyterians, and ten Roman Catholics. The rate of pay allowed to these gentlemen is 16*s.* a day, with the exception of some who, receiving a contribution from the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, are allowed an annual payment of 100*l.* a year. There is an increase in the charge for the pay of schoolmasters of 7,150*l.*, which is owing to the intention of the Government to appoint thirty new schoolmasters who have been trained in the normal school at Chelsea, and to establish and organise schools in each regiment. It is also proposed to appoint schoolmasters in the new depôts which have been established, and no less than eighteen trained schoolmasters have been appointed to schools in the different militia regiments which have been embodied; for it is felt that as these regiments are now being called out for permanent service, it is but fair that they should have the same advantages in the way of schools and schoolmasters as are enjoyed by the regular regiments, whose places they take. The number of schoolmasters at present employed is seventy-four, and it is intended to appoint thirty more, thus raising the whole number to 104. If there has ever been any doubts entertained as to the expediency of educating our soldiers, I think they must be entirely dispelled by the letters which have appeared in the public journals from private soldiers since the commencement of the war. The next item on which I feel it necessary to make any remarks is the miscellaneous charges. There is among these a charge of 156,000*l.* to cover claims which are likely to be made for losses sustained by officers and men while engaged in active service against the enemy. This estimate, however, is an entirely conjectural one. There is an increase of 65,000*l.* in the item of field allowances, which are payments made to officers of somewhere about 2*s.* 6*d.* a day while engaged on active service, to enable them to provide the means of transport, &c., for their private baggage.

There remain now two more items in this Vote on which I have to touch—namely, the charges for the land transport service and for the foreign corps. It is admitted that the land transport service of the army in the Crimea has fallen into a state of inefficiency. It had been placed under the charge of the Commissariat, and, as the duties of that department were sufficiently ample to occupy the whole time of one head, it was by no means surprising that, almost overburdened with its own special functions, the Commissariat had proved little qualified to cope with the difficulties which met it when it attempted to carry on the duties of another department. It must be remembered, however, in justice to the Commissariat, that it had been called on not only to provide means of transport for the rations of the men and the forage of the horses, and for the carriage of the sick, but also for the conveyance to the camp of large quantities of warm clothing, huts, and other articles, although at the time the animals which it had collected together were dying in large numbers from the insufficiency of food, the badness of the roads, and also from exposure to the inclemency of the weather. Certain it is that this service was in a state of admitted deficiency, and the Government have, therefore, determined to organise this land transport corps, under the command of Colonel M'Murdo, which would undertake the whole of the land transport of the army. The number of drivers of the land transport corps will be 8,000, and the Vote will provide for the transport of the animals purchased by Colonel M'Murdo's agents from adjacent countries to the seat of war, where they would be available for the use of the corps. [Mr. BAILLIE: How many horses will there be?] I am unable to state the number of animals that will be collected together, because that will be regulated by the demands of the service. The hon. Member for Aylesbury has said that we have made no provision for the maintenance of the foreign corps; but in that respect he was in error, for I have now arrived at the estimate which provides for that purpose 400,000*l.* The charge of the foreign corps, as I have stated, will be 400,000*l.*, supposing that they would consist of thirteen regiments of 1,000 strong. The total charge of the land forces proposed to be voted is 7,353,804*l.*, which is an increase upon the Estimates of last year, including under this title the original and two supplementary Estimates, of 2,630,516*l.* There is no difficulty in accounting for that excess. It is owing to the increased number of men receiving daily pay—the cost of the foreign corps—the cost of the land transport corps — the additional cost of hospital service and of the recruiting service, and the mounting of the men. Suppose I divide the charge for the land forces amongst the men to be maintained, including the foreign corps, I find the cost per man, including officers as well as privates, will be for 1853–54, 35*l.* 8*s.*; for 1854–55, 34*l.* 14*s.*; and for the present year, 37*l.* 19*s.* The increase of the Vote for the staff amounts to 163,600*l.*; but there was a Supplementary Estimate of 70,000*l.*, which leaves the net increase 93,600*l.* There is no alteration, I think, in the staff at home; and, with regard to that part of the foreign staff that is employed in the Colonies, I find there is a diminution of about 5,500*l.* That diminution is owing to the reduction of the military forces in the province of Canada. In consequence of that reduction, we have substituted a major general on the staff for a lieutenant general, and to that substitution this reduction is to be attributed. There is one remark which I wish to make in reference to the pay of the military secretary of the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope. The Government have determined that for the future, where there is a civil Governor in the colony, he shall not be allowed any staff by the Imperial Government. The consequence is, that in the case of the Governor of Canada we have taken away the provision that was made for the aide de camp of the civil Governor. But we have made an exception to the rule in the case of the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope. We allow him a military secretary, paid by this country, and the reason is partly in consequence of the much larger force maintained in the Cape of Good Hope than in the other colonies, and partly, also, in consequence of the Major General commanding the army at the Cape being at a very great distance from the seat of the civil government, the Major General being at the eastern extremity and the civil Governor at the western extremity of the colony, and it not being desirable that the correspondence between them should pass through the office of the Colonial Secretary. The whole of the increase in the Estimates is to be attributed to the staff employed in the army abroad. It is not necessary to go into details, but I may say that more than one-half of the increase is required to pay for the large number of surgeons and assistant surgeons which it is necessary to employ in the hospitals at Scutari and with the army. The next Vote to which I come is Vote No. 4, for the public departments connected with the army. In this vote there is also a considerable increase—there is an increase of 48,500*l.* I may state that I shall reduce the Vote when I come to take it by the salary of the Secretary at War, for, that office having ceased to exist as a separate office, it will not be necessary to vote the salary. The increase in No. 4 arises partly from our having included in it the charge for the establishment of the Secretary of State for War, which amounts to a sum of 18,787*l.* The charge for that department last year was, I think, included in the Civil Estimates; at all events, it was not included in the Army Estimates. There is also a considerable increase in the cost of the office which has hitherto been known as that of the Secretary at War. It has been found necessary to have an additional number of clerks employed in that office. The clerks engaged are temporary clerks, and, of course, will cease to be employed the moment the pressure of business shall be reduced. There is also an increase on account of postage, which is merely a matter of account, costing nothing to the public; and those items added together account for the whole of the increase in this Vote. I shall pass over the fifth vote—the vote for the Royal Military College—because that is a self-supporting institution; that is to say, the payments made by the young men who are educated in that college quite cover the cost of the establishment. The payments, however, are made into the Exchequer, and a certain sum is voted in the Estimates for the support of the establishment. An hon. Gentleman has given notice of a Motion on the subject of the payments made by the different classes of students, which will come on in due course, and I may reserve till then further reference to this matter. There is an increase in the Vote for the Military Asylum, Chelsea, which is Vote No. 6, of 2,611*l*. I am informed that last year an Act of Parliament was passed authorising the appropriation of 10,000*l*. for the purpose of enlarging the accommodation in the Military Asylum, and the object of the increased Vote in the present year is to provide for the additional orphans who are to be admitted into the Asylum in consequence of the additional accommodation thus provided. The present number of orphans, as well in the Royal Military Asylum as in the Hibernian School, is 350, and we now provide for the maintenance of 120 additional orphans in the Royal Military Asylum. Passing over Vote No. 7, in which no alteration is made, I come to Vote No. 8, which is the charge for the embodied militia of the United Kingdom. There are 150 regiments of militia to be provided for, and the charge amounts to 3,813,383*l*. This is the first time that the charge for the Militia has been included in the Army Estimates of late years. The course hitherto has been to take the Militia Estimates separately from the Army Estimates. A Committee was appointed, to whom the Secretary at War submitted the Militia Estimates, and if the Committee approved of them, they were introduced to the House separately, and passed in that form. Last year a sum was taken in those Estimates on account for the several regiments of militia embodied. This year, however, nearly the whole of the militia of the country is placed on a permanent footing, and the charge, therefore, for this service is included in the Army Estimates. Of the regiments embodied the services of three have been accepted for the Mediterranean, and it is intended to send a further number to the same part of the world. With this Vote is concluded the effective branch of the Estimates, and upon the effective branch it is that the whole augmentation takes place.

On coming to the other division—the non-effective branch—it will be found that, on the whole, as compared with last year, there is a reduction of 33,000*l*. The first Vote on the non-effective branch is the charge for rewarding officers and men who have rendered distinguished service to the country. The whole Vote amounts to 22,000*l*., of which 18,000*l*. is appropriated to the rewarding of officers, and 4,000*l*. to the rewarding of sergeants. There is an increase in that part of the Estimate that is employed in the rewarding of sergeants of 1,500*l*. The next two Votes are Nos. 10 and 11, both of which are important, and both of which show a considerable increase. The first of those Votes is applied to the unattached pay of general officers, and there is an increase in the Vote of 18,000*l*. I will state the manner in which the increase arose. It is owing to the recommendation of the Commission which was appointed last year upon the subject of the retirement and promotion of officers in the Army. The number of general officers receiving payment at the rate of 1*l*. 5*s*. per day was fixed some time ago at 120. Supernumerary general officers, provided they had served a certain number of years as field officers, were allowed to receive, not 1*l*. 5*s*. a day, but an annual allowance of 400*l*. In consequence of there being no brevet for some time past, the number of general officers in the Estimates of last year had sunk below 120, having fallen to 105, being fifteen below the number fixed, so there was no general officer receiving the pay of 400*l*. a year. The Commission appointed last year made an entire change in the manner of promoting officers to be general officers with the view of bringing forward younger men where they could be employed in the command of brigades or divisions. It is unnecessary to enter into the details at length, except in so far as they bear upon the Estimate in this Vote. It was stated that the effect of the recommendation, if adopted, would be to bear hardly upon the colonels created by the brevet of 1841 and 1846, and in order to prevent any complaints it was advised that one more brevet should be issued, to include all the colonels of 1841 and 1846. The Commission recommended that the number of general officers receiving 1*l*. 5*s*. a day should be reduced to the number of 100; but the effect of the brevet of last year, by bringing forward to the rank of major-general the colonels of 1841 and 1846, has been to raise the whole number of major-generals, excepting always those who are employed and are colonels of regiments, to 148, and the excess over 100 is to be provided for; but it is intended in future to promote only one colonel to the rank of major-general for every three vacancies, until the whole number, which is now 148, shall be reduced to 100. The payment of the 400*l*. a year to the general officers exceeding 100 will therefore account for the increase in this Vote.

The increase on Vote No. 11 is caused by the retirement on full pay of a certain number of colonels, captains, and other officers, and that is owing also to the recommendation of the Commission; for, whereas formerly the sum fixed was 46,000*l.*, in accordance with the recommendation of the Committee it was agreed that it should be raised to the sum of 60,000*l.*, the object being to make provision for certain captains and other officers who did not possess the activity which the exigencies of the present time required. A sum of 5,000*l.* would be sufficient for the purpose in the course of this year; and next year and subsequent years more Votes would be taken for the same purpose, so as eventually to bring up the whole Vote for retired full pay for officers of the rank of colonel and captain and other officers to the standard of 60,000*l.* The charge for half-pay has undergone a reduction in the course of last year. The diminution in the number of officers receiving it is not less than 313, and the diminution amounts to 7,721*l.* A great part of this reduction is owing to deaths in the course of the year, but a portion of it is also owing to the course pursued by the Government in calling out all available captains who would accept employment in the army on active service, the opportunity of offering them employment being afforded to the Government by the augmentation of the forces. I may observe that this Vote, though substantially a non-effective Vote, has to a certain extent, in consequence of what passed in the course of last year, maintained a reserve on which the Government are able to call for officers, and by which the establishment of the army may be increased without at the same time increasing the burdens of the country. I have no remark to make upon Vote 13, which provides for the pay of the disbanded officers of the foreign corps in the late war, which shows, of course, a reduction. I wish, however, to say a few words on Votes 14 and 15, which provide pensions for the widows of officers and for their families. The increase in the Vote for the present year is to be attributed to the probability that there will be an increased number of claims in the course of the year; and it is considered desirable to relax the forms of the warrant under which those pensions are granted. Suppose an officer dies from fatigue or privation while engaged against the enemy, it is considered that his widow and family have as fair a claim upon the country as if he had died in battle. In the Vote for the hospitals there has been a small increase in consequence of the increased price of provisions. The only remaining Vote which it is necessary for me to advert to, is the charge for out-pensioners. There is a reduction of the sum of 27,123*l.* in that Vote, in consequence of out-pensioners dying off in the course of the year, while the present war it is not supposed, during this next year, will exercise any material influence on the number of out-pensioners. Having occupied the Committee so long, I shall now, without making any of those general reflections which the nature of the subject might suggest, at once proceed, Sir, to place in your hand the first Vote for 193,595 officers, non-commissioned officers, and rank and file for the year commencing the 1st of April, 1855, and ending the 30th of March, 1856.

Colonel BOLDERO said, he wished to bring under the notice of the Committee one point connected with the medical department. He found that officers in the navy who had been wounded had, when brought home, asylums open for them, such as the hospitals at Portsmouth and Plymouth, where they received every attention, and had the benefit of all the surgical skill which their cases required. Now, with respect to the army, he was not aware that there was for the officers brought home wounded from the Crimea any receptacle, where they could be received and attended to free of expense. Now, he thought, this was a very great hardship upon the officers in the army, though the alteration made in the deduction of from tenpence to twopence from the pay of the soldiers upon entering an hospital must be regarded as a very satisfactory change. He happened to know a case, which he would state to the Committee as it had been related to him. It was the case of an officer who was wounded in the Crimea by a *ricochet* cannon ball, a nine-pounder. He saw the ball coming, and saw it enter the ground, and thought it had not sufficient power to rise, but it did rise and struck him in the breast. He (Colonel Boldero) was speaking of facts related to him by the officer's brother. The ball struck him and knocked him from his horse; the medical men in the Crimea saw the wound was of great severity, and he was ordered home. He had seen the individual himself in London, delicate in appearance, but still in pretty good health. The wound turned out badly afterwards, an ulcer formed in his chest, and he was laid upon his back. He went to an eminent medical man in London and stated his case. The opinion of that medical man was, had the ball struck him lower down, in the pit of the stomach, it would have been instant death; that had it struck him higher up it would have caused a lingering death, but, having struck him where it did, he thought he could cure him. He made a deep incision in the chest, and attended him twice a day. That officer was paying two guineas a day to that medical man for attending him, in the hope that he would cure him; whereas, if there was an hospital for officers of the army like those in Portsmouth and Plymouth, he would receive the best medical attendance in the kingdom free of expense. That officer had about 15*s.* a day, and he had to pay between two and three guineas a day for medical attendance. He stated this case in order to show that there was something rotten in the present system, which compelled our gallant and brave defenders, for whom the country would grudge no needful expense, to spend, when brought home wounded, three times the amount of their pay in order to procure requisite medical attendance. A statement made the other night by the hon. Member for Aylesbury struck harshly upon his ear. The hon. Member said, that the medical men before Sebastopol had signed a "round robin," offering their resignation to Lord Raglan. [Mr. LAYARD: Not a "round robin," but a paper.] Good God! was it possible that such a state of things could occur; that medical men, in the presence of the enemy, and who, being 3,000 miles from the shores of England, could not be at once replaced by other surgeons, should so far commit themselves, when night after night sallies were being made by the Russians, when casualties were continually occurring, and when sickness and death extended from one end of the camp to the other! Was it possible, he repeated, that gentlemen highly educated, scientific men, could have committed such an act? He did not doubt the assertion of the hon. Member; but he had a right to ask whether the Government had received from Lord Raglan any intimation of such conduct on the part of the medical department? If it did occur, it was mutiny to the fullest extent, and why was it not punished? Was it that the noble Lord in command of the army

thought the medical men in question were so overworked, that he could not come down upon them, and punish them for their mutinous act. He made these remarks in a pure spirit, for he wished to improve the condition of the officers in the medical department, who had generally performed their duty nobly in the Crimea, and if they had taken the step imputed to them, there must be something, as he had before observed, very rotten in the system, and the sooner that House set to work to amend it the better. In what he was about to say, he should, perhaps, meet with the concurrence of very few in that House. At the end of 1853, seeing war to be inevitable, he had had occasion at public meetings to declare his opinion that the Minister was not born, who would dare to come down to the House of Commons and ask for supplies to land a British army at any part of the continent of Europe. The war, he had said, must be a naval one, for this country was not a military nation. However, when Parliament met, he was amazed at the feeling prevailing in the House of Commons, for there was scarcely a man in it prepared to oppose the propositions of the Government to send out an army for actual operations. He confessed that he was not bold enough to stand up in his place and state his views at the moment, because all the House appeared to be against him. Nevertheless, he was still of opinion that a gross mistake had been committed, and that the Government ought never to have attempted in 1854 to send out an army to the East, to contend against the Russians. This country should have sent out its fleets, and destroyed the Russian trade and fortresses. Instead of this, however, the Government had thought fit to send an army first to Varna, where thousands upon thousands of men were lost by sickness, and afterwards to the Crimea, without the necessary auxiliaries and appendages to meet difficulties. Those men had done their duty in three actions, which history could not equal for the gallantry and bravery displayed; and however much the regimental officers may be condemned, it was they and their men that gained those battles. But in the present circumstances. hon. Members ought to express their opinion without being mealymouthed, for those circumstances were, as an hon. Member had said, of a dangerous character. This country had sent out about 60,000 men, and there were only remaining of that large number

12,000 in the field to undertake offensive operations. What has become of the rest? Their places of course must be supplied by recruits; and every means had been taken to obtain recruits by altering the standard, and the age, and by increased bounty. Well, he understood that the Government now obtained by the system of recruiting 1,000 men a week. But what was the amount of casualties? Why, 1,000 a week. How were they able to supply troops for the Colonies, the East Indies, and the home service, in addition to what they required for the war, by recruiting at the rate of only 1,000 a week? How were they to form their army in the spring for service in the Crimea? They were not to turn tail upon Sebastopol. Having commenced they must go on with this war; and yet, if what he had stated was correct, they were only recruiting at the pace of furnishing supplies to meet their casualties in the Crimea. This expedition to the Crimea had been described as similar to that of the Walcheren, but in certain respects it was different. In the Walcheren expedition they landed their troops in a place most notoriously unhealthy. The loss of men was truly lamentable, and an expense of about 20,000,000*l.* was entailed upon the country. But in the Crimea they had a good climate, and the loss of their troops arose from various other causes—they lost them from over fatigue, from want of food, from want of clothing, and from lack of medical attendance, and not from climate. Had they given them proper food and clothing and a fair share of work, they would not now have to lament over a tenth part of the number who had been cut off. The Government undertook a work which they were not able to accomplish. They failed in their Commissariat arrangements, they failed in their siege batteries, and in their medical department; in short, they had failed in every operation they undertook. They entered on a war with Russia, a most formidable Power, and what had they accomplished? They sent a magnificent fleet to the Baltic, which came home after doing next to nothing; they sent an army to Varna, where great losses were sustained by disease; and then they sent it to the Crimea, where no doubt most splendid actions were performed by the troops, but, notwithstanding, Sebastopol was stronger at this moment than when they first assailed it. There was not a family in the kingdom that did not mourn over the loss of relatives who had perished in this expedition. All these things were admitted; every blunder was admitted; for when these things were mentioned there was not a point on which the Government were not ready to express their regret. They were sorry that no road had been made—that provisions had not been got up to the troops—that there were not doctors in sufficient numbers—and that the medicines had not arrived in sufficient time. Indeed, it could not be denied that the whole arrangements of this army and its supplies had exhibited a mass of confusion, injury, and neglect, from beginning to end. But notwithstanding all this, he hoped the Government would now put their shoulders to the wheel and carry them through their present difficult position. It was essential to our *prestige* as a military nation that Sebastopol should fall. That great military fortress was not yet invested. They had only invested seven miles, leaving other seven miles open to the enemy to carry on their supplies, and our own troops, looking through their glasses, could see caravans bearing ammunition, guns, and provisions into the heart of the fortress. If they could name in history a siege undertaken by any Power leaving half the investment open to the enemy, he should like to hear when and where that siege took place. There was one subject which he had not heard touched upon in the course of any of these debates. He recollected last year, in the month of July, walking on the banks of the Thames, amusing himself, after sitting for a length of time in that House on Committee, when he saw a barge loading a quantity of porter, destined, as he was informed, for the Crimea. Soon after he saw it stated that the porter was to be delivered to the troops at cost price—a very praiseworthy proceeding; but he had since been informed that, though the porter was sent out, there was no person to receive it, and no stores wherein it could be placed, so that the porter actually came back. Whether it came back because there was no one to receive it, or because it was of inferior quality, he knew not, and should like to be informed. In the meantime he would beg to read an extract from a document which came from India, on the subject of porter. It was a letter from an officer of the 94th Regiment, in which he stated that the surgeon had latterly noticed a great improvement in the health of the 94th Regiment. There was a record of the mortality among the troops from 1835 to 1854; and it appeared that in 1840 the mortality was 9½ per cent, while in 1854 it was only 1½ per cent. This reduction in the mortality he attributed to the improved sanitary measures which had been adopted, such as the system of confining men to the barracks in the heat of the day, but chiefly to the introduction of porter to the canteen, the men being thereby induced to give up in a great measure the use of spirituous liquors. Now, there was no difficulty about the porter. It was a wholesome beverage, which could be obtained to any extent that was desired; and he should like to know why the porter to which he had alluded had been sent home from the Crimea, and why an additional supply had not been sent to the troops, seeing the good effect which it might be expected to have upon their health?

Mr. W. WILLIAMS said, he would make no objection to the Vote for the number of men proposed to the Committee; but he felt bound to say that, on looking through these Estimates, there were various items on which extensive reductions, he considered, might fairly be made. At the same time he felt that it was useless at the present moment to enter into the various matters to which he might refer, with the view of inducing the Committee to agree to any proposition that he might make. He begged to call the attention of the Committee, however, to the charge for the establishments that were to be consolidated. The establishment of the Secretary for War was put down at 18,787*l.*; but there was also a charge for the establishment of the Secretary at War of 46,085*l.* Now, they had been informed that this office was to be merged into the principal office of the Secretary of State for War. Then, the charge for the Commander in Chief's department was 13,989*l.*, the Adjutant General's 8,499*l.*, and the Quartermaster General's 6,618*l.*; making altogether a sum of 93,978*l.* Now, he held that if they wished to economise their military expenditure, they must begin by combining the whole of these offices into one. If the Secretary for War had the entire charge, with competent persons under him to discharge the duties of the respective offices, the expense would be reduced one-half and the business would be infinitely better done than it was at present. Only place a proper person at the head of the War Department, as was done in France, and he should have no fears for the result; but in the meantime, until they were informed what Government had determined upon, he thought this branch of the Estimates ought to be postponed. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. F. Peel) had referred to the change which had been made in the clothing of the army; he (Mr. Williams) had made it a rule to bring that question before the House for a number of years past, and, of course, he was not sorry to hear that at length the clothing of the army was placed in the hands of the Government, instead of the colonels in command, who were general officers. As far back as 1831, a Committee reported upon this very subject, and at that time the profit to the colonel for clothing the Grenadier Guards was 1,800*l.*, but now he hoped the system was irrevocably changed, and that the colonels were provided for as gentlemen and soldiers ought to be, instead of having to make up their incomes by becoming the tailors of their own regiments. The alteration of the system would be beneficial to the men, who would be much better clothed than formerly, and a considerable saving effected. He had perceived a vast improvement in the clothing of the Grenadier Guards already. Their cloth was of better quality, and the colour a brighter scarlet. With regard to the emoluments of general officers, that had been made a topic of complaint; and no doubt the change of system would reduce those emoluments. Prince Albert, for instance, would lose, perhaps, not less than 1,500*l.* a year by the change, still there was no good reason why Prince Albert should be paid more than any other general officer. There were three general officers of high merit who had been serving the country in the Crimea—General Sir De Lacy Evans, General Sir Colin Campbell, and General Sir George Brown. These three generals received 1,100*l.* a year each as colonels of regiments, while Prince Albert received 2,200*l.* a year as colonel of the Grenadier Guards. He was aware that colonels of regiments were general officers, and as such enjoyed perfect sinecures. The hon. Gentleman had also referred to the promised reduction of the number of general officers. It was a remarkable fact that there were more general officers in the British army than in the French army. In the British army there were 303 general officers, while in the French army there were only 255—that was to say, 5 marshals, 78 generals of division, and 172 generals of brigade. On looking at the Queen's warrant, he found a loophole by which it was possible to place any number of the officers of the Guards on the list of generals, notwithstanding that warrant ["No, no!"]; and by virtue of the Queen's warrant any officer who should be removed from the Foot Guards in consequence of being promoted to be a general officer was to receive unattached pay according to his regimental rank—if a lieutenant colonel 600*l.*, and if a major 550*l.* a year. Now, a general officer in the army would receive only 450*l.* a year. He wished to know why a major in the Guards should, as colonel, receive 100*l.* a year more than a colonel holding the same rank in any other regiment? Neither could he understand why a captain in the Guards should hold the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the army, unless it were that the officers of the Guards consisted almost entirely of the aristocracy, or of persons connected with that clique. He considered this distinction between the Guards and the other regiments of the service to be most unjust, the payment of the one being 50 per cent greater than the payment of the other, besides all the privileges that were enjoyed by them, such as an allowance of 5,000*l.* a year for breakfasts and dinners at St. James' Palace, and the various other advantages which, as an aristocratic body, they possessed.

MR. BENTINCK said, it was not his intention to trouble the Committee with any details of a purely professional character; that task he would leave to military Gentlemen. He simply rose to remind the Committee how frequently they had been told of the enormous expense attendant upon the maintenance of the army. But when he recurred to the Estimates moved this time last year, and coupled it with the state of that army at present, he must say no man could help feeling surprised at the enormous sum of money expended on starving it. However, that surprise would be very considerably increased when it was recollected that that result had occurred under the auspices of a Government which was declared by its supporters to embody the ablest administration of the country. Still it was to be hoped, now that the Government had been re-constructed—or, as his right hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) termed it, "re-burnished"—that the House would not be called upon when it met next year to deliberate upon a state of things so suggestive of sad reflections as that now before them.

COLONEL KNOX said, he sincerely believed that it was the hon. Member for Lambeth himself, and his class, such as his (Mr. Williams's) Friend the Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume), not now present, who, by the course they had pursued, had brought the country to its present necessity. ["Hear, hear!"] Yes, he maintained that those Gentlemen had impaired the efficiency of the army; and then up got the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Williams), and delivered a speech which was nothing more than a tirade against the army, and a tirade against Prince Albert, because he was in command of the Grenadier Guards. Now, he (Colonel Knox) was inclined to think that when an hon. Member got up to criticise the condition of the army he ought first to have learned his lesson. He could, however, inform the hon. Member for Lambeth that in his comments he was most grossly mistaken. Why, what did the hon. Gentleman mean by telling the Committee that while ordinary colonels of regiments only received 1,100*l.* a year, Prince Albert received 2,200*l.* a year as Colonel of the Grenadiers? But did not the hon. Gentleman know that the command of the Grenadier Guards, which was composed of three battalions, was equivalent to the command of three regiments. Now, he charged the hon. Member for Lambeth with making remarks on that subject which he knew to be as false as anything could be. The hon. Gentleman, descending to a miserable pettifogging economy, talked of dinners being given to the Guards at the Palace. But just let him look a little further into the army, and see what was the case—what was the position of the Guards? They drew for neither coals, candles, nor any other of the military allowances which the rest of the army drew. He could only say that, if the Guards were placed upon the same footing as the rest of the army, there would be no economy to the State. But "oh!" exclaimed the hon. Gentleman, "the Guards are better paid." Well, what was the fact? A lieutenant and captain in the Guards had but 120*l.* a year, while a captain in the line had rather better than 200*l.* And yet the hon. Gentleman opposite, knowing all that, had not the manliness or straightforwardness to avow it, but came forward year after year to reiterate these charges that had been as repeatedly disproved. He would ask the Committee was that the moment to decry the Guards? was that the moment to declare that the Guards had not done their duty, or were unworthy of their hire? He for one, connected as he had been with the Guards for five-and-twenty years, could not remain silent when such aspersions were cast upon that gallant corps. Well, but that was not all; the hon. Member for Lambeth then went on to talk of the clothing of the army. Now, he dared say, the hon. Gentleman might be a very good soldier in Lambeth; for all he knew he might be a most efficient member of the Lambeth militia; still he would like very much to see what kind of clothing he would select for his regiment, if the choice devolved on him. On that point all he (Colonel Knox) would say was, that he should rather be excused from wearing it. The hon. Gentleman spoke, also, of the change which had been made with respect to the clothing. Now, he was quite prepared to admit that that change had been a wise and proper one; but he would not allow that it had been so made at the suggestion of the hon. Member for Lambeth. At the same time he begged leave to tell that hon. Gentleman that he was quite in error in his calculations on this head, for very great doubts were entertained whether the country would more likely lose than gain by the new system. And in point of fact he might mention what a relative of his, who had been in command of a regiment for several years —one of the senior officers of the army— said to him on the occasion of the change, "I am very glad to get rid of the clothing of my regiment, for all I know is, what with the various changes in the uniform, and accoutrements, and what not, I am very much out of pocket." But he could furnish the hon. Gentleman with another sample of the consequences following from the change he seemed to think so much of. He believed that at that very moment a claim was pending against Government on the part of a contractor, because sufficient time had not been allowed him to complete the alterations of the uniform. The contractor, acting in rather a different manner from hon. Gentlemen opposite, had looked a little a-head, and had prepared already for forthcoming seasons. The Government, however, turned round upon him, and said, "No, we cannot take any of these uniforms; we have altered the pattern." But the contractor was not content with that, and claimed 10,000*l.* as compensation for his losses. He (Colonel Knox) believed the hon. Member for Lambeth had here a capital case, and he would urge him to take it up and claim compensation for the contractor. As a military man he was quite ready to admit that the old system of farming out the clothing to general officers was wrong in principle, and that commanding officers were much satisfied with the change that had been made. He quite concurred in the view taken by the hon. and gallant Gentleman behind him (Colonel Boldero), that the country had rushed into a gigantic war without having adequately provided for it. They had done so with their eyes open, well knowing that the Gentlemen of the school of the hon. Member for Lambeth, by their fighting and quibbling, had entirely crippled all the military departments. He must contend, however, that the responsibility of that state of things rested with the Government. If he was not misinformed, in December, 1853, when war was imminent, a conclave was held at the War Office, at which the Minister of War, the Secretary at War, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Commander in Chief, attended. Now, public rumour had it that the distinguished officer who was at the head of the army was called upon to give a statement as to what number of men he could furnish in case of emergency. Be that as it might, it would be well to know— no matter what might have been the statement of the Commander in Chief as to the number of men he could supply—if he had told the Government that there would be a terrible deficiency in materials of every description. If he had done so, he had only done his duty; but, at the same time, he still maintained that a grave responsibility rested with the Government. He was prepared to maintain that a great deal of the evils of the Crimea had arisen from the fact that there had not been a single military man connected with the Government. If they were to have a Commander in Chief, make him in reality responsible for the condition of the army. He would conclude his observations by again protesting against the hon. Member for Lambeth year after year reiterating his charges against the army, and of giving them currency throughout the country, without assuring himself that they were substantially correct.

LORD SEYMOUR said, he rose to say a few words in defence of an absent Member. The hon. and gallant Member who had just sat down (Colonel Knox) said that the state of the army was, in a great measure, owing to the conduct of the hon. Member for Montrose (Mr. Hume). Now, in the first place, he (Lord Seymour) should like the hon. and gallant Member to look back at the votes and to find any single instance when the hon. Member for Montrose had proposed a reduction in the number of men when he was in a majority. Whenever such a thing was proposed, the party proposing it had always found himself in a very small minority. He had been in the House very many years, and had never seen a Government propose a number of men without carrying it. So far, then, the hon. and gallant Member's charge was unfounded. But, in the next place, he (Lord Seymour) thought it unfounded, because, having acted for three years consecutively with the hon. Member for Montrose, in relation to the Estimates for the Army, Navy, and Ordnance, he had not found the hon. Member ever propose any vote which tended to reduce the efficiency of the service. What the hon. Member (Mr. Hume) always said, and fairly said, was, let me see the money properly spent. This was his great anxiety, and it was a just one. He also took upon himself to object to particular payments, a most disagreeable task. It was always a disagreeable duty to object to payments made on account not only of distinction but of party favour. There was no doubt that the hon. Gentleman did take such objections, and he (Lord Seymour) could not but think that such a course was proper and most useful, not only to the country, but also to the Government. When that hon. Member did allude to any reduction in the Estimates, it was always to the Conservative Estimates of 1834–35 that he pointed. These were his model estimates, and to them he always referred when he wanted to enforce any argument having regard to a reduction. This, of course, was a time when no one would propose to reduce Estimates; but if any observation were made, it would be that at this period we ought to maintain a more effective cavalry force. We had a very small cavalry force, even on paper—9,000 in all. That was but a miserable amount with which to enter into a war with Russia. We knew that it would be ridiculous, in speaking of any Continental power, to talk of such a force. But when we came to consider that of these 9,000 men, three regiments were household troops, who, it was now understood, were not to be sent abroad, and were, therefore, a force kept only for ornament, like the beef-eaters—we might well doubt whether we should keep so large a proportion of so small a force ineffective for purposes of war. It seemed to him but right, for the sake of the splendour of the Court, that we should have one magnificent regiment, with horses so large and men so heavy that for many of the services of war they would be perfectly useless; but he would suggest that in future years it would be worth considering whether, while we keep up so small a force, we ought to render three regiments out of it ineffective for practical purposes.

Mr. BAILLIE said, he had understood that the proposed land transport service was to consist of 8,000 men. The number of horses attached to such a corps could not be less than 12,000. It would be necessary to calculate some such number, for the food of those animals would have to be sent from this country. They had the authority of no less a person than the Earl of Cardigan that the horses composing our cavalry force in the Crimea had been literally starved to death. It was generally understood that the cavalry in the Crimea was to be increased by at least 1,200 men, now on their way from India, and by at least a similar number to be sent from this country. There had never been any explanation why the horses in the Crimea had been starved to death. Barley, it was known, could be procured in any quantity at a distance of only two days' sail. The head of the Commissariat department, however, still retained his place, and therefore it could not be supposed that the Government had any serious cause of complaint against him. It had been stated that recruits were now to be engaged between the ages of twenty-two and twenty-six, and for periods of one, two, or three years. He had never before heard of engaging troops for one year. That, he considered, would scarcely give time for the recruits to be drilled and brought into a condition to be of service. He therefore supposed no man would be engaged for less than three years, and he wished, at the same time, to know whether men engaged for that perriod were to be allowed the same bounty money as those engaged for the ordinary term of years? He also wished to know whether any steps had been taken to enlist the foreign corps?

Sir ERSKINE PERRY said, he should be glad to know what were the actual expenses of the army to this country? Those expenses were spread over so many Estimates, and in the case of the Ordnance were so mixed up with charges for the Navy, that it was impossible for independent Members in the country to ascertain the actual amount. If, however, the Government would give the Committee a statement of the total cost of the army, the information would have the effect of throwing much light upon military discussions. They had heard that, by a late order of the Crown, sixty sergeants of the line were to be endowed with commissions. He wished to ask whether, in giving those commissions for gallant conduct in the field of battle, any allowance was made to them to enable them to take up those commissions? Every one knew that a large expenditure would be incurred by the acceptance of those commissions, and it was idle to suppose that a man in the position of a sergeant in the army had the requisite means of obtaining uniform, &c., or, in the case of cavalry, chargers. The army accounts of France gave very specific information on this head; and, if hon. Members would take the trouble of consulting the *Budget de Guerre*, they would see that all these wants were provided for. If the Government had no intention of accompanying those commissions with some adequate allowance for outfit, the gift of a commission to them would be rather a *damnosa hereditas* than anything else. Passing over these details, he would proceed to the great question raised by the hon. Member for Aylesbury, and to the mode in which it had been met by the noble Lord at the head of the Government. The noble Lord had said that his (Mr. Layard's) observations were vulgar appeals to the prejudices against the aristocracy. He (Sir E. Perry) denied the truth of that observation. There was nothing in the speech of the hon. Gentleman to warrant such an assertion. That great question respecting the aristocratic interest in the English army must be dealt with by some statesman who was able to read aright the signs of the times. It was no vulgar demagogue who said that "the British soldier fought under the cold shade of aristocracy." That was a sentiment expressed by a member of the aristocracy himself, who could rank with the highest born of the land. When they recollected the gallant deeds of the soldiers in the three glorious battles of the Crimea—when they considered the intelligence that was displayed in their letters that were published, and the high moral tone which was exhibited—they must feel that the time was ripe for considering the question of promotion in the army. When he (Sir E. Perry) contrasted the moral condition of the soldiers in the Crimea with the moral condition of the soldiers who fought our battles in the revolutionary war, the last of whom were said to be the outpourings of the streets of London, he felt that the time was come when that great question must be dealt with, and the same open career afforded in the army as was to be found in other ranks of life in this country. It was from no insolent sentiment of ill will to the aristocracy that his hon. Friend (Mr. Layard) had brought forward this question. For himself, his own sympathies and interests were all bound up with the institutions of the country; but in order to make these institutions stable, the statesmen who guided their councils must adapt those institutions to what was growing up around them on every side; and it was because the noble Lord at the head of the Government had the power of effecting such an adaptation, that he (Sir E. Perry) was willing to give a strenuous support to the noble Lord's Government. But although he had this strong desire, what he rose for was to express the dissatisfaction with which he had heard the taunts and ill-deserved sneers which had been levelled at his hon. Friend who pointed out where the blot lay. This question of army reform was so much connected with the Committee to be moved for on Thursday next, that he must make a few observations with reference to it. He had come down to the House the other day with an earnest desire to be able to retract the vote he had given on a former occasion. He had expected that the noble Lord at the head of the Government would have put forward such a vigorous programme of the conduct of the war that he should have been able to reconcile to his conscience and his constituents the change in his conduct; but on hearing the plans which had been adopted, he only felt, in common, he believed, with the greater portion of the House, a feeling of chill and dissatisfaction. The hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) had pointed out the extraordinary fetters placed upon the executive in the field, and the noble Lord had given no answer to any one of those objections. If the Government were not satisfied with their Commander-in-Chief, their course was obvious, and they had ample power, for the whole country was with them; but their mode of shackling a general in the field with Commissioners tied round his neck, and with power almost to displace him, must paralyse the efforts of any man, however skilled he might be in the art of war. His hon. Friend (Mr. Layard) had been taunted with citing the Commission *de la sureté publique* as an example to be followed; but, on the contrary, the hon. Member had pointed to that as the only instance on record in which such an extraordinary procedure had been resorted to; and that to make that Commission succeed, the Commissioners were armed with an ambulatory guillotine. As an independent Member of the House, and as a supporter of the Government who had no other opportunity to make his opinions known, he had ventured to make these observations. He observed that his calling himself a supporter of the Government called up some smiles on the opposite side of the House; but he could assure the hon. Gentlemen who sat opposite that he had no desire at all to see them sitting in the places of the present Government. Their Chancellor of the Exchequer would, under Lord Derby, probably have been the right hon. Gentleman the leader of the Opposition; and their War Minister would have been a nobleman (Lord Ellenborough) under whose rule he (Sir E. Perry) had lived during a most eventful period; and if Conservative Members opposite wanted to see what sort of a War Minister that noble Lord would have made, let them turn to the last chapter of a Conservative historian, *Thornton's History of India*. He (Sir E. Perry) believed that the noble Lord at the head of the Government had the power to do anything which his experience and his genius suggested for the conduct of the war; and, as one who wished well to his Government he implored him to wield his great powers with vigour, and to mould his measures according to the desires of the nation and the exigencies of the crisis.

MR. PERCY said, he must complain of the deductions made in the soldier's pay for the expense of his clothing and other comforts, in time of war, and thought that if this system went on, between the noble Lord the Secretary for War and the Under Secretary the firm would soon be known by the appellation of Moses and Son. At Scutari he had been told by the medical men connected with the hospital there that there prevailed a deplorable want of proper clothing for the sick and wounded, and very often the only clothes they had were those which the marines and sailors had given them while on their voyage from the Crimea, and very often men were sent thence as convalescents, who, on arriving at their destination, were found to be so ill that they were obliged to be sent back again. He therefore urged on the Government to provide proper clothing in the different hospitals for convalescents going out to the Crimea, and also for those returning to England. He must also allude to the stoppages made from the soldier's pay for hospital allowances. He knew an instance in which several hundred sick and wounded were landed from the *Acorn* at Scutari, who arrived at the hospital in such a state as to be incapable of taking care of themselves, much less of their kits. The authorities refused to supply them with knives and forks, because, by the regulations, a soldier was obliged to find these articles, but fortunately there were other parties who supplied them. He thought great blame must be attributable to some of the subordinate officers, as he was ready to express his belief that no one could be more zealous or active in the cause of the soldier than the late Secretary at War (Mr. S. Herbert). He wished at the same time to ask why it was that there were so many ships at Beicos Bay lying idle and doing nothing? Why could they not drop down to Scutari, where they might anchor in perfect security, and their crews might be employed in landing the sick and wounded, and assisting to carry them to the hospital, instead of leaving them to the tender mercies of the Turks. Under the kind directions of Lady Stratford the sufferings of these poor men in this respect were greatly lessened. If hon. Members had seen, as he himself had, 450 sick landed in one day, they would acknowledge that there was much cause for this question. He believed that on that occasion a request was actually made that a ship should drop down to Scutari, but was refused; some days elapsed before these poor wretches were landed, and during that time they were lying on the deck in their miserable rags of blankets. He hoped that the Government would require better arrangements to be made for the reception of the sick and wounded at Scutari than had as yet been established. He wished also to call their attention to the staff of surgeons in the hospitals. He understood that they were called upon to perform duties—such as drawing up the diet roll—which should not be thrown upon them. He had seen a letter from a sick officer in which he stated that his doctor had to attend to sixty-nine men and nine officers. Now, by the French regulations there was one doctor appointed to twenty-five wounded men, and one doctor to every fifty *malades ordinaires*. It was impossible for the medical men of our army to do all the business that was thrown upon them. He hoped that the attention of the Government, would, therefore, be given to this subject.

MR. LAYARD said, he begged to be allowed to call attention to one point of great consequence — that of the tents. He believed a large number of the tents furnished to the troops for use during the present campaign were old tents that had been used in the Peninsular war, and that it had been truly remarked of them, that they might as well sit under a sieve. In fact, a great part of the misery endured by our men was owing to the insufficient protection they had against the weather. For this purpose the arrangements adopted in the French service were admirable, the troops being provided with small tents, which the men could carry about with them. He had received a letter from Colonel Ellers Napier, who took a great interest in these matters, which acquainted him that a tent had been transmitted to him, divided into six parts or more, of so light a nature as to be carried by a man on foot, which was capable of holding six persons, and was the invention of a private soldier, as he had been informed by General Bosquet was also the case with the tent used by the French. If we entered upon a summer campaign, we might expect great suffering again to be experienced by our army: and he must again urge the adoption of a better mode of covering the troops, especially that a better description of hospital marquees should be chosen. It was remarkable that, during the gale of the 14th November, when every one of our tents was blown down, not a single Turkish tent had been. Another point he wished to allude to was the enlistment of the new proposed corps of cavalry. Government always appeared to do the right thing at the wrong time, and in the wrong place. They were now about to send English officers to raise cavalry in Thessaly, but they might as well send them to Iceland, or any other quarter. If they wanted an excellent and efficient corps of irregular cavalry, they ought to send to Asia Minor, where it would be easy to raise such a body amongst the tribes of Anatolia. That thought was a subject well worthy the attention of the Government.

MR. JOHN MACGREGOR said, that in spite of the sneers which met him from hon. Gentlemen opposite (on the Ministerial benches), he wished to express his opinions fearlessly, yet briefly, upon the question which had caused so much excitement throughout the country. He wished to say that he had great confidence in the noble Lord at the head of the Government, but that he had no confidence in the Cabinet which the noble Lord had formed, for it was a Cabinet condemned alike by the country, by that House, and, with one exception, by every public paper in London, and by the whole country press. With regard to what had been said, rather disparagingly, of our officers, especially of Sir Colin Campbell and the Duke of Cambridge, he would state his belief that there was no officer more deserving of our admiration than was Sir Colin Campbell for his conduct in the field; and of the Duke of Cambridge he would, without fear of contradiction, observe, that there was not in the whole course of history a record of more heroic conduct than that exhibited by His Royal Highness at Inkerman. He could not allow that, as to those two general officers at least, there was any want of bravery or of military skill. But then he came to the supplies sent out to our army; and on this subject he would express his belief that there was not a single house of respectability in London, in Liverpool, or Glasgow, that would not be ashamed of the manner in which these supplies had been sent out. Every merchant sent out supplies to their agents in foreign countries in a satisfactory manner. Every article was delivered by their shipmasters to the persons to whom consigned by bill of lading. Take, for example, the house of Green and Co. [*Laughter.*] Yes, but not "green" in their experience and mode of conducting business. The Admiralty were "green," and the Commissariat were "green." But he was referring to Messrs. Green and Co., the great shipowners in the Indian and Australian trade; and if they examined into the subject they would find that all their cargoes, for the last twenty years, were delivered in proper order, and according to their bills of lading, while, as to our storeships, nobody seemed to know where to find the articles which composed their cargoes. Well, we had a new Government. Yes! But had we new men to carry out the views and the honest designs (as he believed them to be) of that Government? Nothing of the kind. They had found it a matter of ease and comfort to take the actual staff of blundering subordinates already in existence—they went no further. Then they were threatened with a dissolution of Parliament if we opposed their measures—if we voted for inquiry. For his own part, he never could go to his constituents with more confidence than he could now. But he believed that those Members who had voted, or who should vote, in opposition to inquiry would, on going to their constituents, find themselves in a miserable position—that scarcely one of them would have a seat in the next Parliament. Speaking in the full spirit of an independent Member, he deplored the position of the noble Lord, and deplored his choice of a Cabinet which, he repeated, did not possess the confidence of the country.

MR. RICH said, that in reverting to the actual question before the Committee as to the number of troops, he wished to make one suggestion to the Government with regard to the estimate of casualties, which the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Frederick Peel) had calculated at 20,000. The hon. Member had stated that an increase of 35,000 men would be required for the addition made to the army this year; that there would be an arrear of 5,000 voted last year, and 20,000 for casualties, making in all 60,000 men. Now, he would put it to the Government whether it was possible for them to put the list of casualties so extremely low? For the year past the casualties in the Crimea had been at least 30,000. God forbid we should have such severe suffering in the ensuing year, but it was impossible, he feared, considering the increased numbers of the army, that the list should not be a heavy one. He was sure that official documents at the Horse Guards would not bear out so low an estimate of casualties upon this number of men as the Government had calculated for. He thought it a most serious subject for the consideration of the Government how they were to raise the requisite number of men. They had already placed the casualties at 20,000, but he thought he should be within the mark when he added 20,000 more to that estimate. It was not for him to suggest how that enormous gap was to be filled up, but he thought the Government ought to state how they proposed to keep up the efficient force of the army.

MR. DRUMMOND said, he was sure there was no objection on the part of any Member of that House to vote certain things for which they had been asked. But they had voted nearly the same sums last year. For instance, they voted a large sum for clothing for the army, but the army did not get it; and he wanted to know how they were in the least more sure now that the clothes for which they were now voting the money would ever arrive in the Crimea? They were also going to vote a certain number of horses. They had horses last year, and they starved their horses to death. They were now going to send horses out to the Crimea, but they had not stated, either to-night or at any other time, that they had altered anything between this day and the last twelve months by which they might assure the Committee that they were not going to starve the horses again that they were now about to send out. He was sure the Committee were not prepared to vote 9,000 horses to be sent to the Crimea to be starved to death. And yet, what machinery had the Government now got? He might ask, with the hon. Gentleman behind him (Mr. Layard), what man had they got to say these things should be done? and if he could get no proper answer, he would turn out every man of them from first to last. They required a man of strong mind to do and to act, and not a mere pack of twaddling red-tapists, who did nothing.

MR. NEWDEGATE said, he had asked a question of the Under Secretary for the War Department relative to the summer clothing for our troops in the Crimea. This was the 19th of February, and the answer he had received was that the patterns for the clothing had not been decided upon. They had heard something about the advantages of the change which had been made in the mode of providing clothes for the troops. There seemed grave reasons to doubt whether the clothing under the new system would be better than it had been under the former system; but even if better clothing were not produced, he should be satisfied if convinced that the troops would have summer clothing, or even their ordinary clothing before the warm weather set in. There was no assurance given that the pattern for the clothing had been as yet decided upon, or, indeed, that ordinary clothing was ready; and he did, therefore, trust that the Under

Secretary for War would be able to show the House that this summer clothing was in progress, for certainly it was not too much to expect that on the 19th of February the summer clothing which was required for 30,000 or 40,000 men should be in progress. The hon. Member for Northamptonshire (Mr. Stafford), who had just returned from the Crimea, said the spring came on rapidly in that quarter, and it was not too much to ask that, when the summer arrived, the troops should not be found walking about in sheepskin coats, after having been exposed all the winter in the ordinary clothing in which they went out. In regard to another point, he was told that there was, at present, scarcely any cavalry in the Crimea, and very little in England; that they were buying horses at the rate of 40*l.* a piece. He hoped they were not taking these horses from hot stables in England to place them at once upon picquet duty in the Crimea, for, depend upon it, if they did, their horses would die like rotten sheep. The Government should take care that the horses they were now hastily buying were put through some course of treatment to prepare them for the exposure they would have to meet. Having been a man of " stable mind " all his life, and having had a good deal to do with horses, he warned the Government that if they took their horses as they bought them, and shipped them in dealer's condition at once for the Crimea, many of them would die like rotten sheep. He understood that several regiments of irregular cavalry in India had volunteered their services; and he did not believe there was a finer or more effective body of men to be found than the irregular cavalry in the service of the East India Company. They were men thoroughly trained for their duty. Such was the evidence before the Committees on the Affairs of India, and their horses were seasoned to exposure. If the Government wanted cavalry, why not avail themselves of the services of these troops? He knew they had volunteered their services, and they were commanded by officers who would do as much credit to the service of Her Majesty as they had done to that of the East India Company. He trusted the Committee would pardon the observations he made, but the matter was pressing. The hon. Gentleman opposite (the Member for Aylesbury) had made an attack on what he called the aristocratic portion of the officers of the army, and on them he chose to visit the misfortunes and calamities which had occurred, and had been followed in that strain by other hon. Members on the Government side of the House. He (Mr. Newdegate), on the contrary, maintained that the officers of the British army were as superior to the officers of the armies of other nations as the British soldier was superior to the foreign soldier. They had not shown in the Crimea that they had degenerated. Wherever victory was to be won, had they not won it? Whenever brought face to face with the enemy, they had proved themselves victorious. The noblemen and the gentlemen who were officers in the Crimean army had done their duty. But, it was true, disasters and calamity had befallen that army. Let the House consider where the failure had occurred—it had not occurred in the regimental service of the army, which some hon. Members condemned as being aristocratic—failure had befallen the army for want of food, for want of the means of transport, for want of medical assistance and organisation. Were the duties of the Commissariat, the transport duties, discharged by members of the aristocracy? Was the medical department in the hands of the aristocracy? It was notorious that the conduct of those departments was not in the hands of the noblemen and gentlemen of the army. It was notorious that the failure in the Crimea was attributable to defective commissariat, to the blundering, miserable defects of the transport service, and to the gross inefficiency of the medical department. It could not be said that any one of those departments was in the hands of, or conducted by, the aristocracy. It was to the civil service, to the lapsed state, the miserable confusion consequent on, and engendered by, protracted peace, on those departments that all the suffering and misfortunes that had occurred was to be charged. It was gross injustice, therefore, to attempt to fasten odium on the aristocracy for calamities which had been occasioned by departments with which they were the least connected. He (Mr. Newdegate) merely trusted that hon. Members would speak with common fairness of the noblemen and gentlemen who, as officers of the army, had done their duty, and not attribute to them discredit for calamities for which they were in no way accountable. Recurring to his original question, he hoped the Under Secretary for the War Department would be able to give an assurance that the summer clothing was not only ordered but provided, when he should next week renew his question on that subject.

MR. OTWAY said, it was to the inaptitude of the Gentlemen who composed the important branches of the service that the failures were owing, and it was from that cause that he had to complain of the inefficiency of the staff, for it was notorious that many of the misfortunes which had occurred were attributable to that branch of the service. As soon as the French army arrived in Kamiesch Bay the staff officers made arrangements for the construction of jetties and wharfs, to facilitate the landing of supplies for the army; but at Balaklava no similar arrangements were made for conveying provisions and stores to the British troops. There was in this country an establishment ably conducted by professors of eminence, to which every officer in the army could have access by applying for it. They might there learn everything necessary to fit them for staff duties; and he believed this establishment sent out annually about thirteen officers fully qualified for every department of the army. Unfortunately, however, these officers were hardly ever appointed to staff situations; and the consequence was, that the staff of the English army was so inefficient that it brought upon it the derision of every foreign officer who might come into contact with it. He had no objection to the present Vote, for he was only surprised, considering the enemy with whom we had to contend, that the number of troops asked for by the Government was so small. He could not, however, help expressing his regret that, considering the deficiencies of the military system, the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of the War Department (Mr. F. Peel) should not have inaugurated his advent to the office by expressing his intention of introducing modifications into some parts of that system. For instance, the manner in which commissions were purchased in the service was a most ridiculous arrangement. Some steps had certainly been taken in the right direction, for a commission in each regiment was to be given to sergeants or non-commissioned officers who were recommended by their colonels or commanding officers for such a mark of distinction. That, however, was not sufficient. In the French army a certain number—he believed, one-third—of the commissions in each regiment were conferred on non-commissioned officers or soldiers, and therefore every private who entered the ranks of that army knew that if he conducted himself properly, if he distinguished himself in action, or if he did anything to deserve promotion, he would in due course obtain a commission. He (Mr. Otway) considered it most desirable that a somewhat similar system should be adopted in the British army. Some months ago he had suggested to the right hon. Baronet the President of the Board of Control the expediency of employing some of our Indian troops in the Crimea, but that suggestion was not very favourably received. He (Mr. Otway) had, however, been gratified to learn, within the last month or six weeks, that a regiment of cavalry was on its way from India to the Crimea. They would thus obtain not only efficient men, but also horses admirably adapted for service in the Crimea, for the horses of the Indian army were accustomed to exposure, and yet during the campaigns of Cabul and Affghanistan he believed the casualties among the horses of the cavalry regiments were not greater than those which occurred in regiments upon ordinary service at home. He knew it was the opinion of very distinguished officers that the Sikh and Ghoorka infantry, and the Scinde irregular cavalry, and other similar forces which existed in India, might be employed in the Crimea with great advantage, and he hoped that, at the present crisis, the Government would avail themselves of the services of such men as Colonel Outram, Major Jacob, and Major Edwards, who were experienced in warfare on a grand scale, and who were men of high reputation. He (Mr. Otway) did not, as he had previously stated, approve the system of purchase in the army, but so long as that system continued he thought some modication ought to be adopted with regard to the pensions awarded to the widows of officers who might fall in action, and who might die from disease in the service of their country. They had had to deplore the loss of more than one Member of that House who had fallen during the past year in battle or from sickness in the gallant discharge of their duty. He knew that one of those officers, a gallant and distinguished colonel of the Guards, must have paid 8,000*l.* or 9,000*l.* for his commission; and, although he did not know what might be the position of that gallant officer's family, he thought it was only just that the wives and families of officers who fell in battle or died from disease under similar circumstances should have some larger provision made for them by the State. He had been surprised to see that the vacancy thus occasioned had been filled up by the appointment of the eldest son of one of the richest peers in this country, who had received the commission without purchase. Now, he regarded that as an act of monstrous injustice. He considered that that vacant commission ought to have been given to the son of an officer who had fallen in the discharge of his duty in the service of his country. Certainly, so long as the system of purchase remained in existence, that commission ought not to have been bestowed upon any one who did not pay its full price, and the purchase money might have been handed over to the fund out of which provision was made for the widow and family of the deceased officer. It might be remembered that when the Bill authorising the establishment of a foreign legion was submitted to the House, the noble Lord now at the head of the Government urged the adoption of that measure on the ground that the services of such troops were necessary to save the lives of our soldiers in the Crimea. He wished to know how many men had been enlisted in the foreign legion? Also, who was to be the commander of that legion? He asked this question because he had heard, in military circles, that some six weeks or two months ago a very excellent officer, who had held a command in the Schleswig-Holstein army—a Baron Von Stuttenhein, he believed—had been sent for to this country, by telegraphic message from Holstein, or some place where he was residing, in the north of Germany. He understood that the Baron rushed to the railway station in the clothes in which he stood, and at once came to London, considering that his presence was required upon some business of the most pressing urgency; but he was told that this Baron Von Stuttenheim had, every day for the last six weeks, been running about between St. James's and the Department of the Secretary at War, or the Secretary of War, or the Secretary for War, and that he had never succeeded in getting beyond the porter in the hall. This gentleman, who had been sent for by telegraph, and who came away without a clean shirt, had never yet, it was said, seen anybody in the department, nor had any steps been taken to render his services available. He (Mr. Otway) thought that, as the House had given their assent to a measure dangerous, if not degrading, to this country, on the plea of urgent necessity, which was put forward by the Government, they were entitled to some explanation on this subject.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: Sir, the hon. and gallant Gentleman who began this discussion entered into an argument upon the general arrangements which Her Majesty's Government have made in regard to the war. He stated his opinion that, this country not being, as he considers, a military Power, ought not, when it was compelled to engage in war with Russia, to have attempted any operation with a military force, but ought to have confined itself entirely to naval operations by a fleet; and he seemed to think that it would have been sufficient to have sent a fleet to blockade the Russian ports in the Baltic, and another to blockade the Russian ports in the Black Sea, by which means we would have been able so to coerce the Russian Government as to compel them to accede to any terms which we might have pleased to desire. Now I must say that I entirely differ from the hon. and gallant Gentleman upon that point. It is manifest, I think, to everybody that the mere action of a naval force never could have exercised such a coercion upon the Government of Russia as would compel any decisive or peaceful result. But I deny entirely the assertion which he made, that the operations of our navy were attended by no result. The hon. and gallant Gentleman said, "You sent a magnificent fleet to the Baltic, but it came back without having done anything." Sir, I utterly deny that assertion. Why, in the first place, our fleet destroyed that which was the beginning of a great naval position at Bomarsund, intended to be even upon a greater scale than Cronstadt. I say that of itself was something to have accomplished. But does the hon. and gallant Gentleman forget that there were in the Russian ports in the Baltic from twenty-seven to thirty sail of the line; that there were from twenty-seven to thirty frigates; that there were steamers and small vessels in abundance; and that if we had not had in the Baltic a very large and formidable naval force, we should have had the whole of that Russian fleet scouring our seas, ravaging our commerce, threatening our shores, and inflicting danger and disgrace upon the country. Sir, I say it is unjust, unfair, and untrue to assert that we accomplished nothing when we cooped up that formidable naval force in its ports during the whole of the season, and saved our country from the inconvenience and detriment which would have arisen from the escape of even a portion of that fleet.

Now, with regard to the military operations which we undertook. It is plain that if you intend to bring Russia to terms you must strike a blow somewhere. Would the hon. and gallant Officer have had us send our army to wander about in the steppes of Central Russia, striking here and there, without being able to inflict any blow that would have had any decisive or permanent result? We might have gained a victory in the interior of Russia, and yet not have been a step further towards the accomplishment of any useful or decisive result. We adopted a different course. We endeavoured to strike a blow where a blow would have been most sensitively felt, and where the effect would have been the greatest if we succeeded. We undertook the war to defend Turkey against the aggressions of Russia. We engaged in it, not—as some people have foolishly said—because we had a preference for the Mahomedans over the Christians, but because we thought it of the greatest importance for the interests of the world that those vast regions now under the sway of Turkey should not fall under the dominion of Russia. That was the object for which we declared war. Well, where did the danger lie? Why, Sir, in the Black Sea. It was perfectly manifest that Austria had such an interest in protecting Turkey from any formidable invasion by land that we might safely leave the protection of the land frontiers of Turkey to the combined armies of Turkey—which, by the by, for a whole twelvemonth stood as a barrier against the forces of Russia—to the combined armies of Turkey and Austria, if the assistance of the latter should become inevitably necessary. It is clear, then, that the aggressive power of Russia as against Turkey lay in Sebastopol. There was the great fleet which had the dominion of the Black Sea; there was that great arsenal under the protection of which that great fleet floated in security, and from which it could issue forth, with the promptitude of lightning, as it were, to fall upon Constantinople; there, in short, was the centre of the power of Russia in the Black Sea; and if we were to do anything, it was there we ought to do it. The difficulties, I confess, have been greater than were anticicipated when the expedition was settled. I will not now enter into a discussion of whether those difficulties were not increased by want of arrangement, or by bad management on the spot. But the Committee ought to look with some indulgence upon the errors and mistakes of men who had not had that experience in the duties which they were called suddenly to perform which might have enabled them to discharge those duties with greater efficiency and success.

The hon. and gallant Member for Stafford (Mr. Otway) has said that we have an establishment where staff officers may learn their duties, but it is well known that the learning of them theoretically in an educational institution and the learning them practically by the actual performance of them in the field are two things as different as they possibly can be. The armies of the Continent have a great advantage in that respect over the army of England. The great bulk of those armies is always within their own country. They are assembled in large bodies. They are called out to perform great operations in the summer, and mimic war there teaches them the duties of a real campaign. Our armies have not had that advantage. The first occasion on which anything of the kind took place was in 1853, when a very small number of men were assembled in the camp at Chobham, and, therefore, we ought not to condemn too readily men who have not had practical experience in the performance of those duties which they were suddenly called upon to discharge under circumstances of unparalleled difficulty. So much for the policy of Her Majesty's Government in the conduct of the war. I contend that to have confined ourselves to a naval war would have been perfect imbecility on our part. I contend that if you were to enter into any military operations at all, the point to which those operations were directed was the point, and the only point, at which an effectual blow could be struck at the adversary with whom we were engaged. An hon. Member during the discussion made a suggestion which certainly is deserving of consideration. He stated the hardships that may fall upon officers who, returning to this country suffering from wounds or infirmities contracted in active service, may be unable, as naval officers would, to receive assistance in hospital. Whether the military arrangements would admit of that, I cannot at present say; but, undoubtedly, the suggestion is one fully deserving of the consideration of the Government. My hon. Friend the Under Secretary for War reminds me that when an officer has received a very severe wound, or lost a limb, the regulations of the service give him a gratuity of a year's pay, which is intended for the purpose of enabling him to receive that medical assistance which the condition of his wound may require.

My hon. Friend the Member for Lambeth (Mr. Williams), as usual, condemned the household troops. He thought there was no use in having a body of men like the Guards, with higher pay and greater privileges than the rest of the army. Now, we are often told that we ought to imitate the military arrangements of foreign countries; and that the reason why our operations are not always so successful as they should be, is that we do not follow those examples. But if there is one arrangement which more than another prevails in all foreign armies, it is to have in each some one corps entitled to greater privileges and of greater distinction than the rest; and to so great an extent has that system been carried that recently in the French service the Imperial Guard has been reorganised—it having in late years been abolished; and I myself had the satisfaction, the other day, of seeing 13,000 of the most magnificent troops, forming the Imperial Guard lately organised, reviewed in the Gardens of the Tuileries. Therefore, whether you look at the Russian service, or the Prussian, or the Austrian, or the French, you will find a body of troops corresponding with our brigade of Guards. I need not detain the House with any observations as to the manner in which those troops have performed their duty upon every occasion on which their services have been required. If upon any occasion there is a desperate resistance to be made, or a distinguished service to be performed, there you are sure to find a regiment, if not the entire brigade, of Guards in the van. That brings me to the observations of my noble Friend the Member for Totness (Lord Seymour), who thought that the household brigade of cavalry were of no use, that they were merely for show, that they never could be employed, and that both men and horses were too heavy to be of any service. Does my noble Friend forget the battle of Waterloo? Does he forget the magnificent manner in which, by the weight and strength of men and horses, that beautiful force overbore everything opposed to it on the field of Waterloo? Does he forget that, also, in the Peninsula the household brigade were employed with great distinction and success? Of course, they have not been sent to the Crimea, that being too distant a place, and the nature of the ground not admitting of the operation of that particular description of force. My hon. Friend the Member for Lambeth also said he was sorry not to see in the Estimates of the present year that consolidation of departments which we had announced as being desirable. Why, Sir, the fact is, that there is no consolidation of departments which can supersede the necessity of having a great number of clerks for the examination and settlement of the accounts of the army, of the militia, and other forces whose accounts are sent to the War Office, and, therefore, nobody ever imagined that by placing all the civil departments of the army under the control of the Secretary of State for War you could avoid having an establishment for the performance of the different services which were thus to be placed under his charge. Consequently, the House must expect that when that arrangement is completed, there will still be the necessity of providing establishments for the different services the whole of which will be placed under the control of the Secretary of State.

The hon. Member for Inverness (Mr. Baillie) said we began the war without any plan of transport. Now, there he was mistaken. We began the war without a separate corps, as we now proposed to have it, specially designed to manage the land transport. The land transport was under the Commissariat, and it was found that great inconvenience and inefficiency arose from the combination under one department of two services totally distinct in their nature—namely, the service of procuring supplies and the service of transporting the various articles that were required. But I would remind the hon. Member that we had a large number of animals collected at Varna. There were 4,000 or 5,000 horses and mules at Varna, especially provided for the transport service of the army. It was not possible to carry them over to the Crimea when the troops went, and circumstances arose which prevented their being sent afterwards. But the arrangement we are proposing is not the creation for the first time of the means of land transport. These means have already been employed under the Commissariat department. It is the transferring them to a separate establishment, whose sole duty will be to look after that service, and perform it correctly; and we think great advantages will arise from that concentration of the transport service into one particular department. The hon. Member has also observed upon the calamity which befell a great number of horses which died for want of forage; and he ascribed that to the great neglect on the part of those whose duty it was to provide a sufficient supply of forage. But he is not perhaps aware that the unfortunate hurricane in which the *Prince* was lost destroyed twenty days' forage for the animals in the camp. Then came the badness and impracticability of the roads, and the great difficulty of bringing anything from the harbour up to the camp—a difficulty which led to this consequence, that, while there were abundant supplies at the port, those who were at the camp, and for whom those supplies were intended, were left in a state of great suffering. The hon. Member for Inverness also asked what progress we had made in raising foreign troops? It was stated, and with great force, that in the early part of the Session we urged the great necessity of passing a Bill to enable us to raise foreign troops, and I especially entreated the House to consent to the passing of that Bill, in order that we might, without loss of time, enlist foreign troops, to give assistance to our troops in the Crimea. It is perfectly true that hitherto we have not succeeded in acting upon that Bill. And why? I must tell the Committee the truth, however unpleasant it may be to some parties to hear it; but the reason why we have not succeeded is the language which—I am forced to say it—the language which was used in the debates in this and the other House of Parliament, which created such a feeling of resentment, of irritation, and of indignation throughout the Continent, that those persons who were before prepared to take letters of service to raise troops in Germany said that, under these circumstances, they were unable to raise a man. The condition, also, which was imposed on the Government, of not giving half-pay to the officers, likewise tended greatly to impede the execution of that Bill. I will undertake to say that if Parliament had not put in a clause prohibiting the grant of half-pay to the officers of the Foreign Legion, and if language of the most insulting kind had not been heard with regard to what were called the "mercenary troops"—German and Belgian "mercenaries," and Heaven knows what—raising the national feeling of the Continent against us, I have no doubt that by this time we should have had a very different story to tell of these foreign troops. It has not, however, altered the feeling on the Continent with regard to the cause in which we are engaged. They still say that England is right, and wish her success; but they say that, after the language which was held with regard to their nationality, they will not take service under our flag. I would not have made that statement, which may be considered a reproach; but having been asked the reason, I am forced to give it.

The hon. Member for Devonport (Sir E. Perry) asked a very natural question. He said that commissions are given to non-commissioned officers, and that these commissions involve considerable expense, and he asked whether any provision was made to enable the gallant men on whom these rewards were conferred to encounter the expense attending their commissions. My hon. Friend has evidently not studied these Estimates, but if he will look at page 4, he will find the sum of 5,000*l.* proposed to be voted specially as a gratuity to those deserving men, to enable them to meet the expense of the commissions which are given to them. As a proof that the Government is not unmindful of the services of non-commissioned officers — of those to whom commissions cannot be given—it will be seen that there is a long list of non-commissioned officers to whom gratuities for life are to be given, amounting to 2,000 or more, in the same list in which good-service pensions to officers are given. An hon. Gentleman opposite told us that the soldiers sent to the hospital are frequently, in consequence of the loss of their knapsacks, destitute of knives and forks, things which are really essential to their comfort, and that great difficulty has sometimes arisen in providing them in the hospital. That evil has been, I am happy to say, anticipated; and orders were given to purchase a large number of knives and forks at Marseilles for the use in hospital at Scutari of those soldiers who may come unprovided with these necessary articles. The hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) made some very proper remarks. He said it was essential that a new supply of tents should be provided for the use of the army in the ensuing campaign. I can assure him that that requirement will be duly attended to, and I trust they will be of a sufficiently substantial description. They will not be old tents, but new ones, perfectly fitted for the service for which they are intended. It is perfectly true that the French have been provided with a tent much more portable than that of the English; but, although it is far more portable, it is by no means so well adapted to protect the soldier against the inclemency of the weather. It is a most convenient tent for light service, but it is not above three or four feet from the ground. It barely affords shelter at the sides. It is easily carried and easily put up, but the French felt so strongly the inferiority of their tent to that of our troops, that the French general sent to France for tents upon our model, feeling that their tent was an insufficient shelter from the weather to which they were exposed. The hon. Gentleman has also made a very good suggestion with regard to the supply of light cavalry. It is perfectly true that in all probability light cavalry might be obtained in Asia Minor. I am sure, if they could be found there, it would be far better, both in point of economy and expedition, to obtain them from thence than to bring them from India, for the transport is tedious and expensive, and probably the cavalry so brought would not find itself so well adapted to the nature of the country and the service to be performed as cavalry obtained nearer the country where the operations are to be performed. With regard to the suggestion relative to bringing distinguished officers from India, such as Major Outram and Major Edwardes, I think my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Control would have a word or two to say on that point. These officers are occupying posts of great importance in India, and, I apprehend, the Governor General would not thank the Government at home if they were to deprive him of those able officers, on whose ability and services he counts in the event of circumstances arising which might require India to be defended as well as the Crimea invaded. It is unncessary for me to point out to the Committee that many circumstances may arise in which it would be necessary for the Governor General of India to be in possession of ample means to protect our territories in that quarter of the globe.

The hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond) wishes to know what better machinery we have established for sending out provisions and clothing to our troops in the Crimea? That is exactly, Sir, one of the arrangements which the Government have felt it to be their imperative duty to give their earnest attention to. We know the great importance of seeing not only that things are sent, but of making arrangements by which the things sent to the army shall reach the men and officers for whom the things are intended. The defect has not been the want of things despatched from this country. Forage, ammunition, and everything requisite has b en sent from this country, and, I will venture to say, when the matter comes to be looked into, that it will be found that there never was sent from this country so large a force in so short a time, so fully equipped, so well provided with everything necessary for the comfort of the horses and men, and for the purposes of the service to which they were destined, as the army which was sent to the East in the course of the year that just elapsed. The defects are from the want of arrangement for conveying to the men and the horses the things that were sent out to them. At the same time, I must say there was great truth and force in the observations of the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate), in answer to the attack made on the aristocracy of the country, in which, I suppose, we must include the gentry, for I hope the aristocracy includes the two. In answer to the charge that our army had not been so successful as it ought to have been, in consequence of the great number of gentlemen who are officers in the army, I think the hon. Member made a most triumphant reply, by showing that where the system has broken down—where the evil has arisen from the want of capacity, want of energy, want of intelligence, want of an accurate and zealous performance of duty—it has happened not where the gentry were, not where the aristocracy were, not where the noblemen were, but where there were persons belonging to other classes of the community—in the medical department, the commissariat department, the transport service, which have not been filled with the aristocracy or the gentry. It is there that the system has broken down—it is there that the service has failed, and produced the suffering which we all so much regret and deplore. The hon. Member for North Warwickshire has expressed a hope that the new clothing will be provided in time for the services in the ensuing campaign. I can assure the hon. Member and the Committee that no effort shall be omitted to secure the prompt and effectual despatch of the clothing, and I entertain not the slightest doubt that the clothing will arrive in proper quantities and in due time. Most of the observations which have been made are perfectly correct. Nobody disputes the importance of having a large and effective army. If any hon. Member has objected to the amount of the force, or to anything which is required to make the force effective, I trust that between this time and the opening of the campaign Government will be able to organise a sufficient army of reserve to enable it to put into the field an army sufficient to cope with whatever difficulties it may have to contend; and I am satisfied that if that army shall be called upon to vindicate the honour of the country and maintain its interest by the continuance of the war, we shall find that the service has been well performed—that the experience of the last few months will enable us to correct those faults and errors which have been committed, and that by the means which the Government are setting to work to reorganise and to rearrange those several departments of the service, we shall be able to put into the field an army of which the country will be proud—an army whose services will meet the thanks and acknowledgments of Parliament and of the country.

Colonel SIBTHORP said, he regretted to have heard from the noble Lord at the head of the Government an intimation that an ex-Minister who, one would think, had been sufficiently convicted and condemned by the country, had been set forth to patch up a peace which, from his knowledge of the character of the man, he (Colonel Sibthorp) feared would not redound to the honour or interest of England. He hoped England would never succumb to the Russian, nor to any other country; and he had, therefore, hoped that the noble Lord to whom he referred had retired from public life, never again to return to it. He was surprised to hear from the noble Lord, for whom he had the greatest respect, a hint respecting a dissolution of Parliament. Old birds were not to be caught with chaff; and he (Colonel Sibthorp) would not shrink from appearing before his constituents to defend his public conduct. He was prepared to do all in his power to uphold the honour and security of the country, and would be ready to abide by the consequences of doing his duty.

Mr. PIGOTT said, he wished to know whether the Government intended to keep up the corps of pensioners that went out with the army in the East, and the efficiency of which had been greatly questioned?

Mr. FREDERICK PEEL was understood to reply that the Government had no intention to maintain the corps to which the hon. Gentleman had alluded.

Mr. BARROW said, he wished to know if any and what provision had been made to supply the 10th Hussars, now on their way to the Crimea from India, with warm winter clothing; and also, if they were to bring their tents with them, or if provision had been made to supply them with tents for themselves and their horses on their arrival in the Crimea?

Mr. FREDERICK PEEL said, it was not intended to send the 10th Hussars direct to the Crimea. They would remain in Egypt until the winter was over.

Mr. J. BALL said, he rose to vindicate his hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury from a misrepresentation of his expressions which the noble Lord at the head of the Government had twice put forward in the course of the evening. His hon. Friend had never attempted to draw any invidious distinctions between different classes in this country, nor had he attributed a desire and an ability to serve the country to one class more than to another, but what he had endeavoured to impress upon the Government was, that the only way in which affairs could now be conducted was by recognising and putting forward energy and ability in one class as well as in another. He certainly, so far, had not been able to recognise any disposition on the part of Her Majesty's Government to act up to the wishes of the country on this important point, and he had heard with consternation that they had discovered no better way to remedy the inefficiency which existed in our military departments in the Crimea than by sending out Commissions to inquire and report on the maladministration of affairs there. The noble Lord at the head of the Government had acknowledged that there existed great want of energy and ability in some of the departments in the Crimea; and certainly the correspondence respecting the supply of coffee to the troops proved that at least one officer out there had shown himself utterly inefficient and inadequate to the duties of his position. Of course he alluded to Mr. Commissary General Filder, to whose deficiencies in energy and ability he believed much of the sufferings undergone by our troops was to be attributed. That officer, it appeared, commenced by ordering unroasted coffee to be supplied to the troops, and though the evil effects of such a measure were obvious from the very first, though in most cases the coffee was thus rendered entirely useless, and though, moreover, he had been requested in July to report as to the comparative merits of roasted and unroasted coffee, it was not until the middle of October that he ventured to give a somewhat doubtful opinion that the evidence on the whole was favourable to roasted coffee.

signments had ever been acted upon up to the present moment.

Mr. WILSON said, the right hon. Gentleman had not sufficiently attended to the explanation which he had already offered on this subject. He had already called the attention of the Committee to the fact that, though the order was given the day after the letter was received, that order was not executed till the 16th of December, and the reason of this was that, after the battle of Inkerman, there was such a demand for ships to transport fresh troops to the Crimea that none could be got to carry the order into effect.

Colonel NORTH said, he wished to call attention to the fact that the Messrs. Collier, in their letter to the Treasury, offered to assist in roasting and grinding the coffee in any of the Government dockyards. He thought that Sir Charles Trevelyan, in his reply, might at least have thanked them for the offer.

Vote *agreed to;* as was also

(2.) 7,353,804*l.*, Charge of Her Majesty's Land Forces.

House resumed.

The House adjourned at a quarter before Two o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Tuesday, February 20, 1855.

Minutes.] Public Bills.—1ª Criminal Justice.
2ª Army Service Act Amendment.
3ª Army Service Act Amendment.

ARMY SERVICE ACT AMENDMENT BILL.

Order of the Day for the Second Reading, and for taking into consideration the Standing Orders, Nos. 37 and 38, in order to their being dispensed with on the said Bill, read.

Moved, That the Bill be now read 2ª.

The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH: I really expected, my Lords, that in moving the second reading of this very important measure the noble Baron the Secretary for War would at least have made a statement to the House—similar to that which has been made on all occasions when a great alteration has been proposed in the mode of supplying deficiencies in the Army—of the operation of the existing mode of enlistment; that he would have stated the amount of the establishment, and the amount of the effective force which we possess; and, likewise, that he would have informed us of the number of recruits obtained at different times under the present circumstances, so that we might be enabled to judge of the practical effect of the present system of recruiting the Army. The noble Baron has afforded us no information whatever of this kind. I must confess, however, that under the circumstances of the country and of the Army, as they appear to me at the present moment, I am not disposed to make any opposition whatever to the Bill which is now proposed to us; but at the same time I must venture to suggest to the noble Baron that this is a very strong measure, and one which deserves the greatest consideration before the House adopts it—we ought, I say, very seriously to consider whether we should make so very great an alteration in the system of recruiting for the Army without limiting the period for which that alteration is to continue. The necessity is one which we may hope may be at an end at the expiration of three years, or may not exist to the same extent; and even if the case should be otherwise, and the necessity should still exist, there can be no difficulty in coming again to Parliament to ask an extension of the period during which this alteration is to have effect. I shall, therefore, suggest in Committee that the noble Baron should limit the duration of the powers contained in the Bill to the period of three years; and I am quite sure that if, when those powers expire, the need should still continue, Parliament will make no difficulty in granting an extension of them.

I have looked into the Army Estimates for the present year, and I confess, my Lords, that the view I take of the state of our military establishments, and the means of furnishing the amount of force required for the public service according to these Estimates, is one of considerable alarm. I observe that the number of recruits expected to be obtained, or desired to be obtained, during the present year is 60,000 men; and I find also that the increase of the establishment proposed in this year is 35,869:—but I apprehend that at the present moment, considering the great losses which have been sustained in the Crimea, it cannot but be supposed that the army is considerably below the establishment. Taking the deficiency of the effectives of the establishment at 24,131, and adding it to the number by which the establishment is proposed to be increased, the numbers will amount to the full 60,000 recruits for which provision is made. If, indeed, the 60,000 recruits could be obtained in one day, no doubt on that day the army would be in a perfect state of efficiency, and up to the complement which has been voted by the House of Commons. But observe—in this calculation no provision has been made for the casualties which are to be expected during the present year. I apprehend that, under ordinary circumstances, if we were not engaged in actual war, we could not expect that the casualties from various causes would be much less than 12,000 men; and I am sure I take a very low estimate of the probable casualties of war when I put them at 18,000 more; and, therefore, in addition to the 60,000 recruits required to complete the establishment, if they were obtained to-morrow, you will require 30,000 more in order, on the 31st of March, 1856, to have the actual establishment up to the strength now voted by Parliament. This is a very serious state of things. In the same Army Estimates I see it is proposed that 60,000 recruits are to be obtained for the militia, or rather are wanted for the militia; but, as there is a very large deduction from the expenditure for these recruits, amounting to 700,000*l.*, which may be taken to represent 28,000 men, I apprehend that it is supposed that 28,000 men will be transferred from the militia to the regular army:—there can be no doubt, however, that a very large number of men will be required for the purpose of keeping the militia up to its establishment, even after the deduction of the 28,000 men for which provision has been made. All the consideration I have ever been able to give to this subject has led me to the conclusion that the only solid foundation for an efficient army in this country is a full militia—a militia full up to its complement: but of this I must say I am quite sure, that, unless Parliament shall take very energetic measures, and unless individuals will exert themselves for the public service to the full extent of their personal influence, in the localities in which they have that influence, it will be perfectly impossible to effect this object. I, therefore, earnestly recommend the noble Baron that he should communicate with the Home Secretary; that the Home Secretary may write to the lords lieutenant of counties, stating the requirements of the country and the absolute necessity of individual exertion; and that the lords lieutenant may then call together their deputy-lieutenants and state to them, each as he may best think fit, the wants of the public service and the duties imposed upon them. I must say, too, that having considered this matter to the best of my ability, I have come to the conclusion which I have more than once expressed in this House, that it would be advisable that the Government should avail itself of the power which is granted in the Act passed two or three years ago, to make the Poor Law unions the districts to which the quotas of the militia are to be apportioned. I feel, too, that some measure of coercion should be adopted—though I should be most unwilling at the present moment to resort to the ballot; but it appears to me that the most convenient mode of stimulating their energy would be to inflict a fine upon the union for every militiaman of the quota apportioned to the district not provided. I have had a great deal to do at different times with the practical operation of Poor Law unions, and, having sat a great deal on boards of guardians, I know the great power which that establishment possesses, and I am perfectly confident that if the chairmen of boards of guardians—men always of the first influence in the union—in co-operation with the guardians, a great many of whom are continued from year to year, and in co-operation with those with whom they have been connected as guardians in former years, would really exert themselves for the purpose of obtaining a sufficient supply of militiamen, the fine would rarely be imposed, and the militia would generally be maintained up to its full complement. In the present state of the country, however, and of this war, I am convinced that it is necessary not merely to resort to those measures which may be passed by Parliament with this view, but that the personal exertions of every individual, wherever he may be able to make those exertions, are required for the purpose of filling the ranks of the militia, and enabling it to supply the army with that force which is absolutely needed for the maintenance of the public interests and the national honour.

My Lords, there is something that strikes me very much, in looking into these Army Estimates, as defective in the present organisation of the army, and I beg to submit the subject to the consideration of the noble Baron the War Minister. I perceive that there has been a very great addition to the number of the officers in the army in the course of last year. In one page of the Army Estimates I find it stated that that addition has amounted to 1,962. I do not find, however, that that number corresponds with the number which I should calculate from the details given; and which, on the contrary, appears, when added together, to be in the total 1,669. But your Lordships will observe that while the addition of majors is proportional to the addition of captains and other officers, so that the chance of promotion to the rank of major remains the same as before, yet not only is there no addition to the rank of lieutenant colonel, but, in point of fact, the latter are one less than when the subordinate officers were fewer. This is a matter which appears to me of material importance, for not only in the matter of promotion is injury done to officers in the ranks of lieutenant and captain, but the service sustains a very serious loss; for there could be no doubt that it is most desirable that persons in a considerable number should be placed in the rank of lieutenant colonel, and should in that rank have the command of a sufficient body of men to acquire the power of moving battalions, and so qualify themselves for higher appointments in the army.

This subject brings me to the enormous increase which is proposed to be made in the numerical strength of the regiments—to which increase I very much object. I see that each regiment serving in the Crimea is to be made up to 2,200 men; but it is not intended that this body should ever be brought together in one mass; but some were to be kept in depôt at home, others at Malta, while the main body would be employed in the Crimea. But the men so employed, amounting to more than 1,400, would be infinitely too large to be handled by the ordinary regimental officers; they would form the ordinary strength of a brigade, and not of a regiment; it would be necessary to break them into wings, and thus altogether to destroy their usefulness as a substantive unit—for the battalion should be a unit in the army organisation. But there is this further objection to the proposed arrangement, that one-third or more of the battalion would be dispersed in small bodies in a fragmentary state, and no officer commanding a fragment could obtain any knowledge of his duty so as to command an entire regiment hereafter. In what position should we then be in England, when the only force in England would consist of these fragmentary regiments, and when there would be no possibility of bringing together a military force of any amount fit to contend with an enemy, for you could not put together occasionally and for extraordinary purposes of war two or three bodies of 200 or 300 men, each commanded, perhaps, by accidental captains who may engage for a short period in such a service. The system about to be adopted is practically nullifying the efficiency of the army. By the deductions made from the militia, from the regular force by detachments at Malta and elsewhere, and by the enormous force in the Crimea, you will have at home men, but army none—nothing in the shape of an army—and that appears to me to be contrary to all military principle and reason.

It is with very deep regret that I am compelled to come to the conclusion that our military institutions are utterly inadequate for the support of an army of the strength of that originally sent to the Crimea. That army, no doubt, has been subject to extraordinary losses; but, even had it only been subject to the ordinary losses of war, we have not in our military institutions the means of maintaining such an army to its full complement. The consequence of that deficiency has been that we have been taking most extraordinary measures for the purpose of maintaining it at the number at which it originally stood. For this purpose we have denuded the Colonies, shuffling regiments together, and dislocating them, so that when a regiment lands in the Crimea it finds its best men, not in its own ranks, but transferred by volunteering to the ranks of other regiments. The whole army is thus shuffled together; the *esprit de corps* is entirely destroyed, and all the effect of discipline done away with. Thus, instead of sending out a perfectly well disciplined and equipped army, perfect in all respects as the one we ought in all circumstances to send abroad—if we send an army abroad at all—we have sent out the present one deficient in all the qualities which ought to distinguish an army, except that courage which is innate in the British soldier. What is the consequence? In the endeavour to keep up the number of the army the Government is compelled, day after day, to send troops to the Crimea utterly unfit for the service. I have seen a regiment sent out to the Crimea composed of boys of from nineteen to twenty years of age, not of the usual stature, full of spirit, but utterly unable to contend with the difficulties, or to bear the hardships of a campaign. The consequence is, that you are throwing regiment after regiment into a bottomless pit, where they can do no public service, and must die, because nature compels them to sink under the exertions and privations to which they are subjected. It is most painful to see this state of things, which has resulted altogether from the extraordinary notion of sending out every man you could lay your hands on without considering whether it was possible to maintain the army up to the complement at which it was sent out, and thus all these calamities have arisen.

I confess I look with very great regret on the conduct of this war. It is very painful for me to see that, while the Turks were fighting at Silistria, our troops were doing nothing at Varna; and when our troops were fighting before Sebastopol, the Turks have been doing nothing on the Pruth. All this is very unsatisfactory. It shows a want of system and of combination in the operations between the three armies, and that either there was no knowledge of the principles and mode of conducting war, or, if there were that knowledge, that there was some impracticability in applying it.

But I rejoice that in the midst of a great deal of regret on various subjects, I have at least to congratulate the noble Earl at the head of the Foreign Department on two events which appear to me to be a very good augury, and extremely valuable in themselves. Whether diplomacy has had anything to do with them I know not—I am not one of those who profess any great respect for diplomacy—but I really envy the satisfaction which the noble Earl must have enjoyed when the Convention was signed with Sardinia. I look upon that Convention as contributing a most valuable force to the common exertions of the Western Powers. I envy him the satisfaction he must have enjoyed, because I must say that of all the events which have occurred since 1848—events which have generally been creditable to the smaller constitutional Powers of Europe, whose conduct almost universally has been far superior to that of the great Powers in the emergencies in which they have been placed —I say of all the measures adopted, that which most conduces to the credit of the Piedmontese statesmen by whom it was adopted—that which most conduces, not only to their present credit, but to the future interests of their country—is that Convention, by which Piedmont joins the Western Powers. That of all other measures is destined to find a place in history as one of the most admirable transactions —one of the most remarkable acts—of a long-sighted Government. I congratulate the noble Earl and the statesman at the head of the Piedmontese Government—the people and the army of Piedmont, on that event. They are the hope of Italy—they have taken a new position in Europe, and have justified the expectations entertained of their virtue and wisdom; and I most earnestly hope that they may get the reward they so justly deserve in the advantage to be derived from the measure to their country, and in the honour which they deserve to have for themselves. It is to me a subject of the deepest regret that that noble prince the Duke of Genoa—as noble a soldier as ever met an enemy in the field—should not have been spared to lead his country's troops to glory and victory, and to add another ray of honour—of that honour which never deserts them—to the head of the illustrious military family of Sardinia.

There is another subject on which I have to congratulate the noble Earl, and that is the recent convention with Turkey; that also makes a very material addition to the forces of the Western Powers. Undoubtedly, it would have been a subject of very great satisfaction if that convention had been made ten months ago. Whether it was impossible to overcome Turkish scruples sooner, I know not—or whether the ordinary means were adopted for the purpose of effecting that great object, I know not; but this I will say, that it is an object fraught with advantages, not only to the prosecution of military operations, but more especially to the actual position of Turkey itself; because we must not think that if we can save Turkey in the present war, we have done all that is to be done;—we have done little or nothing unless we place Turkey in a position in which she will be able to protect herself, at least, until the other Powers of Europe may come to her assistance. I know nothing that can tend so directly to the revival of the Turkish empire as the revival of the Turkish army. It has had at a distant period an army more instructed, more disciplined, and more scientific than any army known in Europe at the time, though that was the time of Charles V. I know not why at this time she should not be capable of producing an army of equal merit; it may perhaps be a difficult task; but this I know, that in States sunk as that is, the only possible chance of revival is in the reconstruction of the army. When a State is falling in virtue the last place virtue leaves is the army in the field. It was so in the fall of the Roman empire, when the highest virtues still adorned the army, while everything that was corrupt existed in the court; and, my Lords, I feel satisfied that if you can in any way reconstruct the Turkish army, you will give to that country the chance of reconstruction in other respects which it has never yet had, and which may free the future Government of that country from many difficulties and dangers to which it has been recently exposed. But I must say that I think the extent to which the employment of Turkish troops in our service is to be made available is very insufficient; and I think that it is not in our own service only, but in the service of the French also, that a very large body of Turks ought to be employed. Instead of 20,000, we should at least have 30,000 Turkish soldiers in the pay and disciplined by the officers of this country; and I should earnestly desire to see the same number in the service of France, officered by French officers, to serve on the Pruth, as our Turkish contingent should be led by English officers to serve in Asia; for, my Lords, I have no doubt whatever, that, so long as we attempt to conduct this war against Russia without attempting any diversions whatever—allowing her to bring her whole forces over the hardened snow, with all their means of transport, and all their artillery, to attack our forces, exposed as they are to most inclement weather, and at a distance of 3,000 miles from their supplies, without an adequate artillery perhaps, certainly without the adequate equipment that an army in the position before Sebastopol ought to have—I say, that so long as we contend with Russia as we are now doing at Sebastopol, the allied troops will be exposed to a weight which it is impossible they can withstand, and it is impossible that we can succeed at the point which we have selected as that of conflict. My Lords, it has been to me a deep subject of regret, from the commencement of this war, that Her Majesty's Government should not have paid that attention which I think they ought to have done to the importance of the war in Asia. I entirely concur, my Lords, in all that has been said and written by that able gentleman who, more than any other, is acquainted with the affairs of Asia—I mean Mr. Layard. I entirely concur in all that he has said. We are not merely an European, we are an Asiatic Power. To us this war has a double interest and importance. It affects us, not merely as regards the coasts of the Mediterranean, or the manner in which Russia may get possession of Constantinople and establish her fleet in the Black Sea, with a view to the destruction of our commerce and our position there as a naval Power; it is of importance to us, as it affects greatly our position in the East. Upon the result of this war depends the maintenance of our communication with India through Egypt. Upon the result of this war depends the question whether Turkey shall possess any independent strength in Asia Minor. If Russia advances to Erzeroum, that strength will fall—all communication between Turkey and Persia is cut off; Persia becomes subject to Russia, and all the power of Persia, through Russia, will be directed against us in India. I say, therefore, the importance of the war in Asia is incalculable to us. It is quite a different thing to us whether Russia succeeds in Asia than it is to any of the other Powers engaged in this war; and therefore I most earnestly desire that in addition to these Turkish troops in our pay, we should also have the aid of Persian soldiers. From what I have heard, I believe the Persians are the best soldiers in Asia, equally able with those of other countries to bear heat and cold, brave as their swords, and obedient to their officers whenever they are paid, and will go wherever they are taken. I most earnestly desire to see such an army in our employ, officered as the irregular forces are under the East India Company, by a commandant, a second in command, and an adjutant; and I feel satisfied that, so officered, those troops would be equal to any service to which they might be called. But, my Lords, there is another Power whose assistance I think we have a right to claim in this war—a Power most deeply interested, whose existence as connected with India is, I will not say dependent on the result of this war, but most materially connected with it—I mean the Government of India. Is the Government of India to stand aloof in this war, which affects Persia and which affects the communication through Egypt? Is that Government to do nothing? Is she to be the Prussia of the East? Is she to let others fight her battles, and not adventure one man of her own in her own defence? I think not. I think not only that the available forces of India should be brought into the field, but that the Government of India should pay the cost of maintaining them in the field, because it is for their interest and for their safety that they would have to fight. In addition to the 30,000 Turks and Persian soldiers that could with great effect be opposed to Russia in Asia, why should we not have the use of the noblest artillery in the world—the Native artillery of India? You can have forty-eight guns without the smallest inconvenience to the service in India—not served by men who will run away when the enemy is advancing to their muzzles, but who will die at their guns; who may have their guns taken, no doubt, but who will never desert them, standing at their post till left dead men. And why not add, also, some part of the irregular cavalry of India, than which there is no nobler body of men in the world. The officers are selected from the whole army of India—men full of daring, full of knowledge, genius, and zeal, to whom the soldiers are devoted, and who would follow them to the end of the world. Of those you can easily have 3,000 or 4,000, officered by the best men in the world. In addition to this force of irregular cavalry, we should have eight or ten battalions composed of volunteers from different regiments in India, all Mahomedans, officered by men—some of whom I well know—equal to any you possess in the army. Thus, then, including the Turkish and Persian troops, you might have an army of 50,000 men, which would be strong enough to give you Teflis and Georgia. Observe that in this war before Sebastopol you are inclosed by the town and by the enemy, and you have no means of contact with the people of the country. But in Georgia you would have the feeling of the nationality of the country in your favour. We should have allies by our side. We should have Schamyl and the Circassians, and would have an opportunity of attacking Russia with the arms she has herself used for the purpose of subjugating a large portion of Asia. You would attack her with her own arms, and you may depend upon it that in this war you must fail unless you determine to appeal to nations and not alone to armies—unless you will avail yourselves of the means which the national feeling of the people more recently annexed to Russia places at your disposal. This is a war, I regret to say, *ad internecionem*, and it is absolutely necessary that you should avail yourselves of every means in your power to bring it to a conclusion honourable to this country, safe for us, and safe for the rest of the world.

THE EARL OF HARROWBY said, he had listened with satisfaction to the observations of the noble Earl, and more especially to what he had just stated with regard to the nationalities oppressed by Russia. He believed that we had made a great mistake in not having called the nationalities of Europe to our side in our present struggle—for it was only by arousing the nations that had been oppressed by Russia that real and efficient obstacles could be opposed to the future extension of that empire. On the side of Asia the Circassians and other nations on the Russian frontier had, almost unassisted, opposed a successful resistance to her progress. Why, then, did not Europe afford assistance to those who were carrying on this struggle for independence? They had fought battles occasionally with success; it was true they had occasionally been defeated, but they had never been defeated ingloriously, although the whole power of Russia had been arrayed against them, and they had not been supported by the assistance or the sympathy of Europe. If aid were afforded to these people, and they were enabled to resist the power of their assailant, Russia would be prevented from gaining a position between Persia and Turkey which would enable her to turn the flank of Turkey, and Turkey would be protected against future encroachments. But there was one name which ought not to be lost sight of in considering this subject, and that was the name of Poland. He deeply regretted the statement that was made a little while ago in the other House of Parliament, by the noble Lord the late President of the Council, to the effect that whatever the result of the war there was to be no change in the territorial distribution of Europe. But if you do not do that, what are you fighting for? Are you fighting simply for a treaty? Are you fighting for a disclaimer of pretensions which may be revived at any future opportunity? For his part, he understood they were fighting for a substantial guarantee; and what better guarantee could they have than by altering in some degree the territorial power of Russia? They could not retain the Crimea in the long run; and to whom could they give it? On what point could Russia be so effectually attacked as on the side of Poland and the Caucasus? Yet on neither of those two points had the slightest effort of the Allies been made. If they could get the concurrence of Austria to enable them to raise the standard of Polish independence, what did they do? They at once raised 17,000,000 of men, the most warlike opponents of the power of Russia, as a permanent barrier between the East and the West—from the Baltic to the Black Sea—between Russia and the rest of Europe. Knowing how ready Austria, through Prince Metternich, was at the time of the Congress of Vienna to restore the ancient dominion of Poland, and establish that barrier between Russia and the rest of Europe, he could not but believe that with proper encouragement Austria would be ready to make sacrifices of portions of her territorial possessions for the safety and security of the remainder, for he thought the cause which had hitherto induced Austria to hold back was the position occupied by Russia from her possession of Poland, which enabled her to command the whole of Germany from North to South. The question of the independence of Poland was, after all, the key to the whole policy of Europe. At the present moment there was not a doubt as to what was the public opinion of Europe with regard to the position of Russia —none whatever. The other Powers of Europe who stood aloof from the Western Alliance did so, not because they did not sympathise with the objects of the Allies, but simply from terror of the power of Russia; and as that terror arose solely from the strategical position which the possession of Poland gave to Russia, surely such an important question ought not to be overlooked or neglected. When the propriety of establishing a Polish Legion was some time since discussed, it was urged as an objection to the measure that such a body of men would act as a revolutionary force; and the noble Lord now at the head of Her Majesty's Government was represented to have replied, "Oh, no; not revolutionary, if you please, but desertionary certainly." He trusted, however, that any rate the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) who was about to proceed as our Minister at Vienna, would not go there pledged to carry out the opinion which he had, perhaps rather hastily, expressed — that under no circumstances would a change be made in the territorial position of Russia, either on the side of Poland or the Caucasus, or on both; for he was convinced, that unless some alteration was effected in the distribution of territorial power in one or both of these quarters, we might conclude treaties with Russia, but have no security that they would be observed—we might achieve her humiliation for a season, but would leave her power of ultimately disturbing the peace of Europe unimpaired.

LORD PANMURE: My Lords, I certainly did not expect that a debate upon the second reading of this Bill would have led to such an enlarged statement of the noble Earl's (the Earl of Ellenborough) views as that with which he has favoured your Lordships, and before I take any notice of those views I may disencumber the subject of some of the technical details to which the noble Earl has referred. In the first place the noble Earl has expressed his opinion that it is an expedient that Parliament should grant to the Crown an unlimited power of curtailing the period of enlistment in the army. I, to some extent, participate in the opinion he has expressed, and I do not dissent from the proposition of the noble Earl that the operation of this Bill should be limited to the period of three years, for I earnestly hope, and most sincerely pray, that the necessity for its continuance may not exist three years from the time at which I now address your Lordships. I can have no difficulty whatever, therefore, in consenting to the Amendment suggested by the noble Earl. With this Amendment, and limitation of the period for which the alteration is to be in force, I trust that the House will have no difficulty in agreeing to this measure. I thought I had fully and distinctly explained the object of this Bill when I proposed it and laid it upon your Lordships' table. I stated distinctly that its object was to enable us immediately to enlist in Her Majesty's service men of somewhat mature age, whose sinews were sufficiently strong and whose constitutions were sufficiently formed to enable them to enter at once upon the arduous and trying work of a campaign, instead of—as at present—enlisting boys of the age of eighteen, who have to be fed and trained for two or three years before they are fit to engage in any operations of the commonest kind. I do not understand that to such a plan, limited to a certain definite time, any objection will arise on the part of this House; and therefore I shall proceed, instead of discussing the mere principle of the Bill, to meet some of those points which have been raised by the noble Earl, connected rather with the state of the army in general than with the subject to which the Bill particularly refers. The noble Earl has referred to the number of recruits requisite to raise the effective strength of the army to the number of men for which the Under Secretary of State for the War Department obtained a vote in the House of Commons last night. Those who are conversant with the affairs of the army are, however, well aware that it is almost impossible, at any period, to maintain the effective force of the army up to the number voted in the Estimates for the year. If that is the case in time of peace, it must be much more difficult in time of war. The noble Earl has stated that, in time of peace, in an army of 120,000 or 130,000 men, there are annually about 12,000 casualties. Of course the casualties in an army of 190,000 men, and in a time of war, must be considerably more numerous, and a greater number of men will be required to supply the deficiency thus created. I do not fear that there will be any difficulty in raising the requisite supply of men by recruiting. The Government do not rely solely on their own measures—we do not doubt that every possible exertion will be made by all lords lieutenant, by deputy lieutenants, by all men of property, by all men interested in the welfare of the country, by any interests, whether landed, mercantile, or commercial, to induce men to enter the service of their Queen and country, for the more speedily we can employ an efficient force, the more speedily will a conclusion be put to a state of things which disturbs all the relations of the country, landed, commercial, and mercantile. But, my Lords, recourse has been had, to a certain extent, to the militia. I am sorry to say that some of the militia regiments have not shown that alacrity and vigour in supplying their quota to serve in the line which it was expected they would do. It is my intention to take energetic measures for inducing a proper supply of men from the militia regiments; but I trust that, previously to taking energetic measures, an appeal which I have made to the commanding officers of the several militia regiments may have its due and proper effect. But, my Lords, with regard to the militia itself, I am perfectly ready to admit, with the noble Earl, that the number of that force is not such as is required by Parliament and the country. With respect to the system of fines referred to by the noble Earl, I am afraid that, also, is an illusory resource. It was tried during the last war, and the system failed; as far as my information goes, I believe that the fines which were imposed were never exacted, and were never paid into the public Treasury. With that precedent before us, I doubt very much whether the system would succeed any more now. The attention of Government has been much directed, my Lords, to the recruiting of the army, and there can be no question that means must be found, if not gentle, then they must be found by compulsion, for recruiting the ranks of Her Majesty's service, in order to enable this war to be carried on with the requisite vigour. My Lords, in another point to which the noble Earl alluded, he raised an objection to the composition of the regiments which now form the army in the Crimea. He objects, in the first place, to the disproportion of superior officers in those regiments—namely, of one lieutenant colonel and three majors as compared with the captains and subalterns. I have to state to the noble Earl that that circumstance has attracted my attention, and, agreeing with him in what he has said, I have instructed the Commander in Chief, instead of making the establishment of each regiment one lieutenant colonel and three majors, as at present, to make it two lieutenant colonels and two majors. When, therefore, the regiment is separated into two divisions, both the portion which remains at home and that which is engaged in service in the field will have the advantage of being commanded by a lieutenant colonel. This I trust will secure the increased efficiency of the various regiments both at home and abroad. It is intended to raise the force of each regiment serving in the Crimea to 2,000 men, and it is proposed that there shall be present in the field the half of that body—namely, 1,000 men. Out of that force of 1,000 men, it is supposed that there may be from casualties of various kinds a deficiency of about 200 men, bringing the regiment in the field down to 800 men, which, I believe, all military men agree is the number which can be most easily handled, which can be most successfully formed and manœuvred, and which can be best managed in action. Having thus provided for 1,000 men, it is intended to compose the other 1,000 as follows:

A depôt of 400 men will be stationed in the Mediterranean for easy and immediate relief, and for supplying any vacancies which may take place in the portion of the regiment engaged in the Crimea. The remainder of the regiment, consisting of 600 men, under a lieutenant colonel in command and his due proportion of officers will form the regimental depôt at home; add I will only remind the noble Earl that that is not altogether so despicable a force, inasmuch as the regiments that were sent out to the Colonies only a few years ago went out at a strength of 650, being only fifty over the number we take to form the regimental depôts which we now propose shall remain at home. Each depôt regiment will, in fact, form one battalion under the new system, what you had formerly in two battalions. The noble Earl, in the remarks which he addressed to your Lordships, proceeded to notice that which took place certainly long before I had any conception of being called upon to take any part in the administration of the war—namely, the mode in which the regiments originally embarked for service in the East were brought up to the complement at which they were required to embark. Great inconveniences, no doubt, did arise from the course which was followed in bringing up these regiments to the complement at which it was necessary to send them to the East. But at that time it was thought that the expedition would not be of a permanent character; but when the Commander in Chief was suddenly called upon to raise the strength of the regiments destined for foreign service from 800 to 1,000 men, I do not see that he could have done better than to call upon those regiments which were not required for immediate foreign service to supply by volunteering the vacancies existing in those regiments which were about to proceed abroad. If any inconvenience did arise at that time, I am quite sure that that inconvenience has disappeared altogether many months ago. It was merely an inconvenience of a temporary, and not of a permanent nature. The noble Earl then proceeded in a much higher tone to address your Lordships on various subjects of high policy connected with the war, and he enlarged at some length upon the course which the Government have taken with reference to the convention entered into with Piedmont. My Lords, in every word which the noble Earl said with respect to that convention I entirely concur. I also concur most entirely in the high compliment which he paid to that gallant individual whose loss we all deplore; and, my Lords, to show the sincerity with which the Piedmontese Government are acting in this matter, I may state that not only are they affording to the Western Powers the flower of their troops, but they are sending in command of them the man whom they recognise as most fit above all to take charge of them — namely, their present Minister of War. The noble Earl next proceeded to congratulate my noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) upon having achieved a convention with Turkey, by which a certain body of Turkish troops are to be maintained in British pay. It is not necessary to follow the noble Earl in the details to which he has adverted. Of course Her Majesty's Government view with the same satisfaction which he does the conclusion of that convention. We see much benefit to be derived, not only by the English but by the French army, from the Turkish contingent; but we do not say how that contingent is to be raised, or to what extent it is to be raised, beyond what was stated in the terms of the convention itself. I do think it would be somewhat unbecoming in me if I were to venture to follow the noble Earl in all the details of the campaign to which he has referred, considering the position which I have the honour to hold. It might be inferred from some of the observations of the noble Earl, that this war is undertaken for some special purposes in which this country has an individual interest; but I cannot help deprecating the idea that England is fighting this war for any peculiar interest of her own. My Lords, this war in my opinion is undertaken against the aggressive policy of a great Power in Europe. It is undertaken with no aggressive views on the part of this country; but it is undertaken honestly for the purpose of restraining the power and the ambition of Russia. It is not undertaken for the advancement of any particular interests of this country, and I should be sorry to see this country endeavour to turn to her own individual advantage a force which has been brought together for a higher and nobler purpose. With reference to any assistance we might be able to obtain from the Indian Government, I confess that the noble Earl speaks with somewhat more conviction upon his own mind than I can speak with conviction upon mine. He has filled a high office in India, and he ought to know more of the exigencies of the Indian Government, and more of the relations of the people of India, than I can pretend to know. But it must be a very serious consideration that can induce us to withdraw from India such troops as the noble Earl has described, and I could not venture to express an opinion upon that subject without being thoroughly acquainted with the views of the Governor-General of India at this moment as to the safety of India; nor, further than withdrawing those few regiments belonging to the Queen's service, to the withdrawal of which the Governor-General has given his full acquiescence, would I venture, merely for the sake of employing Indian regiments in the Crimea, to deprive India of troops on which it may be necessary that she should rely, either to resist attacks within her own territories, or to maintain that order which at this moment, I am happy to say, exists from one extremity of our Indian dominions to the other. With these observations it is not my intention further to detain your Lordships, except to assure you that, in moving the second reading of this Bill, I do so solely with the intention of engrafting upon Her Majesty's service a body of men who shall be capable of discharging more fully and more immediately the duties, and of supporting the hardships of war, and at less cost of health and life than the class from which our recruits are at present taken. I have no objection, as I said before, to limit it to a period of three years, feeling not the slightest doubt that when that period has elapsed, should it unfortunately be necessary to continue the operation of the Act, your Lordships will grant that extended power as willingly as you will grant the power for which we now ask.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH: Perhaps I may be allowed to explain. I do not know whether or not the noble Lord misunderstood me—that I did not speak of withdrawing a single European regiment from India, or of employing Native troops in the Crimea.

THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: My Lords, I must say that on one point the language of the noble Lord the Secretary for War rather alarmed me when he stated, and stated very truly, that the militia regiments had not on every occasion contributed that number of recruits to the line which was looked for. The manner in which the noble Earl alluded to that point, and the stringent measures which he indicated as necessary in order to promote enlistment, certainly alarmed me to some degree, because, being myself a militia officer, I know that a very strong feeling exists upon that very point. Your Lordships must recollect that not very long ago, as was done during the last war, recruiting sergeants were sent out to enlist militiamen for the regiments of the line. The consequence of this was, that all the militia regiments for a week or ten days, while these recruiting sergeants were at the different garrisons, were in a state of complete disorganisation. This, for example, was the case at Portsmouth, where it was really no light matter in an arsenal of such importance, for four or five regiments of militia to be so completely beyond the control of their officers as the men stationed in that town were, while the army recruiting officers were tempting them to enter the line. There is another impression which prevails very generally, and it is that the militia has not been in all respects treated fairly by Parliament and by the Government of the country during the last three years. When my noble Friend behind me (the Earl of Derby) introduced his Bill for the establishment of a militia force in this country, the men universally enlisted on the understanding that they should be only embodied in case of invasion, and exercised for only fifty-six days. That Bill remained in force for a year. Then, in consequence of events which took place, the apprehension of war shifted from the West to the East, and your Lordships were called upon to pass a second Bill to embody the militia in case of a war. That was never fairly understood by the men who were enlisted under the first Bill. I can give numberless instances in my own regiment, and within my own county, where many men who enlisted into the militia had no intention of ever enlisting into a force which was likely to be permanently embodied. They looked upon invasion as a mere vision. They were glad to serve their country in the way provided for under the first Bill; but they had no intention, and never thought it possible, that they would be called upon to be permanently embodied. However, the Bill for their permanent embodiment passed in 1854. At the same time they were called out under the provisions of the first Bill for twenty-eight days, but many of them did not know that at the end of twenty-eight days they had the opportunity of going back to their homes, and they were kept under the second Bill and then permanently embodied. Many of the men now said, "If we are to be permanently embodied, though that was not what we expected, we would much rather be in the line, because then we should share in the advantages enjoyed by the soldiers of the line. There is no 'humbug' about that force. In our case we have been gradually led into a force which is to be embodied, and if that is to be done we would rather go into the line." That has caused a feeling, at all events in the South of England, which has prevented in a very great degree recruiting for the militia being carried on successfully. If, for instance, the noble Lord the Secretary for War looks at the statistics in the case of the militia of Hampshire, an agricultural county which ought to produce, and has hitherto produced, a large supply of recruits in the militia, he will find that the proportion supplied to their quota falls short of that supplied by other counties. I would, therefore, press upon the noble Lord that, whatever is done by the Government—and I acknowledge that even if the ballot is necessary it must be resorted to—but whatever course is taken it should be taken in the most open, frank, and intelligible manner. These men had much rather, if I may use the phrase, "know the worst of it" at once. They had much rather be chosen by ballot; because, though this course is disagreeable enough, it is a fair one, and no man is worse treated by it than another; but what they do not like is that they should be tempted step by step to enter into a force by one Bill, have the service prolonged by another Bill, and finally be forced—though, no doubt, not violently—to enter into the line, where they had no intention at all of entering. I agree with the noble Lord in the opinion that the militia should remain as the nursery of our Army, and that if all other efforts fail the ballot must be resorted to; but I entreat him to consider the subject with all the force of his mind, and, whatever steps he takes, I hope they will be made thoroughly intelligible to the most ignorant mind among the population from which these men are taken.

Earl GREY: My Lords, I can confirm entirely what has been stated by the noble Earl who has just sat down. I know that the departure from the original understanding upon which the militia was raised has had a most prejudicial effect upon the service. At the time the Bill was passed last year which authorised the permanent embodying of the militia, I, for one, expressed my dislike to it, and my apprehension of the consequences of the measure. I know from long experience that the class from which you raise your soldiers requires to be dealt with not only with good faith, but with scrupulous attention, even to appearances, so that there may not be the shadow of a suspicion of any departure from good faith. Now, with respect to the militia, you have not adhered to this rule. When you originally raised this force you took the greatest possible pains to inculcate upon the people of this country a persuasion that in going into the militia they ran no hazard of being permanently embodied even during war, unless there was an apprehension of invasion, and the Act of 1852 contained a clause which specially provided that the militia should not be called out for a longer time than that allowed for training even in war, unless in the case of actual invasion, or immediate apprehension of invasion. But having induced men to volunteer into the militia on the faith of that principle, you departed from it, and passed a different Act, by which, without the consent of the men, you altered the terms of their engagement, and enabled the Government, though there was no fear of invasion, permanently to embody the militia during the war; and, as far as my own county is concerned, I must say since this I observe a very marked difference, as well as I can judge, in the readiness of persons to engage in the service. In one case it was represented to me that the feeling described by the noble Earl was so strong that a man who had been enlisted into the militia under the original Bill said, that if the regiment was to be permanently embodied, he must emigrate to America before that took place. There was no power of stopping him if he went away before the day on which the militia regiment was ordered to assemble, and he stated openly and publicly, that if the engagement into which he had entered was altered without his consent, he would emigrate to America. When this case was brought under my notice by the colonel of the regiment, I wrote to the Secretary of State for the Home Department on the subject, and I asked whether a man in this situation should not be entitled to leave of absence for any period after twenty-eight days' service. The reply to this was in the affirmative; but I much doubt whether the intimation that they may obtain leave of absence has been generally given to men in a similar situation, or would satisfy them. I must say I differ from the noble Earl who has just sat down in thinking that the militia is the proper nursery for the Army. The original intention in the establishment of the militia was not that of making it a nursery for the Army, but a totally distinct force—a force for national defence. I think you have made a great mistake in departing from that original intention. It is now neither the one thing nor the other. It is neither a reserve force kept back for great occasions, nor is it a nursery for the army. If it is a mere nursery for the army, how can you expect colonels and officers of the militia to take any interest in disciplining their men, when, directly they have made them efficient, their men are to be drafted into the regular army? It is utterly impossible you can expect this. And then, are we to keep up the whole staff of militia officers to discipline the men when this could be done equally well by a few captains and drill sergeants? I say the course of the Government with regard to the militia is an entire departure from the original scheme, and one which has thwarted, instead of promoting the great object of increasing the strength of the army. The proper plan to adopt is to increase the army as much as you can in a legitimate manner, by holding out inducements to men to enter at once into the regular service of the army, and by using such means, and by ameliorating the system which has hitherto existed, the regular force might be legitimately increased. My Lords, I entirely approve of the measure of my noble Friend the Secretary for War, and I have listened to his speech with great satisfaction. The course he has adopted in holding out inducements to persons of a more advanced age than the general run of recruits is, in my opinion, a very wise course. I venture to express a hope, while I am upon that subject, that my noble Friend will take some steps to bring back again into the service of the army a class of persons who would, under the present circumstances, be most valuable. Your Lordships are aware that, during the peace, successive Governments have acted upon the wise principle of allowing men to leave the army upon easy terms, and a large number of men have been in that manner discharged from the service; but I believe that a very large number of those men might be induced to re-enter the service if they were allowed to reckon their former military services as part of the time which all men are obliged to serve before they can receive a pension. At the present time, my Lords, when one well-trained soldier is worth nearly his weight in gold, when he is at least worth five or six recruits or young lads, it is of the greatest importance to consider the propriety of inducing that class of men to which I have referred to re-enter the service; and, as I have said, the greatest inducement to those persons would be to allow the time they have served, before leaving the service, to be reckoned in the term of years' service necessary to secure a pension. It would no doubt be just that those persons who having purchased their discharge should have the money they have paid refunded to them on some fit and reasonable terms. Having made these remarks, I would not further trespass on the time of your Lordships, but that I cannot pass by a subject of great importance referred to by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Ellenborough). I concur entirely with my noble Friend (Lord Panmure) that this is not a convenient opportunity for entering into the high and important questions relating to the conduct of the war which the noble Earl has raised, and if he wishes your Lordships to consider the policy he has recommended, he ought to bring the subject before you distinctly, and with due notice; but the subject having been introduced I cannot help saying that I heard with great satisfaction that my noble Friend the Secretary for War did not concur in, what appeared to me, the wild and extravagant suggestions of the noble Earl opposite. I heard the suggestions of that noble Earl, my Lords, with no little dismay. I believe that, if we were to act upon those views, we must be prepared to wage a war extending over the whole globe and lasting the whole of our lives. I am glad, I say, that my noble Friend does not sympathise with those views. I regretted to hear from the noble Earl who has held high office in India, and whose opinions must be regarded with interest, that India has a deep interest in the present war. I believe it to be impossible to make a statement less founded upon a correct view of the real interests of India, or more calculated to be injurious to the interests of this country in Europe. The noble Earl has endeavoured to show that India has an interest in this war, because it would be menaced by the extension of Russian power in Asia. From a person of the noble Earl's experience I did not expect such a statement. I believe the idea of danger to India from Russia to be utterly monstrous and chimerical. Danger to India from Russia? Why how is Russia to attack India? Is Russia to advance many hundred miles through a wild and trackless waste, to carry an army over the great mountains dividing the peninsula of India from Central Asia with the necessary artillery and provisions for the march? Could Russia carry such an army across such an extent of country, with all its necessary equipments, that could contend against your army in India? We know that, however formidable Russia may be in defence, her means of attack are not very formidable. Even in the present war, however formidable the defence of Sebastopol, we have seen that on the Danube the means of attack on the part of Russia were not very formidable, and that she does not possess the means of moving large masses of men and parks of artillery over great distances. Now, my Lords, to carry an army across the Danube is nothing, but to carry an army through that part of Asia, across those mountains, with artillery and supplies, is a very different thing. Does any one think that Russia could so carry an army that could, when it arrived in India, contend with such a force as we could oppose to it? That any one should think that such could be the case appears to me to be a delusion so absurd and monstrous that I am at a loss to conceive how any one can entertain such an opinion. My Lords, while we possess the affection of the people of India we are secure from Russian attack in that quarter, but if we lose their respect and confidence let our armies be what they may, our empire in that country will most assuredly crumble. To call upon India to take part in the war would be to bring upon that country a financial embarrassment; and to burden the finances of India for the sake of a wild scheme of military organisation in Central India would be most impolitic. The Government of this country have shown that they have been acting upon a wiser method, that they know that the best way to improve the country and the inhabitants of India is by the extension of useful public works and the promotion of education and commerce. My Lords, I cannot help observing that, with regard to other points which have been adverted to, and more especially with regard to Poland, which has been adverted to by my noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Harrowby), I hope and trust that this war, which has been entered into to prevent Russian aggression upon Turkey, may not be converted into a war having for its ject the carrying out of magnificent schemes for the restoration of Poland. No man feels for the fate of Poland more than I do, or condemns more strongly the iniquitous proceedings of the three Powers which terminated in its dismemberment; but, at the same time, I am bound to say that, if it had not been through the faults of the Poles themselves, if it had not been for those internal divisions which, in spite of their many great qualities made the Poles incapable of governing themselves, the designs of Russia upon that country would never have succeeded. If it had not been for those unhappy divisions, the number of the people, the extent of the territory, and its natural resources, were ample to have enabled the Poles to protect themselves against the ambitious designs of their neighbours. I fear, my Lords, that the Poles have the same faults now which they had in those times, and I believe that if Poland is to be restored that restoration cannot be effected from without, but that it must be accomplished from within. If we were to engage in the hopeless task of re-establishing Poland we should find ourselves embarked in numberless difficulties and committed to the hazards and responsibilities of future wars, which might for generations involve this country in calamity. My Lords, as I have already said, I do not think that a subject so important ought to be discussed at a moment like the present; but, entertaining as I do such strong opinions upon the matter, I could not pass by what has fallen from two noble Earls opposite without entering my earnest protest against the views they advanced to your Lordships.

THE EARL OF HARROWBY: I rise to explain what appears to have been misapprehended. I want to know if the noble Earl who has just sat down contemplates taking any security against future aggression on the part of Russia, and if so, I should like to know how that can be done if not in the direction he has just specified? The present war is not one of immediate self-defence, for Russia is not attacking us, and we are under no obligation to be perpetually protecting Turkey. It is a war of far-sighted self-defence—a war of policy, of which the main object is to prevent Russia obtaining a preponderance in the affairs of Europe. That object can not be effected by expelling Russia from the Principalities, humiliated but not weakened; but it may be by the restoration of Poland. It was not a trifling matter when we went to war with Russia; ought we not, therefore, to have counted the cost and to have seen that we could not impair her power for future aggressions without a European struggle? ["Order!"] I admit I was going too far. Perhaps, however, I may be allowed just to point out one inaccuracy in the speech of the noble Earl (Earl Grey). He spoke of Poland as having ever been unequal to defend herself. I must remind him that not only was Poland equal to defend herself, but that she was the saviour of the empire of Germany. under Sobieski, very little more than 150 years ago; and it was at the moment when the main evils of her internal condition were about to be remedied that Russia stepped in and effected her subjugation. I must apologise for troubling your Lordships, but I think that the noble Earl must have rather forgotten one part of the history of Poland.

The Earl of EGLINTON: I am not going to detain your Lordships by entering into the large subjects which have been introduced this evening; nor will I travel so very far from the subject of the Bill upon the table of the House as some have done. I will only depart from it so far as to allude to the subject of the Scotch militia. It has been said by the noble Earl who commenced this discussion, that there was so much difficulty in obtaining a sufficient number of men for the militia that he thought it right that the lords-lieutenant of counties should call upon the deputy-lieutenants to aid them in inducing men to volunteer for that service. I wish, however, to call the attention of the War Minister to the fact that in the Scotch Militia Act there is a clause which prevents lords-lieutenant from calling together the deputy-lieutenants for the purpose of carrying out that Act except under authority specially given by the Crown. Entirely concurring with the noble Earl who made the suggestion, and with the Minister of War as to the necessity for the present Bill, I think that it is desirable that as little time as possible should be lost in giving to the lords-lieutenant authority for calling together the deputy lieutenants for the purposes of the Act. I am happy to say that in the county with which I am connected we have been tolerably successful in obtaining volunteers. Several weeks ago I was informed by the colonel of the militia that considerably more than 400 men out of 600 were then enrolled, and I have no doubt that we are rapidly approaching the number which is allotted to us; but I must be permitted to call attention to the fact that, however much soldiers who come from warmer climates may do without clothing, or however well the Scotch may dispense with it on some parts of their body, yet that they cannot come entirely without clothing to be embodied and trained. It is not yet settled, I believe, what dress the Scotch militia are to wear. The colour, even, is not settled. There is some question, I understand, between green and gray; or, up to this moment, the tinge of gray, if gray it is to be, has not yet been decided; and though we have between 400 and 500 men ready to be embodied and trained, we are at a complete standstill until the Government shall decide what dress they are to wear.

Lord COLCHESTER observed, with reference to the comment of the noble Earl opposite (Earl Grey) upon what had fallen from his noble Friend (the Earl of Ellenborough) with respect to India, that the point which his noble Friend had meant to raise was this—that whereas the Government were at the present moment removing from India, in order to carry on the war in the Crimea, Queen's troops to whom we looked in a great measure for our security in India in case of internal troubles, it would be infinitely better to send—not to the Crimea, but to Asiatic Turkey—the Company's Native troops, who being Mahomedans, would be of the same religion as the people with whom they were to act as allies, and to whom, from their habits and manners, they would very readily assimilate. The irregular cavalry of those troops were known to be among the finest in the world, and they would no doubt be of very essential service. His noble Friend also thought that if they were sent it was not unreasonable that they should be paid for, to some extent at least, by the East India Company, because they had a great interest in preventing the countries lying between India and Russia from falling under the dominion of Russia; and, though the noble Earl opposite might think it illusory to suppose that Russia should ever attempt to attack India by land, he might remind him that other very great authorities had been of a very different opinion. What was it but that which made the independence of Persia a matter of importance? And was not the noble Earl aware that the Melbourne Government in 1838, upon a mere rumour that the Ameer of Cabul was entering into intrigues with Russia, had thought it necessary to send an army to upset his sovereignty?

EARL FITZWILLIAM said, he entirely approved the measure before the House, believing it to be calculated to produce a most beneficial effect in improving the composition of the army. He was old enough to remember the discussions which had taken place in another Assembly with relation to the preference to be given to limited or unlimited services; and he remembered also the effect which was produced by the substitution of the limit of a seven years' enlistment for the previous permanent enlistment. The result of the recruiting in corresponding periods of those years during which recruiting was for an unlimited period, as compared with those when it was for limited services, showed that the recruiting had actually trebled under the limitation system. He believed that the measure now proposed was a great improvement upon the enlistment for seven years, and that the effect of it would be found to be very beneficial. He was not desirous of detaining their Lordships at that critical part of the evening, but there was one point to which he wished to direct the attention of his noble Friend at the head of the War Department. He entirely concurred with his noble relative (Earl Grey) with respect to the injurious effect which would be produced upon the militia service of the country if it were to be converted merely into a nursery for the regular army. He had no objection to the "volunteering" of the militia into the regular army; but then it must be a *bonâ fide* volunteering—it must be the free will and desire of each man, whether that man were a private, a subaltern, a captain, or a field officer. It was a great mistake on the part of the Government which had been—not changed, but rather metamorphosed—that it should have encouraged the volunteering of entire regiments of militia, as it had done. Under that system he did not see how the militia could be officered in a proper manner; and he quite concurred in the opinion expressed by his noble Friend who spoke early in the debate, that it was desirable that the militia should be officered, both as respected the subalterns and those who were higher in command, by men of the greatest fitness; but this they could not expect to be the case if the militia regiments were to be induced to volunteer in their corporate capacity. Speaking generally, he thought the field officers of militia regiments ought not to be expected to volunteer for foreign service, because, if they were fully qualified to hold the higher commissions in the militia they were also in situations in which they had other duties to perform to their country, which would not permit of their volunteering either for colonial or foreign service. He trusted, therefore, that the Government would consider well before they called on the officers of the militia to enforce—if he might so speak—volunteering among the men of their respective regiments. He said, "to enforce" volunteering, because what was termed "volunteering" was, when managed in a peculiar manner, anything but real volunteering; and he was satisfied that they would not recruit the sources of the army, but, on the contrary, dry them up, unless they continued the militia upon its original footing. He made these remarks because he was very strongly impressed with a sense of the impolicy of making the militia force a mere nursery for the regular army; although, to the volunteering of the militia, provided it was a *bonâ fide* volunteering, he entertained no objection. He could not sit down without expressing the great gratification with which he had listened to the speech of his noble Friend who commenced that debate, with almost the whole of whose sentiments he perfectly coincided; but he could not concur with him in the fear he had expressed that Russia would attack us in India. If his noble Friend expected that a Russian army would march into the northern parts of the peninsula of India, that was an apprehension which he (Earl Fitzwilliam) did not share. He did not believe that a Russian army could pass over the intervening deserts, or scale the mountains which protected that peninsula from the frosts and snows of the North—ay, and which protected it, not alone from those physical evils, but also from the ambition of the Northern Autocrat. He did not fear any danger of that character; but, if in speaking of the Asiatic aspect of this question, his noble Friend meant to refer to the countries which lay between Persia and the now advanced Russian frontier, he concurred with him in thinking it most desirable that we should avail ourselves of the high spirit and peculiar position of the tribes inhabiting the regions situated between the Black Sea and the Caspian, because he thought it highly essential to maintain a barrier in that quarter between Russia and Persia. Whatever apprehension he might entertain of Russian designs upon India would not arise from the North, from the neighbourhood of the Sea of Aral—but would spring from the influence of Russia in Persia—an influence which he considered must prove most detrimental to our interests in India.

Lord **PANMURE** wished to say a word or two in explanation of what had fallen from him earlier in the debate, and which appeared to have created a somewhat erroneous impression. When he stated that other steps must be taken to obtain the quota of volunteers from militia regiments for foreign service, which had not yet furnished them, he did not mean that in any sense they should coerce the militia:—all he meant was that there should be no time lost in volunteering, so that the quota of each might be ascertained. He thought it was of the highest importance that every man should understand for what service he was volunteering, and that his volunteering should in no way be compulsory, but should be an entirely free and spontaneous offer on his own part to perform a duty which was distinctly and properly explained to him; but he fully agreed that it was not for the credit of the service that the practice of sending down recruiting sergeants and keeping militia regiments in a state of disorganisation for a period of a week or ten days owing to the uncertainty that was left around the matter, and was not consistent with the efficiency of Her Majesty's service; and, therefore, when he had spoken of taking a more stringent step, in order to obtain the due quota from each regiment, he merely proposed that a person of the rank of a field officer should go down and communicate with the commanding officer of the regiment, to ascertain why the quota had not been furnished, and to see that the men had fair opportunities for volunteering afforded them. With respect to the suggestion of the noble Earl (Earl Grey) as to the propriety of allowing men who had purchased their discharge to re-enter the service, the noble Earl was apparently not aware of the existing regulation upon this point. When he (Lord Panmure) first went to the War Office, the existing regulation was that, if a man purchased his discharge, he was allowed six months for further considering the step he was about to take, and, if he rejoined the service before that period expired, a portion of the money was repaid to him and his former term of servitude then counted towards his pension. When he was Secretary at War he extended the period given for consideration to one year; and he understood from the Commander in Chief that it had been still further prolonged, and was now two years. So that, at present, if a man purchased his discharge and repented of the step during the next two consecutive years, he might return to the army, and his previous service would be reckoned as an integral part of the whole term, at the expiration of which he was entitled to a pension. This system, he thought, already presented a sufficient opening to men who had retired from the service and afterwards wished to return to it; and even if they were now to propose that all the men who had purchased their discharge should, without restriction, be allowed to rejoin the army, and reckon their former service towards a pension, an experience of six years at the War Office convinced him that the force likely to be so obtained would be of very trifling worth indeed. During the whole of that period of six years he did not believe that there were more than sixty or seventy men in each year who purchased their discharge; and when they remembered that the cost of a discharge was *20l.* for the infantry, and *30l.* for the cavalry, it was easy to understand that the friends of private soldiers, looking at the class to which they generally belonged, would experience considerable difficulty in raising either of those sums. Again, men who had purchased their discharge after fourteen years' service, would, he apprehended, be somewhat too old to enlist again. A man who joined the army at eighteen would be thirty-two years of age when he had served fourteen years; and if he purchased his discharge this year he might be a very good soldier, but if he offered himself after he had attained his thirty-fifth or thirty-sixth year, he would be rather too old to be invited to re enter the service.

Lord **VIVIAN** said, that their Lordships must recollect that the country was now in a great crisis, and wanted an army that could at once take the field; and he believed that the Government would be able to obtain a considerable number of men who had bought themselves out of the service, and who would be ready-made and efficient soldiers, if it only consented to reimburse them the money they had paid for their discharge.

Motion *agreed to;* Bill read 2ª accordingly; Committee *negatived;* then the said Standing Orders were *considered* and *dispensed with:* Bill read 3ª; an Amendment made (limiting the operation of the Bill to three years); Bill *passed,* and sent to the Commons.

House adjourned to Thursday next.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Tuesday, February 20, 1855.

MINUTES.] NEW WRIT.—For Stirlingshire, *v.* William Forbes, Esq., deceased.

PUBLIC BILLS.—1° Army Service Act Amendment; Public Prosecutors; Marine Mutiny; Mutiny; Sea Coast Fisheries (Ireland); Inland Fisheries (Ireland).

LIVERPOOL IMPROVEMENT BILL.

Order for Second Reading read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

MR. MILNER GIBSON said, there was a principle of public policy involved in this Bill, and he wished to direct the attention of the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade to it. Commissioners had been appointed last year to inquire into the local charges on shipping in all parts of the United Kingdom, and they had reported that all charges upon shipping levied in docks and harbours, and not expended for purely maritime purposes, should be abolished. In consequence of that Report, the Government, he conceived, would feel it their duty to legislate on that subject; but if in the meantime that House passed private Bills of the kind now before them, which mortgaged the Liverpool harbour dues and pledged them for moneys to be raised for town improvement, they would entirely defeat the Government's intention. The improvement of the town of Liverpool should be effected by means of a borough rate; and he hoped the House would at least insert in the present Bill a clause to prevent those dues from being taken out of the future consideration of the Government.

MR. HADFIELD said, the Liverpool dock and harbour dues amounted to 125,000*l.*, exacted mostly from the manufacturers of Yorkshire and Lancashire, who had thus to pay not only their own borough rates, but those of the town of Liverpool also. Further, it appeared that the freemen of Liverpool were entirely exempted from the payment of those dues. As there was no assurance from the Government with respect to this matter he must move the second reading that day six months.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months."

Question proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."

MR. CARDWELL said, that early in 1852 the question of tolls and other dues levied on ships, from which the parties paying those dues derived no benefit, came under the consideration of that House; and the Government issued a Crown Commission for the purpose of collecting a mass of information upon which future legislation might be founded. At the same time Parliament enacted a clause in the Merchant Shipping Bill for the purpose of effecting the object the two hon. Gentlemen who had addressed the House had in view—namely, to prevent Parliamentary legislation being prejudiced in the meantime by pledges and mortgages. That clause was now in operation, and it would be his duty to take especial care that no Bill passed the House exempting any fund from the provision of that clause. He had had an interview that morning with the Chairman of the Liverpool Docks and of the Liverpool Finance Committee, who had placed in his hands a paper containing what he considered to be a stipulation that the present Bill should not pass through Parliament without a careful reservation of the clause in question. It would, therefore, be impossible to pledge the Liverpool dock and harbour dues without the consent of the Lords of the Treasury and of the department over which he (Mr. Cardwell) had the honour to preside, and he for his part should take care to prevent the objects of Parliament being forestalled in any way. This was a question of very great importance and of very great difficulty. It ought in any case to be viewed dispassionately, and not to be prejudiced by Bills passed in the meantime. The present Bill was one for the improvement of the town of Liverpool, and he did not think it would be at all just to stop it on the second reading, more especially when the clause to which he had referred was not at all to be prejudiced.

MR. H. T. LIDDELL said, that after the assurance of the right hon. Gentleman to the House that an understanding had been arrived at not in any way to prejudice a free and full consideration of the ulterior question, he trusted the House would have no hesitation in permitting the Bill to go through a second reading.

MR. HADFIELD said, he had been intrusted with petitions against the Bill, but, solicited as he was, he should not stand in the way of the second reading if the right hon. Gentleman would give him an assurance that the Bill should contain a clause providing that no prejudice should arise to future Parliamentary legislation.

MR. CARDWELL said, that no prejudice to ulterior legislation should arise from the passing of the Bill.

Amendment, by leave, *withdrawn.*

Main Question put, and *agreed to.*

Bill read 2°.

RAILWAY AT BALAKLAVA—QUESTION.

MR. LOCKE said, he begged to inquire whether any report had been received from the engineers sent out to construct the railway at Balaklava, stating the progress which had been already made, and the time that would be necessary for completing the railway? Also, whether any common stone road exists between Balaklava and the extremity of the lines capable of serving the wants of the army; and, if not, whether any orders have been given for the construction of such a road?

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON said, he felt much pleasure in answering the question put to him by the hon. Gentleman. Accounts had been received of the arrival of the engineers and workmen at Balaklava who were to lay down the railway. On the 6th of February they had already begun to lay a portion of the road down, and there were materials at Balaklava for the construction of fifteen miles of rails, together with all things necessary for the purpose of laying them down. The men were proceeding with the work with every prospect of speed and success. As to the question whether there was any other road between the extremity of the lines and Balaklava, he apprehended there was no other road than that which had hitherto existed, and which was so very bad as to be useless in wet weather.

MR. LOCKE: Can the noble Lord say what length of time it will occupy to form the railroad?

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON said, he had received no report which would enable him to state with any degree of precision what length of time its formation would occupy.

TENANTS' IMPROVEMENTS COMPENSATION (IRELAND) BILL.

MR. SERJEANT SHEE: Sir, as I can hardly conceive it possible that there should be any opposition on the part of Her Majesty's Government to the first, or even second reading of the Bill which I wish to introduce, it will not be necessary for me to detain the House by any lengthened observations upon it. I should content myself, indeed, with the briefest statement of its provisions, were it not for the unhappy indifference to all questions connected with Ireland which is manifested by a majority of the House. No doubt there are many honourable exceptions; but still it is necessary, whatever may be the nature of the measure proposed—ecclesiastical, economical, or political—to begin again in every Session from the beginning, and demonstrate the existence of evils, notorious in the country which is afflicted by them. On the Irish land question this difficulty is more disheartening than on any other. Forgetting the agrarian misery, disorganisation, and crime which, in the presence of foreigners, and even at home, have so often brought a hot blush upon the face of Englishmen, hon. Members are too apt, as they rise from their seats to leave the House, or stand in groups about the lobbies, during the discussion of this, to Ireland, vital subject, to exclaim—How long will this thing last? What can these Irish Members want? Are not the laws which regulate the relation between landlord and tenant in Ireland substantially the same as in England? Why cannot Irish tenants agree with Irish landlords, as English tenants agree with English landlords? The law relating to landlord and tenant in Ireland is substantially the same as in England; but the inveterate agricultural customs and agrarian economies of the two countries are so widely different as to make the same law in one country a just and useful law; in the other a fatal discouragement to industry, and an engine of injustice and oppression. In the first place, owing in a great degree to the confiscations of former times in favour of English settlers, and of powerful English families, then and still possessed of large landed properties in England, the number of proprietors is, relatively to its area, much smaller in Ireland than in any country in Europe. There is no competition for tenants among Irish landlords—they impose on the occupation of their land whatever terms they please. In France, there are twenty proprietors to every square mile; in Prussia, ten; in England, if I remember rightly, three; in Ireland, only one. Secondly—Almost all the land of Ireland is in strict settlement, the landlords being only tenants for life, without the power of granting leases of sufficient duration to justify any considerable outlay by the lessees. In England a man who possesses or purchases an estate for 5,000*l.* or 6,000*l.*, or even 10,000*l.*, never thinks of conveying it to trustees, to his own use for life, and after his death to the use of his eldest and other sons in succession—with remainders over. But in Ireland, the smallest freehold and even leasehold interests are thus tied up, and, except recently and comparatively to a trifling extent in the Incumbered Estates Court, land never comes in small parcels into the market. Thirdly—and this is the greatest of all the causes of agrarian disorder—the maxim imported from the Roman Code into the law of England, that "everything which is fixed to the soil, becomes parcel of the soil," operates upon a condition of things the very reverse of that existing in England, and renders the legal rights of landlords in their possible, too frequent, and always apprehended abuse, absolutely intolerable. That I may not be supposed to be communicating to the House a fanciful view of the evils which result in Ireland from the difference in this particular between the circumstances of the two countries, I will ask permission to read two short extracts —one from the work on *The Tenure and Improvement of Land in Ireland*, published in 1852, by Messrs. Ferguson and Vance, gentlemen of eminence at the Irish Bar; the other from a *Tract on the Popery Laws*, written in 1772 by an illustrious Irishman, than whom no man was better acquainted with the condition of his country—

> "In point of fact," say Messrs. Ferguson and Vance, "the prevailing practice in Ireland, as stated in the Report of the Devon Commissioners was, and is, that the dwelling-houses and farm buildings, the necessary and suitable adjuncts to every farm, and which are built and provided by every landlord in England and Scotland, are for the most part made by the tenant; and that the landlords do not usually either make, or maintain in suitable repair, the buildings, offices, fences, gates, or permanent improvements fit for the farm. No doubt there are many honourable exceptions. But the complaint is made, that whilst the landlord in England makes every requisite improvement as to buildings and offices, &c., the landlord in Ireland lets the land without any improvement, and the tenant is compelled either to attempt to work at it as he gets it, in which case no toil or thrift can compensate for the risk and loss to which his crops are exposed for want of buildings, drains, fences, and gates, or, if he makes improvements at his own cost, he is subject to have his rent raised, or to be evicted, and in either case, as he conceives, robbed."

Now for the extract from the *Tract on the Popery Laws*, written eighty years before—

> "Ireland is a country almost wholly unplanted. The farms have neither dwelling-houses nor good offices, nor are the lands almost anywhere provided with fences and communications; in a word, in a very unimproved state. The landowner there never takes upon himself, as is usual in this kingdom, to supply all these conveniences, and to set down his tenant in what may be called a completely furnished farm. If the tenant will not do it, it is never done. This circumstance shows how miserably and peculiarly impolitic it has been in Ireland to tie down the body of the tenantry to short and unprofitable tenures. A finished and furnished house will be taken for any term, however short; if the repair lies on the owner, the shorter the better. But no one will take one not only unfurnished but half built but upon a term which, on calculation, will answer with profit all his charges. It was on this principle that the Romans established their Emphyteusis or Fee-Farm; for though they extended the ordinary term of their location only to nine years, yet they encouraged a more permanent letting to farm with the condition of improvement as well as of annual payment on the part of the tenant where land had lain rough and neglected, and, therefore, invested this species of engrafted holding, in the later times, when property came to be worse distributed by falling into few hands."

The plantation contract, thus indicated as the remedy for the then and still existing evil, was identical with the regulations of the articles of the Ulster Plantation, under which, by time-honoured custom, the tenantry of that part of Ireland have created, enjoyed, and now ask legislative protection for a vast amount of property and prosperity, which have no existence in the other provinces. And whose words does the House imagine these to be? Who is it who thus points out to us from his tomb, the evil which still afflicts his country and its remedy? Assuredly no revolutionary demagogue, careless of the rights of property, the gradation of ranks, and the institutions of society, but the prince of Conservative statesmen—Edmund Burke. It argues little, I regret to say, for our system of constitutional and Parliamentary rule—little for the wisdom with which the absolute power vested by the Legislative Union in the Crown and Parliament of England to make laws for Ireland has been exercised, that a state of things, the mischiefs of which have at periods so distant been thus described by witnesses above exception, should still continue. But so it is. The first step towards the remedy of evils, the like of which upon the Continent of Europe were removed without difficulty by the Ministers of despotic Princes, has with us not yet been taken. The superior wealth and enterprise of the English people, and the laws by which, in former times, Irish manufacturing industry was depressed, have confined the population of Ireland almost entirely to agricultural pursuits; and the effect upon it of the state of things which the extracts I have read describe is thus shortly summed up in his *Principles of Political Economy* by perhaps the most enlightened, and certainly most impartial, of all the living writers who have thought and reasoned upon Ireland, Mr. Mill. "The Irish farmer and cottier is almost alone among mankind in this condition. If he be industrious and frugal, no one but his landlord can gain; if he be lazy and intemperate, it is at his landlord's expense." During the last twenty years numerous attempts have been made by distinguished Members of this House in and out of office to reform the Irish land laws. In the years 1835, 1836, 1843, 1845, 1848, 1850, and 1852, Bills were introduced into the House for that object by an hon. Friend of mine formerly Member for Rochdale. Those Bills, founded upon a system established by custom in the north of Ireland were for years and years denounced as revolutionary by the numerous sciolists in this and the other House of Parliament, who have from time to time endeavoured to achieve distinction, by vituperating a principle of legislation which they knew not to be identical with that now in full force in all the European countries which have adopted the jurisprudence of the Empire. The main principle of these measures—protection against eviction without compensation, for improving tenants—with a more or less extended application, was pressed upon the Legislature in Bills presented by Lord Derby in 1845; by the Earl of Lincoln and Sir James Graham in 1846; by Sir William Somerville, Sir George Grey, and Lord John Russell in 1848; by Sir William Somerville, Sir George Grey, and Mr. Solicitor General Romilly in 1850; and finally, in 1852, during the Administration of Lord Derby, by his Irish Attorney General, the right hon. Member for the University of Dublin, who, in the Session of 1852, presented to this House a complete code of Irish Landlord and Tenant Law, consisting of four Bills—a Land Improvement Bill, a Leasing Powers Bill, a Tenants' Improvement Compensation Bill, and a Landlord and Tenant Law Consolidation Bill. All these Bills proceeded on the principle that to look for such agricultural improvements as the condition of Ireland required from Irish landlords, or from any persons, or at the expense of any persons but the tenants of Irish land, would be a desperate and unreasonable expectation. The Land Improvement Bill passed this and the other House of Parliament with little substantial alteration. After reciting the Acts authorising the advance of public money to promote the improvement of land by drainage, it empowered the owners of settled estates to borrow money for effecting certain improvements to be executed under the superintendence of the Board of Works. The improvements thus authorised were the erection of agricultural buildings and farm houses, the reclamation of waste or cut-out bog, by its conversion into arable or pasture land, the making of farm roads, the main or thorough drainage of land, the clearing away of rocks and stones, the making of boundary fences, the marling, liming, claying, and otherwise improving the soil. Landlords, though only tenants for life, borrowing money for these objects, were enabled to charge their estates with a rent-charge of 7*l*. 10*s*. for every 100*l*. borrowed during a period of twenty-two years; and the Board of Works was empowered to raise the rent on the tenant on account of the increased value of his holding of the lands so improved. By the Leasing Powers Bill, power was given to persons with limited interests—tenants for life, tenants by the courtesy, corporations sole and aggregate, lay and ecclesiastical—to promote the like improvements of their lands by leases binding on their successors, or by agreements with or without lease, also binding on their successors—to make compensation on eviction to their tenants, either by money payments or compensatory periods of occupation, without increase of rent for the same improvements. That Bill was taken up by the Government which succeeded Lord Derby's, was carefully considered in a Committee upstairs, passed by large majorities in this House, and returned from the House of Lords with very little alteration. The third was the Tenants' Improvements Compensation Bill, which was also referred to the Select Committee. The mode of compensation, by compensating periods, was objected to by me and others, and it was thought better by the Government of Lord Aberdeen, represented in that Committee by the Secretary for Ireland, and sometimes by the noble Lord at the head of the present Government, to give the tenant compensation, under proper restrictions, by money payments, limiting it, however, to classes of improvements less numerous, but more visible and indisputable than some of those which were to be the subjects of compensation, by agreement under the Leasing Powers Bill. The improvements for which compensation was thus provided prospectively and retrospectively were the following:—the erection of farm houses and farm buildings—the reclamation of waste or cut-out bog, and its conversion into arable or pasture land—the making of farm roads and boundary fences. The result was, that after a long discussion in Committee, the Bill was read a second time, and afterwards passed by this House, and sent up to the other House of Parliament by a large majority, and I was led to believe, by repeated assurances to that effect, that it was the wish of the Government, once for all, to settle the question. By the provisions of that Bill, a tenant, on eviction, was declared to be entitled to pecuniary compensation not exceeding the actual value of the improvements made by him. In my belief that was a good Bill, and a statesman-like attempt to settle this much agitated question; but I am sorry to say that it was not pressed, or even discussed, by the late Government as it should have been in the House of Lords, and I would warn the present Government that, if they give no better earnest of their desire to meet the wishes of the people of Ireland than was evinced by their predecessors, they must not reckon upon a long tenure of power. The friends of Ireland would support Her Majesty in all that is required for the purpose of regaining, by a vigorous prosecution of the war, a secure and honourble peace, but when that was once effected, and the Government becomes involved in one of those miserable and wretched predicaments which make manifest intrinsic weakness, and from which the Irish liberal representation can alone extricate them, then it would be seen that, having failed in their duty to Ireland, they would not be able to remain in power a single day. Well, the several Bills having passed the House of Commons were sent up to the House of Lords, and were referred to a Select Committee. I grieve to say it, the Government allowed the Tenants' Improvements Compensation Bill to drop. The Lords' Committee passed a miserable apology for a Tenants' Compensation Bill in the shape of a fixture clause in the Landlord Consolidation Bill; but on the Tenant Compensation Bill made no report; and so ashamed of that conduct was the noble Lord the Member for the City of London, that when the other Bills came down to the House of Commons, the noble Lord, on an appeal from me, although he had up to that time dealt with them as Government Bills, postponed all legislation to a future day. When, on former occasions, I have proposed a measure for the benefit of the tenants, intimations have been made to me that the unreasonableness of the tenants' friends out of doors, and of their enemies elsewhere, has rendered it impossible for any Government to pass a Bill on the subject; I have been reproached, on the other hand, with having acted perversely, for that I, not being able to obtain a Tenants' Improvements Compensation Bill, had opposed the passing of the Leasing Powers Bill. My opposition to that Bill did not originate in any desire to prevent the landlords from encouraging improvements on their estates; on the contrary, I believe the Leasing Powers Bill, as part of a code, to be a very useful measure. Wherever there is a free and liberal landlord, the provisions of that Bill may (for the future) be brought into operation, and will prove just as good for the tenant as for the landlord. It is unjust in many, nowadays perhaps in most cases, to blame the Irish landlords. If we wanted to make the tenants comfortable, the most expeditious process we could adopt, were it in our power, would be to relieve the landlords from their embarrassments. Wherever we find an impoverished landlord, we are sure also to find a miserable and impoverished tenantry. The object of the Leasing Powers Bill is, to rescue the landlord from the thraldom of those restrictions which prevent his encouraging the tenant to improve his own condition by the creation for his own benefit of property on his farm. I was asked by an hon. Member near me, when I was stating that the farm houses and farm buildings were erected in almost all cases by the tenants, what sort of houses and buildings they were? My answer is, except where the custom of Ulster prevails, as bad almost as can be. But this is one of the strongest arguments for the legislation I propose. Hon. Members not conversant with the subject, will be surprised at the smallness of the farms in Ireland. In the most prosperous of the Irish counties, Armagh, Down, Antrim, they do not average more than twenty acres. It is preposterous to expect that landlords, who are only tenants for life, should erect the dwelling-houses and buildings on farms of that size. It has not been the custom hitherto, and no rental could stand its introduction. An hon. Friend of mine, a Member of this House, who possesses an estate of some 2,000*l.* or 3,000*l.* a year in the county of Cavan, composed almost entirely of these small holdings, assures me that the tenants of them are in all respects as satisfactory to him as tenants occupying much larger farms on other portions of his property in England and Ireland. Nothing is wanted by such tenants but security that they shall not be losers if they erect farm houses and farm buildings, or make other improvements suitable to their holdings for themselves, and thereby create a property which will be a guarantee to their landlord for his rent. If we depend for this object on the Leasing Powers Bill alone, the maxim *quid leges sine moribus* will be exemplified by our failure. Landlords, without the stimulant which the Tenants' Compensation Bill would give, will be too apt to make captious objections to the grant of leases or agreements for compensation to obnoxious tenants. As soon as the potato becomes sound again, the recently improved systems of farming will, in numerous cases, be set aside, and we shall have whole counties consisting of nothing but potato estates as heretofore. Let me ask the House to remember what have been the fruits of that system hitherto. Has not the population fallen off at a fearful rate—aye, and when it was most wanted? The diminution of the population in Galway during the last ten years has been twenty-nine—in Mayo, twenty-five—in Roscommon, twenty-one—in Clare, twenty-five—in Kerry, twenty-nine—in Cork, twenty-eight per cent. If the usual condition of the tenantry had been such as to have enabled them to live in good warm houses, and obtain a supply of wheaten or oaten, and occasionally animal, food, they would not have perished, as they did, before our eyes by thousands. In my view, therefore, it is not sufficient to give to landlords the power of making leases and agreements for compensation with their tenants, unless you add this stimulant to its exercise, that in all cases of visible undeniable improvement by the tenant, whether under agreement or without agreement, he shall on eviction be entitled to compensation. This would be effected by the Tenants' Improvements Compensation Bill. I ask the House to permit me to introduce the Leasing Powers Bill nearly word for word as it came down to us from the House of Lords last Session, and to add to it the Tenants' Improvements Compensation Bill, with one exception, word for word, as it was introduced into this House in the Session before last by the right hon. Baronet the Secretary for Ireland. The exception is this. By the 13th section of the Tenants' Improvements Compensation Bill, it is provided that against any claim for compensation made by a tenant on his eviction, the landlord shall be entitled to set off the amount of any claim he may have upon the tenant for dilapidations, waste of improvements, arrears of taxes, arrears of rent, or damages for breach of covenants contained in any lease or agreement, and if the amount which the landlord claims shall exceed the tenant's claim for compensation, or *vice versâ*, a cheap and easy process is provided for the recovery of the excess. Nothing can be more just or reasonable. But there is another clause of the Bill which appears to me to be inconsistent with that provision, and unreasonable. It provides that compensation shall be granted to all evicted tenants for improvements, except when evicted for arrears of rent or breach of condition contained in a lease or agreement. I think it is enough that the tenant should have his claim for compensation set off against arrears of rent or damages by waste or dilapidation, &c. It is not just that improvements, probably made by means of money lent to the tenant, and in which the tenant considered he had a property, should, when the tenant falls into difficulties, be excluded from compensation. I, therefore, propose to strike out of the Tenants' Improvement Compensation Bill the words "except for arrear of rent, or breach of condition contained in a lease or agreement." I think no one can deny that I have now placed the land question on a simple issue. I ask the House to agree to the first and second reading of my Bill. In Committee I intend to propose certain Amendments; but I will not ask the House to consent to anything which is not manifestly consistent with the principle which the House has affirmed. And now I wish to say a word to the noble Lord at the head of the Government. I should be glad to give the noble Lord my support, but I will not do so unless the noble Lord will endeavour to settle, on sound and just principles, this Irish land question. Without the support of the Irish Liberal Members, his power is not worth two months' purchase. He has a powerful Opposition in front, and many of the Members behind him and below the gangway give him only a reluctant support. Without the aid of the Irish Members the Government cannot conduct the affairs of the country with that power, and influence, and authority which are necessary even to the successful prosecution of the war. The Irish Members will not go back to their constituents with the shame upon their brows of having allowed the English Government and the English representatives to treat Irish questions as if they were not worth a moment's consideration. ["Oh, oh!"] I do not mean to say that there is any want of personal courtesy—what can be more considerate than the attention with which I have been heard to-night?—but I assert that the Government has not shown that firm purpose to introduce reforms into the Irish land system and other systems which it ought to have shown. It has not used its Parliamentary influence and the influence of the Crown to pass the measures to which I have referred; and the result is that, after a union of fifty years, the great and substantial grievances of Ireland remain unredressed. The noble Lord may depend upon it that the Irish Members will not tolerate such a system any longer. He must make up his mind either to say, "I disapprove of your Bills, and will not support them," or to say, "I and my colleagues will do our utmost to insist upon the passing of these measures." The majority of the Irish Liberal representatives are bound, in conscience and honour, to withhold all party support from every Government which will not take effectual means for the settlement of these land questions, and to that policy they and their constituencies, as the noble Lord will find, should he appeal to them, will adhere. The hon. and learned Gentleman concluded by moving for leave to bring in a Bill to provide compensation for Improving Tenants, and to consolidate and amend the Laws relating to Leasing Powers in Ireland.

SIR JOHN YOUNG said, that from the explanations which had been offered to the House by the hon. and learned Serjeant, he understood that the Bill which he was about to introduce was identical with the Tenants' Compensation Bill, which he (Sir J. Young) had moved, and had the good fortune to pass in that House two years ago, together with the Leasing Powers Bill of the right hon. and learned Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Napier). He was happy to be able to relieve the hon. and learned Serjeant's mind of any uneasiness which he might feel with respect to the fate of his Motion, by assuring him that Her Majesty's Government would offer no opposition whatsoever to the introduction of his Bill. With reference to the Amendments which were proposed to be made in the Bill in Committee he could not give the hon. and learned Gentleman any distinct assurance. The points which were involved in those Amendments had been discussed in the Committee upstairs, and the preponderance of opinion had certainly been against their adoption. However that might be, he had much satisfaction in bearing testimony to the moderation which the hon. and learned Gentleman had that evening displayed, and he trusted that they might, before long, see the question of landlord and tenant in Ireland brought to a happy issue.

Leave *given;* Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Serjeant SHEE and Mr. POLLARD-URQUHART.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.

MR. SOTHERON said, he would now beg to bring forward the Motion of which he had given notice, which was to the effect that no public Bill should be read in that House a second time after the 1st day of July without special leave. He thought that it was desirable to introduce this subject early in the Session in order to obviate the pressure of business which always accrued towards the latter portion of the Session. He found that the House sat during the month of July last year on twenty-two days, and the aggregate length of those sittings was 240 hours. The number of Orders of the Day appointed during that month was no less than 508.

It might, perhaps, be said that last year was an exceptional one; but he found that in the preceding year the number of days during which the House sat, and also the number of Orders of the Day, were even greater than last year. To remedy this he urged the House to support his Motion, the effect of which, if adopted, might easily be seen, when he told the House that out of the 109 Bills which received the Royal Assent last year, forty-seven were read after the 1st of July; so that nearly half of the legislation of the Session passed through the most important part of its process after that day. He considered that his propositions would prove much more satisfactory to Members than the violent process to which they were usually obliged to submit their Bills late in the Session. His Resolution having reference to the introduction of continuance Bills was rendered necessary by the mischievous practice that had grown up of late years of introducing late in the Session Bills which were said to be merely continuance Bills, but which often contained new clauses. He only made this proposition as an experiment, and if it should be found to work injuriously it might be flung aside; but he hoped the House would adopt it, unless a better plan should be produced either by the Government or by any other hon. Gentleman.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House will not allow any Public Bill to be read a second time after the 1st day of July, without special leave."

MR. BOUVERIE said, he must call upon the House to hesitate before they adopted the propositions of the hon. Gentleman, as he did not think they would have the good effect anticipated by the hon. Gentleman, but, on the contrary, would be attended by evils which he had not contemplated. If his first proposition were to operate at all, it would have the effect of pressing all the Bills introduced into that House to a second reading before the 1st of July, and the practical result would be that Committees on Bills would be postponed until after that day. This would not by any means lessen the labour of the House or decrease the time it would spend upon these Bills in the latter part of the Session. The second reading of unimportant Bills could come on at any time; but if many of them were brought on in the early part of the Session, they would be a fruitful source of conversations, while if they were introduced at the end of the Session they would not produce, as they would not require, any debate. But what would be the effect of such a rule upon Bills of importance? Why, it would introduce an additional opportunity of discussion upon the question "that leave be given for this Bill to be read a second time," and a great advantage would thereby be afforded to those who wished to delay such Bills. The evil, therefore, would rather be increased than diminished. Then, had his hon. Friend considered the subject of the Lords' Bills? [Mr. SOTHERON said he proposed to except them.] The House of Lords had last Session passed a Resolution that they would not read a Bill which was sent up from that House after a certain day in July, but they were in a different position from that House. At the beginning of the Session they laboured under a perfect dearth of Bills, and towards the middle of July there was a deluge poured on them which they were quite unable to contend against. But the evil under which that House laboured was not a dearth of business before the 1st of July, but a plethora of business from the beginning to the end of the Session, and the problem was how that vast amount of business should best be despatched. No doubt there was much to find fault with in the present system, but he had often wondered, considering the inattention with which a great deal of business was done, how it was got through with so much credit, on the whole, to the House. There was a given amount of debating and talking power in the House. It did not much matter whether the number of Bills to be disposed of was great or small, for until all that debating and talking power had been exhausted scarcely any business was done. Thus, in the early part of the Session there was an immense amount of discussion and very little business, while in the latter part of the Session there was very little discussion and an immense deal of business was got through. If the hon. Gentleman could diminish the business of the House, or suggest any method by which that disposition to debate which possessed many hon. Members could be got rid of, there might be some hope of the business being despatched by the middle of July; but until that could be done he believed the evil could hardly be remedied. He also objected to the second proposition of his hon. Friend, as what were called continuance Bills—a modern, and not a very advantageous invention—were Bills which were passed because it was supposed that the House had not time fully to consider the matters to which they related. If such Bills were to be brought in before Easter, there would be no reason for introducing them at all, as Parliament might be supposed to have time to discuss and decide upon them between that period and the end of the Session. The hon. Member's third proposition was that after Whitsuntide Orders of the Day should have precedence over Notices of Motion on every day of the week. The practice of the last three or four years had been for the Government to propose after Whitsuntide to dock independent Members of one of their Motion days. If this Resolution were agreed to, no independent Member would have a chance of bringing before Parliament any subject which he might consider of importance. This was not a power that Members would be willing to confer upon the Government, and the practical effect would be that Members would bring those matters forward upon the Motion to go into Committee of Supply, when the time and attention of the House ought to be given to the voting away of the public money. At present Members never knew when Supply was coming on, for there were usually a dozen Motions upon the paper before going into Committee, and this inconvenience would be greatly increased by the adoption of the Resolutions of the hon. Member.

Mr. W. WILLIAMS said, he regarded the third proposition of the hon. Member as the greatest innovation ever attempted upon the privileges of Members of that House. To say that Members should have no opportunity of bringing on Motions after Whitsuntide would be to say that they had nothing to do but to vote for or against the Government.

Viscount PALMERSTON said, that the proposals of the hon. Gentleman were at first sight very plausible, like many others of a similar kind. There was no question that the great accumulation of business during the Session of Parliament was attended not only with inconvenience to Members of the House, but that also in certain cases it was detrimental to the public service. But the House ought to recollect for what purpose they were there assembled. The convenience of Members was frequently a matter of public interest, because, unless hon. Members were able to bring a due share of physical strength and the power of mental attention to the performance of their duties, the public interest would suffer. But all attempts to confine and restrict their proceedings by rules set upon their deliberations by themselves ought to be considered with the greatest caution. A broad distinction existed between the functions of private and public business. When private persons and parties came to that House for legislative powers, they were properly bound to look beforehand, and they had nothing else to do except to conform to the rules laid down for the conduct of the business they wished to bring before Parliament. But matters regarding the public interest were of a totally different kind. They were governed by circumstances which could not be subjected to fixed regulations with regard to the time when they should be brought forward, and in attempting to tie themselves down by rules that were not applicable to fluctuating circumstances, they would give themselves more trouble than by letting matters take their usual course. He agreed with his hon. Friend (Mr. Bouverie) in thinking that the proposal that after a certain day Bills should not be read a second time would only add another stage to those Bills, because Members who had charge of Bills that were not read a second time by that date would, instead of moving the second reading, make a preliminary Motion that leave should be given for the Bill to be read a second time, and the regulation would thus only defeat its own purpose. It was true that the House of Lords had established a rule similar in effect to the second one proposed by the hon. Member (Mr. Sotheron), but the result was that when they came to apply it the rule could not be maintained, and the House of Lords were obliged to break through it in many instances. It was impossible that the Government, in bringing in Bills, could foresee all that might be required for the public interest. The Oxford University Bill of last Session very properly took a length of time for consideration, but were the Government on that account to be precluded from carrying on other Bills that were also of great importance to the public interest? Private Members might bring in Bills which might be put off, from the length of time taken up in the discussion of Bills like the Oxford University Bill, but why should they and the public be subject to the loss of those measures, as would be the case if the House resolved that after a certain day those Bills should not be carried on?

He was very much against all rules that at a certain hour of the night business of a certain kind should be carried on, or that Members should be limited in the length of their speeches. These were all very plausible things, and many times would be very convenient to the Members of the Government, whose duty it was to sit there and listen, and who were not always very much amused by what they heard. But, looking at that House as a great and important machine for legislation, and assembled to deliberate on great interests, he thought they ought to have their hands free and unshackled in matters of public interest. Therefore he should not be disposed to agree either to the first or second proposal of the hon. Gentleman. With regard to the third, however tempting the bait might be to the Members of the Government, he must exercise an act of self-denial, and say he did not think it fair on Members of that House to impose restrictions on them. It might be, and he thought the House often considered it was, desirable that after a certain period of the Session either every Thursday, or every alternate Thursday, should be considered as the only notice days. He thought a regulation of that sort really conducive to the public interest. It might be better that the rule should be established early in the Session, that Members might know by what time they must bring forward their measures, if they wished to have them discussed; but he could not accept on the part of the Government that full and entire command of the week which the said Resolution would give them. With all deference to the hon. Member, and quite understanding the view with which he had brought forward these Resolutions, he was not prepared to agree in any one of them.

MR. SOTHERON said, he was perfectly aware that the Resolutions ought not to be adopted, unless they met with general support; and, having positively met with no support at all, he would not press them on the House.

Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

DWELLING-HOUSES (SCOTLAND).

MR. DUNLOP said, he begged to move for leave to bring in a Bill to facilitate the erection of dwelling-houses for the working classes in Scotland. An increased accommodation for the working classes in Scotland was rendered necessary by the increase of population and the decrease of dwelling-houses, especially in Edinburgh, where the increase of public buildings had caused such a deficiency of dwellings that families were forced to herd together in insufficient space, and in cellars, with all their accompaniments of filth, misery, and vice. Much had been done of late years by the benevolence of individuals, but much yet remained to be done. Mere individual benevolence was not sufficient to supply the want, and the object of his Bill was to induce capitalists to invest in the erection of suitable dwelling-houses with a reasonable prospect of a return. The first obstacle was the unlimited liability of all parties engaged in associations for building dwelling-houses; and he proposed by the Bill to give a limited liability to such parties under the authority of the sheriffs of the different counties, who were to approve of the sanitary regulations adopted, and to see that the required capital was subscribed. He also proposed to remove another obstacle, by substituting for the present expensive conveyance of land, where dwelling-houses were to be erected, the lodging in the office of the sheriff a plan of the boundaries of such dwelling marked with a particular number. A register book was to be kept in the office of the sheriff, and the transfer could be executed by an entry in the book of the number of the plan, which would cost about 5*s.* or 10*s.* instead of 7*l.* or 8*l.* There was some difficulty in getting rates for such dwellings, and also in converting bad houses into good ones. In Glasgow there were large blocks of houses in the obscure parts of the town which had no known owners, and were inhabited by chance comers, and were dens of pollution and disease; but no one could acquire property in them, or build on and improve them, because no title was to be traced. He proposed by his Bill that any competent association for building and inproving dwelling-houses should, by consent of the local magistrates, apply to the Court of Session, and on a certain sum being paid into Court, and retained in case the heirs to the property should appear, that a Parliamentary title should be given to the purchaser free of any future claim. These were the principal provisions of the Bill, to which he hoped there would be no opposition.

MR. ELLIOTT said, that, as a Scotch Member, he could not conceive anything more calculated to raise the moral character of the people of Scotland, than the hon. Member's proposal; and its benefit would be felt not only in the great towns but extended over the whole country,

MR. KINNAIRD said, he begged to thank the hon. Member for having introduced this measure, and cordially agreed with him, that a mere benevolent society, without some legislative provision, would be found ineffectual to correct the evil in a great city; with the assistance of such a measure as this, however, he conceived it might be done.

MR. WILKINSON said, he must express a hope that the measure would be extended to England at some future period.

MR. CARDWELL said, he could not conceive any subject of greater interest than this, and he should be exceedingly happy to see a Bill brought in upon it; so far as his department was concerned, the Government would render any aid they could to make it a perfect measure; but, at the same time, he must point out to the hon. Member that there were some difficulties in dealing with the subject.

Leave given; Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. DUNLOP, Mr. BAIRD, and Mr. COWAN.

PUBLIC PROSECUTORS BILL.

MR. J. G. PHILLIMORE said, he would now beg to move for leave to bring in a Bill for the appointment of public prosecutors. He would not occupy the time of the House at present in stating its details, for he understood it was not the intention of Government to oppose the introduction of the measure. It was most important that every step in a criminal proceeding should be an act done by public authority, and as the law now stood, all that important part of the proceedings, which elapsed from the discovery that the crime had been committed until the prisoner was brought before a superior Judge to take his trial, was totally unprovided for. Even when the case against the prisoner was closed before the magistrates, and when the examinations and depositions were brought before a public officer, everything was left to chance. The Crown, indeed, was the nominal prosecutor, but the consequence was that we gave to policemen, to a class amongst whom were to be found some of the most hardened and profligate of mankind, and over whom the most incessant vigilance was requisite to prevent flagrant and cruel abuses of their authority, we gave to these men an unlimited power of pardon and connivance; and we intrusted them with an authority which in every country but England was regulated with as much anxiety as the functions of the Judge himself. In many cases it depended on the magistrate's clerks to prosecute; and there was evidence to show that they sometimes recommended committals, because they had a large interest in the fees they would gain by the prosecutions. He would not now enter into any details on the mode in which he proposed to remedy these evils; but when his measure was brought forward he should be obliged to any one who would suggest improvement. This matter involved no party interest, but that in which they were all interested, the pure administration of justice. He had endeavoured, by one clause, to provide against an evil which every one who attended the courts of justice must have witnessed with regret. He proposed that prisoners should have the power of calling witnesses (except witnesses to character) at the public expense, provided the Judge would certify that such witnesses were necessary for the defence. In his opinion, the administration of justice ought to provide not only for the conviction of the guilty, but for the defence of the innocent.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL said, it was very far from his intention to offer the slightest opposition to the introduction of this Bill; but when the hon. and learned Member introduced a Bill upon the subject last Session, that Bill appeared to almost every lawyer in the House to be an almost hopeless Bill; a more crude specimen of legislation he never saw. At the same time, he quite agreed with the hon. and learned Member that the subject was highly important, and if any scheme could be devised whereby a public prosecutor could be appointed, consistently with a due regard to the expense, and a due consideration of the difficulty which must be occasioned with so large an amount of patronage, he was ready to admit that the appointment of a public prosecutor was most desirable. He had offered his cooperation to the hon. and learned Member, and they had met to discuss the subject, when the hon. and learned Member said he could suggest nothing better than this. It assuredly was a subject of the greatest difficulty. The whole of our existing administration of justice was entirely distinct from the existence of a public prosecutor, and almost inconsistent with it; it would be entirely new and foreign to the present system, although he agreed that it might possibly be accomplished, yet it was a matter of great difficulty. Having been anxious to see whether any scheme could be devised, he (the Attorney General) applied to the very highest authority, the Lord Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench, who had, upon more than one occasion, declared himself in favour of appointing a public prosecutor. Now, what was the answer of that learned Chief Justice? It was to this effect, that he himself, during the time he was Attorney General, had again and again directed his attention to the subject, and that, although he was most anxious to devise some scheme, he had failed to devise any scheme that appeared to him to be satisfactory. His (the Attorney General's) own opinion was, that the present moment was not the precise time for legislation on the subject. In the first place, what was to be done, for instance, with the magistrates' clerks? Were they to be introduced into the proposed new system, or were they to be deprived altogether of any share in the conduct of prosecutions? He agreed that it would be much better if they were limited to the functions of magistrates' clerks, and not allowed to take any part in prosecutions; but then, on the other hand, we should deprive them of considerable emoluments, and then would come the question of compensation. He therefore thought the first step would be to see what was the part the magistrates' clerks took in prosecutions, and to see whether the amount of expense that would be incurred in providing compensation to them would not make it desirable rather to introduce them into the new system proposed than to get rid of them. He had moved for certain returns on the subject, which were not yet produced. If a body of agents appointed expressly for the conduct of criminal prosecutions were introduced, as the hon. and learned Gentleman proposed, an immense expenditure would at once be created; and the system could not be made efficient without a great number of such agents. It was not merely in the conduct of the case in court, but the great advantage anticipated would be in the previous preparation of the case, so as to make it fit for a jury; and if agents were employed to collect evidence, and get up the cases, such a staff of them would be needed as would entail a very great expense upon the country. Then, what should we do with the patronage thus created? Should all that patronage go to the Government? If it were to be given to the Judges, there were many objections to that, for then its exercise would be under no Parliamentary responsibility, and it might become, like other patronage administered in the same way, a matter of nepotism and favouritism; and he thought it would also tend to create subserviency and a want of independence in the bar. If, on the other hand, it were given to the Government, there were serious objections also to that, which, he thought, we were not yet prepared to deal with. At the same time, if his hon. and learned Friend could see the way to devise a scheme that would be satisfactory to the House and to the country, he (the Attorney General) should be glad to see it introduced, and, if it were a scheme fit for adoption, to give it such assistance as lay in his power.

MR. M'MAHON said, if the Bill intended to be introduced were similar to the one brought in by the hon. and learned Gentleman last year, he should be prepared to oppose it, because that Bill would have had the effect of introducing a most objectionable system; a system which had been adopted in Ireland, and which had signally failed in securing public confidence in the administration of criminal justice in that country. To illustrate the operation of the system pursued in Ireland, and that which was at present the law in England, he would mention the case of the disturbances at the elections at Stockport in this country, and at Ennis in Ireland. A riot occurred at Stockport which resulted in loss of life; the parties prosecuting selected their own counsel, and conducted the matter in their own way. The accused were tried and justice was administered so satisfactorily that nobody heard a word against it. Now, at Ennis there was a serious riot in which some soldiers were involved. The Crown Solicitor undertook the defence before the coroner, and, after a verdict had been obtained, application was made to the Court of Queen's Bench to quash the inquisition. That application was unsuccessful. A change of Government then took place. Another Attorney General and another Solicitor General came into office, and they undertook the prosecution of the same parties, and also of a Catholic priest who was charged with having instigated the riot. What ultimately was the effect of these proceedings? Why, both the priest and the soldiers escaped prosecution altogether, both sets of proceedings being abandoned, each as a set off to the other. Another illustration of the system was the well-known case of Mr. Carden. That person was committed for a most unmanly assault upon Miss Arbuthnot, and although he was an exterminator of his tenantry, and a most unpopular individual among the peasantry in Ireland, having obtained the *sobriquet* of the "Woodcock," from having been so often shot at, yet, when his acquittal of the felonious part of the charge was announced, the crowded court in Tipperary gave him a vociferous cheer, because the public prosecution instituted against him had the effect of making him appear in the eyes of the spectators as a person who was persecuted by the Government. If the assault had taken place in his native county, Lincolnshire, and the parties had been left to take their own course, no such public sympathy would have been enlisted in his favour. He should be glad to see this subject investigated by a Select Committee; for really, at present, the term "public prosecutor" was very little understood, and he believed that in every country where such a system was introduced, confidence in the proper administration of justice was destroyed. ["No, no!"] Why, was there any country in the world in which the public had such confidence in the administration of justice as in England, in which no such system existed? In France the public prosecutor was interested in the conviction of the party charged, and, instead of sending in a simple indictment, he put before the tribunal an elaborate argument against the prisoner. He apprehended, if we were to institute a similar officer, we should fail to insure for him the confidence of the public.

Mr. EWART said, he had taken up this subject himself many years ago, but he found it so beset with difficulties that he could not go on. His counsel was that his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. J. G. Phillimore) should precede the introduction of the Bill with a clear investigation of the subject by a Select Committee. That must be the real basis of any legislation on the subject, and he apprehended the House would never consent to pass a measure of this importance unless the subject was previously referred to a Select Committee, who should have the power of examining witnesses, and should thoroughly consider the important questions involved in it, through which he was willing to confess he did not, as yet, see his way at all. He did not, however, see all the objections which the hon. and learned Attorney General and the hon. Member

for Wexford (Mr. M'Mahon) had stated, because in Scotland there was a system of public prosecutions, and he was not aware that the confidence of the public in the administration of justice was at all shaken by its operation.

Mr. NAPIER said, when a similar Bill to the present was introduced last year he gave it his support, and he certainly, on that occasion, understood the hon. and learned Attorney General to say that he would communicate on the subject with the Lord Advocate of Scotland and the Solicitor General for Ireland, and, if the principle of the measure met with the concurrence of those learned Gentlemen, it would be satisfactory to him. As far as his recollection went, the principle of that Bill was approved, but great difficulty, he was aware, was experienced in respect to the details. It was the general opinion, that the administration of public justice ought not to be left in the hand of private individuals, who might be actuated by personal motives, and he certainly thought the machinery now existing in Ireland might, with some improvements adapted to meet the requirements of this country, form the basis of something like a perfect system. The hon. Member for Wexford had not correctly stated the cases he had given; for, so far from Mr. Carden being acquitted, he was convicted. [Mr. M'Mahon: Not of the felony.] That person was charged with two offences——felony and misdemeanor, and though it was not thought proper to press the case of felony, he was convicted of the misdemeanor, and was now in gaol. Then, again, the hon. Member was mistaken with respect to the inquisition at Ennis, and as to its having anything to do with the prosecution of the soldiers. He (Mr. Napier) was of opinion that when they were using the name of the Crown to bring parties to public justice for a breach of the laws, the prosecution ought to be intrusted to a public officer responsible to his Sovereign and to Parliament; for nothing could be worse than to leave the prosecution of criminals in the hands of private individuals, who might, under certain circumstances, keep back the evidence or compromise the matter. Such a system was unsound, and it would be a great public advantage if it were put an end to. In all cases of public prosecution, great care should be taken in previous investigations before the matter was brought into Court, so that it migh be presented to the jury in the most per fect shape possible. For this reason, he would get rid of inquiries before coroners' juries, one of which, in the time of the Irish famine, brought in a verdict of wilful murder against Lord John Russell and the rest of the Cabinet Ministers. To have a public prosecutor—say, the Attorney General—at the head of a proper staff, would, he conceived, be a great advantage; and he advised the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. J. G. Phillimore) to go on with his Bill, and try to get it passed in a perfect shape before the end of the Session.

MR. J. D. FITZGERALD said, he fully concurred in what had just fallen from the right hon. and learned Gentleman. In Ireland there was a system long established, under which, the moment an offence was discovered to have been committed, there was some public officer who had it in charge, and whose duty it was, not only to prepare the evidence against the prisoner, but also to secure the attendance of persons who could give evidence in his favour. That system had given great satisfaction, and he hoped the measure now proposed would be persevered with, and he should be glad to give all his aid towards carrying it to a successful issue.

MR. GEORGE said, he could not concur with the hon. and learned Attorney General as to the extreme difficulty of establishing a system of public prosecutors. There was no difficulty about it in Ireland, where the earlier stages of criminal proceedings were much in the hands of public officers, who held a position like that of stipendiary magistrates in this country, and whose duty was to sift and investigate the evidence before it assumed the form of sworn informations, and it was not until afterwards that the matter came into the hands of counsel, who acted as public prosecutors on circuit, and who had a double duty, not only to punish the guilty, but to take care that no innocent person should suffer punishment.

MR. PACKE said, he thought that the proposed Bill was so important that the hon. and learned proposer of it would exercise a sound discretion in allowing it to be investigated before a Select Committee. It was not his intention to offer any opposition to the Bill; but he wished to notice the strong language used by the hon. and learned proposer of the measure with reference to the police of the country. A more excellent or worthy body of men did not exist than the police of the county he had the honour to represent—Leicestershire.

MR. J. G. PHILLIMORE said, he must explain that what he said was that there were to be found among the class of police some of the most hardened characters; but he did not speak so generally of the police.

MR. PACKE said, that that portion of the police with which he was acquainted—namely, the police of the country of Leicester—were free from such a charge. Since its establishment crime had diminished one-half in the county; and the police in question had the confidence and respect of every individual in the county.

MR. PHINN said, he thought his hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General had had great injustice done to him. It had been complained that that hon. and learned Member had held out a promise to the hon. and learned Member for Leominster (Mr. J. G. Phillimore) to consider the subject and frame a proper measure. So far as the Attorney General was concerned, he (Mr. Phinn) knew that he had fulfilled his promise as far as possible. His hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General had consulted the Lord Chief Justice and gentlemen of great experience, all of whom were anxious, if practicable, to form a measure capable of being put into operation. It was, however, very easy to enunciate sweeping principles, and to lay down rules in which all concurred. Every one concurred in the necessity of having a public prosecutor, but it was very difficult to engraft a new system of administration upon an old and complicated system. There was a strong feeling against magistrates' clerks being paid by fees, and it had been proposed to pay them by salaries, and thus make them independent of cases which now it was their interest to get sent for trial, and to make them in the first instance public prosecutors. With that view he (Mr. Phinn) had moved for certain returns showing the fees that those clerks had received, and he regretted that those returns had not yet been laid before the House, as they would have afforded considerable information in connection with this particular subject. There was another question intimately connected with this—the grand jury. Was that to be permitted to exist together with the public prosecutor? Another question was—in whom would the patronage vest? He had a very strong objection to the patronage of the bar being vested in the Judges, as tending to render the bar subservient to the latter. At present the great school for young men at the bar was at sessions and assizes, where the prosecutions were dispersed among them, but the appointment of one or two Crown prosecutors to travel from place to place would destroy that source of future recorders. Without committing himself to any of these particulars, he thought it would be most desirable to adopt the suggestion of the hon. Member for Dumfries (Mr. Ewart), and send the matter to a Select Committee.

Mr. J. G. PHILLIMORE, in reply, said, he thought the speech of the hon. and learned Attorney General was more worthy of the days of Lord Eldon than of the representative of a Liberal Administration. The hon. and learned Gentleman had, no doubt, unintentionally deceived him last year, and the question was quite as ripe for consideration as it would be twenty years hence. As to the measure he had proposed being a crude piece of legislation, all he could say was, that the hon. and learned Gentleman had not suggested anything better.

Leave *given*; Bill *ordered* to be brought in by Mr. John George Phillimore and Mr. Watson.

Bill read 1°.

TRADE WITH RUSSIA.

Mr. COLLIER said, that in moving for a return of the Russian exports from Archangel to this country during the present year, he wished to ask the attention of the House for a short time, while he brought before them this matter, of which he had given notice. It was a question most intimately connected with the subject of the war now pending, and was, he felt certain all hon. Members would allow, a matter of very considerable importance. He had framed his Motion in the shape of asking for Returns, as it seemed to him that on the accession of a new Government it would be premature to pledge the House to any opinion in the shape of a Resolution. He was desirous to hear from the Government an explanation of the past, and he thought the House was entitled, to some extent, to have a statement of their intentions for the future. Should those explanations be satisfactory, the object of his Motion would be attained; should they not be satisfactory, it would be still open to him to consider whether he should state the policy which he considered advisable in the form of a substantive Resolution, and upon which he would take the opinion of the House. He must say for himself, and he believed he might speak on behalf of the great majority of the House, that, so long as the Government carried on the war with vigour, they had no desire to interfere with it, but, on the contrary, were most anxious to give it their most cordial support. It was only when the Government failed to carry on the war with vigour that it became the duty of the House to interfere and to call for explanations and information. The peculiarity of our trade with Russia was well known. It was well known that in Russia there could scarcely be found to exist any industrial, commercial, or manufacturing class, such as existed in other continental countries. The wealth of Russia consisted almost entirely of serf labour and the productions of the soil, produced for the benefit of the nobles. Tallow, hemp, linseed, were commodities of that description. It was well known that for these commodities this country was the customer of Russia to an amount ten times greater than any other country, and to a larger extent than all the rest of the world beside. These productions were raised in a great measure by advances of capital from British merchants, by the aid of which the landed proprietors of Russia were enabled to produce a great many of those articles he had described, and which we afterwards bought of them. Should, therefore, that supply of English capital which stimulated the productions of Russia be stopped, it would at once diminish the productive power, and consequently the resources, of Russia. At the outbreak of the war fully as much was expected from the injury to be done to Russian commerce as from the prowess of our arms in the field. It was said, truly, that we were not a great military Power, and that the country had not a great standing army, but that we had fleets which, if they could not destroy the forts and fleets of Russia, could at least blockade every port that Power possessed. It was, therefore, anticipated from that blockade that the commerce and wealth of Russia would be so crippled that it would be impossible for the Emperor to continue the war for any lengthened period. History was appealed to in order to show that the short war with Russia in 1801 produced such disastrous consequences to that country, and, the prospect of still further disasters being imminent, the war became unpopular among the nobles, and no doubt contributed to the catastrophe which so soon followed. Russia was subsequently induced by the Emperor Napoleon to join the continental blockade, and she became in consequence a serious sufferer. Upon these and other occasions the rouble, which might be called the "pulse of Russian commerce," had declined in value, and whenever that had happened to any serious extent a succession of financial difficulties had fallen upon the Emperor of Russia. At the outbreak of the present war, the rouble fell from par—38*d.*—to 32*d.*, and it was confidently anticipated that before the war had lasted many months, it would fall much lower, that a serious financial crisis would overtake the Emperor, that ruin and poverty would fall upon the landed proprietors, and that national bankruptcy must ensue.

Let the House now see how far those predictions have been realised. If our armies had hitherto failed in their efforts —and he wished to be understood as not doubting their ultimate success—but if they had hitherto failed, let them inquire how our operations against the commerce and wealth of Russia had succeeded. That our efforts had not met with the desired result was certain, but, indeed, the reverse. So far from our having blockaded the principal ports, the exports from that empire had been greater than ever. The whole case might be summed up in the statement that Russian commerce had not been much injured; that 10,000,000*l.* of English money had gone to Russia instead of 11,000,000*l.*—the ordinary amount; and that the rouble, which had declined to 32*d.*, had risen to par. That fact alone was conclusive that Russian commerce had not materially suffered in consequence of the war. When he said that 10,000,000*l.* had gone to Russia in place of 11,000,000*l.*, he must explain that we were in the habit of paying in three modes for what we imported; first, by exports from this country; secondly, by consignments of foreign goods to Russia, and lastly by money. The first two sources had been cut off, and therefore all our payments had been made in money, in the shape most convenient, during warlike preparations, for the Emperor of Russia, and which enabled him to equip those forces with which he attacked us. He would venture to say that if they were to rely for a termination of the war solely upon the measures hitherto adopted against the enemy's commerce, that war would in all probability survive the youngest Member of the House. He would now proceed to inquire into the cause of the signal failure of our measures. He believed that much was expected from the blockade of the ports in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azoff, because the blockade there could not be evaded by land carriage, the distance being too great. On account of the great interest of the subject, several questions were put to the right hon. Baronet at the head of the Admiralty, some of whose answers he would read. On the 1st of June the right hon. Baronet said—

> "He had on more than one occasion endeavoured to give a distinct answer to a question nearly identical with that now put. istinct orders had been sent by the Governments of France and England to institute a rigorous blockade of the principal Russian ports both in the Baltic and the Black Sea, and the effect of that blockade would apply to ships of all nations, whether neutral, French, or English. No official information had yet been received either from the Baltic or Black Sea that those blockades had been instituted, and, in the absence of such official information, no proclamation had been made either in the *London Gazette*, or, on the part of the Government of France, in Paris. He should state, however, that, in the absence of that official proclamation from the Government, a blockade *de facto*, with an efficient force, would be effectual either in the Baltic or in the Black Sea, and would not allow the entrance or departure of neutral ships where it was established."

Again, on the 13th of June, the right hon. Baronet said—

> "I have repeatedly answered questions on this point, and I have endeavoured to make my answers as clear as a sense of duty would allow me. Orders were given some time ago to the admirals both in the Black Sea and in the Baltic to institute a strict blockade of the Russian ports; and I have every reason to believe that these blockades have been instituted."

And on the 11th of July similar statements were made. He did not wish to make an attack upon the Government, but he felt bound to state these facts. It was a fact that that blockade was not instituted —up to the present time it had not been established. A blockade was notified to commence on the 1st of February, then was put off to the 14th, and, if any blockade at all existed, it had only been instituted within the last two or three days. A memorial had been forwarded to him by the Chamber of Commerce at Hull, a body that had taken a good deal of pains to obtain information on this subject, which, referring to the trade carried on through the ports of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azoff, contained the following statement—

> "Shipments of linseed have continued to be made from the Russian ports of the Black Sea and Sea of Azoff, on a scale unprecedented in any previous year. Since the declaration of war, that is, from May to December, 380 to 400 ships, carrying about 700,000 quarters of linseed, have sailed from the Russian ports of the Black Sea and Sea of Azoff, representing a value to Russia of about a million sterling in this one article only. The greatest previous annual export of linseed was in 1852 and 1853; that in the entire twelve months of 1853 being 640,000 quarters, and in the entire twelve months of 1852 only 445,000 quarters; whereas in the eight months of this present year of war, in the face of an assured blockade, we have the enormous export of 700,000 quarters, and that in an article of the first magnitude as respects the trade of the Black Sea."

He was told that during the remaining four months of the last year trade had been carried on to the same extent. The document went on to state—

> "The injury to British merchants, as alluded to in the foregoing memorandum, has continued through the interim since July. The reiterated assurance on the part of Ministers that blockade would be strictly enforced, has had the effect, not only of placing this considerable trade in the hands of foreign houses, but the counter operations into which the said British merchants were driven in consequence of their being so warned off from the Black Sea, are threatened with loss owing to the immense import from the very quarter from which they were thus interdicted, and from which Government assured them repeatedly nothing would be allowed to come. As a collateral consequence, the neutral shipowner has found his vessels employed at high rates, whereas, imports of the like articles from neutral countries on which British ships could have been engaged, have been proportionally discouraged."

Now, although the ports of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azoff had not been blockaded, the mouths of the Danube had been blockaded, and by that blockade of the mouths of the Danube this country had been deprived of a large supply of grain that might otherwise have been obtained from the Danubian Principalities. The fact was, that the mouths of the Danube, which ought not to have been blockaded, had been blockaded, while the ports of the Black Sea, and of the Sea of Azoff, which ought to have been blockaded, and which the public were assured were blockaded, had not been blockaded. The consequence had been that, during the past year, the exports of Russia had been more considerable than, he believed, in any previous year; that the British merchants who, believing the assurances of the Government, had made extensive arrangements for procuring articles which we now obtained from Russia from other quarters, and who had opened up markets in India and elsewhere for linseed, hemp, and other produce, when they brought their commodities to this country suffered an enormous loss, and that the only parties benefited were the Greek merchants who all along were wise enough to disbelieve in the blockade, and, acting as if there was no blockade, had been considerable gainers in consequence, and made enormous fortunes. He thought the House would agree with him that some explanation was due to the public on this subject, and he would be very glad if a satisfactory explanation could be given. The hon. Secretary to the Admiralty, the other night, in what he (Mr. Collier) might call his celebrated Serpentine speech—for he suggested the propriety of turning that river through the Horse Guards—admitted, with a frankness which did him honour, and which would doubtless be greatly approved by his constituents, that the war had been disgracefully conducted, and that there had been great misconduct on the part of those in office, although he could not agree in the conclusion of the hon. Gentleman, that because great evils had existed there should be no inquiry, and that because the officials had misconducted themselves they should continue to hold office. He thought, however, that that hon. Gentleman, when he said that the Admiralty were blamed by nobody, and had nothing to explain, had gone rather too far. He (Mr. Collier) was anxious to hear the explanation that would be given on this subject by the First Lord of the Admiralty, and knowing the great administrative talents of that right hon. Gentleman, and the ability with which the affairs of the Admiralty had generally been administered, he had no doubt that right hon. Gentleman would be prepared to give a satisfactory explanation so far as he had any concern in the matter. He thought, however, they might venture to lay down this rule as applicable to all departments—that the head of a department was answerable for failures unless he could show who were the culpable parties. If there had been remissness or negligence in any department, and the House was informed who was to blame, and the person whose conduct had been culpable was censured or dismissed, there were some hopes of improvement; but if they were never to know upon whom the blame rested—if they were never to lay their hands upon the incapable, the incompetent, or the obstructive—he feared the management of public affairs was absolutely hopeless, and that there was nothing before them but an endless career of disaster and disgrace. He applied this observation to the authorities at Balaklava, who, he was sorry to say, had not been removed, but a Commission, they were given to understand, was to be appointed to inquire into their conduct. He hoped the inquiries of that Commission would be satisfactory, but he entertained considerable doubt upon the subject, and he thought that little good would be effected without the removal of those anarchical spirits — Filder and Boxer. He thought the House was entitled to know from the heads of departments what had been the causes of failure, and if blame attached to any parties who those parties were. The First Lord of the Admiralty might possibly be able to show that there had been reasons for changing the policy of the Government with regard to the blockade—that, for instance, our fleet was insufficient to blockade the ports of the Black Sea. He (Mr. Collier) could not, however, conceive how such a reason could be assigned, when a single steamer might have blockaded the Straits of Kertch, and thus have cut off the communications of the ports in the Sea of Azoff, from which goods to the amount of 2,000,000*l.* had been exported. Single steamers might also have blockaded Odessa, and other ports of the Black Sea. He would not enter into the nice question whether a blockade of the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus would have been sufficient; but if they had a competent force to maintain an efficient blockade, and if orders had been sent out to the admirals to establish such a blockade, he wished to know why those orders had not been obeyed.

He would now pass to another part of the subject—the blockade of the Baltic. They had had two great fleets, one operating in the Black Sea, which had not blockaded at all, or done anything, as far as he knew, beyond firing a certain number of shots at the forts of Sebastopol, and another operating in the Baltic, which had, indeed, established an effectual blockade; but that blockade had been entirely evaded by means of land carriage. He thought he would be able to show that the blockade of the Baltic had been substantially evaded in a manner which no doubt was not anticipated, and for not anticipating which he threw no blame upon the Government. The traffic by land carriage, which had been organised by the Emperor of Russia, with the connivance of Prussia, had been brought to a degree of perfection that could scarcely have been anticipated. A Commissioner, a very able man, was appointed by the Emperor of Russia with a competent staff, to make good and efficient roads, and these roads had been overflowing with Russian commerce, vast stores of tallow, hemp, flax, and linseed, flowed through Prussia to Memel—the countries through which this trade passed deriving from it great advantage, in consequence of which the war was exceedingly popular in Prussia. Indeed, this stream of commerce going through Prussia gave that country good grounds for wishing to maintain her neutrality in this war. The hon. Member for Stoke-upon-Trent (Mr. J. L. Ricardo) had written an able pamphlet on this subject, in which he described thus the flow of Russian produce through Prussia—

> "'One of the custom houses on the frontier has taken as much as 1,000 thalers a-day for import duties, and as many as 500 cartloads of hemp and flax have frequently arrived per day at Memel. Throughout the summer the town has presented an extraordinary spectacle. Every warehouse, coachhouse, stable, and outhouse has been literally crammed with merchandise; the streets and open spaces have been piled with it; while upwards of 100 ships have been kept lying in the harbour, unable to discharge their cargoes, on account of all the landing-places being occupied. Landlords have realised rents, taverns and shopkeepers have obtained prices comparable to those which resulted from the rush of emigration to Melbourne.' It is estimated that the extra cost paid on Russian produce belonging to the British merchant, for its transport by the Russian peasantry to Memel, is no less than 2,500,000*l.* This is exclusive of the goods carried to Archangel for shipment, and the loss from damage and destruction to them on the road, where insurance is impossible."

He agreed to a certain extent with his hon. Friend, as, for example, when he said that it was humiliating to see how the blockade had been evaded, and how we were in the first instance put to the expense of imposing a blockade, and then we had to pay a further cost for its evasion of 2,500,000*l.* But his hon. Friend was for no blockade at all. Now, that was a view which any gentleman might reasonably and logically adopt; but to say that we should have a blockade and that it should be ineffectual, was to hold ground utterly untenable. When his hon. Friend had arrived at the conclusion that there should be no blockade, he ought in consistency to oppose the Navy

Estimates; for, if there was to be no blockade, why so great an increase in our fleet as was proposed in those Estimates? What he contended for was that either they should have no blockade or an effectual blockade. If they could not stop this transit through Prussia, then, by all means, let us have our goods direct from Cronstadt, and thus save both time and expense; but to institute a blockade that could be evaded was an untenable measure and one which it was impossible to do ought than condemn. He would not attempt to dictate to the Government the precise course which they should adopt. That was a matter of policy which it would be better to leave in their own hands; but he would shortly state the notions he had formed as to the mode of dealing with the subject. In the first place, then, it seemed to him that Prussia had substantially been guilty of a breach of neutrality—that the trade carried on through Prussia was not only a trade of private individuals, but one organised in a great measure between the Governments of Russia and Prussia for the express purpose of evading our blockade. A convention had been entered into for the formation of a railway, and Prussia derived great revenue from the Russian commerce which passed through her dominions. This transit trade through Prussia was entirely a new trade, and it was carried on to the detriment of ours. It had been laid down by publicists—and in fact there was a rule known as the rule of 1756—to this effect, that a neutral was at liberty to carry on his accustomed trade in time of war, but not a new trade to the prejudice of either of the belligerents. On that subject he would refer hon. Members to the dictum of Lord Stowell; who said the general rule was that a neutral had a right to carry on in time of war his accustomed trade to the utmost extent to which that accustomed trade was capable, but the law was different in the case of a new trade which the neutral had not previously carried on. Now, here was, in fact, a new trade carried on by Prussia for the advantage of herself and Russia, in evasion of our blockade, and distinctly to the detriment of one of the belligerents. This, in his opinion, afforded ground for remonstrance on our part with Prussia. They had a right to call on Prussia in this case, and, at all events, if Prussia joined the Western Powers—which he trusted she would do—he hoped one stipulation would be, that Prussia should seal her frontier to the transit of Russian produce, so that the blockade might be effectual, and he trusted that no stipulation would be made with Prussia except such an arrangement was entered into by that Power. Close the Black Sea and the Baltic and the Prussian frontier, and the commerce of Russia would be so far crippled that she would not be able to carry on the war for any length of time. But he had been told there were other measures that might be adopted; they might institute a search of neutral vessels for enemies' goods coming from neutral ports. They might do so on the ground that it was necessary for the enforcement of the blockade, and he apprehended that they would have a perfect right to do so. He did not put it on the footing of interfering generally with the rights of neutrals, but he merely suggested that it might be adopted in this particular case, for this particular object, and in consequence of this particular necessity. There was one measure which they undoubtedly had a right to adopt, and that was to prohibit the importation of Russian productions into this country. They had a right, without offence to any other nation, to prohibit the importation of Russian produce into this country. The objections that might be made to that were twofold. In the first place it might be said that the prohibition would not be effectual, and next, that it would injure ourselves. The hon. Member for Stoke-upon-Trent, in his able pamphlet, argued that we should not prohibit Russian produce on the latter ground. What might be done was, that certain specified articles, such as hemp, tallow, &c., should not be admitted without certificates obtained from the British Consul in the country from which they came that they were not the produce of Russia—an oath to be taken to that effect—and also an oath by the importing merchant to the same effect. It might be said, there would be perjury; but the House must bear in mind the peculiar character of the Russian trade. It was carried on by few houses, those being of great respectability and employing a large amount of capital. Without a large amount of capital it was impossible to engage in the Russian trade with effect, because it was carried on by large advances. Now, he believed that if the importation of Russian produce was rendered unlawful, the Russian merchants as a body would refuse to have anything to do with it. In St. Petersburg, before the war commenced, the merchants in that city engaged in this trade informed Sir Hamilton Seymour in a memorial that, if the trade were prohibited they would have nothing to do with it whatever, and a similar conclusion was come to in London. The consequence was that the rouble fell from 38d. to 32d., though now, as he had previously stated, it had again risen to par. He believed he could state confidently that those merchants—and one of them would second the Motion he should now make—would supply the country with any article we now got from Russia from other parts of the world—from India, from the coast of Africa, from Italy; and he had reason to believe that the prohibition would be in a great degree effectual. There might be some smuggling possibly. Inferior houses might engage in the contraband trade, but the great merchants generally would keep agents at the foreign ports to look after the contrabandists, and he had no doubt the stream of Russian produce, if not altogether stopped, would be at least dammed back. He had been told that the prohibition would be evaded in various ways, that Russian tallow would be melted down as German tallow, that German tallow would be liberated and sent to this country; and that manufactories would be established on the continent for the purpose of sending articles here in a manufactured state. Now, with respect to the substitution of Russian tallow for German tallow, the quantity liberated could not be to any great amount, and to evade the prohibition effectually a new trade would have to be organised, and altogether a new system established. So with respect to manufactories. A manufactory was not built in a day, but required skill, labour, machinery, and capital; and was it likely that the Germans would invest any considerable sums in these operations when any month might render the outlay of their capital unavailing by bringing either a general peace or a general war? In either case their efforts to establish a new trade would be rendered entirely nugatory. If they were sure that the war would last twenty years there might be something in the argument; but, as it might be over at any day, it did not seem likely that any considerable amount of capital would be invested in Germany for the purpose of evading our prohibition. It was further said that the people of this country would injure themselves by this measure. He freely admitted that they would; but did any man suppose that they were to enter upon a war without incurring serious injury to themselves? Were they to go about their affairs in the usual manner, to pass their Reform Bills, and busy themselves with matters of external legislation, and if they had any surplus cash to spare expend it in crumpling up the Emperor of Russia? If they were not prepared for the sacrifices of war they ought never to have undertaken it. If they were not prepared for the sacrifices of war they had better conclude peace at once, and on whatever terms they could make. But should it be said of this country that it hesitated not to sacrifice the lives of the best and bravest of its children in the cause of liberty, that it could contemplate with comparative calmness the calamities of the battle-field and the hospital, but that there was one thing it could not contemplate without agony and despair, and that was a rise in the price of tallow? Was it to be said that they were not prepared to succumb to the Emperor of Russia, and that they would take every measure for the purpose of prosecuting the war with vigour, except one, which was likely to injure their commercial interests? If they were only prepared to carry on the war in that spirit, they were rightly called a nation of shopkeepers, and they had better stay at home. [Mr. BRIGHT: Hear, hear!] He was cheered by the hon. Member for Manchester, and the views of the hon. Gentleman on this subject were perfectly consistent. The hon. Gentleman was perfectly right in saying that they should not have entered upon this war unless they were prepared to make peace at once, or that, unmindful of their trade, their flax, or their tallow, they were determined to carry on the war with vigour, and at every sacrifice, if they were prepared to carry it on at all. But, after all, they were not likely to be driven to any great stress in consequence of the loss of Russian produce, and, perhaps, the House would allow him to quote a passage from the *Economist* newspaper, which, intimating that the trade with Russia was stopped, consoled them with the reflection that they were able to obtain from other sources the supplies which they had been accustomed to procure from Russia. In the *Economist* of April 1, before it was anticipated that the blockade would be evaded, the editor, after expressing infinite contempt for those "dealers in grease," as he called them, who were doing what they could to alarm the country touching a scarcity of tallow, proceeded to state :—

> "The import of tallow, therefore, is stationary or declining, the quantity from Russia not increasing, while our growing demand for materials of that description is supplied by the increasing quantities of palm and cocoa-nut oil. In like manner, the largely increasing supply of hemp comes less from Russia than other quarters."

He then went on to say :—

> "It should not be forgotten by those who anticipate still higher prices for Russian produce that oily matters, which can be substituted for tallow in many cases, may be obtained from the vegetable as well as from the animal kingdom, and that numerous substitutes may be found for hemp, as well as wheaten bread."

Afterwards the editor of the *Economist* went into a long statement to show that we could procure tallow, hemp, corn, and other articles from other parts of the world, and he concluded with this sentence :—

> "We may expect, therefore, from the impediment which war will lay in our way of getting tallow, hemp, and corn from the uncivilised space the Czar governs, that art and industry will know how to obtain from the whole of the rest of the world a greater abundance than hitherto of useful articles than stationary or retrograding Russia can possibly supply."

In reference to the supply of hemp from Russia, he would beg to read to the House an extract from a circular of Messrs. Noble, which said :—

> "In the early part of the present year, when it was expected the supply of hemp from Russia would be stopped, we called the attention of several of our friends to the hemp from India, and they have forwarded us samples of superior qualities, well adapted for all the purposes of Russian hemp; but it would take some time before any large quantity could be obtained, properly prepared for the purpose, and arrangements were made for so preparing the crop that would have come in next year; but, after it was discovered that the supply from Russia would be regular through Prussia, there was no inducement strong enough to urge them to carry out these arrangements, and they have, therefore, fallen to the ground, and instead of our getting the large supply we expected, there will be very little more than the usual supply from those places. If, however, it were certain that the trade with Russia would be stopped for one year only, it would give such an impetus to the growers of fibres in the colonies that we might for the future leave them entirely to themselves, and we should be sure, in the year 1856, and after that, to receive such quantities and quality that would make us perfectly independent of Russian hemp, as the producers would be able to send it (after they were once fairly started) at prices that would compete with Russian hemp when at its lowest price, and it would also be of great advantage in doing away with the prejudice now existing on the part of consumers about trying a new article."

He had been glad to hear the announcement the other day that arrangements had been made for procuring hemp in any quantity from Italy. Flax, also, to any amount could be grown in Ireland, and could be obtained from other quarters; tallow could be obtained in great quantities from Australia, and palm and cocoa-nut oil from the coast of Africa. In fact, there was no article which they now got from Russia which they might not obtain from other parts of the world, and principally from their own colonies. Once open these quarters, and he had every reason to suppose that the produce of Russia could be dispensed with. The courses he ventured to recommend as calculated to enforce our claims on Russia were, either to exercise the right of searching all vessels from Russian ports, or prohibiting the importation of Russian goods into this country. We should not by such prohibition give the rest of the world a great advantage over us, for we were almost the only customers of Russia. Russia could not obtain elsewhere the advances she obtained from this country. Without the advances of English capital, which she had hitherto received, the power of Russia must be very much lessened and diminished. If he were told that there were grave objections to the measures which he had suggested, then he could only revert to his former position, and call upon the Government to abandon the blockade. If the blockade was to be kept up at all it was absolutely necessary to resort to some of the means he had mentioned for enforcing it and rendering it effectual. If an announcement were made to-night showing that the Government were in earnest in endeavouring to stop the contraband trade now passing through Prussia, he believed the effect would be serious and immediate on the finances of Russia, and that the rouble would immediately fall. He firmly believed that a large amount of English capital was at this moment in London waiting for its destination, and which, if it went to Russia, would supply her with the means of carrying on the war and of sending fresh armies into the field. It now, doubtless, would find its way to India and other parts of the world for the purpose of supplying us with the produce we formerly got from Russia, if the importation of Russian produce into this country were at once wholly and effectually prohibited. The success of our troops did not depend merely upon our own numbers, but upon the numbers opposed to us; and at present we were supplying the Emperor of Russia with gold to enable him to raise armies for the purpose of resisting our troops. Russia was not a large commercial country, and, as compared with Russia, we were as a great commercial company compared to a small trader. Our commerce with Russia was small, but the commerce of Russia with this country was almost all she possessed, and to put a stop to it would be nearly to reduce her to a state of bankruptcy. The Emperor of Russia had more men than we had, and if he could insure the loss of one of our soldiers by two of his he was a winner. On the other hand, we could lose two sovereigns to his one, and still be the gainers. He (Mr. Collier) trusted, then, that he should hear from the Government that they were prepared to manage the war in this respect with vigour and effect; and he might say that, as long as they were disposed to carry on the war thoroughly and in earnest, to apply to it all the resources of the country, they would form a strong Government, and would meet with the hearty, the unanimous, and the enthusiastic suppport of the country. If, however, they still went on as the former Government did, proposing half measures, showing themselves unequal to the occasion, and requiring to be goaded into activity by the press or by public opinion, the sooner they fell the better. He, for one, was inclined to give them his support, and he trusted that their explanation upon the subject he had now brought before the House, and upon the conduct of the war generally, would be satisfactory to the country.

MR. MITCHELL said, that in seconding the Motion of his hon. and learned Friend, he concurred generally with what had fallen from him, but he wished to fill up, with a few details, the outline he had drawn, which details might, perhaps, be necessary to enable Her Majesty's Government to come to some decision upon this question. And, first of all, he regretted that his hon. and learned Friend had changed the form of his Motion. As it orignally stood, it was one directly expressing the opinion of this House—that the trade of Russia ought to be further restricted. He regretted that that course was not persisted in. The Government had had the fullest time to consider this question. Three months ago, in answer to a deputation from the flax merchants of Dundee, the Earl of Clarendon said the subject should receive the fullest consideration from Her Majesty's Government, and, considering the present Government to be almost identical with the former one, he thought his hon. and learned Friend might have ventured to bring forward his original Motion, and, if the explanation of the Government was not satisfactory, to obtain a direct vote of this House upon the subject. He, himself, feeling strongly as he did in reference to it, should have brought the matter forward at an earlier period; but he confessed he had been pusillanimous. He allowed himself to be deterred by a fear lest it should be said that he and others who moved in this question were holders of Russian produce in London, and therefore advocated the measures of which his hon. and learned Friend had sketched the outline to-night. Now, within the last ten days a deputation representing the Russian trade in this country had had an interview with Lord Clarendon. That deputation represented not merely speculative holders of Russian produce in England, but gentlemen who had necessarily large amounts of fixed capital locked up in Russia—people whose entire trade was with Russia, and whose direct interest it was, therefore, that that trade should be carried on, provided that it could be carried on on a proper and honourable footing. He repeated, they were not speculative holders of Russian produce. It might happen that they all held a certain amount; and when had they not done so? But, for himself—though he felt almost ashamed to occupy their time in repudiating any improper motives in the course he was now taking—he believed that he did not hold one-third of his usual amount of Russian stock at this moment. Almost all his neighbours were in the same position, but their interest was the same as the interest of the public. That interest was, to have this war brought to a close as speedily as possible, so as to enable those merchants—leaving patriotic views entirely out of sight—to carry on their legitimate trade with Russia, and to make use of that dead capital which was now locked up and absorbed in Russia. This was the motive which animated them, and his opinion was, that in the course they were pursuing they were advocating the general interests of the country. He believed that the deputation to which he had alluded, which included nearly all the gentlemen who had establishments in Russia, had expressed but one opinion in the course of their interview with Lord Clarendon. He believed, also, that that opinion was entertained by every one who had a knowledge of the trade of Russia, who had been a long time in that country, or who had means of communication with those who lived in Russia. This opinion was that the most powerful lever which the English Government had to bring this war to a termination, was to stop the trade with Russia. Having himself passed his whole life in the Russian trade, he had naturally sought to converse with those who were in the same position on the subject, and he had found but one opinion prevailing, which was, that more powerful than our armies would be the stoppage of our trade with Russia. Nearly all the produce of Russia was raised by serf labour, and belonged either directly to the nobility or came to them in the shape of rent, which must be paid by the grower of the produce to the nobleman who possessed the soil; and if that produce did not bear any value, of course the cultivator could not pay any rent. Experience had proved that there was one, and probably but one, lever with the Emperor of Russia, and that was the power of the nobility of that empire. The House would recollect that the Russian nobility were almost the only possessors of military power. There were some German generals in the Emperor's service, but the nobility were almost exclusively in the chief commands. You, therefore, brought to bear upon the Emperor one most potent lever, when, by stopping the sale of the produce of Russia, you destroyed the rents of the nobility, and, consequently, reduced them to poverty. Of course there were men among the Russian nobles, like Prince Demidoff and some others, who had accumulated enormous fortunes; but, as a general rule, those nobles lived up to their income. Well, already, by this war, the nobles were losing their serfs, and were paying large war taxes; and if you added to this the total stoppage of their rents, which would be the direct effect of the stoppage of the trade with Russia, his opinion was that the Emperor himself, with that sagacity which distinguished him, would at once yield to the opinions of the nobility, and would no longer wish to prosecute this war. This stoppage of Russian trade would also have a direct effect upon the exchange. It was a fact that, notwithstanding the enormous issue of paper money since the war—notwithstanding the export of gold from Russia was now prohibited—the exchange had been generally at par, and was very little below par now. How could this be accounted for? It could only be accounted for by the influx of money into Russia, in return for the export of goods.

Now, as to the various modes in which that capital had been supplied. Take the case of the Black Sea. Before an effective blockade was established, about 1,000,000 quarters of linseed were shipped from the Black Sea to all quarters of the world. The present value of that article in London was 63*s.* a quarter, and the whole of that money had gone into the pockets of parties either professedly neutral or directly hostile to this country—to the Russian producer, and to Greek merchants who were notoriously hostile to this country, or the neutral shipowner. The right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham) early in the Session had stated distinctly that a blockade would be established. The consequence was, that nobody in this country thought of taking steps for procuring linseed from the Black Sea. They considered, as a matter of course, that, as the First Lord of the Admiralty had given distinct notice that a blockade would be instituted, it would be hopeless to think of supplies from the Black Sea. The Greeks, however, who were on the spot, very soon found out that the right hon. Baronet's instructions were not carried out; they had, therefore, systematically gone on with the trade, and he had just learnt of he did not know how many cargoes of linseed as being in process of shipment from the Black Sea. Here was 3,000,000*l.* which had gone directly, in the face of the assertions of the Government that a blockade would be carried out, either to the enemy or to neutral shipowners. What had been the result in other ways? The direct statements of the Government as to the blockade and the consequent failure in the supply of Russian produce had led to orders being sent out to India for linseed, to the extent of 150,000 to 200,000 quarters, which, on its arrival here, had to be sold at a ruinous loss. In consequence of the maintenance of the supply of Russian produce, the price fell 15 per cent, and this Indian linseed had to be sold at that loss; so that, of course, put a stop to further purchases in India. What had happened, too, had this further effect—that until the blockade was actually established nobody would believe a word of it, and no arrangements would be made to procure a supply from India and from other quarters. Well, while the Government had been doing this, they had, from the month of May last, instituted a most rigid blockade of the mouths of the Danube. Now, there never had been any great importation of corn into this country from Russian ports in the Danube, and he believed the greatest quantity imported in any one year was 50,000 quarters. Corn was the only article exported from the Danube, and some time prior to May the Emperor of Russia had entirely prohibited the export of corn from any port of his in the Black Sea. Consequently the Government need not have troubled themselves much to blockade the Danube. But what was the effect of their operations? Why, they were allowing 1,000,000 quarters of linseed to be shipped from the Black Sea under the very nose of our admiral, and they were preventing the shipment of 2,000,000 quarters of Turkish corn lying in the Danubian Principalities. He might be told that the Government had no information upon this subject. But, if that were the case, surely it was the duty of the Government to get full information from those quarters from which they might easily have obtained it. But to leave that subject and to come to the question of the blockade in the Baltic, he was prepared to go upon either of two grounds—either to institute a real and effective blockade in that sea, or to institute none at all. He knew perfectly well the value that the Emperor of Russia attached to that trade; in fact, so great was the value attached to it that when the roads communicating with the ports through which that trade was carried on were out of repair the Russian soldiers were employed to repair them. He knew that such was the value of that trade that he believed that a convention might be entered into under which all the Russian ships of war would remain in the harbours of Cronstadt and Sweaborg, if British ships of commerce were permitted to enter into the ports of the Baltic; in fact, that if the Government would agree that trade in that sea should go on as in time of peace, there would be no necessity for the presence there of a British fleet at all. Now, what he wished to press upon the Government was, either that some such course as that should be adopted, or that a strict and effective blockade should be maintained.

He had been furnished with a statement drawn up under the auspices of the Russian Government of the quantity of goods despatched from the Russian ports for shipment through Prussia before the blockade of Riga. All the goods referred to had not yet been shipped from Memel, but no doubt they all would be. According to that statement the quantity of tallow despatched for shipment through Prussia amounted to 30,500 tons, the average cost of which, delivered free on board at Memel, was 60*l.* a ton, making the total cost 1,830,000*l.* The quantity of hemp and flax was 70,756 tons, which, at 50*l.* a ton, made a total of 3,537,800*l.* The price of the quantity of bristles, linseed, and other goods despatched to Memel was stated at 1,000,000*l.* The trade with Archangel amounted also to about 1,000,000*l.* With regard to that trade he might remark that a most strict blockade of Archangel had been instituted after all the goods had been shipped away. The trade in the Black Sea amounted to about 1,500,000*l.*, so that the total amount of the trade with Russia was not less than 8,867,800*l.* He found also from the average exports of the three previous years that, independently of corn, the exportation of which was now prohibited, the quantity of goods despatched to the frontier during the last year did not amount to more than two-thirds or three-fourths of the whole quantity of goods shipped from Russia in former years. Now, the average cost of the exports in former years was about 10,000,000*l.*, so that the result of the war hitherto had been that we had paid 8,867,800*l.* for two-thirds of that which formerly cost us 10,000,000*l.* He could not conceive a case more monstrous or more absurd.

He would now come to what had been proposed to put an end to such a state of things. He had given the subject full and careful consideration, and he concurred in the propriety of the course suggested by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Plymouth. He was aware that the proposition was contrary to the doctrines of political economy; that could not be helped, and, indeed, he did not think that it would always be advisable to follow the doctrines of political economy in the midst of a great war. Inconvenience must fall on all parties. Consider how many thousands of lives had been already sacrificed! What was to be considered was the advantage of the general community, and if any measure, although it might inflict some slight injury upon a few branches of trade, could be devised by which a speedy end might be put to the contest in which the country was engaged, it was the duty of the Government to disregard that slight injury to trade, and to carry out any plan which offered a speedy termination to the war. It had been stated by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Plymouth that the want of British capital would be felt in Russia. The fact appeared to be that from two-thirds to three-fourths of the exports of Russia came into this country, and he believed that even a larger proportion of Russian trade was carried on by means of English capital. Money was advanced, in the winter, to Russian dealers to enable them to go into the interior and to bring produce from thence to the coast in the summer. A trade of that description required a large amount of capital, and, although it might be said that if the dealers of this country were prevented from embarking in that trade, dealers from other countries would, he did not think that such would be the case, for, in addition to large capital, that trade required great knowledge of the people on the spot. A very striking proof of the value of English capital was afforded upon the declaration of war. The declaration of war was made upon the 28th of March, and the general belief among the people of this country was that it was illegal, after that declaration, to have dealings with the Russians, and, indeed, it was generally determined not to continue mercantile transactions with Russian subjects. What was the result? In the town of Riga, the town with which he was best acquainted, the prices of goods fell 15 per cent. On the 15th of April a proclamation was issued, allowing English subjects to trade with Russia, and the result was that the prices of goods in Riga advanced more than the 15 per cent they had previously fallen. That, he considered, was a tolerably decisive proof of the value of British capital in Russia. Assuming that that permission to trade was again repealed, and that British subjects were no longer to be allowed to trade with Russia, then he would say, follow up that measure and forbid the importation of Russian produce. He was persuaded that the withdrawal of British capital from Russia would produce a most beneficial effect towards putting an end to the war, and he believed that the merchants in this country would not object to any such steps being taken. He had no doubt that, if any speculative persons should venture to embark their capital in trade thus forbidden, they would soon be pointed out to the Government and receive the punishment they deserved. His view of the certificate of origin would be that our consuls at the different shipping ports should throw the onus of proving that goods were not of Russian origin upon the persons applying for that certificate. Of course a great deal would depend on the manner in which the consuls did their duty. He trusted that they would justify the opinion which the noble Lord at the head of the Government entertained of them. It was notorious that, hitherto, no tallow had ever been shipped from Prussia, therefore our consuls would be pretty well justified, if an application were made for a certificate in the case of tallow, in suspecting its origin. There was certainly a small quantity of flax sent from that country, but his impression was that due vigilance on the part of the consuls and of those directly interested in the trade would prevent any smuggling to an extent which would assist the trade with Russia, and would materially assist in bringing the war to a conclusion.

Now, as to the effect which this would have upon home interests. No doubt it might possibly do a slight injury, but he thought he should be able to show that it would be as nothing compared with the national benefit of bringing the war to an early close. The three main articles which were sent from Russia and arrived here *viâ* Prussia were hemp, flax, and tallow. Now, at the beginning of the present month there were in London 9,844 tons of hemp as against 4,825 tons at the same period of 1854, 2,524 tons in 1853, and 4,009 tons in 1852. So that there was a great deal more than double the quantity in London at this time than at any of those former periods. Of tallow there were now 39,536 casks against 39,624 casks in 1854, 43,102 casks in 1853, and 57,847 casks in 1852. The quantity of tallow, therefore, was rather less. The great market for flax was Dundee, and he believed that in Dundee there never had been such a stock of flax as at this moment. But, in addition to this, let the House consider how easy it was to find substitutes for these articles. Since the repeal of the soap duties it was pretty well known that rape oil, linseed, palm, cocoa-nut, and all kinds of oil, had been largely substituted for tallow; and every year we were using less of tallow and more of its substitutes. This would be proved by a reference to the prices. On the 26th of December, 1853, several months before war was declared, the price of tallow in London was 59*s.* per cwt. At present it was 56*s.* So that it is now 3*l.* a ton lower than it had been fifteen months ago, when no war was anticipated. Palm oil, on the contrary, which at the former date had been 41*l.* a ton, was now 44*l.*, having risen precisely to the same extent as tallow had fallen. This was a clear proof that palm oil had been used as a substitute for tallow. With reference to the substitution of German tallow for Russian, he had already shown that German tallow was never sent to this country now; and when it was considered that in order to effect this the tallow of Russia would have to be sent to all the different little villages at which certain productions of tallow took place, and there used for local purposes, while the German tallow was sent thence to England, it would be seen that the expense would be so great that nothing but a very large differential value in this country would be likely to lead to any great substitution of German tallow for Russian. His own impression was, that there would be no such differential value as to repay the expense of the substitution in question. Next, with regard to hemp. There had been recently a considerable importation of hemp from India, and, if the question of transit were set at rest, we might, no doubt, look for large shipments from that country. The First Lord of the Admiralty had lately supplied himself also with an enormous quantity of hemp from Italy—about 5,000 tons—which was nearly three years' average consumption in time of peace in the dockyards. Then, again, within a very short time the patent for wire rope had expired. That article was a most formidable competitor with hemp, and it had lately fallen to one-half its former price, which was of itself an enormous advantage to the manufacturers of cordage. Lastly, he would take flax, and he must especially ask the House to look at this, because a deputation from Dundee appeared to have exercised some effect upon the mind of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs upon this subject. He thought that they had not informed that noble Lord, however, that the price of Russian flax at this moment in Dundee was as low as it had been previously to the declaration of war twelve months ago. The hon. Member for Stoke-upon-Trent (Mr. J. L. Ricardo) stated in his pamphlet that Russian flax was about two-thirds of the whole quantity of flax imported into this country; but he had forgotten the Irish flax, and, taking that into account, the Russian would not exceed half the whole quantity. He (Mr. Mitchell) had only yesterday received a letter from Ireland in which it was stated that in consequence of the present low price of flax it was the intention of the farmers to sow only half their usual quantity. The usual crop in Ireland was 35,000 tons, and if the gentlemen in Dundee, in their pursuit of great wealth, insisted upon reduced prices, they must make up their minds to find the Irish production diminished. A great deal of stress had been laid upon the supposed probability, if a great differential value were created between Russian flax and the substitute for Russian flax, that a vast number of other mills would be started in Prussia. He perceived by a circular from the Belfast linen manufacturers that the whole number of flax mills all over Prussia was nine. Now, that certainly was not a very formidable competition! Was it conceivable for one moment, because the prohibition of Russian flax might create a fictitious difference of some 10 or 15 per cent, that the flax spinners in Prussia or Belgium would set about ordering most expensive machinery for the spinning of flax, which could not be erected much under a twelvemonth; knowing, as they must know, that a termination of the war, which was the only ground of that differential value, might entirely annihilate it at a moment's notice. He had now gone through various items, and might pursue the same line of argument with regard to other articles, but he would not trouble the House further, and would conclude by stating that it was his solemn opinion that by stopping the trade of Russia the Government would adopt the most speedy and efficacious means of bringing the war to a termination.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That there be laid before this House a Return of Russian Exports from Archangel to this country during the past year."

Mr. CARDWELL: Sir, the Motion which has been brought forward with so much ability by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Plymouth is for the production of certain papers, which of course the Government can have no objection to lay upon the table, but probably the House may consider that on a question which has been argued with so much ability, and which has created so much interest both in and out of the House, it is right that I should make a more general statement than I otherwise should, were I to confine its reference merely to the terms of the Motion itself. Sir, when, unfortunately, at the expiration of a peace of nearly forty years' duration we found ourselves once more involved in a war with a European power, it became necessary for us to consider what ought to be the commercial policy of this country, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, with reference to the enemy we were about to engage, the Ally with whom we were about to be united, and with reference also to the neutral Powers whose good feelings we could not but be desirous of carrying along with us in the war in which we were involved. The consideration of these circumstances naturally led us to these conclusions — that the enemy with whom we were about to contend was peculiarly circumstanced, inasmuch as his ports were situated on the shores of land-locked seas, and so peculiarly exposed to the consequences of blockade; that the Ally with whom we were to be united had differed from us as to the maritime policy and laws which ought to prevail during hostilities; and that the neutral Powers would naturally sympathise with us if we adopted a maritime policy which would be least unfavourable to their interests. Sir, the declaration of war was accompanied by a declaration of policy on the part of Her Majesty, not waiving any of those belligerent rights for which Great Britain has contended in former wars, but suspending a part of them during the continuance of the present conflict on motives of policy arising from the considerations to which I have alluded, but which I do not think it necessary further to pursue on the present occasion. This declaration, Sir, was followed as a natural consequence by the Order in Council of the 15th of April, extending to our own countrymen the same latitude which the previous Order had given to all other persons, to which the hon. Member for Bridport (Mr. Mitchell) has alluded in terms of disapprobation, and however desirous we might be of carrying on the war with vigour — however (reasons sufficient being shown) we might be ready to agree with the hon. and learned Member for Plymouth (Mr. Collier) to engage in a conflict with Russia, which would cost us two sovereigns for every one it would cost that Power, yet surely to adopt a course the consequence of which must be to inflict an injury on ourselves, while scarcely an appreciable particle of it could reach our enemy, would be neither compatible with the dictates of common sense, nor with the desire to bring this war to a speedy and successful termination. But, says my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Plymouth, you have adopted a course the result of which has been totally and entirely ineffective. I took notice of the phrases which the hon. and learned Gentleman used while he was so contending. He said that our operations had signally failed—that the exports from Russia have not been diminished. [Mr. COLLIER: From some of the ports.] But the statistics of the whole trade, those quoted by the hon. Member for Bridport, and those which it may be necessary for me to trouble the House with, lead to a totally opposite conclusion. But, says my hon. and learned Friend, the result of your proceeding by blockade has been ineffective. With that conclusion I most respectfully join issue. I shall be able to show that they have been far from ineffective, even under the circumstances under which they have been conducted. But what are those circumstances? You tell us truly that trade with Russia is peculiar, because in times of peace it is carried on by advances of English capital made in preceding years. It was so carried on, and the natural corollary from that system was, that on the outbreak of a war you should lean to those whose property, invested in Russia, was on its return home—those subjects of your own Crown who were bringing their property from hostile ports, for otherwise you would injure yourselves, not your enemies. Accordingly time was given in the Baltic and in the White Sea, and I will not hesitate to acknowledge, with regard to the Black Sea, that the blockade was not enforced in that satisfactory manner which may be considered desirable. Making this avowal frankly, I may state some of the causes which led to that circumstance. At the outbreak of hostilities, a blockade was to be carried on by your own vessels in conjunction with those of an ally, it was necessary that communications should be made between the Allied Powers as to the terms upon which that blockade was to be carried on, and as to the vessels by which it was to be conducted. It unavoidably happened that some time was spent in the early part of the summer in communications upon this subject before the blockade was signified, and, at a later period, every vessel which either of the Allied Powers could command was employed in that great expedition which took place in September. Be that, however, as it may, there was time given in the Baltic for the reason I have stated, and there was time given in the White Sea longer than was given in the Baltic, on account of the difference of latitude; and also, because there was English and French property in the White Sea which it was important should be brought home. There was, besides, that inevitable remissness of the blockade in the Black Sea to which I have alluded. You will not expect, under these circumstances, that the comparison of 1854 with preceding years will show that result as respects the pressure upon the trade of Russia which the advocates of effective operations might desire. But do not imagine that I am making this preamble as an excuse for results that when they are laid before you you will consider unsatisfactory. The hon. Member for Bridport says that we have been paying dearer for two-thirds of the usual Russian exports than we used to pay for the whole. Now, Sir, my hon. Friend coupled with that an argument which, I hope he will allow me to say, did surprise me, coming from so acute an economist as himself, and which I shall more fully examine by and by. What, then, has been the actual result of our operations up to this time? First, whatever mercantile navy Russia possessed may be said, for the purposes of commerce, to have been entirely annihilated, while our own ships ride unharmed in every sea, and I do not know the shipowner or consigner of merchandise who would give any considerable insurance in order to be guaranteed against the risk of capture by the Russians. Then, with regard to manufactures, Russia takes great pains to become a manufacturing country. She protects her manufactures by import duties. I have reason to believe that her manufactures have suffered materially by your being able to put upon Russia, by means of your blockade, that very pressure which my hon. Friend is so anxious to induce you to put upon Great Britain, namely, to prevent the supply of raw material with which our manufactories are supplied. Perhaps, Sir, I ought upon an occasion like this to trouble the House with figures, because everything connected with the conduct of the war is naturally of interest in your eyes, and I will, therefore, read to you a few of the the figures which have been supplied to me to show what has been the state of the case in 1854, as compared with 1853, with regard to the exports of Russia to this country in the articles which the hon. Member for Bridport specified as those to which he wished to direct particular attention—namely, flax, hemp, and tallow. In 1853 Russia sent us 1,287,000 cwt. of tallow. In 1854 she sent us very little; but, in order to make the comparison a fair one, I will add the Prussian increase to account for the Russian decrease, and then you will see how far, by means of the overland trade through Prussia, Russia has been able to avoid the loss thus occasioned to her. The Prussian increase in 1854 was 425,483 cwt.—making the net Russian decrease in that article 676,000 cwt., or 52 per cent upon the whole trade. With regard to the diminution in hemp in 1854 as compared with 1853, it was 53 per cent, and with regard to tallow it is 62 per cent. Under the circumstances I have stated, these figures show that the blockade has not been ineffective, and I think it is surprising that so great an effect should have been produced in so short a time, for you will not forget that these are the results of a blockade as yet very imperfect, and that the advances of British capital, by which in time of peace the trade of Russia is carried on, had not yet been discontinued. Now, Sir, with regard to the exports of cotton, the raw cotton sent from this country to Russia has fallen off to the extent of 54 per cent, and I hold a long list of other articles which have fallen in the same proportion. My hon. Friend said that there were other sources from which any vacuum created in these trades might easily be supplied. They have told us that it is quite futile to suppose that new manufactories would be established in Germany; but they have not, I suppose, ever travelled into the manufacturing districts, and do not know the rapidity with which, when money and cotton and corn are cheap, manufactories grow up. I do hope that this country, whether in war or in peace, will never be led into that fancied security which would lead them to suppose that they can trifle with the position of its trade. Depend upon it that in times like these, competition springs up where you do not expect it,—

> "Grows like the summer grass, fastest by night,
> Unseen, but crescive in its faculty;"

and, if you pass unwise laws here, you will find out when it is too late a formidable enemy that you have yourself created. I hold in my hand an account of the extent to which other countries than Russia have increased in their exports to this country in the same time, and I find a correspondent increase. With regard to prices, it is notorious that the tendency has been to raise the price of those articles at London, and to depress them at St. Petersburg. I hold an extract from two circulars of respectable Russian merchants, Messrs. Catley and Co., showing a decrease in the prices of tallow, of hemp, of flax, and of linseed at St. Petersburg, between the end of 1853 and the end of 1854, and a correspondent rise of most of those articles in the port of London.

MR. MITCHELL: I wish to inquire if the cost of carriage is included in the calculation?

MR. CARDWELL: If my hon. Friend desires it, I will read what Messrs. Catley and Co. say, *in extenso*. My hon. Friend is dealing with the case of articles produced in different countries, and having to compete with each other in the common market of London. He has told us that we need not be afraid of Germany, for that the adoption of his plan would not be followed by the erection there of new manufactories to compete with ours. The duration of the war is uncertain, and the confidence necessary for that expenditure would not exist. Why, then, does he suppose that the confidence, and consequent expenditure, for creating in India a new cultivation for our market, could arise from that source which in the other case he has described as so precarious? But if hemp be grown in India to compete with Russia, does he think the additional cost to which you put the Russian in bringing his goods to market is a gain? That doctrine of my hon. Friend the Member for Bridport would lead to extraordinary consequences. I will read the views of Messrs. Catley and Co. on this point:—

> "The expense, risk, and delay attending the overland trade has caused much discouragement and dissatisfaction, and there is little disposition here to continue it. We may state, in explanation of this, that the cost of conveying tallow, hemp, and flax hence to Memel and Königsberg has been from 20*l.* to 25*l.* per ton, and that goods have been three and four months on the way thither; and there have been several instances of their having been lost sight of entirely for weeks—left lying in the woods or villages, where the carriers had left them while they took other goods forward at higher rates of carriage. At this moment considerable quantities are stopped by ice on their way down the Niemen, bound for Memel, and other parcels are detained at Kowno, there being no supply of horses to convey them forward to Memel and Königsberg."

It has been said by the hon. Member that the cost had exceeded 2,500,000*l.*, but I am willing to take either estimate, and I will say that the greater the cost of bringing the goods into a neutral port the more I am convinced does the pressure of the blockade begin to operate upon the Russian trade. Messrs. Catley proceed to say—

> "It is scarcely credible, but we believe it to be a fact, that the sum disbursed for land carriage in the overland trade above alluded to considerably exceeds 1,000,000*l.* sterling for exports only. So great an addition to the usual charges of invoice may, in a great measure, account for the comparatively high rate of exchange. Prices in the interior are said to be low, a natural consequence of accumulation of supply and absence of the usual demand; but a change from war to peace would soon alter that state of things. The course of exchange was on the rise yesterday, but a decline may be looked for under existing circumstances."

Well, Sir, that is the result of a blockade which is said to be utterly and totally inadequate, and to have produced no effect whatever upon the trade of Russia. Then an hon. Member has founded an argument upon the price of the rouble and the state of the exchanges. Now, it must be obvious that an argument drawn from the state of the exchanges is only another form of the argument already drawn from the other circumstances of commerce. The exchanges are the barometer of commerce, and the mode by which the pecuniary transactions of trade are regulated. But there are so many disturbing causes, connected with investments, the payment of dividends, and the like, that when other indications are accessible, it is safer to rely upon them than upon the state of the exchanges. It is, however, natural and probable that the course of the exchanges, if spread over a considerable period, will bring you to the same result as that at which you would arrive if you argued upon other, and, as I think, safer grounds. Well, Sir, do they bring you to the same result here? When my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Plymouth said the rouble fell, at the declaration of war, from 38*d.* to 32*d.*, but, afterwards, on the Orders in Council, rose again to par he intended you to suppose that the rouble had not fallen, and from that circumstance to infer that there had been no pressure upon the trade of Russia. But is that the fact? and is it not desirable to examine that statement? The fact is, that in time of peace the exchange is favourable to Russia, because advances are made in money for produce which is exported from Russia. Accordingly, in time of peace, the value of the rouble usually indicates the flow of bullion from London to Petersburg. Ever since the declaration of war the reverse has been the case. Throughout the whole time the rouble has been so far depressed that its value has indicated a constant tendency of bullion from St. Petersburg to London. It is true that the first effect of the depression to 32*d.* was not wholly maintained. My hon. Friend would not have been surprised at this circumstance if he had reflected that at 32*d.* the export of bullion yielded a profit of 10 per cent. It is clear that this rate could not continue, but must come to something more near the level of the exchanges. The evidence of the exchanges here agrees with and confirms the proofs derived from any other indication in the case. I am sorry to trouble you with this detail of facts, but it is, I think, manifest that, by the operations of the blockade, you have produced considerable effect upon the trade of Russia, that her mercantile navy has ceased to exist for commercial purposes, that her manufacturers have been prevented from obtaining their raw material, that the quantity and the prices of her produce have diminished, and that the cost of transporting her raw material to market has been considerable. Here I must notice a fallacy that crept into the argument of the hon. and learned Member for Plymouth. It necessarily followed from the system of advances that a considerable part at least of the expenses of transport of Russian produce should at first fall upon the British merchant, because it was his interest to get home the goods for which he had paid; but in future years, when the advances are put a stop to, and contracts are made upon a new footing, the expense of transport will always fall upon the producer, who, coming here, will have to meet other sellers in the open market. That being the result of the blockade, the next question for consideration is, was it in the power o the Government by further measures to inflict still greater injury upon Russia; and would the effect of the measures which have been suggested this evening have been to inflict further injury upon Russia; and would the measures which have generally been advocated have had the effect of injuring Russia or England? Now, it is manifest that if the trade with Russia were entirely interrupted, both countries would suffer, since both countries derive profit from the trade, or it would not be carried on. But a blockade operating on neutrals as well as upon Russia inflicts the maximum of injury on Russia and the minimum injury upon ourselves. Customs regulations in this country against Russian produce would, on the contrary, have inflicted the maximum injury upon ourselves and the minimum injury upon Russia. That was the reason why the Government hesitated to enforce commercial restrictions at home. And here let me ask you to pursue this case and take a particular article—that of flax. Now, you talk as if the sources of supply of the raw material were easy to be obtained. You talk of the great importance of the English market to Russia, and the insignificance of the supply of Russian flax to Great Britain. But the linen manufacture of this country is equal in value to the whole export trade of Russia in flax and all other exported articles. Stop the raw material in the country of its growth, and what pressure do you cause upon the agricultural producer? You drive him from his best customer, and you compel him to go to his second best customer and dispose of his property, though, I admit, at a diminution of profit, which, nevertheless, always has a constant tendency to regain itself. For by your suicidal policy you make those his best customers who had not hitherto been so, and you cause yourselves, who were his best customers, to be so no longer. Well, what is the effect upon the manufacturer? My hon. Friend the Member for Dundee (Mr. Duncan), if he should address the House with that ability and knowledge which he possesses, will be able to tell you much more accurately than I can what is the exact amount of advantage which the linen manufacturers of Yorkshire, Scotland, and Ireland possess over their German rivals. I believe that in the open market that advantage is small, and that a slight difference in price would cause orders to go to Germany. What is the consequence? We are now fighting an equal battle. Hon. Gentlemen have said that there are too many flaxmills in England, that the linen trade is overdone, that more was produced than the manufacturers could find a market for, and that the remedy of the hon. Member for Bridport for an excess of production is to make the raw material dear in order to enable them the better to compete with their rivals! Now, I beg you to observe the effect. You make his raw material dear. You tell him he is to go to India for it. Why does he not go to India now? On account of the difference of price. Then you are going to add a difference of price, which is not added to the price of his competitor. All Russian flax which he does not buy must go somewhere, though at a lower price. It goes to the very persons with whom the Englishman is competing, and, by a double operation, you have made his material dear and cheapened the material of his rival, and all this for the purpose of inflicting a trifling loss on your enemy, the producer in Russia, because, as I have shown you, there is a constant tendency in trade to reduce the small difficulty created to him, and to aggravate the difficulty created to you. I will read to you a chapter of history towards the close of the late war, because these doctrines have not been invented by the hon. and learned Member for Plymouth (Mr. Collier) and the hon. Member for Bridport (Mr. Mitchell). These doctrines were held forty years ago by high authorities. They were held at that time by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and by the Gentleman who filled the office which I now have the honour to hold, and in the year 1811 the Chancellor of the Exchequer brought in a Bill for laying a duty on the cotton of the United States of America, and, as if in whimsical parallel with the arguments made use of to-night, when the late Lord Ashburton objected to the Bill on the ground of the injury it would do to England, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said—

> "As to the supply of cotton, he did not fear but that our own colonies and the East Indies would yield a very sufficient supply in case we should get none from America."

The Board of Trade was of the same opinion. Mr. Rose said—

> "That he believed there never could be any deficiency in the supply of cotton wool, as the East Indies could yield a supply to any extent."

Now, how were you saved from those deplorable consequences? By the wisdom of this House. The first Sir Robert Peel, Colonel Stanley, the Member for the county of Lancaster, and the late Lord Ashburton did not think that it was desirable that we should go to the East Indies for cotton, and the House of Commons agreed with them, and differed from the Government of that day, so that injurious result was prevented, and the Bill was rejected. The cotton was then a great trade in comparison with the flax trade, and during the interval the cotton trade has immensely increased; but let me ask you to consider what would have been the effect if that doctrine of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1811 had prevailed. Do you think it is no advantage to Manchester that Liverpool should be the cheapest market for cotton in the world? If, in 1811, the Government had succeeded in making Hamburg or some continental town the great emporium for cotton, and their German rivals had been able to get it cheapest near them, while the Manchester manufacturer had to send to a distant market, do you think there would have been that wonderful development of the cotton trade which we have happily witnessed in the last forty years, or that we should now be deriving those immense sources of wealth, of domestic happiness, and of martial power which we do derive in a great measure from that development? You deal lightly with the linen trade, though I have shown you that it is equal to the whole export trade of Russia put together. How can you set limits to the expansion, which, in in the absence of restrictions, the linen trade may attain in forty years? And do not let us confine it merely to a question of trade. It was with great astonishment I heard Ireland pressed into the case, as if it were to the benefit of Ireland. Those doctrines which we heard some time ago, about putting on prohibitions to encourage domestic growth, have reappeared to-night. Ireland, and the north of Ireland particularly, has been quoted as an argument why we ought to have resorted to Customs prohibitions and certificates of origin. Let me appeal from my hon. Friend (Mr. Mitchell) to the Royal Flax Society, who devote themselves with so much advantage to the improvement of the cultivation of flax in Ireland, and permit me to read to you their sentiments on the subject now under consideration, as embodied in their last annual Report:—

> "When war was declared by Her Majesty's Government against the Emperor of Russia, it was at once apparent that the interruption of our commercial relations with that empire might seriously affect the supply of the raw material of the British and Irish linen manufacture, as well as of the seed which has hitherto been obtained from Riga for sowing in Ireland. When it is remembered that of an annual average of 80,000 tons of flax from all countries, nearly 60,000 tons are brought from Russia alone, and that, of the yearly import of flax-seed fòr sowing in Ireland, from two-thirds to three-fourths come from Riga, it will at once be seen that the cessation or diminution of the supply of these articles, as a consequence of the war, might be productive of serious inconvenience to the linen manufacturers of the United Kingdom, and to the flax-growers of Ireland."

I have said that the linen trade of this country is nearly equal to the whole external commerce of Russia; but supposing you were resolved to prohibit all articles coming into this country by Customs regulations. Observe, that is no part of the ordinary laws of war, and, remember, I have not said a syllable in favour of that relaxation of the ordinary rigour of warfare for which some hon. Members are disposed to contend. I am arguing now against imposing restrictions, the effects of which operate almost entirely on yourselves, and the incidence of which, on your enemy, is minute or imperceptible. But, supposing we had determined it was beneficial, and had set about to do it, how were we to do it? Are we to resort to certificates of origin, which have been proved inefficacious by universal experience? In the last European war, which we waged for years against combined Europe, what were the circumstances which increased the pressure on this country but that you had thrown your own trade out of employment, and the manufacturing districts were in confusion. What has been the experience of history? I will tell you, from unexceptionable authority, from one whose natural inclinations would not indispose him to restrictions. Sir Archibald Alison, speaking of the fruitlessness with which Napoleon, in the plenitude of his power, attempted to accomplish an operation which you speak of as so easy to accomplish, that the Government is culpable for not having carried into effect. Alison, reviewing the history of the last war, says—

> "To such height was this practice carried by the French Emperor that it opened up new channels of commerce to British industry quite equal, on the Continent of Europe, to those his decree had destroyed; and the suffering experienced in England during the continuance of the continental system was almost entirely owing—not to this Berlin Decree—but to the loss of the great North American Market, which the Orders in Council ultimately closed against British industry."

But how would you have undertaken to accomplish it? Let me ask, first, would you have proceeded in this war alone, or would you have thought it necessary to consult France? She is your ally. She, like you, is dependent for the seed of flax on the source you seek to close. Are you ready to do it of your own mere motion, without concurrence with her? Do you think it would tend to cement good understanding between the two countries to see a benefit conferred on an ally by her superior sagacity, from which you have thought proper to exclude yourselves? But again, I ask, how would you do it? By certificates of origin! That is to say, that Prussia, being a great exporting country of flax, you would ask your Prussian Consuls to state whether produce exported thence originated in Russia or Prussia. Now, do you believe that such a system would either be efficacious or even practicable? Flax and tallow are the produce of Prussia as well as of Russia. How can a Consul distinguish the origin of any particular consignment? He must accept the affidavits that are sworn. The hon. Member for Bridport said, with truth, that perjury would be the result; but, he added, you need not be afraid of it, for the Russian houses are the most respectable in the world. Let me ask, how long would the trade continue in those houses, and what would be the benefit to this country of destroying the foundations of those houses, which you justly say are most respectable, in order to substitute firms who are willing to make perjury part of their business? I am afraid experience of human nature teaches, that if you want an affidavit of origin, an affidavit of origin can be obtained, the difference being that you would pay for the article and pay for the affidavit also, and I believe that would be the result of requiring Prussian Consuls to give certificates of origin. But, supposing you got over that difficulty—the law of the country, and the law of common sense is, that partial manufacture makes a production the production of the country where it is partially manufactured. My hon. and learned Friend quoted Lord Stowell's language, with regard to the doctrine of 1756, and urged that we should make the overland trade the ground of a remonstrance to be addressed to Prussia. It is necessary before doing so that we should be more accurate in our statement of that doctrine than my hon. Friend. I have no right to contend with my hon. and learned Friend, but when I hold in my hand the *Commentaries* of Chancellor Kent, I am inspired with a confidence that what he lays down is not deficient in sound law. Chancellor Kent said—

> "It is contended that it is unjust and illegal for neutrals to avail themselves of the pressure of war to engage in a new species of traffic not permitted in peace, and which the necessities of one belligerent oblige him to grant to the detriment, or, perhaps, the destruction of the other."

Again, my hon. and learned Friend contended that the right of search for enemy's goods in neutral vessels ought to be revived. That is one of the suggestions which he makes. Would it be prudent, I ask, to announce to neutral countries that we contemplated the reinstitution of the right of search? I presume that is not what we are to contend for. Then, with respect to the prohibition of importing the raw material, what would be the effect of such a measure? What is the law upon that subject? When the raw material is partially manufactured in any country it becomes the manufacture of that country. If Russian flax be combed in Prussia it becomes Prussian flax; if Russian tallow be melted in Prussia it becomes Prussian stearine. What would be the effect, then, of your prohibiting the importation of the raw material from Russia? It would not be to cripple the trade of Russia, but it would be to create a large manufacture in Prussia both of manufactured flax and of stearine, to the prejudice of those branches of trade in this country. But, supposing you were to succeed in putting an end to the importation of partially manufactured articles from Prussia, how far could you carry that policy? You may rely upon it that if you did succeed in prohibiting, by means of certificates, the importation of partially manufactured articles from Prussian ports, you would not be able to prevent those articles from coming in through Holland and other countries of the Continent. Depend upon it means of evasion would be found to follow every enactment you might impose, and what would be the result? You would injure your own trade to the clear gain of Russia. We may derive some experience from the late war as to the effect, not exactly of the system of certificates of origin, but of licences. By the commercial system which we have pursued there has been one signal and conspicuous advantage derived. It has been carried on upon one universal rule; no privileges have been granted, no benefit has been conferred by licences; there have been no favoured traders, no unscrupulous traders; but all have been dealt with alike. During the late war licences were granted by the Privy Council. I may ask whether those licences were not as likely to be free from suspicion as certificates of origin granted by Consuls? But what was the experience of trade with regard to those licences? My hon. Friend the Member for Bridport thinks that a system of certificates would give rise to fraudulent oaths, but what was the case with respect to the system of licences in 1812? So great was the abuse of the system that at that period it led to several lengthened debates in both Houses of Parliament, in the course of which the strongest and most indignant denunciations of the system were uttered. On the 28th of February, 1812, the Marquess of Lansdowne said, "that licences had increased to a most unparalleled extent, and with them a system of immorality, fraud, and perjury which pervaded the whole trade of the country." And what was the opinion of Lord Stowell on the subject? The Marquess of Lansdowne on that occasion quoted the words of Lord Stowell, who said, "that the whole system of the commerce of the country was one of simulation and dissimulation." That was the result of the system of licences granted by the Privy Council; and what, I wish to know, would be the result of certificates of origin granted upon affidavit? But it was said during the late war, and no doubt the same would be said by my hon. Friend the Member for Bridport now, that his were not the doctrines of sound political economy, but were exceptional doctrines necessarily adopted in consequence of the pressure of the war. The same thing was said in the debate at the close of the last war. But, surely, the true test of any doctrine is this —is it accurate or inaccurate? Does it lead to a right conclusion or a false conclusion? If doctrines be true, then the more important the crisis, the more serious the consequence of departing from them, the more you are bound in reason and prudence to adhere to them. How can you show that that which is commercially inj rious would be politically expedient? What would you expect to be the consequence on the mind of the Emperor of Russia or of neutral Powers of adopting a course calculated to injure us more than Russia? Do you think it would produce a discouraging effect on the mind of the Emperor of Russia, and hasten his disposition to conclude a peace? It seems to me it must lead to the opposite result. It is said that Prussia is encouraged in her neutrality because she derives a benefit from the transit trade. Would she be less encouraged if she derived, besides, the profit of having your manufactures transferred to her? What would be the consequence upon the population at home? I believe the capitalists and the working men of this country are prepared to make any sacrifice for the sake of a vigorous prosecution of the war, but they must be satisfied that it is reasonably and thoughtfully done; and when the hon. Member for Plymouth talks of our losing two sovereigns where the Emperor of Russia loses one, I think they will require some proof of the advantage of that system before they consent to adopt it. I think our trade has kept up most remarkably, considering that we are subject to the disasters of a war. It is astonishing to think that as 1853 was beyond all precedent the greatest year ever known in the British export trade, when there came upon us in 1854, a European war, a crisis in America, and a crisis in Australia, the falling off of our trade in 1854 was so small that, although it was two per cent below the year 1853, it was far beyond any comparison with preceding years. You are aware of the temporary check which has been given to our trade in the manufacturing districts on account of the pressure of the war; but do you think that in furnishing the ways and means for a vigorous prosecution of the war it will be any satisfaction to you to find that you have dried up some sources of revenue without inflicting injury on the Emperor of Russia? Do you think, if we were to approach the state of things which existed in this country in 1812, when great distress pervaded the manufacturing districts, and the price of food was high, we should find that any advantage in the way of a vigorous prosecution of the war? It appears to me a most remarkable circumstance that at the end of the first twelve months of the war you should have been able to inflict this serious injury upon the trade of the Emperor of Russia, with every prospect of inflicting a far severer blow in the coming year, and that you should have sustained so small and disproportionate an injury yourselves. I submit to the House that it justifies the course which we have pursued in adopting that mode of repression which was calculated to inflict the maximum injury on the enemy and the minimum injury on ourselves, and in refraining from those acts of restriction which would have inflicted slight and temporary injury on the enemy and great and permanent injury on ourselves. I have dealt with the course of events during the past year, and the results which that course of events has produced. I think I have shown you that a vigorous prosecution of the war has been the desire of the Government, and that if they have refrained from adopting the measures which the hon. Members for Plymouth and Bridport have suggested, it has not been from any other motive than the belief that these measures would have been injurious, not to the great empire against which we are contending, but to the manufacturing population of this country—to the agriculture of Ireland—to the revenue of this country—and, speaking generally, to the domestic prosperity of the United Kingdom.

Mr. J. L. RICARDO said, he should be quite willing, after hearing the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, to leave the argument as it had been stated by the hon. and learned Gentleman who made the Motion and his hon. Friend who seconded it, and as it had been answered by the President of the Board of Trade. But, at the same time, he did not think there could be any policy in letting in a little of the Russian trade, or in admitting that the raw material was what we wanted, and refusing to give every encouragement to those who would furnish it for the purpose which had been so well described by the right hon. Gentleman. Before he replied to what had been said, he was bound to state that no man who knew his hon. Friend (Mr. Mitchell) could attribute to him any motive of self-interest in the course he had taken on that occasion, and the very position of the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Collier) who had made that Motion was sufficient to convince anybody that he also was not actuated by any such feelings. Both of these hon. Members did well in disclaiming on behalf of those who urged them to bring forward this subject that any self-interest was mixed up with the patriotic cry for a stringent blockade, of which they were the organs. He (Mr. Ricardo), however, viewed with great suspicion the source from which this cry proceeded. He could not believe that the Russian merchants were anxious to stop the Russian trade, and when the hon. and learned Gentleman said that Prussia was infringing her neutrality by allowing Russian produce to pass to England he would tell him that if the Russians wanted to sell it, and the Prussians had an interest in allowing it to pass, Englishmen would buy it whether that produce were Russian or not. This always had been, and must always be, the case. The Milan and Berlin decrees were unable to prevent the produce of France from coming into this country. The very corn which was consumed by our army came into this country from France in spite of the restrictions of Napoleon; and the great evil inflicted on us was not caused by the French Government through the decrees by which they endeavoured to deprive us of their trade, but was produced by ourselves through our meeting them half-way by our Orders in Council of 1807, whereby we deprived ourselves of our trade for the benefit of those to whom we were opposed. Now, he must say, that of all the conflicting reasoning he had ever heard adduced to establish one and the same proposition, the mutually contradictory arguments which he had heard that night from the two hon. Members who moved and seconded this Motion were the most remarkable. One hon. Gentleman taunted the right hon. Baronet at the head of the Admiralty with omitting to institute a stringent blockade, and said that the only place where such a blockade had been established was at the Danube, and that we had had no corn imported into this country because we had blockaded that river. Now, this was a point worthy of the consideration of the House. The hon. Gentleman held that we ought not to permit Russian produce to enter this country. But the Emperor of Russia said the same thing, and was ready to spare our First Lord of the Admiralty the trouble or necessity of sending out any of our cruisers to prevent Russian corn from being imported into England to feed the people, who he was sorry to see in some parts of the country were up in arms because of the high price at which bread was now sold to them. But the hon. Gentleman wanted to shut out Russian produce altogether. He wanted to establish the system of certificates of origin, respecting which he (Mr. Ricardo) would add nothing to what had fallen from the right hon. President of the Board of Trade. The hon. Member for Bridport had discovered a most remarkable means of stopping Russian produce from coming from a Prussian port, and argued that, as no tallow now came from Memel or any other Prussian port, therefore none would hereafter come thence, and so he concluded that when any tallow proceeded from a Prussian port our consul must know that it was Russian, because no tallow ever came from Prussian ports. This was a most extraordinary line of argument, because it was obvious that if we prevented Russian tallow from leaving Prussian ports the Prussians would naturally keep the Russian article for their own consumption and send out their own, which they never used to do before; and it would be quite impossible to tell the one article from the other. We had no means of knowing the origin of corn—whether it was Dantzic corn or any other—and so in the case of tallow. The merchant would only have to mix a ladleful of Prussian tallow with a whole cask of Russian tallow and the article would become Prussian immediately, and all the certificates of origin they could invent would not put a stop to this. It was therefore perfectly ridiculous to say that we would not buy Prussian tallow without requiring half-a-dozen people to swear that it was not Russian. He would undertake himself to convert Russian tallow into Prussian in five minutes by simply taking a ladleful of the one and a ladleful of the other and mixing them together, and then he would not mind taking the oath. [*Laughter.*] He was only illustrating the construction that was put upon the origin of tallow by the Board of Trade, and put upon it also by all other countries; because, when the article was in the slightest degree manufactured, or to the smallest extent mixed with a different sort, it was no longer dealt with as the produce of the country from whence it originally came. The discussions that had taken place upon the Navigation Laws had, he thought, familiarised the House with that fact. They all knew that, under those laws, cotton proceeding from America could not come to this country in a French ship unless it had been partially manufactured, or mixed in some manner, in France; and this was manifestly a very easy process. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. Mitchell) said it was quite idle to suppose that we could have any competition in the linen trade, even if we shut out all the flax which entered this country, because he said nobody would be such a fool as to build a factory when he knew that the war might be over in six months, and his factory would be of no use to him. He (Mr. Ricardo) would not repeat the able argument of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Cardwell), who showed how inexpedient it was to create competition to ourselves, and that it was far easier to lose a market for our goods than it was to recover it again. But how did the hon. Gentlemen reconcile their reasoning on this point with their assertions that we should obtain all kinds of raw material from other countries besides Russia? They had stated that if we excluded Russian hemp, flax, and tallow, we could procure supplies of these articles from Italy, Australia, and India. But he might turn round upon these hon. Gentlemen and ask them, in their own words, whether they supposed that any man in India would be so foolish as to embark his property in the cultivation of flax when he knew that the war might be concluded in six months, and he would have to compete with the Russian producer? The one or the other of these arguments must be fallacious. Either we ran the risk of the manufacture of flax being established in foreign countries, or we had no chance of receiving supplies of the raw material from places which did not grow it now. He next came to the main point in this controversy. Hon. Gentlemen contended that by shutting out Russian produce we could so coerce, intimidate, and impoverish the Emperor of Russia as to compel him to make peace with us upon any terms that we pleased, and that we could make him swallow, not the "four points" alone, but any number of points that we chose to impose upon him. Now, the whole amount of the exports from Russia into this country was 7,000,000*l.* per annum, and this was not all profit. 10 per cent of it only was the total gain accruing to the Emperor of Russia's subjects, or 700,000*l.*; but, allowing the profit to be 5 per cent more than that, this would raise it to 1,050,000*l.* Our prohibition of Russian produce, then, would be equivalent to a tax of 1,050,000*l.* per annum upon the Emperor's subjects; and was it to be contended for a moment that for such a sum as that they were likely to be induced to coerce their Sovereign into making a peace? The proposition was too contemptible to be entertained for an instant. What did the Emperor of Russia think of the matter himself? Why, by a single stroke of the pen he arrested the export of corn to the amount of 6,000,000*l.* a year from his own ports without being afraid that his people would turn upon him for taking such a step. It was preposterous, therefore, for us to imagine that by stopping a trade yielding a profit to the extent of 1,050,000*l.* per annum, we should be able to compel the Emperor of Russia to submit to our dictation. They were advised to shut out this 1,050,000*l.*; he sanctioned no such proceeding; for it would only tend to make the Emperor of Russia despise us, and give him the idea that we were depending upon such measures rather than upon the vigorous operation of our forces. If they returned to the fiscal measures of 1806 and 1807, and to the miserable economical doctrines displayed in the Orders in Council of that period, sure he was that they would be followed by the same difficulties in meeting the exigencies of the war, and by those scenes of distress which he hoped would never again recur.

VISCOUNT DUNCAN said, he thought the House had some reason to complain of the notice which appeared on the paper, and which might have been reasonably supposed to lead to a different sort of debate than that to which the House had been called upon to listen. The terms of the Motion were, "To call the attention of the House to the state of our trade with Russia, and to move for a return of the Russian exports from Archangel to this country during the present year." Now the port of Archangel was closed with ice, and would not be open until the middle of June. [MR. COLLIER said his Motion was intended to refer to last year.] It was not his intention to trespass long upon the time of the House after the able speeches which had been made by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade, and the hon. Member for Stoke upon Trent (Mr. J. L. Ricardo), but as he had been personally alluded to by one of the hon. Members who had brought forward this Motion, he thought he was bound to offer one or two words of explanation. He had joined a deputation that had waited upon the Earl of Clarendon a few weeks ago, and he, perhaps, might be enabled to enlighten the House upon one or two points. The hon. Member for Bridport (Mr. Mitchell) had cast some unworthy taunts upon the millowners who were engaged in the manufacture of linen. He would not follow the example of his hon. Friend, for he should be sorry to cast censures upon any large bodies of his countrymen. There could be no doubt that both the hon. Members for Plymouth and Bridport were above suspicion; but he would ask the House to consider the conduct of those capitalists whom they represented. From the declaration of war in March nothing was heard with regard to the proposed blockade. Everything went on smoothly until a larger amount of flax than in any former year was brought into this country. When that amount of flax was brought in certain gentlemen were seized with a sudden fit of activity, and found out that the blockade had not been properly enforced. Soon afterwards deputations of merchants, not of manufacturers, were heard of, as waiting upon the Earl of Clarendon, and endeavouring to impress upon him the necessity of enforcing the blockade. He, having heard of those deputations, accompanied a deputation of millowners to Lord Clarendon, and he was bound to state in that House that the noble Earl told them that, whatever might be his personal or private feelings—however anxious he might be to maintain the trade of this country—he thought it right to say that in the position he occupied he should feel it incumbent upon him to take every means in his power to vex, to harass, and to annoy the great enemy with whom we were at war. Considering the difficulties with which all our operations had been accompanied, he (Viscount Duncan) thought that the conduct of the noble Earl did the greatest possible credit to Her Majesty's Administration. He could not for an instant forget that, during what had been called the party shuffles of which they had lately heard so much, there was the greatest unanimity on one point—namely, that, whatever changes might take place, the Earl of Clarendon was not to be removed from the position he so worthily occupied as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He (Viscount Duncan) would tell his hon. Friends who had spoken in favour of this Motion that he had more confidence in the noble Earl's judgment than in theirs, for the noble Lord had carried the country triumphantly through the war as far as his foreign policy was concerned. [The noble Lord then proceeded to read extracts from letters he had received from Russia, stating that prices were 30 per cent higher than during the peace, which must inevitably produce great distress, and that if the present standstill should continue much longer trade would be completely ruined.] Now, while the Russian people were in that state of distress, let the House for a moment turn their attention to the people of Forfarshire, which he represented, and which was largely engaged in the linen trade. Whether they looked there, or to the West Riding of Yorkshire, or to the northern parts of Ireland, they would find that the state of the working classes would be benefited by keeping down the prices of flax to the lowest possible amount. How could the trade of Russia be stopped? Were we to declare war with Prussia? Could we prevent Russian produce coming through Prussia? Even if we could, we should find that Russian produce would come into this country through some other channel, if it was wanted. Was the House gravely to deliberate whether it would cut off the supply of flax at once? No doubt if the war continued, other places might be found from whence supplies of raw produce might be obtained equal to the supplies which we received from Russia, but let the House consider what evils would be inflicted upon the districts he had named by the course which had been suggested by the supporters of this Motion—what dire distress they would have to contend against if the raw material were suddenly cut off. There was distress enough in those districts already. He had that day received letters stating that they had suffered greatly from the war, but that they were still willing to endure any amount of suffering; that they were willing to take their full share of the difficulties, their full share of the pains and penalties, but they were not willing that the Government by any hasty or injudicious step should aggravate their distresses. On the part of his constituents, he publicly thanked the Government for what they had already done in regard to the conduct of the war, but at the same time he must express a hope that by no such course as that suggested by the hon. and learned Member (Mr. Collier) would they consent to inflict upon his constituents, and others in a similar position, heavier distresses than they were at present called upon to endure.

Mr. WATSON said, that he did not distinctly understand the policy of the Government; for while they avowed an intention of carrying on the strict system of blockade which had been pursued in all former wars, the argument of the President of the Board of Trade, if good for anything, went to show that blockades should be entirely done away with, and that free trade should be allowed in time of war as in time of peace. Now, he could not assent to this, for he believed that blockades, by crippling the trade of Russia, were the most effectual means of depriving her of resources for carrying on this war. By a strict blockade, not only the Russian merchant but the Russian noble, who grew the produce to be exported, would be impoverished, if not ruined. The war of the counting-house would bring this most miserable contest to an end sooner than battering at the walls of Sebastopol. On this, the political part of the question, he had neither the means nor the inclination of following the President of the Board of Trade. He wished to discuss the mercantile question. What he complained of was, that the Government proclaimed their intention in that House to adopt a system of blockade, but did not, in fact, maintain any blockade. The linseed trade with the ports in the Baltic and Black Sea was the principal one of the town which he represented — Hull. The merchants of that town were more interested than any other parties in the country. Now, it was stated last year in that House, by the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty, that orders had been sent out to the Black Sea to enforce a strict blockade of the Russian ports there. The result of this was, that our merchants were prevented from endeavouring to import Black Sea linseed into this country, but embarked their capital in the attempt to procure supplies from other sources—the East Indies, Africa, and, he believed, Australia. In consequence of the blockade not having been enforced, and linseed having been imported from the ports of the Black Sea, their enterprises had failed, their capital had been locked up, and they had suffered considerable losses; while certain Greek merchants, who were more knowing than they, and who, disregarding the announcement of the intended blockade, had imported Black Sea linseed, had made large gains. He could not understand why the blockade of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azof, which was announced in July or August last, was not enforced. Surely, from our large fleet in the Black Sea two or three steamers might have been despatched to the Straits of Kertch, which were only twenty-three miles across, when they might easily have prevented any ships leaving the Sea of Azof. The hon. and learned Member for Plymouth had read a statement put forth in December last by the Hull Chamber of Commerce. In a subsequent document, dated the 8th nstant, it was stated that ships had since continued to arrive at Constantinople in considerable numbers, from the Russian ports in the Black Sea and Sea of Azof; that from May to December last 452 ships with 770,000 quarters of linseed had thus arrived, being in fact a larger export than had taken place in any previous year. The exportation in 1853 was 640,000 quarters, while, in 1852, it was only 455,000 quarters. This was in linseed alone. This large export was to the prejudice of the English merchants, who, relying on the professions of the Government, had turned their attention to other sources of supply. In fact, the last year's crop of the linseed grown on the shores of the Sea of Azof, and which was usually exported in September, had been exported and had come to this country to compete with the linseed which our own merchants had brought from other places. He wished also to call the attention of the House to another point. The mouths of the Danube, from which a large supply of corn might have been drawn for our own army, had been blockaded, while the port of Odessa, from which the Russian army drew its supplies, had been left open. Certainly, the way in which the city of Odessa had been dealt with from the beginning of this war was one of the most sickly pieces of sentimentality which he had ever met with. That port contained a large quantity of corn, and was, in fact, the granary of the Russian army, and yet, with an amount of inconsistency hardly to be conceived, while we destroyed merchant ships and private property at sea, we spared this town, and made a merit of merely firing on the batteries. Let us have either one thing or another. Certainty was essential to commerce on occasions like the present. Either let us have free trade, or let there be a blockade, and let it be strictly enforced. The President of the Board of Trade had not explained to the House why there had not up to the present time been any blockade in the Black Sea or in the Sea of Azoff. He called upon the First Lord of the Admiralty to explain why, after publicly announcing several times last summer in that House that there was to be a real and effective blockade in the Black Sea, there had been no blockade at all.

MR. HEADLAM said, the constituency which he represented had suffered most grievously, in consequence of the statements made by the Government with respect to their intention of instituting a blockade not having been carried out. In answer to a question which he had put in the course of the last Session the Government had stated that it was intended immediately to put a blockade in force, and, on the faith of that assurance, the merchants had immediately taken steps to obtain from other quarters the articles necessary for their operations. The blockade, however, never having actually been enforced, the consequence was that the very same articles which they had procured elsewhere at exorbitant prices were introduced into the market by the Greek houses at a much lower rate. If the failure of the blockade had been brought about by the natural incidents of the war, he believed not a murmur would have been heard, but up to the present time no satisfactory explanation had been given by the Government of the reasons why the assurances given on this subject had not been carried out.

SIR JAMES GRAHAM: Sir, I have had some hesitation as to whether I should break silence upon this subject or not, because I am conscious that I sinned during the last Session by saying too much with reference to our intentions as to blockade, and somewhat indiscreetly, from time to time, with an honest desire to give information to the commercial interests of this country, I answered questions put to me in a searching manner, and, as I now think, I answered them somewhat prematurely. But, Sir, as the matter now stands, I have been taxed, in terms not intended, I am sure to be disrespectful, but somewhat harsh, by the hon. and learned Member for Plymouth. I have been pronounced by him to be both incompetent and incapable. [Mr. COLLIER: No, no!] I certainly understood the hon. and learned Gentleman to have used terms somewhat of that description. I am very sorry that I should have incurred displeasure by misconducting myself in an official capacity upon this question, in which I feel that great interests are concerned, and great caution ought to be observed. The hon. and learned Gentleman did me justice when he said that he was certain that, at the time I gave the answer, it was intended by the Government that a rigid blockade should be instituted in the Black Sea. Orders to that effect had been issued. My right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade, in the admirable speech he has addressed to the House this evening, stated correctly to the House that it was necessary to remember that we were conducting this war in alliance with a maritime Power, and that it was not possible for us to adopt any policy, in regard to a blockade either in the Baltic, the Black Sea, or the White Sea, except after full discussion with France. The order to institute a blockade was issued in the month of May, after consultation with the Government of France. The order to the English and French Admirals was express that a blockade should be instituted. The mode in which the order was to be carried into effect was left to their discretion. The House will remember that this order was conveyed to the authorities 3,000 miles distant. The French and English Admirals received this order, and, after consultation as to the mode in which it should be executed, they came to a decision as to a mode which would have been most effectual, and which, if contrary to the law of nations, was by no means inconsistent with the course which common sense would naturally suggest. They thought that the most effectual place at which to institute the blockade would be in the Bosphorus, at the entrance into the Black Sea; and, to give effect to their intention, they prepared a notice, declaring that, from a time fixed, a blockade should be instituted in the Bosphorus, and that vessels should be stopped on their passage into and from the Black Sea. This notice was communicated to the French and English Ambassadors at Constantinople. They entertained the gravest doubts as to the validity of the notice, and it was sent home to their respective Governments. After full consultation with the highest authorities, and after due consideration, it was held to be an invalid notice, and no effect was given to it. The consequence was, that nearly three months were lost. After the expiration of that time, the great movement from Varna to the Crimea was undertaken by the naval forces of France and England, having to convey an immense army—one of the largest naval operations of modern times — and the whole naval force of France and England in the Black Sea was for some time occupied with the preparation and execution of that expedition. At the investment of Sebastopol it was thought necessary by the naval and military commanders that the whole naval forces of the two countries should be present. I have now accounted, I trust, for the various delays up to the month of October. After that period the English force was available, but it was necessary that the blockade should be a blockade instituted by the presence of the combined forces. Circumstances, into which it will not be necessary for me to enter, and which, I am sure, the House will not press me to explain, rendered it inconvenient that the combined forces should be so employed. I have now, without disguise, and with a strict adherence to exact truth, explained to the House the circumstances under which that blockade, so promised and so intended by the Governments of France and England, has not until a very late period been carried into effect. At the present moment I have no doubt that a blockade, *de facto*, does exist both at the mouth of the Sea of Azof, at Odessa, and in the offing of every port in the Black Sea, with the exception of the mouth of the Danube. Now, it was held to be most important, with reference to the military operations, that while Russia occupied the Principalities, all contraband of war should be barred in its passage from Odessa through the Sulina passage to the Bessarabian branch of the Danube occupied by Russia. It was of comparative indifference to the mercantile interest whether that blockade were or were not instituted, because, as I stated on a former evening, the military occupation by forts and batteries of the left bank of the Danube for about forty miles above the Sulina passage, does give to Russia a complete command of the navigable portion of the Danube, the deep water being on the Bessarabian side. Therefore, while Russia occupies in force that position, she does, whether or not the Sulina mouth be blockaded, command the passage of the Danube; and the blockade was held to be necessary only for the purpose of intercepting the military communication between the Principalities and Odessa. Circumstances have altered, and it is no longer necessary to maintain that blockade for military purposes. It is quite sufficient that a force shall be present at Odessa and the Sulina mouth to intercept contraband of war. The blockade of the Danube has been raised. I hope, and am confidently persuaded, that at this moment every other Russian port in the Black Sea is closely blockaded. Then, Sir, with respect to the White Sea, the circumstances attending the first declaration of war, as relates to the mercantile interests both of France and England, have been most accurately explained by my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade. The course of trade had always been that large advances were made in the antecedent year, for Russian produce to be exported both to France and England. In the course of trade, these advances had been made in the autumn of the year antecedent to the last. If France and England had determined to institute a strict blockade from the first moment that the White Sea was open, the only effect would have been, the French and English merchants having made their advances, that Russia would have been in possession both of their money and of the produce for which they had paid. Acting upon their common interests, and in obedience to common sense, France and England did not think fit to institute that blockade until their merchants had secured the export of the whole of the produce purchased by them and still in possession of the enemy. In the Baltic, it is not alleged that any possible precaution in reference to the blockade was omitted. Henceforward France and England are completely of one mind, that from the earliest moment at which it is possible a blockade shall be enforced in the White Sea. The blockade will be repeated with the same rigour in the Baltic; and I am convinced, as I have just stated, that at the moment I am addressing the House there is not an open port in the Black Sea—France and England are sole masters of the navigation beyond the Bosphorus.

MR. DUNCAN said, he felt bound to express his thankfulness to the right hon. Baronet, representing as he (Mr. Duncan) did a large commercial community interested in the trade of the White Sea, for the considerate manner in which he had protected the interests of the merchants of Dundee, and of the mercantile classes of this country generally. Many of his constituents having remitted money to Archangel for goods, he at an early period waited upon the right hon. Baronet and the President of the Board of Trade to inquire whether their goods could be brought away, The right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham) stated that he could not authorise a direct trade with the enemy. He (Mr. Duncan) said he should not ask for anything of the sort, and explained the circumstances under which he made the application. On the 10th of May he received from the right hon. Baronet authority to intimate to his constituents that they might bring away the goods. He asked him if he could give any time? and his answer was, "Get them away as fast as you can." The result was, that large freights were given to neutral vessels, and the goods were eventually brought away. He believed that in taking advantage of the licence afforded to them of bringing home that property they did not enter upon any fresh trade to the value of even a shilling. His constituents were now enabled to prepare for the spring trade, but if the restrictions which had been talked about had been placed in the way of their receiving Russian flax last year, which they had already paid for, he questioned much the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of recovering it. He could not tell whether it would have been easy to find means to feed the 40,000 people dependent on that trade. It was said that flax might be obtained from India and from Ireland; but what were they to do in the meantime? If once they lost a market, even for a short space of time, it would be no easy matter to recover it. Thanking the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade for the admirable and distinct statement which he had made, he would conclude by offering his best thanks to the right hon. Baronet the First Lord of the Admiralty for allowing the British merchants to bring away their property, which would otherwise have been confiscated by the enemy.

Mr. COLLIER, in reply, said, he must beg to explain that any expression he had used with regard to the blockade was not intended to apply to the administration of the Admiralty by the right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham), but he had alluded to the conduct of some of those intrusted with the administration of the navy at Balaklava. With regard to his complaint on the subject of the blockade in the Black Sea, he should leave it to the country to decide how far it had been satisfactorily answered. With regard to the blockade in the Baltic he had urged that either there should be a good blockade or none, and he had asserted that the blockade had been seriously evaded. He wished to call attention to a serious mistake which had been made by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Cardwell). The right hon. Gentleman had in his argument taken the returns of the Board of Trade of imports from Russia into this country during the last year; but the fact was, the imports were now carried on by means of land carriage, by which goods were detained longer in transit; and the question was not what quantity of goods was imported, but what quantity was ordered and on its way. When, therefore, the right hon. Gentleman referred to the returns to show a diminution of 62 per cent in the imports last year, he adopted a fallacious test of the extent of the trade, as the returns of the next two months would show. He (Mr. Collier) had before him a paper signed by all the principal merchants of St. Petersburg, which stated the quantity of tallow sent from Russia last year. The result was, that in the year 1854 there had been exported from Russian ports 82,567 casks of tallow, while in 1853 there were 102,453 casks, and in 1852, 82,717 casks; so that the quantity of tallow sent from Russia in 1854 was about the same as was exported in 1852, and only a third less than the exports of 1853. He was justified, therefore, in his position that almost the same quantity had been sent out from and ordered in Russia by British capitalists in this year as ever, although it was detained longer on its way by land carriage. The error of the right hon. Gentleman applied not only to tallow, but to hemp and flax. He (Mr. Collier), therefore, was not removed from the position he had taken when he asserted that the blockade in the Baltic had been evaded. He had suggested what he thought the most effective way of stopping the trade, namely, by remonstrating with Prussia, and, if she joined the allies, to insist on her really closing her frontier to the produce of Russia: next, that the right of search to a limited extent should be enforced; and, last, the prohibition of the import of Russian produce into this country if the war continued. If all those failed, he would assert that it would be better to give up the blockade altogether, and in that opinion he was supported by the hon. Member for Stoke-upon-Trent (Mr. J. L. Ricardo). The arguments of the hon. Member for Stoke and those of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Cardwell) were identical and most decisive against any blockade. The right hon. Gentleman said we could not do without the raw material of Russia, and that we would suffer more by not having it than Russia would lose by not sending it. If so, why should there be a blockade? Let that principle be carried out to its logical conclusion, and let there be no blockade; let us not stultify ourselves by pursuing so absurd a course as continuing a blockade, and sending a large force to stop the front door, and yet leave the side door open. That was his position, and it had not been controverted.

Mr. CARDWELL said, he wished to know whether the hon. Gentleman meant that he had been guilty of a serious error only in argument, or whether he meant a serious error in fact.

MR. COLLIER: No, not in fact.

Question put, and *agreed to.*

The House adjourned at a quarter before One o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Wednesday, February 21, 1855.

MINUTES.] NEW WRIT.—For Swansea, *v.* John Henry Vivian, Esq., deceased.

PUBLIC BILLS.—1° Dwelling Houses (Scotland); Cathedral Appointments Act Continuance; Court of Chancery (Ireland) (Jurisdiction); Court of Chancery (Ireland) (Procedure); Court of Chancery (Ireland) (Receivers); Court of Chancery (Ireland) (Sales of Estates); Court of Chancery (Ireland) (Appeals); Court of Chancery (Ireland) (Stamp Duties).

2° Nuisances Removal and Diseases Prevention Acts Consolidation and Amendment; Public Health; Army Service Act Amendment; Marine Mutiny; Mutiny.

NUISANCES REMOVAL, ETC. BILL.

Order for Second Reading read.

SIR BENJAMIN HALL, in moving the second reading of the Nuisances Removal and Diseases Prevention Acts Consolidation and Amendment Bill, said, that it might be well if he were to state, then, the various alterations it had been decided to make in the Bill. Previously to the introduction of the Bill he had some conversation with his right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Advocate for Scotland about the propriety of separating the Bill and bringing in a special one for Scotland. The Lord Advocate entirely acquiesced in his proposal. Subsequently he saw the Secretary for Ireland, and that right hon. Baronet desired that there should be a separate Irish Bill also. The Bill now before the House would, therefore, apply only to England and Wales. There were two objects in the Bill. The first was that of general application, and the other had for its object provisions which could only be applied under special and peculiar circumstances. With regard to the first object of the Bill, it was thought that its provisions should apply under all circumstances whatsoever; with regard to the other provisions of the Bill, they could only be applied under peculiar circumstances, when the President of the Board of Health should obtain the sanction of the Council, under whose orders the provisions of the Bill should be enforced. If the House would allow him to take the second reading of the Bill now he would go into Committee *pro formâ,* strike out everything that related to provisions which could only be applied under Orders in Council, leaving the Bill as it stood with reference to the removal of nuisances, and then he would introduce another Bill whose provisions should be applied under special Orders in Council. He had already made a statement on moving the first reading of the Bill, but he hoped the House would allow him to reply to any questions or suggestions that might be made. He would now merely move that the Bill be read a second time.

LORD SEYMOUR said, he considered that the Nuisances Removal and the Public Health Bill should be taken and considered together. It was impossible to speak of one without at the same time speaking of the other. He thought the course taken last year by the late Government was a very judicious one. It was very fortunate that they had now in the House an hon. Member who represented the Board of Health, and to whom complaints could be made. So far they had gained a great step; but when he came to consider those two Bills, he must say he found, especially in the Public Health Bill, a great deal that would require consideration and considerable alteration before they could be satisfactory to the country. There were some portions of the Public Health Bill which it certainly would be more judicious to remove to the Nuisances Removal and Diseases Prevention Bill. The power of summary interference given to the Board of Health when deaths exceeded twenty-three in a thousand ought to be taken out of the Board of Health Act altogether, and should come under the Diseases Prevention Act; for the Public Health Bill proceeded on the principle of the election of local boards by local ratepayers, and not on the principle of the arbitrary interference of a central board. Then, the question of boundaries to be enforced was one of great difficulty, doubts, and disputes, and ought to be very carefully considered by a Select Committee upstairs. Again, it was provided that where there was a district to be brought under the Act, and a small suburb in the neighbourhood, a majority of votes in the district should suffice to bring in the suburb, whether that suburb liked or not. Now, he thought that was not only unfair, but unjust. There ought to be afforded to a small suburb some means of defending itself against a large town in the neighbourhood. The suburbs were just the parts that were the most improved. They had been recently built, they were generally well drained, and to them was congregated, in most instances, the wealth of the neighbourhood. No doubt, the larger town would be anxious to bring them in for the purpose of putting a rate upon them, and relieving themselves to a certain extent. The inhabitants of the suburb would consequently find that, although their district was properly and healthfully conducted, they were to be called on to pay for the health of the town in the neighbourhood, in which they were not at all concerned. The Board of Health, under the Bill, might take water and might take property, and to whom was there any appeal? The quarter sessions and the justices were totally unsatisfactory. The justices would not even attend to listen to business of this kind. Then there was the Buildings Bill. Now, if there was anything that could try the patience and good temper of the people of England, and if there was in Europe an oppressive and tyrannical Bill, such a Bill was the Buildings Bill.

SIR BENJAMIN HALL: All the clauses of the Buildings Bill have been struck out of these measures.

LORD SEYMOUR said, he was very glad to hear it. That at once got rid of what was most objectionable in these measures. The Committee upstairs ought also to have power to call for persons, papers, and records, and to take evidence. This Bill was one which must carry with it the good temper of the country, for the comfort and happiness of all were connected.

SIR GEORGE PECHELL said, it must be satisfactory to the country to have obtained the valuable services of the right hon. Baronet. The Bill before the House corrected, at all events, a great number of hardships and inconveniences, which had been a fruitful source of contention in a great number of large and populous towns. But it must be by the declared and manifest consent of a majority of the ratepayers that anything could now be done. He had shortened his life by the battles he had had to fight with former Governments; and he hoped that under the administration of the right hon. Baronet all those battles would cease.

MR. WILKINSON said, he considered that the proposed measures fairly recognised the principle of compensation. He thought that some compensation ought to be made payable by those who sought to remove what they considered nuisances to the persons whose property was injured by the removal.

MR. H. BERKELEY said, he thought that evidence ought to be taken by a Select Committee on this subject. It was very important, and the law upon it ought to be carefully settled.

MR. HENLEY said, he thought that the determination that had been taken to legislate separately for England, Scotland, and Ireland, was a step in the wrong direction. He could see no objection to the separation of the Nuisances Removal Act into two parts; but many serious objections would still remain in the Bill. It would be very inconvenient to have neighbouring towns governed by different laws; the one by local Acts, the other by a general Bill. When they considered how many were the places in which the deaths exceeded twenty-three in a thousand, he thought great numbers of those who were anxious for a popular principle of government would find a central authority coming down upon them when they little expected it. With regard to the different modes of making the districts, great improvement was wanted. He did not think that parties were sufficiently guarded from being taken in against their will. The power of voting against being taken in was no sufficient defence, for the inhabitants of a rural district were always much less numerous than those of a neighbouring town that might desire to join that district to itself. He thought, also, that the scheme of referring matters of this kind to tribunals like the quarter sessions and the justices was most objectionable. He could not conceive any tribunal less fit for the exercise of such a jurisdiction. It was a jurisdiction wholly foreign to the duties of a magistrate, whose commission of the peace never contemplated his being saddled with duties of this kind also. It was one of the objections to the House of Commons that Members could rush in at the end of a debate, and vote without having heard either one side or the other. In the same way, at the end of a trial of some days, a batch of magistrates from town would come into the court of a rural district and decide its annexation to the town by an overwhelming majority. It was also a very objectionable thing to give to districts in the country a power to repeal all local Acts; and there were many other provisions to which he could by no means assent. He thought it ought to be seen how the Bill would work before there was given so great a power as that to remove gasworks, soap-boiling works, and other establishments which might be thought to be obnoxious in the districts where they were.

MR. W. WILLIAMS said, he approved the principle of the Bill, and gave great credit to the right hon. Baronet for the pains which he had taken, not only with this measure, but with all the matters connected with his office. He contended, however, that, in the event of some of those trades which created nuisances being done away with, ten times greater nuisances would be occasioned. Suppose every person were obliged to keep his dust in his yard, what a nuisance that would be! He would put another case. One of his constituents was extensively engaged as a market gardener. He had commenced business years ago, when there was not a house near the spot. He was now surrounded with houses, and the manure which he used for fertilising his garden was complained of as a nuisance; but if market gardens were to be abolished, what was to become of our refuse and manure? He certainly thought that persons whose business was interfered with and destroyed should be entitled to compensation, as provided under the Act of 1844.

MR. MICHELL said, he objected to the powers which it was proposed to confer by the Bill, especially those which related to the owners of establishments in which the machinery was worked by water power from pools and ponds. If the right hon. Baronet would consent to a clause at a future period, which should give compensation for the ponds or pools which might be closed up by the operation of the Act, the objection would be obviated, for it was unfair to interfere with private property in this manner.

MR. BARROW said, he did not agree with the principles involved in these Bills, for if they were carried out they would most unjustly interfere with the rights of property. He could not consent that a principle which would establish the boldest democracy ever dreamt of should be referred to a Select Committee upstairs, without being fully discussed by the House. It was unfair that in a case of such importance to property, mere numbers should override property. He must dissent from the precedent of handing over to a Select Committee questions which dealt with the rights of property in the manner proposed by these Bills.

MR. APSLEY PELLATT said, he trusted that the inspectors who were to be appointed under this Bill would be medical men. He cordially agreed to the compensations recommended by his hon. Friend the Member for Lambeth (Mr. Wilkinson), for the owners of property might be driven out of the districts in which they had invested a large amount of capital. He also highly approved of the mode of single voting, for the system of plurality of votes was a modern innovation, which had never been granted until Sturges Bourne's Act.

VISCOUNT EBRINGTON said, he thought that great advantage would be derived from the division of the Nuisances Removal Bill into two Bills, one being applicable to permanent, the other to temporary circumstances. He quite approved of the Bills being sent before a Select Committee, but he hoped that it would not occupy such a length of time as to prevent legislation during the present Session. He was glad to find that the right hon. Baronet's (Sir B. Hall's) experience of his office had taught him the necessity of adopting a number of the principles and plans of his much calumniated predecessors. With regard to the Public Health Bill, while approving of many of its provisions, he lamented the introduction of one or two enactments which were new, and which appeared to him to be rather of a retrograde character. He also objected to the principle of a majority of temporary inhabitants entirely excluding permanent owners of property from any voice in the arrangements under the Bill. Questions of this sort seemed to require more careful consideration than appeared to have been given to them in the Bill as it stood. He likewise objected to the machinery provided for voting, which seemed to him to be also of a retrograde character, and calculated to consult rather the convenience of the few than of the many, and which would practically disfranchise thousands of voters. He hoped evidence, however, would be taken on these points.

MR. NEWDEGATE said, he trusted that the Committee would be so selected as to be a fair representation of the House. He recognised the valuable principle of local self-government which pervaded the Public Health Bill, but he thought the powers which it proposed to confer on the quarter sessions were so large and extensive, that they would require the most careful consideration of the Committee, to see that they did not trench upon those rights which it was the duty of the House to preserve. According to the plan proposed, the owners of property, from the limited time of notice, would frequently be unable to attend, and the working of the

Act would be left in the hands of those who had no permanent interest in the matter. He trusted that as soon as the Bill had been duly considered by the Select Committee it would be printed, and ample time given for the country to become fully aware of the extent to which the House intended to delegate the powers of legislation on those questions, and that due respect would be paid to the rights of property.

Mr. BRADY said, he thought that to be effective the Bill should provide that the inspectors should be medical men. Several clauses would require careful consideration—particularly that one which so far interfered with private rights as to prevent any private person erecting an hospital without the consent of the board.

Bill read 2°.

THE PUBLIC HEALTH BILL.

Order for Second Reading read.

Sir BENJAMIN HALL said, he would now beg to move the second reading of this Bill. He would take that opportunity of replying to the observations which had been made by the hon. Members who had addressed the House in respect to these measures. He could assure the hon. Member for Lambeth (Mr. W. Williams) he had no desire to restrict discussion, but had taken a course which would render, he thought, the Bills more open to discussion. He would accede also to the suggestion of the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate), and have the Bills printed, and allow ample time for a consideration of their provisions. He was more convinced than ever, from the statements which had been made that day, that the Bills were most necessary, and that they would be most difficult to pass. It was his duty not to shrink from these difficulties, and he would bring before a Select Committee, to which he hoped the Bills would be referred, all the suggestions which had been made to him from different quarters. He had no desire whatever to interfere with existing interests more than was absolutely necessary for the welfare of the community at large, but if existing interests were not carried out for the benefit of the community, he thought it was necessary for the Legislature to interfere. He had no objection to transfer the powers for the intervention of the Board of Health when the mortality exceeded the rate of twenty-three in 1,000 to the Diseases Prevention Bill, and he thought it a most useful suggestion. A provision would be introduced to limit these powers under the Order in Council to temporary cases. With respect to the alteration of districts, the question was one that must be considered by the Select Committee. He had proposed a Bill such as he thought would be useful. He could only make suggestions, and it would be the duty of the Committee to carry them out. One of the important provisions of the Bill was the compulsory power of taking land for the purposes of the Act, but it would require to be carefully guarded. When any one read the evidence taken before a Committee of that House with respect to the expense which parties were put to who came for Bills for local purposes, he would feel that the time was come when some other tribunal, less expensive, should be permitted to decide these matters. He had a great desire to reduce this expenditure, and he hoped the Select Committee would assist him in so doing. Three of his colleagues in the representation of the metropolis had wished to insert a clause for compensation to those persons who had created nuisances when these nuisances are to be put down. He (Sir B. Hall) could not hold out any hope that he, for one, should be disposed to give that compensation. He did not think it would be useful, and he hoped that the Select Committee would not offer compensation to those who had created nuisances, and who would be obliged by the Public Health Bill to remove those nuisances. It had been urged by several hon. Members that evidence should be heard before the Select Committee. He had no objection to that, but he hoped the Committee would set their face against any unnecessary prolongation of taking evidence. It was his desire to pass a Bill as early as possible, in order that, if a pestilence should again visit the country this summer, they might have taken every precaution, and shown all the foresight that it was in their power to do. A noble Lord had said with reference to this question that there were two parties, the dirty party and the clean party. He (Sir B. Hall) must say that the most dirty party he knew were the gas companies and the water companies, and if any attempt was made to improve the sanitary condition of the public, and to supply them with more light and the means of securing greater cleanliness, the first persons to oppose such a proposition were usually the dealers in gas and the retailers of water. While the Select Committee would see that the rights of gas and water companies were properly preserved, he trusted they would not allow these Bills to be thrown over by those whose duty it was to minister to the wants of the public in respect to the supply of gas and water. It would be his duty to lay before the Select Committee all the suggestions which he had received; and he sincerely hoped that after they had been considered by the Committee, and ample opportunity given to the country to consider them, some measures would be passed, at no distant period of the Session, to carry out objects so necessary.

Bill read 2°, and committed to a Select Committee.

COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACT AMENDMENT (IRELAND) BILL.

Order for Committee read.

Mr. I. BUTT moved that the House go into Committee on this Bill.

Mr. WHITESIDE said, he hoped the hon. Member would not proceed with this Bill until a more comprehensive attempt were made to assimilate the law of England and Ireland.

Mr. I. BUTT said, he thought the Bill ought to pass as a matter of course. Last year a Bill was brought in with reference to criminal procedure in England, and he then moved that several of its clauses should be extended to Ireland. Every one agreed that one of the clauses of the English Bill ought to be extended to Ireland—namely, that by which the defendant was allowed to address the jury at the close of his case. It was thought that this clause was applied to Ireland by the Bill of last Session, and he had received letters from some of his friends thanking him for this measure of improvement. However, on investigation it was discovered that the clause was not extended to Ireland, and the present Bill was intended to cure the defect and assimilate the law.

Mr. KEOGH said, he saw no reason why the error in question should not be rectified. He proposed to introduce a Bill next week altering in many important particulars the Act of last Session, and it would then be seen whether the alterations now proposed to be made could not be embodied in one Bill.

House in Committee; the several clauses were then *agreed to.*

House resumed.

SUPPLY—EXCHEQUER BILLS.

Order for Committee read.

House in Committee of Supply.

Mr. WILSON said, he had to move that a sum not exceeding 17,183,000*l.* be granted to Her Majesty to pay off and discharge Exchequer bills charged on the aids of 1855 unprovided for.

Resolution *agreed to.*

House resumed.

WAYS AND MEANS

Order for Committee read.

House in Committee of Ways and Means.

Mr. WILSON said, he would now beg to move the following Resolutions—

1. "That, towards making good the Supply granted to Her Majesty, the sum of 20,000,000*l.* be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland."

2. "That, towards making good the Supply granted to Her Majesty, for the deficiency in the Grants for the Service of the year ending the 31st day of March, 1855, the sum of 1,300,000*l.* be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland."

Resolutions *agreed to.*

House resumed.

ARMY SERVICE ACT AMENDMENT BILL.

Order for Second Reading read.

Mr. FREDERICK PEEL said, that in moving the second reading of this Bill he should merely say a few words, in order to recommend the measure to the consideration of the House. The principle of enlisting men for a limited period of service was not a new one. That principle had been affirmed by the House of Commons in the year 1847, when the Secretary at War of the day had proposed a Bill to authorise the Government to enlist men for a period not exceeding ten years. The present measure had for its object to legalise the enlistment of soldiers for a period less than ten years, namely, from three to five years. The necessity for introducing the Bill rested partly upon technical considerations, and partly upon considerations of general policy. It proposed to remove the stringency which existed with respect to the regulations by which men were enlisted for a term of ten years, neither more nor less, and to obtain the services of men whose age—thirty to thirty-four—rendered it probable that they could better endure the fatigues and hardships of active service than those who entered the army under the present system. It would, he was certain, be gratifying to the House to hear that the recruiting service of the country was at the present moment in a most satisfactory position. He found, from returns upon the subject, that in the year 1853, 11,545 men had joined the army. That number had, in 1854, been increased to 34,844, of which 1,942 men had volunteered from the militia. In the month of January there had been no less than 6,092 recruits, of which number 1,190 had come from the ranks of the militia. The continuance of the Bill before the House was to be limited to three years; but if, at the expiration of that time, it should be found expedient to prolong its operation, he had no doubt that Parliament would assent to its renewal.

Colonel FORESTER said, he wished to take that opportunity of making a few remarks, in consequence of some observations which had fallen from the noble Lord the Member for Totness (Lord Seymour) a few nights ago, who had thought proper to make an attack on the Household Brigade. In 1853 he (Colonel Forester) was in camp at Chobham with his regiment, the Royal Horse Guards Blue, in company with the Scots Greys, the 4th Light Dragoons, and the 8th Hussars. They were encamped for six weeks, and during that time he would appeal to every military man whether the regiment which he had the honour of commanding did not go through its exercise with as much activity, with fewer falls, and fewer accidents than any other, The difference of weight between the Scots Greys and the Royal Horse Guards in full marching order was one stone and a half. The difference between the Light Cavalry and the Household Brigade was two stones. The cuirass of the Household Brigade was taken to weigh from 14 lbs. to 17 lbs. If that weight was taken off the breast of the Household Brigade, they would be brought within 5lbs. or 6lbs. of the Scots Greys. The noble Lord said the Household Cavalry, men and horses, were too large, too heavy in every way for service. Now he would take the liberty of reading an extract from *Alison's History of Europe,* in reference to what occurred at the battle of Quatre Bras. The historian said no attempt was made, upon that occasion, to disturb the retreat of our army, except by a body of French Lancers, which, between Gemappes and Waterloo, had, in spite of the gallantry of the 7th Hussars, almost overwhelmed that distinguished corps of light cavalry, who were no match in close fight for the Lancers of France. Lord Uxbridge, afterwards Marquess of Anglesea, seeing the position in which the Hussars were placed, came up to their relief in person at the head of the 1st Life Guards, and those magnificent troops, albeit unprotected by armour, bore down upon the French Lancers with a vigour so irresistible as to rout them completely, and the retreat was afterwards permitted to take place undisturbed. He (Colonel Forester) deemed it to be his duty to offer these observations to the House, in reply to the attack which had been made upon the Household Cavalry by the noble Lord, who had said that they were no better than "beef-eaters."

Lord SEYMOUR said, he was glad to hear that the troops under the gallant Colonel performed their evolutions so well at Chobham, but he wished to call the attention of the House to what he really did say on the occasion referred to, because the question was one of great importance, and one which affected not only the Household Brigade, on whom he made no personal attack, but also the other regiments of cavalry. There were three regiments of the Household Brigade, with about 400 horses to each regiment. Now, what he said was, that one effective regiment would be much better than three ineffective regiments, and could be maintained at a much less cost to the public. At present we had the maximum of expense with the minimum of efficiency—officers for three regiments and men for only one. This remark applied not merely to the Household Brigade, but to all the other cavalry regiments. It was said that these regiments must be considered a nucleus, and that as soon as war occurred they would be filled up. But that had not been done, and they had been sent abroad as they were. Any man acquainted with cavalry regiments abroad would say that this was an admirable system for patronage at the Horse Guards, and for expense; but it was certainly not a good system, so far as regarded efficiency. He never doubted the efficiency of the regiments alluded to at Waterloo, and he had no doubt if they were taken from this country fresh they would overthrow almost any cavalry that could be brought against them; but if the gallant Colonel had looked to what occurred in the Peninsula, he would not have found that the heavy cavalry went through the service very well. If he had been aware that the question was likely to be raised, he should have been prepared to show that in the Peninsula the weight of the horses and men was considered very disadvantageous in many respects. His object had merely been to illustrate the system. He did not think it right to have so large a proportion of heavy cavalry, nor did he consider it right to have three regiments of the Household Brigade when one could be made more effective and maintained at a much less cost, although it certainly would not, as he had previously stated, give such an amount of patronage at the Horse Guards.

COLONEL KNOX said, he understood that men might be enlisted, under the operation of the Bill before them, for three years. He should suggest that that period should be extended to five years. The men who would enlist under the Bill would enter the army later in life than was now the case, and a longer period of time would be requisite to make them good soldiers.

MR. FREDERICK PEEL said, he understood that the men were to be enlisted for three years. The suggestion of the hon. and gallant Member might receive consideration, if it were sent back in the shape of an Amendment to the House of Lords.

Bill read 2°.

ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE, SANDHURST.

COLONEL NORTH said, he would now beg to bring under the consideration of the House the regulations of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, respecting the admission of orphan sons of the officers of the army, navy, and marine into that establishment. He felt assured that at a moment when this country had to mourn the loss of so many gallant officers, the House would not grudge him their indulgence while he made a brief statement upon the subject of his Motion. The Royal Military College at Sandhurst had been erected under the auspices of his Royal Highness the late Duke of York. The order for its erection was dated the 7th of May, 1808; admission to it was then, as at the present time, confined to three classes. The first class which attracted towards it the kindly solicitude of his Royal Highness had been the orphans of the subaltern officers of our army, and who had died leaving their families in pecuniary distress. Those who entered the college as members of that class were to receive here their education, board, and clothing, free of expense. The second class to whom admission had been accorded were the sons of officers who were alive, and serving in the army or navy; while the third class comprised the sons of noblemen and gentlemen who wished to enter into our military or naval services as a profession. Those regulations had, however, been since altered, and at present the first class embraced the sons of officers under the rank of field officers, and those, upon becoming students of the college, were obliged, instead of being educated free of expense, to pay a pension of 40*l.* per annum. The second and third classes continued in the same position as that in which they had been placed in 1808. The regulation which enabled the orphans of officers to be educated at Sandhurst free of expense had been in operation when he himself had been a student of the establishment. Under the system which then prevailed many of the sons of our most distinguished officers had received their education at the College. Among them was Sir Gaspard Le Marchant—the brother of the Clerk of that House, and at present Governor of Nova Scotia—one of the best officers in the service. He could, if it were necessary, mention the names of many other officers who had received their education at Sandhurst, and who had since shown themselves to be deserving of the kindness which had been extended towards them by their country. But he should advert to the cruel results of the changes in the regulations at Sandhurst to which he had alluded. The orphans of every class of officers were now compelled to pay 40*l.* a year upon admission to the college, and it must be obvious that many of the orphans of our officers were in consequence precluded from availing themselves of the means of obtaining military instruction. The widow of an ensign received only 30*l.* per annum, of a lieutenant 40*l.*, of a captain 50*l.*, and of a major 70*l.* per annum, and from that miserable annuity it was of course out of the question that the widow of an officer could pay 40*l.* a year for the education of a son, provide him with clothing and pocket money, furnish him with books, and support him during the vacations. In order to show how cruelly the present regulations operated he should mention to the House a case with which he had himself become acquainted. An officer on full pay had within the last two or three years a son at Sandhurst whose good conduct and attention to his studies had given to his instructors the greatest satisfaction. The young man in question had passed some of the examinations which it was necessary that he should pass before he was presented with his commission. Well, his father had died. The boy had become an orphan, and had been called upon to pay 40*l.* a year during the remainder of his term in college. To pay that sum had for him become impossible; and it appeared to be inevitable but that he must be removed from the college in consequence of his inability to pay the pension; thus his prospects in life had been upon the point of being blasted. However, to the great credit of his father's brother officers, they had stepped forward and agreed to pay for the son of their comrade in arms 40*l.* a year until he should have passed the necessary examination and obtained his commission. But could anything, he would ask, be more disgraceful to the country than that the necessity for an act of so much generosity upon the part of individuals should be permitted to exist? Sandhurst was called a Royal college, but what, he should like to know, was Royal about it except the building? It was called self-supporting, but it was so at the expense of officers of our army and navy. The question which he had asked the House to consider was not one embracing any religious or party feelings. It was a question upon which hon. Members of every shade of political and religious opinions might agree, and there were few among them who were not directly or indirectly interested in the well-being of the army and navy of this country. But it was not the country only which felt an interest in those who devoted their lives to its service; her sympathy with those gallant men, and her admiration of their valour, had been conveyed to our army in the Crimea by the commands of the Sovereign. Under the circumstances to which he had called the attention of the House, he thought he was justified in moving that twenty boys—the orphans of subaltern officers in the army, navy, or marines—should be elected annually to be educated at the expense of the country, and that for that purpose the number of cadets of the first class should be raised to fifty. He should also move that the new appointments in the Civil Service should be thrown open to cadets of Sandhurst who should pass the requisite examinations.

Colonel KNOX, in seconding the Motion, said, he considered it most desirable to extend to the services the boon now asked for. At present a great deal was said about the policy of raising men from the ranks, and making them officers; but if they should have the misfortune to fall in the service, how was it likely that sufficient means should be provided for the education of their children? He trusted the Government would take the matter into consideration, and deal with it in a liberal spirit, and if they did so they would receive the thanks of the profession, and deserve the gratitude of the country.

Mr. SPEAKER said, that there was an irregularity in the Resolutions, which prevented him from putting them to the House. No charge on the revenue could be voted except in Committee of the whole House, and therefore he was precluded from putting the Resolutions.

Colonel NORTH said, that under those circumstances he would withdraw the Resolutions.

Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

The House adjourned at five minutes after Five o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Thursday, February 22, 1855.

DAY OF HUMILIATION.

The Earl of RODEN said, he wished to address a few words to their Lordships on a subject of the greatest importance—namely, the appointment of a day of humiliation and prayer to be observed throughout the country on account of the present disastrous state of things in the Crimea. According to all accounts, the army was rapidly wasting away, and in a few weeks, unless some speedy change took place, would be entirely extinct. Their Lordships would recollect that some weeks ago a noble Duke (the Duke of Grafton) asked the Government to appoint a day of humiliation and prayer. He regretted that the noble Earl who was then at the head of the Government thought it his duty to refuse the application of the noble Duke; and he stated to the House at the time that such an answer from the Prime Minister might draw down a grievous calamity upon the nation. The army in the Crimea had been sinking from that day to the present, and had been reduced from 50,000 to little more than 8,000 men, and he was informed that on the 5th of the month the Guards were reduced to little more than 400 men. He was told that the deaths in that brigade averaged thirty per day; so that, if the mortality proceeded in the same ratio, in the course of a few weeks the Guards would have ceased to exist. The condition of our army was such as to call upon us to use every means for its rescue; and surely it was the duty of the Government of a country which believed in the supreme providence of God—which believed that there was one overruling Power regulating the affairs of men—to take steps to appoint a day of national supplication for the averting of the impending evils. So strongly did he feel his duty upon this subject that, should the answer of Ministers to his present appeal be unfavourable, he would, on Monday next, move an address to Her Majesty.

THE EARL OF ABERDEEN: The noble Earl has, unintentionally I am sure, misrepresented what I stated on a former occasion. The noble Duke who asked me the question proposed that a prayer should be introduced into the Liturgy for ordinary use. Now, I certainly do object to introduce any such prayer into the Liturgy for ordinary use, but I did not object, and I have no objection whatever, to the appointment of a special prayer to be used on a special day of humiliation. So much is that the case that a short time before I left office I wrote to the noble Duke in question, and informed him that it was my intention humbly to advise Her Majesty to order a special day of humiliation and prayer some time in the course of Lent. My objection, therefore, was not to a day of humiliation, but to the appointment of a prayer for common use.

THE EARL OF RODEN was quite ready to ask the pardon of the noble Earl for having misunderstood him. He could assure the noble Earl that he had not done so intentionally.

EARL GRANVILLE said, that in consequence of the remarks of the noble Earl with respect to the state of the army in the Crimea, he very much regretted the absence of the noble Baron at the head of the War Department. Not seeing any notice upon the paper relative to that subject, the noble Baron hoped their Lordships would excuse his presence for one evening, at a time when his whole energies were directed to the demands of the public service. He (Earl Granville) thought, however, he might state—indeed, he was authorised to state—that, whatever might be the case with regard to any particular regiment in the Crimea, the Government had every reason to believe that considerable improvement had taken place in the condition of the army generally. With regard to the particular question put by the noble Earl, he assured him he did full justice, as every Peer in their Lordships' House must, to the noble and pure motives by which he was actuated; and he was conscious that there were peculiar circumstances connected with the noble Earl which made it more natural that he should feel strongly on this subject. He was happy to inform the noble Earl that almost immediately after the question which he put to him about a fortnight ago, the Government resolved to advise Her Majesty to issue a proclamation, appointing a day of humiliation and prayer.

LORD CAMPBELL said, that as he was involved in the discussion which took place upon this subject when it was last before the House, he might be excused if he made one or two observations upon the present occasion. It was true that he objected to the proposition of the noble Earl opposite at that time; but what he understood the noble Earl to propose was, that a day of thanksgiving should be appointed for the prosperous state of public affairs, and he pointed out that before the day so appointed arrived our army might meet with a reverse, and we should be called upon to show humiliation for our condition. Such, unfortunately, had been the case, and he now most heartily agreed that a day of humiliation should be appointed. Our situation as a nation was most humiliating with regard to what had taken place abroad, and he was sorry to say it was still more humiliating with regard to what had occurred at home.

House adjourned till To-morrow.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Thursday, February 22, 1855.

MINUTES.] PUBLIC BILLS.—1° Consolidated Fund (£20,000,000); Intestacy (Scotland).
3° Common Law Procedure Act Amendment (Ireland).

IRISH PAUPERS—QUESTION.

MR. MAGUIRE said, he had a question on the paper, to be addressed to the Secretary of State for the Home Department; but as he did not know who the Secretary of State for the Home Department might be at present, he would postpone his question to a future day.

SIR GEORGE GREY said, he trusted he could answer the question of the hon. Gentleman.

MR. MAGUIRE then said, he must make a short statement, in order to render his question intelligible, and the answer to it satisfactory. He wished to refer to a report which appeared in the police reports of the morning papers, the other day, to the effect that an Irish boy had received temporary relief at St. Martin's Workhouse, but had been turned out into the streets at midnight, where, but for the interference of a gentleman, he might have perished. The formal question he had put on the paper was—

> "To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether his notice had been called to certain statements reported to have been made in his official capacity, by Mr. Hardwicke, a police magistrate of the metropolis, in the course of last week, to the effect that shiploads of Irish paupers were being constantly sent by the authorities of Ireland to this country; and, if so, has any step been taken with respect to a person holding a responsible public office making such statements?"

SIR GEORGE GREY said, his attention had not been called to any statement of that kind, and except from what the hon. Gentleman had said, he had no reason to believe that any such circumstance had happened.

MR. MAGUIRE said, he then must beg the right hon. Gentleman to make inquiry into the matter.

SIR GEORGE GREY said, that if any report were made to the Home Office with respect to the conduct of any magistrate, inquiry should be made into the circumstances, but he did not think it would be fair to call any magistrate to account for chance statements made in newspapers.

ARMY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE CRIMEA —QUESTION.

MR. BERESFORD said, he wished to ask the Under Secretary of the War Department, whether, as reports generally concur in the statement that the quality of the food supplied to the army in the East was bad and injurious, that the tents issued were inefficient for the necessary shelter of the troops from the exposure to which they were subjected, and that the hospital arrangements, especially as to the corps of ambulance and orderlies, were lamentably deficient, any suggestions were made, as they ought to have been, by the principal medical officer there, to Lord Raglan, commanding the forces, or by the Director General at home to the Secretary for War, and, if any, whether the Secretary for War will produce copies of the suggestions, with the date of their receipt, and the answers returned to them?

MR. FREDERICK PEEL, in reply, said, that the Government were not in possession of copies of any correspondence that might have passed between the principal medical officer abroad and Lord Raglan as to the imperfect provision that had been made for the army. With regard to the other part of the question, Dr. Smith informed him that he had made representations as to the importance of organising a staff of persons to attend upon the sick in hospital, and also upon the troops; but perhaps the hon. Member would not press him for the production of that correspondence till he should have had an opportunity of seeing whether it would be for the benefit of the public service to produce it.

MR. WARNER said, he begged to ask the First Lord of the Treasury, whether the Commission proceeding to the East, in relation to the Commissariat service, was to be merely a Commission of inquiry, or whether it will have power of summary dismissal and appointment extending to all officers and appointments to which its power of inquiry extends; and, if it shall appear that the Commission will have powers of appointment and dismissal subject to any kind of restrictions, what those restrictions are?

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON said, that the Commission would have power to alter any arrangements they might think calculated to be effective, and to make reports both to the Commander of the Forces there and to the Government at home, with a view to any personal arrangement also. But they would have authority to carry into execution immediately any change or arrangements they might think essential to the public service.

THE COLONIES AND THE WAR— QUESTION.

MR. ADDERLEY said, he wished to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether Mr. Rankin, a member of the Canadian Parliament, had made an offer to Her Majesty to raise and equip 1,000 men to join the army in the East, and, if so, what answer had been given him; and whether Her Majesty had offered commissions to colonists who raise regiments at their own expense; and, also, whether it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to propose that any grateful acknowledgment should be made on the part of Parliament of the sympathy and patriotism evinced by various colonies in voting large sums of money towards the expenses of the present war?

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON said, he had

not the least recollection of any offer such as that to which the hon. Member had referred; nor had his right hon. Friend near him the Secretary for the Home Department, any recollection of any such communication being made. With regard to the offer of commissions, there had been on one occasion a confidential correspondence with the Governors of Canada and Nova Scotia on that subject, but he was not at the moment prepared to inform the House of the exact position in which the question stood. With regard to the third question about the thanks of Parliament for funds sent to assist in the prosecution of the war, they were unable to make any definite statement on the subject in any vote of thanks they might move, for the whole funds expected had not come in, and a Resolution at the present moment was impracticable. With regard to funds that had come in on previous occasions, the Colonial Secretary had certainly expressed in his letter to the Governors General of the Colonies a high opinion of the liberality and generosity that had been shown, which could not fail to be fully appreciated by the Crown, the Parliament, and the people.

MINISTERIAL EXPLANATIONS.

VISCOUNT **PALMERSTON**: Sir, I have to state to the House that which I think is pretty well known already, that three Members of Her Majesty's Government have intimated their intention to resign the offices they have hitherto held—I mean the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the Secretary of State for the Colonial Department. Those officers hold their offices at present only until their successors shall be appointed. Under these circumstances, and considering that those officers are three Members of the Government in this House, I trust the House will not think I am unduly pressing upon their indulgence if I propose that we should not enter into any public business to-day; but only to carry through those Orders of the day which may stand on the paper, to which no objections are made, and that this House should adjourn till to-morrow. To-morrow my right hon. Friends will attend in their places, and will state to the House the grounds upon which they have taken the decision to resign, which I have announced; and I therefore propose that the House at its rising adjourn till to-morrow.

MR. **DISRAELI**: I merely, Sir, wish to state that I have heard with deep regret from the noble Lord that, before ten days have elapsed, the Government, which we with pleasure heard was formed, and which it was hoped would prove a strong Government, was virtually dissolved. We hoped it would be a strong Government, since the presence of the noble Lord, who was generally considered to have been the obstacle to the formation of such a Government, was a difficulty which had ceased to exist. But after the statement of the noble Lord, and in the absence of the right hon. Gentlemen, whose conduct must be canvassed on the proper occasion, as well as that of the noble Lord, I think it would be improper on this occasion for me to make any remarks. I only wish the noble Lord to understand that I express a very general feeling in this House and the country when I say that they have heard the official and authentic announcement of the noble Lord, that the Government recently formed is already partially and considerably dissolved, that they have heard that announcement with deep regret and some consternation.

ARMY SERVICE ACT AMENDMENT BILL.

Order for Committee read.

MR. **MILNER GIBSON** said, he wished to make an inquiry of the hon. Under Secretary of War or the Secretary for War—he did not know the precise office which the hon. Gentleman filled—and if he could not give any explanation, he would ask the First Minister of the Crown a question with reference to what had been stated in another place when this Bill was under discussion. He found it was reported that in reference to the recruiting for the army, the Minister of War made use of these words—

> "The attention of Government has been much directed, my Lords, to the recruiting of the army, and there can be no question that means must be found—if not gentle, then they must be found by compulsion—for recruiting the ranks of Her Majesty's service in order to enable this war to be carried on with vigour."

As he could not conceive that the Minister of War intended the meaning conveyed by those words, and presuming he must have alluded to the militia, and not to the army, though speaking of recruiting for the army, he wished to have the matter explained by the First Minister of the Crown whether this compulsion contemplated for some service or other, did not apply, if it applied at all, to the militia and not to the army?

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON said, that if stringent means were necessary to replenish the ranks of the army, those stringent means would entirely consist of an increase of bounty. As to the militia, the Government had power by law to resort to the ballot, but he should be extremely unwilling to have recourse to it, because the militia had had its ranks filled by voluntary enlistment to a most satisfactory degree, and those men who had entered had conducted themselves in so admirable and exemplary a manner that he should not willingly resort to anything which would in any degree weaken that voluntary enlistment which had been so generously and nobly displayed by the people of this country. He was sure the words quoted never were uttered by his noble Friend as relating to the army, and that he could only have said, if the militia should fail by voluntary enlistment, it might be necessary, in certain eventualities, to have recourse to the ballot.

MR. MILNER GIBSON said, he did not presume to impute that it was intended such should be the meaning of the words. The Minister of War was reported in all the public papers to have used the word "compulsion."

MR. A. STAFFORD said, he wished to draw the attention of the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for War to a paper which had been sent to him. It was headed — "Quinine for the Sick and Wounded Soldiers in the Crimea," and it went on to say—

> "This invaluable restorative, so essential to the sick and wounded, is much needed in the Crimea at this moment. Subscriptions are therefore earnestly requested for the purpose of providing this medicine, and care will be taken to ensure its immediate delivery to the officers commanding regiments in the Crimea."

Now he need not tell the hon. Gentleman that, if one medicine more than another was of essential importance to the troops serving in the Crimea, it was quinine; yet the opinion had generally gone abroad that the medicinal stores were so deficient in the Crimea, and in the hospitals in the East, that the people of this country, already so heavily taxed for those supplies, were called upon to provide, by private subscription, for these important medicines; and that, too, in the month of February, after so much attention had been called to the subject that the whole island had formed itself into a committee to supply these articles. He trusted that the hon. Gentleman would give a distinct answer, or that steps would be taken without the intervention of a single hour, to forward a supply of this important medicine. If he found that the smallest delay occurred, he should make the most sedulous inquiries, and should feel that it was his imperative duty to again bring this most serious question before the House.

MR. FREDERICK PEEL said, the only answer he could give to the question of the hon. Gentleman was, that he would make inquiry upon the subject. It was not within his knowledge that there was any deficiency in the medical stores supplied to the hospitals. He could only say that a most ample Vote had been taken for medical and other stores, and it would be his duty to see that that Vote was well and properly applied.

MR. GOULBURN said, it had been his duty some time since to see great quantities of quinine and other medical stores placed, in waggons, on board ship for the Crimea.

House in Committee; the several clauses were then *agreed to.*

House resumed.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.

MR. WILSON said, for the convenience of the House it was thought desirable that the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) should take precedence of the Orders of the Day to-morrow, and he had been required by the noble Lord at the head of the Government to move that the Orders of the Day for to-morrow be postponed till after all Notices of Motion, in order that the Motion for the nomination of a Select Committee to inquire into the state of the army before Sebastopol might be brought on at an early period of the evening.

MR. DISRAELI said, he wished to know whether he was to understand that the noble Lord at the head of the Government intended to make a statement before the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield was brought on?

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON said, he thought it was very desirable that the explanations of the right hon. Gentlemen who had recently withdrawn from the Government should take place, and a decision on the Motion for the nomination of the Committee to inquire into the state of the army before Sebastopol be come to before the House went into Committee on the Army Estimates. With that view, his hon. Friend (Mr. Wilson) had moved that the Notices of Motion should take precedence of Orders of the Day for to-morrow. This would give his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sheffield an opportunity to bring forward his Motion, at which time the explanations of those right hon. Gentlemen to whom he had referred would be given.

Motion *agreed to.*

The House adjourned at half after Five o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Friday, February 23, 1855.

Minute.] Public Bill. — 1^a Common Law Procedure.

THE RECALL OF SIR JOHN BURGOYNE —EXPLANATION.

Lord PANMURE said, that before the House adjourned, he wished to correct an impression which appeared to have gone abroad, either from what fell from him in that House, or from the statements of his noble Friend (Lord Palmerston) in the House of Commons, with reference to the recall of Sir John Burgoyne. The impression to which he referred was to the effect, that Sir John Burgoyne had been recalled in consequence of some fault which had been found with him by the Government. His wish was to make it clear that the recall of Sir John Burgoyne from service in the Crimea arose from the fact of a younger officer—General Jones—having been sent out to take the command of the engineers there, and to assist Lord Raglan with scientific advice. The Government had, therefore, thought it advisable to recall Sir John Burgoyne, a man who was now far advanced in years, from the severities of a Crimean winter, and to request him to resume in this country the discharge of those duties which he devolved into other hands when he went out to the army in the East—namely, the Inspector Generalship of Fortifications not only at home but abroad. Therefore, if any impression existed that Sir John Burgoyne had been recalled under any stigma whatever, he trusted that that impression would now be entirely removed from the minds of the public.

The Marquess of LANSDOWNE was extremely glad that his noble Friend had had an opportunity of making so desirable an explanation; because nothing could be more unfortunate than that any impression should go forth that there had been on the part of the Government, or he would say on the part of any one person connected with it, an opinion formed unfavourable to the character or services of Sir John Burgoyne. He had occasion to know that Sir John Burgoyne had, at the earnest request of the noble Duke lately at the head of the War Department, quitted without hesitation a situation suited to his time of life and past services. It was highly to his credit, looking to his time of life, and to his past services, that he did not hesitate on an emergency to sacrifice his comfort and every other consideration to go out to the Crimea for the purpose of performing temporary but very important duties there. In doing so, Sir John Burgoyne only did that which he had done throughout his whole life—sacrificed his private convenience to the public service. He had done that in a variety of services. He did it in Ireland in a service of a different nature from that to which he had been accustomed; and he acquitted himself there in a way which was worthy of the highest commendation, and which showed that he had the greatest capacity for such an office. Upon every occasion, indeed, he had performed the duties which the country had a right to expect from him in a manner which entitled him to the thanks of the public. He was returning home solely for the purpose of resuming a very important function in this country, and there could be no doubt that he would continue to perform his public duties with the same ability, the same zeal, and the same energy which he had hitherto displayed.

THE ARMY IN THE CRIMEA—SUMMER CLOTHING—QUESTION.

Lord LYNDHURST: I wish to put a question to the War Minister which arises out of a statement reported to have been made in the other House of Parliament in reference to the summer clothing of our troops now serving in the Crimea. In answer to a question put to him on the subject, the Under Secretary for the War Department is understood to have stated that the patterns for the summer clothing had not yet been settled. Now, my Lords, I believe that early in the month of April, or at the latest, in the middle of that month, the climate of the Crimea is often extremely sultry; and I believe, also, that if all the summer clothing were ready at this moment, it would require at least four weeks to put it on board ship and transmit it to the Crimea. Now, there are but five weeks from this to the beginning of the month of April, and I wish to know if any steps have been taken for the purpose of preparing summer clothing for the army in the Crimea; and, if so, whether it will soon be ready to be sent out? It would be extremely hard that our soldiers in the Crimea should perish from the want of proper clothing in the winter, and should be smothered by winter clothing in the summer. I also wish to know to what department it belongs to settle the patterns for the summer clothing?

LORD PANMURE begged to state, in answer to the noble and learned Lord, that the question of clothing for the summer had not failed to engage his early attention. The usual clothing was supplied to the army in April. He had written to Lord Raglan to make a suggestion to him with respect to the clothing which should be used by the army in the Crimea, but, above all, to dissuade him from permitting the troops suddenly, when the warm weather commenced, to put off the worsted shirts which they had been wearing during the winter. He thought it would be a very great mistake if the army were suddenly to resort, labouring as they did both in the trenches and in the field, to any light species of summer dress, inasmuch as they would be liable to take cold immediately after their work for the day was done. He had written to Lord Raglan upon the whole question; and anything that was required in addition to the usual supply of clothing which was used in the army will be prepared and sent from hence. He had already taken steps to furnish a fatigue dress for the army for summer use, which he thought would promote the health and comfort of the soldiers, and enable them to discharge their duties easily. The question had engaged much of his attention, and he had endeavoured to do all that could be done for the comfort of the army, as well as for the convenience of the soldiers in any operation in which they may be engaged.

LORD VIVIAN said, these questions with regard to the summer clothing naturally led to one of which he had himself given the noble Lord notice, and which he now begged leave to put to him—namely, what clothing had been supplied to the drafts sent out to marching regiments during the last four months, previously to their leaving this country? He held in his hand a letter from an officer in command of a regiment in the Crimea—a gentleman who had brought great honour upon himself—in which the writer said—

> "In the last letter which I wrote to you, I fortto mention one fact, that I had sent out to me two drafts of men, one of 100 and one of fifty, one sailing the last week in October, the other the second week in November, and yet not one stitch of winter clothing was put on them. The consequence was that they arrived here in the worst weather, and immediately sickened, got disheartened, lay down in their tents, and died in disgust. I don't think thirty of them remain. Not one of them has been put *hors de combat* by the enemy."

It was added that drafts were sent out to other regiments in the same condition; and that in the case of the 46th and 63rd, the entire regiment were situated alike, and were consequently *hors de combat.* His reason for putting this question was, that as great censure had fallen on several of the public departments, he thought it behoved Parliament to ascertain, as far as was in their power, where the blame really lay.

LORD PANMURE said, the noble Lord had given him notice of his question only half an hour before he came down to the House, and he had made such inquiries as he had it in his power to make in so short a time. He found that previous to the middle of November some difficulties had arisen with regard to the supply of warm clothing to the troops. When it was ascertained beyond a doubt that the army were to pass the winter before Sebastopol, large supplies of warm clothing were contracted for, through Lord Westmoreland, at Vienna, which supplies were sent to the army from thence. The consequence was, that, previous to the middle of November, the regiments which sailed from this country left under the impression that they were to receive their warm clothing upon their arrival at the seat of war. Mistakes, however, occurred which were very much to be lamented, and some of the regiments did fail to some extent in obtaining their warm clothing. But those mistakes there was no possibility of preventing here. Ample provision had been made at home for meeting the necessities of the case, but it was impossible to foresee and control all that had occurred. He was sorry to say that some of the troops had suffered from the want of warm clothing; but after the 25th of November all the detachments which sailed from this country were supplied with their warm clothing here, sailed with their warm clothing, and, he was informed, arrived with their winter clothing at the seat of war, and had enjoyed the benefit of it ever since they had been in the Crimea.

LORD LYNDHURST said, the noble Baron had not answered the whole of his question. He wished to know what department settled the pattern of the clothing for the army?

LORD PANMURE replied, that it was the business of the Board of General Officers to see and approve of every pattern of the clothing for the army.

THE BLOCKADE IN THE BLACK SEA—QUESTION.

LORD LYNDHURST said, he wished to put a question—though he did not know very well to whom he was to put it; but he hoped it would be answered by the noble Earl the President of the Council. It also related to something which was reported to have passed in the other House. It appeared that as early as May last instructions were sent out to blockade the different Russian ports in the Black Sea; but no particular directions were given as to the manner in which the blockade was to be effected. In these circumstances it appeared to the English and French Admirals that the best mode of blockading the Russian ports in the Black Sea was to place a blockading squadron in the Bosphorus. Such a proceeding was much the same as if, with the view of blockading the ports of Italy, we were to think of placing a blockading squadron in the Straits of Gibraltar; or as if, wishing to blockade the Russian ports in the Baltic, we should place a blockading squadron in the Sound, or the Great Belt. As was to be expected, some doubts arose as to whether such a blockade would be legal, and he supposed that applications were immediately made to the Admiralty on the subject. Of course, when these applications reached the Admiralty, as time was of the utmost consequence in such matters, that department consulted the law officers of the Crown, who could not delay long in declaring the blockade to be altogether illegal and ineffectual. Such being the case, it was, of course, of the utmost consequence that no delay should take place in despatching information to the Admirals in the Black Sea. The whole of these proceedings might have been completed in less than four or five weeks; but he understood that the original blunder was permitted to remain unrectified for the period of three months; and at the expiration of that time it was found impossible to blockade the Russian ports in the Black Sea, because our fleet was then engaged before Sebastopol. Now, the question he wished to put was this—how it happened that three months were consumed in rectifying so gross a blunder?

EARL GRANVILLE said, he would venture to suggest that it would have been much better if notice had been given of this question, as he thought it was for the public convenience to adhere to the rule laid down in such cases, more especially when the department more particularly implicated was not represented in that House; but as he was anxious to give all the information in his power to the noble and learned Lord, he would state what he believed to have been the circumstances of the case. Orders were sent out, as the noble and learned Lord had stated, to the Admiral to blockade all the Russian ports in the Black Sea. After some communication between the French and English Admirals it was resolved to blockade those ports in the manner described by the noble and learned Lord. It was to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to whom the doubt at once suggested itself, whether such a blockade would be consonant with the law of nations. The question was referred to the law officers of the Crown. They gave it as their opinion that it was quite impossible that such blockade could be good in law. It was then necessary that some communications should pass between the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs and the French Government, in order to inform them that such a blockade could not be maintained, and also to make arrangements for the establishment of an efficient and valid blockade. The dates were not so clear and precise in his mind as to enable him to give the exact number of weeks or months which those communications occupied; but the fact was, as stated by the noble and learned Lord, that when the second order reached the Admirals in the Black Sea the fleet was engaged before Sebastopol.

LORD LYNDHURST said, the explanation of the noble Earl was not satisfactory. He did not understand why so much time had been lost. No proposition could be clearer than that such a blockade as that attempted was altogether ineffectual and illegal.

House adjourned to Monday next.

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HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Friday, February 23, 1855.

MINUTES.] PUBLIC BILLS.—1° Tenants' Compensation (Ireland); Militia (Ireland); Commons Inclosure; Dean and Woolmer Forests; Lunatic Asylums (Ireland) (Advances).

2° Consolidated Fund (£20,000,000).

Reported.—Consolidated Fund (£20,000,000); Nuisances Removal and Diseases Prevention Acts Consolidation and Amendment.

3° Army Service Act Amendment.

SUPPLY—MINISTERIAL EXPLANATIONS.

Order for Committee read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the said Order be postponed till after the Notice of Motion for nominating the Committee on the Army before Sebastopol."

SIR JAMES GRAHAM: Mr. Speaker, according to established usage and in conformity with a salutary practice, having ceased to be one of the confidential servants of the Crown, and now only holding office until my successor is appointed, I think it a duty incumbent upon me, with the permission of the House, to state the reasons which have induced me to take the step to which I have alluded. And, Sir, I have thought it best to avail myself of the opportunity when you have a Motion in your hands, to tender this explanation; because I am afraid it will be necessary for me to trespass for a short time upon the indulgence of the House, and in setting forth the reasons which have actuated me I may be driven to make some statements and use some arguments that may require reply; and, on the whole, this appeared to me the fairest and best opportunity for the purpose. I am more disposed to take this course because, having recently suffered from very severe illness, from which I am only imperfectly recovered, I was unequal to the task of attending in my place on the occasion when my hon. Friend below me (Mr. Roebuck) moved for the appointment of a Committee of Inquiry, which Committee the House is now about to nominate. I did not take part in the debate which preceded the division on that Motion, and I was unable to record my vote on that occasion. I hope, therefore, I may crave the indulgence of the House while I enter into some of the reasons which have led me to think that the further prosecution of the inquiry by the Select Committee is, in the present circumstances of the country, inexpedient.

Sir, I may at once state that I observe that the Government has now adopted the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield. According to a practice well known in this House, the original names proposed by the hon. and learned Member having been withdrawn, we are now about to consider an amended list of eleven names, which, for the purpose of removing all ambiguity, I think I may consider as a list fully discussed and finally settled between the hon. and learned Member and the Government, with the view of appointing a fairly balanced Select Committee. I must make an observation, as a prelude to what I have to state to the House, with respect to the composition of this Committee. If the executive Government has, on the whole, made up its mind that a Committee of this vast importance should be appointed under present circumstances, I regret extremely not to find, among the list of names now to be proposed, the name of any member of Her Majesty's Government included in it. I have a strong opinion, that if this inquiry is to be conducted into circumstances so delicate, with due regard to the interests of this country, there would have been great advantage in having a Minister of the Crown present on the Committee, in order that if subjects of inquiry should be opened which, from his knowledge of our foreign relations, might appear to him inexpedient and dangerous, warning might be given to the Committee, and some influence exercised to check the investigation when trenching on dangerous grounds. But, Sir, it is not only the absence of any member of the Government from the Committee proposed to be appointed on which it is my duty to comment, I object to the appointment of a Select Committee. I think, from the very circumstances attending the nature of such a Committee, there are practical dangers at the present moment with reference to the proposed inquiry. You, Sir, will bear me out that it is quite in the discretion of the majority of the Committee now about to be proposed, consisting of eleven Members—it is quite open to a majority of that Committee to decide whether the inquiry shall be secret or open. If six out of these eleven Members should be of opinion that strangers ought not to be present, this Committee becomes a Secret Committee. If, on the other hand, their decision should be the opposite, it would then be an open Committee. Now, let me regard this question in its double aspect. If it should be a Secret Committee, all check of public opinion, as operating on the inquiry, will be withdrawn, the proceedings of the Committee will be unknown, persons will be inculpated by evidence without having the opportunity of defending themselves or of preparing for their defence, of cross-examining witnesses or of rebutting false accusations. Until the termination of the inquiry, the tendency of the evidence will remain secret and unknown. If it should be an open Committee, then from day to day the evidence will be published, most adverse comments of a party character will be applied to the evidence as published; and again, the most erroneous impressions, bearing hard on individuals at a distance occupying high situations, and fatal to their character and position, will be created, without their having the power of cross-examination or defence. In the conduct of the inquiry, too, there will be no appeal from any Member of the Committee to this House for the guidance of the Committee: when once this House has made a delegation to the Committee, there can be no appeal from its decisions, until the final Report has been presented. Now, Sir, I must say, considering the gravity of the subject, its immense importance, and its bearing on interests of magnitude almost uprecedented, such delegation to eleven Members appears to me to be a most dangerous course. I am not aware of any precedent whatever in our Parliamentary history for such a delegation or for the appointment of such a Committee. I am aware that rarely, but still occasionally, inquiries of this character have been instituted at the bar of this House. I should infinitely prefer such an inquiry to the one proposed. The investigation then would proceed in the presence of the public; in its conduct it would have the advantage of the intelligence and the knowledge of many Members of this House with respect to the subject-matter of inquiry; there would be publicity, but under check, through the medium of the ordinary channels of information; and, as between a Select Committee and an inquiry at the bar of this House, I should not hesitate to give my preference to the latter. An inquiry of this kind by a Select Committee is unprecedented; whereas, for an inquiry at the bar of the House there are some few precedents, though not at all applicable to the case now in hand. I believe that at a remote period in the reign of William, an inquiry was instituted with respect to the conduct of a naval expedition; and at a later period another inquiry was opened with respect to the Walcheren expedition. These were inquiries at the bar of the House; but in both cases the military operations were not pending, but were concluded, and the generals and admirals whose characters were at stake were present to defend themselves. In the Walcheren case, Lord Chatham appeared at the bar of this House, and had an opportunity of stating his case and of being heard. But as the matter now stands, this question will be thrown down on the floor of a Committee; the condition of the army in the Crimea is to be the subject of inquiry, and no other instructions are given to the Committee. I understand that there were some instructions of which notice was given in the name of an hon. Member, but without his authority, and he is not now prepared, if I am correctly informed, to move those instructions. There is, it is true, an instruction to be moved by the hon. Member for Inverness-shire (Mr. H. Baillie), and if there had been any doubt that the object of this Committee was to inquire into the conduct of our admirals and officers, that instruction so extending, in express terms, the scope of the inquiry would prevent all mistake on the point. Far be it from me to contest the power of this House in its largest sense. I know not any object so minute as to be below the notice of this House, or so exalted or so remote as to be beyond its reach. I am not one of those who have a secret desire to cut down the authority or power of the House of Commons. My whole political life has been spent within these walls, and the great effort of my youth and of my mature age—I hold it not to be a matter of regret—has been to labour to increase the democratic influence of this House. Within its proper sphere no man more rejoices than myself at its power. It controls the appointment of the Ministers of the Crown, and, in its legislative capacity, it is equal and co-ordinate with the Crown and the House of Peers. It is greater even than the House of Peers with respect to taxation and to the supply of ways and means. Even as the grand inquest of the nation, I admit its constitutional authority; and I know no limit to that authority, except when in its exercise this House, in an ill-advised moment, trenches on the legitimate constitutional functions of the Executive.

I thought, Sir, on the first night of the debate, when this Committee was moved for, that it was admitted on almost every side of the House that the Motion for inquiry was only intended as a vote of censure on the servants of the Crown. I remember well the speech of the noble Lord late the President of the Council, who, on the whole, did not think himself able, satisfactorily to his conscience, to defend the entire conduct of his former colleagues; but as a vote of censure by implication, in the broadest manner he said it was impossible for him to support this Committee of Inquiry, because its institution, in his opinion, was incompatible with the legitimate and necessary functions of the Executive. It was stated, also, by the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard), that he supported the Motion because he thought there was great ground for accusation against the Executive, and it was the first Parliamentary opportunity that had occurred of recording by his vote an opinion strongly entertained by him. He, too, added, if I mistake not—and he will correct me if I misrepresent him—that he did not anticipate any advantage from this inquiry, and only used the Motion as a mode of expressing want of confidence in the Government. I was present on Friday evening, when I heard the speech, which, on account of its ability, I should wish to have uttered myself—a speech far better than I can hope to make—of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Sir G. Grey), who put this question in a manner not to be gainsaid. He appealed to the House, and said—"Let us come to an understanding on this matter. I cannot believe you mean to press this as a substantive vote of inquiry; but you only mean it to be a censure on the Executive." That appeal was responded to by loud cheers on the whole Opposition side of the House. It was understood to be solely a vote of censure—it was supported as such—and was so regarded both by those who supported it and by those who opposed it. I am sure the House will permit me to state what was my own impression. I have declared that such was my impression at the time, and I am sorry to say that, looking back upon what has since occurred, I have not changed my opinion—that the Motion was proposed in this sense and carried in this sense. Well, Sir, how was the vote of this House regarded by Lord Aberdeen's Government? It was treated as a vote of censure, and acted upon in that manner, and one and all, Lord Aberdeen and his colleagues, took the only constitutional course which was open to them, and the following morning they tendered their resignations. Now, allow me to ask, if censure is inherent in that Motion for inquiry, how are the circumstances altered by anything that has since taken place? If it was a vote of censure then, surely the nomination of the Committee is a vote of censure now. If it was right not to submit to that vote of censure in January, how can it be right to submit tamely and without any contest to the nomination of the Committee in the month of February? It appears to me that the ground is the same, the intention is the same, the objections are the same. There is, however, some novelty in the course now adopted. Hitherto, generally, when votes of censure have been proposed upon Governments, certain Parliamentary courses, well known and commonly recognised, have been adopted. A Motion that the House should resolve itself into a Committee of the whole House on the state of the nation is a recognised "notice to quit" to the Government occupying those benches. That is a vote of censure in a direct form—unambiguous, not to be mistaken; but the misfortune in the present case is, that a course has been adopted which is unprecedented, which is ambiguous, and which is capable of two constructions, though, as I contend, the only legitimate construction is that which was first put upon it, and upon which Lord Aberdeen's Government acted—namely, that it was clearly intended to be a vote of censure.

Well, it may be said—has nothing since occurred to alter the aspect of the Motion? Yes, much has since occurred. Lord Aberdeen, who, when the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield was brought forward, was the Prime Minister, upon the expressed and recorded opinion of this House, ceased to be a Member of the Administration. The Duke of Newcastle, yielding also to the implied censure of this House, no longer occupies a place in Her Majesty's Government. My noble Friend the Member for Tiverton (Viscount Palmerston) supplies the place of Lord Aberdeen; but, although he supplies that place, he concurred with his colleagues in the Administration in regarding the vote for the appointment of the Committee as a vote of censure, he yielded to that vote, and he also retired. Lord Panmure supplies the place of the Duke of Newcastle. With the exception, I think, of Lord Panmure there is no Member of the present Government who was not a Member of the late Government—I mean as far as regards the Cabinet; all the Members of the present

Government in the Cabinet, who fill offices of the greatest importance in the State, with the exception of Lord Panmure, are the identical persons who were Members of Lord Aberdeen's Administration. Allow me, in passing, to observe that on Friday last, when the noble Lord at the head of the Government opened the policy of his Cabinet, he appeared to me distinctly to recognise the existence of this Committee of Inquiry, if pressed, as a difficulty not to be lightly regarded, because he tendered and volunteered to the House the functions of the Executive in lieu of the prosecution of an inquiry by a Committee. But it may be said to me, "How came you to accept office under the noble Viscount the Member for Tiverton if these were your impressions with respect to the proposed inquiry?" Now, I wish to state the case with perfect frankness. When the noble Viscount paid me the great—the undeserved—compliment of wishing me to become a Member of his Administration, I was confined to my bed, and I was not in a condition to carry on protracted correspondence or to make many inquiries. I will tell the House, however, that there was one difficulty which with me was cardinal, and upon which I required to be entirely satisfied. I wished to know from my noble Friend now at the head of the Government, whether there was to be any change in the foreign policy pursued by the Earl of Aberdeen's Administration, to which we, as colleagues, had given our united consent; and also whether, with reference to the negotiations now pending at Vienna, any alteration was contemplated with respect to the terms which, in our opinion, were held consistent with the attainment of a safe and honourable peace. I thought it my duty to satisfy myself upon these points; and my noble Friend, in the most frank manner, gave me explanations which were entirely satisfactory. Being satisfied, therefore, on these points, which I considered those of main importance, I made no further difficulty upon any other subject, nor did I make any other inquiry whatever. I frankly said, being satisfied on these points, "I will do my very best, if you think my services can be useful to support and to sustain your Government." Sir, perhaps greater caution might wisely have been exercised by me with respect to this Committee; but I was of opinion—and until very lately I continued to entertain that opinion—that two Ministers, my dearest friends, whom I trust, whom I have trusted long, and whom I believe to be as blameless and as trustworthy as any Ministers who ever served Her Majesty—I mean the Earl of Aberdeen and the Duke of Newcastle—having incurred, as I think, unjustly, public obloquy, and having been sacrificed to the wishes of the country and to the pleasure of this House; and the national desire and the opinion of this House being, as I believed, strongly in favour of the elevation of my noble Friend now at the head of Her Majesty's Councils to the chief post in the Government—Lord Panmure, who is conversant with the administration of the army, having supplied the place of the Duke of Newcastle—I was of opinion that changes had been thus effected which might have been satisfactory to this House and to the country, especially when, coincident with these changes, an announcement of great administrative reforms was made.

I will not dwell upon what more immediately concerns the department I have just vacated; but, considering the novelty and the difficulty of the immense operations in which we have been engaged, it was impossible that errors should not have been committed, or that imperfections should not be discovered. With regard to naval transport, I believe that errors have been committed, and that the service has not been performed in a manner altogether satisfactory. Well, while I was serving Her Majesty, I, on my own responsibility, applied a remedy which I believe will be efficacious. I have, in that department over which I lately presided, established a board specially for the performance of these duties, under the control of the Board of Admiralty. The office of Secretary at War has been abolished; great changes have been made and are in progress in the military departments; the General commanding the engineers before Sebastopol has been recalled, and another officer now commands that force. With regard to the Quartermaster General's and the Adjutant General's departments of our army in the Crimea, a chief of the staff has been sent out; Commissioners have been appointed, emanating from the Crown—the legitimate authority, to which I attach great importance—and from whose services much good may be anticipated. I certainly believed, until very lately, that the changes to which I have referred would have satisfied the public mind, and would, in the opinion of this House, have superseded the necessity of proceeding with an inquiry before a Committee.

I am aware that I may be charged with want of foresight, and I readily submit to that imputation, but I must claim for myself the right of entertaining an unchanged opinion with regard to the danger of the prosecution of this inquiry. In the first place, Sir, I believe it to be unnecessary. I am satisfied that the action of the Executive Government, possessing the confidence of this House, would be more efficient, more speedy, more certain than that of a Committee of Inquiry. While the Gentlemen composing that Committee, without any official knowledge, were picking out their way as best they might, without the guidance or assistance of any servant of the Crown, and were putting their questions, the Government would be deciding; and while the Committee were seeking how to reform, the Executive Government, using the power of the Crown, and possessing the confidence of this House, might rapidly, surely, and safely effect all the changes required. I have ventured to point out what has already been done with reference to the Naval and Military Departments. I am quite sure that more might be done, more ought to be done, and more would be done, if the Government were not hampered by the fear that this Committee, exercising functions not merely of a legislative character, but interfering with the Executive, would retard their proceedings and cramp their operations.

I have said that I consider this Committee unnecessary. I have a far stronger objection to it—I consider it to be unjust. Will the House bear with me while I say a few words on this point? The Executive Government of this country, armed with the authority of the Crown, appoints all the admirals, all the generals, all the officers in the army and navy on the most distant stations and in foreign parts. The servants of the Crown have the power of selection; they have the power of control; they have the power of investigation; they have the power of removal; they have the power of punishment through the means of tribunals organised by the Legislature of this country. I must say that I think officers so chosen, so controlled, so subject to the authority of the Ministers of the Crown, have a correlative claim. I think that the Executive Government, the servants of the Crown, are the protectors and defenders of those officers from any other inquiry behind their backs.

I have said that I think this inquiry is unjust; I have said that I think it dangerous—and I will show you how I consider it particularly dangerous in present circumstances. Will the House permit me to refer to an allegation which was made against me, with reference to my own department, from the very place where I now stand, on the last occasion that I had the honour of addressing it, that I was highly culpable as regards the blockade of the Black Sea? I met that accusation in my place, and on the spot. I told the House what were the circumstances which had led to delay during three months before the expedition sailed from Varna to the Crimea. I explained to the House how in the conduct of that expedition the whole naval forces of France and England were concentrated; how impossible it was to execute until October the purpose of instituting a blockade; and then, going to the very verge consistent with my duty, I shadowed forth the danger of prosecuting the inquiry further with regard to the reasons of subsequent delay. The House, with its accustomed prudence and indulgence, abstained from pressing further, and the statement led, I hope and believe, to no dangerous consequences whatever. But suppose a Committee, having called the admiral charged with these operations before them, presses that inquiry, does not exercise the forbearance shown by the House, seeks to go into details, which the House did not call upon me more fully to explain. Under the compulsion of a Select Committee, he is forced to disclose the reasons and the incidents which led to that delay. It depends on the prudence of six out of eleven gentlemen whether those inquiries are not so prosecuted. If, unhappily, imprudence should prevail, I state positively I am confident that inquiry will run directly into questions connected with the policy and conduct of our great and powerful ally. It is of vast importance that there should be no misunderstanding whatever, and I warn the House that in delegating this investigation, unaccompanied with any check or control, to the chance-medley prudence of a majority of six out of eleven gentlemen, it may involve this country in consequences, the fatal result of which cannot now be foreseen. I have said this only with respect to the navy. Let me carry this warning one step further, and let me just allude to the position of Lord Raglan, which bears directly on the question of the state of the army in the Crimea. I imagine, Sir, that of all the difficulties in which the most splendid human talents can be tried the successful command of an army in the presence of a superior force of an enemy is, perhaps, the greatest. The probability of success in command rests mainly on undivided authority. I may say, as has been truly said by one of the greatest commanders of ancient times, "Id est viri et ducis, non deesse Fortunæ præbenti se, et oblata casu flectere ad consilium,"—that is, the operation of one undivided superior intellect; but if the command of an army is to be conducted by the side of an ally, there must be constant communications involving the most complicated considerations; there must be difference of opinion; there must be more or less compromise of opinion—always a weakness in itself—in the distribution of the relative forces there must be inequality. I will not go further. I have shadowed forth the dangers with respect to the navy. Apply these considerations with respect to the command of an army in front of Sebastopol; and, without further expression from me in this, the most intelligent audience that can be addressed in the world, there is not a gentleman who will not feel within himself the nature and the extent of the danger.

Well, Sir, but it is said, this inquiry, whatever the danger, is irresistible. Now, I demur to that doctrine. It is in itself the most dangerous doctrine which under any form of government can be propounded; all difficulties become irresistible when those whose duty it is to confront them have not firmness to resist them, and, yielding to dangers which, if they had been firm, might have been overcome, they are then hurried into courses against their better judgment and their conscientious convictions.

I know that I am subject to the most painful of all taunts, "You are about to leave your colleagues in a moment of immense difficulty, and it is in moments of immense difficulty that the bonds of political union ought to be strongest, and ought religiously to be observed." But I must be permitted—and I hope I may say it without offence to my Friends on the Treasury bench—to deny that I am the deserter on this occasion. I took my stand in common with them in the resolution to resist this inquiry. It was resisted. The position was taken and firmly occupied. I still stand to the guns in that position, not believing it to be untenable. They abandon the position because they pronounce it to be untenable; they spike the guns and flee amain. Allow me still further to observe that I cannot believe that it is right in Ministers of the Crown, if they should be convinced that any given course is dangerous, because resistance may be unpopular—because resistance may be declared impossible—that they should not give this House the opportunity and the country the opportunity of reconsidering a foregone conclusion. I do not know a more honourable duty on the part of individuals, and it is a paramount duty on the part of a Government, on rare occasions such as this, in which men are acting from proper motives which will bear scrutiny, to stand up and avow their opinions, take the chances of failure or success, but, above all things, be firm and manful in the bold execution of their trust. It is in the painful discharge of that duty that I appear before you. It would be unseemly, even if my strength would permit it, to detain you at much greater length. I know nothing more honourable than the service of the Crown, when united with colleagues in whose principles and opinions you agree, and when in possession of the confidence of the people. I know nothing more dishonourable or painful than assenting to measures, adopted by a majority of your colleagues, which you consider dangerous, which your conscience and judgment tell you are unjustifiable, and, I must add, when you have the painful conviction that the confidence of this House is no longer reposed in the Cabinet of which you are a Member. It may be said, what right have you to make this last inference of want of confidence, when the Navy Estimates, with a large increase, have been voted, and the Army Estimates, with a still larger increase, have been also voted? Sir, I have been long a Member of this House. There are indications which are not to be mistaken, and I should conceal the truth if I did not state that, having sat on that bench only three or four evenings ago, when great changes were announced to conciliate individuals and win the favour of this House, I had come to the painful conclusion—painful, indeed, under present circumstances—that the Administration, of which until to-day I was a Member, does not possess in a greater degree the confidence of the House than that Administration which only a few weeks since retired because it was convinced that this confidence had been withdrawn.

Sir, I said I would speak without reserve that which I felt and which I believe. By your kind indulgence I have executed my purpose imperfectly, but honestly. Honeyed words at parting with colleagues are almost always nauseous, generally delusive, and, like lovers' vows under similar circumstances, they are unavailing and are laughed to scorn. I shall not, therefore, make any professions; but it shall be my endeavour to mark by my conduct my sense of the responsibility incurred by the step I have just taken. With my colleagues, from whom I am now severed, I have acted for two years. They are my friends. I esteem them. I value them. I could not be led by them to take a step which my judgment and my conscience disapproved; but if my leaning towards them, instead of being strong and friendly, were infinitely more adverse than it is, under the present circumstances I should hold it to be my paramount duty to give the humble support which is in my power to the Queen's Executive Government, however constituted. I shall, therefore, religiously abstain from anything that can partake of a factious character. I shall hope to give a cordial support generally to the measures of the Government. I will make no further professions, but, instead of professions, I will endeavour to prove by my conduct that with me the safety of the State, in the midst of a great emergency, is paramount to every other consideration; and I can only now thank the House cordially for the patience with which they have listened to the expression of opinions, shared, I believe, only by a small minority.

Mr. BRIGHT: I am one of those forming the majority of the House, I suspect, who are disposed to look upon our present position as one of more than ordinary gravity. I am one, also, of those, not probably constituting so great a majority of the House, who regret extremely the circumstances which have obliged the right hon. Gentlemen who are now upon this bench to secede from the Government of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton. I do not take upon me for a moment to condemn them; because I think, if there be anything in which a man must judge for himself, it is whether he should take office if it be offered to him, whether he should secede from office, whether he should serve under a particular leader, or engage in the service of the Crown, or retain office in a particular emergency. In such cases I think that the decision must be left to his own conscience and his own judgment; and I should be the last person to condemn any one for the decision to which he might come. I think, however, that the speech of the right hon. Gentleman is one which the House cannot have listened to without being convinced that he and his retiring colleagues have been moved to the course which they have taken by a deliberate judgment upon this question, which, whether it be right or wrong, is fully explained, and is honest to the House and to the country. Now, Sir, I said that I regretted their secession, because I am one of those who do not wish to see the Government of the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton overthrown. The House knows well, and nobody knows better than the noble Lord, that I have never been one of his ardent and enthusiastic supporters. I have disapproved much of his policy both at home and abroad; but I hope that I do not bear to him, as I can honestly say that I do not bear to any man in this House—for from all I have received unnumbered courtesies—any feeling that takes even the tinge of a personal animosity; and, even if I did, at a moment so grave as this, no feeling of a personal character whatever should prevent me from doing that which I think now, of all times, we are called upon to do—that which we honestly and conscientiously believe to be for the permanent interests of the country. We are in this position, that for a month past, at least, there has been a chaos in the regions of the Administration. Nothing can be more embarrassing—I had almost said nothing can be more humiliating—than the position which we offer to the country; and I am afraid that the knowledge of our position is not confined to the limits of these islands. It will be admitted that we want a Government; that if the country is to be saved from the breakers which now surround it, there must be a Government; and it devolves upon the House of Commons to rise to the gravity of the occasion, and to support any man who is conscious of his responsibility, and who is honestly offering and endeavouring to deliver the country from the embarrassment in which we now find it. We are at war, and I shall not say one single sentence with regard to the policy of the war or its origin, and I know not that I shall say a single sentence with regard to the conduct of it; but the fact is that we are at war with the greatest military Power, probably, of the world, and that we are carrying on our operations at a distance of 3,000 miles from home, and in the neighbourhood of the strongest fortifications of that great military empire. I will not stop to criticise—though it really invites me—the fact that some who have told us that we were in danger from the aggressions of that empire, at the same time told us that that empire was powerless for aggression, and also that it was impregnable to attack. By some means, however, the public have been alarmed as if that aggressive power were unbounded, and they have been induced to undertake an expedition, as if the invasion of an impregnable country were a matter of holiday-making rather than of war. But we are now in a peculiar position with regard to that war; for, if I am not mistaken—and I think I gathered as much from the language of the right hon. Gentleman—at this very moment terms have been agreed upon—agreed upon by the Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen; consented to by the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton when he was in that Cabinet; and ratified and confirmed by him upon the formation of his own Government—and that those terms are now specifically known and understood; and that they have been offered to the Government with which this country is at war, and in conjunction with France and Austria—one, certainly, and the other supposed to be, an ally of this country. Now, those terms consist of four propositions, which I shall neither describe nor discuss, because they are known to the House; but three of them are not matters of dispute; and, with regard to the other, I think that the noble Lord the Member for the City of London stated, upon a recent occasion, that it was involved in these terms—that the preponderant power of Russia in the Black Sea should cease, and that Russia had accepted it with that interpretation. Therefore, whatever difference arises is merely as to the mode in which that "preponderant power" shall be understood or made to cease. Now, there are some Gentlemen not far from me—there are men who write in the public press—there are thousands of persons in the United Kingdom at this moment—and I learn with astonishment and dismay that there are persons even in that grave assembly which we are not allowed to specify by a name in this House—who have entertained dreams—impracticable theories—expectations of vast European and Asiatic changes, of revived nationalities, and of a new map of Europe, if not of the world, as a result or an object of this war. And it is from those Gentlemen that we hear continually, addressed to the noble Lord the Member for Tiverton, terms which I cannot well understand. They call upon him to act, to carry on the war with vigour, and to prosecute enterprises which neither his Government, nor any other Government has ever seriously entertained; but I would appeal to those Gentlemen whether it does not become us—regarding the true interests and the true honour of the country—if our Government have offered terms of peace to Russia, not to draw back from those terms, not to cause any unnecessary delay, not to adopt any subterfuge to prevent those terms being accepted, not to attempt shuffles of any kind, not to endeavour to insist upon harder terms, and thus make the approach of peace even still more distant than it is at present? Whatever may be said about the honour of the country in any other relation in regard to this affair, this, at least, I expect every man who hears me to admit—that if terms of peace have been offered they have been offered in good faith, and shall be in honour and good faith adhered to; so that if, unfortunately for Europe and humanity, there should be any failure at Vienna, no man should point to the English Government and to the authorities and rulers of this Christian country, and say that we have prolonged the war and the infinite calamities of which it is the cause. Well, now, I said that I was anxious that the Government of the noble Lord should not be overthrown. Will the House allow me to say why I am so? The noble Lord at the head of the Government has long been a great authority with many persons in this country upon foreign policy. His late colleague, and present envoy to Vienna, has long been a great authority with a large portion of the people of this country upon almost all political questions. With the exception of that unhappy selection of an ambassador at Constantinople, I hold that there are no men in this country more truly responsible for our present position in this war than the noble Lord who now fills the highest office in the State and the noble Lord who is now, I trust, rapidly approaching the scene of his labours in Vienna. ["Hear, hear!" *and cries of* "No, no!"] I do not say this now to throw blame upon those noble Lords, because their policy, which I hold to be wrong, they, without doubt, as firmly believe to be right; but I am only stating facts. It has been their policy that they have entered into war for certain objects, and I am sure that neither the noble Lord at the head of the Government nor his late colleague the noble Lord the Member for London will shrink from the responsibility which attaches to them. Well, Sir, now we have those noble Lords in a position which is, in my humble opinion, favourable to the termination of the troubles which exist. I think that the noble Lord at the head of the Government himself would have more influence in stilling whatever may exist of clamour in this country than any other Member of this House. I think, also, that the noble Lord the Member for London would not have undertaken the mission to Vienna if he had not entertained some strong belief that, by so doing, he might bring the war to an end. Nobody gains reputation by a failure in negotiation, and as that noble Lord is well acquainted with the whole question from beginning to end, I entertain a hope—I will not say a sanguine hope—that the result of that mission to Vienna will be to bring about a peace, to extricate this country from some of those difficulties inseparable from a state of war. There is one subject upon which I should like to put a question to the noble Lord at the head of the Government. I shall not say one word here about the state of the army in the Crimea, or one word about its numbers or its condition. Every Member of this House, every inhabitant of this country, has been sufficiently harrowed with details regarding it. To my solemn belief, thousands—nay, scores of thousands of persons—have retired to rest, night after night, whose slumbers have been disturbed, or whose dreams have been based upon the sufferings and agonies of our soldiers in the Crimea. I should like to ask the noble Lord at the head of the Government—although I am not sure if he will feel that he can or ought to answer the question—whether the noble Lord the Member for London has power, after discussions have commenced, and as soon as there shall be established good grounds for believing that the negotiations for peace will prove successful, to enter into any armistice? ["No! no!" *and* "Hear, hear!"] I know not, Sir, who it is that says "No, no," but I should like to see any man get up and say that the destruction of 200,000 human lives lost on all sides during the course of this unhappy conflict is not a sufficient sacrifice. You are not pretending to conquer territory—you are not pretending to hold fortified or unfortified towns; you have offered terms of peace which, as I understand them, I do not say are not moderate; and breathes there a man in this House or in this country whose appetite for blood is so insatiable that, even when terms of peace have been offered and accepted, he pines for that assault in which of Russian, Turk, French, and English, as sure as one man dies, 20,000 corses will strew the streets of Sebastopol? I say I should like to ask the noble Lord—and I am sure that he will feel, and that this House will feel, that I am speaking in no unfriendly manner towards the Government of which he is at the head—I should like to know, and I venture to hope that it is so, if the noble Lord the Member for London has power, at the earliest stage of these proceedings at Vienna, at which it can properly be done—and I should think that it might properly be done at a very early stage—to adopt a course by which all further waste of human life may be put an end to, and further animosity between three great nations be, as far as possible, prevented? I appeal to the noble Lord at the head of the Government and to this House; I am not now complaining of the war—I am not now complaining of the terms of peace, nor, indeed, of anything that has been done—but I wish to suggest to this House what, I believe, thousands, and tens of thousands, of the most educated and of the most Christian portion of the people of this country are feeling upon this subject, although, indeed, in the midst of a certain clamour in the country, they do not give public expression to their feelings. Your country is not in an advantageous state at this moment; from one end of the kingdom to the other there is a general collapse of industry. Those Members of this House not intimately acquainted with the trade and commerce of the country do not fully comprehend our position as to the diminution of employment and the lessening of wages. An increase in the cost of living is finding its way to the homes and hearts of a vast number of the labouring population. At the same time there is growing up—and, notwithstanding what some hon. Members of this House may think of me, no man regrets it more than I do—a bitter and angry feeling against that class which has for a long period conducted the public affairs of this country. I like political changes when such changes are made as the result, not of passion, but of deliberation and reason. Changes so made are safe, but changes made under the influence of violent exaggeration, or of the violent passions of public meetings, are not changes usually approved by this House or advantageous to the country. I cannot but notice, in speaking to Gentlemen who sit on either side of this House, or in speaking to any one I meet between this House and any of those localities we frequent when this House is up—I cannot, I say, but notice that an uneasy feeling exists as to the news that may arrive by the very next mail from the East. I do not suppose that your troops are to be beaten in actual conflict with the foe, or that they will be driven into the sea; but I am certain that many homes in England in which there now exists a fond hope that the distant one may return—many such homes may be rendered desolate when the next mail shall arrive. The angel of death has been abroad throughout the land; you may almost hear the beating of his wings. There is no one, as when the first-born were slain of old, to sprinkle with blood the lintel and the two sideposts of our doors, that he may spare and pass on; he takes his victims from the castle of the noble, the mansion of the wealthy, and the cottage of the poor and the lowly, and it is on behalf of all these classes that I make this solemn appeal. I tell the noble Lord, that if he be ready honestly and frankly to endeavour, by the negotiations to be opened at Vienna, to put an end to this war, no word of mine, no vote of mine, will be given to shake his power for one single moment, or to change his position in this House. I am sure that the noble Lord is not inaccessible to appeals made to him from honest motives and with no unfriendly feeling. The noble Lord has been for more than forty years a Member of this House. Before I was born, he sat upon the Treasury bench, and he has devoted his life in the service of his country. He is no longer young, and his life has extended almost to the term allotted to man. I would ask, I would entreat the noble Lord to take a course which, when he looks back upon his whole political career—whatever he may therein find to be pleased with, whatever to regret—cannot but be a source of gratification to him. By adopting that course he would have the satisfaction of reflecting that, having obtained the object of his laudable ambition—having become the foremost subject of the Crown, the director of, it may be, the destinies of his country and the presiding genius in her councils—he had achieved a still higher and nobler ambition; that he had returned the sword to the scabbard—that at his word torrents of blood had ceased to flow—that he had restored tranquillity to Europe, and saved this country from the indescribable calamities of war.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT: I trust, Sir, that in the peculiar situation in which I at present stand, the House will grant me their indulgence while I endeavour to explain the reasons which have actuated me in the course I have taken, of seceding from the Government of the noble Lord; and in making those explanations I will be as brief as I can, first, because the greater portion of what I might have had to state has been anticipated by my right hon. Friend (Sir J. Graham), and partly on account of physical inability to address the House at any great length at the present moment.

Sir, I feel that the position which I occupied in the late Government differed somewhat from that which was held either by my right hon. Friend lately the First Lord of the Admiralty, or by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford. I was connected by my official position with one of the War Departments; and was, therefore, though in a secondary degree, implicated in the censure which has been passed by the House upon the management of those departments; and, although by all constitutional theory every man who forms part of any Cabinet is equally as responsible with his colleagues for whatever may have been done by that Cabinet, yet, at the same time, our common sense teaches us that those who are the most nearly allied to the departments the operations of which have been condemned, do, in fact, bear a heavier weight of responsibility, are more liable to censure, and are, therefore, bound to endeavour to stand more clearly before this House. Now, as far as that is concerned, I wish to say one word with respect to the latter portion of the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck). The Motion of my hon. and learned Friend was divided into two portions; he proposed in the first instance to institute an examination into the state of the army before Sebastopol; and in the next place, to institute an inquiry into the conduct of those departments of the Government which were concerned in the due maintenance of that army. Now, Sir, I draw the widest possible distinction between the two cases—and for this reason; the House of Commons not only has the right, but it is its solemn duty to institute the most searching investigation into the conduct of the Ministers of the Crown, if it is so minded; and, therefore, I have not one word to say against that portion of my hon. and learned Friend's Motion which concerns the conduct of the Ministry. He had a perfect right to bring his Motion forward, and the House of Commons had a perfect right to pass it—just as much as any man had a perfect right to resist it, as I did, who felt conscious that the imputations which it involved were not deserved. Not only was my hon. and learned Friend right in bringing it forward, if he thought there was any necessity for it, but he was right also in adhering to it, for, at any rate, he brought it forward upon a distinct view which he had in his own mind, that there had been malversation or misconduct on the part of the functionaries of the Government. The tribunal which he proposed was a constitutional tribunal, and —what is most important to bear in view in considering this case—a tribunal which from its proximity to the scene of action was both able and powerful, and sufficient and efficient, to investigate and sift these charges to the bottom, and either to acquit or to condemn. I do not object, therefore, to that portion of the Motion, and am ready when the Committee sits, to go before it. I have nothing to conceal. I was going to say I had nothing to regret —but would to God that any of us, taking a retrospective view of all the details of this war since it first commenced to the present moment, could say that!—but what I do say is, that I have done nothing which I shall be ashamed to look back upon—nothing which I am afraid to put before the light of day. Not a word have I said, not a sentence have I written, but what I shall be willing to place before the Committee, and shall be perfectly well satisfied to abide the issue. I say emphatically, let no man hint for one moment that I am attempting to shirk or to evade inquiry. I may speak, and I may vote, as a Minister of the Crown, against inquiries of this character; and I am justified in so doing, because the appointment of such a Committee as this is in the nature of an accusation against the Ministers of the Crown, who ought not to be placed under accusation so long as they retain their places. I felt, therefore, as one of the Ministers of the Crown, that I must share the censure with which they have been visited, since those were gone who were possessed of more direct authority and influence in this department than myself; and I conceived it was not right, while this inquiry was pending, and while my conduct was being investigated, that I should still retain the office of a Minister of the Crown; for though in civil life we hold that a man is to be considered innocent until he is proved guilty, that is not so with respect to an Administration. They should suffer no breath of suspicion to exist with respect to their conduct; for the moment in which they are suspected should be the last of their power.

But, Sir, this Committee has a different and a wider scope. I have seen upon several occasions in this House much confusion and difficulty resulting from Motions being brought forward, the objects of which, in themselves, were clear and direct, but which were couched in language so ambiguous that men might take them in whatever sense they pleased, and convert them to their own purposes. This Motion, when brought forward the other night, was supported by a vast number of Gentlemen in this House entirely on the consideration that it was a vote of censure. I recollect the words of an hon. and learned Gentleman sitting below me, who said he should vote for the Motion, but that the sitting of the Committee would be ridiculous, that the efficiency of the services would be paralysed, and that it was monstrous, it was absurd, to suppose that after the vote was passed, and after the object of it had been attained, the nomination of the Committee was to be proceeded with. The hon. and learned Gentleman who moved the appointment of this Committee, and other individual Members, may have entertained a different notion; but the question is, what were the general feeling and the general expectation of the House upon the subject? I do not hesitate to aver that the general expectation was, that when, by means of this Motion, Lord Aberdeen's Government had been put an end to, we should hear nothing more of the Committee but a formal negative of the names proposed for the Committee. The right hon. Baronet (Sir James Graham) said, that he may be accused of great want of foresight; but, Sir, I think the House of Commons may equally well be accused of great want of foresight, for, to a very great extent, they shared in his opinion. My colleagues shared it, and I can answer for it that the noble Lord the First Lord of the Treasury shared it up to last Friday, for the speech which he made on that occasion was that of a man who considered that the whole object of the Motion had been attained, and that it was done with. I have the very words of the noble Lord here, and, with permission, I will read them to the House, for it is important to see up to how late a period this conviction existed. The noble Lord says—

> "In undertaking, however, the task which Her Majesty has confided to our care, it would be useless to dissemble the difficulty which meets us and stares us in the face—namely, that difficulty which arises from the notice of Motion which my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Roebuck) has given for Thursday next. I will not attempt to disguise that I feel the same objection to the appointment of the Committee of which he has given notice as I had the honour to express when the subject was first under discussion. My opinion is that such a Committee would in its action not be in accordance with the true and just principles of the constitution, and that it would not be, for the effectual accomplishment of its purpose, a sufficient instrument."—[See p. 1424.]

Well, Sir, I must say that that statement of my noble Friend was in strict accordance, in strict consistency, with everything which fell from him at the interview which I had the honour to have with him at the time when, after some conversation, I accepted the position which he offered me in his Cabinet. The noble Lord then thought that the Motion for the nomination of the Committee would afford no obstacle or difficulty in the way of his Government; he was of opinion that it would be negatived without discussion. But I will put that out of the question, and will consider the Motion for the Committee in the second point of view. What is the meaning of such a Committee as this? Sir, while the Committee was in the course of formation, a very marked change took place in opinion out of doors; and this vote, which had done its duty for the purpose of extinguishing an Administration, was taken up by the public, and honestly taken up, as a means of inquiring into those evils which are gigantic in their proportions, and which have perplexed every one. That circumstance has altered the aspect of the Motion in this House. But then comes the question—if the people of England are determined, and, as I think, rightly and justly determined, to have a searching investigation into these matters, is this the best—is it the most constitutional—above all, is it the most efficient—tribunal for getting at the truth? Take care that, in coming to a decision upon this question, you are not perpetrating a fraud upon those who honestly think that it is so. As I said before, for the purpose of inquiring into the state of the departments you could have nothing better—you could send, at five minutes' notice, to any man for every paper or despatch that was written; but for the purpose of inquiring into transactions that have been going on 3,000 miles off, I tell you the Committee will be utterly inefficient. Certainly, inquiry must be confined to the past physical state of the army. I do not know how you can possibly inquire into the future state of the army. What has happened may be investigated, but I do not see how you can pursue an inquiry into what may hereafter happen. The hon. and learned Gentleman says, he did not give notice of that instruction, and that it was placed upon the paper by mistake. I do not attach much importance on the withdrawal of that part of the Motion—it does not get rid of the difficulties inherent to the question. What the "past" is, is not specified, and what happens to-day will be "past" to-morrow. I apprehend the Motion must be for inquiry into the existing as well as the past state of the army. Then, again, I apprehend what it means is not simply to inquire into the state of the army—as to how many are sick and how many are dead—God knows we have heard enough of that without troubling any Committee—but all that we want to know is as to the causes of these great calamities. Well, Sir, I say that for any such purpose this Committee will be useless. You might have had a Commission to do that; you might have appointed a Commission in whom the country would have confidence, who, sitting on the spot, would then and there have endeavoured to ascertain what were the causes of these evils, and to whom likewise might have been entrusted a remedial power, emanating from the Crown, which is the rightful authority. But, if you trust to this Committee of the House of Commons, I must say I entirely share the objections which the right hon. Baronet took to its composition—that you are going to appoint a Committee of Inquiry without the presence upon it of any Minister of the Crown. If not the Prime Minister, at least the Foreign Secretary or the Minister for War should be there. Those are the departments whose acts are to be scrutinised, and which may be supposed to be in danger; in these are involved the delicate and difficult relations of this country which you are going to take away from the charge of responsible men sworn to secrecy, and trust to an irresponsible body, who may, perhaps, publish everything the next day. Now, in the first place, I would just ask you this—What is your own opinion on the point? How do you indicate your own opinion as to the Committee you are about to appoint? You advise the Government, you entreat the Government, to pay no respect to the operation of this Committee, but to institute its own inquiries—not to wait for the Report of this Committee, but to act at once from its own investigation and its own observation. What, in all probability, will be the result? When the Report of this Committee makes its appearance in the form of a blue-book four months hence, it will be as waste paper; and it will be treated with the utmost contumely by your Executive: you will with great pomp and ceremony have installed a Committee upon which you yourselves ask the Executive to heap every disrespect—disrespect in not waiting to know its opinions, and not acting upon its advice. I must say, I do not myself see on what principle we can, after an interval of two weeks, take a course diametrically opposite to that which a fortnight ago we deliberately adopted. Recollect what has occurred since. One object which hon. Gentlemen had in view in bringing forward that Committee is accomplished. There is less necessity, therefore, for this Motion now. As a vote of censure it is valueless, for its work is done. As an inquiry I tell you it is nothing but an immense sham. I defy you to get to the bottom of any of these defects; but, if you do, you do it at the risk either of disorganising your army, or of exciting the susceptibilities or shaking the confidence of your allies. You cannot attach too great weight to the warnings which the right hon. Baronet addressed to you on that subject. If you succeed in avoiding this danger through the intuition of some Member of that Committee, who shall have influence enough in it to arrest its progress when you come to dangerous ground in that respect, then you may do the grossest injustice by sacrificing officers whom you may bring before that Committee—officers to whom you may put questions of an accusative character, but who will not be allowed to answer questions directed against themselves, because they cannot do it without trenching upon ground too delicate and too dangerous for them to be allowed to approach; nay, in the case of many, these accusations will be brought against them in their absence. The accused will never be confronted with the accuser. They will not have even the opportunity of defence. I say, Sir, that I, who have held for a long time a position in connection with the administration of the army, and who in the course of this period have met from that noble service every mark of kindness and support, owe a debt of gratitude to the members of that service, and feel that I should be ashamed of myself if I could allow such a course to be instituted here without raising my voice against it, and offering it may be my humble and feeble protest against placing them in a situation so false, and in which everything that is dear to them—their character and their honour, dearer than life itself—may be attacked in such a manner that they will be unable to defend themselves.

But I am told—this is now the common expression—that the present demand for inquiry is irresistible. Well, Sir, I confess that I have seen, in the course of my short experience in the House of Commons, a resistance made, and successfully made, to feelings quite as strong and quite as universal as those which now prevail in this House—nay, I have seen resistance made against plain and decided convictions which pervaded the whole of this House, sincerely and according to the plain sense and meaning of the words. Now, at the present moment, this is not the case. We have some men who voted for this Motion on one ground and some who voted for it on another. We have men voting for it as inquiry, who know that it will not and cannot be an inquiry at all; and we have men voting for it because, in the present state of things, they say they can see nothing but chaos. Well, but is there not a Government?—is there no man who shall bring order out of this chaos, and who, by his commanding position, may take the lead of the House, which, like all popular assemblies, is willing to be led, if it discern, in those who aspire to lead it, the qualities necessary for that purpose? I have seen this House rescind a vote at the bidding of Sir Robert Peel; but it was after the reasons for doing so had been fully and gravely stated, and from a conviction on the part of the House that they were dealing with a man of great judgment and, above all, of strong will; from their conviction that they must either rescind that vote, or part with a Minister whom they then thought necessary for the common welfare. I heard two years ago —it was during the Administration of a

Government of which I had the honour of being a Member—a decided expression of opinion—it was a feeling that pervaded the whole of the House, that you should have no income-tax in this country, unless it were a graduated one. Yet, by the firmness, by the weighty arguments, and by the eloquence of one man, the House came to a different conclusion, and, in adopting the proposals which he had made, they not only accepted his arguments, but they honoured the genius and the courage of the man who had stood forward boldly to oppose them. Depend upon it, Sir, what you want is a strong Government. I confess my own impression is that the right hon. Gentleman near me (Sir J. Graham) has analysed truly the state of feeling in the House, when he said that he believed that the Government, as it was constituted (when we were Members of it, at any rate), had not the confidence of the House of Commons. It had a great deal of professed support. Some on the bench above me declared that they gave it critical support; a few supported it because they believed it inclined to war at all hazards; others, again, because they fancied that under its auspices we should have peace at any price; and then there was, from hon. Gentlemen opposite, what we may call a vituperative support. But genuine support given to the Government—a support founded upon the single object of the common welfare—is a thing which in this House, at the present moment, does not seem to exist. Well, for my part, under these circumstances, not having succeeded in my humble capacity in conciliating any the smallest share of confidence, I felt myself willing to go again into the ranks and attempt to give the Government a support —not critical nor vituperative—but a support given to the Executive because I think it is necessary it should be supported, and with the single object in view of giving stability to the Government and strength to the country in a moment of great difficulty, and of seeking the promotion of the public welfare. Sir, you will not have a strong Government by having in it strong men who take a weak course. You must have strong men taking a strong course. They must not at the first moment throw down the reins, and act contrary to the opinions which they strongly expressed only a fortnight ago, because the House at the moment happens to demand it. The Government, to be a strong Government, must be something more than the mere reflex of the caprices of a large popular assembly. For these reasons, the Government must not only be a Government of strong and independent men, but it must act strongly. Sir, I have felt that in the course which the Government are now about to take, such a condition is not likely to be fulfilled. I disapprove of this Committee. If it be inevitable—which I deny —that is no reason why I should vote for that which I disapproved of at first and still disapprove of. I will not make myself a party to what I disapprove of because I cannot prevent others from doing so. But I deny that this inquiry was irresistible. I think if the House of Commons had given the Government a fair chance—if the public outside had had a thorough explanation put before them—if it had been represented to them and to this House that the Government was more interested than they were in having a searching investigation—a public which is now perplexed by reading official despatches, representing the existence of a certain state of things, and private letters, some corroborating, some denying, the truth of those representations, while they have constantly before them the letters of writers in the newspapers, which, however graphic pictures in themselves, are more like a species of scene painting, and are written to produce a great effect rather than to narrate the facts in any great accuracy of detail—if, I say, the public had been told that the Government have really the greatest interest in instituting an inquiry which should be thorough and searching—if the public had had that case put fully before them, and the dangers of the course they are now invited to take had been pressed upon the attention of this House, I think they would have hesitated. The House of Commons is not a tyrant which none can approach without cringing; it is an assembly of the most educated men, of men occupying the highest position in this country, who feel their responsibilities, and feel also that the great secret of their power is their unwillingness on any occasion to transgress its limits. In the same way, while the Government, I think, might have guided the House, there is an intelligent community out of doors who look to be guided by this House, and who accept the direction and lead from this House, who, however, in this instance are not giving it—for the public, I fear, are being deceived with the hope of an investigation which can be no investigation at all. An investigation into the conduct of the Government or of its late Members? Yes—for that purpose the Committee may be efficient. But the promise of an investigation into the state of the army and the causes of that state is, I believe, delusive. An investigation, to be effective, must be conducted on the spot. You cannot get it through a Committee of the House of Commons; and it is a mere piece of Parliamentary red-tapism to say you can; in the nature of things you cannot. The public should have had warning of the danger they incur and of the risks they run by adopting this course. I am confident that had such an appeal been made, we should not have heard that this Motion was irresistible, and that had the Minister who opposed this Committee a fortnight ago declared that he persisted in that opposition to what he deemed a useless inquiry, the Government would not now have taken up the Committee as though they thought all their previous arguments fallacies.

I will not much longer detain the House, but I wish to say one word by way of comment on what has fallen from my right hon. Friend (Sir J. Graham). He has said that the expression of compliments on colleagues from whom you have separated are delusive and had better be avoided. I am younger than my right hon. Friend, and, perhaps, a more youthful temperament may account for a more trustful feeling in that respect; but I say, with sincerity and truth, that I never left colleagues with greater pain than those with whom I have served for the last two years. I have served with them in what is popularly denounced as a "Coalition Ministry"—by which is meant, a Ministry in which men are supposed to have coalesced while holding opposite opinions on certain questions, and whose conduct on matters of public policy is supposed to be the result of compromise. Well, I am happy to state that I have acted with those colleagues for the past two years in a spirit of the most perfect harmony and with the most perfect sympathy, and I shall always look back with satisfaction to the period when I co-operated with them, and to the friendships I acquired during that period of co-operation, and which, I hope, I shall ever retain. I have this conviction, which is most agreeable to me, that no men—and I believe that you nowhere see men so thoroughly as in a Cabinet where you are acting together in the most close and intimate connection—while acting together, could have displayed a more cordial spirit towards each other, and I rejoiced to see by what high motives, and high sense of honour and of duty, men were prompted to act in the councils of the nation. I have left those colleagues with the deepest regret. I particularly lament that at this moment I should have been severed from my connection with them. I do not think it selfishness to say that, having passed through this gloomy period with them, I regret that I shall not share with them in any forthcoming prosperity. I will not profess that entire indifference to office which many men on such occasions think it necessary to profess. I will say frankly that, holding a position in which the greatest and most important interests which could be entrusted to any man had been committed to me, I had questions before me which I had hoped to settle—upon the settlement of which any man who had the good fortune to achieve it might look back with pride and congratulation; and I honestly confess that I gave up that position with pain; but I gave it up as I part from my colleagues, from a paramount sense of public duty. I am told that I have deserted my colleagues at a period of great difficulty. I say, like the right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham), that I have deserted no man. I was prepared to stand by my colours, and I must not be called a deserter for so doing. But, Sir, in the course which I shall pursue hereafter I trust that I may learn a lesson from the conduct of many whom I have seen in this House, professing to support Her Majesty's Government, but at the same time throwing every possible impediment in its way. I have no inclination to take any such course. I can, therefore, only look trustfully forward, hoping that the conduct of the Government may be such as I can cordially and heartily approve. I do so for their sakes, I do so for my own sake, I do so above all for the sake of my country, which I now see to be involved in great difficulties, but which I trust will, by the energy of a wise Administration, by the courage and bravery of our armies, and by the wise and deliberate councils of Parliament, retain that position which as a military nation she has always hitherto held.

Mr. MILNES GASKELL said, he had listened to the speech of his right hon. Friend who had just sat down (Mr. Sidney Herbert), and to that of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir J. Graham), with feelings of very great surprise. He owned he was at a loss to understand how those right hon. Gentlemen, or how any man, could have expected the noble Viscount at the head of the Government to insist on the reversal of a decision which had been arrived at by so immense a majority, and on an occasion of such immense public importance. It was too much the habit in that House to shrink from dwelling on the real facts of this case, and not sufficiently to bear in mind the gravity of the occasion, or the reasons for the decision to which the House had come. The occasion had been the wasting away by disease, by mismanagement, by neglect, of a British army: The facts had been admitted by the Ministers of the Crown—they had been described in thrilling but unexaggerated language by the noble Lord the Member for the City of London, and the decision to which the House had come had been this, that they would institute a searching inquiry into the cause of these disasters, and endeavour to apply a remedy. He (Mr. Gaskell) would take leave to add that, however unpalatable that decision might have been to the right hon. Baronet and his friends, it had been honourable to the House of Commons, and had met with the almost unanimous approbation of the country. And what were the circumstances under which the noble Viscount now at the head of Her Majesty's Government had been expected to propose the reversal of that decision? The facts of the case remained the same. It was not denied that there had been grievous errors, that there had been almost unparalleled suffering, that there had been gross and culpable negligence, either here or elsewhere, in the management of this expedition; and were they to be gravely told that because there had been a partial, a very partial, change in the composition of the Government—that because a Secretary of State, however distinguished, had become First Minister of the Crown, and because another noble Lord, much less distinguished, had become Secretary for War, the necessity for inquiry had ceased? It was said, indeed, by the right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham), and by others, that these things should be left to the Executive; but the complaint of the country was, that they had been left to the Executive, and that these disastrous consequences had ensued. They (the House of Commons) had recognised and deplored these evils—evils which had brought discredit upon our name and nation: they had resolved by an overwhelming majority to investigate their cause, and it was too much to find three distinguished Members of the Cabinet leaving the Administration almost as soon as formed, because the noble Lord the First Minister of the Crown was not imprudent enough,—he (Mr. Gaskell) had almost said, not insane enough—to run counter to the declared and deliberate opinion of the vast majority of the representatives of the people. He (Mr. Gaskell) could perfectly understand the argument, that in time of war a despotic form of Government might in many respects be better than our own—that it might give greater facilities for unity of action and for singleness of purpose; but as long as we retained our free institutions, unless we wished them to become a byword of reproach throughout Europe, he trusted the House of Commons would not consent to such an abandonment of duty—such an abdication of functions as these right hon. Gentlemen would recommend. With him (Mr. Gaskell) this was no question of confidence in any Government, no question of compliment to any Minister. He felt that it was the paramount duty of that House to give effect to their previous decision, and if unhappily they should fail in the performance of that duty, and retrace the step which they had taken, it was his firm conviction that they would strike a fatal blow at the character of representative institutions.

Mr. DRUMMOND said, that, great as were the difficulties with which he had to contend in comprehending the proceedings of that House, there was one which peculiarly pressed upon his mind, and that was, that he was not quite sure in what language it was that the House spoke. He had hitherto believed that they were in the habit of speaking in a dialect of the English language; but when he was told, after he had in the honest simplicity of his mind been voting, as he thought, for inquiry, that he did not mean by that vote any such thing as inquiry, but that he really meant a want of confidence in somebody, he confessed he was totally at a loss how to proceed. But even if he admitted the translation of his vote into that sense, still he hardly knew the meaning of it, or what the words "want of confidence" meant. He had full confidence in the right hon. Gentleman the late Chancellor of the Exchequer, that he would not rob the till, but was he to be supposed to mean by that that he should have confidence in the right hon. Gentleman as commanding the army? Not at all. However, he supposed he must take all these words in a non-natural sense, as that was the only way in which these matters could be reconciled. As he had taken some part in recommending the House to adopt the inquiry, he begged leave to say that, if he had seen any reason to retract that vote, nothing would prevent his voting against the Motion now. But let them remember this fact—the House had no knowledge before it. Ministers came down and gave the House no information, and there was nothing for the House to act upon except what certain individuals had been told in private letters. The House itself knew nothing, except that on every occasion they had been asked to do so they had voted very large sums of money and large numbers of men. It was true that they saw by *Gazettes* that enormous numbers of these men had died or were sick; but whenever any hon. Member spoke of the state of affairs in the Crimea the Ministers were most eloquent in defence of themselves, and in uttering panegyrics upon each other; but when any hon. Member spoke of the houseless, starved, frost-bitten, and annihilated army, there was—

> "No pitying heart, no eye t' afford
> One tear to grace their obsequies."

["No!"] Well, since the hon. Gentleman was so positive in his contradiction, he would challenge him to produce his *Hansard*, and show to him one single sentence—until Friday last, when the noble Lord now at the head of the Government agreed to this Motion—one single word from any Member of the Government expressive of sympathy for the painful and degraded state of the army. The Ministers positively denied the state of the army to be such as it was represented to be. He agreed with the hon. Gentleman who last spoke, that one most remarkable thing in the present situation of affairs was, that the three Gentlemen, Members of the Privy Council, who had retired, did not seem at all particular in what manner they abandoned their functions, or in what state they left the Executive. At a moment when negotiations were going on which could not be suspended without detriment to the public service—at a moment when every delay caused additional hardships to our wretched army—at a moment when it was of the utmost importance to be provided with a strong Government—what were they doing? They were either running away from their places, or, like spoilt servants when the house was on fire, and the mistress called for their services, it was, "John won't come unless Bill will," "Tom won't come unless Harry will," and so the house went on burning. They had heard before of the farce of *High Life below Stairs*, but this was the tragedy of *Low Life above Stairs*. That, however, was not the worst of the matter; this Government, which had confessedly by sheer incompetence destroyed an enormous army, which had brought the mockery of all Europe upon us, and which had brought the criticism of all the German papers upon our military skill, at that very moment advised the Crown to give the highest mark of favour it could confer upon the head of that Government—in mocking insult to the votes of the House of Commons, and in defiance of the common sense of Europe. He did not deny that there was much danger to be apprehended from this Committee; but were they to be scared by the report of the danger which might arise if they voted for it? Let them be taught to avoid it. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Sidney Herbert) was afraid that the Committee was to be a sham. He promised the right hon. Gentleman that it should be no sham—he need not be in the least concerned on that score. The opponents of this Committee raised a number of questions which they themselves knew were never intended to be put—which they knew would never be gone into at all—and then they asked, "Will you trust these eleven men to go into such questions?" It was not intended to touch upon these matters at all; but perhaps the Committee would be able to find out how it was that these very eminent statesmen, who at the end of nine months of war were beginning to find out, at last, that something like a waggon-train was wanted, and why, when they made the waggons, they forgot the harness. Why, there was not a country booby throughout all England who, when he went to buy a cart, did not know it was also necessary to provide the harness and horses. It was thought that the national prejudices of the country were now likely to be at an end; but he should like to know what, at a time when the country was running breast high against French influence, would have been thought if the day would ever arrive when this country would have 10,000 of its soldiers fighting in French uniform, and receiving, as an act of charity, 10,000 rations of fresh meat—the only fresh meat they were enabled to get in consequence of the want of brains displayed by the Government. Talk about danger! Could not the Committee find out how it was that all the horses had been starved? Could not they find out how it was that the wooden huts, when they were made, remained at Bristol and Southampton for no one knew how long? What was requisite was an inquiry into the conduct of the civil departments; but there had never been any intention upon his part, or upon the part of any hon. Gentleman who had supported the Motion for inquiry, to inquire into anything relating to the conduct of the war. Such a course would, he thought, be exceedingly dangerous, and so dangerous that he thought the House ought to take upon itself the duty of giving instructions to the Committee. He did not think that the inquiry ought to be left altogether to the discretion of a Committee. He had no wish to excite the John Bullism of hon. Members, or to rouse their anti-French feelings; but he would appeal to their common sense, and ask whether they had wisely or unwisely gone into partnership with another Power, without having passed a Bill for limited liabilities? It would neither be fair nor honest for the Committee to inquire into anything with which they had no right to interfere:—they had no right to make the misconduct of their own Government an excuse for inquiring into the conduct of the French Government; but it was absolutely necessary to inquire into the misconduct of their own Government, though how that was to be done he would leave to others to say. Whether the Committee were to act upon their own responsibility or upon instructions from the House of Commons he could not tell, but somehow or other the inquiry ought to be made.

Lord SEYMOUR said, he was anxious to state, as his name appeared in the list of the proposed Committee, that he had originally voted against this Committee, and that he was still of opinion that an inquiry at the present time would be fraught with great inconvenience to the public service. It would be injurious to the army in the Crimea, it would be embarrassing in regard to those preparations that ought to be made for the next campaign, and it would not be without danger as connected with our noble allies the French. But he understood that the Government had acceded to an inquiry; and having been asked by a Member of the Government to allow his name to stand on the Committee, he had felt it his duty to consent, after consulting with his right hon. Friend the Member for Coventry (Mr. Ellice), who agreed with him in all he now stated as to the inconvenience of the inquiry, and as to its danger, unless carefully guarded by the instructions of the House of Commons or the good sense of the Committee itself—a matter which, with the strong feeling now existing in the country, would be very difficult to accomplish. At this moment, now that they were about to institute an inquiry, they ought to be making every preparation for the approaching campaign. They ought to communicate with the Government of France, and decide now what course they would take for military operations in the spring; but, instead of that, what would all the military departments be doing? Why, every one of them—the War Office, the Office of the Secretary at War, the Horse Guards, the Ordnance, the Commissariat, and the Medical Department, instead of looking to the approaching campaign, would be making every exertion to defend themselves against the inquiry which would be taking place before the Committee. He felt as strongly as any one the difficulties which this inquiry must impose upon the public service; but he also felt that if there was to be an inquiry, then it must be a searching inquiry. It would not do to make the inquiry anything but a strict, searching investigation. It must, in justice to the army in the Crimea, in justice to all the relations of persons who had been employed in that expedition, and in justice to the Members of the late Government, whose character and conduct were impugned. It must also be a searching inquiry for the vindication of the character of that House, and in obedience to the general opinion of the country. Let the House then consider what would happen. They would call individuals before them who would say, "We did all in our power, but the error arose in the Crimea." The consequence would, therefore, be that a charge of neglect or mismanagement would be hanging over the heads of parties serving their country in the field, without those parties having any possibility of setting the matter right for the next three months at least. This was a serious thing, but it was one which must occur. He wished to know if this was to be a public or a secret inquiry. There were great objections to a Secret Committee, and even then things most dangerous to the interests of the country might get published; and if it were a public inquiry, the accusations against the different departments and against individuals would be published in the newspapers of the following day, and might, for months before they could possibly be answered, excite the public mind, and do injustice to persons who, when the inquiry was concluded, might be acquitted of all blame. He felt strongly these difficulties, and hoped the House would consider well what instructions they would give to the Committee. Would they limit the inquiry to the civil departments concerned in the management of the army? If they did that, they would then draw a distinct and clear line for the Committee to follow; but if they proposed that the Committee should go rambling over all the matters that might incidentally arise upon this very wide question, he feared that it would be an almost endless inquiry, and that, from the largeness of the field over which it would extend, it would be most unsatisfactory. Whatever course the Committee might take, he trusted that the House would take upon itself the task of telling the Committee what it was really required to do. He had voted against the Committee, but, after the overwhelming majority by which it was carried, he did not think it was possible to do away with it; and he thought that the Government had taken the same view of it, for, on looking to the speech addressed to his constituents by the right hon. Member for South Wiltshire (Mr. S. Herbert), he found that he had said that there must be a searching inquiry. He (Lord Seymour) thought, though he had evidently misinterpreted the right hon. Member, that the Government had acceded to the inquiry, and that the only question would be as to how it was to be regulated; and he hoped that the Government would have stated their views on the point. What the public desired to know was, how the mismanagement in details had happened; and he thought that they could satisfy the public on these points without entering on matters it would be inconvenient for them to deal with.

Mr. LOWE said, that, after the speech they had just heard from, he might presume, the intended Chairman of their Committee, he hoped the House would permit even so insignificant a person as himself to offer the reasons which weighed strongly in his mind against proceeding any further in the proposed inquiry. The hon. Member for Wenlock (Mr. Gaskell) had asked, whether it could be supposed that the House of Commons would be so foolish as to reverse its judgment. He hoped that in supposing the House could be induced to amend its Resolution when it found that it had been induced to come to a hasty and improper decision, he was paying a higher compliment to the House than had the hon. Member. The House was called upon to grant a Committee to inquire into the condition of the army before Sebastopol, and into the conduct of those departments that administered to that army. It was the desire of the hon. Member for Surrey (Mr. Drummond) that they should limit this inquiry in some way; but in what way was the inquiry to be limited? Were they so to limit it as to exclude from it any inquiry which would prove dangerous to their alliance with France? How was this to be done? Let them not confine themselves to vague generalities. They would not find the solution of this question in the declamation they had heard; and, notwithstanding whatever the hon. Member for Surrey might say, he was sure that there was not a man in the House so unfeeling as not to have made this subject his thought by night and day—it had been a nightmare that they could not throw off, and it had embittered and poisoned all their hours of pleasure and relaxation ever since this misery had begun. They could not limit the inquiry so as to exclude France. Let them look at what the Committee would have to do. They were to inquire into the condition of the army before Sebastopol; and in this would be involved the conduct of those who had the charge of the army; and the first question raised would be—"You had, side by side with you, another nation not possessing so great maritime resources as yourselves, and how does it result that their army is in a prosperous condition while yours is in misery?" Then, if persons were allowed to defend themselves—and he had very great doubt whether, under the conditions of this Committee, they would be permitted to do so—they would argue, and would call witnesses to prove that the difference between the French and English was not in truth so great as had been stated. This was the issue that would be raised, and on this the verdict of the Committee would have to be given. If they intended to do justice to the parties accused, this question could not be excluded from the consideration of the Committee. They might do so by an arbitrary rule; but if they did, those put on trial would be deprived of the most powerful argument in their favour, in a case which, if it were decided against those who had the conduct of affairs, would fix an indelible stain on their names. He agreed with the hon. Member for Surrey, that there would be the greatest danger, the absolute certainty, of imperilling their alliance with France, if they dragged to light that which the Emperor of the French desired—and he had an undoubted right to do so if he thought proper—should not be given to the public. It was not to be expected that the Emperor of the French would attach the same value to an alliance with this country if we, for political and party purposes, wished to inquire into every act connected with the administration of his army. Let hon. Members, then, well consider this—that if the Committee did not go fully into this question they would deprive those whose interest and reputation were called in question, of their most powerful weapon of defence; and, if they did go into this portion of the inquiry, they would imperil the safety of our invaluable alliance with France. This was the state of the question; and he should like to know, from those who followed him in this debate, how they could escape from this dilemma. There was another objection which was cognate to the one he had just taken—would they, in this inquiry into the conduct of the generals, be so unjust as to carry on the inquiry in the absence of those who were accused, who, if they were present, would be able to call those under whose orders they had acted and carried on the expedition, and thus defend themselves, and, perhaps, by the aid of evidence, exculpate themselves? If they did allow this, then the inquiry was virtually at an end, for they must wait until the expedition was over, and do that which the noble Viscount at the head of the Government had asked them to do—adjourn the inquiry for some time, until they could get that evidence which in justice they must have. It was very good, no doubt, to inquire into public abuses and to apply remedies to them, but the maxim *salus populi suprema lex* was to be regarded; and in this case they must also look at their alliance with France, the negotiations they were entering into, their position in Europe, and the absolute importance—a month before the campaign was to open anew—of the whole attention of every department being exclusively devoted to it without let or hindrance, and of being undisturbed in the performance of the onerous duties and enormous labours which they were called upon to discharge. Let the House weigh these considerations. Let them look also at the position of the noble Lord at the head of the War Department. What were his labours? Lord Panmure had taken a department that was newly founded in June last, and, before sufficient time had elapsed for this department to be in an efficient state, on the top of it was placed, in December, the Commissariat, taken from the Treasury; and then came the Ministerial crisis; and on the top of all these conjoined departments was placed the department of the Secretary at War. This was like placing Ossa on Olympus, and Pelion, with all its woods, on Ossa. He believed that these departments were still in great confusion, and that there were great practical difficulties in connection with them, with which not only the Minister of War, but the country, would have to deal before they could make these departments efficient to carry on the war; and, indeed, he believed, before they could be made fit working instruments, these departments must be taken to pieces and put together again. Then there were those who took exception to the administration of the army, which had remained intact for years, and expected great reforms to be carried on, while at the same time the war at its most critical period was also to proceed with vigour. All this was expected; it was a labour superhuman, and beyond the powers of living man; and what would be the result when, into all the confusion arising from this additional amount of labour and the amalgamation of offices, was introduced the distraction that would be furnished by this Parliamentary investigation, ranging over all the departments? He would point out to those desirous of improvements being effected in the administration of the army, that whatever practical suggestions might be made—and never was there a time when such suggestions would be of more importance than the present—would have to be delayed until the Reports of this Committee were made, until the wide range of its investigation had been brought to a conclusion. He also had other objections to this Committee; he could not look upon it as a vote of censure on this or any particular Government—it was a blow struck at all executive government. The House by allowing it, would diminish the power of all future Governments. The present Government might submit to it, but they would, by so doing, be giving away that which was not their own—the rights and privileges of executive government in general. An hon. Gentleman had said that they were asked to leave it to the Government; but that they had already left too much to the Government. The meaning of the hon. Member was, that the House of Commons was going to take the executive government upon itself, and that the executive government was no longer to have the same ample powers and functions and responsibilities that it possessed before the inquiry, but that a portion of them was to be passed over to the Committee. He earnestly entreated the House seriously to consider what this would amount to. Let them think what had been the history of all juntas appointed by legislative and popular assemblies which had taken on themselves, as delegates from those assemblies, the functions of the executive government. Their history had been one and uniform; they had resulted in despotism, misconduct, and complete absence of responsibility. The persons who exercised these powers did so, not as responsible Ministers of the Crown, liable to dismissal or censure, but in their legislative capacity, which placed them out of the reach of such proceedings. At the point at which we had arrived in Europe, when it was the fashion to say that our institutions were in some discredit through our ill-success, he asked the House of Commons whether it was right or prudent—whether they would be acting in the spirit best calculated to impress their allies with confidence, to strike terror into their enemies—if they set up a power antagonistic to their own Government, and taught foreign nations to consider that the Executive of this country was a system of duality, and that those persons with whom negotiations were carried on, as the ostensible heads of the Government, did not really possess its power, but shared it with others who had been set up to act with them by this House. He would not trespass on the House any longer; he was quite sure that what he had said was opposed to the views of the vast majority of those whom he was addressing, and it was ridiculous to suppose that anything which he could urge would produce the slightest effect upon their minds; but he was anxious that this great breach in our system of government—that this formidable attack upon our means of offence and defence in the war—that this measure, which so clearly menaced our alliance with France and imperilled our position in Europe—should not be carried out without his having offered his strong protest against it.

General PEEL said, the House was kind enough, upon a late occasion, to give him the opportunity of expressing his opinion upon the danger of appointing the Committee to inquire into the working of the departments, or into the conduct of those engaged in the Crimea. His name had now been placed upon the Committee; but he must say that he still felt, as he felt then, that the result of the inquiry must be valueless, if not absolutely injurious. If, in entertaining those opinions, it was considered that he could be of any use to that Committee, he was willing to work to the best of his ability, and to assist it in realising the expectations of the country—an object which could be obtained only by the strictest impartiality, and by being conducted by gentlemen who would not shrink from full inquiry, and at the same time would not condemn any without giving them the opportunity of defending themselves. He wished to say one word more, as to a word which he was reported to have used upon a late occasion, but which he should consider as of great importance if falling from the lips of any Englishman. He was reported to have said that "he was not at all surprised at the 'despondency' expressed throughout the country at the state of our army in the East." What he said, or what he intended to say, was, "The 'indignation' expressed by the country." He did not think that there was any despondency on the part of the country; it was a feeling which he, for one, never entertained for a single moment; and though we might have horrors and distress to face at the beginning, he never desponded at effecting any object which the English people took upon themselves to accomplish.

Mr. F. SCOTT said, the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe) had given to the House an account of the arduous duties which would devolve upon the War Office if the Committee were granted; he stated that the load of duty which fell upon that office was quite sufficient, without its being called upon to inquire into the causes which had led to those occurrences which they all deplored. The hon. Gentleman had completely overlaid the subject, and had endeavoured to withdraw attention from the subject which was uppermost in the mind of the country. The question at present before the House was, the conduct of the three right hon. Gentlemen sitting now below the gangway, who lately sat upon the Treasury bench. Every one lamented, and none more than the hon. Gentlemen on that (the Opposition) side of the House, the loss to the country of the talent and administrative ability of the right hon. Gentlemen. But if their regret at the absence from power of those right honourables was great, most undoubtedly their wonder exceeded their regret, because where were the altered circumstances, where the difference between the aspect of affairs now from what they presented when they so lately joined the Government? The House had come to the conclusion that there should be an inquiry into the cause of our failures and disasters in the East. It might be convenient for the right hon. Baronet, speaking with that power, and vigour, and experience which always commanded attention—it might be convenient for him to state that the matter brought before the House by the hon. Member for Sheffield was merely brought forward as a vote of censure; and it might also be very well for the right hon. Member for Wilts (Mr. Sidney Herbert) to deny the existence of the strong opinion of the House, and say that many voted for the Resolution in that sense; but he had his own opinion as to the conduct of the Government, and he stated his own opinion, and he believed he stated the opinion of the great majority of that House, when he said that the principal object of that Resolution was to inquire into the causes of the unparalleled sufferings and the losses which the army had suffered, and by which it had been reduced from 55,000 men to 15,000. The House and country wanted to know what had become of the remaining 40,000, and what was the reason of so deplorable a loss. He believed, moreover, that the effect of that inquiry could not be so prejudicial to the interests of the country as that which would be produced by the sudden withdrawal of three right hon. Gentlemen who had undertaken to serve the Crown, without any sufficient reason, thus leaving the country in the state of having no Government at all, when a strong and energetic Government was so much required. The noble Lord the Member for London (Lord J. Russell) had gone to Paris, and thence to Berlin, and from there he was to proceed to Vienna. He was to point out to the Emperor of the French what was the policy of our Government upon the important subject of the war; at Berlin he was to use his influence with the King of Prussia to bring him into an agreement with the policy of Great Britain;—but what was that policy? Who was to say that the policy of yesterday would be the policy of to-morrow? Look again to the state of our hospitals at Scutari and at Balaklava. What would the public say when they were told that the interests and feelings of individuals had been accepted by the House of Commons as a sufficient reason for rescinding an inquiry into the causes of the sufferings and distress that there prevailed? Why should not men high in office have their conduct inquired into? The question was, how had these great disasters come to pass? and when the lives and sufferings of our fellow-subjects were in question, no considerations of party should interfere. The Resolution asking for an inquiry was passed by a majority of more than two to one. It was no party victory; there were no cheers from one side or the other upon the announcement of the division; it was received in solemn silence, without any expression of party triumph; because the House considered it not as a vote of censure, but as the expression of the feelings of the House, that a close investigation and a close inquiry should be instituted into the circumstances which had produced such disasters to our soldiers. It appeared that the ground on which the right hon. Gentlemen opposite took office in the Government was, that this should not be a *bonâ fide* inquiry, and they appeared to have made it a condition precedent with the noble Lord at the head of the Government, that this inquiry should be a farce. But the idea of an inquiry into such a loss of lives not being a *bonâ fide* inquiry was not to be entertained for a moment. He thought the glowing epitaph pronounced by the right hon. Member for Oxford (Mr. Gladstone) upon the late Administration would well apply to that which had so lately been formed. For himself, he would say—"Here are the Members of a disheartened and incapable Ministry, who, having taken the reins of office, were unable to hold them. Belonging to all parties, they had the principles of none;

and having no confidence in each other, they soon lost the confidence of all besides. Finding England at peace, they plunged her into war. They exposed her best and bravest sons to needless dangers; they repaid their heroism with starvation and misery. Unmoved at the great hecatomb they were making, and collectively condemned by the indignant voice of an universal people, they shrank from office, dwelling upon their own misfortunes rather than admitting the sufferings of their victims. After a vicarious sacrifice they returned to the occupation and emolument of office, whose duties they were not able to discharge. Having arrived at this point unmoved, they shrank from the heartrending and horrible details of the victims of their own incapacity—for that exposure they had not the courage or the strength to endure." They were told that the Government could not go on while the Committee was sitting; but he must remind the House that the duties of the Committee were retrospective, and those of the Government prospective, and that the Committee would be able to assist the Government in the matters which the Members of the Government had not been themselves able to master. One reason why the Government had not been enabled to obtain sufficient recruits was, that the people had no confidence that due inquiry would be made by the Government into the causes of the loss of life which had occurred in the army in the East. The appointment of the Committee, supposing it to be formed of men of competent ability, would restore confidence in the Government, and no difficulty would be felt in obtaining recruits for the army. The right hon. Gentlemen opposite were in the condition of persons who, having been called upon to find bail to the country, had chosen to forfeit their recognisances. He did not see why the proposed inquiry should involve us in any difficulty with the French Government. He could see sufficient reasons why our Government should not inquire into the condition of the French army, but none whatever why they should not inquire into the condition of our own.

Mr. GRANVILLE VERNON thought that if anything could have added to the strength of the arguments adduced by the late First Lord of the Admiralty and Secretary for the Colonies, it would have been the speeches delivered by three of the future Members of the proposed Committee. An hon. and gallant General (General Peel), whose name was in the list of the Members of the Committee, described its appointment as dangerous and inconvenient; and the speech of the noble Lord the intended Chairman of the Committee (Lord Seymour), was to the same effect. But the speech of the hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond) unanswerably proved that it would be worse than useless—that it would be mischievous—for he said that he meant that the Committee should be no sham, but that all matters should be sifted to the bottom; and he then went on to admit that there might be danger and inconvenience in many questions that might be put. The hon. Member said that there was no intention to inquire into the conduct of the war. What, then, was the inquiry for? Was it solely as a vote of censure on those who had the conduct of the war? It was not denied on any part that there had been mismanagement and suffering which might have been avoided; but he (Mr. Vernon) did not see what utility could result from an inquiry by a Committee in this country as to the condition of the army 3,000 miles off, and into the reason why roads had not been made between Balaklava and Sebastopol. He knew from private information that shortly after the army arrived at Balaklava 400 or 500 men were set to work to make a road, and a report was drawn up, if he were not misinformed, that that road would take two or three months to execute, and so the men were taken off, the General supposing probably that the place might be taken sooner. That was a mistake; but were they to blame the Government at home for it, or indeed any one, until they were aware of the reasons for that opinion? They ought to back up their Generals if they wished the army to be victorious, and he trusted that the Ministers of England would ever throw their mantles over the officers engaged in the service of the country, and that, should mistakes occur, they would rather sacrifice themselves than cast blame on their officers. He regretted to hear Members of that House talking of national disgrace and disaster. Had disgrace been incurred by the men of Alma and of Inkerman? Perhaps it might be said that disgrace was the result of the conduct of the Administration at home. That, of course, was matter of opinion; but he believed, in common with many others, that an army of unparalleled magnitude, considering the resources of this country, had been sent out fitly and adequately provided for, and, if there had not ensued that speedy success which some sanguinely anticipated, they must seek for the reason in causes over which human foresight or sagacity had little control. It had been said that it would not be necessary for the Committee to inquire into the conduct of the French army; but questions connected with the English army were so mixed up with the state of the French army that it would be impossible to separate them; and it was not desirable that the susceptibilities of our allies should be wounded, and the alliance perhaps thereby endangered. The people of England were anxious on the subject; but what they cried out for was a change of men and speedy action, and the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield had presented them a long and slow inquiry instead; and the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) had anticipated inquiry and prejudged the verdict. He was inclined to give his most cordial support to the present Government throughout the conduct of the war, and he trusted also on many occasions afterwards; but he did not think that the Government had been much strengthened by the change of the Minister of War. He believed that great injustice had been done to the Earl of Aberdeen and the Duke of Newcastle. He had scarcely the honour of personal acquaintance with the first-named nobleman, but he had always admired his prudent and temperate course of foreign politics; and of this he was certain, that no man had been more forward than the noble Earl in supporting the introduction of every liberal measure. Of the Duke of Newcastle he felt a delicacy in speaking, as that noble Duke was his friend; but he believed that if the proposed inquiry took place, justice would be done to the noble Duke's ability, constant activity in business, his integrity, and unremitting attention to his duties. There was a cry raised about the aristocratical system of our army; but he could not believe that the system of purchase in the army was the fault—he saw nothing in the system of purchase that rendered the army inefficient. The officers and the men who fought at Inkerman exhibited no symptom of inefficiency, and there was shown how deep was the attachment of the soldiers to the officers, and how great the sympathy of the officers for the men. He, therefore, did not think the system of purchase a faulty one. No doubt, there might be contrivances devised by which promotion should be given to merit, and he hoped to see some relaxation of the system; but the cry against the system of purchase was fallacious as applicable to our troops. We had now at the head of affairs the man who had been called by the common acclaim of England to preside over its destinies and conduct this war, and why was his Government not to be granted a fair trial? The Motion for inquiry, disguise it as they might, was a vote of censure upon the late Ministry. Attached to the members of a party which might now be called defunct, he pledged himself to lend the noble Lord's Government his best support, although he might not sit with his knees in the noble Lord's back, and he trusted that the House would act in the same manner. The hon. Member for Manchester had that night made a speech which would live in the hearts and memories of all who heard it, and than which it had never been his good fortune in Parliament to listen to one that had moved him more strongly. It was delivered with a truth, a fervour, and an honesty which did the hon. Gentleman the highest credit, and he (Mr. Vernon) could only echo its sentiments. Let the noble Lord not be led away by chimerical views of the balance of power, or captivated by wild schemes in favour of "oppressed nationalities," but bear stedfastly in mind, that the true and legitimate objects of the war were the defence of the violated rights of Turkey, the vindication of the interests of the Powers of Europe in the Black Sea, and, above all, the securing of a just and honourable peace.

Mr. PALK said, he had heard that night for the first time that those who retained office were deserters, and those who quitted it were faithful; but, in his opinion, on the contrary, those who, under difficult circumstances, remained at their posts were faithful, and those who quitted them were the real deserters. He trusted that the result of that night's debate would be to clear the eyes of the country of some of the dust with which recent events had blinded them. It was now ascertained that the present Government had been formed to "burke" that inquiry which the all but unanimous Resolution of that House, ratified by the universal voice of the country, imperatively demanded. The popular cry brought the noble Lord into power, not simply because of his great merits and long official experience, but from the belief that rival parties would be reconciled by his instrumentality and a powerful Government formed. A Ministry, heralded by the press as strong from its unity of sentiment and principle, had been constructed; but the first question on which its Members had to give an opinion had served to scatter its discordant elements and rudely dissipate the illusion of its boasted strength. There was, however, something much more important to the country than the rise and fall of Governments. It was impossible that the present state of Ministerial disorganisation could continue, and that the country would be satisfied with hearing, week after week, the explanations of Ministers and ex-Ministers, and doing nothing else besides. The Government, in disappointing the popular voice, as they were doing, were playing with edged tools, and raising a storm which they would by and by find themselves unable to control. The country asked whether the reforms, now so urgent, were always to be postponed; and already ominous murmurs were heard against "the cold shade of the aristocracy." The present posture of affairs was not due to the influence of the aristocratic element in that House, but was the fault of politicians possessed of distinguished talents, who thought they could retain office without a principle or a party. As to the proposed inquiry into the state of the army, sufficient had been proved already to justify heavy censure, if not even impeachment, but a Committee of that House was not necessary; and the effect of further investigation could only be to give increased prominence to that disastrous misgovernment which had first disorganised and ruined an army originally 60,000 strong, and then left the country at the present moment without an Administration, without an army, and without a general.

Mr. LAING said, that the prolonged Ministerial crisis now threatened such serious national misfortunes that it behoved the Government and its supporters to come to a mutual understanding; and for this purpose it was necessary that expression should be given to the sentiments of hon. Gentlemen of different shades of opinion on the Ministerial side of the House. The late Secretary of State for the Colonies had told them that the Government had not enjoyed the confidence of a large proportion of those who sat upon its own side; but he (Mr. Laing) could state for himself and for other independent Members with whose sentiments he was acquainted, that they had given a cordial and disinterested support to the late Ministry, and were equally prepared to accord the same to the existing Government, upon the single condition that the urgent demand for army reform was fairly and promply acceded to. But there were two great questions which entirely overshadowed the question of the change of Government—the negotiations for peace now going on, and that of the vigorous prosecution of the war. As to the negotiations now pending with Russia, if peace could be obtained by the sincere and honest acceptance on the part of that Power of the terms agreed upon by the noble Lord at the head of the Government and by the noble Lord who had proceeded to Vienna, in concert with the Cabinets of France and Austria, there surely could be but one opinion as to its being the bounden duty of a Christian country to embrace such a solution of the dispute. As for the relief of "oppressed nationalities," and other such impracticable and extreme schemes, he could not conceive that anybody, in or out of the House, would wish to incur the responsibility of prolonging war and bloodshed for such chimerical objects. This was emphatically a statesman's war. It was against a great Power, undertaken, not for the purpose of territorial aggrandisement, but to preserve the balance of power in Europe, to defeat the aggressions of Russia, and to make Turkey one of the European family of nations, and to secure her independence; and if these objects could be obtained on terms which met with the concurrence of Powers even more interested than ourselves in this matter, it would be a piece of suicidal madness for England to hold out for more rigorous conditions. With this opinion, he had supported the past and would support the present Government. But there was another and still more important question which had arisen out of the war—the state of our military and naval establishments as disclosed by the result of this year's campaign. It was, indeed, absolutely appalling to consider how these departments had failed. What if we had got into a war with France instead of with Russia, as some people ridiculously feared two or three years ago, and as some foolish Members of the Cabinet went about trying to persuade the country was likely to be the case? What if the vigour and resources of the new empire had been turned against us, and 100,000 French soldiers had landed on our coast, and we had had to resist them with such a military administration, such generals, such a Commissariat, and such a staff as had figured in the Crimea? We had been paying millions yearly for the maintenance of our military establishments, but what had been the product of all this cost? We found when we wanted to make use of them, that the money which we had been spending during the last thirty years as a sort of assurance against such dangers had been absolutely thrown away—we had been insuring, in fact, in an insolvent company, and we might as well have thrown our money into the sea. The noble and generous pride of England was cut to the quick by the figure we had made in this war. While the practical men of the age—the countrymen and followers of Arkwright, Watt, and Stephenson—had been straining every nerve to raise the country higher than she had ever stood before, and while they were flattering themselves they had succeeded, the veil was suddenly rent from their eyes, and they found that in this conflict, entered into with all the resources of the nation and the unanimous support of Parliament and the people, England actually went far less than a single second-rate Power, like Sardinia, probably might when she descended into the arena. The feeling that civilians knew nothing of military matters and were not competent to give an opinion on them was now entirely thrown aside—every man felt himself called upon in this matter to exercise that plain common sense with which God had gifted him. It was not from any want of valour in our soldiers that these failures had occurred; they had never fought better, and, as it appeared, the regimental officers had never behaved better; but it was that the whole administration of the army was conducted with a total disregard of the common-sense principles which were held to be essential to the success of every private undertaking. In the first place, for a private undertaking to succeed, there must be somewhere a clear undivided responsibility—there must be one head, dealing with a series of efficient instruments, to whom all things must be referred, who would direct all and be answerable for all. But who was responsible for the whole administration of our army? Until within the last few weeks the administration of the army had been conducted by the Secretary for War and the Secretary at War and half-a-dozen different departments, and all responsibility was completely evaded. One of the greatest disasters that had ever befallen this country—the Cabul disaster—was attributable in a great measure to the appointment of an improper and incompetent general to the command of the army; but to this day the country did not know who was the man responsible for this appointment. What we wanted was one man, like the Minister of War in France, who would be responsible for the whole army—one man who would have all the power and all the responsibility. Then, again, another principle essential to the success of private undertakings was the proper division of labour among different departments; and this principle should have been applied to the case of the Commissariat, the transport, and all the other civil departments of the army; but the manner in which we had totally failed in matters in which England was pre-eminent showed that this principle had been entirely neglected in the administration of the army. Were there no men in England who could make a road or maintain a regular communication between England and the Crimea? There were hundreds of men, he believed, in the City of London, who would be ready to-morrow to contract to supply the army with food and clothing, and who would perform the service, too, with regularity and despatch. The whole transport service of the army in the Crimea was an operation of far less magnitude than his hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Lindsay) was accustomed to deal with every day in the ordinary course of business. Then, for the land transport service, were there no Chaplins and Hornes, no Pickfords in the country, whose special business it was to do these things? Were there not, too, in this country a class of men who had arisen out of the extension of our railway system—the great contractors—whose business it was to do the very things that were wanted to be done, and were they not men who managed to keep themselves out of the *Gazette* by the exercise of those administrative abilities from the want of which the present deadlock had arisen? Were there no Petos, no Brasseys—men who could make a road, or half a dozen roads, if they were wanted, between the camp and Balaklava, carry up the huts, and, in fact, do the very things which the military authorities had failed in doing? Now, indeed, they had sent out some "navvies," but not half enough for the work, and people of this country will demand to know what are the causes of these misfortunes. They are looking anxiously to the proceedings of this House—they expect inquiry—and rest assured they will not be satisfied without inquiry. They expect to be able to ascertain—and it is our duty in this House to assist them in the inquiry—who is to blame for the misfortunes and calamities that have overtaken our army. I think any man is greatly to be censured who at a moment like this hesitates to express his opinion on the state of affairs, and I have no hesitation in expressing my distinct conviction that the blame for this state of affairs is to be attributed to the misconduct and mismanagement of the Government of the Earl of Aberdeen. I do not deny that great mistakes have been made in the Crimea, and that much that has occurred there has led to part of the suffering that has been endured by our army in that quarter of the world; but it is my deliberate opinion that it is the bad policy of the late Ministry, and their mismanagement of affairs, which have, in a very large measure, conduced to the misfortunes which this country has now to deplore. My belief is that from the commencement of this unhappy war, and the negotiations that preceded it, the conduct of Her Majesty's late Ministers has been marked by a series of the gravest mistakes and blunders. But when I use this language I beg to say I entirely agree with those who, in the debate on the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, altogether disclaimed the intention of attacking any one individual Minister. Undoubtedly, I agree in the opinion that the whole Cabinet must be held equally responsible, and the right hon. Member for Wiltshire (Mr. S. Herbert) has broadly and fairly accepted that issue to-night. The right hon. Gentleman urged that if mistakes had been made the whole Cabinet must be responsible for them. I allude to this matter the more particularly, because, in one of the speeches we have heard to-night from one of the Gentlemen that have retired from the Government, it was said that the Earl of Aberdeen and the Duke of Newcastle had been sacrificed to the public obloquy that had fallen on them in consequence of the disasters in the Crimea. If I were called upon to name the Members of the late Government who, in my judgment, bore the heaviest share of the responsibility of the unfortunate events that had occurred in the Crimea, I must honestly confess, without having any political leaning to the noble Duke—I should not name him as one of those men. Whatever mistakes had been committed in the Duke of Newcastle's department, I am free to own that the mode of his retirement is more honourable to him than the mode in which others have contrived to retain possession of office. If I were to name the members of Lord Aberdeen's Administration to whom I am disposed to attach the greatest share of blame for the misfortunes that have occurred, I should name the noble Lord the Member for the City of London and the noble Lord opposite, who is now the Prime Minister of this country. The reason why I thus refer to the noble Lord the Member for the City of London is this:—the Duke of Newcastle himself, in that remarkable defence of his conduct which he recently made, distinctly stated that when the new office of Secretary for War was created, as an office distinct from that of Secretary for the Colonies, he strongly remonstrated against the incompleteness of the arrangements then made. Last year, when the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) explained the new arrangements that had been made, and stated that a Secretary for War was to be created, but that no consolidation of the various offices of the army was to take place, it will be in the recollection of the House that I, for one, took objection to the imperfection of these arrangements. I complained of the absurdity of retaining a Secretary for War and a Secretary at War, and stated that it was impossible to conduct the administration of the army on such principles—I said that in time of war especially they could not conduct the affairs of the army satisfactorily unless some consolidation took place of those various and conflicting departments by which the army had hitherto been governed. I was, however, overruled. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Wiltshire said my objections were groundless; but I now find that at the very time I made these objections in the House of Commons, the Duke of Newcastle had urged—and urged in vain—the same objections in the Cabinet, and was also overruled. The noble Duke appears to have urged, with truth, "I cannot discharge my duty as Secretary for War under this imperfect arrangement;" but he was overruled by the noble Lord the Member for the City of London and the Cabinet, on the ground that Parliament demanded the change, and that to please Parliament the change must be made. I think it is a most grave charge against the noble Lord and all his colleagues. I have no hesitation in expressing my opinion that, whatever may have been the talent or capacity of the Duke of Newcastle, I do not believe that any Minister would have conducted the war satisfactorily as Secretary of State for War, with the department in the divided, conflicting, and unsatisfactory state in which it has remained up to this time—when we are at last told that under the pressure of irresistible necessity that consolidation is now to take place which I, for one, urged in vain last Session—which was urged with consummate ability by Earl Grey—and which it appears the Duke of Newcastle urged on the Cabinet, but was overruled by the rest of his colleagues, because they thought more of what would be acceptable for the moment to the House of Commons than what was desired by the country, and what would be most conducive to the proper conduct of the war. The passage in the speech of the Duke of Newcastle to which I have referred justifies me in opinion that the member of the Government most responsible for the failure of affairs in the Crimea is the noble Lord the Member for the City of London. I have alluded to the noble Viscount the present Prime Minister on account of his connection with the militia. I believe one of the gravest errors of the late Government was their neglect of the militia. On the 2nd of May last a friend of mine, the hon. Member for Dublin, in putting a question to the Government, said he trusted the Government would state their intention on the subject of calling out the Irish militia. The answer of the noble Lord was this:—

> "With respect to the Irish militia, it was not the intention of the Government during the present year to organise or enrol the Irish militia. It was not desirable to incur any large expense if the public service did not require it. What might be done in another year was a matter for future consideration."—[3 *Hansard*, cxxxii. 1173.]

We have been told that from the commencement of this war Her Majesty's Government contemplated an attack on the Crimea. In the month of June the order for the attack on the Crimea was issued. In May the noble Lord said the Irish militia was not then to be enrolled or embodied. Were the English or Scotch militia embodied at the proper time, or was any one step taken to secure to the country that legitimate and constitutional reserve from which the army ought to be recruited? We are told to look upon the noble Lord as the man to relieve us from our present difficulties. For the sake of the country I devoutly wish he may, and no one will be more ready to give him credit for it if he shall succeed; but what am I to think when I find him holding this language in May last, and exhibiting such a complete absence of the foresight and sagacity that ought to distinguish the Minister of this country at such a moment, when it was clear to every one who considered the state of affairs that we were about to embark, not only in a serious war, but to make that war an aggressive war by invading the soil of our enemy? The first duty of the Government on the outbreak of the war was to take every step in their power to embody and enrol the militia, and to secure to the country that legitimate and constitutional reserve. I have, therefore, a right to impute to the noble Lord a large share of the misfortunes which have occurred. We are feeling the effect of this neglect in the instances I have given of the sort of recruits sent out. Why are the recruits inefficient but because there has been no reserve upon which to draw? As I have said before, I do not regard the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, and the division which took place on that Motion, as a vote of censure on any individual member of the late Government; but I regard it as a vote of censure on the conduct of the Government; as a vote of censure on the collective Government that Motion was accepted by the noble Lord, and he now sits, as Minister of the country, subject to a vote of censure, which was agreed to by an unparalleled majority. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir James Graham) has expressed very great dislike to the Committee about to be appointed, and has objected that those who voted for it did not intend seriously to have a Committee of Inquiry, but only intended to censure the Government. Let me remind the right hon. Baronet that those who assented to that Motion as a vote of censure, and as such gave it their support, did not anticipate that the immediate consequence of their vote was to be the return to office of the very same men who had been condemned; and I am free to say that the common sense and right feeling of the country were never more outraged than take Sebastopol by a *coup de main*, and that we had, in all probability, a winter campaign before us. Still, there were no huts ordered until the third week in November. Are we to inquire into that? These are some of the subjects well worthy of inquiry, wholly irrespective of the condition of the army, and the conduct of the generals, which deeply implicate the conduct of the Gentlemen who now sit upon the Treasury bench. Are we to inquire into these things or are we not? If we do not it will be a mere mockery of an inquiry, and the country will reject with indignation and disgust what they will deem to be only an evasion of that inquiry. These are the opinions which I have thought it my duty to state upon the nature of the inquiry before us. If it should be the opinion of the House that, having expressed these views, I am precluded from taking a part in the Committee, if they think that with these strong impressions I am unable to act judicially, I shall at once acquiesce in that opinion. If, on the other hand, it is desired that I should be a Member of that Committee, I shall discharge the duty imposed upon me as fairly, as justly, as impartially as I can; but only upon the understanding—and about this let there be no mistake—that the inquiry is to be a thoroughly sifting one. The Committee is not yet appointed, and it is now open to the House to take what course it likes with regard to myself; but, if I am appointed, I can only consent to serve upon the distinct understanding that the inquiry shall be full and complete. There must be no evasion for the sake of screening any person in office or out of office, whether high or low, whether at home or abroad, and then there may be a prospect that those who have been guilty of these unhappy calamities will be discovered and exposed.

Mr. STUART WORTLEY said, he could assure the House that if this were a mere party question he should feel that his position in that House would prevent his taking any part in it; but as he but seldom obtruded his opinion upon the House he trusted that he should be excused if he asked to be allowed to give expression to the strong feelings which pervaded his mind. He had voted against this inquiry, with the full persuasion that it was a most unconstitutional proposition, and that it would eventuate in no good to the country. But if he had entertained that opinion at the time when he gave that vote, certainly every speech which he had heard that evening—he spoke not of his right hon. Friends who sat before him (Sir J. Graham and Mr. S. Herbert)—but the speeches which he had heard from every quarter had tended to confirm him in the opinion which he had originally formed. Admitting that the appointment of the Committee was not unconstitutional, it was at least exceptional; admitting, for a moment, that it would not be dangerous, it was at all events most inconvenient, and must be, if carried out, attended with great and manifest injustice. He would pass no opinion upon the course taken by his right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty, nor upon that of his colleagues who had left the Government; but upon this point he entirely agreed with the hon. Gentleman the Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright), that upon the question whether a man ought to remain in or retire from office, his own conscience was the best monitor; and had he been in a similar position himself, he could not, under all the circumstances, and entertaining the opinions they did, see how he could take any other course than the one they had adopted. He regretted exceedingly that the noble Lord at the head of the Government had so readily yielded to the appointment of this Committee. He admitted that there was great difficulty in resisting it, but he believed the best interests of the country would be eventually best served by averting it. There were three cardinal objections to its appointment. The first was, the danger of disturbing our alliance with France. Now, every one must admit—and especially those who took the most desponding view—as he regretted the right hon. Baronet who had just sat down seemed to do—that the French alliance was essential to the success of the expedition. Was there, he would ask, no danger of losing this alliance if this inquiry was proceeded with? Why, they were to have a searching inquiry. The country was told they were to have a searching inquiry, and the country expected it. If there was not a searching inquiry, the indignation of the country would be raised beyond what it then was. Well, what was the very first question that would be raised in the Committee? Why did you go to the Crimea so late in the season? Was that a question which applied to the English army alone? Were they to inquire into what had been termed in a well-known public document "the timid counsels?" Again, suppose we inquired into the condition of the army before Sebastopol and its causes—how that condition was brought about—would not another question naturally arise out of that—namely, why was not Sebastopol attacked by land and sea immediately after the battle of the Alma? ["No, no!"] Why, there were many persons who were strongly of opinion that, had Lord Raglan marched upon Sebastopol twenty-four hours after the battle of the Alma, and the fleet attacked it by sea simultaneously, Sebastopol must have fallen into the hands of the Allies. Well, would not this question again raise the other question of the conduct of our allies? The real fact of the matter was, those hon. Members who were foremost in proposing and advocating a Committee already appeared to shrink from its consequences. We would investigate anything that concerned our own Government, but the moment one word was said about France or the French army, the witnesses' mouths would be stopped. The hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond), whose wit and eloquence he much admired, had even admitted the danger of disturbing the French alliance. That hon. Gentleman said, that the Committee could inquire into such circumstances as, whether the waggon-train had been despatched without harness, and similar circumstances, but the country expected, if there was an inquiry at all, not only an inquiry into the administration of the War Department at home, but a full and searching inquiry into the conduct of the war. ["Hear, hear!"] The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck) shook his head, but he would tell him, that there could not be a searching inquiry into the state of the army before Sebastopol which did not involve the consideration of the whole conduct of the war. There was another objection of great force. It was all very well for the right hon. Gentleman the late Secretary for War, in a chivalrous spirit to offer no objection to an inquiry into the administration of the department with which he had been connected, because, no doubt, he was conscious of having done all in his power to discharge the duties of that department. Nothing could be more natural than that that right hon. Gentleman should adopt that course, but the conduct of the war could not be separated from the conduct of our allies. There was another objection of the gravest moment. He was glad to hear the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Droitwich (Sir J. Pakington) speak in such terms of the Duke of Newcastle. He entirely agreed with the right hon. Gentleman. He made no doubt but that there was nothing the noble Duke desired more than to remove from himself the load of obloquy under which, in his (Mr. S. Wortley's) opinion, he most unjustly suffered. His right hon. Friend the Secretary of War would no doubt, as he said, desire also to go before a Committee, and to vindicate himself and his colleagues; but the hon. Gentleman the Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe) had clearly demonstrated how this inquiry must be carried out, and what it must of necessity involve; and he, too, asked, as well as that hon. Gentleman, was it fit, was it right, was it for the welfare of the public service, that at a time when men should be concentrating all their vigour, energy, and intellect for promoting the work of the several departments for a spring campaign—that at that very moment civil and military servants should have their exertions paralysed, and their minds occupied with preparing for their own defence? Another, and, in his opinion, a paramount objection to the appointment of this Committee was, that it would necessarily tend to the perpetration of great injustice against those who might be inculpated. Were those insignificant persons they were going to put upon their trial? It had been said there was no sympathy on the part of the Members of the Government for the condition of the soldier. He (Mr. S. Wortley) did not subscribe to any such assertion. God knows there was sympathy in every part of that House. There was not a man in it that did not feel, and feel acutely, for their sufferings. Well, but he asked, were they going to put men upon their trial who had been for the last half-century engaged in the public service—who had spilt their best blood in fighting for their country—who had left all but their lives on the battle field; were we going to arraign our most distinguished, most zealous, most loyal, and most faithful officers—men who had supported the honour and glory of England in hard-won fields; were we going to inculpate those men—["No, no!"]—were we going to arraign them in a spirit of what might be almost termed vindictiveness? ["No, no!"] Yes; hon. Gentlemen might say no; and the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Sheffield might shake his head. Such might not be his view, or wish, or intention. But what were the views of the hon. Gentleman who sat next him—he meant the hon. Gentleman the Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard)? Did the House forget the eloquent speech of that hon. Gentleman a few nights ago, in which he spoke of the way in which he thought matters ought to be dealt with in the Crimea. The hon. Gentleman spoke of cutting at the root of the system there—he spoke, too, not of things, but of persons—and he intimated that his object was to remove every man who now held command there. The hon. Gentleman did not hesitate to point to Lord Raglan, and blame that noble Lord for the course he took. Again, he must say he did not think it was quite a constitutional course for that House to take upon itself to arraign our eminent public servants, and that such a proceeding ought to emanate from the Crown. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Midhurst (Mr. Walpole) had stated, a few nights ago, that this inquiry ought to be secret. Secret! Why, was a secret inquiry practicable? Would a secret inquiry satisfy the country? He felt certain it would not. Did not the public expect to hear of the cause of the disasters which had occurred before Sebastopol? Why, was not that one of the main objects of their desire, to see how it was that their relations had perished? What would be the consequence? Day by day they would have in all the public papers the bitterest inculpations against men who were 3,000 miles off, where communication, except by telegraph, would occupy six weeks in transmission; and no evidence could be obtained to refute those charges until a deep impression had been made on the public mind, and perhaps a most unjust one, and until the refutations, however complete, would be looked upon as stale, and would not be cared for. In concluding, he would again warn the House not to proceed with this inquiry, for in his opinion the most dangerous consequences were likely to result from the appointment of the Committee.

Mr. WALPOLE: I have listened, Sir, with extreme surprise to the observations made by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir James Graham), and also to those of the right hon. Member for South Wiltshire (Mr. S. Herbert) on the constitutional rights, privileges, and duties of Members of this House—observations more extraordinary than any I ever heard from statesmen of authority. The right hon. Baronet has told us that the inquiry will not only be unjust and unconstitutional, but that it is likewise without precedent. There is no precedent, he says, except a precedent in the reign of King William and the Walcheren expedition, in which the House of Commons has inquired into naval or military operations of this description, and that in both the cases to which I have referred the operations were at an end when the inquiry took place. Now, Sir, I will presently show that there exist many authorities of the greatest weight, both in this and in the other House of Parliament, that where there has been calamity—where there has been disaster—where there has been mismanagement and supposed misconduct—it has always been reckoned the duty of this House and the duty of the other House of Parliament to inquire into the cause of those calamities and disasters which were the apparent result of such mismanagement and supposed misconduct. I have heard it stated by my right hon. Friend the Member for South Wiltshire that this is an inquiry which cannot be acceded to upon the part of the Government, because an inquiry of such a character, if acceded to, would be tantamount to dismissal. Does not my right hon. Friend know full well that inquiry after inquiry is often acceded to on the part of the Government with reference to almost every question of foreign and domestic policy, without any imputation on those who are the subjects of it, and further, that this House most wisely awaits the result of such inquiries before it expresses an opinion on the matter, instead of taking the other alternative to which such an argument would lead, namely, the alternative of condemning first and inquiring afterwards? My right hon. and learned Friend who has just sat down tells us that we are infringing upon the duty and functions of the Executive Government, because this House has determined to have a searching investigation into all the circumstances connected with this case, not for the purpose of condemning prematurely or censuring unnecessarily, but in order to ascertain whether the allegations which have been made against the system or against the men by whom that system is worked, are or are not correct and well-founded. Surely, when you have before you every kind of conflicting statement, it would be idle to stop the legitimate mode of ascertaining the true facts of the case; and to say we are not to inquire is to say, that this House—which, as the right hon. Member for Carlisle most justly reminded us, is the grand inquest of the nation—is to shut its eyes to the fact that the army is perishing before us, and to close up with a strong hand all sources of information, when from one end of the country to the other that information is loudly demanded and strongly needed; and we are told that the justification for such a proceeding is, that, by persisting now in the assertion of our rights and the discharge of our duties, we are trenching upon those functions of Government which ought to be left simply and solely to the Executive. Who ever heard of such an argument? I am willing to concede, what may very properly be conceded, that inquiries of this kind which in any way whatever affect the functions of the Executive Government, are always attended with considerable inconvenience, and oftentimes with serious evil; but I ask you to consider fairly whether there are not times, and whether this is not one of them, when inconvenience is unavoidable, and even evil a necessity? As well as I can understand our present position, such a time is forced upon us now, and remember it is not forced upon us by any clamour or agitation from without; it is not forced upon us by caprice or waywardness on the part of the people; it is not forced upon us by any selfish ambition to displace the Government; but it is forced upon us by the calm, strong, deliberate conviction in every Member's mind, that there is something wrong which ought to be remedied, and that this remedy can best be applied by searching into the causes which have led to the wrong. This conviction is nothing more and it is nothing less than the echo of an equally strong conviction out of doors. Under such circumstances, you are bound to ascertain—if you can ascertain—the cause of the calamities by which you are surrounded, to detect the errors which may have been committed, to punish the faults, if faults are brought home to any one whatever, and to remedy the evils of the system itself, if all these calamities are to be attributed to the system, and not to the men. Now, Sir, it being, as I take it, a sound constitutional principle, that you are entitled and bound to institute inquiry when grounds for inquiry are brought under your notice, I am willing to admit, that unless those grounds are strong and urgent, the functions of the Government ought not to be interfered with, for I am not one of those who would lightly or unnecessarily intermeddle with those functions, but I would preserve them to the utmost for the good of the country, to be interfered with only when circumstances require it. At the same time I would equally preserve the rights, the privileges, and the duties of this House; I would keep the two acting together. I would leave to the Executive the full power of an Executive; but if Her Majesty's Ministers, who are the responsible advisers of that Executive, have either brought us, or are supposed to have brought us, to anything like calamity or disaster, then, on the part of this House, and consistently with my duty towards the Executive, I would assert to the utmost the right of Parliament to investigate the matter till the truth is discovered. In asserting that right, and still more in acting upon it. I have stated before, that my right hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle has a little overlooked some of the historical precedents which a moment's reflection must have brought to his mind. He will probably recollect that in the War of Succession, when General Stanhope was driven to capitulate for himself and his forces, to the number, I think, of 2,000 men, Parliament—I believe, on the very next day, certainly within one or two days at furthest, after information was received of that event, without a message, and without even waiting for official intelligence—Parliament insisted upon an instant inquiry, although the war was then going on, and although that humiliation was followed by a victory. The right hon. Baronet will not forget the surrender of General Burgoyne at Saratoga. Who was the greatest man at that time in this country? Lord Chatham. Was he silent when the intelligence of that disaster came upon this country? No. Both the Houses of Parliament resolved themselves into Committees to consider the actual state of the nation, and in the House of Lords, Lord Chatham moved for all the papers, which showed, while the war was actually going on, a full and complete exposition of the state and condition of the army and navy, and he also moved, though there he was beaten, for the orders and instructions by which General Burgoyne was directed to make the attack upon Saratoga. When the war was continued, greater disasters happened even than the surrender of General Burgoyne at Saratoga; and during its continuance, and when those magnificent colonies were about to be severed, through the success of the inhabitants of the United States, from this country, what was the conduct pursued by Mr. Fox in the House of Commons? Was he silent then? Did he teach us the doctrine that the executive functions of the Government would be interfered with if this House inquired into the causes of the disasters and calamities which then befell us? I hold in my hand the report of the proceedings of this House at the commencement of the Session of 1782, and I find that Mr. Fox, after calling the attention of the House to all the circumstances connected with the disasters to which I have adverted, ended his speech with this Motion—

> "That it be referred to a Committee to inquire into the causes of the want of success of His Majesty's military and naval forces during this war, and more particularly in the year 1781."

That is to say, down to the very time when Parliament was sitting, Mr. Fox insisted upon an inquiry into all our naval and military operations. The matter was referred to a Committee; Lord North at first was opposed to the Motion, but Ministers were forced to give in, and a Committee was granted. That Committee was afterwards turned into a Committee of the whole House. ["Hear, hear!"] Of course, I am aware of the two objections which occur to the minds of hon. Members—namely, first, the change from a Select Committee to one of the whole House, and secondly, that these inquiries were supposed to be retrospective. I will not blink the difficulties of the question; but I think that the precedent to which I have adverted shows that the inquiry was an inquiry into operations which had been actually going on down to the moment when the inquiry was granted. The distinction about the Select Committee was not taken, the Committee was granted; and it was turned into a Committee of the whole House on Mr. Fox's own Motion. And why? because in the interval he had moved for papers which made out his case, and the Solicitor General was the only man who had the hardihood then to resist the Motion on the ground now taken—namely, that it would interfere with the functions of the Executive. Lord North himself, however, assented to the Motion, but Mr. Fox, having obtained the papers he wished for, and finding there was no longer any necessity for inquiry, moved a direct censure upon Lord Sandwich, who was at that time First Lord of the Admiralty. In 1809, the year before the Walcheren expedition, after Sir John Moore's retreat to Corunna, and after what was called the Convention of Cintra, Mr. Ponsonby, the Whig leader in this House, at the very commencement of the Session which followed that event, moved generally for inquiry into the conduct of the war, and the causes of the want of success in the campaign of the preceding year. That was followed in the next year by the inquiry into the Walcheren expedition, which has been so often adverted to in the debate; and then, in 1813 (if any further authority could possibly be needed to crown this series of precedents), after the retreat of Lord Wellington from Burgos, Lord Wellesley found such fault with the conduct of Ministers in not supplying that great general with sufficient resources to enable him to carry on the campaign with success, that he moved in the House of Lords, supported by Lord Grey, in two speeches of the highest constitutional wisdom and knowledge, and with powers of eloquence which have never been surpassed, even if they have been equalled, that under the circumstances to which he adverted in his speech, the House should—do what?—resolve itself into a Committee of the whole House to consider the state of affairs? No! Lord Wellesley moved the following Resolution—

> "That a Committee be appointed to inquire into the circumstances and results of the late campaign in the Peninsula."

Now, observe! You have the authority of the greatest statesmen who ever lived in this country—of Lord Chatham, of Mr. Fox, of Mr. Ponsonby, of Lord Wellesley, and Lord Grey—for insisting upon the right of Parliament to make inquiries into military and naval operations, which inquiries might, moreover, affect the executive functions of the Government at the time. Two of these Motions, the one moved for by Mr. Fox, in 1782, and the other by Lord Wellesley, in 1813, were not Motions for inquiry at the bar of the House, were not Motions for a Committee of the whole House to take into consideration the state of the nation, but they were Motions for Committees to make inquiry into all the circumstances connected with the naval and military operations which were then going on, or which had been going on, down to the very period when those Committees were nominated. Well, then, having shown you that upon principle you are entitled to inquire, having shown you that this principle has been repeatedly recognised by high authority, the next circumstance you have to look to is simply this—whether the circumstances of the present case are sufficient to justify and call for such inquiry. Sir, after the numerous arguments and observations we have had in this House upon that point, I think it would be almost a work of supererogation to say anything on this subject. It has been remarked upon by the greatest authority in this House, it has been recognised by almost every Member who has spoken in this debate, that whether you have inquiry, or whether you forbear to inquire, the calamities which have befallen our army are heartrending and inexplicable. Now, if these calamities are so great as to be called "heartrending," I am sure they are of a nature to justify inquiry. But if, in addition to this they are inexplicable, it throws upon you the duty and the necessity of instituting an inquiry, in order that you may be able to solve the mystery in which these "inexplicable" disasters are shrouded. The circumstances of the present case, therefore, will, I think, be admitted on all hands to justify and call for immediate investigation, but then comes the next point—granted that there ought to be some inquiry, ought it to be instituted before a Select Committee, or should it be conducted at the bar of the House and before a Committee of the whole House. Now, nothing is easier, when you want to avoid an unpleasant subject, than to say that some other course would be better than that which is distinctly proposed. But I feel confident, if any one had proposed that you should institute an inquiry into the state of our army and the conduct of the war departments which have had to administer to the wants of that army before a Committee of the whole House, you would immediately have been met by these forcible objections:—that the whole business of the country would be stopped by such a proceeding; that evidence must be taken, examinations must go on, cross-examinations must be allowed on the part of any and every Member—that this would lead to interminable delays; and that, under those circumstances, you could neither conduct the operations of the war, nor any other business with any prospect of advantage or success. Now, Sir, in principle there can be no reason why you should not refer this matter to a Select Committee. A Select Committee is nothing more nor less than a delegated authority from this House to certain of its Members to act for it, when it would be inconvenient for it to act as a collective body. Remember, also, that one great objection which is always taken to an inquiry before the whole House, in addition to the objection that it puts a stop to public business, is that in point of fact it becomes so inconvenient to go on with an investigation conducted in this way that it is really a good mode of getting rid of the inquiry altogether. More than this, you cannot fail to observe that you must either exclude all strangers from this House, or allow the proceedings to be daily published; and I can conceive nothing more inconvenient or more dangerous than to say that these proceedings shall be published to the world from day to day; that evidence partially taken shall be partially known; that a pre-judgment of the case shall therefore take place, and that the result of the inquiry shall be canvassed in a manner which takes away from this House its deliberative judgment upon the circumstances which are ultimately to be submitted to it. For all these reasons—though I grant that there are difficulties with reference to a Select Committee—I still think it is preferable to refer the matter to such a Committee, limiting the inquiry (if limitation be necessary) in such a manner as not unduly to interfere with naval or military operations. But then we are met with another observation—"Why not have limited the inquiry at the time you granted this Committee? Why not have conducted the inquiry by means of a Commission instead of a Committee?" The answer is, I think, obvious. Inquiry was a duty. In discharging that duty, it was for this House to insist upon an inquiry generally, but if that inquiry when so insisted on was likely to be attended with disadvantages in the form in which it was moved for, it was incumbent upon the Ministers of the Crown to advise the House how far that inquiry should be limited and qualified; and, having so advised it, that then the inquiry should be allowed to go on under these limitations. When I addressed the House before on this subject, I remarked then that this was the duty of the Ministers of the Crown; that independent Members could do no more than either assent to or dissent from the inquiry, unless prepared to take upon themselves the responsibility which belonged more properly to the Executive. That remark I again repeat. And now, before I sit down, I cannot help taking notice of an observation which seems to me to be totally uncalled for, and which will litical lives, acted together. I am bound to say that events, so far as they have gone up to the present time, have strongly tended to confirm me in that opinion. With respect to the intermediate proceeding—namely, the formation of the Government of my noble Friend (Lord Palmerston), my right hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir J. Graham) has announced that the great question of foreign policy was the only one which formed the subject of any stipulation or understanding between us, or which caused even a moment's delay; and it is needless for me to say more than that, whatever I might think of the Parliamentary prospects of that Government in the ordinary sense, yet, under the circumstances, having no differences with him, but feeling a warm and high regard for my noble Friend, founded on an experience both of community of opinion as a colleague, and co-operation with him in a political combination, during two very eventful years, I think I should have been wanting in my duty to my country if I had not accepted the offer which my noble Friend was so good as to make. But I am bound to say that there was to me a painful matter of a personal character involved in the whole transactions, for which my noble Friend is in no way responsible. To me nothing could cause, in public life, suffering more acute than to be separated from my noble Friend the Earl of Aberdeen. This House has listened—as it was bound to listen—with patience to attacks made from various quarters upon the fame and public conduct of that noble Lord. While in office, it was, perhaps, difficult for me to have endeavoured to defend him from those attacks. But he has been dismissed, by a blow darkly aimed, from official life; and now at least, when my right hon. Friends and myself have followed him into exile, I hope I may be permitted to express my feelings and state my opinion with regard to Lord Aberdeen. I believe Lord Aberdeen to be a man who has been much misunderstood. Twenty years have elapsed since I heard Lord Aberdeen denounced in this House by one of the most honest statesmen of his day as a person holding principles that made him the enemy of mankind. Such was the idea that men could then entertain of Lord Aberdeen. I am unwilling to name the individual who uttered those words, but I am quite sure he has long since deeply regretted the attack he then made on Lord Aberdeen. But after that Lord Aberdeen lived to become the trusted colleague, the admired colleague, the eulogised colleague of Sir Robert Peel, his faithful ally, and the first to encourage him in every measure that had for its object the benefit of the people. Now, again, for a moment only, I believe, Lord Aberdeen has become the subject of an adverse opinion. He has fallen from his distinguished place in public favour; but as that, I will not call it calumny, but error of twenty years ago was dispelled, so, you may rely upon it, these prejudices will also be dissipated, and the fame of that man, not so much on account of the high office he has held, as from his elevated and admirable character, will not only live, but his name, I venture to say, will be enshrined in the grateful recollection of his country. [Mr. LAYARD: No, no!] Well, Sir, I am sorry that the hon. Member for Aylesbury is so intolerant. I really should have thought that he would have been content with the latitude of vituperation that this House allows, and properly allows him. I believe he belongs to what is termed a Liberal party. But Liberal in what sense? While I remained Chancellor of the Exchequer, I forbore from wounding his tender feelings by allusions of this kind, but surely, now that he has purged the Government of the foul element in my own person and those of others, it may be permitted to me, by the kind indulgence of the House, to express an opinion that I conscientiously entertain, and that I know to be shared by every man who has been the friend and colleague of Lord Aberdeen. This is no gratuitous sally upon my part, for to-night I have witnessed fresh assaults on Lord Aberdeen. Even his retirement from public life is not sufficient to mitigate the wrath of some gentlemen among us, because he has retired with a mark of his Sovereign's regard, an honour well and nobly earned by half a century of service.

Now, Sir, thanking the House for permitting me these retrospective and personal allusions, I pass on to the question now before the House. We have quitted Her Majesty's Government because that Government, placed, I grant, in circumstances of great difficulty, has made a choice between the alternatives which were before them, and has made what we think a fatal choice. Sir, I heard to-night an hon. Gentleman, the Member for South Devonshire (Mr. Palk), remark that he had heard for the first time in this debate with unspeakable surprise that those who retained office were deserters, and those who quitted it were faithful. The hon. Gentleman asserts the opposite doctrine. He says, those who under difficult circumstances retain office are faithful though they change their intentions, and those who keep to their intentions and quit office, according to the Member for South Devonshire, are deserters. Well, Sir, I confess I was surprised to find the hon. Gentleman entertain that opinion, because I do recollect a case in point, which, if I may presume to make him a suggestion, I would commend to his serious meditation. Under difficult circumstances in this country, at the end of the year 1845, with a famine impending at home, Sir Robert Peel adhered to office and changed his intentions, Lord Derby adhered to his intentions and quitted office, and I am afraid, according to the doctrine of the hon. Gentleman, that Sir Robert Peel was faithful, and the Earl of Derby a deserter. I certainly have never applied that term to Lord Derby. It seems to me unjust so to apply it, and I did not expect to see a rule involving such injustice laid down in such a quarter. And undoubtedly I do not venture to pronounce censure of any kind on the course taken by my right hon. and noble Friends. I know, Sir, too well from experience the difficulty, the pain—I might almost say the agony—of arriving at decisions for the government of one's own conduct in sharp passages of public affairs. I know that too well to presume to find fault with those who may arrive at conclusions opposite to my own. But, Sir, I am sure that from my noble Friend at the head of the Government and his colleagues we shall hear no such imputations, because our case, whether we are right or wrong, is a very simple one. You may say we ought to have changed our intentions, but the very head and front and sum and substance of our offending is that we have adhered to them. We have nothing to do but to repeat on the 23rd of February the expressions we used on the 29th of January. It is impossible for me to-night to denounce this project of a Select Committee of inquiry into a great warlike operation, now pending and in progress, more decidedly, I would almost say more violently, than I ventured to do on the occasion when it was first mentioned in this House. I think that, next to eating one's own words, one of the most disagreeable processes within my knowledge is reading one's own words. But in times like these it is necessary to go back upon former proceedings, for in the rapid whirl of events we forget to-day our feelings of yesterday. I venture to say, however, that I look back now with some satisfaction to the expressions I used myself with respect to this Committee on the 29th of January. I then ventured to tell this House that its business was not to govern, but to call to account those who govern. I further spoke as follows—Your Motion is without precedent, and precedent in these matters means wisdom. The hon. Member for Aylesbury condemns the Committee as unworthy and ridiculous, and he is right in his condemnation. It is nugatory for the true purposes of inquiry—namely, the remedy of evils. It is unconstitutional; it will lead to nothing but confusion and disturbance, increased disaster, shame at home, and weakness abroad. It is useless and mischievous for the purpose contemplated, and it is full of danger to the power, dignity and usefulness of the Commons of England. Sir, I used those words on the 29th of January, from the bottom of my heart, and it requires little apology now for appearing in the face of the House of Commons to state to them why I resigned office rather than be a party to measures which I then so vehemently denounced. I make no light matter of the resignation of my office. It was painful for me to part from the work of my department in a period of arduous exertion—it was painful for me to part from my colleagues whom I cordially esteemed—and it was painful for me to part from the admirable public servants with whom I had been associated in the Treasury and revenue departments. But these pains must be met and borne. They are incidental to the course of public life, and if the House differ in judgment with regard to the wisdom of the decision arrived at, they will at any rate perceive that that decision was one for which I am not obliged to go out of the way to imagine extraordinary and far-fetched motives, but that it was one founded upon convictions deliberately entertained and expressed with all the force of language I could command.

And now, Sir, I come to the question of the Committee upon its merit, and I beg to call the attention of the House strictly, and with distinctness, to the matter which is at issue between us. This subject is one of such deep importance that I confess my extreme anxiety that there shall be no misunderstanding on that point. And here let me say a word in reference to what fell from the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich (Sir J. Pakington) with respect to the Committee. I listened attentively to his speech, and I thank him for his generous appreciation of the motives of my right hon. Friends and my own. But I listened with particular satisfaction to an observation which touched upon matter of much higher public interest. If I understood him correctly, he stated this—that in his opinion there was much in the conduct of the Government that demanded strict scrutiny; and, secondly, if I understood him right, he intimated an opinion that if the alternative had been open to him to pursue that inquiry by means of a Commission appointed by the Crown, in lieu of a Parliamentary Committee, he would have been ready to close with the tender of such a Commission. I hope, and am glad to infer that I have correctly understood the right hon. Baronet. I have repeated his sentiments, not for the purpose of establishing points of difference, but rather for the purpose of establishing points of agreement. I trust it will be clearly understood that we are not here as the opponents of inquiry. We are not here as the opponents of inquiry even in the sense of endeavouring to shut out from the view of the House that which, under ordinary circumstances, it might be desirable so to exclude from their view. The question raised here is as to an inquiry properly twofold. It is, first, with respect to an inquiry into the state of the army in the Crimea, and it is, secondly, with respect to an inquiry into the conduct of the Government departments. Now, Sir, as respects the inquiry into the conduct of the Government departments, if there be, as there has been stated to be, a difference between my right hon. Friends on this point, I venture to say it is a difference in words only. I am sure I am speaking the sentiments of my right hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir J. Graham) when I say that his desire is that the conduct of the Government departments should be inquired into and examined to the fullest extent which does not involve examination by this House into the state of the army in the Crimea. That is the point which has so greatly weighed upon us. My right hon. Friend was of opinion that it would be most difficult, if not altogether impossible, to examine into the conduct of the Government departments without bringing into view all that is embraced by those words the state of the army in the Crimea. We were all alike of opinion that the state of the army in the Crimea was not a fit subject for inquiry at the present moment, if that inquiry were to be conducted by a Committee of this House. That is the sentiment upon which we are all agreed; that, and no more than that, is the objection upon which we take our stand. Well, Sir, no doubt the greatest inconvenience will attend an inquiry, even if limited to the Government departments. When the noble Lord the Member for the City of London (Lord J. Russell) made his explanation upon his retirement from office, it will be recollected that, though he felt unable to join with us in giving a negative to the Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Roebuck), yet, on the other hand, he found himself also unable to give his countenance and sanction to an inquiry such as that proposed. And if I remember rightly, his expressions were these, that the inquiry of that Committee, sitting for weeks—probably for months—would paralyse the action of the several military departments of the Government. I am afraid, Sir, as I have said previously, that there may be much inconvenience in this inquiry: that inconvenience, I, for one, should not, on the whole, have treated as a conclusive objection to an immediate inquiry by this House; but yet I am decidedly of opinion that, looking to the credit and authority which the Executive Government must carry with them to enable them to conduct the public affairs safely, it was far better for the public service that my right hon. Friends and I myself, as concerned with the management of affairs, should appear before the Committee to give an account of ourselves, if we are called so to appear, out of office rather than in office. On the other hand, I do not think our retirement from office will involve any Parliamentary detriment to my noble Friend at the head of the Government. I am sure there are gentlemen in this quarter of the House with whom I may now hope to cultivate the amicable relations of good neighbourhood; in whose minds the uppermost thought is one of great satisfaction that the Government should be rid of such worthless, or, at any rate, such incongruous materials. But I must confess that I appreciate the desire for inquiry as a fact apart even from the reasoning. I grant you that there is a state of feeling in the country which requires that you should proceed with the utmost caution and circumspection, and I further grant that every vote of this House—unless it can be shown to involve the most serious and substantial detriment to the public interests—is entitled to the deference of every public man. With these feelings I should, notwithstanding the inconvenience it would give rise to, have been content to submit the conduct of the Government departments to inquiry; but the larger question which we opposed a fortnight ago—which began by distracting the councils of the country—and which has not even yet run its course or reached its end—the larger question is, whether a Committee should be appointed to inquire into the state of the army before Sebastopol?

In proceeding to state the principle on which we have ourselves acted, I conceive that I shall not undertake a very difficult task if I presume to draw an outline of the duty of the House with reference to this subject. Now the House cannot but view with feelings of horror the sufferings to which our troops have been exposed, but I hope it will not adopt the strain of exaggeration with reference to them which I am sorry to see creeping unconsciously into the language and feelings of the Members of this House. The hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. M. Milnes), if he had sat through these debates as I have, would have been compelled to admit the justice of my observation. A mode of speaking prevails which I cannot sit here to censure, because I know it is due to the strong feeling which exists on the subject; but it is said that the army has been annihilated, has perished, has disappeared. We have heard this said by three or four hon. Members, Gentlemen of ability and dispassionate judgment, but I hope the House will not adopt a tone so dangerous and so mischievous, nor give its countenance to accounts of the state of things so far beyond the reality. Still the pains and sufferings of our army dash and subdue the joy with which we have contemplated their brilliant exploits. I admit, as fully as my right hon. Friend whom I follow in debate, that the House ought to ascertain the cause of these sufferings; but how and when are you to do this? If you are to examine into these sufferings with a view of calling to account the Ministers—with us who are out of office you may deal; but if you are to examine into them with a view of calling to account those who are in command of the army in the Crimea—then I protest most solemnly, and with all my power, against such a proceeding. If, on the other hand, your object is not to call to account any of those persons for the present, but simply to reserve to yourselves the right to do so hereafter, then I say, the real object you ought to consider on the present occasion is, not whether this or that man holding any command or station in the Crimea is justified in his conduct—for you have not yet in your hands the materials necessary for a right and sound judgment; but you ought to consider what remedies ought to be applied to existing evils, and, especially, what remedies are likely to be the most efficacious and expeditious. That is the issue: are we agreed in this principle? If we are, I do not think it will be difficult to show that those who thus agree with us ought also to join with us in our protestations against this proceeding—in our resistance to this Committee. I came down to the House with the strongest determination indeed to this effect, yet, also, with an impression that I should hear a great deal said with which I could not agree, but still a great deal said with ingenuity and with force in favour of the appointment of the Committee. I have been a patient and interested listener to the debate since half-past four o'clock, and I must say if it were possible for me to entertain feelings of malevolence towards an abstract proposition like that of the appointment of a Committee, I should have had those bad feelings gratified to the utmost by the mode in which hon. Members have joined us in deprecating and denouncing the appointment of the Committee of the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield. Prepared as I was to make sacrifices rather than accede to it, I have seen with feelings of delight that predominance of true English good sense and perspicacity which, notwithstanding all the disposition which may have existed out of doors to see this Motion carried, has given the tone to our debate. You have heard, Sir, in the course of the evening something like twenty speakers, and yet no answer has been given to the argument used by my right hon. Friend (Sir J. Graham) except upon the single point of historical precedent, and to that I will presently refer. The late First Lord of the Admiralty brought, as I think, his heavy guns into action, and offered very formidable arguments against the appointment of this Committee. No answer to him has been attempted; no man has attempted to meet in detail his masterly, argumentative statement; he has been grappled with on the score of precedent, but he has not been grappled with on the score of wisdom and of prudence. My right hon. Friend the Member for South Wiltshire (Mr. S. Herbert) followed with arguments against the Committee which likewise remain wholly without an answer. We indeed were prejudiced; we had arrived at foregone conclusions; but our conclusions seemed after all not to be disputed, and even this was not all; further consolation was designed for our ears, for from all quarters rose protestations against this Committee. The hon. Member for South Devonshire (Mr. Palk) stated in the fairest manner his apprehensions; the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe) delivered an able speech, to which no answer was attempted; my right hon. and learned Friend the Recorder for the City of London (Mr. S. Wortley) followed in the same strain, and no answer was made to him. Not that our House is indisposed to inquiry. I am not going to fight the battle against inquiry, for we say, "Give us the best and most searching inquiry, but do not, under the form and name of an inquiry, give us that which must prove an imposture or a mistake, and, probably, may prove both." I will not go through the names of many other Gentlemen who were avowed opponents of this Committee; but I select my hon. Friend below me, the Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond), who made a speech, entertaining as his speeches always are, and who seemed to imagine that he made a speech in favour of the Committee. All minds are subject to occasional delusions; and, perhaps, the most brilliant minds are even peculiarly liable to the infirmity which attaches to those of a common order. Well, my hon. Friend said that there was an infinity of danger in this Committee, and that he could not go into it with a safe conscience, unless it were limited by instructions as to the course of its examination. I do not wish to misinterpret him, but I understand this to mean, that the hon. Member desires a code of questions to be formed for the Committee. Very sound doctrine this may be, but yet the recommendation is most strange from the mouth of a Gentleman who terms the inquiry politic and judicious. We then had still more important declarations from the noble Lord the Member for Totness (Lord Seymour) whose great experience and ability appear to have designated him, in the minds of hon. Members, as the Chairman of this Committee; it was almost cruel to hear the long string of charges that the noble Lord, urged by the force of his candour, launched against it. I am sorry that my memory was too weak to retain them, but, in fact, there was nothing that he did not say; there had been no argument brought forward that the noble Lord has not endorsed, and he added also a goodly number of his own to the accusations previously made by others.

Again, Sir, we may form some idea of the inexpediency of this Committee from the difficulty there is in inducing hon. Members to accept the responsibility of serving on it. There is a sentiment of Burke's, applicable to this subject, and founded, as his sentiments usually are, on practical wisdom. I do not recollect the exact words, but in substance it is this—You ought not to commit the management of any institution or instrument to persons who disapprove its nature and character. Now, let us apply this test to the proposed Committee. It is to be composed of eleven Members. Now, of the sentiments of four of them there can be no doubt, because they have recorded their sentiments by dividing against it. I believe I may name them—Lord Seymour, Mr. Ellice, Mr. John Ball, and General Peel. In passing, I may observe, that no one has struck harder blows at this Committee than the hon. and gallant General, being moreover as he is one of the most dispassionate and not the least shrewd Members of this House. Then there is Sir George Lewis, who had no opportunity of voting on the question of this Committee; he stands, therefore, as a neutral, but I think it easy to divine the opinion he is likely to have entertained on its original appointment. Here, then, are five men who—I do not say will stifle inquiry—I make no such charge as that—but who disapproved the original appointment of the Committee. Then we have the hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond), who said he could not go into the Committee with a safe conscience unless its course were marked out in a specific and peculiar manner—he may, perhaps, be quoted as making a majority of the Members of this Committee who are against its appointment; but, whether he can or not, there is, at any rate, the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard), who, acting in a manly manner, has never suppressed his opinions —he has used the very strongest language upon the subject, and I believe I have his concurrence in saying that he still disapproves the Committee, and is of opinion that it may prove highly mischievous. Now I have a majority; and it is certainly very odd that six Gentlemen out of the eleven composing the Committee should disapprove, either certainly or presumably, of the appointment of that Committee. Nay, more; I venture to conjecture, and that with very considerable confidence, that among the remaining four I might, were it in my power to put them under examination, find some not altogether in their own minds friendly to the Committee. I am a determined opponent of the ballot; but I am certainly of opinion that, if this House were at this moment to decide by ballot on the subject of the appointment of the Committee, the side of the question on which I should vote would at least make a very respectable muster, if it were not even more probably found in a majority. But, now, what have we heard upon the other side? We heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Wenlock (Mr. Gaskell) that it was impossible to suppose that the people would be contented without this inquiry; and the hon. Member for Wick (Mr. Laing) also said, the House of Commons has given a vote—it is a law of the Medes and Persians, therefore do not worry us with any more of your reasons, but appoint the Committee. If these hon. Gentlemen think that by these observations they are paying a compliment to the public out of doors, I differ from them; I have a higher opinion of the people of this country. I think our duty is, when we entertain a conviction, to state that conviction respectfully but manfully; and the very debate of this night, the very answers made to my right hon. Friend's appeal from quarters where we did not expect them, and the total want of any attempt to show that this instrument—this Committee—is really adapted for the purposes it professes to carry into effect, have convinced me of the correctness of that opinion and the wisdom of applying it to our own practice.

I must confess that there is a topic connected with this subject which does not affect the House, but which has most materially affected myself as a person holding office, and to which I cannot help alluding. To me it would have been most difficult to have convinced myself that I was acting in a manner conformable to the laws of personal honour, as having been one of those who had appointed Lord Raglan to a charge involving his great—I may rather say his tremendous responsibility and who had at least stood by while the other appointments in the Crimea were made by the proper authorities, if, while he was engaged in his unspeakably arduous task, and we, the advisers of the Crown, had not thought proper to recall him, we had declined to act as his protectors and defenders, but had abandoned his feelings, his honour, and his character, to the good or the ill conduct of a Select Committee. I hold it, Sir, as a principle of Government, that no persons, being advisers of the Crown, have a right to pursue such a course. They appoint men to go, it may be, to the ends of the earth, and there to discharge duties the most responsible, the most difficult, the most truly overwhelming, that can fall to the lot of man to perform. Those men go forth, laden with the sense of their responsibility, educated in a profession the very vital air of which is its high sense of honour —men perhaps who have served their country for half a century—men, it may be, who have been mutilated in its defence—these men go forth to lead your armies, and then, in the performance of a task for which no human ability except the very rarest can suffice—only consider for a moment to what they are liable, upon what terms, so to speak, they serve. They know well that they cannot have an immunity during their absence from free, it may be licentious, comment upon their proceedings by the public press; they know that unbounded liberty in this sphere is essential to our free institutions, and that, in matters where the heart and the soul of the people are deeply engaged, many sharp and painful, many hasty and precipitate, and therefore cruel, things will be said. They know that the mouths of Members of this House cannot be shut, and that even here many things will be said in haste, in heat, or upon faulty or imperfect information, which those who said them will one day lament having uttered. Surely, these are enough of hard things for the generals and others acting in the Crimea to bear. Have they no defenders? Is there no body of men whose duty it is to support them? I say there is, and that body of men are the advisers of the Crown. Upon them they have a right to rely for protection, countenance, and support; and so long as the Ministers do not recall them, so long as they leave them in the exercise of those duties which nothing but their confidence and support can enable them to perform, so long have they a right to expect that they shall be shielded in their character, and honour against unjust attack, and that the Queen's

Government shall not hand over even to a Select Committee the task of defending and caring for that character. I hope, Sir, it will be understood, when I speak of inconsistency with personal honour, that I do not presume to judge for other men. I do not suppose that I am one whit better qualified to fix a standard of what is conformable with personal honour than my noble and right hon. Friends the present Ministers of the Crown. They are at least as competent or more competent than I am to judge in this matter, and I am certain they would faithfully adhere to any obligation they may recognise; but I think it fair to state that which deeply weighed on my own mind—namely, my belief that if I had brought myself to consent to the appointment of a Committee, as a Minister of the Crown, standing in the relation I held towards those men, peace of mind would have been a treasure which I should have had difficulty in retaining.

But, after all, it may be said, that is no argument for the House. The House, in the discharge of its duty, has to deal both with Ministers and with those whom Ministers appoint. If the Committee be a constitutional, just, and effective engine of inquiry, I grant that the House is bound to appoint it. Let us then ask what are the purposes it is to fulfil? Is it a Committee of punishment? My right hon. Friend (Mr. Walpole), who has just sat down, thinks he has proved much when, in triumphant language, he asserts the right of the House to call Ministers and others to account. But, if my right hon. Friend chooses that field to show his prowess, he will find, I apprehend, no champion to meet him. I am also ready as he is to maintain that proposition. That is not the question. No one will tell me that you are going to appoint this Committee for the purpose of calling to account the generals in the Crimea; that is not the defence of the Committee; on the contrary, a part of the charge against the Committee is, that you cannot help making it a Committee of accusation against those who are charged with the direction of our armies in the Crimea. We never supposed you capable of forming, with open eyes, such a scheme as to proceed against them in their absence; but there is no doubt that a Committee of accusation against some person or persons absent, and unable to defend themselves, it must and will be.

A Committee for the purpose of calling a general, or even those under him, to account cannot with justice be appointed until the transactions or else their concern in them shall be at an end; that is my answer, in a single sentence, to my right hon. Friend's (Mr. Walpole) speech. He has expended much learning in the discovery of precedents, and I grant that in two cases he appears to show that the investigation of military operations has been intrusted by this House to Select Committees. But the objections taken by my right hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle, to the mode of proceeding by Select Committee were altogether of a subsidiary and secondary character. The use of a Select Committee, with respect to a military matter, may be wise in certain cases, but is without precedent in a case such as that of the siege of Sebastopol. But I am now an objecting party, not to the mere mode of carrying into effect what is legitimate in itself; I deny that your purpose is legitimate—I deny that you will act either prudently or constitutionally if you investigate, even at the bar of this House, much less if you instruct a Select Committee to investigate, the state of the army pending a great military operation. This operation is one still in progress; here is the ground of contest; let there be no mistake about it. I do not care one tittle if I am told that unanimity prevails on this subject. Prejudices of that sort will soon be dissipated, when the matter shall be brought to a practical discussion. Hitherto it has, most unhappily, been mixed up with political considerations, and perhaps, in some minds, I wish to speak mildly and without offence, even with objects of party. These are the unfortunate incidents that disturb in a free country the progress of public affairs, but surely, when we come to examine this question, reason and justice will prevail, and if it shall indeed appear that your Committee is an illegitimate, and, moreover, an ineffective instrument for the purpose to which you propose to apply it, rely upon it the mere popular cry for inquiry by a Select Committee is one it will be easy to subdue by the force of truth. I shall now, Sir, assume that this Committee is not intended to be a Committee of punishment, and that you will not say you are preparing to call to account generals and others exercising command and holding responsible situations in the Crimea so long as they continued to be engaged in the siege of Sebastopol. Well then, Sir, is it to be a Committee of remedy? Can you contest the proposition that it is your duty to apply to the case of your army in the

Crimea those remedies which are the most effectual and expeditious? Now is this the most expeditious or the most effectual form of remedy? Are Committees instruments suited for the purpose of applying effectual and rapid remedies to evils, of which the causes and the particulars are subject to every kind of contest and every degree of uncertainty, and which have their seat in a country 3,000 miles distant? I once sat upon a Committee, not by any means illegitimate in its character, which had to inquire into distant operations. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) will recollect the Committee to which I refer; it had to inquire respecting a then recent rebellion in Ceylon; he will recollect the long laborious days; the overpowering fatigue it caused; the wearisome and endless examinations during the two Sessions in which it sat, and the perfectly abortive, nugatory, worthless Report which it produced. If I recollect right my hon. Friend the Member for Honiton (Sir J. W. Hogg) was another of my fellow sufferers on that occasion, and he will also remember that, after sitting for two years to investigate the cause of the rebellion, we ended by stating, I think, our total incompetency to deal with the subject, and recommending the appointment of a Commission. That is a specimen of the efficiency of a Committee for the purpose for which you require it. It is said that, for one thing, reliance can be placed on a Committee, and that is to ask 20,000 questions. A Committee is extremely well fitted to investigate truth in its more general forms by bringing every possible form of thought to bear on the points before it; but it is also well fitted for overloading every question with ten or fifteen times the quantity of matter necessary for its consideration; and, therefore, as ill as possible calculated for those rapid, searching, and decisive inquiries which bear practical remedies, rather than arriving at general propositions for their main business. That at least has been my experience, and I believe it has been the experience of every Member of this House. Your Committee will remedy nothing. Its power is limited to this country. Sir, I grieve to weary the House by taking up so much of its time. But how will your Committee be enabled to examine into the state of the army in the Crimea? It has no power there. Its powers, even through the medium of this House, cannot be exercised beyond the limits of this country. Well, then, it is, I suppose, to hear witnesses at home, who will come and state their views of the case, and it will have no power to call upon those generals and others who are in the Crimea, and who are the most important and indispensable witnesses in the case. I do not now stop to examine into the merits of the measures adopted by my noble Friend (Viscount Palmerston), but it is impossible not to see the great advantages which those measures possess over the inquiry by a Committee of Members of this House. My noble Friend sends out Commissioners—men armed with powers to ascertain the truth—and they are to consult with Lord Raglan, and, in concert with him, apply the remedy. You may spend twice or thrice the time in the Committee in ascertaining the truth, and when you have, as you think, arrived at it, you will have no power to apply the remedy, but you must make your application to the authority of the Crown, which you have begun by disparaging and thrusting aside.

The real purpose of this Committee is now coming out. It is not to be a Committee of punishment, it is not to be a Committee of remedy. Then what is it to be? It is really, so far as it is anything practical, a Committee of Government, a Committee, too, which takes out of the hands of the Executive the highest, the most important, and the most solemn, of its functions. I am convinced that an inquiry such as is proposed by a Committee of this House is incompatible with real confidence on the part of Parliament in those who hold executive office, and entirely incompatible with the credit and authority which ought, under all circumstances, to belong to the Ministers of the Crown, whatever party or political creed they may profess. The inconvenience of such a course is aggravated by the fact that these powers and functions are to be exercised by a Select Committee, because you are not only taking to yourselves the powers of the Crown; for that you may, perhaps, find precedents, inasmuch as this House has used such a method of declaring its want of confidence in an existing Administration. But in such cases it grasps at those powers in order that they may be taken from unfit and given to fit men, not in order to hold them itself. Now, you are going to do worse than hold them yourselves; you are going to delegate those powers to a small Committee upstairs. It may seem at first sight that this is a very simple matter, that it is quite easy to come at the state of facts, and it may appear as if the Government cannot but know all about it. But now let me illustrate the difficulty that you will have in arriving at the knowledge of facts which have happened 3,000 miles off. I trust the House will bear with me while I briefly illustrate this subject by a particular instance. I heard the hon. Member for Aylesbury the other night state that whatever else might be obscure, it was quite clear that it had become the duty of the Government at once to proceed to the dismissal of Captain Christie, the head of the Transport Service, on account of his inefficiency. Well, now, how stands the case as regards Captain Christie? Let me point out the facts to the House, for they show that the Government are beforehand with you in cases where the facts are at all clear. The hon. Member for Aylesbury said—and he made it a part of his case in attacking the Government—"Why do you not dismiss Captain Christie? Why do you not put him out of office?" Now, had Captain Christie been put out of office? He had, then, already been dismissed by my right hon. Friend near me. But is that all? Captain Christie was on his way home—he had reached Malta, when my right hon. Friend, hearing that Captain Christie had been chargeable with mismanagement, sent to stop Captain Christie, and made him return to the East in order that he might take his trial by court martial. The hon. Member said Captain Christie had been guilty of mismanagement, and in that respect his opinions agreed with the presumptions of the case as it came before my right hon. Friend. Well, Sir, the hon. Member had just been in the Crimea, and we are in the habit of thinking a great deal of what any one says who has just been in the Crimea, so much so that if some one comes home from the Crimea and says that the army is perishing, and that no one is doing his duty, then within twenty-four hours some hon. Member is sure to rise in this House and say, "I have just seen a gentleman who has come from the Crimea, and he says that the army is perishing, that it is, indeed, already all but annihilated, and that nobody is doing his duty." The hon. Member for Aylesbury says that he was in the East in October or November, and that Captain Christie was guilty of mismanagement. But the other night the hon. Member for Linlithgowshire (Mr. G. Dundas), who left the Crimea in December, in a most manly manner, the very moment that he heard of the intentions of the Government, got up in his place, and, speaking as an eye-witness, bore testimony to the great exertions and great merits of Captain Christie, and said it was with the utmost grief that he heard the allegations against him which he knew to be wholly undeserved. You may learn from the conflict and contradictions of such testimony as this that to ascertain the truth of contested facts which occur 3,000 miles off is no very easy task, and that the evidence upon such subjects had better be taken by those who are responsible and who have the power, as the case may demand, both to inquire upon the spot and to act when they inquire.

Sir, I object to this Committee on constitutional grounds. I suppose indeed that to talk of constitutional grounds will be considered both visionary and pedantic. Sir, I hope that I am no pedant or purist with respect to the constitution; I hope that my opinions are not of an extreme character—they are certainly not of an extreme character in the Conservative sense, and I speak in the presence of many Gentlemen who find their glory in that very title; but I confess that my opinions, such as they are, and my Conservative feelings, be they what they may, revolt from taking the functions of the Executive, with respect to an army in the field, out of the hands of the Government, and putting them into the hands of a Select Committee of this House. It might be enough for me to say that there is no precedent that I can remember for the adoption of this course. If I should be asked "where the constitution of England is to be found—is it in Blackstone? is it in Delolme? is it in the pages of Hallam? in which of our writers or in which of our laws is it to be found?"—I confess I think that no small part of the living spirit of that constitution is to be found in the usages and precedents of the House of Commons. Those powers which this House undeniably possesses are powers that, if used without stint or guard, would enable it to throw the whole country into confusion; but it is the wise and prudent limitation which the House has itself put upon its own powers that enables it to exist and to wield its enormous force without crushing to atoms the other bodies which exercise power or are charged with power in this country. But, Sir, I have heard people say, that although this may be very sound as general argument, yet there is one reason why we should, for once, set aside these ideas, and that is on account of the extreme emergency of the occasion and the greatness of the calamity. It is declared to be an exceptional case. Well, Sir, I tell my right hon. Friend that all bad rules and practices grow out of cases that were in the first instance exceptional. Well, suppose it is an exceptional case, and that in order to meet an extraordinary calamity and difficulty a new instrument must be called into exercise; surely, at least, you should show that that instrument is more powerful than any other of a more usual and safer kind that may be put into competition with it. If this House had a power of action in the Crimea on which it could fall back, I could understand the excuse taken by those who are in favour of inquiry by a Committee. But why you should use this argument of an extraordinary emergency to justify your putting forward an instrument which is unusually weak and futile, and which is not armed with the powers you require, I cannot understand. Your whole argument cuts the ground from under your feet. The necessity of the case calls for strong measures, and you are about to adopt what, in addition to all its other faults, and all its serious dangers, is a weak one.

Sir, it is not a simply constitutional argument, it is not a theory, it is not a mere logical question, but a matter of solemn consideration as to the result of this inquiry upon the state and discipline of the army, and upon your relations with the French Government that you have now to decide. The right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Pakington) thinks he can distinguish between the policy of the expedition and the circumstances under which it took place. [*Laughter.*] Well, Sir, that task is a difficult one; but, suppose he can, and that, under such circumstances, the lateness of the season at the time of sailing from Varna, or the want of information with respect to the Russian force in the Crimea, and to the strength of Sebastopol, can be inquired into, without touching upon the policy of the expedition—but did the lateness of the season or the want of information apply to the English army alone? Did the French army go sooner than the English? I might ask, perhaps, if the right hon. Gentleman is aware when the besieging train of the French army left Toulon? There is one other subject to which, for a moment, I may advert. Is the Committee to inquire why no road was made from Balaklava to the camp? I think I may say that if there is not to be an inquiry into that subject, your inquiry, as far as regards the state of the army and the causes of that state, will be little less, as respects the people of this country, than a fraud and an imposture. Well, suppose there is inquiry, and evidence is taken upon the question why no road was made, I presume the answer will be found in the want of labour. Well, why had you no labour? Because the men were in the trenches. And why were so many men in the trenches? Because the trenches and the field works were of such extent. And why were your trenches of so great an extent? Because the labour of the trenches was divided between the English and French army, and what the French army did not take the English took. I hope it will not be supposed that I am desirous to insinuate a doubt as to the gallant spirit of the French army, or as to the disposition of our allies to lend every aid in their power to the English generals. But the French will fairly lay claim to perfect independence in their judgment, and this they will certainly expect, as we should ourselves, in a like case, expect that no Select Committee of this House shall presume to inquire into their proceedings. I tell you, then, that your inquiry is a mockery if it does not extend to these topics, and that if you inquire, then the defence of those whose conduct is attacked will turn upon the distribution of labour; and the whole of that defence and every matter connected with the employment of the troops will run right up into the most intimate relations of the French and English armies. Sir, the patience of the British army is great and its discipline admirable, but I would not answer for the conduct of any army under the projected application of machinery such as that which is contemplated, when you appoint a Committee, that if it really explores the field marked out for it by the order of reference under which it is to act, cannot but interfere with the authorities at the camp. It is impossible for me to pursue these subjects further. The nature of the ground is so tender and delicate I would rather not have gone so far. My desire is to avert greater danger and greater embarrassment, and I have already proceeded to a greater length, perhaps, than under other circumstances I should have thought prudent.

Before I conclude, let me very briefly

enter upon the personal argument. Are we to be told that we had better have remained in office and assented to this Committee, because if this Government went out some other Government would come in, and do what was as bad, or even worse than the measure now proposed? Now, with great and sincere respect for hon. Gentlemen on the Opposition benches, I hope I may be permitted to say, with not the slightest tinge of acrimony, that I have great difficulty in understanding the course they have deemed it their duty to pursue with respect to this Committee; for I have had a strong suspicion, or rather I should say a very lively hope, that if Lord Derby had come into office about three weeks ago—and possibly if he were to come in even now—we should be supporting him and giving him the best assistance in our power to get rid of this Committee, with its weak and mischievous machinery, and to substitute some more fair and more satisfactory mode of effecting the purpose in view. However that may be, that is not our affair; our business is in a solemn question of public duty of the highest order, for each man to try and sound his conscience, and be governed by the verdict which that conscience gives. Still less can I be moved from following the course so pointed out to me, if I am told that I ought to have thought of this three weeks ago, and ought to have known that the House of Commons would not reverse its judgment. It is a much smaller matter that my right hon. Friends and myself should be convicted of levity and inconsiderateness three weeks ago than that we should now commit a gross public delinquency. Let it be granted, if you will, for argument's sake, that we have been chargeable with a great omission; but that would not justify us now in concurring in a policy which we say is false and erroneous. But I do not plead guilty to this charge of inconsiderateness. I never doubted that my noble Friend at the head of the Government would and must still entertain the same opinions with respect to the Committee which he entertained when he first besought the House in earnest language not to grant it, and my noble Friend is aware that, before my acceptance of office under his Government was announced to the world, I had the satisfaction of conversing with him on the subject of this Committee, in which conversation he acquainted me of his continued opinion that the opposition of Government ought to be offered to its appointment. ["Hear, hear!"] This can be no secret, because the right hon. Gentlemen opposite, and indeed, I might say, the whole world, must have observed that this, and this only, was the meaning of a portion of the speech delivered by my noble Friend, when he addressed the House last Friday, after the formation of his Government. I might, if it were needful, advert to other circumstances which would further exhibit the view taken by my noble Friend and his colleagues of the question of the Committee; but after what has already been stated it would be superfluous. So much for the personal part of this question, which I am grateful to the House for allowing me so far to explain. Now, Sir, I have been obliged to speak in a strain of egotism and to express opinions perhaps adverse to those entertained by a large majority of the House; but I hope I have made it clear that the ground on which my right hon. Friends and myself have acted is not one of mere perverseness or of unreasoning objection to inquire into the causes of the calamities in the Crimea, or into the misconduct or mismanagement of our own or any other department of the Government. I yet trust this House will rest content with its own broad field of action, within which it has great and noble and amply sufficient functions to discharge. The hon. Member for the Wick District of Burghs (Mr. Laing) has promised a Motion in respect to the great question of army improvement. Why does he not give us the opportunity of closing with him on that subject, and of prosecuting such improvement in every wise and salutary form with the greatest vigour possible? You will, it may be, have to consider the whole system of training, and admission, and promotion in the army. My hon. Friend said that merit ought to be the ground of admission and promotion in the army. To that sentiment, applying it in all cases where merit can be adopted as a practical test, I most heartily respond, but I am bound to say that, when any substantive measure comes to be urged in this House, the doctrine that merit, wherever it is capable of being ascertained by fixed tests, ought to be the basis of admission into the public service, ever will find, if I am to judge from what I have witnessed, the greatest of all the obstacles to be overcome within the four walls of this House itself. However that may be, I trust the House will be content with those great questions respecting the arrangements of our army, and the nature of its relations to the Indian army, which have been opened more or less distinctly by hon. Members, and which this House will have to examine, and will, I hope, conduct, or see conducted, to a satisfactory issue. I admit, Sir, that we are now debating at a moment of much popular feeling. Times of military disaster are always times of popular excitement; at other periods that excitement has led to lamentable results, and even to the shedding of blood under the idea of justice, and with the full belief that it was the due atonement for the mismanagement of the public service. There are cases of this kind which I will not recite, in respect to which we look back on the deeds of our forefathers, done under the impulse of heated feelings, with horror and with shame; but we live now in milder times. The fault of our constitution now, if it be a fault, is this, that public servants are, perhaps, not called to account with sufficient strictness; and responsibility, though far from being only a name, is made operative chiefly through the medium of honourable feeling. No such acts of cruel precipitancy as heretofore occurred are now to be feared. The feelings of the people may, indeed, be heated by dreadful recitals constantly repeated. From day to day, I may venture to say, we have had served up before our eyes the supper of Thyestes. All that we read in such particularity of detail, without the power of learning whether the facts are coloured by feeling beyond strict and precise truth, or whether they are modified by other facts not put forward, or how far these lamentable sufferings and privations are the necessary incidents of a state of war, cannot fail to produce in us first strong commiseration, and then an indignant eagerness to detect and punish. But all these feelings, so powerfully aroused, find vent in what I gladly own seems, at first sight, no more than a Parliamentary irregularity. That irregularity might demand our forbearance if we had only the trial of a technical rule before us. But we see in the first place that this proceeding can only disappoint those who demand it; in the next, that it would involve a cruel injustice; and further, immediately in its rear, we perceive the dark form of public disaster. Therefore, it is our duty, whether we be many or few, whether we be alone or attended by others, to resist and protest against this measure, and this resistance we now make and offer with great pain and with wounded feelings, and with the utmost respect and deference for the sentiments of the representatives of the people, but with a fixed and immoveable determination, which the public interests and our own consciences alike require.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: Mr. Speaker, my right hon. Friends have this evening explained to the House the grounds on which they have separated themselves from Her Majesty's Government. I shall not venture a single word of criticism on the course which they have thought it their duty to pursue—being convinced as I am that they have acted from a sincere conviction that their duty points to the path which they have pursued, and that by so doing they have not only in the best manner given effect to their own opinions, but have performed what they think to be their duty to their country. I feel the greatest regret at having lost the assistance of my right hon. Friends, with whom it has been my good fortune to act during the last two years, and of whom I can say with perfect truth, that which they themselves have said of those whom they have left, that there prevailed among us the most cordial confidence, and upon the great questions which are now pending, in action or in decision, that there was among us no difference of opinion upon any great principle of policy which Government considered it their duty to pursue. Sir, on the other hand, I must say that at the time when it was Her Majesty's pleasure to command me to endeavour to form a Government, it was impossible that either I or those with whom I was about to act could shut their eyes to the fact that there was this Committee, which the House had determined should sit, and the appointments to which we must be prepared to meet. I had stated upon a former occasion the objections which I entertained to the course which the House by a large majority had determined nevertheless to pursue. Those objections to a certain degree still prevail; but when I had to consider what was the real nature of the course which this House had followed, it was impossible not to see that when this question was originally proposed, the great majority which supported this Motion of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sheffield supported it on two separate and distinct grounds. A large portion of the hon. Members who affirmed the Resolution did so because they thought inquiry ought to take place; but there was unquestionably another portion, who, as has been stated by my right hon. Friends, supported the Motion because they considered it was a vote of want of confidence in the Government which then existed. Well, Sir, the Motion was carried. We resigned our offices. Her Majesty then commissioned Lord Derby to form another Government. The noble Lord was unable to do it, and I have already explained the reasons why. I stated to him the reasons why I thought that under the present circumstances of the country my junction would not have enabled him to form that strong Government which it was admitted on all hands the country required. That attempt failed. My noble Friend the Member for the City of London then endeavoured to form a Government. He was also unsuccessful. Well, then, Sir, I felt, being called upon, that it was my duty to endeavour to the utmost of my abilities to form that Government which the country so urgently required and so urgently demanded. If we had not formed a Government and presented ourselves to the country, the result must have been, I presume, that that noble Lord, who felt that he could not with credit to himself or with advantage to the country present that Government which alone he could have formed, would have been obliged again to make the attempt, and to present a Government which he had himself shrunk from offering to the Sovereign and to the country. Now, Sir, I do not deny that there are great objections to this Committee. But the country took it up, and took it up in a different sense from that in which many persons voted for it in this House. Many hon. Members voted for it here as an indication that they had no confidence in the Government as it then existed; but I apprehend the country did not go into that question. The nation having had its attention deeply fixed upon the events which had taken place in the Crimea—having had its feelings deeply moved by the recitals which from day to day it was reading of the sufferings of the brave army engaged in those operations, and seeing that there had been undoubted mismanagement in various departments connected with the war—the country honestly and sincerely required inquiry into these matters. It did not stop at the first question —what Government was to conduct the affairs of the country—but it said, "Here something has gone grievously wrong, and we insist upon it that there shall be an immediate inquiry, that we may know the causes of the mischances which have taken place." Well, then, that opinion of the country reacted upon this House. When we met this House as a Government reconstituted, after the attempts which had failed to make an Administration, we found ourselves in this position, that, although we might have wished that the Committee should either not be appointed at all, or that its appointment should be postponed, we had no right any of us to deceive ourselves by the expectation that it was possible to resist the Committee altogether, or to persuade the House to rescind the vote to which it had so deliberately come. I did undoubtedly think, that when we should have stated to this House the various changes, improvements, and administrative reforms which we were prepared to make — when we should have stated to the House the inquiries which we were ourselves making into the causes of these mischances—the House might be disposed, for a time at least, to forego the appointment of this Committee, to wait to see the result of our changes, and to learn the result of our inquiries. But, Sir, I never would have undertaken the task, nor would my noble and right hon. Friends have joined me in undertaking the task of forming a Government, if we had intended to stake the continuance of our exertions upon the question as to whether this House should or should not confirm the vote to which it had come. We should have been trifling with the country and the Sovereign if we had determined in our own minds to shrink from our posts if the House should not be prepared to rescind the vote which it had deliberately passed. Sir, no doubt there may be inconveniences and evils attending the inquiry; but I think it would be a greater evil if this country should present to the world the lamentable spectacle that, in consequence of personal differences, and in consequence of the fragmentary divisions of parties, we should for one month or six weeks be unable to find any set of public men who could present themselves to the country as a Government, and undertake to conduct the public affairs of the nation. And at what period would this spectacle have been presented? Why, at a period when we are simultaneously carrying on a great and arduous war, and at a period when we are engaging in a most important negotiation—when, on the one hand, energy and vigour in conducting the war are eminently required, and when, on the other hand, a just spirit of conciliation and moderation may be required in conducting the negotiations for peace. Sir, I think, therefore, that the course we have followed is the course which it was our duty to pursue; and I think that if we had abandoned our posts upon this occasion—if we had set our own opinions up against the deliberate judgment of the nation—if we had undertaken the vain task of resisting the unanimous sentiment, I may say, of the whole people of this country by attempting to refuse the inquiry—I think we should have undertaken a useless labour, and should not have performed the duty which we had undertaken to perform. Now, Sir, I come to another question. It has been asked by the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Bright) whether we are disposed to abide by those propositions for peace which had been settled by the Cabinet which existed when the House came to the vote on this Committee, and concurred in by the Cabinet as re-formed after I had the honour to receive Her Majesty's commission to form an Administration? Sir, most undoubtedly we do abide by it. Most unquestionably the instructions under which my noble Friend (Lord J. Russell) is now proceeding to Vienna, are founded upon those resolutions to which my right hon. Friends who have just left the Government were parties. And most undoubtedly, when I am asked whether we are prepared to negotiate in good faith, I say that we are prepared to negotiate in good faith, and if we were not so prepared, we should be unworthy not only of holding the offices which we do, but of being Members of this great assembly. Sir, we are as anxious as any body of men could be, to be able, upon terms consistent with the future safety of Europe, consistent with the attainment of those objects for which the war was begun—to put an end to the contest by an honourable treaty of peace. But I think that if, by an over desire for peace, we were to conclude that which would be more properly called a hollow and insecure truce—if we were to consent to terms which would leave the same source of danger by which we have been brought into the arduous struggle we are now carrying on—if we were to agree to terms which would leave that danger in all its former amplitude—instead of deserving the thanks of the country, I think we should then deserve its censure; we should have betrayed the trust which has been imposed upon us, and for the purpose of gaining a temporary relief we should have laid the foundation of great future calamities and dangers. That, then, Sir, is the line which Her Majesty's Government are prepared to pursue. We have felt it our duty in a moment of great emergency, when other persons who had the opportunity of forming a Government were unable to do so—when the question put to us was, whether the country should be left longer in a state, I may say, of anarchy, or whether we should undertake the task of conducting its affairs—we have felt it our duty, I say, to undertake that task, and we intend to perform it honestly and conscientiously. If peace is to be obtained upon terms consistent with the security and tranquillity of Europe, it will not be our fault if peace is not so obtained. If, on the other hand, it should unfortunately happen that the abilities of my noble Friend (Lord J. Russell), and the sincere desire of the Government to put an end to the war upon proper conditions, should unhappily fail, then it will be our duty to prosecute the war with that vigour which may be necessary for bringing it to a successful termination, and in that case I am persuaded that we shall not appeal in vain to the generous support of Parliament. Sir, I am convinced that, whatever differences may exist between parties who sit on different sides of the House, those differences will for the moment at least be laid aside, and that we shall all feel that this is a national and not a party question—that we shall all feel that we are here representing this great empire in the face of Europe, and that we shall not exhibit a spectacle which would be humiliating and disgraceful to the country—the spectacle, namely, of party divisions, or personal jealousies, or differences upon particular questions, disabling the Parliament of this country from giving to whatever Government may exist for the time those means by which alone it could properly conduct the affairs of the country, and bring an arduous struggle to a successful and honourable termination. Sir, these are the grounds upon which we have undertaken the duty which has been imposed upon us. If, on the other hand, this House and the country should think that we do not properly perform those duties which are expected from us, and if any other Government can present itself which would be more acceptable to Parliament and the country, then, Sir, no feeling of personal ambition, no paltry love of power, will induce us to cling to the posts which we occupy longer than we think we can do so with advantage to the country and credit to ourselves. But, until we shall find that we have lost the confidence of Parliament and the country—until we shall find that the nation is disappointed with us and condemns us, instead of being disposed to support us—so long as we have the support of public opinion with us, and the good will of Parliament and the country—the House may depend upon it that we shall exert ourselves to the utmost, and shall not quit the post to which the confidence of the Sovereign has called us.

Mr. DISRAELI: Sir, I am quite sure that the noble Lord is correct in the anticipation that any existing Government at the present emergency will receive a liberal and candid support from this House. But it would have been satisfactory to the House, this being the conclusion of the week, if the noble Lord could have found it convenient to assure the House and the country that a Government was really in existence. The noble Lord has omitted in his speech to answer the arguments of the right hon. Baronet the late First Lord of the Admiralty, and the right hon. Gentleman the late Chancellor of the Exchequer, against granting this Committee; but the noble Lord has also made an omission almost as singular, for the noble Lord Lord appears to have forgot that which we thought we were all collected together today specially to hear from the noble Lord —namely, that he, at least, had been successful in forming an Administration. If that be the case, as all the House had hoped, I think there is some want of courtesy in the leader of the House of Commons permitting us to adjourn this evening without having that gratifying information made known to us and the country. But instead of this the noble Lord says—"So long as we possess the confidence of the House and the country, we intend to do our duty to Her Majesty, and to retain our places." But what we want to know is, who are "we"? The moment, no doubt, is one of great national peril. The emergency is granted by all. We are ready to extend to a Government, with a less reference to party feeling than at any other time, a just and generous support. But it does not appear to me to be a severe condition to be made by Members of Parliament that they should at least be acquainted with the names of Her Majesty's Ministers—that they should have the satisfaction of knowing who are those patriots whom they are asked to support in the fulfilment of these onerous duties under circumstances so grave and so trying. I am bound to say that, in listening to the remarks of the noble Lord with regard to his conduct respecting the nomination of this important Committee, I find them not satisfactory. I must even say that I find them incoherent. I did expect from the noble Lord at least an answer to the argumentative speeches of his late right hon. Colleagues. But the noble Lord did not do so. I did expect the noble Lord would to-night at least vindicate the policy which now seems to be the cardinal point of his Administration. The noble Lord opposed this Committee when it was first proposed, and when it was supported by many hon. Gentlemen on his own side of the House, and by the great bulk of those in opposition—he opposed it in language most strenuous, and in a spirit the most uncompromising. The Government of which the noble Lord was a member, in consequence of the decision of the House of Commons, ceased to exist. It is unnecessary for me to refer to the circumstances which intervened in the period between that vote and the day when the noble Lord received the commission of Her Majesty to form an Administration, and I make only one remark upon them, because the noble Lord has fallen into a great inaccuracy in his reference to particulars with which he ought certainly to have been well acquainted—I allude to Lord Derby's attempts to form a Government. Lord Derby never declined, as the noble Lord has stated, the exalted duty which was offered to him because he could not form an Administration, but he declined it solely because he could not form a strong Administration; and, Sir, I cannot admit that the noble Lord, especially in the position in which he now finds himself—after ten days' experience of his more felicitous enterprise—has any right to pride himself on his superiority over Lord Derby in this respect.

But now let us look to the conduct of the noble Lord with respect to this Committee —his former opposition to it, his present support of it, and his dealing with his late colleagues with respect to it. The noble Lord, when a member of the late Government, strenuously opposed the Committee to inquire into the causes which have led to the present condition of our army before Sebastopol, and upon principle, too. The noble Lord, since he has been First Minister—since he was successful in forming this strong Administration, over which, only a week ago last Friday, he delivered so animated and fervent a eulogium—for it was only last Friday that he congratulated the country on possessing a Ministry distinguished alike for administrative ability, political sagacity, and sufficient liberalism—the noble Lord when he was called upon to form this Administration, formed it, if upon any principle, upon the principle of opposing this Committee of the House of Commons to inquire into the condition of the army before Sebastopol. In trying to form his Government there was, indeed, no other subject on which there required to be any communication between himself and his intended colleagues. They had all of them been members of the late Cabinet. The noble Lord has confessed to-night that with regard to his foreign policy, which absorbs all other subjects, not the slightest difference exists between the Cabinet of which he is the chief and that of the late Ministry of Lord Aberdeen. There could, therefore, be only one question on which a frank explanation would naturally take place between the noble Lord and his intended colleagues when he was forming his Administration. The right hon. Baronet the late First Lord of the Admiralty explained, by a cause which we all regret, why there was not that complete conference between him and the noble Lord which is usual under such circumstances, and we have it from the right hon. Member for South Wiltshire (Mr. S. Herbert) and the right hon. Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. Gladstone)—and the noble Lord has not in any way disputed their allegations—that the concession of this Committee was the subject on which they required from the noble Lord, for the satisfaction of their minds, a clear and complete understanding, and as I collected from the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) the noble Lord was of the same opinion then as he had previously been in the House of Commons, objecting to the Committee upon principle, and expressing his determination to resist it. Well, what did the noble Lord do even last Friday night? He again announces to the House that he will resist this Committee; and on what ground does he found that resistance? Why, on the ground of its not being constitutional—no paltry ground, no slight ground, but the most powerful and effective objection that could possibly be stated. Now, Sir, this does seem to me to be very strange, that the noble Lord the First Minister of the Crown should within the space of one short—"one little week," be prepared to do that which a week ago he deemed unconstitutional. And for what reason, I ask? Simply because he is determined to remain, he says, a Minister of the Crown, as no other person, on his own showing, could form a strong Ministry. I imagine there are many persons who could form a Ministry as strong at least as that of the noble Lord. The noble Lord votes against this Committee—he speaks against it—he absolutely forms his Cabinet on the basis of opposing this Committee—and before a week has passed we find the noble Lord rising in his place, staking the existence of the Government on carrying that Committee, and not urging one single reason in favour of that Committee being appointed, or offering the slightest argument in support of this sudden and extraordinary change in his policy. After having listened for hours to arguments which I think are answerable—to precedents with which, I think, the noble Lord might have grappled—to a discussion which I supposed the leader of the House of Commons would have condescended to meet at least in fair debate—the noble Lord changes all his opinions—the opinions which, only a week ago he himself described as unconstitutional, he accepts—he not only accepts them, but he makes them the basis of his Government. And this is the man whose firmness and energy are to save the country! I do the noble Lord injustice. The noble Lord did give a reason for granting this Committee. The noble Lord has found out since last Friday, that there is a strong public opinion in the country upon the subject of appointing this Committee to inquire into the condition of the army before Sebastopol, and into the causes that have produced that condition. He has found out that there is such an almost irresistible feeling in the country that no Ministry would be justified in opposing it. Why, Sir, what a fine observer must the noble Lord be of the nation's disposition—what an acute observer must he be of public opinion—how skilfully must he feel the pulse of the public mind, if it is only since last Friday that he has arrived at that conclusion. The discontent of the country for months, which resulted in the overwhelming majority which destroyed a Government, were instances and circumstances which never induced the noble Lord to suppose that a Committee like this was a great necessity. Called upon to fulfil the most responsible duties which a man can be called upon to perform—called upon to form a Government at a time when one would have thought, if a man could feel deeply or think profoundly, he would have felt and thought deeply and profoundly, the noble Lord is still unconscious that this Committee of Inquiry is still a necessity—the noble Lord is still so ignorant of the public mind, and unmindful of that of which all are so conscious, that he forms his Government, not in oblivion, not in neglect, not in forgetfulness of that necessity, but absolutely in defiance of it. Administrative ability, of which we once heard so much, we know has vanished; but I thought, at least, political sagacity remained. Political sagacity was, I supposed, represented by the First Minister of the Crown; but after the experience of the noble Lord's career, and the speech we have heard to-night, my hopes of his triumphant future are less glowing than I at first hoped it might have been. I have made these observations with reference to the change of opinions of the noble Lord—I cannot say change of argument, for he offered us no reasons. I have not changed my mind upon the necessity of appointing this Committee, although I have listened with the respect which they deserve to the speeches of the late colleagues of the noble Lord, and which I certainly did expect the noble Lord would answer. It has been said, that this is an unconstitutional mode on the part of the House of Commons. I hardly care to enter into that question, because it has been very ably discussed, and I do not know that I should have adverted to it to-night, even after listening to the speeches of the right hon. Gentlemen opposite, had it not been for the observation of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. Gladstone). I have not come down to-night, Sir, to enter into a debate on the expediency or inexpediency of granting this Committee. I came down by appointment to-night to hear three statements from three distinguished statesmen, and, if necessary, to listen to the answer, reply, comment, or criticism of the noble Lord the First Minister of the Crown upon those statements. I certainly think the three right hon. Gentlemen have taken a constitutional course in making those statements to the House. I am sure the House would have felt greatly offended if they had not given a frank exposition of their views, and I think it was a great mistake of the noble Lord, when, having, more than a year ago, seceded from the Government of Lord Aberdeen, he came back to office without a frank explanation to the House of Commons, and I believe I express the very general feeling of the House on this subject. None of us have come here to enter into the discussion whether we should have a Committee or not. That is a question settled—settled by an overwhelming majority—and I should like to see the Minister who will directly or indirectly attempt to rescind it. But it is impossible not to notice some of the remarks which have been put forward by the right hon. Gentlemen who have addressed us, one of which is brought to my mind by the observations of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford. The right hon. Gentleman has taunted my right hon. Friend the Member for Midhurst (Mr. Walpole) with appealing to precedents. He found that my right hon. Friend was armed with precedents not very easy or convenient to grapple with. He saw that those precedents had made an impression on the House; and then he derides this appeal—this recurrence to the force of precedents, and will not condescend, he says, to argue the question on so low a ground. But let me remind the House that the question of precedent was introduced by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carlisle (Sir J. Graham) at the commencement of his weighty and matured speech. The right hon. Gentleman said, "You have only one or two precedents in your favour, and those of a bad time." He spoke of them as of no consequence, although he by inference indicated that if there were many precedents, and they were good, they might have considerable effect upon the opinion of the House and of the country. My right hon. Friend (Mr. Walpole) quoted many precedents, and good ones, some of which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford has admitted to be completely adapted to the question before us.

There are objections made to some Committees of the House of Commons appointed to consider disastrous circumstances of war because they were in Committees of the whole House. I will mention one precedent which has not been referred to to-night, and which was a Committee of the whole House—in the year 1779, when Lord Cornwallis was examined before a Committee of the whole House—and what was the opinion of Mr. Burke on that subject? Mr. Burke said that the Committee produced no great effect because of the bustle and confusion which pervaded the House during the time of the examination. I think that is not only a precedent in favour of a Select Committee, but shows from great authority how inconvenient Committees of the whole House may be found. But, if you grant a Committee of the whole House you concede all the arguments which you urge against Committees in a constitutional point of view; and with respect to precedents against Committees of the whole House to inquire into circumstances analogous to those in the Crimea, their name is not one or two, but legion. I do not want, however, to place this question on precedents, numerous as they are. They are to be found in the time of Charles II.; for instance, when the conduct of the war by the Duke of York was made the subject of inquiry. They are to be found in the time of William III.—in the time of Queen Anne—in the time of George II.—in the time of George III., and during the Regency. I did not, however, place this question on precedent. I say, had there not been a precedent to meet this instance, it was the duty of the House of Commons to frame a precedent; because the circumstances are grave. A fine army disappears, and the Chief Minister of the Crown in this House, and the right hon. Gentlemen who have seceded from the Government, tell us that, in possession of all the secrets of the Cabinet, the causes of this disaster are to them inexplicable. If there had been no precedent it was the duty of the House of Commons, I maintain, under such circumstances, to have made a precedent; and, notwithstanding all his refined and sustained argumentation, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Oxford may rely upon it that the people of England, not in moments of passion, but in the calmest periods of their existence, will always feel that with such an unparaleled disaster, not explicable by the chief statesman of the day, it was the duty of their representatives, their first duty, to inquire into the cause of these disasters. "But," says the right hon. Gentleman, "leave it to Government. Why do not you leave it to the Government? I am for inquiry," says the right hon. Gentleman, "but not inquiry in this way, not inquiry by a Committee of the House of Commons." I am perfectly ready to admit that you might, under ordinary circumstances, have modes of inquiry more satisfactory than the one that has been proposed; but what does that come to? I admit that, under ordinary circumstances, a Government might claim the duty and privilege of inquiring into maladministration, of recommending, and even of devising a remedy, but the fact is, that, in the present state of affairs, the country has no confidence in the Government. It is a conviction that no fair relief, no sincere and efficient relief, could be afforded by the Administration, either the last or the present—I make this as a general, not a personal, observation—that the Government could not make an effective inquiry, that has made them feel that it was their own House of Commons from which alone they could obtain redress and satisfaction. Then the right hon. Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. Gladstone)—and this was almost the most laboured part of his argument—takes up the list of the Committee. He seems to be very familiar with the opinions of all Gentlemen upon it, and he says, quoting the opinion of a great authority, that nothing can be done effectually unless the individual who is employed is in favour of the task which he is engaged to fulfil. And it was considered by his friends certainly as a very unanswerable argument. But did it not occur to him that it was in effect an argument against the constitution of every Parliamentary Committee that every day, upon every subject, is called into existence. There is not a Committee upon any subject which does not consist, in many of its members, of instruments that are not favourable to the subject-matter of the inquiry, and therefore, if the argument of the right hon. Gentleman means anything, it is good against the whole system of Parliamentary inquiry. Is the right hon. Gentleman prepared to go so far as that? We have heard many sneers at Parliament. We are told that the constitution is in danger, because the noble Lord at the head of the Administration has, in the course of a week, changed the whole policy of his Cabinet;

but I am certain that, if you wish to deal a blow against Parliamentary authority, you can deal no more effective one than to impress upon the country that the elements of a Parliamentary Committee are not adapted to the effective fulfilment of their purpose. The noble Lord opposite, instead of answering the arguments of his late colleagues respecting this Committee, which a week ago he declared was unconstitutional, and on which to-night he has staked the existence of his Government — the noble Lord has again favoured us with flattering visions of an impending peace. I am quite sure that if the country believes that peace with honour can be achieved by the noble Lord the Ministry may count upon the earnest support of this House. All I can say is, that I hope the instructions which the noble Lord has given to the noble Lord the Member for the City of London (Lord John Russell) are conceived in a more frank spirit and in more intelligible language than the communications which he had on behalf of Lord Derby with the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) and with the understanding which he arrived at with his late colleague as to the basis upon which his Government was to be formed. If the noble Lord has gone to Vienna to be the promoter of peace, with a foregone conclusion in favour of war, that I think is not a satisfactory prospect for the country. I can, therefore, only hope that the instructions which he has received from the First Minister have been couched in a more familiar spirit and expressed in more intelligible terms than the conditions which he (Lord Palmerston) apparently made to be the basis of his Government—a Government that, after ten days, has experienced a disastrous blow at a time when the noble Lord assures us it is of the utmost importance that the country should feel that it was strongly and effectively governed, and when the noble Lord, under circumstances so discouraging to the country, after a week nearly has elapsed since this unfortunate and untoward event has been proclaimed—the noble Lord does not find himself in a condition, at the conclusion of the Parliamentary week, to feel that by all his exertions, and all his combinations, he can assure the country that his Sovereign at this moment possesses a complete body of responsible advisers.

Mr. GLADSTONE: I rise, Sir, to explain one or two points referred to in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down. One of them relates to the question of precedents; and upon that subject I merely wish to say that what I stated was, that all the precedents which were quoted by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Midhurst (Mr. Walpole) failed entirely in this essential particular—that they related to operations which had been drawn to a close; whereas the essence of this inquiry is, that it has to do with operations which are still in progress. The other point upon which I wish to offer an explanation is a matter of much more importance. I am afraid I have been unfortunate in expressing myself indistinctly upon it; at any rate, my meaning has been misapprehended by the right hon. Gentleman opposite. The right hon. Gentleman has, of course, a perfect right to put whatever construction he pleases upon my statement; but, as far as I recollect, I never stated to the House that my noble Friend at the head of the Government used the expression in conversation with me that he would form his Government upon the basis of resistance to this Committee, or that I asked for any engagement from him upon that subject. I never made it the subject of stipulation at all. I never even mentioned it to my noble Friend until I had written to him to acquaint him that, after the communications we had had respecting his foreign policy, I was ready, at his desire, to accept office under his Administration. But I had the pleasure of seeing my noble Friend before receiving any reply or making any final arrangement; and at the interview at which it was finally arranged that I should take office, I inquired of my noble Friend what his intentions were with reference to this Committee. He then stated that his intentions continued to be the same as they had been, and that it was his intention to oppose the Committee. But I never in the least doubted my noble Friend, and never thought of asking from him any stipulations upon the subject, as they appeared to me wholly unnecessary.

Sir GEORGE GREY: Sir, the explanation which has just been given by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) has relieved me to a great extent of the indispensable necessity of correcting the repeated statements in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) upon assumptions without any evidence that my noble Friend (Lord Palmerston) formed his Government on the basis of resisting this Committee. Having, as a Member of

Lord Aberdeen's Government, offered my strenuous, but unavailing, opposition to the decision at which the House arrived, and having subsequently acquiesced in the decision of a majority of the Cabinet of my noble Friend, that, under the circumstances of difficulty in which they were placed, it was their duty to withdraw from any further opposition to the nomination of that Committee, I feel bound emphatically to deny, so far as I am concerned, and so far as any information has reached me, that my noble Friend's Government was based on opposition to this Committee. The policy of that Government—the basis of that Government—was the vigorous prosecution of the war by all the means at our disposal, and which the confidence of Parliament may enable us to make use of, with the view to the attainment at the earliest period of a just, a safe, and an honourable peace. When I opposed the appointment of that Committee, I did not deny the right of Parliament to inquire into the state of our army in the Crimea, or the conduct of the different departments of the Government whose duty it was to minister to the wants of that army, nor do I agree with the right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham) in thinking there was anything unconstitutional in its appointment, but I did so under a deep sense of the risks we might incur, the inconvenience which would arise to any Government administering affairs while such a Committee was sitting, and also of the injustice which might be inflicted on parties absent in the Crimea by evidence being taken in their absence affecting their conduct and character. I felt those grounds were sufficient to justify the opposition to that Motion. My arguments were unavailing, and the House by an overwhelming majority affirmed the appointment of the Committee. It has been truly said, there were different motives which influenced hon. Gentlemen in supporting the Motion for this inquiry. There were some who were honestly desirous for the inquiry, for the sake of truth. There were others who, not denying the inconvenience of the inquiry, availed themselves of that Motion to strike a blow at the Government of Lord Aberdeen. It was obvious that the vote implied want of confidence in the Government. That Government, in consequence, tendered their resignations to Her Majesty, and their resignations were accepted. In tendering my resignation I had not the remotest conception that it was not final and conclusive; I had not any expectation that the circumstances which have since occurred would have arisen, and which have made me feel it my duty to resume office under my noble Friend. The Earl of Derby was applied to to form a Government. He undertook that commission, and failed to accomplish it. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) says that Lord Derby did not say he could not form a Government, but that he could not form a strong Government. Any Gentleman may take half a dozen Members, and say he has formed a Government, but he must find men deserving the confidence of the country, and able to discharge the duties of Government. I understand Lord Derby abandoned the task, being unable to form such a Government out of the materials at his command, and not being able to obtain that assistance from the opposite ranks. The attempt of my noble Friend (Lord J. Russell) to form a Government also failed, and then my noble Friend (Lord Palmerston), having been intrusted with the task, did me the honour to solicit my assistance. I should most gladly have declined, not from want of confidence in him, or from any difference of policy, but because, under the circumstances of the case, I thought it was deeply to be regretted that a totally new Government was not formed. The times, however, were critical. It was not a moment when the country could be left without any Government; war was in progress, important negotiations were pending, and I felt, if my noble Friend could obtain the co-operation of those Gentlemen whose character, talents, and well-known abilities justly recommended them to the confidence of Parliament and the country, I had no right to withhold that assistance which he did me the honour to ask, although I might think he attached undue importance to it. It would have been offering an insult to the House if the first act of my noble Friend had been an attempt to rescind their decision. Yet I am free to admit I entertained the hope, if not the expectation, that when the Government was reconstructed, and when it was announced what measures we were prepared to take, the House would have acquiesced in the abandonment of that Committee. The House and the country still undoubtedly remained of the opinion that an inquiry should take place, and I am satisfied that no Government formed in such circumstances as the present could have gained any useful object by attempting to stem the tide of public opinion, or to overrule the decision of a majority of the House of Commons on this subject. We believed, therefore, that we were best discharging our duty by endeavouring to induce the House so to construct the Committee that the inquiry should be conducted by men who would act under a solemn sense of the responsibility committed to them, and whose knowledge and experience of public affairs would lead them to avoid those evils and inconveniences that were the main ground of our objections to the inquiry. The right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Disraeli) has indulged in his usual vein of sarcasm on the Government as at present constituted. I shall pass by that sarcasm. I deny the proposition of my right hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Sir J. Graham), so far as my own experience goes, that the determination of the House to nominate this Committee, and to prosecute the inquiry, is a renewal of the vote of want of confidence, or a censure upon the Government, as recently constituted. I believe that is not the object of the House. I have seen no sign of such being its intention, and no opinion has been expressed by this House, indicative of any want of confidence in the Government. The Estimates were willingly and generously voted; means were afforded the Government for carrying on the war with vigour, and I certainly think there is nothing to justify the Government in resigning their trust and abandoning their post. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) has stated that a week has elapsed since this division in the Cabinet, and that my noble Friend is unable to announce the names of those Gentlemen who will fill the places recently vacated. Two days only have elapsed since their resignation was announced, and I do not think my noble Friend is asking too much of the forbearance of the House if he asks for at least two or three days before he announces the names of the Gentlemen who may be approved of by Her Majesty to fill the places recently vacated. They are all important places, and they have been held by men of great eminence. The Earl of Derby has declared that he had not men of sufficient eminence or capacity to construct a Government, and it is a little too much to require that my noble Friend should at once repair the serious loss which the Government has sustained. I earnestly trust that my noble Friend will succeed in obtaining the co-operation of men with whom his remaining colleagues may act with the same cordiality with which they have acted with those who have recently resigned, and that the Government will, in a short time, be so constituted as to command the confidence of this House and of the country.

Mr. MUNTZ said, that it was an old saying, that it was better late than never. The noble Lord had shared the fate of all those who tried to please everybody—he had pleased nobody. If in the first instance he had agreed to the Committee, and then, finding a difficulty, had thrown himself on the confidence of the country, he would have been supported. But he did not rise for that. He rose to object to the talk about precedents. Precedents! Why, was there a precedent of such an army having suffered so much in so short a space of time? He voted for a censure on the Government, and also for an inquiry. He wished for inquiry, because he thought it requisite—not an inquiry into what is going on now, but an inquiry into the past. Then there was another question—what would the army itself think if the House of Commons had voted an inquiry into their dreadful condition, and then no inquiry took place? Hon. Members said there were difficulties connected with the inquiry. Were there no difficulties connected with no inquiry? With regard to the Government of the noble Lord, he would say the same he had said of all Governments—that so long as he believed it was promoting the interest and honour of the country he would support it.

Question put, and *agreed to.*

Orders of the Day.—Other Orders postponed till after the notice of Motion for nominating the Committee on the Army before Sebastopol.

ARMY BEFORE SEBASTOPOL—NOMINATION OF COMMITTEE.

Mr. SPEAKER then put the names of the proposed Committee *seriatim.*

Mr. ROBERT PHILLIMORE said, he would submit that the House ought not to proceed further in the nomination of the Committee at that late hour, especially as no two Members who had spoken in defence of it had expressed the same opinion with regard to it, or had agreed as to whether it was to be confined to the past or to enter into the future; no one yet knew whether it was to be a gross fraud, a delusion, or a full and searching inquiry, such as had been pointed at by the right hon. Member for Droitwich (Sir J. Pakington). If he stood alone, he should divide the House against this inquiry.

Mr. WALPOLE said, he trusted that, as it was decided to have a Committee, hon. Members would see the propriety of not having continued and protracted discussion. The question had been fully and most ably discussed on both sides. He believed he was right in saying that, according to the forms and rules of the House, when a Committee was appointed to inquire into a subject, it was not in the power of that Committee, without the express instructions of the House, to inquire into any matters of a subsequent date to the time when it was appointed.

Sir THOMAS ACLAND said, that although feeling a very strong objection to the appointment of the Committee, still he would not be a party to any further prolongation of the difficulties in which he considered the House, the Government, and the country were placed, in consequence of the vote of that House.

Sir HENRY WILLOUGHBY said, he did not see any disadvantage that could result from the appointment of the Committee, if it were to confine its labours to an inquiry into the conduct of those departments in this country whose business it was to supply the wants of the army. But he felt persuaded that any attempt on the part of the Committee to enter into military matters in the Crimea would be productive of the most fatal consequences to the public service.

Viscount PALMERSTON said, it was not his intention to propose any limitation to the inquiries of the Committee. It appeared to him that the first and main object to be attained was to appoint a Committee consisting of Gentlemen in whose discretion and judgment the House might repose confidence. He thought the selection which had been made was a selection which entitled the Committee to the confidence of the House. He thought the names perfectly unobjectionable. He for one was prepared to repose in those Gentlemen sufficient confidence. He thought that in the pursuit of their inquiry they would not travel into those delicate and dangerous topics which had been adverted to in the course of the debate. It did not appear to him to be impossible for them to pursue inquiries with regard to the condition of the army in the Crimea without travelling into those questions which would affect our relations with our allies. It would, indeed, be a most unfortunate thing if they were led to make inquiries which would wound the feelings of our allies. He thought, therefore, it could not be too strongly impressed on the Gentlemen who formed that Committee to abstain from any inquiry which would have so calamitous a result. It appeared to him that if they pursued the inquiry with proper judgment and discretion, they would satisfy the expectations of Parliament, without giving rise to the evil to which he had adverted. As far, then, as he was concerned, it was not his intention to put any limitation on the inquiry of the Committee.

Mr. ROEBUCK: It is not my intention, Sir, to move any instructions to this Committee, for I think the words of my Motion do limit the inquiry of that Committee. The words are that they should

> "Inquire into the condition of our army before Sebastopol, and into the conduct of those departments of the Government whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of that army."

Now, it appears to me that these words are definite, they explain themselves; and such being the case, I think, the Committee require no instructions. The House, when it selects a Committee, generally has some confidence in that Committee, and, perhaps, the House will allow me to say a few words upon the selection which has been made in this instance. I have to apologise to the Gentlemen whose names I used in the first instance for not being able to carry out my original intention. I found, however, that those names did not appear to meet with the confidence of this House, and I, therefore, felt it my duty to place myself immediately in communication with the noble Lord at the head of the Government. The result of my communication with him is, that I have been enabled to present to the House a Committee in which I think they have confidence, and if that Committee deserves the confidence of this House it requires no instructions. I perfectly agree with everything said respecting the difficulty in the way of this inquiry. But I think the difficulty justifies and calls forth inquiry. The difficulty is great; I know we are trenching as closely as possible upon a prerogative which we ought not to trench upon; but still, all that notwithstanding, we have before us an army melting away; we have the people of this country demanding inquiry; and I believe we should not satisfy the desires of our constituents did we not grant the inquiry I have asked for. It is on these grounds, and on these grounds alone, that I have ventured upon this delicate and, I will say, dangerous investigation. No inquiry, indeed, could be more delicate and dangerous; for, depend upon it, you have a people to satisfy who will not be satisfied until they have probed to the bottom the circumstances which have caused the destruction of the finest army that ever left the shores of this country.

Committee *nominated*:—Mr. Roebuck, Mr. Drummond, Sir John Pakington, Colonel Lindsay, Mr. Layard, Mr. Ellice, Lord Seymour, Sir George Lewis, General Peel.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Bramston be one other Member of the said Committee."

MR. CORRY said, he begged to explain to the House the reasons why he wished to substitute the name of Captain Scobell for that of Mr. Bramston. He thought it desirable that some hon. Member connected with the navy ought to be on the Committee, as the conduct of branches of the naval department was called into question.

MR. ROEBUCK said, he thought the proposal arose out of a misconception. The Committee could examine naval witnesses, and be able to appreciate the evidence.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON said, he hoped the House would abide by the list as it stood. The Committee was not going to inquire into seamanship, but into the management of public departments.

CAPTAIN SCOBELL said, the present Amendment was made without his knowledge or concurrence in the first instance, and he felt no desire to serve upon it. At the same time, he thought a naval officer ought to be put upon it, as the conduct of the transport service was in question.

MR. WALPOLE said, he would appeal to his right hon. Friend (Mr. Corry) not to press his Motion. It was desirable to have the unanimous consent of the House to the appointment of the Committee. There were now eleven Members; there might be a twelfth appointed upon a future stage if it was considered desirable to have a naval man upon the Committee.

MR. M'CANN said, he thought the country would be very much disappointed if no naval officer were appointed on the Committee. He had heard of the nomination of Captain Scobell with great satisfaction.

Question put, "That the name of 'Mr. Bramston' stand part of the Question."

The House *divided*:—Ayes 101; Noes 80: Majority 21.

On the Motion that Mr. John Ball be appointed another member of the Committee,

MR. BENTINCK gave notice that on Monday he would move the insertion of the name of Sir George Tyler in the place of that of Mr. John Ball. He thought it highly requisite that upon a Committee of this nature there should be at least one naval officer.

MR. BERESFORD said, he would also give notice that on Monday he should move to add the name of Mr. Miles to the Committee. He thought it only fair that, as Lord Raglan had no one in the Committee to stand forth and take his part, some Gentleman should be appointed to attend the Committee and defend his character. Mr. Miles was connected by marriage with Lord Raglan, and was, therefore, the most proper person to represent his interest.

MR. ROEBUCK said, this was the first time he ever heard that a member of the jury ought to be a relation of the prisoner in the dock.

MR. MILES said, he was confident that Lord Raglan's character would be perfectly safe with the Committee as proposed by the hon. and learned Gentleman. He trusted the Committee would strictly investigate the conduct of the civil departments, for these were the departments which had more failed than any other.

MR. NAPIER said, he had been sorry to hear the expressions which had just fallen from the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Roebuck). He (Mr. Napier) never knew an instance of a person being put in the dock without a bill of indictment having been first found against him.

Motion made, and Question put, "That Mr. John Ball be one other Member of the said Committee."

The House *divided*:—Ayes 98; Noes 62: Majority 36.

The House adjourned at a quarter after Two o'clock till Monday next.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Monday, February 26, 1855.

MINUTES.] PUBLIC BILLS.—1ª Lunacy Regulation Act (1853) Amendment.

2ª Criminal Justice; Speedy Trial of Offenders.

3ª Purchasers Protection against Judgments.

MINISTERIAL ARRANGEMENTS—THE LORD LIEUTENANT OF IRELAND.

THE MARQUESS OF WESTMEATH said, that a belief existed in the public mind that some change was to take place in reference to the government of Ireland; and therefore during the recent changes in the Government he was not without hopes that the noble Lord at the head of the Government would have found himself in a situation strong enough to carry out the suggestion that had been made, and at once abolish the office of Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. He could speak from experience, and could say that a considerable change of opinion had of late taken place in Dublin respecting the office of Lord Lieutenant. It had been generally understood that the noble Lord who now held that office had been only sent over to wind up the concern. If that was the intention of the late Ministry nothing could be more agreeable than the sending out of that noble Lord. At the same time he had heard a noble Earl (the Earl of Carlisle) designated as being about to fill up the post of Viceroy of Ireland. From that noble Earl's public worth and private character he congratulated the Government in having obtained his services, as he was sure the noble Earl would do honour to the office. He trusted if the appointment did take place that the noble Earl would not be induced, from his characteristic benevolence, to think that every one in Ireland was as well-intentioned as himself. He had learned with satisfaction the appointment of an hon. Gentleman (Mr. Horsman) to the post of Secretary for Ireland. He was national in his feelings himself, but he was not dissatisfied to find that it was not an Irishman who had been named for this office, for he conceived that it was an advantage in carrying on the affairs of Ireland that the person filling the post which Mr. Horsman was to fill should be relieved from the importunity of relatives, who might wish to get appointments and situations in Church or State. There was another topic to which he begged to call their Lordships' attention. It was the rumoured appointment of a right hon. Baronet to succeed the right hon. Baronet at present at the head of the Admiralty. He need not say that the people of England had just now their earnest attention fixed on the existing state of public affairs in a way that had never before been exceeded. He had only been over here a week, and he could say he was quite satisfied on that point, and he thought, therefore, it was not too much for one of their Lordships' House to speak his honest feelings as to what he thought of the appointment. He did not wish to make any invidious allusions as to the administrative talent of the right hon. Gentleman who was to succeed to that office, but it had lately happened to him, as no doubt it had to their Lordships, to read in the *Times* newspaper that which purported to be a codicil to the will of a distinguished and gallant naval officer, Sir George Cockburn. He had left a paper which came before them with an authority which prevented them from doubting its authenticity. The writer stated that he did not conceive it was possible that any board or assembly could be so constructed to show more its own inherent unfitness for the business for which it was appointed as the Board of Admiralty. It was true that the gallant Admiral designed improvements which would take considerable time to mature, even if the Government were disposed to adopt them. It was not with a view of pressing this improvement on their Lordships' attention that he had alluded to this subject, but he thought it was due to the navy, having such an authority as the late gallant Admiral for it, that at the head of the Board of Admiralty should be placed a naval officer. He would only add that he did not think the Government could do better than avail themselves of the opportunity afforded to them by the return of Admiral Dundas from the important and delicate command he had lately held and so admirably carried out in the Black Sea, and appoint that gallant officer to the head of the Board of Admiralty. That gallant Admiral had returned home after eliciting the approval of the entire country for his services, and the thanks of Parliament had been awarded to him as the seal of that approval. The manner in which Admiral Dundas had obtained the co-operation of the officers and fleet of our ally in conducting the common service was also gratifying in the extreme; and therefore, without having had the slightest previous communication with Admiral Dundas, he (the Marquess of Westmeath) took the liberty of suggesting that there ought to be an officer at the Admiralty who could satisfy the country that the business of the department would be performed without that official neglect and ignorance which Sir George Cockburn, after long experience, had pointed out as having been hitherto manifested.

EARL GRANVILLE said, he did not know whether the noble Marquess merely intended to make some observations, or whether he meant to put a direct question to him. He would not give an opinion upon an hypothetical case; he might, however, say, in reply to the suggestion of the noble Marquess, that no intention existed on the part of Her Majesty to abolish the office of Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. As to the noble Marquess's opinion as to the popularity of such a measure, as far as his own knowledge went of the state of public opinion in Ireland—though he admitted much might be said on both sides—he must say that about a year and a half ago, when in Ireland, he heard an opinion expressed at a public meeting by a judicial officer of Government, that he thanked God they had a Lord Lieutenant, a sentiment that he had never heard more loudly cheered than that was. With respect to the appointments to which the noble Marquess had referred, he had to state that Mr. Horsman had accepted the office of Chief Secretary for Ireland, and Sir Charles Wood that of First Lord of the Admiralty.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE BILL.

Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR, in moving the second reading of this Bill, said, it must be well known to their Lordships that for the last two or three years the subject of the trial of offenders for petty offences had much engrossed public attention. It had been felt, not without justice, that to commit for trial at the assizes or sessions persons charged with very petty larcenies, had tended neither to reform the offender himself—which should be an important object in all punishment—nor to the repression of the offences. Several evils had resulted from it. In the first place, it occasioned to the public very unnecessary expense. He would put that question aside for the present—but when a prisoner was tried at the assizes, or at quarter sessions, for a petty larceny of the value of a shilling or two, the effect on the public mind was very injurious, exciting as it usually did a feeling, if not of sympathy for the prisoner, at all events of regret for the delay in bringing him to trial, and it would be infinitely better if such cases were disposed of in a summary way, as were many cognate offences. There was only one way to meet the difficulty, and that was, to enact that certain cases, which were now tried at the assizes or the sessions, should henceforth be tried in a comparatively private forum, namely, before justices of the peace sitting in petty sessions. That being so, the only question which remained was, what were the offences cognisance of which should be given to these petty sessions? What he proposed was, that they should have cognisance of all simple larcenies where the value of the property stolen did not exceed 20*s*. This limit would, of course, be open to their Lordships' consideration in Committee. Their Lordships were aware that in our ancient law distinctions were made between larcenies of small amount and larcenies of a large amount. From time immemorial, a theft of anything under 1*s*. was attended with different consequences from a theft of property worth more than 1*s*., which, at an early period, might be equal to 20*s*. of our own day. It might be asked, was it safe to give cognisance of such cases to justices assembled in petty sessions? He believed it was so. That occasional errors might arise was only saying that justices assembled in petty sessions were subject to the infirmities of human nature; but the Legislature had already given them jurisdiction in cases not dissimilar. At the present moment justices had cognisance of offences so entirely similar in their character that it required the acuteness of a lawyer to detect the difference between them. For instance, justices assembled in petty sessions had cognisance of cases of dog stealing. Now, legally, dog stealing was not stealing; but it would be absurd to maintain that persons competent to entertain cognisance of the stealing of a dog should not have cognisance of the stealing of a duck. Another analogy: justices had jurisdiction over the offence of breaking into a garden, there plucking from a tree all the valuable peaches growing upon it, and bringing them to Covent Garden Market; but if the peaches fell to the ground, and the person picked them up, the justices had no jurisdiction, because that was larceny. Now, what he proposed was, to give to justices jurisdiction in all cases of small larcenies, in the same way as they had at present jurisdiction over offences which did not amount to larceny. The next question was, to what extent should they have the power of punishing offenders? He did not think it would be expedient materially to limit the punishments to be inflicted by the justices—at any rate, not much—below those awarded at the sessions; otherwise he was afraid it would often happen that, in order to save the expense and trouble of sending cases to the sessions, the justices might be inclined to let a prisoner be punished too lightly, and he was not one of those who thought that very short terms of incarceration tended either to the reformation of the offender or to the repression of the offence. Therefore, he thought, considerable latitude should be given, and he proposed to fill the blank in the Bill with words authorising the justice to inflict a term of punishment not exceeding one year's imprisonment. There was another proposition in the Bill which was of a different character, and on which he entertained considerable doubt. It was proposed in the last Session in the other House of Parliament by an hon. Friend of his now no more (Mr. Aglionby) that if a person charged before the justices with a larceny amounting to a higher value than 20*s.* should wish to plead guilty he should be allowed to do so; in which case the justices might either sentence him themselves, or, if they thought fit they might remit the record of his plea to the assizes, at which sentence should be pronounced by the Judge. He had originally prepared this Bill in that sense; but, on consideration, he thought it went to an extent of complication that would, on the first introduction of the system at all events, have been productive of evil. The persons charged with such offences were of the very lowest class, and generally very ignorant. What was more likely than when they were brought to the sessions to receive sentence they would deny having pleaded guilty before the justices, demand to have their witnesses examined, and complain that they were not allowed a trial; and if they were precluded from doing so, it would be very difficult to convince them or to make them admit, or the public to understand, that they had not been treated with hardship. He proposed, therefore, to enable the justices, where a person pleaded guilty, although the value of the property stolen exceeded 20*s.*, to pass sentence summarily.

Moved, That the Bill be now read 2ª.

Lord BROUGHAM said, that, as the Bill which stood upon the Votes in his name—the Speedy Trial of Offenders Bill—related to the same subject as that introduced by the noble and learned Lord on the woolsack, he thought he should save time by taking both together. His Bill arose out of the petition which he presented last Session from the Cumberland Magistrates. His learned friend and kinsman, the late Mr. Aglionby, had brought in a Bill which did not pass; and as he (Lord Brougham) had suggested that course on presenting the petition, he had felt it necessary now to present this Bill. The absolute necessity of some such measure had been frequently pressed upon him within the last few years. The state of the administration of the criminal law was such that a remedy could not much longer be delayed; and even the returns before Parliament were in themselves enough to show the necessity of some more summary treatment of petty offenders. They had obtained from six counties—Somerset, Sussex, Berkshire, Wiltshire, Hampshire, and Dorsetshire—with a population amounting to one-tenth of the whole population of England and Wales, a return in detail of the trials and punishments, and the amounts for which the offenders were tried, at the sessions for one year—1850; not an extraordinary year in any way. Out of 1,500 cases tried at the sessions, 895, or three-fifths of the whole number, were for larcenies under the amount of 5*s.*; 500, or one-third of the whole, were for larcenies under the amount of 1*s.*; 245, or one-sixth, for larcenies under the amount of 10*d.* Applying that proportion to the whole of England and Wales, it would appear that 9,000 cases were tried every year throughout the country for less than 5*s.*, and 5,000 for less than 1*s.*; all cases, moreover, of simple larceny, without any aggravated circumstances. It was bad enough that the Lord Chief Justice should be called upon, when he went circuit, bearing the Queen's Commission, with all the pomp and circumstance of the highest judicial authority, to adjudicate solemnly with the help of grand and petty juries upon larcenies to the amount of 1*d.* or 2*d.*; it was bad enough that all the parties should be put to great and unnecessary expense, both of time and money; but the worst evil of all—it might indeed be called an evil that surpassed all the rest taken together—was, that persons were detained for many days, perhaps weeks, in prison; and when they came to be tried were either acquitted, after being punished more severely than they would have been had they been convicted; or they were convicted, and then it became impossible to award even an apparently just amount of punishment to them for the offence of which they had been found guilty, because the Judge would feel that they had already undergone, secretly and unknown to the public, a greater punishment than was due to them upon their conviction; and the consequence was, that often people saw with surprise that for an offence which properly deserved a greater punishment, a prisoner was dismissed with a day's imprisonment. It happened to the Lord Chief Justice, during the last spring assizes for Buckinghamshire,, to have fifteen prisoners to try, all of whom had been committed for two months. What did their Lordships think was the value of the property which these persons were charged with stealing, and for which they had been so committed? The whole amount was 12*s.*, or an average for each of 10*d.* What was the consequence? The Chief Justice had only one course to take—he dismissed each of them as he was found guilty with one day's imprisonment. The reason why they had been detained so long in prison was, that there had been no adjourned sessions opened between the period of their commitment and the period of holding the assizes. That being the state of things, it was perfectly evident that some step must be taken for the more rapid and summary trial of these petty offenders. The Bill which he presented to their Lordships a fortnight or three weeks ago (the Speedy Trial of Offenders Bill), was very much the same as that subsequently introduced by his noble and learned Friend on the woolsack, although in one or two particulars there was no doubt a difference. The amount for which offenders could be tried before the justices in petty sessions, 20*s.*, was the same in both measures. One particular in which they differed was, the definition of the offences over which the justices should have jurisdiction, because in his Bill he excluded all offences which were attended with aggravating circumstances, which were specified; but the most material difference was, the option given to parties brought before magistrates in petty sessions of being either tried there, or having their cases transferred to the quarter sessions or the assizes. His Bill gave them that option, and he thought it was better to do so, because—although no man could be more sensible than he was of the admirable and judicious manner in which the magistrates in all parts of the country had discharged their very important duties; nevertheless, the subject ought not to be excluded from trial by jury without his consent. He would add his opinion, that it would be desirable to give them, when they desired it, the power to obtain professional assistance. They had the power of choosing county court judges as chairmen, but they hardly ever exercised it. This power was also possessed by the Irish magistracy. And in that country the assistant barrister was almost always chosen as the chairman of quarter sessions. In the Bill introduced by Sir John Pakington in 1851, it was proposed to give magistrates summary jurisdiction when property to the amount of not more than 1*s.* was in question. He (Lord Brougham) thought that sum was too low. Perhaps 20*s.* might, on the other hand, be by some deemed too high in fixing the limit; but he felt sure that this summary jurisdiction should, at any rate, extend to cases where thefts of property of the value of 5*s.* had been committed. Even, however, if the summary jurisdiction only extended to cases where property to the amount of 1*s.* was in question, it would be a great improvement in our criminal law, from the number of the cases in which men were now punished for stealing to a less amount. In 1849, three men, each approaching seventy years of age, were tried at different sessions in a county, the name of which he would not mention. One was sentenced to six weeks' imprisoment, with hard labour, for stealing to the value of about 1*d.*; another to eight weeks' imprisonment, with hard labour, for stealing to the value of ½*d.*; and a third to four weeks, with hard labour, for stealing to the value of ¼*d.* Nor had he reason to believe that there was any aggravating circumstances in their cases. He knew, indeed, of another case, in a different county, in which a man in his seventieth year was sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment, with hard labour, for stealing to the amount of 3*d.* But he assumed that in this case there must have been aggravating circumstances. If such sentences were passed at quarter sessions, it obviously became the more necessary to give the parties who came before the petty sessions the option of being tried there or at the quarter sessions, where, it was to be hoped, the justices would avail themselves of the option of procuring professional aid given to them by this Bill; for he felt persuaded that in no court, presided over by a lawyer experienced in criminal jurisprudence, would it have been possible for a man to be sent to the treadmill for stealing to the value of one farthing. There was one other respect in which his noble and learned Friend's Bill materially differed from his (Lord Brougham's). His noble and learned Friend proposed to confer the summary jurisdiction in question upon magistrates sitting at petty sessions, upon police magistrates and stipendiary magistrates individually, and also upon the Lord Mayor of London and the sitting Alderman individually. Now, he must decidedly object to give the Lord Mayor or the sitting Alderman a summary jurisdiction, severally, and not in petty sessions, to the extent of pronouncing, according to the noble and learned Lord's Bill, a sentence of two years' imprisonment and hard labour. These magistrates, sitting under the charter of the City of London, were wholly irresponsible to the Secretary of State, and the consequence was, that a system which led to the grossest abuses prevailed in their courts—that of going to ask advice of the sitting Alderman in cases where he had not the shadow of jurisdiction. Why, in one case a man actually went before the Aldermen to seek advice as to the manner in which he was to get possession of Alnwick and the other magnificent estates of the Duke of Northumberland, to which he alleged that he had a claim; and, instead of at once saying to him, "Leave the court, you have no business to come here with your tale," the magistrate chose to entertain it. He did not, indeed, proceed to try an action of ejectment for the recovery of the estates, but he did the thing which was next in absurdity, and was not, perhaps, quite so harmless. He said, "Let a letter be written to the Duke, and let it be sealed with the broad seal of the City." Whether that alarmed his noble Friend he did not know, but, at any rate, it had not the effect of making him give up possession of his estates. In another case, which he would mention as an illustration of the same evil, the sitting magistrate made himself the vehicle of circulating a wholly unfounded statement, that two Members of that House—two of the most honourable men who ever existed—had defrauded a poor woman out of the sum of 35*s.* a week, which they ought to have paid her under a trust. On these noble persons were cast imputations which were circulated all over the world as the comments of the Lord Mayor upon their illegal and oppressive conduct, whereas had they been aware of the complaint, they would have given the decisive answer that they were intrusted with the alms demanded, upon express condition of never advancing above 35*s.* at any one time. If such a case as either of these had happened with a magistrate who was removable he would not have the opportunity of committing the same egregious folly a second time, because he would have ceased to be a magistrate as soon as he had committed the first offence. In fact, the same course of giving advice used to prevail in the police courts of the metropolis. Not, indeed, that the absurdity was carried to any such extent as in the cases to which he had referred, because, as the presiding magistrates had been lawyers, they immediately told persons who came to them about such matters that they had no jurisdiction. Still the fact that *ex parte* statements of the most injurious character to the persons assailed were by this means circulated through the press was a grievance of a serious character, and one that called imperatively for a remedy; and accordingly, when Lord Melbourne was Secretary of State for the Home Department he told the different police magistrates that the practice of giving advice or of entertaining applications for assistance in cases out of their jurisdiction must altogether cease. Of course such a notice was effectual; but it would have been of no use to make a similar communication to the City magistrates, since they were corporation justices sitting under a charter, and would, therefore, have laughed at the interference of the Government. For these and for other reasons, therefore, he was of opinion that the summary jurisdiction should not be extended further than he (Lord Brougham) had proposed; and that it should not be exercised by the Lord Mayor or by one Alderman singly. The noble and learned Lord, in conclusion, acknowledged the many valuable communications on this subject which he had received since he introduced his Bill on this subject from magistrates and professional men throughout the country, and particularly from the Society of Justices' Clerks. He had given his most careful consideration to their suggestions, which would, of course, be submitted to the Committee, who would no doubt give due regard to them.

Lord CAMPBELL said, as he was about to go upon circuit for the purpose of administering justice in the provinces, he could not help saying that he should feel great satisfaction in stating to the grand juries and magistrates whom he should have the honour to address, that such a measure was before their Lordships with a prospect of becoming law. Their Lordships could hardly form an idea of the anxiety which prevailed on the subject to which this Bill related. He had remonstrated with magistrates for not holding sessions more than four times a year. The reply was that they were not bound to meet oftener, and that their reason for not meeting more frequently than they did in private was that they wished an evil of such magnitude to work its own cure. It was deeply to be regretted that in the middle of the nineteenth century such an evil should prevail. When he visited Scotland he witnessed a very different system. There the sheriff and his deputy tried all cases with great expedition, and there was no cause of complaint. It was absurd to make such a distinction as was made between trespass and felony. If a man went with a waggon to a field, and cut down and carried away a load of wheat, that would be only trespass, and the case would come before quarter sessions; but if he stole a single sheep, his offence would be felony, and he must then be tried at the assizes. He was exceedingly glad to find that this measure was received with approbation in that House, believing, as he did, that it would prove very beneficial to the community. He thought there should be no forfeiture of goods in cases of summary conviction. He could not sit down without bearing his testimony in favour of the unpaid magistrates. In his opinion they administered justice in petty sessions most purely, and much to the benefit of the public. Formerly the squire sat in his hall, having his gamekeeper for his clerk, and in that position he convicted the poacher. That was a proceeding *in familiâ*, not *in curiâ*.

Lord St. LEONARDS felt some alarm at the power which would be given to magistrates by this Bill of punishing persons who might plead guilty to the commission of comparatively trivial offences by imprisonment with hard labour for the period of two years. He certainly considered that so severe a punishment ought not to be inflicted without affording prisoners the opportunity of trial by a jury. The Bill proposed to give to magistrates at petty sessions a jurisdiction which, it was said, had been greatly abused by many magistrates at quarter sessions. The quarter sessions were constituted by a general collection of the magistrates who sat in petty sessions, and if these magistrates were not to be trusted at quarter sessions, where they transacted business under the eye, as it were, of the whole county, how were they to be trusted when, divided into small sections, they sat in petty sessions, although in open court? He thought they should be careful in committing such extensive powers to magistrates in petty sessions, where there was not the same advantage of publicity as at quarter sessions. He did not mean to oppose the Bill, but he thought the objections which had been suggested ought to be carefully considered.

Lord BROUGHAM, referring to what had fallen from another noble and learned Lord with reference to the Scotch system, remarked that the sheriff and his deputy in that country had the advantage of being assisted by a public prosecutor, an officer whom he hoped we should before long have in England.

The Earl of DESART said, that while sitting as a magistrate in Ireland he had often felt the greatest difficulty in sending men for trial at the quarter sessions or assizes for trivial offences, such as stealing turnips and the like; and he, therefore, hoped that the operation of this measure would be extended to Ireland instead of being, as now proposed, confined simply to England.

The LORD CHANCELLOR having briefly replied,

Motion *agreed to;* Bill read 2^a accordingly; and *committed* to a Committee of the whole House accordingly.

House adjourned till To-morrow.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Monday, February 26, 1855.

Minutes.] New Writs.—For Montrose, *v.* Joseph Hume, Esq., deceased; for London, *v.* Right Hon. Lord John Russell, Secretary of State; for Halifax, *v.* Right Hon. Sir Charles Wood, baronet, First Lord of the Admiralty; for New Radnor, *v.* Sir George Cornewall Lewis, baronet, Chancellor of the Exchequer; for Forfarshire, *v.* Viscount Duncan, Lord of the Treasury.

Public Bills.—2° Militia (Ireland); Commons Inclosure.

Reported.—Consolidated Fund (£3,300,000); Consolidated Fund (£20,000,000).

NEW WRIT—MR. HUME.

Viscount PALMERSTON: I rise to move that Mr. Speaker do issue his warrant to the Clerk of the Crown directing a new writ to issue for the election of a Commissioner to serve in the present Parliament for the Montrose district of Burghs, in the room of the late Joseph Hume, Esq., deceased. Sir, I cannot in doing this simply confine myself to the words of the Motion. I am confident that I should not be doing justice to the feelings of the House if I were not to express my feelings of regret, which are shared, I am sure, by all who hear me, and my feelings of respect for the colleague, for the Member whose loss we are now going to replace. Sir, it was said of an eminent man who lived in former times—"That he gave to party what he owed to his country." Now, the very reverse of this must be said of our late colleague, Mr. Hume, for the party to which he devoted the labours of his life was his country, and beyond his country the general interests of mankind at large. Many men, Sir, have gained for themselves eminent positions in this House, by availing themselves of the assistance of a faithful band of friends, whose object was to acquire political power for the purpose of governing their country. Mr. Hume was a remarkable exception of a man who gained for himself an eminent position not only in this House, and in the estimation of the country, but who succeeded in establishing for himself a name, not only European, but of still wider range—by exertions disinterested as far as he himself was concerned, and equally distinct from any attempt to acquire, either by his own exertions, or by those of his friends, political power in this country. Sir, he was a man of whom it has been said, that he took the lead in almost every branch of improvement, and in every measure of improvement which has of late years been carried into practical operation. He possessed an industry which nothing could tire or overcome. His acquirements spread over the whole range of those matters which concerned the interest of his country, and the general welfare of the community at large. But Mr. Hume had still another claim on the grateful recollection of this House. He possessed great perseverance, and it is only due to him to say, that in the whole course of his pursuits and attempts to carry out his own opinions, he frequently had many opposed to him, and he was frequently exposed to those party conflicts which are the necessary obstacles in the way of any man who wishes to enforce his opinions in this House; but nothing ever passed between him and those most opposed to him which at any time left one trace of resentment, one particle of bitterness, in his mind. I remember it to have been said of a person who held a high position in this House, that whatever acrimony might have been created in party conflict, that feeling never went beyond the doors of the House. I am certain I may say of our late Friend (Mr. Hume), that any feeling which had been excited by party conflict never went so far even as to the doors. Sir, a man of greater industry, a man who devoted the whole labours of his life more entirely to what he considered good and serviceable to his country, never sat within these walls; and I am persuaded even those who most differed with him in opinion on matters which he felt it his duty to bring before the House, and to recommend to the adoption of Parliament, must do him the justice to admit that he acted from the purest motives and a sincere desire to advance the welfare of his country. Those who differed with him must do this justice to his character; and we must all of us admit that a man possessing his ability, his habits of industry, and his disinterested character must, at all times, be a great loss to this House. He was a peculiarity belonging to the age in which he lived. He had party feelings—that is, he was associated with those who agreed with him in politics; but his party feelings were totally independent of any question of political ascendancy. He never regarded anything but what he considered was for the good of his country when success rewarded his achievements, and when he failed he never relaxed an effort, but still continued the career of his public duty. In conclusion, he was a man on whom we must all look back with admiration and regret, and no man feels more sincerely than I do the cause which has led me to make the Motion which it is my duty to bring forward.

Sir JOSHUA WALMSLEY: Privileged, Sir, to enjoy for many years the confidence and friendship of the late lamented Member, I may, perhaps, be permitted to add one sentence to the well-deserved tribute which the noble Viscount at the head of Her Majesty's Government has paid to the memory of our departed friend. It may be justly said, that his unostentatious labours for the public good were only excelled by his private worth. Even in the arena of political strife, he never either made an enemy or lost a friend. And I would indulge the hope that the representatives of a grateful people will not suffer services at once so eminent and disinterested to pass away without some memorial worthy of them and of the country.

Mr. BROTHERTON said, he wished to be permitted to pay a humble tribute of respect to the memory of Mr. Hume. He had been for twenty-one years a witness of his labours, and he never saw a man less actuated by feelings of party than Mr. Hume, or who had more claims to the respect and veneration of the country. If ever there was a honest Member of Parliament, Mr. Hume was one.

Motion *agreed to.*

MINISTERIAL ARRANGEMENTS.

Mr. HAYTER said, he had now to move for a new writ for a citizen to represent the City of London in the present Parliament, in the room of John Russell, Esq., commonly called Lord John Russell, who had accepted the office of one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State.

Sir JOHN PAKINGTON: Sir, in consequence of the Motion just made, I wish to avail myself of the opportunity of putting a question to the noble Lord at the head of the Government. It has just been stated that Lord John Russell has accepted the office of one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State. The question I wish to put to the noble Lord is, whether the office which Lord John Russell has accepted is that of Secretary of State for the Colonial Department? If the noble Lord has accepted that office, I wish to ask from the noble Lord whether Lord John Russell is not about to proceed on his mission to Vienna, and, if he is about to proceed there, when it may be expected that he will return? I should be glad to know also whether there is at present any Under-Secretary of State for the Colonial Department, and also whether, in the event of the noble Lord proceeding to Vienna on the mission which he has accepted, by whom the duties of Secretary of State for the Colonies will be transacted in the absence of the noble Lord? I may venture to say that, from the limited experience I have had of the duties of that office, there can be nothing more seriously inconvenient to the transaction of public business than to have any protracted absence on the part of the Minister who holds the Seals for the Colonies. There are several colonial questions of great interest pending. I have had an interview with a gentleman who lately held a high position in the colony of Victoria, who has, at great inconvenience, left his family in a distant part of England, and who is now waiting in London to give the benefit of his advice in settling the new constitution of the colony of Victoria. I am also aware that there is also in London another gentleman of great eminence belonging to New South Wales, who has left his family on the continent, and who is now in London, to give his assistance in pressing forward the constitution of New South Wales. Under these circumstances, I feel justified in putting a question on this subject, and I hope, if it be true that Lord John Russell is about to be intrusted with the Seals of the Colonial Department, we shall hear that the noble Lord will very shortly return to England to prevent that extreme public inconvenience which must result from his protracted absence.

Mr. ROEBUCK: Sir, before the noble Lord answers that question, I beg to state that I have been in communication with a gentleman who is here as a delegate from Newfoundland. He has already waited upon three separate Colonial Ministers. If Lord John Russell be appointed, and he attends on him, that will make the fourth. Now, as that gentleman is in this country seeking, on the part of the House of Assembly of Newfoundland, the removal of the Governor—nothing less—I think it will be seen that the question of the right hon. Baronet is of great importance.

Viscount PALMERSTON: Sir, Lord John Russell has accepted the office of one of Her Majesty's principal Secretaries of State. The department which he will undertake will be the Colonial Department. He proceeds, nevertheless, on his mission to Vienna, and, in the meanwhile, my right hon. Friend who lately held that office (Sir G. Grey) will undertake to be answerable that no public inconvenience arises from the temporary absence of my noble Friend. There is, as the right hon. Baronet well knows, a permanent Under-Secretary and a permanent Assistant Under Secretary. The political Under Secretary is not yet named, but he will be appointed in a very short time. It is impossible for me to state the precise period when my noble Friend will return, but I have no reason for supposing, whichever way the negotiation terminates, that my noble Friend's absence will be so protracted as the right hon. Baronet appears to anticipate.

Motion *agreed to.*

INVALIDS FROM THE CRIMEA—QUESTION.

Colonel HARCOURT said, he begged to ask the Under Secretary for War whether any of the offers said to have been made to the Government by the London or other hospitals to receive a certain number of the sick and wounded, who had come home from the Crimea, had been accepted; or whether the Government had themselves provided the necessary accommodation, and whether they had made, or were making, arrangements for the fit reception and treatment of those who might hereafter arrive from that quarter?

Mr. FREDERICK PEEL said, the authorities of the hospitals had been informed that the Government would be very glad to avail themselves of their offers, should they have occasion to do so; but the Government were making ample provision for the reception of the sick and wounded soldiers in military hospitals, and at the present moment there was accommodation for no less than 1,600 sick men on their arrival from the East.

MILITARY SURGERY PROFESSORSHIPS—QUESTION.

Mr. GROGAN said, he would now beg to ask the Under Secretary of War—the Parliament having voted a sum of 400*l.* in the last Session for the establishment of Regius Professorships of Military Surgery in London, Dublin, and Edinburgh, what steps had been taken for the establishment of such professorships in London and Dublin, and when we might expect that such professors would be appointed?

Mr. FREDERICK PEEL said, there having already existed a Regius Professorship of Military Surgery in Edinburgh, it was proposed that the plan should be extended to London and Dublin. A Vote was taken last year, and would be renewed this year. A proposal had been made for assimilating the system adopted in the different colleges. He was not aware that it had been yet arranged, but he saw no reason why there should be any further delay, and therefore it was proposed that the matter should be disposed of as soon as possible.

THE CLOTHING OF THE CRIMEAN ARMY—QUESTION.

Mr. NEWDEGATE said, he would be glad to know whether clothing for the troops in the Crimea, suited for the spring and summer months, was being prepared, and whether the winter clothing had been supplied generally to our soldiers now on service in that part of the world?

Mr. FREDERICK PEEL replied, that a second suit of clothes, which, under the ordinary regulations would have been furnished at the commencement of the financial year, namely, in April next, had already been issued. Every soldier now serving in the Crimea had received his second suit during the current financial year. With regard to the issue of the warm-weather clothing, perhaps the hon. Gentleman would be satisfied with his (Mr. Peel's) assurance that every provision would henceforth be made by the Government for clothing the troops in a manner suited to the season.

Colonel KNOX: Who is now responsible for the clothing of the army?

Mr. FREDERICK PEEL: The Government.

Colonel KNOX: But what department of the Government?

Mr. FREDERICK PEEL: The War Office.

THE CASE OF SERGEANT SULLIVAN.

On the order of the day for going into Committee of Supply,

Mr. FRENCH said, that having on a former occasion put a question to the noble Lord at the head of Her Majesty's Government, and not having been able to obtain a satisfactory answer, he now availed himself of the opportunity which the present motion offered him to repeat that question. It might be in the recollection of hon. Members that, on the noble Lord taking his seat after his election for Tiverton, he (Mr. French) felt it his duty to ask whether there was any reason why Sergeant Sullivan, who had carried the colours of his regiment and had signalised himself by great bravery in battle, and had been honourably noticed by the general of his division, should not have been promoted, and the House would, perhaps, equally bear in mind that the reply he received from the noble Lord was, that general authority had been given to the Commander in Chief of the army in the Crimea to promote one non-commissioned officer in each regiment; that another non-commissioned officer, belonging to the regiment in which Sergeant Sullivan served, had been recommended for promotion by the colonel of the regiment, and his appointment had been sanctioned by Lord Raglan. He must confess he heard that reply of the noble Lord with great surprise, and he certainly did not think it at all justified a feeling of confidence in the future administration of the noble Lord. The passing of the Alma, the glorious charge at Balaklava, and the desperate strife at Inkerman, were all achievements essentially of the rank and file of the army. When, therefore, such signal courage as that displayed by Sergeant Sullivan was passed over without one mark of recognition, it, in his opinion, was a circumstance calculated to check, if it had not already checked, the voluntary spirit of enlistment on the part of the people in the service of Her Majesty more than all the terrors that the present disastrous state of things in the Crimea could effect. The noble Lord could not for a moment suppose that there was any man, either in that House or throughout the country, who would suffer a system to be continued which rewarded staff officers, almost indiscriminately, for what was called "distinguished services," while it suffered such gallant but friendless soldiers as Sullivan to be wholly neglected and passed by. He would ask the noble Lord to reflect how our gallant ally acted under similar circumstances. If a French soldier had displayed the same heroic courage as Sergeant Sullivan had done he would have had his services acknowledged on the field of battle. Had Napoleon acted upon the system which England was pursuing, France would not now have to boast of the proud array of marshals which its military annals displayed. There would have been no Bernadotte. Nay, if Napoleon himself had been passed over at Toulon under such a system as that supported by the noble Lord, he, in all probability, would have died a subaltern of artillery. The attention of the public in Ireland had been drawn to this case by the leading journals. The *Evening Mail*, in a very able article, states—

> "Had it been even necessary to make a post of distinction, in order to reward Sergeant Sullivan's bravery, a wise Government would not have hesitated an instant about it, especially at the commencement of a war, on which so much depends evidently upon the courage and intelligence of the 'rank and file,' and of which—according to illustrious authority—all the glory up to this moment pertains to the soldiery. If it be true, as we believe it is, that Sergeant Sullivan was mainly instrumental in saving the Second Division from a like calamity to that which nearly overwhelmed the whole army in a few days afterwards, he should have been promoted on the field of battle. Napoleon Bonaparte would have made such a man a captain before he returned even to his tent. General Canrobert made a chef d'escadron of the officer wounded in defence of their advanced battery before he was borne from the spot where he fell. It is discouraging to find Lord Palmerston, from whose masculine understanding, if not from his appreciation of worth and good service, better things might be expected, standing up to defend so perverse a denial of justice. What if Sullivan's Colonel did recommend another man for an ensigncy, and Lord Raglan approved the nomination, was that a fair reason why his signal merit, proclaimed by the general of division, should not have received a special reward from the fountain head and source of honour at the Horse Guards? It is quite excusable in the man's immediate commanding officer to leave him to the highest authority for the palm he had so nobly earned; it might have seemed like throwing away favours, designed for the other non-commissioned officers of his corps, to accumulate it on one already marked in the public and glorious records of the whole army for advancement. It is not a red tape fact that Sergeant Sullivan has had 'no recommendation.' His recommendation is extant in the *Gazette*, where his name stands recorded, and remains to shame those who allege so pitiful a pretence for passing him over."

He (Mr. French) felt that he would be fully justified in objecting to go into Committee to vote money for a service where the gallantry of the soldier was overlooked and unrewarded, and the recommendations of the generals of divisions treated with contempt, but he should content himself by asking the noble Lord, was Sergeant Sullivan to have his commission or not? In the latter case, if the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster (Sir de Lacy Evans) did not move an Address to the Crown, he (Mr. French) should. He also wished to inquire whether the attention of the Commander in Chief had been called to the alleged misconduct of the officer in charge of the stores at Balaklava, in refusing to supply some stoves to one of the vessels on the requisition of the surgeon who stated that they were essential for the health of the men, and that the death of some of those on board had been accelerated by cold? He found it stated by the *Times* correspondent in the Crimea that the *Charity*, a screw steamer, was in the harbour of Balaklava, for the reception of the sick and wounded under the charge of a British medical officer; that this gentleman applied to the person in charge of the stores sent out by Government for the use of the army for three or four stoves, stating that several of those under his charge had died from disorders brought on by the cold, and that unless he got the stoves many more of his patients must experience a similar fate; that he was refused them unless a requisition was sent to Lord Raglan to head quarters, and returned properly signed. The medical man explained that the men would in the meantime perish; the reply was, "I cannot help it, I must have the requisition;" and that he even refused to lend the stoves on an undertaking to return them. He (Mr. French) wished to know from the noble Lord was this same officer still in charge of the stoves at Balaklava, and had any communication been made to Lord Raglan on this subject?

SIR JOHN WALSH said, that before the noble Lord answered the question, he wished to make an observation, in consequence of an expression which had fallen from the hon. Gentleman. The hon. Gentleman had stated that the battles in the Crimea, which had reflected so much glory upon British arms, had been won by the rank and file of the British army. Now if he meant by that, that the British soldier was the most gallant, and in all respects the best material for a soldier in the world, he (Sir J. Walsh) fully agreed with him, and in that sense acknowledged that it was to the rank and file—to the valour of the British soldier—these victories were owing; but if he meant to place the soldier in a position distinct from the officer, and to say that it was owing to the soldiers and not to the officers who commanded them, then the hon. Gentleman stated that which was not only not precisely in accordance with the actual circumstances which occurred, but which was absolutely impossible to be the fact. They never found yet soldiers fight well unless they were well commanded; and, with regard to the English officers serving in the Crimea, he believed they had shown as much or more valour in the engagements which the hon. Gentleman had mentioned than had ever been exhibited by any similar class of men in any army in the world. In the cavalry charge at Balaklava there were more officers, in proportion to the men, than was usually the case, and more casualties amongst them in proportion than generally happened under similar circumstances, in consequence of the regiments having been at the time little more than skeletons of regiments, not filled up to their full complement.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON said, the battles in question were won by the rank and file in the manner explained by the hon. Baronet—namely, that the dogged valour and sturdy courage of the troops were necessarily the main element of those victories, but the great number of casualties among the officers was a convincing proof that they had done their duty as well as the men, the number of officers killed and wounded on the field being quite as great in proportion as that of the men. With regard to the question that had been put to him respecting Sergeant Sullivan, he could only state what he had explained before, namely, that in the troops under his command, Lord Raglan had authority to promote one non-commissioned officer in each regiment for distinguished conduct in the field, but of course it was left to the officer in command of the regiment to select the non-commissioned officer who was to be promoted; and, whatever might have been the distinguished bravery of Sergeant Sullivan, for aught they knew to the contrary, the non-commissioned officer who was recommended in that regiment for promotion, had as good if not a better claim than Sergeant Sullivan. It was quite impossible that the Government could enter into an inquiry of the different claims of men who had distinguished themselves in the eyes of their officers, that must be done by those who commanded them. With respect to the second question, he believed that the attention of the officer in question had been called to the statement which had been made respecting his refusal to lend the stoves. More than that he could not say.

MR. WHITESIDE said, he considered the answer of the noble Lord with respect to Sergeant Sullivan perfectly satisfactory, but he considered that the rule which had been laid down, that one commission only should be given amongst the non-commissioned officers in each regiment was unsatisfactory, and ought not to be put forward against the claims of a man who had distinguished himself in the way that Sergeant Sullivan had done.

MR. H. HERBERT said, he wished to take an opportunity of correcting a misapprehension which had arisen out of a question which he had put to the Government a few days ago respecting the clothing of the militia in his district. He had stated on that occasion that some of the men had been compelled to mount sentry without greatcoats, and his observations had been construed into a reflection upon the general of the district. He was sorry that such misapprehension should have arisen, for as soon as that officer was informed of the real state of the case he sent a supply, a limited one certainly, being all he could spare, but which was sufficient for the use of the sentries, nor was he accountable for any delay in the supply of those necessary articles of clothing.

THE WAR AND ADMIRALTY DEPARTMENTS.

Mr. LINDSAY said, he could not, when they were called upon to go into Committee of Supply to vote money for carrying on the war, avoid making a few remarks upon the subject of these estimates, and to protest against granting these large sums for the army while the present defective system was continued. If the House would permit him, he would endeavour to explain the system which prevailed in France, which he had had an opportunity of observing while there a few days ago. When he was in Paris he had the honour of an interview of the French Minister at War. He found him a plain man, easily accessible, and when he called upon him in the midst of the business of his office—which business he appeared thoroughly to understand—on one side of his room there was a map of Europe hung up, upon which were a number of patches of blue, white, red, green, and other colours. He (Mr. Lindsay) inquired what these meant. The reply of the Minister was that they represented the different armies of Europe. One colour represented the French, another the English, a third the Austrian, a fourth the Russian, a fifth the Turkish, and so on; and the positions in which they stood upon the map, pointed out their respective stations. Every morning, the Minister added, these coloured patches are removed by means of a pin from one place to another, according as I receive advices from abroad as to any movement made by either of the armies. He (Mr. Lindsay) then asked whether the Government had information as to the quantity of stores at the different depôts in connection with the Crimean army? The Minister at once replied by informing him of the quantity at Marseilles, at Constantinople, at the Crimea, and the amount which was being sent to Sinope. He thought it somewhat extraordinary that this French Minister of War should know everything, and be able to answer at once upon all these matters of detail connected with his department; while if he asked a similar question of any Minister here no information could be obtained, for no one appeared to know anything about the matter, and consequently he could not avoid expressing some anxiety with respect to the system by which such results were produced. That system he found to be exceedingly simple. Under the Minister of War for France it appeared there were five directors—one of transports, one of infantry, one of cavalry, one of Commissariat, and one of a department which at that moment he did not recollect. Subordinate to these five directors there were twenty to twenty-five different heads of districts, who were spread throughout the whole of France. Every day and every mail brought from these twenty to twenty-five persons communications as to the state of the stores, the transports, the state and position of the army, and of everything connected with it as far as it came under their cognisance, and the particulars of any change that might occur from time to time. The five directors having received the reports from their subordinates summed them up, and communicated the result to the Minister of War daily, by whom a condensed account was prepared and entered in a small book, to which he referred when he (Mr. Lindsay) asked him for information upon any point. Now this was an exceedingly simple system, and if it worked well with an army of 750,000 men, he could see no reason why it should not work equally well with a much smaller army like our own. He had been impressed with feelings of shame in allowing such vast sums as had already been voted for carrying on our military establishments to pass without protesting against that confusion which all admitted to exist in reference to them. Now, he would ask, why was there that confusion? He might, perhaps, be told it was want of time. Now, he must deny that, for it was not want of time, it was procrastination, that thief of time, that was the cause of all the evil. The hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) the other night had been somewhat misunderstood when he said the knife ought to be applied. The hon. Member never meant to apply the knife to our glorious institutions, but to the cutting away of that stupid red-tapism by which our whole governmental system was incumbered, and by which the business of every department was incumbered by innumerable, useless, and unnecessary forms. He wished, before sitting down, to say one word as to the transport service, with which he was more intimately acquainted, the more so as he was not in the House the other night when the right hon. Baronet, late at the head of the Admiralty (Sir J. Graham), asked for and obtained a Vote of 7,000,000*l.* for that service. He wished to direct attention to a return delivered on Saturday last of the number of transports now employed. He, a few months ago, moved for returns more in detail, including the names of the transports, the price paid for them, the quantity of stores sent to the army in the East by means of the transports, and the amount each vessel had taken. That return he was surprised to find had not yet been laid upon the table; but, looking at the Return they had, he found that no less than 220,000 tons of shipping now engaged as regular transports were required to supply an army reduced at the present time to 25,000 men. But that was not all, for since the date of that Return 30,000 tons more had been engaged, making 250,000 tons of regular transports, besides about 100,000 tons of other vessels engaged in carrying stores, making a total of 350,000 tons to serve the remnant of an army of 25,000 men. With 350,000 tons of shipping he, or any other man of business, would undertake to provide transport not only for our army, but for the whole of the French army now in the Crimea also, and to convey all the stores required. Of course he did not mean to say that this could be done by the system—or rather the no-system—now resorted to; but by employing the ships in lines, and keeping them regularly employed, instead of leaving some of the steamers of the largest power, and hired at a vast expense, to be used as hospital ships, besides others that were waiting in the Black Sea, doing nothing. These were matters the House ought to look to when they were called upon to vote 7,000,000*l.* for the transport service. The right hon. Baronet the late First Lord of the Admiralty had admitted that there was something wrong in the transport system, and had stated that a remedy was to be applied. But how did the Admiralty propose to remedy the evil? By appointing a Transport Board. That was merely transferring the responsibility from one man's shoulders to those of a number of men. When they had one man responsible they knew whom to look to, but when the duty was transferred to a Board there was practically no responsibility. He therefore protested against this project of entrusting the management of the transport service to a Board, and hoped the responsibility would yet be placed in the hands of one efficient person. They need not go far to look for such a man—they had one already at the Admiralty, in the person of Captain Milne, who he hoped, in any promotion that might take place in that department, would be appointed to such service. It might be said that the sum granted for this particular service was too large to be placed under the control of any one man; but without going into that question, he might observe that, if Captain Milne was appointed, he would be under the check both of the Minister at War and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. [Mr. GLADSTONE: The Chancellor of the Exchequer has nothing to do with it.] The right hon. Gentleman the late Chancellor of the Exchequer says the Chancellor of the Exchequer has nothing to do with that money, but he thought, when a Bill for 7,000,000*l.* was placed before him to pay, the Chancellor of the Exchequer ought to have very much to do with it. He ought to know what it was for, and how the money was to be expended. He would just mention to the House that one company, the West India Mail Company, had no less than 17,000 tons of their ships employed as transports, for the use of which he calculated they were receiving at the rate of 600,000*l.* per annum. That was an extraordinary sum, but he did not complain of it, nor did he say the company was not entitled to it; but, then again, the same company, for the use of the same vessels, were receiving from another department of the Government no less than 240,000*l.* a year for postal services. He did not mean to say that the company were not doing their work efficiently, though he could hardly understand how they could do the work well while a large proportion of the ships were engaged by the Government in another service. The country, he believed, would never grudge any amount which might be necessary for carrying on the war, but they wanted to see the money properly applied; and, for one, he did not think it was properly applied, especially in the transport service. Before sitting down, he hoped he might be permitted to make a remark upon something which had fallen from the hon. Member for Aylesbury on a former evening. That hon. Gentleman had been accused of wishing to sever the aristocracy and the people. As one of the mass, essentially one of the people, he

(Mr. Lindsay) never desired to see the day when any Member of that House, or any one out of doors, should wish to sever the connection between the aristocracy and the people. As one of the people, he felt proud of the aristocracy. He was proud of them when he compared them now with what they were formerly, and also when he compared them with the aristocracy of other countries; and if he saw any attempt to separate them from the people, he would be the first to lift up his hand against it. The people did not complain of the aristocracy, nor did they care whether a scion of the house of Bedford or the child of some unknown man held the reins of Government. All they required was that the destinies of this country should be intrusted to men of ability and energy, who would carry us through the fearful crisis in which the country now was.

Mr. ALCOCK said, he was of opinion that our worst foe in the Crimea had been our own mismanagement. Here was a country, occupying more than one-seventh of the entire world, with a frontier of 25,000 miles, with an army called in a general way 1,000,000 strong, and now likely to be augmented to 8,000,000 or 10,000,000; and yet we had attacked that enormous empire at only one single point upon the whole of its vast frontier. What had we done in this contest with Russia? In the north we had done nothing from which one particle of benefit could be derived. Nothing had been done in Poland, in Sweden, or even in Austria, and not a single practical benefit had yet been obtained from one of those countries. Sardinia certainly had come gallantly forward, and shown her spirit of independence, and he hoped by her conduct she would gain the position she deserved in the scale of nations. Then, what had been done with regard to Asia? No assistance had been given there to assist the tribes fighting for their own independence. The fortress of Anapa, on the Sea of Azoff, was still in the hands of Russia, and had not even been attacked; and although England and France boasted of their ascendancy in the Black Sea, it was not true that they had such an ascendancy until Anapa was in their hands. Georgia was also in a state of paralysis, because nothing had been done to assist her. How was the case as regarded Persia? Our Minister, Mr. Murray was certainly now on his way thither, but for nearly two years we had had no Envoy there. During that time Prince Dolgorouki had insulted the Persian Minister because he would not come into his views with regard to England. We had lost a great opportunity then, for if we had had an able Minister there we might have advanced the interests of England in Persia; but that was neglected, as we had no Envoy there. Persia was of more consequence than seemed to be generally thought; for it should be remembered that it was Persia which, at the instigation of Russia, stirred up the Affghanistan war.

Mr. BAILLIE said, he wished, before Mr. Speaker left the Chair, to ask for one or two explanations, which he thought to be due from the Government to the House. The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for the War Department would recollect that upon a previous evening he (Mr. Baillie) had asked him some questions respecting the new establishment which was to be attached to the army—the land transport service—which appeared to be established upon a very large scale, and with regard to which at that time the hon. Gentleman was not able to give any details to the House. The hon. Gentleman stated, indeed, that it was to consist of not less than 8,000 men; but he was unable to state the number of horses, nor did he say whether it was to be a permanent branch of the army, or only to be attached for this special service in the Crimea. Upon a former occasion, the right hon. Gentleman the late Secretary at War (Mr. S. Herbert) had expressed his opinion that many of the disasters and misfortunes which had attended our arms in the East had been occasioned by the failure or imperfection of our military establishment, and he had drawn a very graphic picture of the state and condition of the English army, which he observed was no army at all, but nothing better than merely a collection of regiments; he had said that the superior officers were unacquainted with their duties; that there was no staff corps attached to the army; that there was no waggon-train attached to it; that there was no commissariat department; and, perhaps, he might have added, that there was no medical department, for that branch appeared to be as defective as any other of the establishments. That was a very melancholy picture of the state of the English army; but it was an extraordinary one to emanate from the Secretary at War. It appeared never to have occurred to the right hon. Gentleman that it might be his duty to represent this state of things to his colleagues, and to warn them before they sent out an expedition so imperfectly prepared for the invasion of Russia. They had received in due time ample warning of the consequences of their adoption of such a course, and upon that very question of the land transport service they had received advice from the most competent military authorities, but that advice they had wholly disregarded. He believed they had neglected to consult the Commander in Chief with respect to the management of the expedition, and, as far as he could learn, it would seem that that noble Lord had not even seen Lord Raglan's private dispatches. It was a matter well worthy of the consideration of the House whether they ought to appoint a civilian as Minister of War without a council of military men to advise him, or whether they ought not rather to follow in that case the precedent which they found at the Admiralty, where the head of the department was assisted by a council of the most distinguished naval officers who could afford him information on all the necessary details of the service. At present it was not any part of the business of the Commander in Chief to give advice to the War Minister, and he could not reasonably be expected to give any, because if his advice were proved to be bad he would have to bear the blame of it; and if it should turn out to be good he would get no credit for having tendered it. He also wished to know who was answerable for the proper clothing of the troops? It had been stated that our army had been left to winter on the heights of Sebastopol without any winter clothing; and if that were true, could they be surprised that our soldiers had perished, not in tens, but in hundreds a day, and that one regiment was reported to have lost half its numbers in a space of not more than ten days? The Government declared that they were answerable for the conduct of the war. But he wanted to know who was specially responsible for the management of the different military departments? They had been told that there had not been any proper supply of medicine in the hospital at Balaklava; and if that statement were correct he wished to ask the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for the War Department who was answerable for that deficiency?

MR. G. DUNDAS said, he rejoiced that the subject of the mismanagement of the transport service had been brought before the House by the hon. Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Lindsay), but, at the same time, he regretted that the hon. Gentleman had not stated some particular instances of that mismanagement. He had heard the statement of the hon. and gallant Admiral the Member for Gloucester, the other night, that there was little to reform in the transport service, with unfeigned astonishment, and the inquiries he had since made had satisfied him that the hon. and gallant Admiral's assertion could not be substantiated. He did not blame the department to which the hon. and gallant Admiral belonged, but he blamed the system, by which a department was managed by a number of people so that no single individual was responsible for anything that was done. He would state to the House the case of the steamer *Eagle*. A short time ago that steamer was taken up by the Government to convey stores to the East, consisting partly of a quantity of medicines, among which were some strong acids. It was thought advisable that these acids should be placed on the deck, above the other stores, and orders were accordingly issued for the rest of the cargo to be put on board, and for the steamer to proceed down the river to take in the acids. But when the steamer arrived at the place where she was to receive the acids, and they were brought on board, some one said, "Why, there is a large quantity of the same acids already in the hold." This was actually found to be the case, and the whole cargo had to be discharged before the steamer could proceed to her destination. Then the Government had taken up a vessel on account of which they had paid the sum of 2,000*l*. to the owner before she went to sea. Another case was that of the steamer *Telegraph*, said to be a very fast vessel. She sailed from Portsmouth, so heavily laden with stores, that some of the pipes of her machinery burst, and her hold was flooded; while at the same time she could only carry three days' supply of coal. None of those misfortunes to which he had referred would, in his opinion, have taken place if the care of the transport service had been confided to one man, on whom the responsibility would rest of seeing that the proper thing was done at the proper time. He did not wish to throw the slightest obloquy on the gallant officer who had been referred to by the hon. Member for Tynemouth, but he would press upon the noble Lord at the head of the Government the necessity of employing the service of men of talent, energy, and business habits, and, if he did so, he would add even to the reputation which he already possessed.

ADMIRAL BERKELEY said, he should have thought that, after the explanation of his right hon. Friend the late First Lord of the Admiralty, the speech of the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down, and that of the hon. Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Lindsay), would have been unnecessary. It had been inferred that the whole amount of tonnage employed by the Government had been employed for the service of 25,000 men, but to that he was prepared to give a direct contradiction. The tonnage employed by the Government had not been employed solely in the service of the English army, but in the service of the French and Turkish as well, and, instead of their being employed in the service of 25,000 men, they were employed in the service of almost 100,000. Those two hon. Members had praised the management of Captain Milne; but, at the same time, both appeared to him to complain of there having been egregious blunders. Now, he could only say that he was ready to share the responsibility of any error which had been committed by the Board of which he was a member.

MR. MUNTZ said, that about three or four years ago he was informed that a representation had been made to the Government regarding the improvements which had been effected in the staff of the French army, and, at the same time, it was stated that if it should ever be the bad fortune of this country to come into collision with France, although the bravery of our troops might prove successful in the outset, still, the more perfect organisation of the army of that country would enable it to overcome us in the end. He was informed that, in consequence of that statement, a Commission had been appointed to inquire into the circumstances of the case, and that, although the Report of that Commission had been laid before the Government, it had never yet been acted upon. He merely wished to state that, if the case which he had mentioned to the House were correct, there must be, in his opinion, great blame attached to some one.

MR. FREDERICK PEEL said, he was desirous of giving all the information in his power in answer to the questions of the hon. Member for Inverness-shire (Mr. Baillie). He did not know that he could add anything to the information he had already given with regard to the land transport corps. The principle on which that corps was established was the principle of the division of labour, of a proper superintendence and responsibility, so that care should be taken that everything should be done which was required for the service of the army in the field at the right time and in the right place. The land transport service had hitherto been under the control of the Commissariat; but as the duty of supplying provisions for the troops was fully sufficient to occupy the whole time of the head of that department, the land transport corps was established, and Colonel M'Murdo placed at its head, and that officer had already left England. He had previously stated, that when it was fully organised the corps would consist of 8,000 men, but of course the number was less now. Colonel M'Murdo's plan was to divide the force into divisions, one to be attached to each division of the army; and he had intimated that he should require one mounted native driver for each three mules or horses employed, and one European driver for every ten animals; so that there would be for every ten animals three native drivers and one European driver. Any improvements in the system which might be suggested would of course be adopted by Colonel M'Murdo, at the same time he might state that it was intended that this transport corps should form a permanent branch of the army. With regard to the clothing of the army, it was charged in the current financial year. Up to a late period the clothing was purchased and issued by the colonels of regiments; but those officers had now no pecuniary interest in the supply of clothing. Under the Votes agreed to for the present year, the clothing would be distributed under the direction of the War Office. That is, the War Office for the present year would use the agency of the colonels for contracting with the clothiers, but the bills would be sent in to the War Office, and paid there. Although the colonels had no longer a pecuniary interest in the issue of clothing, yet for the present year the soldier would have the advantage of the agency of those who had hitherto supplied them. With regard to the warm clothing issued to the troops in the field, that was issued by order of the Secretary of State for War, and the War Office had nothing to do with that extraordinary issue.

With regard to the supply of medicine to the hospital at Balaklava, he was not aware that there was any complaint of a deficiency there, and the question of the hon. Member for North Northamptonshire (Mr. A. Stafford) the other night applied to the hospital at Scutari. With regard to quinine, there was no foundation for the complaint that there was a deficiency in that medicine. Dr. Smith had informed him that since our army left this country there had been sent out to the general store at Constantinople, whence all the hospitals derived their supplies, 850lbs. of quinine, which was eight times the quantity which had been hitherto required by 60,000 men of the British army in a year, and there could not have been more than 200lbs. used yet, so that there was an excess of that particular medicine in question for the army. With regard to the remarks of the hon. Member for Birmingham, he could say that his suggestions had been anticipated, and a Commission was now sitting in Paris, comprising an artillery and engineer officer, to inquire into the system of the French army, and the French Government was affording it every facility. He hoped the Report would be ready before no great length of time.

Mr. MUNTZ said, he wished to explain that he had referred to the fact of no notice being taken of a Report made some time ago, but did not in the least mean to refer to what was being done at present.

Mr. EVELYN DENISON said, when the army went from this country to the East it was little contemplated that such services would be cast upon it as it had since been called on to perform. Some thought the army would never go beyond Malta, and others believed that an entrenched camp at Constantinople would be all that would be required; but no one then dreamed that an expedition to the Crimea would be undertaken. He had a remark to make upon one subject, which had an important bearing on the efficiency of the army—the employment of men of advanced years who were past the period of their vigour and strength. It was no reproach to a man that he was between sixty and seventy years of age, but rather it was greatly to his honour that, instead of seeking repose at such a time of life, he would devote the remnant of his strength to the service of his country; but the consequences were very much to be regretted, when an arduous and difficult task was imposed on such an officer. He hoped that those in military command, who were disqualified by age and infirmities, would be removed. He was happy to observe that a precedent for this had been made in the case of Sir John Burgoyne, an officer of high standing, who had been not recalled, but relieved from the position in which he was before placed, and on whom a high encomium had been at the same time bestowed. He hoped the Government would go further in the same course. He did not intend, directly or indirectly, to point at the distinguished officer in the chief command of the army; there was a different question involved in his case, but no doubt it would be of great advantage that the Commander in Chief of the army should be more in the prime of life. At any rate, all the generals of division and officers of brigade ought to be men in their full vigour. He considered this a matter of such extreme importance that he should be inclined to estimate the disposition of the Government by the degree in which they gave it their attention.

Colonel DUNNE said, that the Government were now about to form a transport corps, which undoubtedly was very necessary, but why, he would ask, was it not done when the army went out, instead of being left until the army was nearly exhausted? It was the Commissariat who were responsible for the transport, as well as for the provisioning of the army, and he believed that to the neglect of that department, not only abroad, but in the Treasury, where it was till lately administered, the losses of that army were chiefly to be attributed. In the Spanish war there were several departments established for the transport of the army, baggage, and reserve, and the minutest details were laid down by Sir George Murray, which might have taught the men who had to conduct the present war how to conduct it properly. But it was not until now, when we had lost one-half of the army, that they applied themselves to form a transport service. He felt confident, however, that under Colonel M'Murdo that transport service would be made complete as soon as could be anticipated. He did not believe the general officers deserved all the blame that was cast upon them. As for Sir John Burgoyne, there was not a more capable and efficient officer in Europe, and he did not think anything would be gained by exchanging him for General Jones, although this latter was also an excellent officer. He contended that the great fault of the expedition was its being undertaken without proper means. The commanders were forced to undertake operations for which their means were totally unfit; and although it might not be wise for the Committee to go minutely into these subjects, it would be found that there were difficulties pressing severely on the English forces, and that many excuses were to be made for our army which it would not be prudent to reveal. But he was sure the Committee would do much in bringing to light the total incapacity of the Administration at home. The French system of *état major* was no doubt superior to our own, but it was not applicable to our army; we might, however, select officers for the staff, from the senior department of the Military College at Sandhurst, where there were now fourteen officers of sufficient standing for such appointments, having served four years in some regimental rank, and having studied in order to qualify themselves for staff employment. He should like to know how many of them had been appointed to the staff; he knew that some of the most efficient had applied for such appointments, and had been rejected. The staff of our army in the Crimea had certainly not been the most distinguished part of the army, but it had been the best rewarded. If hon. Gentlemen would look at the distribution of rewards, as published in the *Gazette*, they would be surprised to see how large a proportion of those rewards came to the officers of the staff as compared with those of the line. Of the lieutenant coloneleies, given for distinguished services, two were given to officers of the staff out of seven altogether. Of the brevet rank of lieutenant colonel there were fourteen, the whole of which were given to the staff, with one exception. Of the brevet rank of major there were fifty-three who received it, of whom there were forty-one serving on the staff, and eleven in the cavalry or infantry of the line. Now that, certainly, was not a fair distribution of honours; and the staff was sufficiently desirable and advantageous in itself, without an unequal distribution of honours in its favour. This was not a new question, for he himself had given evidence upon it, four years ago, before the Committee upon promotion in the army; nothing, however, had since been done. Now, with respect to the clothing of the army: the system had been changed, and the War Office, instead of the colonels, made the contracts with clothiers, and a board of officers assembled to examine the quality of the clothing when it was sent down. That was an amazing improvement; but when it was a question, not of the quality of the clothes purchased, but of the sort of clothes that would be most convenient and fitting, then a clothing board, consisting of old officers, who might not have been in actual command for many years, was appointed to investigate, and that, he considered, was not the best authority; it would be better to assemble a board of lieutenant colonels, who were in active command of regiments, and had opportunities every day of seeing what was required. They would not have sent out such hideous and useless dresses as those which were provided. He must also refer to the delays which had occurred in deciding upon the length of the muskets for rifle regiments. Another subject to which he wished to call attention, was the want of barracks for the militia regiments in Ireland. At this time the Government were paying for billets in almost all the large towns of Ireland, and there were continual disputes between the inhabitants and the military authorities about it, and many people had been fined for not providing the accommodation required; whilst in those very towns there were buildings which could be hired much cheaper than the price of the billets. Unless the Government attended to this matter, considerable inconvenience would be caused.

MR. HARDINGE said, he wished to say one word with regard to what had fallen from his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Portarlington (Colonel Dunne). One of the charges which he brought against the Government, if he understood him rightly, was, that no officers from the senior department at Sandhurst had been appointed to the general staff of the army. Now, what was the case? No less than nine or ten officers from the senior department at Sandhurst had been appointed to the general staff. He would instance the names of the following officers in the Quartermaster General's Department:—Major Morris, who led the 17th Lancers at Balaklava; Captain Wetherall, Captain Sankey, and others, who had received certificates for high proficiency, and had taken honours at Sandhurst. He believed that the accommodation at the senior department of Sandhurst might be advantageously increased. At present only fifteen officers could be accommodated;

that number, he considered, ought to be augmented; but as so many charges had been brought against the Government which might be answered, and so many misrepresentations had occurred, he hoped the House would excuse him for merely stating what he happened to know to be matter of fact.

MR. J. G. PHILLIMORE said, he wished to ask how it was that the 46th Regiment was without clothing in the Crimea; whether any person had been punished for that neglect; and whether it was disputed that, in consequence of that neglect, the men had perished in a frightful way?

MR. W. WILLIAMS said, he wished to compare the number of men voted for the army in 1835, with the approbation of the Duke of Wellington, with the number voted in 1852, the year before this war broke out. The army and auxiliary forces had increased during that period to nearly double the number that was deemed necessary by the Duke of Wellington; the charges, consequently, ought not to be made, which had often been advanced against his late hon. Friend (Mr. Hume), that his frequent Motions for economy had tended too much to reduce the standing army. There was an increase of nearly 5,000,000*l.* in the cost of our military defences in 1852, as compared with the cost in 1835, and it was not, therefore, to Mr. Hume's Motions that the present inefficient state of the army was to be attributed. What was the amount of our army in 1792? The whole number of men in the army, navy, and artillery, in the year before the commencement of the French war was 48,927, besides 33,000 militia; and the whole cost of the army, navy, and ordnance in that year was only 4,760,000*l.* Now, let that be compared with 16,530,000*l.*, their cost in the year 1853, and it would not appear as if there had been any undue reduction. Mr. Pitt was charged at that time with having injured the public service by reducing the army; and he then said that if reductions had not been made since the American war, the country would not have been in a condition to go to work in the conduct of the French war with the energy it was called upon to display. He now wished to direct the attention of the House to the extraordinary cruelty in the case of the flogging of a soldier belonging to the 26th Regiment of the line at Newcastle, of which the following account was taken from a Newcastle paper—

> "The prisoner, after being stripped, was tied up to the triangles by the arms and legs, while the adjutant stood by, to count each stroke as it fell from the powerful arm of the drummer, selected from among the others for his aptitude in what is called slow time—a refinement of cruelty only known to the English army. I had expected a bloody scene, but the cruelty far exceeded all I had even dreamed of human torture. At the fifth stroke of the lash, the flesh rose up on the sufferer's back in welts almost as thick as my wrist, and the writhing of the body showed the agony he endured. As each successive lash fell on the lacerated and bleeding back, blood flowed about on all around him. After the fortieth lash had been inflicted, he was untied, but after staggering a few paces, fell fainting, when he was removed to the hospital, and placed under the medical officers. He has yet to receive the remainder of his punishment, 104 days of solitary confinement."

The editor of the Newcastle paper added—

> "In justice to the officers, we have heard it stated that they were averse to flogging in this case, but were overruled by a recently arrived high military authority, well known as a martinet."

Now, he (Mr. Williams) did say, that when it appeared that Omar Pacha had remonstrated with Lord Raglan, in some cases, for having allowed the flogging of a soldier in the Crimea, it was most disgraceful to us that the only soldiers in Europe, except the Russians, who were subject to be flogged were the soldiers of the British army. He did hope the Government would take up this matter. He believed that the practice of flogging operated strongly against persons entering our army; for who would like to become a soldier to be subject to such a punishment? And if scenes like that were often repeated, the Government might have to double the bounty, but they would not get men to join the army. Was it to be endured, he asked, that the British soldier, one of the bravest in the world, should be the only soldier, except the Russian, whose back was to be lacerated with a cat-o'-nine tails? No doubt there had been a great diminution in the cases of corporal punishment being inflicted; and he saw in the Army Estimates a charge of 21,000*l.* for military prisons. He did not at all complain of that charge, because he presumed that it was applied, to a great extent, to supersede the system of flogging. He saw with gratification that in a majority of the regiments no flogging had taken place; and he hoped that, when it was found so many of the regiments could do without it, it might soon be abolished altogether, for he was certain there were plenty of other punishments to be found, without one so degrading.

MAJOR REED said, he wished to know whether any reforms were intended to be made at the Horse Guards? He would not enter into details of the iniquities of that establishment, but he trusted the Government would turn their attention to it, as reform in that department was generally demanded by the country.

MR. OTWAY said, that with reference to the statement of the hon. Member for Downpatrick (Mr. Hardinge) concerning the staff appointments, he should like to know the date at which the nine officers who had been alluded to were appointed. But even if the fact were so, there had been fifty staff appointments made, and what he complained of was, that there should be one single officer appointed to the staff without such qualifications, so long as there were others serving in the army who had been instructed specially for that service in the senior department at Sandhurst. Those who had gone through the prescribed studies, with the understanding that they were to have staff appointments, could hardly ever obtain them, except by private interest, or on the application of some general officer. He denied that the ill success of our army was to be ascribed to any extraordinary inclemency of the season, or to any unprecedented difficulties. In the campaign of 1848 in Transylvania there was a large army moved without tents, and bivouacking on the snow, obliged to manufacture its own arms, and all its gigantic operations were carried on in a climate much more rigorous than that of the Crimea, and the circumstances were much less difficult in the present campaign, but our calamities were owing to the want of foresight in the authorities at home. He wished to ask one question of the hon. Under Secretary for War. At this time, when we had to vote so many soldiers, he wished to know why the country should be deprived of the services of two, belonging to a regiment now in England; he alluded to those two private soldiers who, as we saw in the papers, were lately tried by a court martial for the offence of making away with their ammunition, and were sentenced, private Gibson to fifty-two days' imprisonment, and private Gallagher to 162 days' imprisonment. He thought the severity of that sentence was really extraordinary, for surely the act of shooting at the Czar or at his portrait, of which these two men had been guilty, was one that might at this time be treated more leniently.

COLONEL NORTH said, he thought it would have been fairer towards the army and the officers of the 26th Regiment if the hon. Member for Lambeth (Mr. W. Williams) had made certain that there was any foundation for the report which he had read from some public newspaper. The other evening the hon. Member had favoured them with an opinion of the soldierly appearance of the Guards, and expressed his pleasure at observing their uniforms were changed from brickdust colour to scarlet. He could not tell where the hon. Member's eyes had been, but for the last twenty or thirty years the Guards had always worn scarlet. He quite agreed that scarlet was infinitely superior to brickdust colour, and, if the hon. Member and his Friends would support him, he (Col. North) would be happy to move that the whole British army should be clothed in scarlet. As an old soldier, nothing was more painful to him than to see the sentries of the Guards at the present moment. He did not wish to say one word detrimental to the young soldiers now in the uniform of Her Majesty's Guards, and he had no doubt with time, discipline, and drill, they would make gallant troops; but where were the splendid specimens of the manhood of England whom they saw last year at the corners of every street, who, with their Herculean frames, soldierly appearance, gallant demeanour, and devotion to their Sovereign, were the pride of the country? It was a perfect farce now to boast of the appearance of the Guards. The hon. Member for Lambeth came down to the House stating facts with reference to the army that showed his ignorance of the subject, and before he talked of the Guards or of the army he ought to make himself better acquainted with them.

COLONEL SIBTHORP said, he must protest against men speaking about the army who did not know the muzzle from the butt-end of a musket. The hon. Gentleman's (Mr. W. Williams) speech was an electioneering speech, cooked up for his constituents. He hoped the House entertained a better feeling of regard for the army than the hon. Gentleman. As for his part, he had constantly heard him, but always with the same feeling of contempt. He would not take the hon. Gentleman as a member of an awkward squad.

MR. MONTAGUE CHAMBERS said, he could not resist saying a few words when he heard the Guards attacked. It was with the deepest feelings of anxiety that he had heard that a battalion of the Guards had been ordered to the Crimea, and that the order had been afterwards countermanded. He could not understand why they had forfeited the highest privilege of a soldier to be the first in the place of danger and peril. He had ascertained, however, that it was because they had not a sufficient number of able-bodied men to go out. These men, however, enjoyed the privilege of not being sent to the East or West Indies, although, upon an occasion of emergency, they had been ordered to Canada. In the Peninsular war the Guards had distinguished themselves—they had gone out 1,800 strong, and in six weeks they were reduced to 600.

Mr. NAPIER said, he was anxious to call the attention of the hon. Under Secretary for War to the question put by the hon. Member for Stafford (Mr. Otway) as to the punishment of the two privates for firing at an effigy of the Czar. There were probably good reasons for it, but he thought it most desirable, in the present state of the army and the country, that some explanation should be given on this subject.

Mr. FREDERICK PEEL said, that it would be irregular for him to speak on this at present, but that when they were in Committee he would do so.

Colonel KNOX said, with reference to the countermanding of the battalion of Guards, he believed that the colonel had given orders without consulting the Commander in Chief. He believed that there were not enough of Minié rifles to supply the whole of the battalion, and it was therefore recommended to send them out in drafts. With regard to the offence of these two men, he considered it a most grievous one. Here were men making use of the ammunition given them for the public service, and firing in the midst of a crowded barracks. He never heard of such a thing in his life, and he thought that the punishment was a proper and a salutary one. He would suggest to the hon. Member for Lambeth whether it was very judicious to be reading *ex parte* statements from newspapers.

Mr. W. WILLIAMS said, the statement he made was from a newspaper which had been circulated about the country. It was sent to him by a gentleman of high respectability, and was accompanied by a letter.

Motion of the House to go into a Committee of Supply *agreed to.*

SUPPLY—ARMY ESTIMATES.

House in Committee.

(1.) 314,984*l.*, Staff.

Admiral WALCOTT said: This vote I cannot permit to pass without availing myself of such an opportunity to express that admiration which I, in common with this House and the country, entertain, when I review the exertions and self-denial of Miss Nightingale and her companions. With a wonderful fortitude and high religious purpose she left her happy home and country to go into a land of strangers, her one object to minister at the bedside of the wounded, in the midst of disease, trial, suffering, and sorrow, from which we shield our wives and daughters, and such as but few in this country could endure even to look upon; nor can I believe a more grateful tribute can be offered to that noble-hearted lady, since such womanly merit ever shrinks from praise, and such high-souled enterprise looks to God and not to man for commendation, than to mention here the names of two friends of hers—two associated with her in affection, and who accompanied her on her mission of mercy and kindness; they, having shared her anxieties, deserve a portion of the common praise. I need scarcely say I allude to Mr. and Mrs. Bracebridge, and it is only an act of justice to allude to one other source of aid, one great means of relieving her anxiety and forwarding her good work. Without warm clothing, without comforts, without the little luxuries, without the stimulants and all the indispensable appliances to cheer the drooping and invigorate the convalescent, the tenderest nurse and the most assiduous surgeon are crippled in any effectual service; they exhaust themselves in mind and body to little purpose. It is due, then, to that journal which holds so prominent a place among the daily press to say it became foremost in the van to point to succour to the sick and wounded in the hospitals at Scutari—it collected contributions for a public fund, as its own subscription it provided an able steward of those bounties at its own personal cost. What has been the result? Testimonies of gratitude, not only in Scutari, but in Balaklava, and in the trenches, and on board the transports, for lives preserved through this humane interference; only one word have I further to add, that it is a marked characteristic of this country, and one, though not without precedent in this century, yet without parallel, that from every age and condition should have been poured forth contributions to the Patriotic Fund, providing every earthly means to restore the sick and wounded, and give comfort to their families at home—the men who, in return, ennoble her name, who went forth with her prayers and shall return with her honour not only safe but doubled in their keeping.

MR. W. WILLIAMS said, he must complain of the attack which had been made upon him by the hon. and gallant Member for Marlow (Colonel Knox) for a statement which he had made on a former occasion. Now, what was it that he on that occasion stated? He complained that the Guards had a sum of 500*l.* 5*s.* 8*d.* granted to them for table allowance, which was not allowed to any other part of the service of the line; and his comment amounted simply to the observation that the bill of fare for breakfast and dinner was very sumptuous. If the hon. and gallant Colonel supposed that by the adoption of strong language he would deter him (Mr. Williams) from observing upon these abuses and condemning them, he was most wofully mistaken. Although he was aware there was something thought to be very terrible in the name of a soldier, he begged to tell the hon. and gallant Colonel that he was neither afraid of him nor of any other man.

COLONEL KNOX said, he wished to call the attention of the Secretary at War to the inadequate allowance made to the officer in command of the South-Western district. It was known that an immense number of foreigners of distinction annually went down to visit the dockyards at Portsmouth, to whom every hospitality was naturally shown, and in the course of their visit they were generally shown over the garrison. The general officer commanding there was expected to keep up his station, although he possessed no other means whatever than his allowance from the Government. No less than four general officers under whom he had himself served had been placed in that situation; and he believed that one officer had left his appointment because he had been so much injured in his pecuniary resources by the demands made upon him. Now, he contended that no officer holding such a position ought to suffer any pecuniary loss.

MR. FRENCH said, he rose to say a few words in personal explanation in consequence of an observation which had fallen from him in the early part of the evening which had been misunderstood. It was true he did use the words "rank and file," in speaking of the gallantry of the army, but he most certainly at the same time recognised the services of the regimental officers.

LORD HOTHAM said, he wished to refer to a document of great importance, relating to the future administration of the army, which had lately been laid upon the table of the House. A Royal Commission had been issued last year for the purpose of inquiring as to the best mode of improving the system of promotion in the army, with the view of bringing to the higher ranks of the service officers at an earlier period of life than those who attained such positions in the ordinary course of gradation. The Commissioners having reported, Her Majesty approved of their recommendations, and directed the Secretary at War and the Master General of the Ordnance to take them for their guidance in their respective offices. Warrants were accordingly issued, laying down the principle that promotions, instead of following the order of seniority, as they had hitherto done to a great extent, should proceed by selection. The first item of the Royal warrant declared that the rank of field marshal should henceforth be conferred without reference to seniority. This provision he considered was wholly unnecessary, because under the previous system the rank of field marshal was conferred by the Sovereign upon great occasions without regard to seniority; and, to cite a memorable instance, the Duke of Wellington could not have been made a field marshal, as he was, after the battle of Vittoria, if only the oldest general could have been so promoted. The second alteration made by the Queen's Warrant provided that, instead of officers rising from the rank of lieutenant colonel by degrees to that of general officers, without reference to the service they might have rendered, henceforth a certain service as lieutenant colonels should be essential to qualify them for the rank of general officers; and the term fixed was a period of three years in command of a regiment, or as lieutenant colonel of a regiment, excepting in the case of an officer filling a post on the staff corresponding to the command of a regiment, and one or two other exceptions. One qualification which had been since added to the original recommendations regarding the promotion of general officers was of a most extraordinary character, because it entitled officers who had served for six years as equerry to the Sovereign to attain the rank of general officers. Now, without desiring to enter into the question whether the office of equerry was not a Ministerial appointment, there certainly was nothing in the functions such an officer discharged to justify his receiving military promotion or reward. It was very much to be regretted that the Report of the Commissioners contained no recommendation that the staff of the army should be placed upon a different footing from that on which it had heretofore stood. The officers of the staff enjoyed all the advantages of the army, such as higher pay, greater promotion and distinction, superior comfort, and lighter as well as more agreeable duties; and it was, therefore, self-evident that appointments to the staff should be held out as prizes to be bestowed on officers of the greatest merit, and on those who had rendered the most distinguished services. In his opinion, no one should be placed upon the staff but such as were fully qualified; staff appointments should be considered the reward of superior merit. Young men who entered the army should be taught to look up to them as the highest object of their ambition, and that they could only be obtained by devoting themselves to their duties and to the study of their profession. If they made the staff to consist entirely of educated officers, the country would have confidence in their ability to discharge their duty, and no other portion of the army would grudge them the advantages which they might possess. It could not be denied that at the present moment much irritation had been caused in the minds of regimental officers by the indiscriminate promotion of officers upon the staff, and believing, as he did, that every one had concurred in maintaining the credit and honour of the profession, there could be no reason why so large a share of the distinctions and rewards should be distributed among the staff. For himself, he expressed his perfect satisfaction with the Royal Warrant by which the recent promotions had been made; it had left him exactly where he was, and he hoped the House would not suppose that he was actuated in the observation which he had made by any lurking feeling of personal disappointment. It had been stated by the noble Lord the Minister of War that the Government intended to send out an officer who should report upon the whole state of the army. That officer, it was intended, should communicate with Lord Raglan, and inform the Government of his views upon all matters concerning the operations of the army in the Crimea. A man in that position would require to be possessed of no common powers of judgment and discernment. He begged, therefore, to ask the Government if they had fixed upon any officer to perform this delicate duty, and, if so, whether there would be any objection to announce his name.

MR. LAYARD said, that in the last despatch received from Lord Raglan he observed with some astonishment the following paragraph—

> "Forage is our only want, and this arises chiefly from the Commissary General not receiving from England the supplies of hay upon which he has reckoned."

That was, he was almost tempted to say, a most scandalous thing. Three months ago our horses were dying for want of forage, and it seemed most extraordinary to him that they were made to depend upon this country for forage, when within three days' sail abundance of chopped straw and other forage were to be obtained. He hoped the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of War would explain the reason of this scantiness of forage. An hon. Member had also inquired what provision had been made to furnish forage for the Turkish troops. Now, if we were unable to supply our own, he did not very well see how we could supply the Turks. Another question which he wished to ask was with respect to the tents. This was a subject of great importance. At present no one knew what direction the war would take, whether peace would soon be concluded or whether we were to have a protracted campaign. As far as he understood, the tents at present provided for the army before Sebastopol were bell-tents, suitable to the operations in which the army were now engaged; but if they were to have a protracted campaign, and operations were to be extended over a large district of country, tents of another description would be required, particularly such as would be useful in protecting the troops from heavy dews. Colonel Elers Napier, to whom he had referred the other night, had sent him a drawing of a portable tent, which seemed to be quite adapted to a lengthened campaign such as he had described. The French army had two descriptions of tents, and, where troops were advancing or making movements in a country, small tents were extremely useful, especially in a country with the climate of Asia Minor. Then, as to the summer clothing for the troops, he trusted that before July the patterns might be prepared, and that before November the summer clothing might be sent out to the soldiers. He would remark that the usual summer clothing served out to the troops at home and in the colonies was not adapted to the climate of the Crimea. He earnestly entreated the attention of Government to the subject, as it was one of the very highest importance to the health and welfare of the army. There was another subject to which he wished to allude, as it affected in some degree the reputation of a gallant officer. Shortly before the Duke of Newcastle left office, Colonel, now Major General, Chesney, was summoned from Ireland to take charge of the foreign contingent about to be raised. That officer came over and entered into communication with the War Minister, but the Duke of Newcastle retiring shortly after, General Chesney was told, without any reason given, that his services were not required. He was thus summarily dismissed, although he certainly might have expected somewhat more courtesy and consideration. With regard to the staff appointments, which had been referred to, he might mention the case of a gallant officer, a friend of his, who he found from recent despatches had been, unfortunately, wounded. He meant Colonel Dickson, one of the most gallant officers in the army, who had rendered most signal services to his country, who had been mentioned in more than one despatch, and whose name was celebrated throughout Europe—that officer had received no distinction whatever, he remained still a captain of artillery, notwithstanding his meritorious services. That officer was on Lord Raglan's staff, and might have received all the honours and promotion which the other staff officers had enjoyed, but when the work began before Sebastopol he requested to be placed in command of a battery, and in that position he had remained during the whole siege up to the present time. However, he still remained a captain of artillery, having obtained his lieutenant colonelcy by brevet some time previous. He trusted the hon. Gentleman would excuse him for calling his attention to these subjects, which were of no inconsiderable importance.

Mr. BAILLIE said, he wished to ask the Government whether they had taken any steps to provide suitable clothing for the wounded soldiers in hospital at Scutari? It was well known that for some time the wounded soldiers at Scutari were unprovided with clothing or necessaries by the Government, and were actually dependent upon public charity. Even the late Secretary at War did not think it improper to write begging letters on behalf of the troops, and to solicit the generosity of the students at the University of Oxford and Cambridge, to the Inns of Court, and to various individuals for old coats and trousers to cover the nakedness of the wounded soldiers. He (Mr. Baillie) had one of these begging letters from the late Secretary at War—a very great curiosity as coming from a Minister of the Crown. The letter ran as follows:—

> "Mr. Sidney Herbert presents his compliments to the Bishop of Moray and Ross, and begs to say, that any contributions people are kindly disposed to make for the use of the army will be thankfully received and forwarded, if sent to Messrs. Hayter and Howell, 52, Mark Lane. It is requested an invoice of contents may accompany each parcel, and that the direction may be distinct either to Scutari or the Crimea, according to its destination. If a suggestion may be permitted, pillowcases and sheets for the hospital might be at present more acceptable than shirts."

There was a distinct admission that sheets and pillowcases were wanted for the hospital at Scutari. He wished to know why those things were not sent immediately by the Government? Were the soldiers to wait until the Bishop of Moray and Ross had been able to excite the charitable feelings of his diocese? It must be remembered that those who sent out shirts sent them as presents to the soldiers, whereas sheets and pillowcases would go into the stores of the Government. The letter was an extraordinary production altogether. The wounded soldiers were indebted chiefly to those gentlemen who had had the direction of the newspaper fund. It was by their exertions that many thousands of our wounded fellow-countrymen had been saved from dying for want of the common necessaries. It was by the exertions of what had been called a "ribald press" that England had been saved from infamy and disgrace, and her annals had been freed from the blackest page ever inscribed thereon.

Mr. WARNER said, he thought that much of the mischief that had occurred in the Crimea had arisen from the inefficient state of our staff, which had brought down upon us the sneers of our allies, the indignation of Europe, and the disgust of every officer in Her Majesty's service. He trusted that the Government would take immediate measures for the thorough reorganisation of the staff.

Mr. FREDERICK PEEL said, the object of the warrant of promotion referred to by the noble Lord (Lord Hotham) was to enable the Crown to employ comparatively young officers in command of brigades and divisions. It was therefore decided that lieutenant colonels who had served a certain period in command of a regiment should be promoted at once to the rank of colonel, and then be eligible to employment as a general officer. The noble Lord at the same time had called attention to the first clause of the warrant, which said that rank should be given irrespective of seniority. He (Mr. Peel) presumed that the recommendations of the Commissioners embodied in the warrant had been taken as the best test for promotion. With respect to the case mentioned by the noble Lord he would observe that a lieutenant colonel serving as equerry to the Sovereign must serve double the period required by a lieutenant colonel in command of a regiment. With regard to the questions of the hon. Member for Aylesbury, he (Mr. Peel) fully admitted their importance, and he could assure the Committee that they would receive the earnest attention of the different departments connected with the administration of the army. In reply to the question of the hon. Member for Invernessshire (Mr. Baillie) he could state that the Board of Ordnance had given directions to establish stores at Constantinople, whence all necessaries could be procured, and although it might have been the case formerly that soldiers upon quitting hospital had not received that proper attention to which they were entitled, yet now that these stores had been established, such a thing could not occur again. As to the reorganisation of the staff, it was so large a subject, and he had been so short a time in office, that he did not feel justified in giving any answer until he had had an opportunity of consulting his noble Friend the Secretary of State for the War Department.

Lord HOTHAM said, he must beg to say that the hon. Gentleman had wholly failed to answer his objection as to the promotion of equerries to the staff. The objection was not that the period of six years' service as equerry was not long enough to entitle them to such promotion, but that no period of service as equerries could properly be a title for any military promotion.

Mr. MONTAGUE CHAMBERS said, he was desirous of asking some questions as to the reorganisation of the medical staff. It was a prevalent opinion that the medical staff in the Crimea ought to be placed on an entirely different footing from that it now occupied. In the first place, with regard to those who were appointed to attend to the sick, it was admitted that there had been great defects with respect to the individual surgeons whose duty it had been to attend to the sick. He thought it was perfectly clear, that with reference to their powers in the performance of their duties, however humane and skilful they might be, those powers had been very much crippled and overtaxed, and that consequently they had been unable to discharge their duties efficiently. There had been a defect—a routine defect—a defect arising from a kind of susceptibility in reference to the departments which had very much interfered with the efficiency of the medical staff. There had been, to his certain knowledge, many enthusiastic and skilful surgeons who had been extremely desirous of going out to the Crimea for the purpose of devoting themselves to one of the most admirable duties that could be performed by men in their station, and yet they had been met by impediments. It struck him (Mr. M. Chambers) that instead of impediments being put in their way, every facility should be afforded to such men, that when they went to put down their names their qualifications should be instantly inquired into, and that if they brought good testimonials they should that instant be marched for the station to which they were desirous of proceeding. But instead of that, when a man put down his name, being desirous of going to the Crimea, he might be despatched forthwith to Van Diemen's Land or Sierra Leone. He therefore thought it was the duty of every Member of Parliament, in the present critical state of affairs, to mention these little incidents to the authorities, in order that a repetition of the evils complained of might be prevented. He was anxious to know what new arrangements had been made to send out an efficient body of surgeons and other medical officers. The second question on which he sought information was with respect to the medicines. Every one knew that the medical department in the East had exculpated itself from blame on the ground of medicines not being forthcoming, for Dr. Andrew Smith had stated that, long before they were wanted, he sent large quantities to be forwarded to the Crimea, but when they were wanted they were not available; that they were considered as a sort of baggage in the vessels in which they were conveyed, because the medical stores were not sent out in separate vessels as was done by the French, so that before the medicines could be obtained the army stores had to be unpacked.

MR. G. DUNDAS said, he believed that there had been no more fertile cause of complaint than the premature promotion of the staff officers. There were many deserving officers who had gone through the dangers of Inkerman, but had not been promoted nor mentioned in despatches, merely because they happened to be regimental instead of staff officers. For instance, one of the generals happened to be down at Balaklava on the day of the battle of Inkerman, but, on hearing of what was going forward, he made the best of his way to the front; he was accompanied by a young man—almost a boy, in fact—as aide-de-camp. He arrived on the field late in the day, but both the general and his aide-de-camp were mentioned in despatches, and the young man received his promotion immediately. The hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) had complained of a want of forage at Balaklava, but what had struck him most when he was there was, not the want of forage, but the want of men to receive and distribute it. In fact, there was a very large quantity of forage lying at Balaklava at the very time that horses, within a mile, were actually starving for want of it. Shortly after his arrival, early in December, he rode out to the cavalry camp, about a mile from the town, and the state of the horses there struck him with horror. They were standing at their pickets—and this was after two or three days' successive rain, hail, and snow—without any covering and without even a rug laid over them. Every alternate horse almost lay dead, and the vicinity of the camp was strewed with their carcases. The mane and hair of the tail of many had been eaten off by their neighbours, showing the state of starvation to which they had been reduced, and yet, all this time, there was no want of forage at Balaklava, only a mile distant. The ship *Cormorant* came into the harbour of Balaklava laden with forage, on the 12th of November, and her captain, having with some difficulty persuaded the authorities on shore to relieve him of his cargo, a number of bran bags were taken on shore and laid on the beach; and there they were lying on the 1st of January. But this was no solitary instance of the mode in which affairs were conducted in the Crimea. When it was found that the men on the *plateau* required vegetables, the steamer *Harbinger* was sent to Constantinople to purchase some. On her return to Balaklava the captain could find no one to relieve him of his charge—no one would take the responsibility of receiving it. These vegetables remained on board until a strong remonstrance was made to head-quarters, when an order was issued by the Commander in Chief that the officers and men should be allowed to go on board and take the vegetables by paying for them. At that time, however, vegetables were to be had on shore, though at a great price; and as there was some difficulty in getting on board, few persons availed themselves of the permission thus given. Time went on, and the great mass of the vegetables began to rot, and, further representations being made at head-quarters, another order was issued—the order which ought to have been made at first—that officers and men should be allowed to go and help themselves, without paying. The effect of this order was, that, though a great proportion of the vegetables had rotted, yet so much of them as could be used at all was very soon got rid of. Such things as these called for the institution of a strict inquiry, and he hoped that it would be made. The departments at home were probably to blame in many instances, but there could be no doubt whatever that the blame of much of the misery that had occurred to the army must be laid on the shoulders of the authorities in the Crimea. A great and grievous error had been committed in not having appointed men of vigour and ability for the discharge of stated duties, and in not making them responsible for the departments over which they were placed. Much misunderstanding had occurred on account of the want of knowledge on the part of different officers as to the particular duties they were to perform. He understood that one officer whose duty it was to see that a proper and fit road was made from Balaklava to the camp, was under the impression that that fell not under his care, but under that of the engineer; and, consequently, between the two, no road was made, or at least only such a road as aggravated immensely the calamities of the campaign. With respect to this road, which he had frequently passed over, he was a good deal puzzled to come to a conclusion about it; it had a good sound bottom, although he must confess it was very muddy and deep. Many hon. Gentlemen who had visited the Highlands of Scotland, knew very well the difficulties of a Highland road, and were yet aware that carts passed over it without killing the horses. The road from Balaklava to the camp was certainly a wretched one, but he believed that if the horses had been properly fed and attended to, and affairs had been carried on with a little more system, those grave and terrible calamities which had unfortunately occurred, never would have happened, and food would have been conveyed to the soldiers at the camp in sufficient abundance to enable them to maintain their strength. They would also have been supplied with clothing, for there was no want of that in the port of Balaklava, or of fuel, another most needful and indispensable requisite. Had the transport service not broken down between Balaklava and the *plateau* he firmly believed that the army would not have suffered one-thousandth part of the calamities they had endured. With respect to the officers serving at the camp, he might say that they had been singularly exempted from disease. Many of them were very comfortable, and nearly all in a state of health and vigour; but the reason was sufficiently plain. They were men of independent fortune, and could command the use of beasts of burden, and thus were furnished with a variety of requisites which were denied to the soldiers. Another grave evil was the enormous amount of work which the soldiers had to perform. The English undertook to defend a greater length of line than their numbers justified. The consequence was, that the men had to go into the trenches so frequently, and were kept there so long, that their strength was totally exhausted, and they were thus rendered unfit for duty. He had heard instances of good men going to the surgeons and declaring that, though they were quite well, they were worn out by fatigue and want of sleep, adding that, if they were to go on sentry they felt they should fall asleep. They said that if they were only put on the sick list and given a few hours' rest they would gladly return to their duty. He had known cases where the doctors, knowing the men, had complied with their request, and the men, refreshed and invigorated, had returned to their work. Repeated reference had been made within the last few weeks to the inability to obtain medicines at Balaklava. There was some signal mismanagement in that, as in almost every department there. A short time before he left the Crimea, late in December, a medical man told him that he had gone down to Balaklava for the purpose of procuring a considerable quantity of opium, which was a *sine quâ non* in reference to the disease which was scourging the army. On his arrival at Balaklava this medical gentleman found that, instead of so many pounds of opium, he could scarcely get so many ounces; and he returned to the camp compelled, much to his regret, to tell his patients that it was impossible to get the medicines requisite for the maladies they were labouring under. There was another subject to which he trusted the attention of Government would be directed—the state of the transports conveying the sick between Balaklava and Scutari. He believed that since he left the Crimea, this had been considerably improved; but, when he was there, great room for improvement existed. Anything more wretched than the condition of the poor men sent from Balaklava to Scutari could hardly be pictured. The ships which conveyed them were totally destitute of anything like blankets or bedding. He remembered, on one occasion, 600 men being sent down from the *plateau* to Balaklava, being conveyed by our generous allies, the French, on their ambulance mules. It happened to be a rainy day, and the men, when taken on board in their wet, dripping clothes, had nothing dry to substitute for these; they had only the great coats they wore, and some of them but one blanket; and in this condition they were compelled to lie down on the hard deck. Nevertheless, so great was the change from the misery they had been enduring at the camp, from wet, exposure, and want of proper sustenance, that, wretched as it might seem to lie down on the hard deck of a transport, these men looked upon it as the very acme of comfort. That does not, however, last long, for when a sick man has to lie for some time on a hard deck he suffers from it, though possibly for a couple of days he may do so with impunity. He had gone in a steamer from Balaklava to Scutari with 300 sick men. The passage was a quick one, for in two days they were brought abreast of the hospital; but, on arriving, there was no accommodation for the sick, and ten days elapsed before the greater number landed. This was a very trying period, and the men died rapidly. He believed that from the time of the vessel leaving Balaklava until the period when the last man quitted the ship, the mortality among the 300 men was at the rate of 11 per cent; but the greater number of these died during the ship's detention at Scutari. This arose from the want of hospital accommodation. Now the French managed these things very much better. They were not one-half so tender with the Turks as the English were. When they wanted a hospital they went and took one, whereas the English entered into a long correspondence, beat about the bush, and took so much time about the matter, that it generally terminated in their losing their chance. He believed that a scheme had already been carried out for the establishment of a hospital at Smyrna; but another excellent suggestion had been made by a gentleman of great military experience in India. His plan was to send out from this country a large wooden building, in separate pieces, to be put together at Sinope. Now, Sinope was but a short distance from Balaklava, and the advantages of the plan were many. One was, that the wounded might be carried from Balaklava, in a very brief time, to a comfortable hospital, in the event of another engagement taking place; and there the necessary operations might be performed. The sad experience of the surgeons had hitherto taught them that secondary operations were hardly ever successful; while those performed in the field had generally turned out satisfactory; but it was impossible to perform anything but a secondary operation, when the patient must be conveyed such a long distance as from Balaklava to Scutari. In the event of this plan being recognised as a sound and good one, as one which the Government would carry out, many valuable lives would be saved. Another advantage would arise from the establishment of this wooden hospital. Stone buildings contracted a deleterious atmosphere, that militated greatly against the recovery of patients. They seemed to become impregnated with disease, which hung about them. But in a clean wooden building that was not the case, and a very eminent physician belonging to the civil department recently organised to go out to Smyrna was so fully cognisant of this fact that he was endeavouring, by all means in his power, to bring the subject before the Government. He (Mr. Dundas) trusted, therefore, the Government would take the matter into their consideration, and not think it unworthy of their notice.

Mr. MAGUIRE said, that those who sat on the Treasury benches, though generally responsible for the failure of our troops, had cheered the statement that the men in the trenches had too much to do. But had the 54,000 men sent out there been properly cared for, they would never have suffered as they had done. It was merely another instance of the blundering which prevailed in the departments at home. He felt the profoundest sympathy, as did every Irishman, for our brave troops in the East. He was convinced that the blundering and stupidity of the late Government had caused more destruction in our army than had their Muscovite foes. Had those 54,000 men been watched over by a general like Wellington, would they, he asked, have been reduced to 24,000 effective men at this moment? The whole career of the Government mismanagement had been a huge disaster. He would mention one instance of mismanagement that had come to his knowledge. A large ship, with 190 bullocks on board, for the troops in the trenches, was about to enter Balaklava; but some wretched nincompoop of an official, by his blundering stupidity, kept the vessel waiting five days; and the result was that only eighty bullocks out of the 190 were landed alive. The troops had been literally starved and murdered in the trenches by the neglect of some department, at whose door their blood would lie. He would say this of Lord Raglan, that, from all he had seen and heard, until that general was replaced, we should not have a successful prosecution of the war. It was only through the newspapers that the public derived their information, and through them the Government had been galvanised into something like activity. At a moment when the greatest distress and despondency prevailed in the Crimea, Lord Raglan was never seen; he was not even known to the troops. Surely it was the duty of a man who had so great a responsibility placed upon him to take all the steps in his power for preserving the efficiency of his troops. These matters must be inquired into, and then it would be seen what answer could be given. The troops had even been denied the last consolations in their dying hours. Only two Roman Catholic clergymen had been sent out at first; of these one had died in the discharge of his sacred duties. Some pressure having been brought upon the Government eight others had been sent out; of these two had died and four were invalided. There were about 5,000 men sick in the camp and at Balaklava, besides those in the hospitals at Scutari and elsewhere. The few Catholic clergymen who were left were totally unequal to the duties they had to perform; and the Government, by neglecting the spiritual wants of the troops, was not treating the poor Catholic soldiers properly in this matter. The rev. Mr. Law, when he presented himself at the hospital at Scutari, had been refused admission. The French Government and the French generals were much more careful of their troops; the contrast between their forces and ours was disgraceful to this country. The French had a cavalry; we had none; it had been sacrificed at Balaklava either by the blundering of Lord Raglan or Lord Lucan, but it had the effect to raise high the moral character of the British army. But if soldiers were murdered by incompetency it was disgraceful to the British name. He had one idea; if ever it was the duty of the British Government and generals to make our forces formidable, it was now when we had an ally from whom, not long ago, we were apprehending invasion. And yet our Government and generals had done more than the worst enemies of this country could have done to render worthless the valour and courage of our soldiers by official blundering and incompetency.

Captain **ARCHDALL** said, he begged to call attention to a few of the appointments recently made in the army, which were accompanied with a certain degree of injustice to old and meritorious officers. He alluded to the appointment of Generals Bentinck, Campbell, and Pennefather to the colonelcies of regiments. They were worthy, no doubt, of every reward, but in the way in which it was conferred an injustice had been done to old and deserving officers. He could not help expressing himself much disappointed at the answer given by the noble Lord at the head of the Government regarding Sergeant Sullivan. With regard to such cases, he might say that none but the officers in a regiment could judge of the fitness of a man for promotion. Some of the smartest men in his troop, men whose pluck and courage would have induced him to select them as a forlorn hope or for any service of extreme danger, were nevertheless men whom he could not have recommended for promotion from the ranks. Such was not the case, however, with Sergeant Sullivan. That soldier was a man of the greatest courage, much respected himself, and connected with a highly-respectable family, and he trusted the House would yet hear of his being rewarded in a way corresponding to his deserts.

Colonel **BOLDERO** said, he had called the attention of the Government the other evening to the great improvement which had taken place in the health of European troops in India from the use of porter, the deaths in one regiment having fallen from ten to two per cent; and he need hardly state that this led to a great saving of money, apart altogether from motives of humanity. Indeed, there could be no doubt as to the advantages flowing from an issue of porter to the troops; and he wished, therefore, to know from the Government whether they would furnish a Return showing the quantities of that beverage sent to the East?—what portions of it had been returned to England, and for what cause?—whether the agent who contracted for the conveyance of the porter had sent in a bill of expenses to the Government for the retention of the ship; and, also, whether there was any objection to lay on the table of the House the correspondence that had taken place with reference to the supply of the porter? He had also stated on a former evening that officers wounded in the army had no place of refuge at home such as was provided for naval officers, and the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) said he thought that was a subject worthy of consideration. There could be no doubt of the hardship entailed upon officers who were sent home wounded in being put to a great expense to effect a cure. He knew the case of a young man who had been severely wounded in the Crimea. The wound was very obstinate, and he came home, when after heavy expense and great care and attention he began to get the better of it. He went before the Medical Board and received *50l.*, one-half of his pay. Now, he was sure that no one would have grudged such a man 100*l.* in those circumstances. This was only one case out of the many that had occurred, and he therefore hoped the matter would receive the serious consideration of the Government.

Mr. WILSON said, that the hon. and gallant Member had on a former occasion put a question to him, which he would now take the opportunity of answering. The effect of the question, as he understood it, was whether or not cargoes of porter which had been despatched from this country had arrived at Constantinople, but that, from the circumstance of there being no officer appointed to receive them there, the vessels containing those cargoes had returned again to this country with the porter; and whether an action was not now pending against the Government for non-performance of their contract? He had great pleasure in informing the House that there was not the slightest foundation for that rumour. There had never been any question at all as to porter returning home, although, in the case of porter or of other provisions having arrived at different ports after the troops had left, there undoubtedly had been questions as to the amount of freight which the Government should pay, taking into consideration the difference of the length of the voyage which those vessels had to perform as compared with the length of the voyage for which they were originally destined. He might mention that porter formed no part of the rations ordinarily issued to the troops, but, with the view of furnishing it to them at prime cost, four cargoes had been despatched from this country. In one case a vessel was sent to Malta, but when it arrived the troops had left that place, and that vessel was subsequently sent on to Varna; another vessel had, in the same way, after having been first sent to Constantinople, been sent to Varna, and subsequently to the Crimea; another vessel landed her cargo at Scutari, where it was used; and the fourth of those vessels carried her cargo to Varna, and it was consumed there. There was no foundation for the rumour that any action for non-performance of contract was pending against the Government, although, of course, the claims made by the contractors for the additional length of voyage were under consideration. With regard to the method in which that porter was purchased, he could only state that it had been bought upon contract by tender, and he did not think that the correspondence referring to that transaction was of sufficient importance to be laid on the table of the House; but if the hon. and gallant Gentleman pressed for the production of that correspondence he would not oppose him.

Vote *agreed to.*

(2.) 151,108*l.*, Public Departments.

Mr. FREDERICK PEEL said, he might, perhaps, be allowed to take this opportunity of making some explanation in reference to a statement made the other evening by the hon. Member for Stafford (Mr. Otway). The substance of that statement was, that two soldiers had been most severely punished for merely firing at a target representing the Emperor of Russia. Now, he (Mr. Peel) had perused the charges against these men, as well as the proceedings of the court-martial held on the occasion; but neither in the charges, the evidence, nor the finding of the court, was there the slightest allusion to the Emperor of Russia. The charges against the men were simply that they had fired away several rounds of ammunition, and had injured the barracks, the public property. The men were sentenced to various periods of imprisonment—the one, he believed, to 148 days, the other to 42 days—and the reason why a distinction was made between the cases was this, that one of the men, Gallagher, had been previously convicted three times, besides which, his general character was very bad.

Mr. OTWAY said, he had never intended to make a charge against the Government, nor had he ever said that the men had been firing at the Emperor of Russia. He wished they could. All he wanted to convey was that he thought two soldiers had been too severely punished for a trivial offence. As he was on his legs, perhaps he might be allowed to express a hope that the Government would see the necessity of attaching to the War Department an officer whose duties would be analogous to those performed by officers in the countries. He wished to see an officer appointed whose special duty it would be to observe the military occurrences of other countries, particularly all new inventions in firearms, to take account of them and report on them to the department.

Mr. P. O'BRIEN said, he wished to know whether any order had been promulgated against Irishmen being recruited for the brigade of Guards? The Guards—more especially the household cavalry—

received larger pay and enjoyed greater advantages than the troops of the line generally; and it became, therefore, a matter of some interest to know whether any indisposition existed on the part of those in authority to accept the service of Irishmen in the Guards. He believed, for example, that in the Royal Horse Guards (Blue) there were only six Irishmen.

Mr. FREDERICK PEEL said, he had not heard of any such order having been promulgated.

Mr. MAGUIRE said, he had put a question relative to the number of Roman Catholic chaplains employed in connection with our army in the East, and, as yet, he had received no answer. As considerable anxiety prevailed on the subject in Ireland, he would repeat his question, and he would request that something like a distinct answer would be given to him.

Mr. FREDERICK PEEL said, in reference to the question of the hon. Member for Dungarvan, he had only to repeat his statement whilst moving the Estimates—that of the forty-two clergymen employed for the service of the army in the East, twenty-four were ministers of the Church of England, eight belonged to the Presbyterian Church, and ten were Roman Catholics. It might be that that number was insufficient for the purposes of the Roman Catholic soldiers in the East, still it was necessary to preserve some distinction between the number of clergymen of each denomination.

Mr. MAGUIRE said, that two of the Roman Catholics originally sent were dead, four were invalided, and he believed only two now remained. What he wanted to know was, whether any steps would be taken to fill up the vacancies thus created?

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT said, he could give the hon. Member some explanation on that point. On a consideration of the relative proportions of the several denominations comprising the army it had hitherto been held that the Roman Catholics constituted one-third of the whole army. Acting on that conviction the total number of clergymen originally sent out to the Crimea being twenty-four, of these, twelve belonged to the Church of England, eight to the Church of Rome, and four to the Presbyterian Church. Subsequently, however, it was proposed by members of different religious bodies that a certain sum should be subscribed, in order to supply an additional number of chaplains to the army, on the understanding that one-half of the cost would be defrayed by Government, the other half being borne by the subscribers. That proposal was accepted, and, in accordance with it, a number of gentlemen, recommended both by the Church of England and by the Presbyterian bodies, had been sent out as additional chaplains, and he had no doubt that the services of additional Roman Catholic chaplains would have been accepted had they been offered under similar terms. He might add that, since the original arrangement had been made, he believed that the relative proportions of the different denominations composing the army had undergone an alteration, and looking to the partial failure of recruiting in Ireland, it was very much to be doubted whether so large a proportion of the army as one-third was now constituted of Roman Catholics.

Mr. MAGUIRE said, he thought it was derogatory to the dignity of the nation, and discreditable to the Government, whose duty it was to provide for the spiritual as well as the other wants of the army, that a bargain should have been entered into with the very poorest class of the community—the Roman Catholics of England, of Ireland, and of Scotland—by which they were required to pay a portion of the expense of the clergy who were sent out to minister to those who were fighting the battles of their country. He would venture to say that in the list of those who had been killed or disabled every third name was that of an Irishman, and the presumption was that those men were Roman Catholics. He believed that one-third of the soldiers who had been sent out from this country to the Crimea some eight or nine months since were Roman Catholics. The 23rd Fusileers was called a Welsh regiment, but he saw that regiment embark at Cork, and he was informed at the time, both by soldiers and officers who belonged to it, that two-thirds of the men had been enlisted in the south of Ireland. He believed that nearly one-half of the soldiers who had sailed for the Crimea were Roman Catholics, and he thought it was most discreditable to the Government and to the nation that such a bargain should have been entered into as that to which the right hon. Gentleman had referred.

Mr. W. WILLIAMS said, that the Under Secretary for the War Department had expressed his intention to reduce this Vote by the amount of the salary of the

Secretary at War, but he thought that, by the union of that office with the office of Secretary for War, a considerable reduction might also be effected in the salaries of clerks and officers of the department.

Mr. FREDERICK PEEL said, the relations subsisting between the whole of those departments and the War Office were under consideration.

Colonel NORTH said, he was anxious to hear whether any extra pay or gratuity had been given to the Gentlemen employed in the War Department, in consequence of the additional work they had been called on to perform since the outbreak of the war. Many of them, as he was informed, were kept at work from nine o'clock in the morning until eight or nine at night; and surely it might be expected that in a country like England public servants would be compensated for the additional demands made upon their labours.

Mr. FREDERICK PEEL said, he must admit that undoubtedly the business of the War Office had greatly augmented during the past year; still that increase of business had been principally met by adding to the number of clerks—an addition amounting to between forty and fifty.

Mr. BERESFORD said, he at least had no reason to believe that the staff of the War Office had been unnecessarily increased. He therefore did not rise to object to the present Vote, but to make a few observations in reference to the Estimates of 1853, and which he was precluded from making at the time in consequence of his having been confined to bed. It happened that in the year 1852, in consequence of the embodiment of that force, the militia estimates were first brought forward. Having the honour at that time of holding the office of Secretary at War, he had deemed it his duty to make an application to the Treasury for a trifling increase in the number of clerks employed at the office, on account of the extra work to be got through. His application having been sent in in the beginning of July, a Commission was issued during the month of September, consisting of the noble Lord the Member for Buckinghamshire (the Marquess of Chandos), Sir Charles Trevelyan, Mr. Bromley, and Mr. Hawes, to consider the whole subject, and they continued their inquiries until the month of December. Well, on the 16th of that month the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) then Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that the Commission, having duly inquired into the War Office, had decided that the extra duties must be got through without any additional expense to the country. However, he (Mr. Beresford) having taken leave of office towards the end of December, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for south Wiltshire (Mr. S. Herbert) succeeded to his place, when a renewed application for additional clerks was sent in, and the consequence was the number employed were increased by nine. Now, he wished to point out that although in 1852, at a period when the business of the office had been greatly and suddenly augmented, a much more trifling addition than that subsequently granted had been refused to him, without any further increase of business, no less than nine clerks were added to the staff. But a still more extraordinary circumstance remained to be shown—namely, that while the report of the Commission of 1852 had never been presented to Parliament, the Reports of two subsequent Commissions had been presented and printed. He could not help thinking that these two facts were exceedingly awkward, and open to suspicion; and he hoped very much Her Majesty's Government would examine into the matter.

Vote *agreed to.*

(3.) 17,795*l.*, Royal Military College.

Colonel NORTH said, he was sorry that, owing to an informality, he could not the other day bring forward the Motion of which he had given notice. He did not now rise to offer any opposition to the Vote. He hoped, however, that the resolution which he had intended to propose would be considered by Her Majesty's Government, as it was quite evident, owing to the great increase of officers by the recent promotion from the ranks, that there must be a proportionate increase of clerks in the War Department. It was his intention shortly to bring this subject under the consideration of the House.

Mr. BRADY said, he wished to make some remarks in reference to what had been stated a few nights ago, by the First Lord of the Treasury, when these Estimates were first brought under the consideration of the House. The noble Lord then endeavoured to shift upon other shoulders the blame that ought properly to be visited upon himself and his colleagues, and proceeded to find fault with the conduct of the medical men that were now in the Crimea. Now, he wished the Committee to understand this fact—that the medical men in the Crimean army were not allowed independent action; they could not, consequently, be as efficient as under other circumstances they might be. He hoped, in the changes that were to take place in our army, that the medical staff would be placed altogether upon a different footing, and by being allowed to act independently of quartermasters and other officers who knew nothing at all of the duties to be performed by them, their services would be made much more effective than they were capable of being made at present. He found in the estimate now before the Committee that the sum allotted to the governor and lieutenant-governor of this institution was 1825*l.* a year; whilst, at the same time, there were two officers whose duties were much more laborious and much more needed, and having yearly between them a sum of only 392*l.* He alluded to the surgeon and assistant surgeon. It might be said that this was a self-supporting institution. There were, however, few officers' widows who could afford to pay 100*l.* a year for the education of their children. He was given to understand that this institution did not only support itself, but it overpaid itself. There were 180 boys allowed into the school, and the chaplain was allowed 300*l.* a year. He thought that this salary was out of all proportion too great. He also observed in the estimate the sum of 442*l.* a year, allowed to the governor for forage. He wished to ask whether it was necessary that the governor should employ horses to ride after the boys? The country, he was sure, would never knowingly sanction such jobbery as this was.

Mr. RICE said, he could not remain silent while an hon. Gentleman designated such an institution as the Royal Military College as a piece of jobbery. He must bear his testimony to the value of that institution. He hoped and believed that when the hon. and gallant Member for Oxfordshire (Colonel North) said that it was merely Royal by name, he did not mean to cast a stigma upon the institution. Now, instead of officers' sons having to pay 100*l.* a year, those of a certain grade were only charged 40*l.* When proof was given that the parents were unable to pay the usual sum with their children there was the greatest indulgence shown to them by the institution.

Colonel NORTH said, that the sum demanded for children was in proportion to the rank of their fathers; some, for example, had to pay 80*l.*, while others were admitted at a much lower rate.

Mr. RICE said, he would be very glad to see some aid given to the institution, in order that the objects suggested by the hon. and gallant Member for Oxfordshire could be carried out.

General PEEL said, great complaints had been made of generals and staff officers not having learnt their duties. He understood that a camp was about to be established at Aldershott, and he would suggest that the pupils of this institution should be in some way connected with that camp, in order that they might have an opportunity of learning not only the elementary portion of their duties, but also of acting with the men who would thus be brought together. He believed that the greatest possible benefit would result from the adoption of this suggestion. He thought that lectures might be given on military subjects at the camp, at which all the officers should be invited to attend, and he trusted that many of the sergeants, who he was happy to see were receiving encouragement by promotion, would have the same opportunity. During the last war the students in the junior department at Sandhurst were allowed to hold commissions by purchase, so that a boy of thirteen might hold a commission without discharging the duties attached to it, permission being given him to pursue his studies. He thought some such system might be adopted with advantage now, and that a boy—say of fifteen—at Sandhurst, having passed a certain examination, and it being understood that he intended to devote himself to the service, should be allowed to hold a commission by purchase, and remain at the college another year in order to complete his studies. If this system were adopted they would have younger men to fill commands, and the service would, he believed, be benefited.

Mr. BRADY said, he must beg to explain that he did not wish to throw any slight upon the institution, but he only wanted to call the attention of the Committee to the glaring fact of the one-ninth of the whole Vote being devoted as salaries to the governor and lieutenant-governor of the establishment.

Lord LOVAINE said, it was not his opinion that the education in the senior department at Sandhurst was of the best character, or the most useful for the officers of the staff. In foreign countries, besides the education such officers must have, they were obliged to serve a certain number of years in other branches of the service. If officers were obliged from the senior department to attach themselves to certain branches of the army for a given time, he was certain that it would prove a much better system. There were great errors abroad as to the real meaning of the staff of the army. Many suppose that, like Lord Raglan's staff, the officers had nothing more to do than to convey the orders of the commander in chief to the different parts of the army. The quartermaster general's department, however, required men with much higher qualifications.

Sir GEORGE PECHELL said, he had no objection to support the proposition of the hon. and gallant Member for Oxfordshire in order to extend the benefits of the college at Sandhurst. He always believed that the money paid by cadets was much greater than it ought to be. He was of opinion that the office of governor could be very well abolished. The lieutenant-governor could do all the duty that was necessary—1,000*l.* a year might be thus saved to the institution.

Mr. W. WILLIAMS said, there was no complaint against the establishment itself, and he for one thought it ought to be extended; but such an item as that of 442*l.* for forage for the governor and lieutenant-governor was very objectionable.

Colonel DUNNE said, that what he complained of was that for several years the system of selecting the officers of the staff was not that of taking them from those that had qualified themselves at Sandhurst. He said that the system hitherto pursued had tended to discourage officers from learning their duty. At Sandhurst an officer did not learn all that it was necessary for a staff officer to know; but he learned what was essential for him to know—the knowledge of surveying, of sketching, and of fortifications, which was not generally taught in other schools. He thought the suggestions of the hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) most valuable.

Vote *agreed to.*

(4.) 23,367*l.*, Royal Military Asylum.

Lord NAAS said, he wished to ask a question in connection with this Vote. It was stated the other night that a sum of 10,000*l.* was to be taken from the unclaimed prize-money for the purpose of being devoted to the Royal Military Asylum at Chelsea. He (Lord Naas) wished the hon. Gentleman to state the number of boys on the establishment, and also the number of additional boys. He hoped the hospital in Ireland would be placed on the same footing of increase as Chelsea.

Mr. FREDERICK PEEL said, the additional number of boys was 120. He would consider the question of whether an addition ought to be made to the Dublin Hospital, although the mere circumstance of an addition having been made to Chelsea Hospital did not, in his opinion, constitute a claim on the part of the Dublin establishment.

Mr. NAPIER said, he thought the claim of Dublin Hospital was quite as great as that of Chelsea.

Sir WILLIAM SOMERVILLE said, the hospital in Dublin was very efficiently conducted, and he hoped its claims would be taken into consideration.

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT said, the Government ought to be guided, in considering this question, by the number of orphan children who required education. When the school at Chelsea was first established by the Duke of York, the number of children placed there was much greater than it had been up to a recent period. The Secretary at War, in consequence of the reduction in the number of children, seized on a part of the building and used it as a normal school for training regimental schoolmasters, and, when the claim for the introduction of a larger number of soldiers' orphans was pressed on the Government, it was necessary to provide an additional building in order to accommodate the same number of children as it had been originally intended to educate. There was no such reason for making a similar addition to the excellent institution in Phœnix Park.

Mr. WHITESIDE said, if it should be found on inquiry that the school at Dublin had the same claim as that at Chelsea it ought to have a similar grant, but not otherwise.

Colonel DUNNE said, he was perfectly satisfied that it had the same claim, for there were as many Irish as there were English soldiers' orphans.

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT said, the regimental schoolmasters educated at Chelsea were for the use of Ireland as well as of England.

Vote *agreed to;* as was also

(5.) 88,000*l.*, Volunteer Corps.

(6.) 3,813,383*l.*, Embodied Militia.

COLONEL DUNNE said, he wanted to know what were the intentions of the Government as to the embodiment of the Irish militia? At this moment hardly any of the Irish militia regiments, though fully drilled, had arms, and he would suggest that the arms of the pensioners, who were only called out twice or three times a year for a day or two's drill, should be given to the militia when not in use by the pensioners. There were many regiments of Irish militia not yet embodied, and unless they were so, no recruits would be obtained from that source.

MR. FREDERICK PEEL said, that the attention of the Government had been directed to both points, and he could inform the hon. and gallant Member that it was intended to call out the Irish militia as soon as arrangements could be made to provide barracks for them, without having recourse to the inconvenient and non-economical system of billeting.

MR. WARNER said, he was glad to hear that it was intended to do away with the objectionable system of billeting, and would suggest that temporary barracks of wood or iron would answer every purpose.

LORD LOVAINE said, he wished to inquire whether the Government intended to resort to the ballot for the militia?

MR. PARKER said, he must complain of the quality of the cloth of which the trousers of some of the militia regiments were made; he would mention an instance in one of the East Lancashire regiments, in which, when a hot iron was applied to the cloth, it took away not only the colour but the whole of the dressing. The cloth of which the militia uniforms was made was far inferior to that of which the uniforms of the rural police, and even of the felons, was manufactured. The boots, too, were of a shameful description, so bad that the soles frequently left the upperleathers as soon as they were brought into use.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON said, he believed that in general the clothing supplied was of good quality, but there were some cases in which it was of an inferior description. The late Secretary at War had made an arrangement by which the colonels were themselves to look after the clothing. With regard to the question of the noble Lord (Lord Lovaine), he had to state that the Government had no intention to resort to the ballot at present. Representations had been received at the Home Office of the difficulty of raising men in some quarters, and recommending a resort to the ballot, but his answer had been that he was perfectly convinced that men would join in due time, and that the best course was to leave it to their good feeling.

COLONEL SIBTHORP said, that the men who had volunteered into the line from the regiment which he had the honour to command had been highly approved of, and were most efficient soldiers.

MR. MONCKTON MILNES said, he was aware of cases in which colonels of regiments had written to the War Office stating that they had men ready to recruit for particular regiments, and they had been informed that a sergeant would be sent down to recruit for the regular army from militia regiments. But after the lapse of some time the dispositions of the men changed. Now, he thought it would be better to give the colonels greater facilities for sending up men who wished to join the regular army.

COLONEL KNOX said, that the transmission of pay from our soldiers in the Crimea to their relatives in this country was a subject with respect to which a considerable amount of dissatisfaction prevailed. It was alleged that the applicants for money so transmitted had in many instances been informed by the authorities here that they knew nothing whatever about it. The answer which they almost invariably received at the War Office was, "We are extremely sorry that we cannot give you any information about your money, but we have had no account upon the matter from the Paymaster of the forces." Now, it was highly desirable that habits of frugality upon the part of the soldier should receive every encouragement, but nothing could tend more to prevent the acquisition of such habits than the fact that there was no security afforded him that he could transmit his pay with safety and regularity to his family at home. There was also another subject to which he wished to call the attention of the Government—it was in reference to the system of hospital service in the East. The general system was, that when the soldier went into hospital, the sergeant entered a description of the man, his name, that of his native parish, &c.; and also took an account of the amount of money of which he might be possessed, with the view that, in case of his death, there might be no dispute as to how it was to be disposed of. He regretted, however, to have to state that at the hospital at Scutari no such system prevailed, and that plunder and robbery to a disgraceful extent were the consequences of the neglect of the necessary regulations. Soldiers were known to have entered that hospital with 8*l.* or 10*l.* in their pockets, and the moment they ceased to breathe the whole amount of their money had disappeared.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON said, he perfectly concurred with the hon. and gallant Member in the opinion, that every facility ought to be given to the soldiers in the East for the purpose of transmitting money to their families at home. The delays which had hitherto occurred in its transmission must, he apprehended, be attributed to the fact that at the time of application for the money being made to the War Office the regimental pay lists had not been received, and of course until that list was received, and the authorities here were thus enabled to ascertain what pay was actually due, they could not pay over the money to the applicants.

COLONEL KNOX: Therefore it is that I think it is impossible you can get on without the assistance of a Paymaster-General of the forces.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: The Paymaster-General would have nothing to do with the accounts of the regiments.

MR. MONCKTON MILNES said, there appeared the other day in the newspapers an account of a proposition having been made to the War Office to transmit a certain sum from this country to persons lying in the hospitals at Scutari and Constantinople, and that the War Office not only declined to receive the money, but stated that the persons lying in the hospital at Scutari had received every comfort and everything that money could supply, and that such assistance was perfectly superfluous. He should be happy if the Under Secretary of War could inform the Committee whether he would be able to afford the means by which the charity of this country could reach those brave and unhappy men.

MR. A. STAFFORD said, he was exceedingly glad the attention of the Committee had been called to the subject. When he was on a visit to the hospital there was not a single day on which the matter was not pressed upon his attention. There were soldiers to whom pay was due who could not send any portion of it to their relations in England. They said, "We do not ask charity, we do not ask subscriptions from private benevolence, but we say that in our sickness caused by the performance of our duty we ought to receive what we have earned, and send it to our wives, sisters, and other relatives in England, but by the regulations at Scutari we have been over and over again refused." He had seen letters from female relatives stating that unless money was sent to them to purchase a mangle or set themselves up in some way of business, there was nothing left for them but the workhouse or prostitution. It gave him great pain to hear these brave men make such complaints day after day. There was no redress, and the reason was that no regimental pay-list had come from the Crimea. The late Secretary at War (Mr. S. Herbert) stated that he had given orders and instructions to remedy this evil at Scutari. Far from hearing that statement with satisfaction, he had heard it with great despair, because it was his firm conviction that it had not arrived yet, so that the great evil which existed at Scutari, when he was there, existed, he believed, in full force at this very moment. We ought to enable the poor soldier to draw, not as a matter of favour or private benevolence, but as a matter of justice, such sums as he might see fit, not only for his own comfort, but to send to his relations. With respect to the men who had been obliged to come home, none of them had been paid since they arrived in this country. A man came here with the loss of a limb; he wished to go to see his friends; but he was unable to do so because he could not get his money from the Horse Guards. The Minister of War, on the other hand, had very justly said that it was the duty of all, in their several localities, to do their utmost to induce men to enlist in the army. But what could individuals do in that way, when these young men who desired to enlist, were told by others whom they met in the streets, "We have served our country abroad; we came home wounded; but we cannot get our money!" Such was another proof of the reign of routine. He was sure that the noble Lord at the head of the Government, and the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of War would be most anxious to remedy these and other evils, and he therefore implored them to depart from the spirit of routine in the present instance, and do justice to those who had fought so bravely and suffered so much for their country.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT said, the

hon. Gentleman who had just sat down had not given a correct description of the regulations under which pay was issued to the soldiers. The hon. Gentleman stated to him some time ago, upon his return from Constantinople, that there was great difficulty about paying the men in the East. Now, there could be no doubt that even by official routine the men were entitled to receive their pay as the hon. Gentleman stated, and they were likewise entitled to have facilities which would enable them to remit the money to their friends at home. When the army went out to the Crimea, in order that the circumstance he had just mentioned should be generally known to the men, Lord Raglan was requested to publish a general order directing the attention of the troops to the regulations with respect to the issue of their pay. That was accordingly done, and when the sick and wounded were removed to Scutari, an officer was sent to act as paymaster at the hospital; but it would appear that he was totally ignorant of the regulations of the service, for he departed from the official routine, and did not afford the men those facilities to which they were entitled. When the subject was brought to his notice in that House by the hon. Member for North Northamptonshire, he instantly wrote to Scutari that those men who had not had the facilities to which they were entitled had been grossly ill-treated, and that they ought immediately to be made aware of their right to remit money to their friends at home. It was true that when the men arrived at Scutari from Balaklava they had no statement as to the amount of money due to them. He was not surprised that that should occasionally have happened; but the officers at Scutari ought to have done immediately what he knew they had done since—paid every man on account from the day he left Balaklava. He hoped the evil was now rectified; if not, he trusted his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of War would look to it, and would select the best men he could find and send them out to replace those who were inefficient. He ought to mention that the hon. and learned Member for Enniskillen (Mr. Whiteside) asked him some time ago whether it was true that the men in hospital at Scutari had 9*d.* deducted as stoppage from their pay. He announced at once that the men in hospital from injuries or sickness contracted during operations in the field were not liable to any stoppage beyond the ordinary stoppage for rations. No more they had; but the hon. and learned Gentleman had some reason to put the question, for he found afterwards that the regulations had been violated, and the men obliged to submit to a stoppage of 9*d.* out of their pay. He might add, however, that upon hearing that fact he instantly wrote to Scutari, to the effect that, whatever might be the inconvenience, every farthing of the money so taken from the men should be paid back.

Mr. WHITESIDE said, it was observable that whenever any abuse was brought before that House, it was sure to be attributed to "routine." Was there no way of killing routine?

Mr. A. STAFFORD said, that since the right hon. Gentleman the late Secretary at War seemed to be dissatisfied with the result produced by his letters he could not do better than to try what would be the effect of his presence at Scutari in person. The right hon. Gentleman might do so now without any considerable inconvenience, inasmuch as he was relieved from the responsibility of office. If his Parliamentary duties stood in the way of the right hon. Gentleman's taking that step, he (Mr. Stafford) could only say that he should be happy to pair with him for the remaining portion of the Session, and should they proceed together to Scutari, he would promise to point out to the right hon. Gentleman much to remedy, to which he might with advantage apply his official knowledge.

Mr. FREDERICK PEEL said, that he did not think that the communication upon the part of the War Office, to which the hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. M. Milnes) had referred, was altogether free from the objections which had been urged against it. He thought it was but right that under present circumstances every facility should be afforded to those who wished to assist our soldiers in the Crimea. At the same time it was but fair to say that the communication in question was well-meant, and the intention of the writer had been to convey the impression that the soldiers at Scutari were not in want of money. It was also right to observe that that communication had not been sent to the War Office. The only letter which had been addressed to that office had been a simple inquiry with reference to sending out a certain sum of money. He believed that every facility had been given to our soldiers to remit money, and he might state that 18,000*l.* had been sent from Lord Raglan's army, and had, in small sums, been paid, through regimental paymasters, to relatives of the soldiers in this country.

CAPTAIN ARCHDALL said, he was sure there must have been some exaggeration in the statements in the letters from the female friends of soldiers in the hospital to the effect that if they did not receive remittances they would be obliged to resort to prostitution. The Central Association had been established for the express purpose of supporting the wives and families of soldiers sent to the East, and he knew it had supported no less than 13,000 persons at an expense of about 1,000*l.* per week.

MR. H. HERBERT said, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Wiltshire (Mr. S. Herbert) had stated that some stoppages had been made at Scutari, contrary to the regulations of the service. Was it not possible to ascertain whose fault it was, and to visit the offenders with punishment.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT said, he thought he had stated that the fault lay with the paymaster at Scutari, and that he desired a proper person to be sent out to replace him.

MR. CRAUFURD said, he wished to know what the Government proposed to do with respect to the billeting of the militia in Scotland, where the system was different to that of England, the men not being billeted in public-houses, but on householders. He had received communications from Oban and another place, pointing out the inconvenience which resulted from the system. He wished to know whether barracks were to be built, and buildings set apart for hospitals.

MR. WALPOLE said, he wished to ask the noble Lord at the head of the Government whether he had heard that the principle of voluntary enlistment had been very seriously interfered with by the Bill passed before Christmas, which empowered the Crown to send out the militia to garrison our colonies and military stations abroad? And if so, he would suggest that, instead of sending the militia to those places, the draughts which were now made from them into the regular service might be sent to those places. The chief object of the Militia Bill was to keep in this country a constant standing force in a state of preparation for the national defence; but that object would be interfered with if, as soon as the men were trained, they should be sent out of the country.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON said, the amount of militia to be sent abroad under the Bill passed in December last would be so comparatively small as to enable the bulk of the militia to remain in the United Kingdom. There was no answering for erroneous impressions which might be made in men's minds; and it might be possible, though he had not heard of it, that some men were deterred from entering the militia by the notion that they would be sent abroad; but under the recent Act no man could be sent out unless he individually agreed to go, and therefore any such apprehensions were unfounded. With regard to another subject, namely, the holding back of some men in the hope that they would get larger bounty by and bye, as substitutes, the answer to that was the statement he had already made—that there was no intention to have recourse to the ballot; so that such persons would find themselves mistaken.

Vote *agreed to.*

(7) 22,000*l.*, Rewards for distinguished Services.

COLONEL KNOX said, he could not allow this Vote to pass without observing that, after what they had recently seen, it was perfectly obvious that some system should be adopted of recognizing military merit different to any that had hitherto been pursued. He should not have ventured to mention the subject, as it might in some respects be considered as trenching on the prerogative of the Crown, if the late Minister of War had not shadowed forth some distinguished "Order of Merit" as being likely to be established that would embrace all ranks in the army. He must own that he felt very strongly on this point. There already existed an Order, which was conferred both on the army and on the navy—he meant the order of the Bath. It was known that that order was granted not only to those officers who obtained the rank of colonel, but also to post-captains in the navy. Now, what he would suggest was, that this Order should be extended to other classes in both services. It was a hard case that meritorious men, whether captains of companies, lieutenants, and ensigns, or non-commissioned officers and privates, who had behaved with gallantry in the field, and conducted themselves well in every other respect, should not be rewarded with some mark of distinction; and if he wished to put the army on a proper footing, let us institute an Order of Merit to be conferred for services of this character. Such an Order of Merit to have due effect, must carry with it double pay and double pension in the case of the non-commissioned officer or private; and if this were done, the greatest stimulus would be given to emulation among all ranks in the army, from the lowest to the highest. An Order of Merit, accompanied by double pay and double pension, would do infinitely more good in this respect than all the commissions that could be given to men who had not adequate means of supporting themselves in their new position. The day did not appear to be far distant when the purchase of commissions would be abolished, but in effecting this change justice must be done to the claims of those who had invested large sums of money to gain an entrance into the service, otherwise a gross act of spoliation would be committed against them. The military Order of the Bath he therefore trusted would be carried a little further, and be extended to deserving captains and subalterns, without additional pay. It was earnestly to be hoped that the Government would take this matter into their serious consideration, and speedily carry into effect some such plan with regard to it as had been shadowed out by the noble Duke late at the head of the War Department.

Mr. APSLEY PELLATT said, that what he had to complain of was that sergeants were placed at a disadvantage in comparison with privates and corporals, who received good conduct money, which the sergeant lost when he reached that step. This appeared to him an anomaly, and an injustice that required to be redressed. As the colonels and generals in the House did not come forward to advocate the interests of these subordinate officers, but confined all their sympathies to the higher class of officers, he would come forward in their behalf, and do his best to get the injustice remedied. When a sergeant was promoted he paid 3d. a day for his clothing more than corporals did, and in reality promotion placed him in a worse position than before. If the war was to be popular, the interests of the army ought to be properly attended to.

Lord HOTHAM said, he wished to call attention to an abuse which was a consequence of the mode in which this vote was administered. When a colonel was promoted to the rank of a general officer he did not, unless he had served a certain number of years as an effective field officer, receive the half-pay of a general, but only that due to him in virtue of his previous commission. In more than one case a general not entitled to general's half-pay had received one of these pensions for distinguished services, and had then been put upon the list of general officers receiving general's half-pay. Now it might very likely happen that a meritorious officer might not have served long enough to entitle him to general officer's pay, and it might therefore be very right to recompense him by a pension for good service. But it was not right then to proceed also to give him general officer's pay because he had obtained this good-service pension. The result of that was that those who had not served long enough to obtain general officer's pay might be better off than those who had. If definite rules were laid down for the guidance of the service, they certainly ought to be abided by.

Colonel DUNNE said, he quite agreed with the hon. Member for Southwark (Mr. Pellatt) in thinking it very hard that a corporal should lose his good-service pay on being promoted to the rank of a sergeant.

Mr. WARNER said, he would take that opportunity of expressing the regret with which he had heard hon. Members attack the conduct of Lord Raglan and the officers in the Crimea, because at the present moment he did not believe that they possessed sufficient data to judge of the conduct of those officers. It rested on the responsibility of the Government to recall them or continue them in their commands if they felt satisfied with them; but he was convinced that an inquiry perfectly independent of that moved for by the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, or the Commission which had been sent out, would take place before long at the bar of public opinion with respect to the calamities which had befallen our army in the present war. If that Tribunal should acquit the late Ministers and Lord Raglan, he was confident that there was no class of men upon whom suspicion would more immediately fall than those officers, and he thought they were prejudging the question by granting them rewards at the present moment. He should move that the Vote be reduced by 200*l.*, being the amount to be paid to the Quartermaster General and Adjutant General in the Crimea.

Colonel NORTH said, he believed that our disasters in the Crimea had been owing to the smallness of our troops there in proportion to the duties imposed on them. Could the Quartermaster General be blamed if men could not be spared for making roads? He did not know how England could expect to get either generals or admirals to serve her; for no sooner had those officers undertaken their commands, than their reputation was pretty sure to be assailed.

Viscount PALMERSTON said, that the pensions proposed to be given to the Quartermaster Generals and Adjutant Generals of the army in the Crimea were to be awarded to them for good service in the face of the enemy at the battles of the Alma and Inkerman, and he did not think that giving rewards for such conduct could at all fetter the House in coming to a judgment upon the general arrangements for the management of the army made by those officers, which was to be the subject of investigation before the Select Committee of that House.

Viscount EBRINGTON said, he thought that some provision should be made for defraying the cost of the outfits of the sergeants to whom commissions were to be given.

Mr. FREDERICK PEEL pointed out that a sum of 5,000*l.* was proposed to be granted for that purpose.

Mr. OTWAY said, he thought there was no period in history where our officers had met with treatment so unjust as had been awarded to Lord Raglan and our officers in the Crimea, they having been condemned by many hon. Members without being afforded the least opportunity of being heard. He could not concur in the proposition of the hon. Member to reduce the Vote by depriving the Adjutant and Quartermaster General of the sum awarded to them. Great blame had been attributed to some officers in the Crimea, especially those on the staff; but he hoped that when the matter was fully investigated, they would be brought before a tribunal a little less vague than that of public opinion.

Mr. WARNER said, that he had no intention of bringing any charge or of prejudging the matter.

Mr. W. WILLIAMS said, according to the statement he had seen in the public press, the Commander in Chief had been authorised to promote one sergeant in each regiment. He wished to know why the sergeants in each of the three battalions of guards were not appointed to Commissions in their own regiments?

Lord HOTHAM said, he thought the hon. Gentleman had arrived at an erroneous conclusion. The order was that a Commission should be granted to a non-commissioned officer in each regiment; but, in order to lose no time in carrying that order into effect, Lord Raglan had power to give temporary rank to the new Commissions, each in his own regiment.

Mr. W. WILLIAMS said, he would be glad if the Under Secretary for the War Office would answer his question.

Mr. FREDERICK PEEL was understood to say that he was not aware of the distinction, and that the matter rested entirely with the Commander in Chief.

Mr. CRAUFURD said, he thought that in granting the promotion it was impossible to separate those who received it from their own regiments. He trusted that his hon. Friend (Mr. Warner) would press his Amendment.

Mr. WARNER said, that in deference to the opinion of the Committee he would not press his Amendment.

Vote *agreed to.*

House resumed.

WAYS AND MEANS.

House in Committee.

Resolved—

> "That, towards making good the Supply granted to Her Majesty, the sum of 17,183,000*l.* be raised by Exchequer Bills for the Service of the year 1855."

Resolution to be reported *To-morrow.*

House resumed.

MILITIA (IRELAND) BILL.

Order for Second Reading read.

Mr. KEOGH moved the second reading of this Bill, and said he hoped that no objection would be made by hon. Gentlemen opposite.

Colonel DUNNE said, he would not object to the second reading of the Bill if the last clause were struck out. The Bill professed to remove doubts as to the Commissions of officers of militia in Ireland who had omitted to deliver descriptions of their qualifications, and to indemnify them against the consequences. He knew prosecutions were going on now, and there could be no objection to put an end to them, but there was a clause giving power to the Lord Lieutenant to remove any colonel of militia at his pleasure.

Mr. NAPIER said, this was a perfectly Irish Bill. One part of the 6th clause gave power to Her Majesty to signify her pleasure to the colonel or other commanding officer of any such regiment of militia to displace all or any officers or officer of militia, &c. It then went on to remove doubts which had been entertained whether such provision included the removal of the colonel, by declaring that it should be lawful for Her Majesty to signify to the colonel her pleasure that he should be displaced from his command. The first clause, too, was so framed that it enabled any person, simply by lodging a certificate of qualification, to become qualified whether he had any property or not.

Mr. KEOGH said, he must maintain that the intention of the clauses was clear enough, although their wording might be rather obscure. Any alteration, however, that was thought necessary might be considered in Committee.

Bill read 2°.

The House adjourned at One o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Tuesday, February 27, 1855.

Minutes.] Public Bills.—1ª Consolidated Fund (£3,300,000); Consolidated Fund (£20,000,000).
Royal Assent.—Army Service Act Amendment.

THE COMMAND OF THE TURKISH LEVIES—GENERAL VIVIAN—QUESTION.

The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH: My Lords, I have given notice to the noble Lord the Minister of War of my intention to put a question relative to the appointment of Major General Vivian, of the Madras army, to the command of the Turkish levies; and also a question relative to the appointment of some officers of reputation and experience to proceed to the Crimea, to inspect the state of affairs there, and to report thereon to the Government. I wish to know whether there will be any objection on the part of the noble Lord to lay a statement of the war services of Major General Vivian before the House. When an officer receives an annual gratuity of 100*l.* a statement of his war services is invariably printed in the Army Estimates; and if it is important that it should be known what are the war services of an officer in such case, how much more important is it that they should be known when an officer is appointed to form and command 20,000 men. I ask for this information because I have not been able to obtain it elsewhere. Let it not be supposed that I impugn the military character of Major General Vivian; I cannot do so, because of that military character I know nothing. He may be a very respectable officer—and he was respected in the Presidency of Madras, or he would not have been appointed adjutant general of the Madras army. He may have conducted himself in this appointment in a business-like way, and he may be a very fit officer to appoint as adjutant general to the Turkish levy; but the question is, his fitness for the peculiar employment that has been given to him. I think your Lordships will agree that a force of this irregular character, composed of Asiatics, ought to be commanded by officers who have had experience of Orientals;—that appears to be the intention of Her Majesty's Government. I think your Lordships will admit that three qualifications are required in the officer appointed to such a command; he should have a high reputation in India, because, in consequence of that reputation, more officers will be willing to serve with him, and therefore his sphere of selection or recommendation would be increased; and he should, besides, have been placed in a position in which he has had an opportunity of becoming personally acquainted with officers the most fitted for the appointments he may have to confer or recommend officers for; he should also have had personal experience in the management of irregular corps, which differ entirely from those composing the regular army. Now, this officer, appointed to the Turkish levy, has not had the good fortune to receive the honour of being made a Companion of the Bath, and, considering the great liberality with which this order has been conferred on the Indian army, I think that circumstance is at once a clear proof that he has not had an opportunity of distinguishing himself in important actions. In point of fact, being in the Madras army, unless he had the good fortune of being selected for service with an irregular corps in the Affghan war, he could not have had an opportunity of witnessing any great operation of war since the Burmese war, which terminated in 1826, because in the war in Affghanistan, on the Sutlej, in Scinde, and on the Indus, the Madras army was not employed. Being an officer in the Madras army, he has not been placed in a position in which he could by any possibility know the men most fitted to be appointed to the Turkish force; such men are to be found in our irregular corps, and of the officers belonging to the irregular corps in India two-thirds belong to the Bengal army; out of 298 officers 210 are in the Bengal army, and the others are equally divided between the Madras and Bombay armies. Again, as this officer has been attached to the Presidency of Madras, and not employed in any capacity in an irregular corps, he has not had that experience in the management of an irregular force which is absolutely necessary to enable him to form and discipline the irregular corps forming the Turkish levy. There is a great difference between a regular and irregular corps. In the former there are many officers and a large establishment of non-commissioned officers, under whom discipline is carried out; but there are only two or three officers to the latter; and it is, therefore, absolutely necessary that the officer of an irregular corps should associate with the men, know them all, and exercise a moral ascendancy over them to an extent not required in the regular army. It therefore appears to me that this officer has the misfortune of being deficient in all three of the requisites which ought to be possessed by the individual appointed to the command of levies of this description. He cannot have a high military reputation, not having enjoyed the opportunity of acquiring one; he cannot have become acquainted with the persons most fitted to officer such troops; and he cannot have had that experience of an irregular corps which is absolutely necessary to qualify a man for this appointment. My Lords, the number of officers whom Major General Vivian will have to recommend, or upon whose appointment he will have to express an opinion, is very considerable. I have looked into this matter, and I think it is impossible that fewer than 125 officers, according to the lowest calculation, will be required for the disciplining of these 20,000 men. Now, where are these 125 officers to be found?—in this country? I have seen notices in the newspapers desiring them to make their applications, and I wish to know in what manner and by what person these appointments are to be made. If recourse is only to be had to officers on furlough, the number obtainable will be exceedingly small; and, besides, many of those officers are here on account of their health, and are, therefore, not the fittest to be selected for employment. I consider that the officer appointed to the command should have to recommend such officers as are fit among those who are at home, but that the Government should reserve to itself a discretionary power of acceding to or rejecting his recommendations. But, above all, a letter should be written to the Governor General of India, explaining to him the circumstances of the case, and desiring him to make known the necessities of the Government, and to recommend and send at once those officers who, in his opinion, are the fittest to hold these commands. Should this step have been taken, I think the best course that could have been pursued will have been adopted. But what I have been informed from, I believe, credible sources is, that, with the exception of the young officers who will do anything to enjoy the excitement of service, few will be disposed to serve in the Turkish force, unless their brevet rank, now extending only to India, should be extended to Europe. My Lords, that is an important question. I have at all times entertained the opinion that it was altogether contrary to public policy to confine the services of Indian officers to India alone. I have always considered that it was deserving of consideration whether the services of those officers should not be made available in this country and in every part of the world. The boon would be to them most grateful. It costs the State nothing. If they are not employed at all, it gives them only a right to that social position which the courtesy of society always now acknowledges, but which they desire to have established on a firmer and more regular footing; while, on the other hand, if their services should be required, the State can at once call for them, and they can be employed with great advantage to the public service. There can be no doubt that service in India is of a larger character, and tends more to open the minds of officers, than the ordinary service of the British army. I do not say that brigadiers to command British regiments ought to be taken from the Indian army, although brigadiers in the Indian army often command English regiments in India with credit and success; but in your staff, commissariat, and transport you can employ the services of Indian officers with whom the officers of the British army in Europe cannot compete. Those Indian officers have a more extensive and more valuable experience, and I have no doubt that in those particular branches of the military service in which it is asserted that great deficiencies have been observed, those deficiencies may to a very great extent be supplied by applying to the public service in Europe the ability and experience of officers who have served in the corresponding departments in India. My Lords, I have made these observations with reference to the appointment of Major General Vivian and that of other officers, because I feel deeply impressed with the conviction that the very first thing—the very life of the execution of all public affairs, consists in the judicious choice of agents, and that the greatest judgment is shown, and the greatest errors are committed, in the selection of the instruments by whom measures are to be carried out. We have at the very commencement of this great war lost the only army we have, and we have not in our military institutions the means of replacing it. We have lost it notwithstanding the most extraordinary efforts of courage and devotion on the part of our officers and men. There has, indeed, been glory, but there has been utter loss. The military reputation of the country has been impaired, not by any failure of the officers and soldiers, but in consequence of the want of men equal to the command of the army and the conduct of its various departments. It is my conviction that unless you can find the men by whom these disasters can be repaired, it will be impossible for you to re-establish our military reputation.

LORD PANMURE: My Lords, I cannot deny the right of the noble Earl to take the course he has just thought proper to follow; but I do deny the justice of that course as regards Major General Vivian, and its prudence as respects our whole army in the East. With reference to Major General Vivian, I can scarcely say that that officer has been yet appointed to command the Turkish contingent. I am in communication, however, with him, and, so far as my responsibility is concerned, I mean to select him for the command of those troops. I will do so, my Lords, from no personal acquaintance with this gallant officer, but because, after consulting those on whom I think I can rely in this matter, I have arrived at the conclusion that I am fully justified in intrusting to Major General Vivian the high and important command of the Turkish contingent which is to be raised under the convention just executed between Her Majesty and the Sultan. I think, my Lords, we require other qualifications on the part of an officer besides those of being a dashing officer and of having been engaged in glorious achievements with irregular cavalry or regiments of the line in India to fit him to organise such a Turkish force as we contemplate. It requires a man who is not only respected and looked up to in the service to which he belongs, but who also has filled such a position as Major General Vivian has long held with reputation in the Madras army, to warrant the expectation that he can organise a large body of troops, and, having organised them, to subdivide them as may be requisite into the different arms of the service. My Lords, Major General Vivian has filled the responsible post of adjutant general, as the noble Earl states, in the Madras army. In early life, while connected with the Indian army, no man in his position in the subaltern or inferior ranks of the army ever displayed more courage or a more gallant bearing on the plains of India, than did Major General Vivian; and in his capacity of adjutant general of the Madras army he so conducted himself in the disciplining of that army and its conduct that on his retirement he received from the General in command in that Presidency the very highest testimonials which I ever knew any man to obtain from another. He received from the civil authorities of that Presidency testimonials equally strong; and he received from the authorities at home likewise testimonials of which, as an officer, he may well be proud. My Lords, if I wanted anything to confirm me in the opinion I have formed of the character of Major General Vivian, and of his fitness for this service, it is the simple fact which I am about to mention. Since it has gone abroad that it was in contemplation to appoint Major General Vivian to the command of the Turkish contingent, applications upon applications have flowed in from officers connected with the Indian service, each of whom is more anxious than the other to be employed under this gallant officer. My Lords, the selection of an officer for so high a command as this, I am aware, is attended with no little responsibility. I feel that responsibility in this case; nevertheless, I am not disposed to shrink from it. But I put it to the noble Earl whether, when an officer has not been actually appointed, it is either fair towards him or just towards the service he is to be called on to administer, to cast, from the moment his name is mentioned to the public—I will not say a slur upon him—but doubts as to his fitness for the discharge of the duties about to be imposed upon him.

The noble Earl has said that he doubts whether any but young officers will volunteer for service under General Vivian. To that assertion I am not able to make an answer, but this I can state, that it will be my duty to select the best officers I can find, of whatever grade they may be, and to give reward and employment to merit wherever that merit may present itself, allowing no personal considerations to interfere with the appointment of the best, most experienced, and most gallant officers whom the Indian army affords. No doubt the greater number of those officers at present at home on furlough will be the first to present themselves, but of course if a satisfactory selection cannot be made from them, the course referred to by the noble Earl will be adopted. Much valuable time, however, would be lost by resorting to this course at once, and therefore from among those who present themselves from the East India Company's service—than whom none better could be desired—from officers on half-pay of Her Majesty's service—nay, even from those who may have retired from the service whose abilities may recommend them for re-employment—I shall endeavour to make a selection of officers for this service. In every way it will be my desire to appoint officers to this contingent who will not only make it effective for the immediate service for which it is required, but who also will do their best to disseminate, through that portion of the Turkish army at least, the spirit, the order, and the gallantry of British troops—thereby conferring a temporary advantage on this country as well as on Turkey, and on Turkey herself a permanent good, by the new spirit and life which will be infused into her army. With reference to the other question on which the noble Earl slightly touched—whether it was the intention of the Government to appoint an officer to go to the Crimea to see and report on the state of affairs there—I have to answer that no such officer has been appointed, nor is it the present intention of Her Majesty's Government to appoint such an officer, but to wait and see the result of the steps already taken with reference to the staff in the Crimea. I was glad to hear that the noble Earl, in questioning this appointment of General Vivian, confined himself to the military fitness of that officer for such an appointment, bearing testimony at the same time, as I am sure every one must who knows him, to the worth of his personal character.

Lord Panmure

LORD VIVIAN: My Lords, I hope I may be permitted to say a few words in vindication of a gallant officer whom I have the honour to call my relative. I must say, my Lords, that I think it is rather hard that the noble Earl should—I will not say attack, but criticise the merits of a general officer, appointed to a particular service by the Executive, who are alone responsible for that appointment, in such a way as materially to damage the *prestige* of that officer, and to render him, perhaps, less useful for the service on which he is to be employed. As the noble Earl thinks he has a right to question General Vivian's capacity, because he has not received that reward for his services which it is for the Crown alone to bestow, I take leave to read to your Lordships the opinion of General Vivian's commanding officer on this point, in order that your Lordships and the public may see whether the selection of my gallant relative is a judicious one or not. The following is an extract from a letter to the Government authorities from the Commander in Chief of the Madras army when General Vivian resigned his office of Adjutant General:—

> "Bangalore, August 29, 1853.
>
> "But besides the requisite ability for the discharge of the duties of his department, Colonel Vivian possesses such eminent qualifications for active command that the Commander in Chief would feel himself wanting in his duty to the Government, to the Hon. the Court of Directors, as well as to the distinguished officer in question, did not his Excellency bring the subject thus prominently to notice, in the hope that, should Colonel Vivian return to India, early opportunity will be taken to select him for employment in such manner as may be most beneficial to the public service. There is not, in the Commander in Chief's opinion, in any army a more gallant soldier than Colonel Vivian. The record of his services contained in the accompanying general order of the Commander in Chief shows that he distinguished hinself in the field on every occasion on which he has had an opportunity of doing so. 'Many officers who have seen less service have (the Commander in Chief believes) been honoured with the approbation of their Sovereign; and, should the right hon. the Governor in Council participate in his Excellency's sentiments in regard to the Colonel's merits, Sir R. Armstrong doubts not that the home authorities will recommend to Her Majesty the recognition of Colonel Vivian's services.'"

General Vivian has also had the honour of being mentioned three times in public despatches. Whenever he has had the opportunity he has distinguished himself by gallant conduct in the field; and I do believe I am justified in saying that no more distinguished officer could have been found for this command. It is hardly necessary for me to say that I knew nothing whatever of the appointment of my gallant relative until it had been made known to the public in the public journals. The noble Earl says he does not think any officer of distinction would consent to serve under General Vivian; but I can only say to that, that two general officers, one of them a C.B., have offered themselves to serve under him, and many distinguished field officers are crowding in to offer their services. I must repeat, I think it most unjustifiable and most cruel to attack the *prestige* of an officer about to undertake a most arduous and responsible duty, and I do not think we are justified in taking such a course in this House. The Executive is responsible for the appointment of officers, and it is sufficient for us to interfere whenever an officer goes wrong and proves himself incompetent for his duty.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH: The noble Lord has mistaken me on one point. I did not say that no officer of distinction would consent to serve under General Vivian. What I said was, that the more distinguished the officer appointed to command this contingent the more probable it was that officers of distinction would press forward to take service under him. With regard to the rest, I made no doubt but that General Vivian was a most respectable officer; that he had the respect of those who were acquainted with him was evident from the fact that he had held the office of Adjutant General of the Madras army, and I thought he would have done extremely well in a similar position in this contingent. What I questioned was his fitness for the peculiar appointment which has been conferred upon him.

LORD VIVIAN: I must venture to tell the noble Earl that higher military authorities than he have pronounced General Vivian to be an officer peculiarly fitted for command in the field. I am perfectly aware the noble Earl thinks himself able to command an army in the field, but I wish to point out to him that General Vivian's reputation has been stamped with the approval of those who have actually commanded armies in the field.

ROMAN CATHOLIC PROCESSIONS (IRELAND)—QUESTION.

LORD BERNERS asked whether the fact stated as to certain Roman Catholic ecclesiastics in Ireland having appeared publicly in their robes had been submitted to the law officers of the Crown with the view to ascertain its legality; and, if so, whether there was any objection to lay that opinion of those officers before the House? He also wished to know whether it was probable the Report of the Commissioners to inquire into the education given at Maynooth would shortly be laid before the House—and likewise whether it was true that a copy of the evidence taken before that Commission had been delivered to the Right Rev. Dr. Cullen?

EARL GRANVILLE was understood to say that the law officers of the Crown had stated their opinion to be that the Act did not affect the secular or working clergy. With respect to the second question, not having had an opportunity of communicating with the noble Earl at the head of the Commission (the Earl of Harrowby) he was not in a position to answer it.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE BILL—COMMITTEE.

House in Committee (according to Order).

THE LORD CHANCELLOR explained the nature of the amendments he proposed to introduce into the measure. In the first place he proposed to reduce the amount for stealing property to the value of which persons might be tried summarily by the magistrates in petty sessions from 20*s.* to 10*s.* He proposed also to reduce the period of imprisonment that might be inflicted from one year to six months, and, in the case of a person pleading guilty to a larceny of greater value than 10*s.*, to one year instead of two years. He also proposed to enact that in no case should any summary conviction under this Act be attended with forfeiture. Exception having been taken to the Aldermen of the City of London being intrusted with the power of summary conviction, he had decided to omit them from the Bill, although the statistics certainly seemed to show that justice was at present by no means less efficiently administered by them than by the magistracy generally. He also proposed to give an option to the accused either to have their cases summarily adjudicated upon or to be dealt with in the usual manner.

LORD BROUGHAM expressed his satisfaction generally at the amendments introduced into the Bill by his noble and learned Friend on the woolsack. To show the extensive operation which the Bill was likely to have, he might mention that in the year 1853 there were 21,000 committals for petty larceny, 12,500 of which were of offenders who had stolen property of a less value than 5*s*. Even, therefore, if the amount of property for stealing which a man could be summarily tried was limited to 5*s*., the Bill would probably be applicable in 12,500 cases in the course of a year. He was, however, very glad that the sum was fixed at 10*s*. instead of 5*s*. With all possible respect for the Corporation of the City of London, of which he was a member, he must say that he did not think it was advisable to give the Lord Mayor or an Alderman, sitting alone, greater powers than were possessed by single magistrates generally, and it was, therefore, with great satisfaction that he heard from his noble and learned Friend that he did not intend to retain them in the clause by which power to convict summarily was given to police and stipendiary magistrates.

Lord CAMPBELL said, he was sorry that his noble and learned Friend on the woolsack had consented to limit the operation of the Bill to larcenies to a smaller value than 10*s*., instead of extending it, as he had originally proposed, to 20*s*. He was, on the other hand, glad that the maximum amount of imprisonment to be inflicted under the Bill was to be limited to one year, which he thought quite sufficient to be imposed without the intervention of a jury. He was glad also that the noble and learned Lord had given the option of a trial by jury; for had he not done so he must have opposed the Bill as unconstitutional. It was also with great satisfaction that he heard that the Lord Mayor and a sitting Alderman of the City of London were not to be included in the clause permitting certain single magistrates to exercise the summary jurisdiction given by this Bill. Entertaining as he did the highest possible respect for the Corporation of the City of London, he nevertheless could not admit that the Lord Mayor or an Alderman was equal to any other two justices throughout the country. The great fault that he found with the Bill introduced during the last Session of Parliament by his learned Friend the Recorder of London for abolishing grand juries at the Central Criminal Court, was, that it made one Alderman equal to twenty-three grand jurymen. The present Bill certainly did not carry aldermanic laudation so far; but he nevertheless thought that his noble and learned Friend had done wisely in striking the City magistracy out of the clause to which he was now referring.

Lord ST. LEONARDS expressed his approbation that the amount of the value for stealing which a man might be punished summarily by the petty sessions had been reduced from 20*s*. to 10*s*., because he thought that if they had embraced all offences up to the former amount in the present measure, the result would have been to throw such an amount of business on the petty sessions as the magistracy—particularly in the rural districts—would have found themselves unable to dispose of. He thought also that a year's imprisonment, with hard labour, was quite a sufficient amount of punishment to be inflicted by magistrates at petty sessions without the intervention of a jury.

Lord BROUGHAM wished just to remind his noble and learned Friend (the Lord Chancellor) that the clerks of the peace were differently paid in different counties, and he understood there was a considerable disposition on their part to oppose the measure. In some counties they were paid by salary, and in others by fees, but he hoped some measure would be taken to have them all paid by salary. So great was the variety of fees in different counties, that in one place the charge for discharging a recognisance was 12*s*. 6*d*., and, in another, only 2*s*.

Lord CAMPBELL observed, that in some counties a great many petty offences were tried, at considerable expense and inconvenience, before the judges of assize, and he thought that such cases might much more satisfactorily be disposed of by the magistrates at quarter sessions, or at intermediate sessions.

The LORD CHANCELLOR thought that the inconvenience to which his noble and learned Friend referred was experienced only in the smaller counties, where there were very few criminals for trial.

Lord BROUGHAM considered that the two circuits now held by Her Majesty's Judges in the course of the year were insufficient to meet the exigencies of the country. It was true that this Bill would effect improvements which would render the rare going of circuit by the Judges a lesser evil with regard to criminal proceedings; but the inconvenience with respect to civil proceedings would still remain the same. He would suggest, therefore, whether steps ought not to be taken to increase permanently the number of circuits. He should think that four circuits a year would not be by any means too many. He was quite aware that difficulties must be encountered before this, in his opinion, most beneficial change could be carried into effect; but he had no doubt that the suggestion would be candidly and fairly considered by the learned Judges, with a desire on their part, to do their duty in the manner most advantageous to the public service and to the administration of justice.

Lord CAMPBELL could only say, as one of Her Majesty's Judges, that he was willing to serve either in town or country, wherever he might be required, and that no exertion on his part should be wanting for the due discharge of his duties; but he must remind his noble and learned Friend that the time of the Judges was now entirely occupied with the duties that were cast upon them. It would be utterly impossible, with the present staff of Judges, that assizes could be held so frequently as the noble and learned Lord proposed. If his noble and learned Friend thought it would be beneficial to have thirty Judges instead of fifteen, that was a matter for consideration; but he thought that such a proposition would be open to many objections. Unless, however, the number of Judges was considerably increased, it would be impossible to carry into effect the suggestion of his noble and learned Friend.

Lord ST. LEONARDS hoped that no addition would be made to the number of the Judges. Nor could anything be more unwise than to call upon the magistrates to hold more frequent quarter sessions at the same time that it was proposed to increase their duties at petty sessions so considerably. He was sure that if it was left to the magistrates themselves to fix the times of holding the quarter sessions, they would make satisfactory arrangements for the administration of justice.

Amendments made; the Reports thereof to be received on *Monday* next.

THE TRANSPORT SERVICE.

The Earl of HARDWICKE: My Lords, I rise for the purpose of moving for certain returns, of which I have given notice; and I shall ask your Lordships, if those returns are granted, to permit me to make some slight observations on the terms of my Motion. Under ordinary circumstances, I should content myself with merely moving for these returns; but there are peculiar reasons why I think it my duty upon this occasion to lay before your Lordships a statement of the case which induced me to bring them before the House. The information with which I have been supplied is, of course, not obtained from any official source, and it is probable, therefore, that it will not have the same degree of weight with your Lordships that any answer which may come from the Government may have; but, nevertheless, my Lords, in all the affairs of this war, the public have been so well informed, and so much feeling has been excited with regard to every branch of the services connected with the war, that, generally speaking, the information supplied to the country has been pretty accurate. Probably, if I were to enter into any detail upon this matter, I should merely weary your Lordships, and perhaps commit several of those errors which persons receiving their information from ordinary channels are liable to commit. Nevertheless, the broad features of the case which I am about to lay before your Lordships are, I believe, perfectly true, or your Lordships may be certain I should not have ventured to bring them before you. My Lords, nothing that I know of can convey a stronger feeling of the desire of this country to carry on the war with vigour than that the whole of the resources of the country should have been laid, as it were, at the feet of the Government. The other night the other House of Parliament voted, almost without discussion, a sum of upwards of 5,000,000*l.* for the transport service of the ensuing year, notwithstanding that that House possessed the knowledge that during last year a sum of no less than 3,582,000*l.* had been expended in the transport service of the country. It is partly for this reason, and also because the First Lord of the Admiralty, in bringing forward the Estimate, though making two general statements, wholly omitted the details of the transport service, that I am desirous, when the Estimates of the House of Commons are brought up in this House in the form of a Bill, to have placed in the hands of your Lordships the returns which I now ask for. It was stated in another place that the expenditure of the last year for the transport service was 3,582,474*l.*, and for the year 1855–6 the sum required was 5,081,465*l.*, which two sums taken together would, I believe, purchase the whole of the transports employed in the service of the Crown. The number of transports stated to be employed was not given in any detail, but it was stated that they were employed, more or less, during the year, thus implying that some ships had been employed for a short period and others for a long period. It was stated that 102 steam transports had been employed with a tonnage of 121,060 tons, and 153 sailing vessels with a tonnage of 93,172 tons, making altogether a tonnage of 214,232 tons. This gives a sum of about 16*l.* a ton for the whole of the tonnage employed during the year. But the Government found coals for the steamers, which is a most important feature in this case, and one which I beg your Lordships to bear in mind. The Government agreed to find coals, in addition to the money paid for the hire of the transports. I say then that the 16*l.* a ton paid for every description of vessel for the year does not appear at first sight an exorbitant sum; but we do not know the period for which the various vessels were employed—whether they were chiefly steam or sailing vessels, or what proportion of each was employed. It was necessary, in my opinion, that this information should have been given to Parliament, but that course was not adopted. The sum now asked for is so monstrous, that in recent periods—for instance, in the years 1830 and 1831—the amount of money obtained for the whole service of the Royal Navy was about equal to the sum now asked for the maintenance of the transport service. The sums which have been voted in former years for the Royal Navy have varied from 5,000,000*l.* to 6,000,000*l.*, and now a sum of 5,000,000*l.* has been granted by the House of Commons for the transport service alone. Under such circumstances, it will naturally be asked, how has this amount of money been expended? My Lords, I venture to assert, with very great humility, that in the whole service of the Crown, under any circumstances whatever, there has hardly ever been evinced a greater degree of profligate extravagance with regard to the expenditure of the public money, a greater degree of carelessness and ignorance in the mode of making the contracts, a greater degree of slovenliness in employing the various vessels, and a less amount of arrangement in the vessels sailing from and coming into the ports of this country. Nay, more; in the quarter in which these ships have been employed—namely, the Black Sea—their utility has been destroyed by a system, or rather by a want of system and a want of arrangement in the various departments—in the receiving department, the landing department, the department for embarking the troops, and for carrying on, in short, all those mechanical operations necessary in a service of this description, and which are so familiar to all persons engaged in mercantile transactions in this country. Now, my Lords, I am bound to show, after making this statement, upon what grounds I venture to use such strong language. When the war first broke out it was thought necessary at once to employ a large amount of tonnage for the purpose of conveying our army a considerable distance for the invasion of an enemy's country. The Government then issued a notice to the public, stating that they were prepared to take up tonnage to a very considerable amount. Merchants came willingly forward with vessels of every amount of tonnage and every description of construction;—in short, the whole trade of the country seemed at once for the moment to be laid at the feet of the Crown. The Government then proceeded to contract for a certain amount of tonnage, and in the process of entering into these contracts they were induced to make arrangements upon terms which very much astonished the merchants, and led them to see at once that the persons engaged in a business of so important a nature were wholly and entirely ignorant of the manner in which such great mercantile transactions ought to be made and carried out. No doubt your Lordships will be perfectly aware that, in the ordinary technical language of builders and seafaring men, there are two distinct descriptions of tonnage—namely, builders' tonnage and registered tonnage; but some of your Lordships may not be aware of the amazing difference existing in a steam-vessel between the two descriptions of tonnage. To show your Lordships the difference which really does exist I will give you an instance. The builders' tonnage of the *Britannia* of the Cunard line is 1,154 tons, but her registered tonnage is only 619 tons, there being a tonnage of upwards of 500 tons occupied by her engines and propelling power. Now, my Lords, the gentlemen to whom the duty of making the contracts was intrusted sent away the merchants perfectly delighted with the news that the contracts about to be entered into would be made at so much per ton builders' tonnage. This was the beginning of a series of difficulties which could not be got over. The contracts were signed and the arrangements made; and, in addition to taking up the ships on these terms, Government undertook to supply the steamers with coals. In the midst of their difficulties the Government began to consider that the best mode of getting out of the position in which they found themselves placed would be to purchase the transports which they had hired, which would, of course, involve a very large expenditure of money at once. Up to a recent date two transports have been delivered into the hands of the Crown, and I am afraid that in the case of each of those transports a large additional expense will have to be borne by the country. The *Prince* was lost in the great storm in the Black Sea, and the *Perseverance* was upset in the dock, and can only be rendered fit for public service at a great outlay. This was the commencement of a series of accidents to the transport service which has involved the country in such an amount of expenditure. Another circumstance which had much to do with the loss of public money with reference to the transports was, that the Government entered into arrangements with another company that was engaged in the postal service between England and North America and the West Indies, and I think the amount of money paid for this postal service was between 200,000*l.* and 300,000*l.* per annum. The vessels of this company were taken up as transports, and they were allowed to enter into arrangements like any other merchants; and, having been thus deprived of the means of carrying on their postal contract, they were still allowed to receive the money they had contracted to receive for such postal service. This appears to me to have been another very great error. Added to this, since these contracts have been entered into by Government, great difficulty is found in sending to various parts of the world. You cannot send anything to the Crimea, for there is no regular communication kept up by the packets; and if you want to send there you are obliged to go to the Government and the officers of the Crown, and beg them to assist you in sending anything you may desire to the Crimea, or any other part of the world. After the Government had entered into these contracts one would suppose that the greatest vigilance and earnestness would have been used on their part to keep these vessels in constant employ, for the purpose of saving as much as they could under the circumstances; but a great number of these transports have been kept so extremely idle that while their owners have revelled in advantageous contracts, they have not been called upon in many instances to perform any great amount of work. The *Simla*, a very large vessel of near 3,000 tons, lay at Constantinople for six weeks, having nothing whatever to do. Another case occurred in the Black Sea—a vessel was freighted from England with boots and shoes; when it arrived at Balaklava, there was no person to whom the cargo was consigned, it was not allowed to be received; and it is a notorious fact that this vessel crossed the Black Sea three times before it could get rid of its cargo. Another flagrant case of mismanagement was what I may call the potato case. Owing to the anxiety of the Government to give the army relief and assistance, a transport obtained a cargo of potatoes; but, as there was no consignment or consignee or bills of lading, these potatoes could not be received at Balaklava; the master of the transport, very wisely, seeing the potatoes would be destroyed if kept longer on board, permitted the people on the shore to take the potatoes away; they did so; and these persons sold the potatoes at the highest possible price they could exact to the troops, to whom they were intended as a gift. I have shown that these contracts and the mode of dealing with these transports have been attended with great loss to the country. But this is not all; let us see what takes place at home in cases where transports are called upon to carry troops or stores to the Crimea. I am happy to be able to state that if the transport was employed for carrying naval stores as connected with the dockyard, there the mode in which the arrangements have been conducted was perfect in itself; the ship was properly laden, the stores which were to be last delivered were put underneath, while those to be delivered first were placed at the top, and there was a constant uniformity and good management in reference to the dockyards and the officers connected with them. But if, on the other hand, it happened that the transport was called on to load with stores for the army, then they had confusion worse confounded; they had the Treasury and Commissariat sending stores, the Ordnance sending shot and shell, the Medical Department with its medical stores, and other departments wrangling which stores should be put in first and which last; in many cases the articles last wanted were stowed away uppermost; and in many instances the vessels sailed with their tonnage not completed, while in other cases vessels became crowded to excess, and carried more than they ought. So much for the vessels on leaving the ports of this country. We have heard enough of their reception at Balaklava; but I should like to say a few words on the vessels arriving in this country. The vessels bring invalids, and generally put in at Portsmouth. They are of considerable tonnage, and, though well adapted to be handled in great waters, they are unfit for the navigation of small rivers. After they have arrived at Portsmouth, and landed part of their men, orders are frequently sent to them to come round to the Medway for the purpose of landing the remainder of their men, and the value of the coals consumed by these vessels in going up the Medway and returning to Portsmouth, is, at the present price, equal to 400*l.*; and the object was to land, perhaps, 100 invalids, who might have been conveyed by railway for less than 50*l.* It was not until it was found at how small a sum the men could be conveyed to Chatham and elsewhere by railway, that it was thought more desirable to adopt this mode of conveyance than to bring the vessels up the Medway at such an expense. These are instances of mismanagement that have been attended with such a large expenditure of public money as renders the case one most important for the consideration not only of the other House, but of Parliament, for the purpose of rectifying these tremendous mistakes and abuses that have arisen in all departments with reference to this war. Such has been the confusion in the embarkation of cargoes and the ignorance of the Government with reference to the character of the cargoes embarked, that when the *Prince* was lost the Admiralty wrote to every dockyard in the country, inquiring if they knew what was in her—if they knew the cargo received at that particular port. Every port in the south said they had never heard of the ship until it was lost;—and the fact was that it was laden under the very nose of the Government in the Thames. In addition to the valuable cargo that was lost in the *Prince*, report said that 200,000*l.* in money went down in her, and I should like to know whether this was so. My Lords, I have now stated very shortly a few of the points bearing most strongly on this question, and which form the grounds that induce me to move for these returns. There is nothing of more importance—as I think there is nothing more easy of attainment—in the conduct of the war than the regular and proper management of the transport service. In a mercantile State like this, or like the United States of America, such a service may be considered to be only part and parcel of the commercial system of the country; and if the Government had only consulted any of our great merchants, both as to the mode of taking up shipping and the manner of afterwards turning it to account, I am confident that the cost of conducting the communications with the army in the Crimea would have been greatly lightened. Of this fact I am convinced, if I only look at the mode in which the ships were hired and supplied with coal. That the Government should furnish the steam-vessels with coal may be perfectly necessary, in order to remove excuses for delay based upon alleged detention from the want of fuel; but the principle on which the coal has been supplied by the Government is very wasteful, and affords no check against abuse. If the merchant or the captain fills his vessel with fuel, the Government has no means of knowing whether he gave any part of his supply away or assisted any other merchant vessel with it. Now, I would suggest that the Government should contract with the owner for the use of his vessel, including the price of coal, and should reserve to itself the power of deducting an average rate—say, 50*s.*—for every ton that it supplied to the vessel. By this means it would be made the merchant's interest to economise the fuel and give none of it away. The cost of coal is a serious item in steam navigation, and a vessel of the power of the *Himalaya* or the *Simla* requires an amount of fuel to propel her of the value of not less than 9,000*l.* or 10,000*l.* per annum. I have mentioned the case of the *Simla*, which lay so long idle at Constantinople, although she was hired by the Government at a rate per month which would make 90,000*l.* a year. Now, I have taken the trouble, with the assistance of other persons who are competent authorities on such a subject, to calculate the amount that ought to be paid for the use of such a ship if fairly hired and required to find her own fuel, and I compute the sum at the rate of 46,750*l.* per annum. I do not say that errors may not have found their way into the public mind regarding the cost of the transport service to the country; but it is obviously most desirable that your Lordships should be set right respecting a branch of the public expenditure of the magnitude of 5,000,000*l.* a year. Within the last few days, I am sorry to say, I learn that the same profitless expenditure has been continued as has been going on from the outset. Public attention has been much aroused on the subject of the green coffee supplied to the army in the Crimea, and the Government have been anxious to correct the evil complained of as speedily as possible, by employing a ship to convey a cargo of roasted coffee to the East. A merchant found a ship for the Government, and as this is a case which illustrates the manner in which the merchants are able to deal with the Government, I will briefly relate the circumstances to your Lordships. The name of the steamer engaged for this service was the *Telegraph*, a vessel which was originally employed as a packet in plying between England and Ireland. The *Telegraph* is a fast vessel, and she had run a race with some of the boats on the Irish station. She was far too expensive for her work, and her owners were glad to get her chartered for a cargo by the Government. She was of 500 tons register, and about 900 tons builders' measurement, and of 440-horse power. Her consumption of coal was three tons per hour, and about 400 tons of cargo were considered quite enough for her when engaged in the coasting trade. Her cost was 28,000*l.*, and at what rate, then, did the Government hire her? Why, at 2,500*l.* per month, which would enable her owners in ten months to realise the whole value of the vessel! Well, the *Telegraph* was laden with coffee, and was to sail for the Crimea, and General Simpson was about to embark in her; but when he saw her, the gallant General refused to go out in such a ship, and he did not do it either;—indeed, the vessel did not go herself, for she was found so deeply laden with coffee that the water ran into her at the closet-tubes, and she had to be taken into dock. I believe, however, she sailed at last, but if she meets with southerly winds in the Atlantic, I dare say she will have to put in for coals at Vigo, and again at Malta; and after three or four stoppages of this kind she may arrive at Constantinople; but it is doubtful, after all, whether this much-wanted coffee will ever reach the troops. The facts I have mentioned are only samples of the occurrences that have so justly excited the public discontent and indignation. I do not assert that there is any ground, with our present knowledge, upon all these circumstances, to warrant us in passing any censure upon the Government; but I think it is necessary that we should be furnished with official information relating to these transactions; and to obtain that information, as I have stated, is the object of my present Motion for returns. The noble Earl then concluded by moving—

"That there be laid before this House—1. Return of the Number of Transports employed in carrying Troops and Munitions of War, between the 1st of November 1853 and the 1st of March 1855 inclusive: 2. The Name of each Vessel (Transport); distinguishing those purchased from those hired: 3. Her Tonnage under old and new Measurement, distinguishing Steam from Sailing vessels, 4. If Steam, Number of nominal and indicated Horse Power: 5. Showing the Amount of Tonnage occupied by Machinery, Coals, Crew, Water, Provisions, and Ship Stores: 6. Showing what Amount is left for Cargo: 7. Showing the Number of Tons of Coal consumed: 8. Showing if any Transport is under Agreement for Postal or any other Service previous to being taken up as a transport: 9. Showing the Amount paid for the Hiring of each Vessel per Month or per Year, with or without Coals: 10. How long a Period each Transport was hired for, and from what Date: 11. For what Service she was engaged: 12. From what Owner she was hired: 13. Showing whether any Alteration has been made in the Terms since first hired, and, if any, what Difference: 14. If Alterations have been made (or Fittings added) in the internal Arrangements of any Transport, describing the Alteration or Fitting, with the Vessel's Name: 15. At whose Expense the Alteration or Fitting has been made, and the Amount of the Expense incurred."

LORD PANMURE: My Lords, it was quite impossible for me when the noble Earl opposite gave notice of this Motion to anticipate all the statements that he intended to make on this occasion; but I readily give the noble Earl credit for having no other object in touching upon the topics to which he has referred than that of obtaining accurate information as to the matters to which they relate. I also fully admit that Parliament is entitled to the strictest account of the expenditure of the large sums which have been required for the transport service. To the production of the returns asked for by the noble Earl, I know of no objection; and, as he proposes to amend his Motion in some particulars, I shall be glad to confer with him with regard to those Amendments. The Government which preceded the one to which I have the honour to belong were quite sensible that in the hurry of sending out the expedition to the East errors might have been committed, and blame incurred by the persons whose duties were connected with the transport service. With the view of remedying those evils the Government appointed officers of their own to make special inquiries into the mismanagement in loading and unloading the transports to which the noble Earl has referred. Those officers have forwarded their reports to me this day, but I have not yet had an opportunity of making myself acquainted with their contents. An inquiry is going on as to the whole subject, and there will be no difficulty in making public the result of that inquiry after the Government have had an opportunity of considering it. With regard to the chartering of steamers, I have made inquiries, and I am assured that those intrusted with these transactions made the bargains with their eyes open, fully aware of the difference between hiring by the register and by the gross tonnage; and I am assured, too, that the contract price upon the whole of the gross tonnage was much lower than it would have been if made upon the registered tonnage; so that, had the steamers been hired on the registered tonnage, they would have cost nominally a much larger figure per ton. With reference to the various points referred to by the noble Earl—such, for instance, as the cargo of boots and shoes sent out without invoice or notice—all these will be matters for inquiry. A stop has now been put to the recurrence of such things by the institution by the late First Lord of the Admiralty of a Transport Board, which will reduce the transport service to order and regularity. A gentleman from the mercantile community has been placed upon that Board, in order that it may have the benefit of the experience of the merchant service; and I confidently hope that the reform commenced by the late First Lord of the Admiralty will have the result of making the transport service more regular and more efficient. It must be remembered that we have not only had to transport, land, and re-transport our own army, but that we have also had to carry large quantities of men and stores for our allies—both the French and the Turks; everything was expected to be done, too, with the utmost rapidity; and, taking all things into consideration, though there may have been some deviation from the regular process of business transactions, and omissions and mistakes have been occasionally committed, I think your Lordships must confess the transport service has been on the whole efficiently executed. Every step, however, is being taken to remedy whatever was deficient, and to put matters on the best possible footing. Of course I have no hesitation to agree to the production of the returns for which the noble Earl has moved.

The Earl of DERBY: The noble Lord who has just sat down, having apologetically and fully admitted that there has been great neglect, great mismanagement, and very considerable abuse in relation to this subject, and having promised to produce the returns asked for by my noble Friend behind me—which returns will show the extent of that abuse, and which will inform us who are the men that are responsible—this, of course, is not a fitting opportunity for continuing the discussion. My only object now is to call attention to a statement which appeared in one of the last despatches of Lord Raglan, to the effect that the condition of the army was generally improving; but that there was one subject of complaint and suffering, inasmuch as the Commissariat had not received at that time a large amount of hay and forage which was expected from England. Now, I wish to ask the noble Lord whether he has ascertained the cause of this apparent neglect in the furnishing of the hay and forage for the small number of horses that remained in our army in the Crimea? and whether he thought that blame was to be attached to any individual for not furnishing this hay, and whether care has been taken to ensure a more regular supply?

Lord PANMURE: Before I answer the question of the noble Earl, I beg, in the first place, to deny that I have made an apologetic speech, or that I have admitted that great neglect and great abuses have existed in relation to this subject; and I trust that the noble Earl will not misinterpret what falls from me in future. In reference to the question of the supply of hay for our horses in the Crimea, the information I have to give the noble Earl is this:—No doubt, at the period at which Lord Raglan wrote, there was a deficiency of hay at Balaklava. I confess that that statement rather surprised me, because, if there is any one article more than another of which I felt assured there would be a regular supply, it was that of hay and forage; for I knew that my noble Friend who preceded me in office had taken the most perfect means for the supply of forage for our army. It happened, however, that within a day or two after the letter alluded to had been written by Lord Raglan, a large supply of hay and forage had arrived at Balaklava; and I have every reason to believe that measures have been taken to ensure a regular supply of forage at Balaklava at least every fortnight, and therefore there is not the slightest prospect of the army being distressed for want of it.

The Earl of ELLENBOROUGH asked the noble Lord whether he did not think it more advisable to have the hay supplied by private contract? He apprehended that a great saving would be effected by adopting such a course.

Lord PANMURE said, he rather thought that the noble Earl was mistaken. He found, upon inquiry, that under the contracts entered into by the Government they had obtained hay at a cheaper rate than the ordinary contractors would be able to procure it.

Viscount CANNING said, there was one point mentioned by the noble Earl in his statement to which he wished to allude. With respect to his observations in reference to the postal services, he begged to assure the noble Earl, that not only in respect to the Cunard steamers, but to those of every other Company carrying mails whose vessels had been taken up as transports, there was a rateable reduction made from the postal subsidy. So far from the Messrs. Cunard receiving 200,000*l.* or 300,000*l.* for their postal services last year, they would only receive such a sum as was equivalent to the service they were able to perform with their reduced fleet.

On Question, *agreed to.*

House adjourned to Thursday next.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Tuesday, February 27, 1855.

Minutes.] New Member Sworn.—For Cardigan Borough, John Lloyd Davies, Esq.

New Writ.—For Northampton Borough, *v.* the Right Hon. Robert Vernon Smith, President of the Board of Control.

Public Bills.—1° Ecclesiastical Courts.

Reported—Commons Inclosure.

3° Consolidated Fund (£3,000,000); Consolidated Fund (£20,000,000).

ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS—QUESTION.

Mr. HADFIELD said, he begged to ask the hon. and learned Solicitor General whether it was intended during the present Session to introduce a Bill to abolish Ecclesiastical Courts, or to transfer the testamentary jurisdiction thereof to any other court, and to make one probate of will or grant of administration of sufficient binding authority over the entire property of any deceased person in all parts of the United Kingdom, the Colonies, or elsewhere, within the dominions of the Crown?

The SOLICITOR GENERAL said, his attention had been directed to the preparation of a measure relating to the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts, but it had been impossible for the Government, by reason of recent occurrences, to consider the subject sufficiently to enable him as yet to lay any measure upon the subject before the House. In a short time, however, he hoped to be able to present to the House a Bill for transferring the testamentary jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts to a new tribunal. In respect to the latter part of the question put by the hon. Gentleman, he begged to say that he was entirely of opinion that any measure of the kind must be imperfect which did not provide that a probate of a will, or a grant of administration in one part of the kingdom, should be of sufficient binding authority in all other parts of the United Kingdom. But there was at the present time some little difficulty existing in consequence of the testamentary jurisdiction in Scotland being different from what it was in the rest of the kingdom. It was his intention to consult with his right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Advocate on the subject. With respect to the Colonies, the law on the subject was so different from what it was in this country that it was felt to be impossible to make any Bill adapted to the United Kingdom applicable to our possessions abroad.

Mr. COWAN said, he wished to ask the hon. and learned Solicitor General a question on the same subject—namely, whether in the proposed Bill, or by means of a separate Bill for Scotland, if necessary, care would be taken that confirmation granted in Scotland should have equal validity and authority with one probate or letters of administration over the entire property of a deceased person, in whatever part of Her Majesty's dominions it might be situated.

The SOLICITOR GENERAL said, he had already answered that question. It was desired by the framers of the Bill to accomplish the object which the hon. Gentleman had in view—namely, that probate in England should have the same effect as probate in Scotland, and *vice versâ.*

MAYNOOTH COMMISSION—QUESTION.

Mr. SPOONER said, he wished to ask the noble Lord at the head of the Government when the Report of the Maynooth Commissioners was likely to be laid upon the table of the House, and whether he was aware of the fact—for such he (Mr. Spooner) knew it to be—that a portion, if not the whole, of the evidence contained in the Report, had been already submitted to Dr. Cullen? He should wish also to know by whom and upon whose authority that evidence had been so furnished to Dr. Cullen?

Viscount PALMERSTON said, that the Report was now nearly in print; that he understood the last part of it had been revised, and that in a few days it would be laid before the House. He found that before that Report had been made a question had arisen as to the solution of certain questions relating to ecclesiastical discipline, in connection with the College of Maynooth, and that one of the Commissioners was desirous of having the opinion of Dr. Cullen, as one of the trustees of the college, upon that question of discipline. Dr. Cullen had stated that he could not well give an opinion upon the point until he had seen the evidence out of which the question had arisen. It also appeared that Dr. Cullen, understanding, as he did, the purpose for which the evidence had been put into his hands, and the degree of discretion which he was expected to exercise with regard to it, had taken the evidence with him to Rome, and had there, without the knowledge of the Commissioners, and without any permission from them, had part of it translated into the Italian language, and published in Rome. So far as the Commissioners were concerned, he (Lord Palmerston) did not think they were to blame. They wished to have an opinion on ecclesiastical discipline from competent authority, and whether they acted prudently in placing the evidence in the hands of Dr. Cullen, every one was able to judge for himself. The result proved that the Commissioners had been deficient in proper caution.

Mr. SPOONER said, he wished to know which of the Commissioners it was who had laid the evidence before Dr. Cullen, and also whether, in so doing, he had had the concurrence of his fellow Commissioners?

Viscount PALMERSTON said, that the concurrence of the entire body of Commissioners had, in taking that step, neither been asked nor given. The communication upon the subject of the ecclesiastical discipline of the college had naturally been made by a Roman Catholic member of the Commission.

RIGHT HON. T. F. KENNEDY.

Mr. BLAND said, he wished to ask the hon. Secretary of the Treasury whether, notwithstanding the Treasury minute of the 10th of May last, wherein the First Lord of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer were stated to have considered the office theretofore held by Mr. Kennedy vacant, and notwithstanding Mr. Kennedy's own letter mentioning himself as having been dismissed from such office as from May last, he (Mr. Kennedy) had continued to draw the salary in respect of such office; and if so, up to what time and for what services?

Mr. WILSON said, that he had that day made inquiry into the subject of the hon. Member's question, and that he had found the facts of the case to be as follows:—When the minute of the 10th of May had been passed, Mr. Kennedy had written a letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, mentioning that he considered the minute tantamount to a dismissal from his office, and that it became the duty of the Lords of the Treasury to determine what course they should take under the circumstances. A notice of Motion for a Select Committee upon the subject of the management of Woods and Forests had at the time stood upon the paper in the name of the hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond). The Government had not felt that they would be justified in at once filling up the vacancy in the face of the proposed inquiry. Two or three months had elapsed before that inquiry had taken place, and other circumstances had since that time taken place which prevented the situation from being filled up, up to the present moment. In order to provide for the proper discharge of the duties of the department in the interim, the Government had been advised not to revoke the appointment of Mr. Kennedy, until a patent should be drawn up nominating his successor. A formal dismissal of Mr. Kennedy, therefore, had not appeared to the Government to be the proper course to pursue. Another difficulty had also arisen in the matter, in connection with the Act of Parliament under the operation of which the office was held. That Act ordered two Commissioners of Woods and Forests to be appointed; but it gave the power to the Lords of the Treasury to allocate to each of those two Commissioners whatever portion of the duties of the office they deemed desirable. The Act, however, did not empower the Treasury to order that the whole of the duties should be discharged by any one Commissioner. The Government had, therefore, been unable for two reasons to abolish Mr. Kennedy's office in May last. The consequence had been, that although that gentleman had practically ceased to perform the duties of his office, yet, upon the allocation of the duties of the department, the manor of Lyndhurst, to which no real duties were attached, had been left in his name, as one of the Commissioners of

Woods and Forests, all the other duties connected with that department having been allocated to the other Commissioner. The consequence of that state of things had been that Mr. Kennedy's patent had remained up to the present in existence, and that gentleman was therefore undoubtedly entitled by law to claim his salary. That salary had been so received by him up to the very last quarter-day.

SIR JOHN SHELLEY said, he would now move for the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire into the cause and justification of the removal of the right hon. Thomas Francis Kennedy from the office of Woods, Forests, and Land Revenues of the Crown. He thought it would have been much better if the hon. Gentleman the Secretary of the Treasury had postponed his reply to the question which had just been put to him until he (Sir J. Shelley) had placed before the House the whole of the circumstances relating to the case. Mr. Kennedy complained not so much of his removal from the office which he had filled as of his having been declared guilty of want of veracity, integrity, and honour, and it was therefore incumbent upon the House to give him an opportunity of vindicating himself from the aspersions which had been cast upon him. Why that gentleman had been allowed to draw a salary of 1,200*l.* a year for the administration of the manor of Lyndhurst, which produced the country exactly 4*l.* per annum, was a question which perhaps more nearly concerned the Chancellor of the Exchequer as guardian of the public purse than any one else; but, considering this as the case of an old public servant who laboured under grave imputations, and who was not in that House to defend himself, they would perhaps permit him (Sir J. Shelley) to trespass upon them at some length while he endeavoured to place the circumstances connected with the transaction clearly before them. In the first place he would explain how it was that so long a time had been suffered to elapse before the attention of the House had been called to the subject. Mr. Kennedy's removal took place on the 24th of April, 1854, but previous to that removal a notice had been put upon the books of the House by the hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond) of his intention to move for a Select Committee to inquire into the management and condition of the Crown forests in England, with a view of scertaining the responsibility of the Commissioners, and whether it would be to the interest of the country that some of the smaller forests should be sold. Now, although for some reason or other that Committee considered itself precluded from going into the case of Mr. Kennedy's dismissal, yet he thought there would have been very little chance of his obtaining a second Committee upon a subject so closely connected with the question of Woods and Forests while that Committee was sitting. That Committee was appointed in no friendly spirit towards Mr. Kennedy, and we find that one of the members of that Committee was Mr. Chichester Fortescue, one of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, with whom Mr. Kennedy has had this controversy. The hon. Gentleman's Committee, however, proceeded with its labours and heard a vast deal of evidence, but did not make its Report until the 17th of July, and at that late period of the Session, and in the state of public business, he felt it was perfectly hopeless for him to attempt to bring the matter forward with any prospect of enlisting the attention of the House. He, therefore, acting by the advice of those with whom he consulted, gave notice of his intention to move for a Committee early in the present Session. He confessed when he gave that notice he thought that, unless the public service absolutely required it, the vacancy occasioned by the removal of Mr. Kennedy would not have been filled up; and for some time he was confirmed in his opinion by the conduct of the Government, until it transpired that a most extraordinary proposition had been made, which was no less than to fill up the vacancy by the appointment of Colonel Romilly, the brother-in-law of Mr. Kennedy, and a gentleman with whom he lived on terms of the greatest friendship. He did not know whether the object of that proposition was to stave off inquiry, but, at all events, Colonel Romilly rejected it. No further attempt was made towards filling up the office till about a week before the meeting of Parliament in December, when an announcement appeared in the newspapers that Lord Courtenay was to be appointed a Commissioner of Woods and Forests, and was to be succeeded as Secretary to the Poor Law Board by Mr. Hayward, a Queen's counsel, and one of the same party to which the ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer belonged. In consequence of that announcement he (Sir J. Shelley) immediately gave notice to the noble Lord the Member for the City of

London (Lord J. Russell) that he intended to ask whether, notwithstanding the notices of Motion given in both Houses for Committees of inquiry, it was the intention of the Government to appoint Lord Courtenay to the office of Commissioner of Woods and Forests, and whether, if so, the salary of the Secretary of the Poor Law Board being 1,500*l.* a year, and that of a Commissioner of Woods and Forests only 1,200*l.*, any promise or expectation had been held out to Lord Courtenay that the salary should be increased. An hon. Member opposite, who had given notice of a similar question with regard to Mr. Hayward, owing to the absence from the House of the noble Lord the Member for the City of London, made his inquiry first, and was answered by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Poor Law Board, who said that Lord Courtenay had not resigned his office, and consequently no such appointment had been made. He (Sir J. Shelley) would have been content with that answer, but the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury came to him, and said that, as the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) was not in the House, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was anxious to answer his (Sir J. Shelley's) question. To oblige the right hon. Gentleman he therefore put his question, slightly varied in terms, whether there was any intention to appoint any one to the office of Commissioner of Woods and Forests, and, if so, would the Government adjourn it so as to give him an opportunity of founding a Motion on the subject? The right hon. Gentleman, in reply, did what he was rather apt to do, lectured him (Sir J. Shelley), remarking that a custom had sprung up of making insinuations and accusations under the guise of asking questions, and that the question then asked was a prominent instance. The right hon. Gentleman went on to say that the Government would give no information, and that if he (Sir J. Shelley) had any Motion to make, he had better do so at once, a course creating a laugh at his expense, although the right hon. Gentleman was well aware that no business of that kind was to be entered into during the short Session before Christmas. Lord Courtenay, however, had made no secret of his appointment, and the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone), in conversation two days after the notice of Motion had been given, said he had no objection to make to the matter being brought before Parliament, but the awkward part of the notice was, that since the Motion had been made, there would be great difficulty in filling up the appointment until Parliament had had an opportunity of considering the subject. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Totally incorrect.] He regretted that the right hon. Gentleman's memory should differ from his upon a matter to the correctness of which he (Sir J. Shelley) was prepared to swear. He would remind the House of a Committee appointed in 1848, at the instance of Lord Duncan, when it was declared that the department of Woods and Forests was a regular preserve of jobbery. To meet the unfavourable evidence given before that Committee, the Government felt it necessary to do something, and accordingly gave instructions to Mr. Clutton, who was not then Surveyor of the Forests, to make a report, which he did, in accordance with those instructions, but taking no notice of the fact that, instead of being productive, the forests had cost the country year by year a large sum of money. The noble Lord then at the head of the Government (Lord J. Russell) felt it necessary to obviate the evils complained of to appoint a man, able, zealous, and superior to jobbery, to watch over that department. At that time Mr. Kennedy was Paymaster of the Civil Service in Ireland, and had been so for ten years, during which period he had earned the greatest credit for his zealous services. In a Treasury minute of the 30th of March, 1847, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer paid a tribute to the valuable services of Mr. Kennedy as Paymaster for Civil Services in Ireland, and it was then recommended that his salary should be increased from 1,000*l.* to 1,200*l.*, and that recommendation was carried into effect. Subsequently Mr. Kennedy received the appointment of Commissioner of Woods and Forests, at the same amount of salary, and although he knew the difficulties he would have to contend against, he felt that, as he had succeeded in the discharge of his duties in Ireland in such a manner as to receive the commendation of the Government, he might reasonably hope for success in the performance of the duties of the new position in which he was placed, and also that he might hope to introduce improvements into that department. Mr. Kennedy accordingly entered upon the duties of his new office with those expectations, but it appeared from his own evidence, given before the Select Committee appointed on the Motion of the hon. Member for West Surrey, that he found that, from the first, difficulties were thrown in his way from the circumstance of positions being held in that department by persons who were entirely unacquainted with rural affairs. He felt that, being determined that the report which it was his duty to submit to Parliament should be an accurate report, it was necessary before proceeding to carry out improvements in the Forests to put the office in London in a proper state, and from his determination to make a full report commenced the unpleasantness which existed between Mr. Kennedy and the Treasury. Subsequently, and in order that he might be satisfied that the report presented to Parliament was a correct one, he resolved upon a personal inspection of some of the forests, and the first inspected by him was Chopwell Wood, in the county of Durham, the condition of which had been represented as hopeless. Mr. Kennedy came to a contrary conclusion, and as he felt that the Treasury would not be convinced by his opinions alone, he directed a Mr. Brown to inspect that Crown property. The Treasury had objected to the employment of Mr. Brown, inasmuch as he had not been appointed by them; and, as he gave opinions contrary to that entertained on forest management by the deputy surveyors of the Royal forests, he was declared to be a mere Scotch gardener, who knew nothing about his business. The House would decide whether that was the case or not when he mentioned to the House that an arboricultural society had been established in Edinburgh, and that Mr. Brown had been appointed president of that society. A letter, it appeared, had been written from the Treasury, finding great fault with Mr. Kennedy for employing Mr. Brown in the inspection of Chopwell Forest, although the report of Mr. Brown, singular to say, had been acted on by that department. In consequence of the censure passed upon him, Mr. Kennedy wrote a letter to their Lordships, justifying his employment of Mr. Brown contrary to official etiquette, and before he had authority to do so from the Government, and observing that the course he had pursued in this instance had not been objected to by their Lordships in any instance except in respect to the Royal forests. He (Sir J. Shelley) believed that if the Committee he asked for were appointed, Mr. Kennedy would be proved to have been engaged with great singleness of purpose in an attempt to perform his duty and improve the state of the property with the control over which he was intrusted. He came now to the dispute between Mr. Brown and Mr. Higinbothom, deputy surveyor of the Alice Holt Forest, and who had filled that appointment for sixteen years. Mr. Higinbothom was a surgeon and apothecary at Pilltown in Ireland—a good name for a doctor, by the by—who had attended the family of Lord Duncannon, and that noble Lord, as first Commissioner of Woods and Forests, taking the first opportunity of placing him in a good berth, had appointed him to the deputy surveyorship of Alice Holt Forest. Mr. Brown was sent by Mr. Kennedy, in 1852, to make an inspection of the forest, and he found great fault with this medical gentleman's management. In 1853 his report was sent to Mr. Higinbothom, who returned an indignant answer to it, in which statements were made upon the truth of which the whole case depended. This was certainly one of the most trumpery cases that had ever led to great results, for it entirely arose out of a dispute as to how many trees stood upon an acre. The answer of Mr. Higinbothom was a most able paper, and as up to that time he had been unable to produce anything like a clever report, a suspicion was raised that he had been assisted by another person. Mr. Brown's report contained a complaint of the mode of thinning which had been adopted, in consequence of which, he said, there were in some instances too few and in others too many trees per acre in many parts of the forest; the answer of Mr. Higinbothom contradicted the statement as to the average number of trees per acre, but said nothing about any thinnings having taken place in the forest since the report had been made. Mr. Kennedy, however, found that between the time of the inspection in 1852, and the answer of Mr. Higinbothom in 1853, a large quantity of bark had been taken from the forest by the removal of a number of young trees. Upon making this discovery Mr. Kennedy certainly acted through his zeal for the public service in an injudicious manner, looking at the terms which he was on with the Secretary of the Treasury; for he wrote to the Treasury those letters which were the cause of his dismissal. His first letter was dated the 23rd, and his second the 26th of January. Mr. Kennedy was supposed to have rather exceeded the bounds of propriety in his comments on the conduct of Mr. Higinbothom, and he (Sir J. Shelley) had no intention to keep anything back, but to state the case fully. In the letter of the 26th of January, after pointing out that Mr. Higinbothom had suppressed the fact of thinnings having been made between the date of his report and Mr. Brown's inspection, Mr. Kennedy observed—

> "Where, then, is the truth of Mr. Higinbothom's contradiction founded? On a suppression of an all-important fact, quite of sufficient magnitude to account for the whole difference between Mr. Brown's assertion and Mr. Higinbothom's contradiction. Mr. Higinbothom's contradiction is at once utterly discredited and set aside by the simple statement of these circumstances, and it is no longer possible to place the slightest reliance on any statement which he makes."

And towards the end of the letter these passages occurred—

> "It is not my intention to advert to those parts of Mr. Higinbothom's report which consist of controversial opinion and discussion, because where I find an entire absence of fidelity in the statement of facts, I will not stoop to reason or to discuss. I consider Mr. Higinbothom to have made a daring attempt to impose upon me, and to blast the reputation of Mr. Brown; and it seems to me that the attempt must recoil upon himself, and that he must eventually find it to have been a most perilous proceeding. . . I entirely acquit Mr. Clutton of having any participation in such statements as have been made; and, although Mr. Higinbothom identifies himself with Mr. Clutton's opinions in forest management, there is no blame to be attached to a difference of opinion, while there can be but one opinion with respect to statements, purporting to be facts, but which are the reverse of facts, and which are intended to deceive in one quarter and to destroy character in another."

He could quite fancy that when Mr. Kennedy sent that report to the Treasury the hon. Secretary was not displeased at perceiving the indiscreet terms which were used. The reason alleged for Mr. Kennedy's dismissal was not the true reason. He was dismissed because he had displayed too much activity and too much zeal to suit certain Members of the Government, and he could not be induced to do anything which he did not consider to be right. Mr. Secretary Wilson, on the 1st of February, despatched a note to that gentleman, informing him that he was directed by their Lordships to desire that he would furnish Mr. Higinbothom with a copy of his letter of the 26th ultimo, in order that he might have an opportunity of furnishing such explanations as he might think fit. No opportunity was afforded Mr. Kennedy of withdrawing the expressions to which exception was taken. On the 18th of February Mr. Kennedy wrote again to the Lords of the Treasury, and used these words—

> "If I felt that I had done injustice to Mr. Higinbothom, no one would be more ready than myself to acknowledge it, and to state both to your Lordships and to Mr. Higinbothom that I regretted that I should have done so; but I am unable to satisfy myself that any such case has arisen, and, therefore, I shall proceed to state, as briefly as I can, some of the grounds on which I formed the opinions which I still entertain. I consider that Mr. Higinbothom's report of the 29th of December was eminently calculated to deceive and mislead me, or any one who should peruse it. It did deceive and mislead me, and it is impossible for me now to say that that impression is removed from my mind by all that Mr. Higinbothom has stated in his paper of the 14th of February."

It was stated that this was a reiteration of the offensive words contained in the letter of the 26th of January, but he (Sir J. Shelley) interpreted the meaning to be simply this—that Mr. Higinbothom had admitted the suppression of a fact, and Mr. Kennedy could not acquit him of having intentionally concealed it. Nothing occurred after that for a considerable period. Mr. Kennedy never thought he was implicated in the matter, but, being anxious that some conclusion should be come to, he wrote to the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the 2nd of March a letter in which, after stating his opinion that the subject could not be allowed to rest where it was, on the decidedly conflicting statements of Mr. Brown and Mr. Higinbothom, and that Mr. Brown earnestly requested there might be afforded to him an opportunity of proving on the ground the facts stated by him in his report before an impartial and competent tribunal, he proposed that such a tribunal should be constituted of three gentlemen, to be chosen from a list of twelve, whose names he inclosed, and which included those of Sir Joseph Paxton and Professor Lindley. That, in his (Sir J. Shelley's) opinion, was a very fair proposition, and it would have been well if the Treasury had acceded to it; but, instead of their doing so, Mr. Kennedy received a letter from Mr. Wilson on the 2nd of March, stating that, as both Mr. Brown and Mr. Higinbothom had been afforded full opportunity of making statements in support of their assertions, and as the same observation applied to the charges brought by him (Mr. Kennedy) against the former gentleman, their Lordships must consider the correspondence closed. They agreed that the question had assumed a shape affecting the personal credit of the parties concerned, and that all matters of opinion and speculation should be set aside, in order that a judgment might be formed upon the facts in dispute; but, as their Lordships had already taken steps with a view to such a course, they did not think it necessary to make any observation with reference to the tribunal Mr. Kennedy had suggested. Mr. Kennedy again wrote to the Treasury on the 23rd of March, which elicited a reply of a most extraordinary nature. In that letter their Lordships expressed their opinion that no communication should take place between Mr. Brown and Mr. Higinbothom and the referees, except what might be necessary to explain their reports, and they desired that neither of those gentlemen might be present in the forest while the investigation was going on, unless sent for, for fear of personal altercation or collision between the parties. It was curious to see how the peace propensity of the then First Lord of the Treasury seemed to have descended through all the grades of the Ministry till it reached the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury. Their Lordships of the Treasury no doubt had heard that when Greek met Greek then came the tug of war, and doubtless they thought if surveyor met surveyor the result might be something awful. He would remind the House of a passage in the *Rejected Addresses* somewhat applicable to this case—

"Did none attempt, before he fell,
To succour one they lov'd so well?
Yes. Higginbothom did aspire;
His Fireman's soul was all on fire.
'What are they 'feard on? Fools! 'od rot em!'
Were the last words of Higginbothom."

A sad catastrophe having occurred in the case of the Higinbothom referred to in the poem, their Lordships possibly apprehended that an equally sad fate might befall this pet of the forest should he come into collision with his adversary. Mr. Brown had reason to complain that he was not made acquainted with the evidence taken behind his back, and with having no means of defending himself. The ground which he (Sir J. Shelley) took was, that great injustice had been done both to Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Brown in condemning them upon evidence given in secret and in their absence. In a letter of the 31st of March the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury mentioned the persons to whom the matter was to be referred—Mr. Murton, Mr. Mathews, and Mr. Menzies. To the first two persons there appeared to be no objection, but as the question was a dispute between deputy surveyors of the Royal forests, it was right to expect that the Treasury would have been careful to select the fittest persons to inquire into the matter. Now, Mr. Menzies was a deputy surveyor of the Royal forest of Windsor. He had been a subordinate officer under Mr. Kennedy, and was holding office at the time under the Hon. C. Gore, the other Commissioner. He was not, therefore, assuredly, a fit person to be appointed a referee in a case of this nature. Besides this, in the office over Mr. Menzies were to be found the son and son-in-law of Mr. Higinbothom, upon whom he was to be called to adjudicate. The reason given for the appointment of Mr. Menzies was because, "in the investigation of facts regarding the age and condition of the trees in Alice Holt Forest, questions might arise in which experience connected with the management of a Royal forest, so far as it might depend on the laws affecting that description of property and the objects for which the Crown plantations are maintained, might be useful." That appeared to be a most ridiculous reason for appointing such a person to judge of a disputed matter, which turned entirely upon matters of fact only, such as the number of trees actually standing on the acre. But, nevertheless, this deputy surveyor, who was said to be independent, with no sympathy with those who considered Mr. Brown a nuisance, and Mr. Kennedy a greater still, was appointed; and the House will, I hope, agree with me in thinking a referee so appointed, coming to a decision upon evidence taken in the absence of the parties interested, cannot be considered of much value. Upon turning to the evidence taken before the Committee of the hon. Member for West Surrey, the House would find that Mr. Arbuthnot, the Assistant Secretary to the Treasury, had suggested the appointment of Mr. Menzies, because, in a visit over Windsor Forest he had found that person an intelligent man, who had read Mr. Brown's book, and was inclined, as a fellow-Scotchman, to agree with him. If that person was selected because he was inclined to favour Mr. Brown, then by a parity of reasoning the appointment was not fair towards Mr. Higinbothom. He would next refer to the report which was said to be so decisive against Mr. Kennedy. It should be remembered that there were two points under consideration—the dispute between Mr. Higinbothom and Mr. Brown respecting the matter of fact as to the number of trees to an acre, and the dispute between Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Higinbothom as to what was in the mind of the latter when he suppressed or did not mention the fact that thinnings had taken place. Upon this last question these referees, however good managers of woodland, were certainly not proper persons to be appointed as judges in a case like this. Mr. Menzies could hardly be qualified to judge of Mr. Kennedy's conduct, but if the House should grant the Committee for which he (Sir J. Shelley) asked, he would defy any one to prove that Mr. Kennedy had been actuated by other motives than the sincerest desire to benefit the public service, and that the Government should have been very careful in selecting a tribunal to try the conduct of a person of Mr. Kennedy's age and long public service, and to which questions affecting his honour and veracity were to be referred. Mr. Kennedy, in his letter of the 26th of January, 1854, charged Mr. Higinbothom with misleading and deceiving him, and there was an admission by that person that there had been certain thinnings. He contended that the case attempted to be established by the minute of the 31st of March, 1854, was not strong enough to implicate Mr. Kennedy with the deputy surveyors, who were persons of a lower standard in society to himself. But the Treasury had mixed them up all together, and it was therefore a case on which they ought to have been most careful not to come to any conclusion, unless they were sure that the evidence was above all suspicion. He would now refer to the letter of dismissal addressed by the late Chancellor of the Exchequer to Mr. Kennedy on the report to which he had referred being received. But, before doing so, he thought it right to observe that the Treasury never gave Mr. Kennedy the slightest opportunity of answering that report; but, within twenty-four hours after its receipt, the Chancellor of the Exchequer wrote to him a letter of dismissal. It struck him that the object of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was not to give Mr. Kennedy a chance of meeting the charges contained in the report, but at once to clinch him by a letter of dismissal within twenty-four hours after the report had been received. In fact, Mr. Kennedy was to them a nuisance; they had long looked for an occasion to get rid of him, and they did not give him the least particle of fair play. The letter written by the right hon. Gentleman was a remarkable specimen of polite dismissal. The right hon. Gentleman was a perfect master of the art of speaking, and he (Sir J. Shelley) had been frequently charmed with his eloquence, but he found from experience that whenever a peculiarly bland smile stole over the countenance of the right hon. Gentleman, he was about to hit the hardest. The letter of the right hon. Gentleman to Mr. Kennedy was dated April 29, 1854, and began in the most affectionate manner:—"My dear Sir"—[*Laughter*]—so ran the letter, "You will before this time have received an official letter dated the 27th instant, relating to the disputes between Mr. Brown and Mr. Higinbothom." The letter then went on to state that the Treasury had been for a long time aware that from the first disagreements had prevailed between Mr. Kennedy and many of the officers in his department, and concluded by informing him that it was impossible the department could remain in Mr. Kennedy's hands with advantage to the Crown and the public. One thing that surprised him was, that in writing that letter the right hon. Gentleman should not have been careful to avoid stating anything which was capable of contradiction; but he (Sir J. Shelley) was prepared to show that the disagreements between Mr. Kennedy and the subordinate officers of the forests had arisen alone, from his determination to do his duty to the public, and that in this he had not met with just support from the authorities at the Treasury. It had been attempted to be shown that the letter was not a dismissal, but it was clearly a hint to Mr. Kennedy to walk down stairs rather than wait to be kicked down. Mr. Kennedy, in acknowledging the receipt of that letter, stated that he understood it as a dismissal from the public service, and the next step he took was to write to Lord Aberdeen, stating the circumstances which had occurred, and entering his indignant protest against the course which had been adopted towards him, and demanding, as a matter of justice to himself, as having been for a very long period a public servant, that a strict and impartial inquiry before a Committee of this House should be openly conducted into the management of the department with which he had been connected. For five days it was not considered fitting by Lord Aberdeen to answer that letter, and in the meantime the Motion of the hon. Member for West Surrey for a Committee of Inquiry stood upon the books. In the interval a petition from Mr. Kennedy was presented by an hon. Member to that House. On the 9th of May, Lord Aberdeen wrote to Mr. Kennedy, stating that there was no objection on his part to granting an inquiry, but, as the matter had been brought before the House of Commons by the petition which Mr. Kennedy had placed in the hands of an independent Member, he was precluded from taking any steps in the affair, but that when the question was brought forward the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be in his place to give any explanation which might be deemed necessary. Mr. Kennedy acknowledged the receipt of that communication; and, to show that even among the Members of the Government there was some doubt as to the meaning of the letter of the late Chancellor of the Exchequer—although he could not understand how any doubt could exist upon the subject—Sir Charles Trevelyan wrote, transmitting to Mr. Kennedy, by command of their Lordships, their minute of the 10th instant, in which it was assumed that Mr. Kennedy had retired from his office. That gentleman was in the receipt of his salary up to the last quarter, although from the period of his dismissal he had only the management of a manor which brought in a net sum of 4*l.* a year. Mr. Kennedy replied to the Treasury that his ceasing to hold office was not in consequence of his retirement; he expressed regret at some expressions he had used, and asked for a full and impartial inquiry into the cause of his dismissal, and into his whole conduct in office. To this letter he got no answer; and on the 23rd of May he again wrote, asking for an answer to his former letter. That answer came, and it was to the effect that it had been considered advisable that the conclusion at which the Lords of the Treasury had arrived, that Mr. Kennedy could no longer retain office, should be communicated to him in a private letter by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and, with regard to any further inquiry, an objection was entertained to any but an ordinary Parliamentary inquiry. The letter proceeded to state that their Lordships would be reluctant to refuse any investigation which Mr. Kennedy might think necessary for his vindication; but Mr. Kennedy having intrusted a petition to the House of Commons to an independent Member, their Lordships would be ready to justify the proceedings they had taken in the House. As it appeared the Chancellor of the Exchequer had taken the step referred to without the knowledge of the Earl of Aberdeen, it struck Mr. Kennedy that the noble Lord the Member for the City of London (Lord John Russell) might be equally ignorant of it, and therefore he addressed a letter to that noble Lord, asking to be allowed to clear his character from the unjust imputations cast on it through the medium of an investigation before a tribunal of high-minded gentlemen, to be selected as a Committee of the House of Commons. To that letter the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) sent a reply, dated 10th of June, 1854, in which he stated that the circumstances were only partially known to him which had led to Mr. Kennedy's separation from the public service; that Mr. Kennedy's high character for integrity and honour, his long and useful career in the service of the Crown, and his zeal for the reform of abuses, made it a matter of deep concern to him that Mr. Kennedy was no longer charged with the department hitherto intrusted to him; but, as he (Lord John Russell) had not at that moment a seat in the House of Commons, he could give no opinion with regard to a Parliamentary inquiry, but, if re-elected, would be ready to communicate with any Member who might move for a Committee on the painful subject. He would now refer to the proceedings of the Committee of the hon. Member for West Surrey on the Crown Forests, which for some reason or other felt precluded from going into Mr. Kennedy's case; but it was clear that no inquiry into the management of the forests could be complete without Mr. Kennedy's evidence. To that Committee the hon. Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Wilson) was added as a Member by the Government as soon as it appeared that Mr. Kennedy was to be examined, though it appeared to him that that hon. Member was the last man who ought to have acted as a judge on that Committee; and he (Sir J. Shelley) had accordingly protested against the appointment. He, however, gave the hon. Member the greatest possible credit for the ability he displayed in making out a case for himself, and yet he could not prevent the Committee from coming to a Resolution which he (Sir J. Shelley) thought favourable to Mr. Kennedy. In the draught report of the Chairman of the Committee the two following paragraphs, numbered 9 and 10, appeared—

9. "The late Commissioner, Mr. Kennedy, seems to have made a proper distinction between sums expended in gathering in the crop of timber

and bark, opening drains, &c., and such as were expended in planting, the latter being capital replacing stock sold. He likewise took efficient measures for repressing the abuse of carrying off the surface of the soil under pretence of cutting turf for fuel, which is said to have taken place to the extent of 5,000,000 turves per annum, destroying 100 acres; and in general he seems to have evinced much zeal in the execution of his office.

10. "It is to be regretted that he sent a stranger of very limited experience to examine and report upon the state of the forest, without apprising either the Treasury or the local surveyors—a measure which, as it implied a censure on their conduct, was sure to excite unpleasant feelings, and generate hostility against anything that he might recommend; but your Committee are convinced that it requires no less energy, activity, and vigilance, than were displayed by Mr. Kennedy to insure the proper management of the forests, and to suppress abuses as they arise."

Paragraph 9 was negatived by the casting vote of the hon. Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Wilson), there being four votes for it, and five against; and paragraph 10 was negatived without a division, but the following paragraph was nevertheless added to the Report—

> "Although the Committee consider that it is not within their order of reference, still they consider it due to Mr. Kennedy to state that, though his proceedings may be open to objection, he has evinced much zeal, energy, and vigilance, in the execution of his office."

He had to apologise to the House for having detained them so long, but he entreated them to remember that he had undertaken the defence of a gentleman who was not in the House to defend himself, who had been held up to public scorn as one who was in the receipt of money for which he discharged no duties, who had been made the subject of most unfounded charges—charges which he had been given no fair opportunity to refute—and who now claimed a hearing before a Committee of that House as the best mode of establishing his reputation in the eyes of the country. He (Sir J. Shelley) undertook to prove that Mr. Kennedy had been actuated throughout his public career by the purest motives, by great integrity, and zeal for the public service, and he asked the House to do justice to an old well-tried public servant.

Motion made, and Question proposed—

> "That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into and consider the grounds and justification of the removal of the right hon. Thomas Francis Kennedy from the Office of Woods, Forests, and Land Revenues of the Crown."

MR. GLADSTONE said, as this was a question in which the hon. Member who had just resumed his seat had thought fit to impugn his conduct, while in office, in one of the most important functions belonging to a Minister, it was not his intention to give any vote upon the Motion when the House went to a division. He would leave it in the hands of the House, but he thought it his duty to contribute, as far as it was in his power to do so, to the knowledge of the House on the subject by taking part in the discussion; and he was induced to do this the more because, as they might guess from the speech of the hon. Member, the subject was one that went over a considerable space. He must, first of all, remark that the subject occupied the pages of several blue books, and he must say he was struck by the remarkable absence of those blue books in the House on the present occasion. He saw in the hands of hon. Members information of a lighter description—namely, a tract or pamphlet in which Mr. Kennedy, as he had a perfect right to do, had stated his case to the world; but he was afraid that the subject was one on which hon. Members would be called upon to act with rather imperfect information. The hon. Member for Westminster had apologised to the House for the length of his speech, and yet he could not say that he had employed to the best advantage the time he had used; for if he would favour him (Mr. Gladstone) with his attention he would point out one or two omissions which he had made of a much more remarkable character than any of the allegations with which he had interspersed his oration. But, before going further, he would quote certain words which had been used in the course of his speech by the hon. Gentleman. He said—

> "The cause for which he (Mr. Kennedy) was dismissed was only made an excuse for his dismissal. The real cause was his being too active and too zealous for certain Members of the Government."

These were the actual words of the hon. Member, and it might be in his power to save the House the infliction of a speech from him (Mr. Gladstone), and, perhaps, from some other Members also, if he would confer upon him this favour — let him reduce to writing the charges he had made against him, let him lay these charges on the table of the House, and promise to prove them, and he would grant at once that the hon. Gentleman had placed himself on a sound footing before the House. He would have made tangible and intelligible charges against him for his conduct as a Minister of the Crown, and he (Mr. Gladstone) would spare the House the infliction of listening to the remarks he was prepared to make, and would at once consent to the appointment of a Committee. Did the hon. Member agree to do so? And would he stand by his word?

Sir JOHN SHELLEY: Would the right hon. Gentleman grant him a Committee?

Mr. GLADSTONE said, he now found that the hon. Gentleman did not stand by his words. He would read them again—

> "The cause for which Mr. Kennedy was dismissed was only made an excuse for his dismissal. The real cause was his being too active and too zealous for certain Members of the Government."

Did the hon. Member, who said he appeared there on behalf of public justice, abide by his words, or did he not?

Sir JOHN SHELLEY said, he had certainly been informed of a conversation which passed between Mr. Kennedy and the right hon. Gentleman in the presence of the Secretary to the Treasury, in which Mr. Kennedy informed the Chancellor of the Exchequer that, up to a certain time, Mr. Wilson, the Secretary to the Treasury, had been favourable and friendly towards him, but that he had stated to him he could not act as he was doing, because persons of influence in the Government and out of the Government, in Parliament and out of Parliament, had come to him and expressed their disapprobation of his conduct.

Mr. GLADSTONE said, he begged the House to observe that the hon. Gentleman had given him no answer to his question. He wished to know whether or not the hon. Member would abide by the words he had used in his speech, and he put him off with an account of a conversation got at second-hand from Mr. Wilson.

Sir JOHN SHELLEY: No—from Mr. Kennedy.

Mr. GLADSTONE said, he begged pardon—from Mr. Kennedy. Now, his answer to the hon. Gentleman was, that Mr. Kennedy was not dismissed by the Secretary of the Treasury. He (Mr. Gladstone) was the man who was then responsible to the House of Commons for the management of the Crown estates; and though his hon. Friend (Mr. Wilson) was one of the most upright, most able, and most indefatigable men he ever had the good fortune to know in the public service, yet he was not the man who dismissed Mr. Kennedy. He (Mr. Gladstone) was not reduced so low—not a being altogether so degraded and so unfit for the discharge of his duty—as that he should be guilty of so monstrous a breach of good faith on a subject relating to the dismissal of a gentleman of unquestioned honour such as Mr. Kennedy was—or that he should delegate to another the task of dismissing that gentleman, and allow him to be turned out upon the world, without having himself examined into the case and made himself responsible for the act. He would not again ask the hon. Member if he stood by his words, but he was able to say that the hon. Gentleman was not prepared to support the allegations which he had so rashly made in his speech. So far as his hon. Friend (Mr. Wilson) was concerned that Gentleman would probably be able to give a challenge to the hon. Member similar to that which he had made, and all he would say was, that he wished him a better deliverance from that challenge than he had now exhibited in the face of the House of Commons. If the hon. Member would make an intelligible charge against him as a Minister of the Crown, that would be a good ground for granting a Committee; but, in the shape in which the question came before the House, and when the hon. Member was found to shrink from taking that plain course, he felt himself called upon to state to the House the reasons why he felt bound to oppose the proposal which the hon. Gentleman had submitted. He must first, however, state to the House that there could not be a grosser mistake than the supposition under which the hon. Gentleman seemed to labour that Mr. Kennedy was dismissed for matters affecting his veracity, his integrity, and his honour. The hon. Gentleman seemed to have overlooked the manner in which these expressions came into the correspondence. If he looked into the report, he would find that it was Mr. Kennedy who spoke of the inquiry generally, and it was with reference to matters of fact alone that the credit of Mr. Brown and Mr. Higinbothom was called into question. The assumption of the hon. Member in this respect was totally baseless. Not one word had been said by Members of the Government from which Mr. Kennedy could imagine that his honour or veracity were attacked, and therefore he (Mr. Gladstone) begged the House to understand that the question before it was not as to that gentleman's having been dismissed on the score of want of honour, veracity, or integrity. Then, again, it was not the fact that Mr. Kennedy had been dismissed on account of matters of opinion connected with his management of the Woods and Forests; and Mr. Kennedy had made a strange and unfortunate mistake on that point in his letter to Lord Aberdeen. It would have been very difficult, indeed, to suppose that where the zeal of a man was admitted, as it was in the case of this gentleman, matters of opinion as to the mode of management could render it necessary for the Minister to dismiss him. At the same time he was bound to say, that he was not prepared to accede to all that was said as to Mr. Kennedy's management of the Woods and Forests. On the contrary, he was disposed to place confidence in the report made by the three gentlemen employed by the Treasury to inform them as to the facts, but who were in no sense employed as umpires between the Government and Mr. Kennedy, as the hon. Baronet appeared to imagine. The report stated that—

> "A great mistake has been made in taking so much old timber in the last few years, when the price was low, and the timber could be purchased at lower rates from other sources. The plea has been, that much of the timber had arrived at maturity, and would deteriorate in value. This also is a mistake; wood which arrives at maturity in two or three centuries would suffer no deterioration for forty or fifty years."

He was bound to say that the system of management of Mr. Kennedy, in deriving from the Woods and Forests a greater amount of profit than they would yield, was less beneficial than a course which would have made better provision for the future. It was not, however, on account of his management that Mr. Kennedy was dismissed. Then, however, the hon. Member appeared to think he had discovered an irregularity in respect to the dismissal of Mr. Kennedy, because that gentleman was told he was dismissed by Her Majesty's Government. Now, he (Mr. Gladstone) was the person whose duty it was to form a conclusive opinion upon the case. It was the duty of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and of no one else, to render an account in that House as to the custody and the expenditure of the public revenues, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer was also responsible as to the care of these estates, the expenses connected with them, and the proceeds derived from them. What had taken place was this:—He had communicated to Mr. Kennedy the conclusion at which he had arrived; Mr. Kennedy made his appeal to Lord Aberdeen; and Lord Aberdeen, having made himself acquainted with the facts of the case, concurred in the minute of dismissal. The hon. Member, if he followed the course of public affairs, would find that, when a department responsible for certain business arrived at a conclusion upon matters connected with that business, the usual, nay, the invariable mode of expression was to say that Her Majesty's Government had decided upon the case. To suppose that the whole Cabinet could have read all these blue books was absurd, and it would have been hypocrisy and folly to have carried the matter there, but there was not the slightest irregularity in the course really taken. The hon. Member did not think it necessary to suppose that any man on the face of the earth had a love of justice except himself, or that any other man except Mr. Kennedy had suffered injustice, and he seemed to imagine that the Government was actuated by some ferocious prejudice against Mr. Kennedy because that gentleman was too zealous in the public service. Now he (Mr. Gladstone) had committed many errors in the course of his public life, but he would appeal confidently to both sides of the House, and ask them whether it had been the besetting sin of his career in office to show a want of zeal for the public service? In this instance, he was ashamed to say that his prejudices, at first, had been rather in favour of Mr. Kennedy. When he had gone to the Treasury, the first thing he had heard of that department was that Mr. Kennedy had declared himself a great reformer, stating that he found many abuses existing, and that that gentleman was at war on the part of the public with the whole troop of deputy surveyors. To that statement he was ashamed to say he had given rather too ready credence, and, if he had to make an apology to any one, it was not to Mr. Kennedy, but to those gentlemen the deputy surveyors. He had, however, failed to elicit from the hon. Member the nature of his charge against him, and he must say that, having listened to the hon. Member throughout a speech not of extreme brevity, he could not distinctly gather what it was with which he was charged. The hon. Member, he supposed, did not mean that there was corruption in this proceeding for which he (Mr. Gladstone) was personally responsible. Did he mean that there was irregularity? But he had shown that the course taken was adopted upon the advice of two Ministers of the Crown, who were the only two connected with the department who are responsible by law, and who are responsible for the acts of Mr. Kennedy to Parliament. There was, then, no irregularity about the proceeding. Was there any precipitancy? It appeared to him that what the hon. Member meant to charge him with was an error in judgment. If, then, the hon. Baronet meant to charge him simply with an error of judgment, he must ask whether it was the practice of the House of Commons to grant Select Committees in order to examine into cases of dismissal of this character, or whether it was convenient to the public service that the House should adopt such a practice? He must beg attention to what appeared to him to be the thread of the hon. Gentleman's speech. The hon. Gentleman throughout his speech had argued this case as if the Treasury and Mr. Kennedy stood upon a par in the face of the House, and he complained that political officers should interfere with persons who held their offices by a permanent tenure. Now, if the House and the Legislature had chosen to give to Mr. Kennedy an independent tenure of his office, Mr. Kennedy would have had to answer for himself to the House, according to the stipulations and provisions of the law. But the fact was that Mr Kennedy was not responsible to the House of Commons. The Treasury—that was, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Secretary to the Treasury in a secondary sense, as assistant to the Chancellor of the Exchequer—were responsible to that House. If anything wrong had occurred in the management of the forests, the parties to be blamed were undoubtedly the Ministers of the Crown, or at least the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It never seemed to have occurred to the hon. Baronet to inquire what was the tenure upon which Mr. Kennedy held his office. By the 1st section of the Act 14 & 15 *Vict.* c. 42, passed in 1850, it was provided that certain persons then in office should be continued in office, and that it should be lawful for Her Majesty, on the death, resignation, or removal of such persons from their respective offices, by warrant, under the sign manual, to appoint certain other persons to such offices during Her Majesty's pleasure. The 7th section of the Act provided that the Commissioners of the Treasury should appoint all the subordinate officers of the department, and the 32nd section enacted that the Commissioners of the Woods, Forests, and Land Revenues should observe, perform, and fulfil all and singular the orders, instructions, and directions which from time to time might be made and given to them by the Commissioners of the Treasury. The Commissioners of the Treasury, therefore, appointed the officers, and the subordinate officers, and the Commissioners were, from time to time, to issue the directions according to which the officers appointed were to act. This constituted a full Parliamentary responsibility. The Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as representing the Treasury in that House, had to answer to the House for the mismanagement of Mr. Kennedy. The Treasury had no right to say, "Mr. Kennedy did this, or Mr. Kennedy did that." The answer would be, "Is Mr. Kennedy still in office? Does not the law give you the power to dismiss him? If you disapprove his acts you are bound to remove him." Did the hon. Baronet think, if the House appointed a Committee, and such Committee reported their opinion that Mr. Kennedy was perfectly trustworthy, that he (Mr. Gladstone), with the law before him, and believing in his conscience that Mr Kennedy was unfit for his office, could have accepted the judgment of the Committee instead of acting upon his own judgment? If he had done so, and had pleaded the sentence of the Committee, the answer would have been, "The law says who is to put Mr. Kennedy in office and who is to remove him from office, and the law has given that power to the Ministers of the Crown, and not to a Committee of the House of Commons." He (Mr. Gladstone) thought the hon. Baronet had not endeavoured to ascertain what had been the practice of the House of Commons in these matters. His (Mr. Gladstone's) doctrine was, that it was impossible to maintain the responsibility of a Minister for an office, if he was to be told who was to fill that office; and the effect of this Motion, if it were adopted, would be entirely to destroy the responsibility of Ministers of the Crown and the discipline of the Civil Service. The hon. Baronet had likewise said that he stood forward to-night in the cause of public justice, but he (Mr. Gladstone) must say he thought no man could have inflicted greater hardship or injustice upon an individual than the hon. Baronet had inflicted upon Mr. Kennedy. He (Mr. Gladstone) found that the practice of the House had been uniformly to decline inquiring into the removal of public servants, when that removal had taken place according to law, and according to the apparently conscientious judgment of those who, by law, were made responsible for the conduct of such public servants. It was true there was one apparent case to the contrary, which occurred in the last years of the past and during the earlier years of the present century. That was the case of Mr. Palmer, who was dismissed from an office in connection with the General Post Office, and whose case was inquired into by a Committee of the House of Commons. Mr. Palmer had submitted to the Government a plan for establishing mail coaches upon a new system, and became a contractor with the Government upon a large scale. One part of Palmer's contract was, that he should hold a situation in the Post Office, in order that he might have authority in the department, a salary being attached to such office, and, as he contended that his contract had been broken, and brought an action, the subject was referred to a Select Committee. That was, however, a case entirely different from the present, for Mr. Palmer brought an action against the Government for remuneration, to which he considered himself entitled. He (Mr. Gladstone) would now mention to the House two cases, but on the other side, which had happened more recently, and to one of which he had himself been a party. The first was the case, not of the dismissal of a man from office, but of an attempt to force the appointment of a man to office. It was the case of Sir John Claridge, who had been a Judge in one of the Indian Presidencies, but who had been removed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Committee, however, in removing Sir John Claridge, declared that considerations of policy and expediency were the main grounds of his removal, and that there was nothing to prevent his reappointment. Having been appealed to by Sir John Claridge as a constituent, and regarding the case as one of great hardship, he (Mr. Gladstone) moved in that House an Address to the Crown, praying Her Majesty to confer upon Sir John Claridge another appointment. Lord Broughton, who was then President of the Indian Board, replied that he could not see how the House of Commons could interfere in the matter, and asked—

> "Have you any precedent for such a proceeding? If the House addresses the Crown for the appointment of Sir John Claridge, and the Crown confers upon him an appointment, who will be responsible for the appointment to the House?"

He (Mr. Gladstone) and the House felt the force of that appeal, and he, therefore, withdrew his Motion. The other case that he would mention was that of a person of the name of Rolls, a Custom House officer, who had been employed as a landing-waiter, and he (Mr. Gladstone) held that in dealing with the case of a high officer they must observe substantially the same rules as in the case of a low officer. He protested with all his soul against the doctrine, that they were to have one mode of proceeding for the man who was a Privy Councillor, who had political influence, and who bore an aristocratic name, and a person in a less influential position. He regretted that the House should have been doomed to hear the miserable jokes of the hon. Member for Westminster upon the name of Mr. Higinbothom, together with his quotation of comic verses, which did credit to the author who wrote them, but great discredit to the hon. Gentleman in the manner in which he had repeated them. He had certainly been ashamed to hear the remarks of the hon. Gentleman, and, even if the name of Mr. Higinbothom were not so euphonous as that of Mr. Kennedy, he claimed that, in regard to depriving a man of his salary, his good name, and fair character, the same set of rules should be laid down and adopted equally in all cases, and that the influence of ridicule should not be used to deprive a man of the justice to which he was entitled. However, to return to the case of Mr. Rolls: he was a landing-waiter, and was dismissed by the Board of Customs, because some persons connected with trade had endeavoured to seduce his virtue as a Custom House officer. The solicitation was refused, but as the fact was not made known by Mr. Rolls to the Board of Customs, they dismissed him. In 1842 a Crown Commission was appointed, of which Lord Granville Somerset was the head, to examine into the Custom House frauds. The Commissioners examined a number of witnesses, among whom was Rolls, who laid his case before the Commissioners, by whom it was reported to the Crown, with a recommendation to reinstate him in the office he had previously held. The Board of Customs resisted the reappointment, and a Motion was made in that House in 1844 for a Select Committee. On that occasion the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Goulburn) expressed sympathy for Rolls, but objected to the Motion; and the House, under the leadership of Sir Robert Peel, refused to entertain the question. He might add that, subsequently, the Board of Customs, by an act of their own, reinstated Mr. Rolls in his situation, and that he had since shown himself to be one of the most able and distinguished officers they possessed, having been chosen in 1851 to conduct the arrangements connected with the reception of foreign goods for the Exhibition. Now, with respect to the appointment of a Committee, he did not pretend to set any limit to the right of that House to inquire. In the year 1784 it was declared by a Resolution of the House of Commons—

> "That it is constitutional and agreeable to usage for the House of Commons to declare their sense and opinion respecting the exercise of any discretionary power which, whether by Act of Parliament or otherwise, is vested in any body of men whatever for the public service."

The hon. Member for Westminster might merely desire to set up his judgment against that which he (Mr. Gladstone) had thought proper to exercise, and to say that an error of judgment had been committed; but he (Mr. Gladstone) would then say to the House that if they were prepared to reprove errors of judgment, they would themselves become responsible for the whole of the service, and it would be better to abolish the Treasury bench altogether. But in this case much more was done. The most odious charges of favour and preference were brought against the House of Commons. This was not the first case of dismissal with which he had been concerned. Every year it had been his painful duty to dismiss officers, but he had never dismissed a Privy Councillor before—a gentleman belonging to a political club and of high connections—or probably he might have heard of it. Unless they were prepared to deal out equal justice and review the judgment of a Minister uniformly and without respect to persons, he ventured respectfully to tell the House that in agreeing to the Motion of the hon. Gentleman they would be entering upon a most dangerous course. With great respect to the hon. Member for Westminster, he thought the hon. Gentleman might be called a dangerous man. It would become hon. Gentlemen, especially those who happened to be in office, to think twice before entering into conversation with the hon. Member during a ride in the park. Things might pass, and very innocently pass, in that conversation, which it would not be altogether agreeable to have produced in the House of Commons; and he would tell the hon. Gentleman who had come there to give instruction, but who, unless he (Mr. Gladstone) was much mistaken, would get instruction before the debate concluded, that he would do well to be careful how he reported conversations. As to the conversation itself, there was one condition which he would positively make—namely, that when the conversation was reported, it should be reported as it took place, and not as it did not take place. The hon. Gentleman said that he (Mr. Gladstone) had made a certain speech on that occasion, and that he (Sir J. Shelley) was ready to make his affidavit to the effect of that speech. Now, if he had thought the hon. Gentleman a rash man at the beginning of his speech, when he had made the violent charges against him (Mr. Gladstone) in which he had indulged, he was really astonished to find the hon. Gentleman so readily prepared to make his affidavit upon this conversation. If he were not ashamed to take such a course, he (Mr. Gladstone) might take an affidavit upon his side. But, at any rate, he would tell the hon. Gentleman that he was wrong, and not only would he tell him that he was wrong, but he thought he would be able to show the hon. Gentleman that he was wrong. It was very probable that, even in serious matters, something which might occur might escape his (Mr. Gladstone's) recollection, for his memory was only weak, but, weak as it was, it was strong enough to retain this conversation. Certainly he had been sufficiently warned of the sort of company he was in to enable him to stamp upon the fibres of his brain the conversation which occurred. The hon. Member said that what he (Mr. Gladstone) had stated was that the consequence of the Motion would be the holding open of the office until the Motion was made.

SIR JOHN SHELLEY said, that what the right hon. Gentleman really said was this—that in consequence of his (Sir J. Shelley's) Motion there would be a difficulty in filling up the appointment.

MR. GLADSTONE said, he was obliged to the hon. Gentleman for the correction. The hon. Gentleman's version of the conversation was, that in the month of July he (Mr. Gladstone) told the hon. Gentleman that, in consequence of a certain Motion which had been given for an inquiry into the case of Mr. Kennedy, it would be a very difficult matter for the Government to make an appointment to the office. Now, he would appeal to any Member of that

House who had had the experience of office whether such a thing was not ridiculous and untrue upon the face of it?—whether any man who knew his duty would say that because one of 654 Gentlemen in the House of Commons, even although it might be the wisest, as had happened on this occasion—because such a man had thought fit to give notice of a Motion for inquiry, was it likely that a Member of the Government should say he would keep an office vacant for six months? No one could suppose that such an answer would have been given. But he would tell the House the answer which he did give to the hon. Member. It was this—and he repeated it now without the slightest hesitation—"I am sorry you have given notice of a Committee about Mr. Kennedy, because, while that notice respecting him is on the books, it would be very difficult for the Government to place Mr. Kennedy in any other appointment in the public service." He was deeply grieved to be compelled, through the ill-judging friendship of the hon. Gentleman, to say a word against Mr. Kennedy, but he was unable to take upon himself the responsibility of Mr. Kennedy's proceedings in the office he then held, although there were many offices in which the government of men was not involved, but in which honesty, regularity, and ability were required, that Mr. Kennedy was well qualified to fill; but if such an appointment had been made when the Motion was on the paper it would have been construed in an improper manner. He must now make some reference to the merits of the case, and he denied that any case of irregularity or hasty action on the part of the Treasury had been made out which should induce the House to grant this Committee. The reasons why Mr. Kennedy was dismissed were—first, because he, as a Minister of the Crown, after his experience of Mr. Kennedy's views of public duty, would not be responsible for that gentleman's proceedings; but he was bound to say that, even had he been prepared to do so, the circumstances which had occurred in Mr. Kennedy's department were such that they were necessarily destructive of all credit and authority attaching to that gentleman, so that it had become a public necessity that he should be removed from that department, because he could not serve the public with credit therein. That was his second reason. His third was, that inferior servants, placed under Mr. Kennedy, not resident in London, despite their plebeian names, had a right to be treated with justice. He (Mr. Gladstone) was the protector of the characters of these men as much as of Mr. Kennedy. He had accordingly addressed a letter to Mr. Kennedy in the courteous terms generally used upon such occasions, not stating all that he thought upon the subject, so as not to wound his feelings, but conveying to him in the mildest manner that his case had been the subject of the most earnest and careful deliberation by the Government, and that the conclusion at which they had arrived rendered necessary his retirement from the office he held. The hon. Baronet had thought proper to ridicule that letter, but if he had adopted a more formal style, would not the hon. Baronet have censured him for being harsh and insulting? The names of two individuals, Mr. Brown and Mr. Higinbothom, were closely connected with this question, and the case of the latter gentleman was the immediate occasion of Mr. Kennedy's dismissal. He could hardly say, however, that it was the principal occasion; because he had come to the conclusion, quite irrespective of that case, that it would be necessary to remove Mr. Kennedy on account of matters affecting his administration, into which he would not now enter. He had no personal interest in Mr. Higinbothom, but as a public servant that gentleman was entitled to be protected so long as he continued in his office. If Mr. Kennedy was not capable of dealing with his subordinates on principles of equity and fairness, he was unfit to serve the public. In his charitable mood of construing Mr. Kennedy's letter, the hon. Baronet entirely misapprehended the facts, and founded upon his misapprehension an inference that the Government were eagerly watching an opportunity to trip up Mr. Kennedy. A correspondence had been going on for a considerable time between Mr. Higinbothom, Mr. Brown, and Mr. Kennedy, and, on the 23rd of January, the latter gentleman acquainted the Treasury that he had obtained most important knowledge, on which he should, probably, feel it his duty to make an official statement. On the 26th of January that official statement came, and it certainly contained no indications of hasty proceeding. It was said no opportunity was given Mr. Kennedy of withdrawing those harsh expressions; but he should show the hon. Baronet, though his sight was not so acute as he could wish, that, on the contrary, many opportunities were afforded for retracting those harsh expressions, if he had so pleased. It was not, however, for a mere hasty word here and there that Mr. Kennedy was dismissed, but on account of the whole proceeding involved in writing that letter, and the frame of mind in which it was written. In his anxiety to be as concise as possible the hon. Baronet did not mention that the letter contained an announcement on the part of Mr. Kennedy of his intention to dismiss Mr. Higinbothom. Mr. Kennedy, in his letter to the Lords of the Treasury, said—

> "I can entertain no doubt as to the course which it will eventually become my duty to pursue, as regards Mr. Higinbothom, founded on the facts which are at present known to myself, altogether independent of the statements which may be made by Mr. Brown, but which will, no doubt, augment the number and decisive character of the facts connected with this subject."

The House would recollect that this gentleman was not living under the same roof as Mr. Kennedy, and had not the advantage of living on the spot to meet any misrepresentation to which he might be subject. When Mr. Kennedy announced the foregone conclusion as to the dismissal of Mr. Higinbothom, had he heard Mr. Higinbothom? No; he never heard Mr. Higinbothom at all. Mr. Higinbothom was in total and absolute ignorance that such a statement as that of Mr. Kennedy had ever been written. Without communicating with the person whom it so seriously affected, Mr. Kennedy sent it up to his superiors in office to poison their minds against Mr. Higinbothom. The hon. Gentleman said the Treasury gave Mr. Kennedy no opportunity to retract. The first measure of the Lords of the Treasury was to direct Mr. Kennedy to send a copy of his letter to Mr. Higinbothom, and, on the 6th of February, Mr. Higinbothom made the following answer to that communication—

> "Sir,—I must express my regret that, before communicating to the Lords of the Treasury such serious imputations against my veracity as are contained in your report of the 26th ultimo, you did not state to me the doubts that had arisen in your mind. I beg leave respectfully to observe, if you had done so, I should have been enabled to show that, from a misconception of some important facts, you had been led to form erroneous conclusions, and I should, I have no doubt, have satisfied you that there is no ground whatever for the grave charges you have brought against me."

Was it possible for a man to have a more winning inducement to retract? Whether he was a doctor in Pilltown he (Mr. Gladstone) did not care a rush, but he said Mr. Higinbothom with admirable temper passed over, by a general reference, charges to which the harshest words in the dictionary would justifiably apply, and assured the person by whom those charges were made that he was able to convince him there were no grounds for his misstatements. He was sorry to say that appeal extracted no response whatever from Mr. Kennedy. On the 14th of February Mr. Higinbothom sent in a full defence upon the charges, and not only a full defence to every point contained in the letter of the 26th of January, but supported, he might almost say *usque ad nauseam*, with a multitude of affidavits, which Mr. Higinbothom had the prudence and foresight to obtain. Did the receipt of that defence give Mr. Kennedy no opportunity to retract? Alas! in vain was it attempted, and on the 14th of February Mr. Higinbothom, having failed in his appeals, sent another letter, every phrase of which he would not say was proper, but which ended thus—

> "In conclusion, permit me most respectfully to remind you that, among the injurious expressions which you have officially placed upon record in your report to the Lords of the Treasury (which document, I may add, you have requested may be printed), the terms 'deceptive,' 'fraudulent and untrue,' 'unscrupulous,' and 'the reverse of facts,' have been applied to statements which I have proved to be perfectly accurate. You have also made a distinct intimation to their Lordships that 'it is no longer possible to place the slightest reliance on any statement' which I make; that I have been guilty of a 'suppression of facts,' and that I have made a 'daring attempt to impose upon you.' These statements, you will allow me to observe, were submitted to their Lordships without my being afforded any opportunity of explanation on any points on which you might have misapprehended my former report. I have to add that I must request you to convey to the Lords of the Treasury an expression of my deep gratitude for having afforded me the present opportunity of refuting the charges which have been brought against me, charges which I must now respectfully request that you will withdraw."

Was that not an opportunity to retract? After the most conclusive statement, backed by affidavits, Mr. Higinbothom entreated Mr. Kennedy to withdraw those charges, and the answer of Mr. Kennedy was a determined and deliberate adherence to the text of his statement. In this letter Mr. Kennedy said that he would proceed to state some of the grounds on which he had formed his opinions, and which he still entertained. The hon. Baronet could not after this say that no opportunity had been afforded to Mr. Kennedy of retracting or explaining what he had said, for he would neither do so after the first or second appeal had been made to him. On the 28th of February, Mr. Higinbothom sent a further answer, and Mr. Kennedy, on the 2nd March, wrote to the Treasury, and though he expressed his opinion that a further inquiry ought to be instituted, yet he did not express any regret, or withdraw any expression or announce any change of his intention from that contained in his letter relative to the dismissal of Mr. Higinbothom from his situation and his livelihood. On the 7th of March his (Mr. Gladstone's) hon. Friend (Mr. Wilson) wrote that the Treasury had taken steps to obtain a judgment upon the facts; and on the 22nd of the same month a minute directing the reference was made. On the 15th of April a report from the gentlemen who acted as a jury in the collection of facts came in, and on the 25th, Mr. Kennedy, during the whole of this time having failed to avail himself of an opportunity to take off a shade from the darkness of his charges, or to express the faintest suspicion of the propriety of his conduct, was informed that it would be necessary to remove him from the office which he held. On the 2nd of May, Mr. Kennedy wrote to Lord Aberdeen, but he did not even then express any regret; so far from that, he said he entered his indignant protest against the manner in which he had been treated. There certainly was an expression of regret on the part of Mr. Kennedy, but it came through a channel that was not available —it was contained in his petition to that House on the 8th of May. Notwithstanding all this, the hon. Baronet had said that Mr. Kennedy immediately felt regret at his hasty expressions—but where was there any evidence of this? The hon. Baronet should have brought forward facts to support that which was so material to his case, and not have drawn wholly on his imagination. The hon. Baronet had not only committed errors on behalf of Mr. Kennedy, but he had made still more remarkable and glaring misquotations when making out his case against Mr. Higinbothom. When Mr. Kennedy wrote his extraordinary letter, unparalleled in the history of official relations, had he any *primâ facie* grounds for saying that Mr. Higinbothom had been guilty of the suppression of material facts which had tended to mislead? In order to prove this, the hon. Baronet made this quotation from the report of the referees with the view of showing the correctness of Mr. Brown's statement with reference to the Glenbervie inclosure—

> "Mr. Kennedy charges Mr. Higinbothom, in this instance, with suppressing the fact that the inclosure was thinned in 1853. Mr. Higinbothom here admits that about twelve or fourteen acres of that part of this inclosure to which his averages of 100 trees to the acre applied were thinned in 1853, but denies that such thinning could have affected the question between him and Mr. Brown as to averages. This inclosure is divided also by Mr. Brown into two divisions; the first where the land is 'good loam and dry,' and the second where the land is 'inferior and naturally damp.' It is to the first of these divisions Mr. Higinbothom's averages are intended to apply; of this division we have ascertained that a detached portion of about fourteen acres was thinned in 1853, but, on a close inspection, we are led to the conclusion that the large portion remaining unthinned presents a fair average of what the whole was on Mr. Brown's first visit."

But the hon. Baronet stopped at the word "visit," after which there was only a comma, whereas the report continued—

> "Which opinion is corroborated by the second report of Mr. Brown, where he, notwithstanding the thinning of 1853, increases his average number of trees and decreases his average diameter."

Then, again, as to whether Mr. Higinbothom was guilty of surpressing material facts, the referees in their report said—

> "It may be inferred, from what we have already stated in the foregoing particular instances, that we consider the average number of trees standing on the acre as represented by Mr. Higinbothom in his report of December, 1853, was not in any material degree affected by the operation of thinning, which took place between the date of his report and the previous report of Mr. Brown. We agree that, in all such cases as these, no facts whatever should be suppressed, but we are decidedly of opinion that a practical man could not have been misled by the suppression in these cases, and we therefore believe that, while Mr. Higinbothom's silence on this point might well call for inquiry by Mr. Kennedy, such suppression ought not to be characterised as 'culpable.' We ourselves should not have been misled; and the circumstance that Mr. Brown, in his second report, has generally increased his average number of trees, and decreased his average diameter, comes in proof that Mr. Higinbothom's general averages had not been either reduced in number or increased in size by such partial thinnings."

He came to the conclusion, therefore, that the conduct of Mr. Higinbothom was free from blame. He was not an imprudent intermeddler in matters with which he had no concern, nor was the hon. Gentleman the Secretary of the Treasury. He was obliged to go into it, and, although his proceedings might have been imperfect from failure of knowledge, he proceeded honestly and in a straightforward manner.

He might have been charged with ungenerous conduct if Mr. Kennedy had had no opportunities of reconsideration; but he had shown to the House that that gentleman had abundance of such opportunities; he had shown them how he had treated the requisitions from the Treasury, and that the first expression of regret which had escaped his lips was after the intention of removing him had been communicated to him. He wished it to be understood that those at the head of departments could not play tricks in this way, making light of the honour, the feelings, and the character of those under them, and if on a review of the proceedings of any one he was found unfit for government, it was an absolute necessity that he should be removed. Even had Mr. Kennedy retracted his words, the case would have been an extremely difficult one, because, when a superior in office had, in a certain degree, committed himself, a disposition to revoke his error did not render him fit to continue a superior. How was it possible that, in the face of such extraordinary transactions as those in respect to Mr. Higinbothom, he could have maintained his credit and authority? The case of Mr. Brown also involved circumstances which rendered the removal of Mr. Kennedy almost imperative; but at that late hour, and considering the length of time he had already occupied them, he would not go into the details. One point, however, he must notice. The hon. Baronet said he had been governed by prejudice. He did not know whether the hon. Baronet thought that prejudice was original, or had been instilled into him by the serpent, the Secretary of the Treasury, or whether that serpent had had it instilled into him by some other serpent; but both his hon. Friend the Secretary of the Treasury and himself had acted entirely from their own knowledge and belief, and had suffered no one to prejudice them in the matter. He was accused of having appointed Mr. Brown, while he was labouring under imputations affecting his character and veracity, deputy surveyor of Dean Forest. What would the House think when he informed them that he made that appointment solely at the instance of Mr. Kennedy himself? He (Mr. Gladstone) felt the difficulty of that appointment. It was made under the deepest sense of responsibility, but it was made solely on the representation and to prevent the dismissal of Mr. Kennedy. With respect to that gentleman himself, not a step had been taken but what had the fullest concurrence of Lord Aberdeen, or which had not been the subject of the closest examination; and, whether he were in office or out of office, no consideration upon earth would induce him to recede from the course adopted, for by so doing he should consider he would be acting with the greatest injustice towards those humble persons who had not only failed to enlist the sympathy of the hon. Baronet, but had formed the unoffending objects at which to launch the shafts of his ridicule. An observation had been made on the course adopted of communicating the intention of his removal from office to Mr. Kennedy in a private letter. Why was that done? Simply that if it were possible any door could be left open of which Mr. Kennedy or his friends might avail themselves to offer explanations or express regret, it might be done. But no such means offered themselves, and upon a full consideration of the case, in his judgment, Mr. Kennedy was found to be unfit for the government of men, and, although without a very lengthened inquiry it would be impossible for the House to investigate all the facts upon which that judgment was founded, he thought it had heard enough to convince them that it was a sound one. Mr. Kennedy had never dissented from the report, but, on the contrary, he made not the slightest difficulty as to the dismissal of Mr. Brown. It was too late now for the hon. Gentleman to say there should be another discussion of the subject. He (Mr. Gladstone) objected to the Motion as entirely contrary to Parliamentary usage, and also as injurious to the public service; he objected that no *primâ facie* ground for it had been established for the proposed Committee. As to the last miserable charge—that of disliking a man for doing his public duty—that he did not feel called upon to notice. His last objection was, that the hon. Gentleman had not had matter enough or courage enough to give the Motion a real shape. The Committee was asked for, not to inquire into charges, but to make charges. He had dwelt in countries where the mode of conducting judicial proceedings was different from that pursued in this country—he meant the south of Italy. In England they inquired if the charge against a man was true, but there the object was to find out what charges could be made against a man. He did not mean to compare a Committee of that House to a judicial proceeding, but still it was a serious matter. No man could remain in office while subject to inquiries of this kind. The Motion asserted nothing. It was a Motion that men in office were unworthy and unable to choose their own instruments. So far as he himself was concerned, he was content to leave the matter to the House, convinced that it would do nought but what was just and proper. The House had heard the statements of the hon. Baronet and of himself, and was capable of arriving at a right and sound judgment. For himself, he should leave the matter in the hands of the House, confident that it would fully appreciate the merits of the statements it had heard. [The right hon. Gentleman immediately quitted the House.]

Lord STANLEY said, that it was never easy to answer a speech of the right hon. Gentleman the late Chancellor of the Exchequer. That task—a difficult one at all times—became doubly difficult in the absence of the right hon. Gentleman. He hoped, however, that if he should unintentionally misrepresent the words of the right hon. Gentleman, that some of those hon. Members who, during the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, had expressed their agreement with the opinions therein set forth, would at once interpose to correct him. He must, in the first instance, premise, that he had no private or peculiar information on the case in dispute, but, on the other hand, he might claim to stand between the two parties as one entirely unprejudiced. Of Mr. Kennedy he knew nothing. He readily admitted the great talents and high character of the right hon. Gentleman who last addressed them, but he thought that the right hon. Gentleman, in his reply, had trusted to the weight of his character and talents to overbear something like a deficiency of evidence. The charge did not seem to him to be one of a personal nature against the right hon. Gentleman, but against a public department. That department had committed a grievous injustice against an individual. He had said that it was not a charge against the character of the late Chancellor of the Exchequer. But the right hon. Gentleman, after the statement of the hon. Baronet (Sir J. Shelley)—which did not err from want of candour—turned round, and, without giving a moment for consideration, asked the hon. Baronet if he meant to accuse him of corruption or dishonesty; for that, if the hon. Baronet did and would reduce the charge to writing, he (the right hon. Gentleman) would consent to the Committee. Now, he apprehended that the simple answer to that challenge was, that the hon. Baronet never intended to make, and never did make, any charge of improper motives against the right hon. Gentleman. The inconsistency of the right hon. Gentleman's answer had struck others besides himself. The right hon. Gentleman said he was willing to grant a Committee to clear his own character, but when the question was merely one with reference to Mr. Kennedy's character he would oppose the appointment of a Committee. He was sure that on neither side the House was there an inclination to do the right hon. Gentleman injustice; but it did not follow, because his motives were above suspicion, that, therefore, he was entitled to lay claim to infallibility and irresponsibility. The right hon. Gentleman had denied that any appeal lay from his decision in the case of an error of judgment. That meant, that the character of a public servant might be injured—his means of subsistence taken away from him—his power of public usefulness destroyed in a moment—without any appeal to any tribunal whatever. That was a claim which clearly ought not to be maintained, and could not, in his opinion, be made good. Let it be considered by analogy with some other branch of the public service. Take the example of the army or the navy. When, in speaking of any Government or administrative body, you wanted to describe it as despotic in the highest degree, you called it a "military despotism"—you said it had its subjects as absolutely under command as the crew of a man-of-war. But what was the case in these necessarily despotic professions? Why, not the humblest officer—he did not say not an admiral nor a captain, but not the youngest lieutenant, or midshipman, or ensign, could be dismissed without sentence of a court-martial. Yet the right hon. Gentleman claimed the right to remove a public servant of long standing and high position without any formal inquiry whatever. That was applying to the Civil Service a principle infinitely more despotic than any which prevailed in the army or navy. Let them recollect the importance of the civil administration—that it divided the power of the Government with the Legislature—that a vast variety of the most important questions must in effect be decided by it—and then consider the result of such a doctrine as that propounded by the right hon. Gentleman—namely, that every man in that service must be under the absolute and irresponsible control of the heads of the departments. That was a power which no man ought to claim, with which no man ought to be intrusted, and he would add, which no man, having a sense of self-respect, would submit to. If it were given and acted on, the result would be to make all who exercised it tyrants, and all who submitted to it slaves. But, after all, the right hon. Gentleman said that there was an appeal, if any Member would get up and undertake to prove—that which was not only difficult, but next to impossible to prove—that the removal had taken place from corrupt motives. But the position was utterly untenable and inconsistent. If the appeal to Parliament were unconstitutional, why admit it in any case; if not, why limit it to that special class of cases? The right hon. Gentleman alarmed them with the threat, that, the precedent once admitted, appeals would become frequent. He did not know whether they would become frequent or not, but if the exercise of such a power as that claimed was common in the Civil Service, then the more frequent appeals were the better. The charges upon which Mr. Kennedy was understood to have been removed were patent and notorious. They were—whether right or wrong—valid or invalid—before the public. The right hon. Gentleman, indeed, had argued that Mr. Kennedy's dismissal of Brown and Higinbothom was only one out of many reasons that determined the Government to remove Mr. Kennedy. Suppose such a statement as that had been made either by Mr. Kennedy or Mr. Brown against those whose part the right hon. Gentleman had taken. Suppose Messrs. Kennedy and Brown had said that it was quite true that they had complained of Higinbothom on certain specified grounds, but that they had other grounds of complaint—other charges—which they would not press, the knowledge of which they would keep to themselves, but which, if the Government knew (which they did not) would make them dismiss those persons. If such an argument had been used by Mr. Kennedy or those who defended him, then he believed that no man would have been more forward than the right hon. Gentleman himself to denounce its injustice. But that was precisely the plea of the right hon. Gentleman himself when he sought to disparage the character of Mr. Kennedy. The case before them might be stated in a few words. It had been acknowledged that in the office of Woods and Forests great mismanagement had existed. Into that office Mr. Kennedy had been placed by the noble Lord the Member for the City (Lord J. Russell), with the express purpose of carrying out there the thorough reform which was needed. The very nature of the task was enough to make Mr. Kennedy unpopular in his department. Of course, Mr. Kennedy's statement to the effect that he found himself opposed and thwarted on all sides was *ex parte*, but still it was probable. Mr. Kennedy was compelled to choose a subordinate to assist him, and he chose a friend of his own, Mr. Brown, who of course would share in his unpopularity. Mr. Brown got into a quarrel with Mr. Higinbothom, who had been previously employed in the department; and, in touching on this part of the case the right hon. Gentleman had certainly resorted to something like clap-trap by talking of this last-named individual as a plebeian. No doubt it was wrong that any man should be exempted from the censure that he deserved because of his social position; but, in addressing a popular audience in this age and country, any injustice that might be done on this score was likely to arise in the opposite way from that at which the right hon. Gentleman had hinted. It was a very common thing for a man who was accused, and even justly accused before a court of law to make capital out of his insignificance, and thus to excite commiseration in his own behalf. But to return to the facts of this case. Mr. Higinbothom made a statement which bore on the face of it resemblance to a fraud, although it might not actually have been a fraud. Mr. Brown, however, believed it to be such, and Mr. Kennedy appeared to have concurred in the same opinion. It was not enough to prove that Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Brown were wrong in their opinion—it ought to be shown that they had no fair or probable grounds for the conclusion they came to as to the transaction. Unless that were shown (and no attempt had even been made to prove it), it must be acknowledged that the offence of Mr. Kennedy amounted to nothing more than an error of judgment, and, according to the right hon. Gentleman, while an error of judgment in a Minister of the Crown was so venial and trifling a fault as not to be worth investigating, yet in a permanent official, not represented in any way in that House, it was assumed at once to be so grave and material an offence as to justify his dismissal. In this he thought there was something like bias shown by the right hon. Gentleman. The fault found with Mr. Kennedy by the right hon. Gentleman was, that, having formed an opinion with regard to the conduct and character of Mr. Higinbothom, he had not been deterred, by fear of consequences, from expressing it, from holding fast to it, from repeating it when its justice was disputed, but, on the contrary, had stated his grounds for holding it, and courted and demanded inquiry. He could not help thinking, however, that if Mr. Kennedy had retracted it would have gone very little better with him; and certainly—though, perhaps, such a course would not have justified his dismissal—it would have fairly laid him open to severe censure. Would it not in that case have been said, "Here is a man so reckless about what he says, that he makes a charge one day and retracts it the next—is he fit to hold office?" But when Mr. Kennedy repeated and adhered to his assertions, then his persistence was blamed as obstinacy. Next came the question—the Treasury having granted an inquiry—how and by whom it should be conducted, and this appeared to be the turning point of the case. In the first place, contrary to all rules of justice, though the meanest prisoner had a right to challenge the jury, Mr. Kennedy was brought to trial without having an opportunity of knowing who the jury were, or, to use his own language—

> "Their Lordships seems to have considered it becoming to nominate the jury and send my case for trial before it, not merely without my acquiescence, but without informing me of their intention until it was executed; and thus a Privy Councillor and a head of a department was, without notice, brought to trial on a question, stated to be one affecting his veracity, his integrity, and his honour, before a jury nominated by those with whom he had recently been engaged in warm disputes."

When he was made acquainted with the tribunal appointed to try him, there were two of the names on it to which he had no objection to make, but to the third name—Mr. Menzies—he did object, because he had formerly been a subordinate of his own, and was then engaged in another branch of the same department, having for his immediate superior the son-in-law of Mr. Higinbothom. This inquiry, therefore, was ordered to take place before a tribunal, the names of the members of which had not previously been made known to the accused—before a tribunal, too, to which neither of the parties had access; it was a trial of an official superior by an official subordinate, and by a subordinate, moreover, who was placed in circumstances which were likely to give him a bias. He ventured to say that before a court so constituted a common pickpocket would not be tried. The right hon. Gentleman, however, said there was nothing irregular in this, that it was merely following the course of official routine. This might exonerate the right hon. Gentleman personally, but it did not alter the circumstances of the case. Nay, it formed a further ground for the investigation demanded, since it appeared that the injustice complained of was not accidental, but systematic. He was not aware whether cases of this sort were common in the Civil Service, but it must be remembered that there were 16,000 persons in that service; and if this were the manner in which justice was administered to those persons, he ventured to say that there was nothing in Russia more despotic. Even if Mr. Kennedy were guilty to the full extent, he had not had a fair trial; it was impossible for any one to place confidence in such a tribunal as had been described; no court of law was open to him for redress, he had no other tribunal to resort to but that House, and he thought they would be neglecting what was due to the public service and to the country at large if they refused to listen to his appeal.

MR. DRUMMOND said, he knew as little, and perhaps less, of the rules of the Civil Service than the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn; but he was certain of this, that if in the civil, naval, or military services, the heads of departments were not to be responsible for their servants, all government was impossible. He objected to this Motion on two grounds—first, because it interfered with the Executive Government; and secondly, because it tended to usurp for the House of Commons the power of the Executive; and introduced a personal debate which he and other Members, he doubted not, would gladly avoid. The hon. Baronet (Sir J. Shelley) had alluded so much to the Committee he (Mr. Drummond) had moved for last year, that it became necessary that he should give a short history of the circumstances relating to it. It happened to come to his knowledge that Mr. Kennedy entertained very transcendental notions with regard to the management of the Crown Forests, as, indeed, was pretty evident from the blue books; and he hoped there was no hon. Gentleman present who intended to vote on this question without having read through all these blue books. Evidently the noble Lord who had just sat down had not gone through them carefully, or he would not have made some of the statements which had fallen from him, and without having done so he certainly was not competent to form a correct judgment on the subject. Having heard, however, that Mr. Kennedy was about to introduce some extraordinary changes into the management of the Crown Forests, he moved for some returns, expecting to get a small paper, but, to his great astonishment, there came as great a blue book as ever issued from Lord Duncan's Committee, and, on speaking to the Secretary for the Treasury on the subject, he was informed that was not one-half of the return if he meant to have all Mr. Kennedy had written on the subject. "Oh! let us have all that Mr. Kennedy has written by all means," was his reply, and accordingly it was given. If those blue books were read through, it would be found that so far from the beginning of this matter being the question between Mr. Brown and Mr. Higinbothom, it, in fact, began by Mr. Kennedy's introducing Mr. Brown into his office for the purpose of overthrowing all the establishment of the Woods and Forests. The abuses found out by Lord Duncan's Committee had no reference to the question before the House. The hon. Baronet had objected to the names of his (Mr. Drummond's) Committee. Now as he found that Mr. Kennedy knew nothing about timber, and that by his own confession, for he had spent years in Ireland, and was born in Ayrshire, where no trees grew, therefore he (Mr. Drummond) had consulted Gentlemen on both sides of the House, and selected names of those whom it was considered knew something of woodland statistics; and he chose Lord Edward Howard, Colonel Clifford, Mr. Vernon Smith, Mr. Compton, Lord Harry Vane, Lord Shelburne, Mr. Denison, Sir William Heathcote, Mr. Tollemache, and others, who were all acquainted with the management of woods; and then he asked, as was but proper, for some Member of the Government to be appointed, and Mr. Chichester Fortescue was selected, for whom Mr. Wilson was afterwards substituted. It might have appeared to some persons that it would have been better to get some Manchester manufacturers, or railroad directors; but he thought it was better to have persons who knew something about woods on a question of this nature. It was found that among the first plans of Mr. Kennedy was to send to India for a quantity of *Deodara* seeds, for planting a new species of wood, but which did not succeed. Then, there was the case of Mr. Minchin, the deputy surveyor of the Forest of Dean. He (Mr. Drummond) remembered when that forest was in a lawless and a very bad state, and Mr. Minchin, by good management, had quite altered the state of things. Now that gentleman had been treated in so *de-haut-en-bas* a way that he had been obliged to resign. With regard to Mr. Higinbothom and his management of the forests in his (Mr. Drummond's) neighbourhood, although he was a Liberal, and all his friends Liberals too—he opposed him (Mr. Drummond)—yet he would say that several gentlemen who had inspected that part of the forests were of opinion that there could be no better management of them than Mr. Higinbothom's. The conduct of Mr. Kennedy, however, towards that gentleman was most unjust. It was not from any dispute with Mr. Brown that that gentleman met with ill-treatment. Mr. Kennedy took upon himself to form an opinion of the conduct of Mr. Higinbothom, and charged him with making fabrications in his accounts, and of being a man unworthy of trust. Hon. Members had expressed an anxiety to do justice to an absent man, meaning Mr. Kennedy, but when they supported that gentleman's conduct towards Mr. Higinbothom he thought the appeal of those hon. Members came with a very bad grace indeed. It had been said that Lord Duncan's Committee was the origin of this quarrel, but he denied it. What was Mr. Kennedy's knowledge of the forests, and what was the cause of his appointment? The wicked world said that it was the result of a family cabal, and that Mr. Kennedy owed his appointment to his connection with the Whigs. All he could say was, that Mr. Higinbothom had served well in his office, and nowhere were woods better managed. With Mr. Kennedy he (Mr. Drummond) had no acquaintance, until he had called on him and claimed him as an old schoolfellow; and although he believed him to be a man zealous in the public service, he did not think he was fit to control men as good as himself, and who did not like unjust charges thrown in their teeth.

MR. MALINS said, he did not think it was any disparagement to Mr. Kennedy to be connected with the Whigs, if his marriage with the daughter of the late Sir Samuel Romilly was supposed to constitute that connection. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) appeared very indignant at the manner in which the hon. Baronet (Sir J. Shelley) had brought forward this question ; but he (Mr. Malins) thought it had been introduced in a spirit of moderation and fairness. It was his opinion that throughout the whole of this transaction the late Chancellor of the Exchequer had acted in a hasty, unfeeling, and most inconsiderate manner towards a public servant of long standing. The right hon. Gentleman had said, that unless this arbitrary power of summarily dismissing subordinate servants were vested in the responsible Ministers of the Crown, the public service could not be carried on. All he could say was, that if that were to be the condition in which the subordinate servants of the Crown were to be placed—if every man holding office was liable to be dismissed at any moment by the Chancellor of the Exchequer—then, for his part, he should never be ambitious to hold office in the service of his country. But the right hon. Gentleman seemed conscious that he was treading on tender ground, and appeared to feel that any Minister's exercising such a power would not be tolerated by the House, because he had evidently taken some pains to impress upon the House that the dismissal of Mr. Kennedy was not his individual act, but that it was the joint act of two Ministers of the Crown ; and he endeavoured to make the House understand that the Earl of Aberdeen, who was then Prime Minister, had concurred in the dismissal of Mr. Kennedy. But what said the great corrector of errors—dates ? The letter of dismissal was dated the 29th of April, 1854. Mr. Kennedy, finding himself at the age of sixty-five years, and after thirty years' public service, dismissed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer by his letter of the 29th of April, on the 2nd of May (three days after his letter of dismissal) wrote to the Earl of Aberdeen. The Earl of Aberdeen answered Mr. Kennedy on the 9th of May, and the best evidence of the extent to which the Earl of Aberdeen participated in the dismissal of Mr. Kennedy was to be collected from that letter. It appeared by the letter written by the Earl of Aberdeen himself, that at the time the right hon. Gentleman dismissed Mr. Kennedy he knew nothing of the circumstances of the case, and had not been consulted on the subject. It was in vain for the right hon. Gentleman to endeavour to persuade the House of Commons that he had the concurrence of another Minister in that transaction. He knew that the multifarious engagements of the right hon. Gentleman might have made it difficult for him to consult the Earl of Aberdeen upon the subject; but he felt bound to express his firm conviction that the right hon. Gentleman, much as he admired his abilities, had, upon his own showing, been guilty of a most rash, and, he must add, unfeeling act in his treatment of Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Kennedy had published a pamphlet, in which, according to the right hon. Gentleman, he complained that his dismissal was an attack upon his integrity, his veracity, and his honour. The right hon. Gentleman denied that that dismissal was any attack upon the veracity, honour, or integrity of Mr. Kennedy ; and then he also stated that he had not been dismissed on account of his management of the Royal Woods and Forests. If such were the case, he wanted to know then for what Mr. Kennedy had been dismissed. It seemed to him that the cause could only be the letter written by him on the 26th of January, 1854. Now, the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) and the hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond) had stated that no one could form an opinion upon this question who had not read the blue books ; but he would at once confess that he had not read those blue books, but from the speech of the right hon. Gentleman alone he considered that he was fully able to form his opinion. It appeared from that speech, that the reasons for the dismissal of Mr. Kennedy resolved themselves into the letter of the 26th of January ; and he would remind the House that, although perhaps the right hon. Gentleman might not have had the opportunity of communicating with the Earl of Aberdeen on the subject, he had sat by the side of another Minister of the Crown (Lord J. Russell) night after night, in that House, between the writing of that letter and the dismissal of Mr. Kennedy. Now, it appeared to him that the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) was the Minister with whom the right hon. Gentleman might have consulted with the greatest propriety, as it was to that noble Lord that Mr. Kennedy owed his appointment; but it seemed that the right hon. Gentleman among his faults included the fault of a too strong reliance on his own judgment, and that unaided—except, indeed, by the hon. Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Wilson)—he took upon himself the responsibility of dismissing Mr. Kennedy without consulting the Earl of Aberdeen or any other high official. That the right hon. Gentleman did not consult the noble Lord on the subject was evident from the letter addressed by that noble Lord to Mr. Kennedy on the 9th of June. The noble Lord (Lord J. Russell), in that letter, stated that it was with much regret that he contemplated the circumstances, with which he was only partially acquainted, which had led to Mr. Kennedy's separation from the public service, and, after passing a high eulogium upon that gentleman's public career, he proceeded to state that, as at that time he had no seat in the House of Commons, he could not say what course he should adopt if any inquiry into the case should be pressed for; but he added that, in the event of his being re-elected, he should be most happy to communicate upon the course which he should pursue with any hon. Member who might move for a Committee of Inquiry into that painful subject. It was clear, therefore, that neither the Earl of Aberdeen, then at the head of the Government, nor the noble Lord (Lord John Russell), the head of the Government in that House, had been consulted in the affair; and he was consequently driven to the conclusion that the right hon. Gentleman, unaided by any advice, except, as he had said before, that of the hon. Gentleman the Secretary of the Treasury—between whom and Mr. Kennedy, from some cause or other, ill feeling appeared to exist—had dismissed that gentleman from the position which he had held. He himself was personally unacquainted with Mr. Kennedy, but when he saw a gentleman, who had for so long a period meritoriously served the public, summarily dismissed, he thought that some inquiry ought to be instituted. It was well known that, when Mr. Kennedy was appointed by the noble Lord the Member for the City of London (Lord John Russell) to the office of Commissioner of Woods and Forests, the woods and forests were in a very bad condition. There had been a loss to the nation of about 6,000*l.* per annum previous to Mr. Kennedy's management, and after his appointment he raised the net income in 1853 to 36,259*l.* That was a proof that Mr. Kennedy was a valuable public servant. It had been truly stated by the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn (Lord Stanley) that, if the principles enounced by the late Chancellor of the Exchequer in respect to this matter were to prevail, there would not exist in Russia a greater despotism than would be found in this country. According to the right hon. Gentleman's account, Mr. Kennedy was nothing more than the mere servant at will to the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the day, and liable to be summarily dismissed by him, and he also maintained that the practice of that House did not warrant any inquiry like the one proposed into the dismissal of public servants. But the Earl of Aberdeen appeared to differ from the right hon. Gentleman, for the noble Lord in his letter said that he could not inquire into the matter because it was now before Parliament. He (Mr. Malins) trusted that, despite such special pleading, Parliament, seeing that an act of injustice had been committed, would not suffer oppression to be practised towards an individual by an arbitrary Minister, however eloquent or talented that Minister might be, who cautiously abstained from consulting his colleague, to whom Mr. Kennedy owed his appointment, but only took counsel from a subordinate, between whom and Mr. Kennedy there appeared to be some ill feeling. With respect to the particular subject which led to Mr. Kennedy's dismissal, he was ready, for the sake of argument, to admit that there was something harsh in Mr. Kennedy's conduct to Mr. Higinbothom, though there could be no doubt that Mr. Kennedy acted under a sense of public duty only. But why did not the late Chancellor of the Exchequer have an interview with Mr. Kennedy, and then he might have pointed out that he (Mr. Kennedy) had written too harshly, and might have advised him to withdraw the letter in question? This was a case in which it appeared to him that a public servant had been unworthily treated, and he trusted, for the sake of justice, that the House would deem that it was one imperatively calling for inquiry.

Lord SEYMOUR said, he thought it necessary, as he had the honour to hold the office of Chief Commissioner of the Woods and Forests in 1850, to say a few words respecting the matter before the House. It was shortly after that period that the vacancy took place to which Mr. Kennedy was appointed. On that vacancy occurring he had a conversation with his noble Friend (Lord John Russell) respecting it, and told him it was most important to name to that place some person who was well qualified to manage the business of a public office, who would be zealous and energetic in preventing abuses, and who would not scruple to look into everything that would lead to a thorough reform of the office. His noble Friend asked him if he could recommend any such person, and he said he could not. His Lordship took some days to consider, and then named Mr. Kennedy as the only person he could find fitted for the purpose, and stated the very high character Mr. Kennedy had earned for himself in Ireland. In 1850 the Bill was passed for dividing the offices, and therefore he had only seen Mr. Kennedy in his office for a very few months. The office of Works was separated from the office of Woods and Forests and Land Revenues, and Mr. Kennedy was left at the head of the Woods and Forests and Land Revenues. He believed that Mr. Kennedy, from what he saw of him, was most zealous and well-intentioned in the desire to correct all the evils of the department. He had many conversations with him, and he showed himself very desirous of doing all he could; but he must say at the same time that in some things he was not very judicious in what he did. He must make that statement in justification of what had been said by the late Chancellor of the Exchequer. Mr. Kennedy was very well-intentioned, and very honest and earnest in his desire to do what was best for the public, but he was in an office totally different from what he had to deal with before. In that office, which was one of very great difficulty, requiring a system of management perhaps different from that of any other, having to deal with people from different parts of the country, both English and Scotch, and to control the management of property of a very peculiar character, he (Lord Seymour) did not think Mr. Kennedy had shown the judgment which he had hoped he would show in the management of that office. Therefore he thought afterwards that the selection was not a very fortunate one, but as regarded Mr. Kennedy personally, he considered that he was honest and sincere in his desire to do all that he could. Some of the deputy surveyors were really deserving of public approbation, and amongst that class was Mr. Minchin, to whom the hon. Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond) had referred. That gentleman was dismissed, and it might have been time for him to retire, but there was a mode of inducing persons who had been a long time public servants to retire without any harshness. The revenues of the forests for one year had been referred to by the hon. and learned Gentleman who last addressed them as a proof of the exertions made by Mr. Kennedy, but they formed no real test by which to judge. Any person who knew anything of timber must also know that such a test was fallacious, because timber was not a crop that grew up in one year and was cut down in the next. The fact was, that the Committee over which Lord Duncan presided recommended that the timber should be cut that had been kept too long. It had been kept from the desire of the Government that in time of peace, while timber was cheap, the timber should be preserved in the Royal Forests. With regard to the appointment of the proposed Committee, he must say he was surprised at the arguments used by the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn. If they once allowed the principle to be adopted, that every one of the 16,000 officials in the public service who might be dismissed was to have his case discussed in that House, their whole time would be occupied with such inquiries. And what would be the effect on the public departments? Who would then dare to dismiss a public servant? Unless he had a very good case indeed, he would be a strong-minded man who would dismiss an official, knowing that he would be compelled to come down to that House and defend his deed. What was the very argument they heard most frequently urged against the Government at this time? It was that they had not courage to dismiss people; and the House might depend upon it, that, if Committees of Inquiry were to be appointed in cases like the present, few persons would be disposed to dismiss Government officials. There were many public servants against whom, perhaps, a strong case could not be made out, but who were known to those at the head of the offices in which they were employed as incompetent to the right discharge of their duties, and there might be a desire to dismiss them; but was this likely to be done when the result might be a strong attack in that House, perhaps a party attack, which would be in the highest degree inconvenient to the Government? If a man was dismissed for some private motive—to make way for a friend of the person having the appointment—to get political power, or to remove a political enemy, then that would be a fair case for inquiry; but no such grounds could be pleaded in the present instance. It was quite clear that the language and conduct of Mr. Kennedy were intemperate. It was clear, also, that the conduct of Mr. Higinbothom was faulty, and he ought to have made a humble apology for the communication which he had sent. There had been, he also considered, intemperate conduct on the part of the Treasury. He thought the jury was not a good selection, but, though there might have been mistakes on the part of the Treasury, the matter would not be remedied by appointing a Committee of that House. He did not regret, however, that this debate had taken place. One useful result of it was, that it was made obvious that no one accused Mr. Kennedy of anything discreditable to his character. On the contrary, every one had spoken of his good intentions and zeal, and the late Chancellor of the Exchequer had explained away those words with regard to veracity which were no doubt very offensive to any honourable mind. He hoped, in conclusion, that the hon. Gentleman (Sir J. Shelley) would not press his Motion to a division.

MR. STRUTT said, he wished to state that the point on which Mr. Kennedy and his friends had felt most strongly was the imputation which, in their opinion, was thrown on his honour by the Treasury minute, by his dismissal, and by the mode of that dismissal. In the investigation which took place it was stated that the veracity, honour, and integrity of the parties concerned was involved; and, when the three gentlemen made their report to the Treasury, the result was that Mr. Kennedy was dismissed. It necessarily followed that Mr. Kennedy and his friends looked on the result of that inquiry as an imputation on his honour. The late Chancellor of the Exchequer had stated expressly that, with respect to Mr. Kennedy's honour and veracity, the fullest reparation had been offered to his friends. Now, he was authorised by the friends of Mr. Kennedy to state that, in their opinion, no such reparation had been offered, and that, if it had, probably the course which was now taken would have been avoided. The noble Lord (Lord Seymour) said Committees of that House should not be appointed to inquire into light cases; but the question was, whether this was one of those light cases with regard to which inquiry should be refused? In his opinion this was not a light and unnecessary case, and therefore, if the matter were pressed to a division, he should give his vote in favour of the Motion.

MR. WILSON said, that, after the personal allusions made to him in the course of this debate, he considered that it was incumbent on him to offer a few remarks before the House went to a division. In the first place, he would observe upon the allegation that Mr. Kennedy had been charged by the Treasury with a want of veracity, integrity, and honour. Now, on his own behalf, and on that of every Member of the Government with whom he had communicated, being perfectly acquainted also, not only with the public, but private correspondence which had taken place betwen the Government and the friends of Mr. Kennedy, he begged to state in the most explicit manner that no charge of that kind had been made, but that, on the contrary, any such charge had been distinctly disavowed. The grounds of justification for the discharge of Mr. Kennedy resolved themselves into this—that that gentleman had not the temper, had not the manner, had not the power of so governing the large establishment intrusted to his charge as to conduce to the public advantage; beyond that no one had ever pressed any charge against him. The hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Malins) had insinuated that the mind of the Chancellor of the Exchequer had been poisoned by imputations cast upon Mr. Kennedy by him (Mr. Wilson), but all who knew the right hon. Gentleman would know that he possessed too great habits of industry and too great conscientiousness to allow himself to be influenced by the opinions of any other person when the character of an individual was at stake. So far, however, from his (Mr. Wilson's) mind being biassed against Mr. Kennedy, the fact was, that, when he went to the Treasury, he had gone there with every feeling in favour of that gentleman, and during the whole of the discussion, though it was his duty to hold the balance evenly, at the Treasury, between a gentleman holding the high office of Mr. Kennedy and his subordinates, he must distinctly state that, from the first, until within two months of the decision to which the Government arrived, he (Mr. Wilson) believed that Mr. Brown and Mr. Kennedy were right and that the other side was wrong, and for this reason—that until then he had only the reports of Mr. Brown and the letters of Mr. Kennedy before him. He never doubted the facts on which Mr. Brown's reports were based, and regarded him as a man of intelligence and ability, who understood his business. Those reports arrived in March, April, and May, and he (Mr. Wilson) read every paper through, and felt disposed to act on them. In one instance he did reverse the decision of the late Government in support of Mr. Kennedy, and of the recommendations of Mr. Brown; but when the larger question came to be discussed, was he (Mr. Wilson) to be blamed that, having a proposition before him from Mr. Brown to reverse the whole order of things in a property which, as we were told, would in a few years be worth millions of money, he took the precaution of inquiring the opinion of the recognised authorities, who should advise the Treasury? His first step was to refer Mr. Brown's reports to Mr. Clutton, who concurred in many respects with them; but where Mr. Clutton differed with Mr. Brown, his own (Mr. Wilson's) impression, which he stated to his colleagues in the Treasury, was in favour of Mr. Brown. On the 21st of December, however, came a letter from Sir James Campbell, representing that the facts as set forth in Mr. Brown's reports were wrong from beginning to end. He had felt it necessary upon this to inquire into the facts. After the receipt of Sir James Campbell's letter his impression was still in favour of Mr. Brown; but then, on the 4th of January, came Mr. Higinbothom's letter, which was exactly to the same purport as that written by Sir James Campbell, and stated that the report submitted to the Treasury by Mr. Brown in March had not been seen by them until October. He did not disavow his responsibility in this case, but his sole object had been to effect a fair adjudication between the contending parties, and he defied any one who had read the blue books, instead of pamphlets containing *ex parte* statements, to point out a single sentence in any of the replies of the Treasury from which it could be inferred that any bias existed towards one side or the other. When the correspondence was completed, he came to the conclusion that the only course which he could pursue—and Mr. Kennedy appeared to have arrived at a similar conclusion—was to find a suitable tribunal, who might decide upon matters of fact alone. The Treasury having decided upon adopting that course, Mr. Kennedy suggested that three gentlemen should be appointed, to whom none of the reports had been referred, and who were entirely unconnected with any of the parties to the transactions, and he forwarded a list of twelve names from which he proposed that the tribunal should be selected. The first two names in the list were those of gentlemen of very high reputation, but it so happened that some of the reports had previously been referred to those gentlemen; and he (Mr. Wilson) thought, therefore, that it would have been highly imprudent and unjust towards those individuals if they had been appointed to adjudicate upon the question. He believed that Mr. Kennedy, as he had himself stated, did not know any of the gentlemen named in the list which, he (Mr. Wilson) understood, had been handed to Mr. Kennedy by Mr. Brown; but it appeared that three of the gentlemen on the list had been upon terms of friendship or intimacy with Mr. Brown, and their appointment would, of course, have been objectionable. Inquiries were made with respect to the other gentlemen whose names were included in the list, and it was found that, although they were individuals of very high character, they had had no experience with respect to forests. He (Mr. Wilson) proposed the appointment of Mr. Josiah Parkes, whose judgment in matters of drainage was well known; but as that gentleman had had some dispute with Mr. Kennedy about the drainage of the Phœnix Park, in Dublin, it was found impossible that he could undertake the duty. He (Mr. Wilson) mentioned this circumstance to show his anxiety to appoint an independent tribunal. With regard to the three gentlemen who were finally appointed, he (Mr. Wilson) could only say that he endeavoured to select men whom he deemed best qualified for the duty; they were entirely unknown to him; and he believed them to be gentlemen of the highest honour, integrity, and ability. The Treasury were bound to look to the subordinate officers whose interests were at stake. High officials could generally get some influential friend to take up their cause, but the inferiors had only the Treasury to protect them. Since the present Board of the Treasury was constituted they had had many difficulties to contend with in the reorganisation of the Customs and other offices, and he thought their conduct showed they were not actuated by the motives attributed to them by the hon. Baronet (Sir J. Shelley). Whatever censure was to be attached to the transaction, a great portion belonged to himself. It would be impossible to carry on the work of Government if the House were to assume a right to review every transaction of this kind, although if a *primâ facie* case of injustice was made out it ought not to be overlooked. He could say for himself, and he believed for every Member of the Government, that there was not on their part the slightest feeling against Mr. Kennedy; but that, on the contrary, if there had been any feeling at all, it had been in his favour, on the ground that they believed he was conscientiously discharging a very difficult duty. But, however zealous a man might be in the performance of a duty, zeal did not always secure discretion, and without discretion zeal sometimes was rather a fault than a virtue in a public officer. He must, before he sat down, express his regret at the light and frivolous manner in which the hon. Baronet (Sir J. Shelley) had treated the responsibility of the Government with reference to matters of this kind. The noble Lord opposite (Lord Stanley) had complained that the inquiry had been conducted before a tribunal whose names were unknown to Mr. Kennedy, but it would be found in the instructions given to the referees that they were directed to transmit a copy of the minute to Mr. Kennedy for his information and guidance. The names were communicated to Mr. Kennedy; he was present when the parties received their instructions, and no word of objection was raised to the proceeding until after Mr. Kennedy's dismissal.

Mr. WHITESIDE said, it was stated that the honour, the veracity, and the integrity of Mr. Kennedy had not been impugned. He (Mr. Whiteside) would, however, read the minute referred to in the manly speech of the right hon. Member for Nottingham (Mr. Strutt), and the House would judge for themselves. [The hon. Member then read the passage in question, which was to the effect that the case, as between Mr. Higinbothom and Mr. Brown, and Mr. Higinbothom and Mr. Kennedy, had assumed proportions, as matters of fact, "involving the veracity, integrity, and honour of the parties."] He (Mr. Whiteside) had only known Mr. Kennedy for two days, and he was bound to say that Mr. Kennedy had stated to him the imputation on the part of the Treasury it was which had stung him to the quick in the matter. The late Chancellor of the Exchequer said it had been resolved to rest the question on the issue of the trial. Mr. Brown and Mr. Kennedy, however, had required one, and were refused; and yet the right hon. Gentleman called upon a body of English gentlemen to say that the decision of the Treasury ought to be respected.

Viscount PALMERSTON said, he could quite understand that those persons who were interested by friendship and long acquaintance with Mr. Kennedy were anxious to bring forward a discussion in that House for the purpose of vindicating his character from any aspersions which they might conceive to have been cast upon it with regard to his honour, integrity, and veracity. He was sure, however, that no one who knew Mr. Kennedy would for one instant impute to him anything which could reflect upon his honour, his veracity, or his character. What had passed in this discussion ought to be satisfactory upon those points, and he hoped that those who had brought on the debate would feel that Mr. Kennedy came out of it with his character and honour clear from all imputation. He thought the hon. Member for Westminster (Sir J. Shelley) ought to be content with the result of the discussion, and he would recommend the House to consider seriously the consequences which might ensue from the establishment of such a precedent as that now sought to be established. It would in his (Lord Palmerston's) opinion strike at the very foundation of the Civil Service of the country. It would reduce that Civil Service to a state of anarchy, and would cause the greatest public inconvenience. He could well understand that if a Minister of the Crown had appointed a person whom Parliament thought unfit for the appointment, that question might be a fit subject for the House to inquire into, because the House, as the guardian of the public interests, was entitled to interpose to prevent the appointment of an improper person to discharge important public duties. But he contended that, at the same time, a discretion must be left in the hands of servants of the Crown as to removing from office those whom they thought incompetent for the duties they were called upon to discharge. There were many reasons which might render a person unfit for a particular situation which it would be impossible to state with that detail and force to satisfy a Committee, but which might still be reasons of such force as to induce the Minister responsible for the appointment to remove an officer from the situation he held. There was no person who spent any time in the public service to whom it did not happen that he had some time or other to remove an officer, though from no motives which might cast a reflection upon the integrity, honour, or moral character of the officer removed. If the House were to establish as a precedent that any man removed from a situation was to appeal to his friends in the House of Commons and obtain a verdict as to the propriety of his removal, there would be an end of all discipline in the service of the State.

Sir JOHN SHELLEY in reply, said, that all Mr. Kennedy desired was to have his honour and character cleared from the accusation and slur which had been cast upon it by the Treasury Minute. The noble Lord (Lord Palmerston) said, there was no intention of impugning the honour or integrity of Mr. Kennedy, yet, while that Minute existed, it would continue to be read when the words of the noble Lord were forgotten. If the noble Lord would give him (Sir J. Shelley) a promise or an assurance that the Minute to which he referred would be rescinded, and another introduced, showing that there was no intention to cast any reflection upon the honour and integrity of Mr. Kennedy, he would not press the motion to a division.

Mr. WILSON said, that the words "honour, veracity, and integrity" occurred in the Treasury Minute containing the instructions to the referees, and were applied to the transactions between all the parties.

Mr. CAYLEY said, he wished to know if the words included Mr. Kennedy?

Mr. WILSON said, in the sense in which they were used, Mr. Kennedy was certainly included. The words did not occur either in the letter of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or in any subsequent Minute.

Viscount Palmerston

Viscount PALMERSTON: I do not know how the object of my hon. Friend is technically to be accomplished; but I apprehend that that which now stands on the record cannot be offensive, and I have no objection whatever to state that I will engage that there shall be placed on record in the Treasury a full acknowledgment that Mr. Kennedy's honour stands perfectly unimpeached.

Sir JOHN SHELLEY said, as Mr. Kennedy's object would be attained by such an acknowledgment, he would not press his Motion to a division.

Motion by leave *withdrawn.*

The House adjourned at a quarter before one o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Wednesday, February 28, 1855.

Minutes.] Public Bills.—1° Purchasers' Protection against Judgments; Union of Benefices; Exchequer Bills (£17,183,000).
2° Episcopal and Capitular Estates.
3° Commons Inclosure.

EPISCOPAL AND CAPITULAR ESTATES BILL.

Order for Second Reading read.

The Marquess of BLANDFORD said, that in requesting the House to agree to the second reading of the Bill, he need not remind hon. Members how important the measure was, how many interests it affected, how wide was its scope, and how serious the results, either for good or evil, which would arise from it. He would, first of all, advert to some remarks which he had heard objecting that the present time, when the country was engaged in an arduous and perilous contest, was not the most fitting occasion for considering a measure of this nature. In his opinion, the present was peculiarly the time when it behoved them to set their house in order, to attend to the spiritual interests of the nation, and to endeavour to bring down the favour of God upon the people of this country. He was not now, for the first time, asking the House to agree to the second reading of this measure, for he had already twice before this introduced a Bill for these purposes. In the first instance he had introduced a Bill, the second reading of which was not pressed, owing to the lateness of the Session; in the second, the House had gone so far as to sanction the principle of the Bill by reading it a second time.

The present measure was not in material points different as regarded its principle from those which he had previously brought forward. In the first instance, of course the principle was new, the proposals were in some degree so startling, and of so wide a scope, that it was scarcely to be expected that the House would agree to them at once ; in the second instance he had a further advantage, for the House had readily consented to the principle of the Bill by a majority of nearly two to one in favour of the second reading. At the present time he had the further advantage, that he was not introducing a new or ill-digested scheme, but one which, whatever its faults were, it was confessed provided a remedy for evils of acknowledged magnitude and admitted existence. That these evils did exist, he should be able to show to the House by ample testimony. He would, in the first place, read the opinion of one of the most remarkable men belonging to the House, who in experience of Parliamentary matters had no equal, who had been Prime Minister of this country, who had been a member of the Ecclesiastical Commission, and consequently had an intimate acquaintance with the details of the subject now under consideration. He was alluding to the noble Lord (Lord J. Russell) the late Member for the City of London, who said—

> "I consider the main intention of the Bill, which, by giving to the Church Estates Commission the administration of the property from which the income of the bishops is derived, is very sound in principle, and one which will tend not only to the improvement of the property, but will be more becoming than the present system to the dignity of the bishops, and will give them the means necessary to the discharge of their duties, which are becoming more and more extensive every day in their respective dioceses."

And at a subsequent stage the noble Lord also observed—

> "It is obvious that a person coming into possession of an hereditary estate may make provision for the management of that estate, and may sacrifice his income for some years to improve it for the subsequent benefit of himself and his successors, knowing that his children will in the end reap the advantage ; but for a bishop to sacrifice his income when, perhaps, the enjoyment of his bishopric may not extend beyond four or five years, is, perhaps, too much to expect. I think, therefore, that the giving of a fixed income, to be paid by the Commissioners who shall have the management of the lands, is so great an improvement upon the present system that on account of that provision alone, if the question were one of affirming or denying the principle of the Bill, I should be prepared to give my vote in favour of it."

He (the Marquess of Blandford) would now endeavour to show, in as brief and succinct a way as he could, what the specific evils were which the Bill proposed to remedy, and what amount of positive good they would be able to acquire by passing a measure like the present one. He would also endeavour to show that it was necessary that there should be some change—he did not say what change—and if he could prove this necessity he should confidently call upon the House to agree to the principle of a measure which had for its object the provision of a remedy, however insufficient, for acknowledged evils. It was admitted that the present state of things was not in all respects a satisfactory one. The property was not managed as it ought to be ; complaints had been urged in a variety of directions, and a great deal of intensified feeling and odium had resulted in consequence to the Church ; and he should endeavour to show how the existing state of things rendered some change absolutely necessary. He believed that a solemn duty rested on that House to take into their consideration any measure likely to promote the extension of the Established Church—of that Church which had been committed to their care from generation to generation, and which, whatever were its faults, had been the source of some of the greatest blessings which the country enjoyed. It was as much the duty of that House to do this as it would be a dereliction of their duty to neglect the nationality of the Church of England, or to cease to consider it in its true position. He saw there was a notice on the books that it was the intention of the hon. Member for South Northumberland (Mr. H. G. Liddell) to oppose the Bill. He (the Marquess of Blandford) gave the hon. Member full credit for the best intentions, but thought he little knew how much evil he was entailing upon the Church, and what injury he might be bringing upon its best interests, when he did not confine himself to proposing amendments in Committee, but was delaying the passing of a measure for another year by opposing the principle of the Bill. If the hon. Member would undertake to bring in a better Bill than this, and move that both Bills should be referred to a Select Committee, he (the Marquess of Blandford), looking at the magnitude of the question, would be prepared to accede to that offer. But he must deprecate such a vague Motion as that of the hon. Member for South Northumberland, which would have the effect of postponing the measure for another year, and which was not consistent with the importance of the subject or the sacred character of the interests at stake. It had been objected to the Bill that it would, by centralising the management of the capitular property, render the title to it insecure, and bring all the evils of a centralised management with accumulated force upon ecclesiastical property, while another objection was, that the Commissioners did not consider local claims as they ought: these, he was well aware, ought to be considered, but he thought that the local interests would be better consulted by this measure than they were at present. It was not in his power last year, when this objection was made, to refer to the Report of the Cathedral Commission, which was not at that time a public document, but he would now show from that Report what course had been pursued by the Chapters. He did not wish to cast unnecessary blame upon capitular institutions, but he was only stating a well known and well recognised fact when he said that capitular institutions had been most backward in providing for the necessary augmentation in the spiritual wants of the places where their property lay. He would cite a few instances of what capitular bodies had been in the habit of giving out of their large resources towards the real wants of the Church. He found that the revenues of the Chapter of Canterbury were 25,000*l.* a year, and that out of that sum 71*l.* a year was given in augmentation of vicarages connected with the property, and 1,306*l.* for schools and other charitable purposes. The revenues of the Chapter of Durham were 57,000*l.*, or rather nearly 58,000*l.* a year, and there was an increased ratio in their grants, but not at all commensurate with the enlarged amount of their income. The provision made by the Chapter of Durham for the augmentation of vicarages was 2,075*l.* a year, and for schools about the same amount; in all about 4,000*l.* out of nearly 60,000*l.* The revenues of the Chapter of Winchester were 22,000*l.* per annum, out of which only 400 a year was granted in augmentation of vicarages, and 1,000*l.* a year to charities. The revenues of the Chapter of Ely were 16,000*l.* a year, out of which only 62*l.* a year was given to vicarages, and 407*l.* to schools and charities. The Chapter of Westminster had an income of 30,000*l.*, of which only 474*l.* was given to the vicars, and 426*l.* to local charities. It had been said that a Commission was now sitting, and that it was not right to proceed with a measure of this nature when that Commission was considering the subject. There might or there might not be truth in that statement, but he was inclined to believe that this Bill had been properly introduced. In the first place, it dealt with a subject which was not adapted to the consideration of that Commission. It dealt with episcopal as well as capitular property, and Parliament had always treated the two matters as proper to be dealt with together, but that Commission would only consider capitular interests. Another reason for proceeding with this measure was that the subject had been fully considered already. A Commission had been issued, of which the right hon. Baronet the Home Secretary was perfectly cognisant, and in which Lord Harrowby had taken considerable interest, and that Commission went fully into the details of the question as to how the property should be managed. They reported their conclusion to the House, but that conclusion had not been acted upon, and no legislation followed their Report; and to wait for the Report of the present Commission would be merely to delay the passing of a useful measure. He believed that this measure had met with a large amount of public sympathy, and that it was now brought forward in such a tangible shape that it might fairly be considered in Committee. An objection was last year urged to this measure that the claims of the Dissenters were not fully considered, and that no measure should be taken with respect to the Church until those claims had been considered. Now, whatever the claims of the Dissenters might be, he wished to put forward fairly and boldly what he considered the claims of the Established Church, and in his opinion the House of Commons was a very proper arena for discussing the question. He did not object to the claims of Dissenters being urged on the one side, and the claims of the Church of England being urged on the other. He was sure the Church would not suffer by the discussion, and if it were rubbed, it would only become the brighter by being rubbed. A Church founded on the prescription of centuries was not likely to be overthrown by non-

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conforming bodies, to whom it was the policy of the country to give complete toleration. A great deal had been said about the reform of the Church, and the necessity of remedying the abuses which exist in her. If that necessity existed, and if the Church was to be reformed, it was the duty of those who were her reformers to set about the work; but if they were indifferent to the subject, and unwilling to introduce salutary changes, was it to be urged against the Church that these abuses were still in existence? The question of church extension was a most important matter, and this could not take take place without the necessary means for augmenting poor livings, creating new parishes, and providing endowments. These means were not likely to be obtained except by such an administration of the property of the Church as would make her revenues sufficient to accomplish these important objects. Another important consideration was, the character of the ministers of the Church. They ought to be without reproach, but so long as they had the management of property there must be collisions between them and their tenants, and all those various contingencies involved in the management of property, whose tendency would be to render them liable to reflections upon their characters. The aim of the Legislature ought to be, in the first place, to render incomes adequate and secure; and, in the second place, to render them easy of collection, and to place the fee of the property on such a basis that the management should not interfere with the security necessary to attach it for ever to its proper purposes. The measure which he had introduced was not new in principle, and was rendered necessary by former Acts. An inquiry was instituted into ecclesiastical matters in 1835, and the object of that inquiry was to consider generally the state of the Established Church, the amount of spiritual destitution, the amounts of the incomes of the bishops, and the anomalies that were supposed to require a remedy at the hands of the Legislature. The inquiries of that Commission showed the inequality of the episcopal incomes and the vast amount of spiritual destitution in the country, and the Ecclesiastical Commission was instituted as a permanent Commission, to carry out the objects recommended by the Commissioners of 1835. He would briefly call the attention of the House to the history of that Commission. The labours of that Commission divided themselves into two periods. The first went down to about 1850, and the second dated from that period up to the present time. In the first period of the Commission it was thought desirable to limit the bishops' incomes. Some of these incomes were found to be much too large, and others much too small, and the course of proceeding adopted was to charge the richer sees with fixed payments, and to make them over to the poorer sees. The charge placed on the richer sees was 41,500*l.* This was done by the Act of the 6 & 7 *Will.* IV., passed in 1836. The system, however, was not a perfect one. Its defects were these. In order to leave a certain amount of interest to induce the bishop to manage properly the property, a fixed charge was placed upon it, and the residue was to belong to the bishop; but the incomes were very much underestimated, and, in some cases, where improvements were made, more than double the allotted income was enjoyed by the bishop. Another evil left untouched was this, that the management of the estate was still thrown on the bishop. This sum of 41,500*l.* the bishops themselves had the labour of securing and paying over to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners in the same period. Other changes of a most important nature were introduced, relating to the chapters. By the 3 & 4 *Vict.*, c. 113, passed in 1840, 360 prebends were suppressed and their property was vested in the Commissioners. A large number of canonries were also suspended, and their proceeds were likewise directed to be paid over to the Commissioners. Other provisions were made, but the legislation which then took place was so incomplete that some further change in the law was rendered absolutely necessary. There was now a joint interest in the property between the chapters and the Commissioners, owing to their being entitled to the proceeds of the suspended canonries. There was also a joint interest and ownership conferred by the limitation of the incomes of other canonries. The Commissioners had also the power to receive the improved value of certain estates. Now, although this joint ownership existed, the Commissioners had no voice or power in the management of the property vested in them. The first duty of Parliament was to give them such power over the property as to enable them to administer it to the best advantage. He now wished to call the attention of the House to the common fund which was formed for the purpose of providing for the spiritual wants of the country. Now, it was found at that time that 145,000*l.* was necessary to raise the incomes of livings under public patronage; and that 131,000*l.* was required to raise those under private patronage. For that purpose, and in order to provide for the spiritual wants of the community, what was termed the common fund had been established; and if a fund of that character were required twenty years ago, of how much more importance must it be at the present moment? Now, he would ask what was the state of the case at present? He would just mention two parishes in the metropolis as instances of the amount of destitution which prevailed. In the parish of Clerkenwell, in 1817, the population was 30,000. In 1854, it amounted to 64,000. In 1817, there were 29,000 persons unprovided with church accommodation. In 1854, the number so unprovided was 58,000, although the number of sittings had been increased from 1,400 to 5,805. In 1817, the population of the parish of Bethnal Green was 33,000. In 1854, it had increased to 90,193. The number of persons unprovided with sittings in 1817, was 31,800. In 1854, the number destitute of accommodation was 75,342. The accommodation had been increased from 1,200 to 14,851 sittings; and, in saying this, however, he did not wish to ignore the exertions which had been made during that time by the nonconforming communities, who had supplied a vast amount of spiritual aid which the Church was unable to afford. He now came to what he termed the second period of the Ecclesiastical Commission, commencing in 1850. In consequence of an inquiry before a Committee of that House into the mode in which the Ecclesiastical Commissioners had administered their property, a law was passed for the purpose of providing for the administration of the large property vested in them in the best and most serviceable manner for the country. The Estates Commissioners were appointed, consisting of three lay Commissioners and two of the Members of the Ecclesiastical Commission, constituting a kind of *imperium in imperio*, for the management of the estates, and they were directed to report annually to Parliament. The next change effected was with respect to the episcopal incomes. The object of Parliament was to limit the incomes of the bishops. Those incomes had not been limited, because the property had yielded more than double what Parliament considered would be the residue. A new mode was adopted, and he would now describe the objectionable nature of the present law. By an Order in Council, in 1851, it was enacted that the future incomes of the bishops should be fixed at 152,000*l.* a year, and the bishops were directed to deliver a half-yearly account of their receipts to the Commissioners, and by as much as they exceeded the sum fixed by Parliament for the see, so much was to be paid over to the Commissioners as the balance. There was a condition attached to that mode of proceeding which rendered it one of the most humiliating arrangements ever adopted respecting the bishops' incomes, for so little confidence was placed in the episcopal body that when any one of the bishops making his return was found to have received a fine which equalled or exceeded the amount of his half year's income, the Commissioners had the power to take the whole of the fine into their own hands, and to pay him the balance; and if any fine was to be received of the value of more than 100*l.*, the Commissioners were to determine the nature of the renewal and the amount of the fine. He wished now to draw the attention of the House to another question. If any increase was to be expected in the value of the property, it would render it more than ever important that the Commissioners should have the power of dealing with it as they thought best, in order to raise it to its full improvement value. Now, what was the actual interest of the Commissioners in the property held by them jointly with the capitular bodies? Originally there were 149 canonries in the cathedrals. The number suspended was sixty-five. The total annual revenue of the capitular bodies on the average of seven years was 295,984*l.* By the process of enfranchisement the entire property would be brought into fee, and one-half of that would come to the Church. Taking the sums received in fines as one-fourth of the entire annual value, the entire value of the property would be 1,183,936*l.*, to about one-half of which, 591,968*l.*, the Church would become entitled, the other half going into the hands of the lessees. The interest of the Commissioners in that property amounted to four-tenths, nearly 200,000. Supposing there should be no change in the law, the result would be that, their interest having proportionately increased, there would still be no proper control over that portion to which they were entitled. In order to remedy the present state of things, two plans might be proposed. Either the entire management of the property might be vested in the Commissioners, as he had proposed last year, or, as was proposed by the Members of the Episcopal Revenues Commission, it might be temporarily put into their hands for the purpose of giving to each Ecclesiastical corporation an amount of income necessary to supply both see and chapter, and the remainder to be vested in the Ecclesiastical Commissioners. Now, in his Bill he proposed to unite the two systems. He proposed that with regard to episcopal property there should be no change from the principle of the former measure—that its management should be absolutely vested in the Commissioners, also that the management of the entire of the property should be transferred to the Estates Commissioners, in order that the process of enfranchisement, with all fairness to the lessees, should be carried on as expeditiously as possible, he proposed that the Ecclesiastical Commissioners should enter into an agreement with each bishop for the payment of the sum necessary to supply the income of his see. With regard to the chapters, he proposed that after a period sufficient in the estimation of Parliament to bring the property out of its leasehold tenure by means of its enfranchisement into rack rent tenure, the chapters should have a sufficient portion of the real estate handed back to yield the income which would be necessary to defray the charges of the cathedral, and thenceforth remain under their management, subject to certain limitations and restrictions imposed under the Ecclesiastical Commission. He would next proceed briefly to state the reasons which induced him to make that change. He should, in the first place, observe that taking the fairest and the most extensive view he was able to take of that subject, he could not help thinking that it would be better to effect an entire transference of the management of that property. He believed that such an arrangement would be the most consonant with the character of the duties of capitular bodies. But he could not conceal from himself that the chapters themselves were strongly opposed to such a change, and he was aware that if he were to attempt to carry it into effect he would be met—and perhaps successfully met—by appeals against the adoption of the principle of centralisation. He should also admit that there was an important difference between the relations of bishops and of chapters to the property which they held. A chapter was a body corporate, and its interest in the due management of its property was sustained and perpetuated; while the interest of a corporation sole, such as a bishop, in ecclesiastical property, was limited to the individual. In dealing with the chapters he had followed the precedent that had already been adopted by the chapters of York and of Carlisle, which had handed over the entire amount of their property to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, in order that it might be brought into a state of rack-rent value. Another point to which he wished to direct the attention of the House, was the misapprehension which existed in the minds of some hon. Members that the provisions of that Bill would injuriously affect the interests of lessees. If it were carried into effect the entire management of the property would be vested in the Estates Commissioners, who were at present, by the Enfranchisement Act, the parties that must approve any contract that might be made between the chapter and the lessees. By the operation of the Bill then before the House, any lessee desirous of enfranchising would go at once to the Estates Commissioners; and he contended that there was nothing in the Bill at variance with those very proper provisions inserted in the Enfranchisement Act of last Session. He believed that under the arrangement which he proposed the interests of lessees would not only not be prejudiced, but would even be better attended to than they were under the existing system, which had not prevented the process of enfranchisement from being extremely slow. He had thus endeavoured, as briefly and as clearly as he could, to go through the details of that most intricate subject, and to point out to the House what he believed to be the evils of the existing system, as well as the means by which he proposed to remedy those evils. In conclusion, he had only urgently to beg the House to assent to the second reading of the Bill, and thus again to affirm its principle, for he believed that by adopting it they would confer a lasting benefit on the Church, a lasting blessing on the nation, and a proportionate advantage on mankind at large.

Motion made and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."

MR. H. G. LIDDELL said, that while giving the fullest credit to the noble Lord for the exertions he had made and the time he had devoted to the subject which he had brought so frequently before the notice of the House, he still felt it to be his conscientious duty to give his most strenuous opposition to the Bill, and to move that the Bill be read a second time that day six months. It was his conviction that the principle of the Bill was opposed to the whole tenour of our cathedral institutions and was highly dangerous to the integrity of those institutions. The noble Lord appeared to have changed the opinion he entertained not long ago on the propriety of legislating upon this subject, for in the Report of the Commissioners on Cathedral Institutions, published last year, there were these words:—

> "Although we are well persuaded that great benefits might accrue from judicious reforms being introduced into these institutions, yet we feel that great prejudices may arise from premature legislation on the subject."

To that Report the name of the noble Lord was appended. The noble Lord might contend that this measure was neither dangerous nor premature, but there were high legal authorities who believed that they discovered great discrepancies and great contradictions in the Bill; the noble Lord, therefore, was not entitled to regard it as a very carefully considered measure. The House, he considered, had a right to know whether the noble Lord had brought forward the measure with the sanction of his brother Commissioners. If not, he thought the course which the noble Lord had taken was most unparliamentary. If, indeed, the noble Lord possessed peculiar sources of information, not open to the other Commissioners, then the House ought to be informed what those sources of intelligence were, that they might be able to form a judgment as to their real value. In coming to the consideration of the measure itself, no one could fail to be struck with that feature in it which was becoming so prominent in almost every Act of recent legislation—he meant, the centralising character of the Bill. But was public opinion so satisfied with the result, he might say the failure, which had already attended the attempt to infuse the centralising principle into other measures, as for the House at once to accept a measure of such gigantic centralisation as that of vesting the whole Church property of this country at once and for ever in one board. The Bill sought to give greater powers to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners. Now, when he alluded to that Commission, he must observe that the country had had eighteen years' experience of its operation, and, great as were the advantages derived from its management, he was bound to tell the House that, as far as the diocese with which he was connected was concerned, great dissatisfaction prevailed in the minds both of the clergy and the laity as to the mode in which the powers of the Commissioners had been exercised. Large sums had been paid over both from the estates of the See and from the estates of the chapter —in the first case a sum amounting to more than 200,000*l.*, and in the second to nearly 100,000*l.*—and they complained that the amount expended in the diocese had been anything but in due proportion to the requirements of that large and important district of the country. He did not deny for one moment that the Church estates might be capable of being placed under a better system of management than that pursued for many years past, and that they might be rendered more productive. He would also admit that a better system than that which had an undue regard for the life interest of the possessor might be adopted. He believed that that system had been obstructive of improvement, and injurious to the interests both of the possessor and of the tenant, but it was no easy matter rapidly to change customs which from immemorial usage had grown into law, and, whatever system of management might be pursued, he hoped that that confidence, or rather that tie of good faith which had so long connected the Church and its lessees, might not be unjustly or violently severed. If the House was of opinion that ecclesiastical persons were unfit to manage their estates, he would say, at least, let the ecclesiastical bodies have a voice in the application of the funds arising from those estates. Surely those persons were better able to ascertain and appreciate the requirements of the places in which they lived than any noble Lord or hon. Member sitting at a board in

London. But then came the difficulty—how were they to enable those ecclesiastical bodies to have a voice in the application of those funds? The noble Lord said, "Do not come down to this House and oppose my Bill unless you have some sort of proposition to make as a substitute for it." Well, he had a proposition to make which emanated from the ecclesiastical bodies themselves. This House had received some valuable suggestions from almost every chapter in the country. Let the funds be administered through the medium of local boards constituted of the clergy of the diocese, and if those persons were distrusted and there was any want of confidence in their character, then let the lay element be infused into the board. He did not say that such a plan might not be open to grave objections and that it would not require careful consideration, but it appeared to him to be a practical scheme, and the only one that would do justice to all interests. He did not deny that episcopal estates were capable of improvement, or that advantage had not already been derived from the establishment of the common fund; but do not make that fund the first mortgage on the ecclesiastical estates. Such a course would be entirely in contradiction to the whole state and tenour of our cathedral statutes. It might be urged that those statutes were framed to meet the requirements of ages back, and were not suited to the manners and customs of the present time. But he begged to observe that improvements and alterations had already been made in those statutes. He did not deny that abuses had existed in the administration of the Church funds, but many of those abuses had been already corrected; nor did he think there was much reason to apprehend that those abuses would again be found to prevail. Nobody would be so bold as to deny that the ecclesiastical bodies were the rightful and legal guardians, not only of the spiritual interests of the Church, but also of the temporal wants of its adherents; but this Bill went to deprive them of the means of promoting the social condition and well-being of their flocks. It deprived them of the most powerful instrument they had of relieving the necessities of their respective districts. True it was the Bill professed to make certain duties incumbent upon the Commissioners. He had no doubt, if the Bill passed in its present form, that all existing rights would be preserved, that the cathedrals would be kept in repair, and that those various payments would continue to be made which were now sanctioned, so long as the Commissioners in their discretion thought it right to do so. But what security was there that the future wants, arising from the increased wealth and increased population of the country, would receive due consideration? It was not difficult to understand that, adopt what system of management they pleased, the amount of the wants of the country would increase almost in proportion to the increase of wealth. Every mine that was opened, every railway that was constructed, every acre of land that was built upon for establishing manufactures, and every measure taken to advance commerce, must tend to swell the population of the districts in which those things took place, and that population would unquestionably have a paramount claim on these funds. Who, too, was the arbitrator to decide whether due consideration would be given to the spiritual requirements of the people? Where were they to appeal if that consideration were not shown? That was a very old phrase—"due consideration shall be shown." In every Commission appointed to investigate the complicated case of Church leases, it was always said that "due consideration should be had to long existing rights;" but it was only last year that this House, after some difficulty, put a meaning on those words. He had already said that great discontent existed as to the mode in which the Ecclesiastical Commissioners had administered the fund intrusted to them. The noble Lord had referred to the state of the population of this metropolis; he would refer to the increase of the population in the diocese with which he was connected. The average rate of increase of the population in the counties in England and Wales, from 1850 to 1851, was 141 persons in every 10,000; but the average increase in Durham was 193, and in Northumberland 117. The increase of the population in Durham in the ten years from 1841 to 1851 was 26 per cent, exactly double that of England and Wales, and, with the exception of a part of Kent, it was the highest rate of increase registered in the Census of 1851. The next remarkable fact was, that the deficiency of church accommodation in Durham was as formidable as the increase of the population, and was found to be most deplorable in the large towns. In Durham 47,944, and in Northumberland 33,570 additional sittings were required to provide for 58 per cent of the population. In the Newcastle district the additional sittings required to provide for those not accommodated by any religious body were no less than 20,692. In Chester-le-Street, 4,608. In Gateshead, Newcastle, South Shields, Sunderland, and Tynemouth, 38,812 persons were without the means of attendance at any form of religious worship. The effect of this rapid increase of population, of the high rate of wages, crowded dwellings, deficiency of church accommodation, and of school accommodation, was a remarkable increase of crime, a still greater increase of juvenile profligacy, and the prevalence of infidelity. In Newcastle, juvenile crime was increasing four times as fast as the population, and in thirteen years had doubled in amount. With regard to school accommodation, the statistics of the Rev. J. D. Stewart, the Government Inspector of Schools, gave this result:—In thirty-two collieries in Durham the population in 1851 was 51,588, giving a school-going population, between the ages of four and fourteen, of rather more than 12,136 children. The accommodation amounted to a provision for only 2,982. The average school attendance was 2,123. Of this number only 632 were above ten years of age—146 boys, 108 girls, 378, sex not given. This statement showed that there were 10,013 children who were receiving no education whatever. It might be said, why, when the chapter had such large sums at its disposal, should so great an amount of destitution prevail? The amount expended by the chapter of Durham for spiritual purposes, during the last eleven years, was 36,000*l.*, besides grants in aid of curates amounting to 250*l.* a year; for education 365*l.* a year; donations to diocesan charities and livings augmented prospectively by cession of property now in lease, amounting to 4,603*l.* per annum. If any hon. Gentleman who heard him give expression to the views he entertained on this subject should suppose that he did so from some personal interest, all he could say in reply to that suspicion was that he was conscientiously endeavouring to advocate the great principle, that the property of the different dioceses of the Church of England was not general property, but was property applicable in the first instance to the wants of the respective dioceses. Then, they ought not to lose sight of the fact that these ecclesiastical institutions were founded for the spread of learning, of sound religious doctrine, and of theological knowledge in the neighbourhood where the institutions were themselves established. Nor ought they to forget that they were also intended for the dispensation of charity in their respective neighbourhoods, and that the revenues of the chapters up to this time had been so applied. When he remembered how much had been done to cut down the incomes of the dignitaries of the Church he had hoped that legislation had reached its limits in that direction. The danger of carrying a rigid economy to the extent which some proposed was, that they would not be able to retain the services of men eminent for their piety, learning, and talent in the higher offices of the Church. Surely the spiritual labourer was worthy of his hire; and yet while circumstances were every day increasing his duties, they were making fresh attacks upon his estate. An undue economy might prove itself to be as prejudicial to the interests of the Church as a shortsighted policy of retrenchment had already proved itself prejudicial to the State. In conclusion, he objected to the Bill of the noble Lord, because he believed it was fraught with danger to the Church as well as to its property, and that it might hereafter be used as a stepping stone by unscrupulous persons to take away the right of the Church to that property altogether; he, therefore, begged to move that the Bill be read a second time that day six months.

MR. HEADLAM seconded the Amendment, and in doing so he said it was his strong opinion that the House ought upon this occasion to deal in a decided manner with the Bill brought forward by the noble Lord, and not act as it had done when the Bill was before the House on previous occasions—give their assent to the principle which it involved, and then take no further step in the matter. It was his opinion that a Bill of this nature ought only to be brought forward by the Government, and should not be left in the hands of any private individual. It was his opinion that, if this Bill were passed, we should have an institution in the State possessed of the most gigantic and tyrannical powers. The law in its present state was characterised by the greatest confusion. They had already connected with the Church Ecclesiastical Commissioners, Cathedral Commissioners, and he did not know how many other Commissioners. If there was to be a body to exercise powers such as were contemplated by this Bill, it ought to be one of the most solemn and responsible kind, and properly represented in that House. Besides, the Bill did not define the powers of the Ecclesiastical or Church Estates Commissioners. It just took the existing Commissioners as they were, and put the whole property of the Church into the hands of those gentlemen for the time being. He (Mr. Headlam) represented a large town in the north of England (Newcastle-upon-Tyne), where the incomes of the clergy were utterly disproportionate to the duties they had to discharge, and to the spiritual wants of the population; and yet that town was situated in one of the richest dioceses in the kingdom, that of Durham. He knew, however, that the people in that part of the country would much sooner submit to the evils they knew of, and take their chance of getting what they could from the existing system, than allow the whole property of the Church to go into the hands of a central body in London, and stand their chance of getting what they could from them. If the House came to the conclusion to invest the property, as provided by the Bill, in the hands of Commissioners for a certain limited time only, the same evils might recur when it returned to the management of the existing corporations. The House should either leave the management of the property to the Church, subject to certain restrictions and regulations, or put it entirely into the hands of a body of Commissioners; which latter, he thought, would be the better plan, provided it had proper regard to local interests.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months."

Question proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."

MR. INGHAM said, he deprecated this Bill being further proceeded with at this particular time. His great objection to the measure was, that they should introduce any novel legislation at all after the subject had undergone a full examination last year, and a Bill had been passed on the subject for a limited time, with the view to encourage voluntary treaties between the holders of church property and their ecclesiastical landlords. The great mass of the leaseholders in the country and also the ecclesiastical bodies felt the utmost repugnance to renew a discussion on this subject year after year, and to depart from the provisions of a Bill which was maturely considered, for the purpose of entering upon novel legislation, even if it could be said that that legislation was in itself meritorious. Before the parties interested could become familiar with the machinery of the Bill of last year, by proceeding with the measure of the noble Marquess they would be distracted from the consideration of a remedy which Parliament had already given them. A petition from the Chapter of Lichfield, which reflected the general feeling of the parties interested in this question, expressed emphatically the kind of consternation they were under by being called away from the management of their property under the Bill of last year to the consideration of the measure now introduced by the noble Lord. He would take that opportunity of stating how the present Bill was likely to affect the community which he represented. The whole town of Shields contained a population of from 28,000 to 30,000, including seamen; and a great part of the property there, and especially the manufactories, was built on ground held under church leases. The manufacturers there were gentlemen of large capital and great intelligence, and understood their own interests; but the mass of the persons who occupied church leasehold property in Shields was composed of men who, by their own industry, perseverance, and good conduct, had raised themselves to positions of comparative comfort and independence, and they deserved the consideration of that House. There were about 700 independent leaseholders in Shields, and it could not be expected that these men could be continually going to a solicitor to inquire the meaning of a new Act of Parliament affecting their interests. He took also another objection to the Bill, which was, that it was quite impossible that any central board could have that personal interest in the social and ecclesiastical condition of a district from which the revenues were derived which was so essentially desirable.

MR. H. T. LIDDELL said, he could not avoid adverting to the absence of the greater part of the Members of the Government from the Treasury bench, the right hon. Baronet the Member for Marylebone (Sir B. Hall) excepted, and to the disrespect which that showed to the House and to the measure under discussion. He should move the adjournment of the debate until it should suit the convenience of the Ministry to attend.

Mr. H. HERBERT said, he thought the Motion of the hon. Member for adjourning the debate was unreasonable, seeing at this crisis that the time of the Members of the Government was better occupied than in attending a debate of this kind, and that in the earlier part of the discussion the leading Members of the Opposition were also absent from the House.

Sir B. HALL said, it was true, as his hon. Friend the Member for Kerry had suggested, that Her Majesty's Ministers were endeavouring to answer the question put by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire the other night, "Who are we?" and, he believed, they were at this moment engaged in taking the necessary steps for completing the arrangements for the formation of a Government. The proposition made by the noble Lord the Member of Woodstock (the Marquess of Blandford) in the Bill of last Session was to take out of the hands of the ecclesiastical corporations, both sole and aggregate, the property now held by them for the purpose of making it more valuable and of applying it to more useful purposes. The alterations which the noble Lord proposed to make by the present Bill did not appear to him to be satisfactory. It was to this effect—that the property should, as originally proposed, be placed under the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, and that the Commissioners should afterwards return to the capitular bodies such an amount of property as would pay the charges of the Cathedral Establishments. He thought it better that the whole property should be placed under the management of one Commission. No doubt, the change which was contemplated to be made by this measure was a great one as regarded the property of the Church, and he (speaking as an individual) believed it would be productive of the most advantageous results. The object of his noble Friend was to make the property most useful to the Church, having at the same time due regard to the interests of the lessees. He believed every one would agree that the present management of church property was not in a satisfactory state. Nothing, indeed, could be more unsatisfactory than the manner in which some of the property belonging to the Dean and Chapter of St. Paul's was managed. He (Sir B. Hall) would take as an instance that most valuable district in St. Pancras called Agar Town, which had been the subject of reports to this House, and had often been commented upon for the disgraceful state in which it was. It had lately passed into the hands of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, and was now improving. The evil arose from the fact that there existed no authority to grant leases for terms sufficiently long to induce men of capital to expend money upon the property, by which its value would be largely increased. With respect to the interests of the lessees, he had no doubt they would be sufficiently regarded in any measure that might be passed. He begged to state to the House that it was the wish of his right hon. Friend the Secretary for the Home Department, approving as he did of its principle, that the Bill should now be read a second time; but he at the same time wished the noble Lord to postpone going into Committee on the Bill till such time as the Cathedral Commissioners might be able to inquire into its provisions, and make a report thereon to the House, and also enable the House to give that report due consideration.

Mr. H. T. LIDDELL said, after the explanation which had been given by the right hon. Baronet, he would withdraw his Amendment.

Mr. HADFIELD said, he should certainly oppose the withdrawal of the Amendment. He submitted that the debate should be adjourned, seeing that the House was not then in a condition to give the subject under discussion the consideration which it deserved. It had long been, and still was, his opinion that the acts and delinquencies of the dignitaries of the Church of England were a disgrace and scandal, not only to that Church itself, but to the country at large. He had heard it said that if transactions such as those to which those dignitaries were sometimes parties were carried on by any mercantile man in the City, he would not dare to show his face on the Stock Exchange. He would take the sense of the House whether they were then in a condition to legislate on this question.

Mr. SPOONER said, the property of the Church as much belonged to the Church as did the property of any Member of that House belong to that Member; and he must say a more revolutionary speech he had never heard than that of the hon. Member for Sheffield (Mr. Hadfield). If they took away the title by which church property was held, he would ask whose property would be safe? He was prepared to vote for the second reading of this Bill, admitting that some change in the management of church property was necessary; but he objected to several of the clauses, by which he thought the interests of the lessees would be greatly prejudiced, and especially that which dealt with them as if they were simply annuitants.

The Marquess of BLANDFORD said, he disclaimed doing anything by the Bill which would at all prejudice the interests of the lessees, and he asserted that no clause in it would fairly bear such an interpretation. He was ready to adopt the suggestion made on the part of the Government by the right hon. Baronet (Sir B. Hall), and, if the Bill was now read a second time, to fix the Committee for Wednesday, the 23rd May.

Mr. T. DUNCOMBE said, "a revolutionary speech" might have been made by his hon. Friend (Mr. Hadfield) in the eyes of the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Spooner); but if it was revolutionary, he was afraid the people of this country were in a state of revolution. He was satisfied, however, that the great body of the people agreed and acquiesced in the sentiments expressed by his hon. Friend (Mr. Hadfield). In assenting to the second reading of this Bill, they affirmed its principle. His right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Health, not having much to do in that capacity, had taken the health of the Church under his care, and had recommended the House to allow the Bill to be read a second time. Now, he (Mr. T. Duncombe) opposed the second reading of the Bill of last Session, and he saw now no reason whatever for receding from that vote. He voted against it, because it went to bolster up a bad system. If they passed this Bill, the Church Establishment in its present bad state would remain long after them. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. Spooner) had asserted that church property was the property of the Church. That was one of the great objections which he (Mr. Duncombe) had to this Bill. He maintained that church property was public property; and the only thing that would make this Bill palatable to the people would be that church repairs should be paid out of the funds of the Church. If church property was the property of the Church, why did not the Church repair its property at its own expense, instead of taxing the people for that purpose? They might adjourn the debate if they liked; but if they went to a division now he would vote against the second reading of the Bill, because it would be consistent with the vote he gave on the second reading of the measure of last year.

Mr. COWPER said, he must complain that the two hon. Gentlemen behind him (Mr. Hadfield and Mr. Duncombe) had taken advantage of a technical proceeding of the House to prevent the further consideration of the Bill. They complained of abuses in the management of the church property, but he thought that was the conduct of men who rather wished to maintain than to reform abuses, and was not a fair way of opposing the Bill.

Mr. HENLEY said, he had not the least objection to vote for the second reading of the Bill, being understood thereby that he only meant to affirm the principle of putting the management of the church property into a better state than it was at present. So far as he understood the Bill, it did not at all deal with the surplus of the property, but only with its administration. It was only natural that the hon. Member for Sheffield (Mr. Hadfield), and those who thought with him, should seek to keep on a very convenient blister with regard to this subject. With respect to the provisions of the Bill, many of them would require great alterations. He did not at all enter into the alarm as to the lessees that seemed to have been taken. He thought their interests were pretty well guarded by this Bill, and that the property of the Church itself stood a great deal more risk than the property of the lessees. Guarding himself against being supposed to assent to the provisions in the Bill with respect to the general management of the estates, he was willing to give his assent to the second reading of the Bill.

Mr. WIGRAM said, he would admit that it was of importance that something should be done with reference to these estates, in order to place them under improved management. Upon that principle all were agreed. He believed they were at present in a most anomalous and unsatisfactory state, and so far as that went he was perfectly ready to acquiesce in the Bill of the noble Marquess. He decidedly objected, however, to handing over these estates to a London board. All the experience he had had of these central boards did not give him the least confidence in their management, and he viewed such a proposal with anxiety and alarm. The second objection he had to the measure was the putting all these funds into the melting pot of the Commissioners, and melting them down into one aggregate, to be dealt with as they thought proper. He did not think such an arrangement at all advisable. The inherent defect of the Bill was the dealing, by one sweeping measure, with property so detached and scattered over various parts of the country, and under varying circumstances. Why not give these local estates the power of improving and regulating their own affairs, and of appropriating the funds more judiciously with the sanction of a central board? He thought some scheme of that sort would remedy all the evils they at present complained of, and if the House divided on the Bill, he should certainly vote against it.

Mr. ROBERT PHILLIMORE said, he did not think that assenting to a Bill, every feature and detail of which had been objected to, was a very wise or salutary proceeding on the part of that House. It was with the most unfeigned regret that he offered any objection to the proposition of the noble Marquess, for whose abilities and exertions upon this question he entertained the greatest respect. If he were only called upon to assent to the proposition that these estates had been grossly mismanaged, he should have no hesitation in supporting the noble Marquess; but he thought that to introduce one sweeping measure like this, without regard to local wants and exigencies, would not be conducive to the spiritual interest of the people, and would not advance the cause which the noble Marquess had at heart. The more prudent course would be to wait for the Report of the Commission now sitting before the House proceeded to enact a statute upon the subject, and then they would be in possession of more ample information, and the matter would be ripe for wise legislation. He quite agreed with the hon. Member for Finsbury (Mr. Duncombe), that Churchmen ought to support their own Church, and Dissenters support theirs. If the House, however, went to a division he should vote against the second reading.

Mr. MOWBRAY said, he also objected to the Bill, for he had not heard one single hon. Member who had not raised some objections to it. The details had been objected to—they had not been assented to by the Government, and they were nevertheless asked to give their assent to the second reading. Under the circumstances he thought his noble Friend ought to consent to postpone the Bill. It was said that before the 23rd of May they would have the Report of the Commissioners before them, but if that Report did not agree with the provisions of the Bill, then the House would have committed itself to the principle of a Bill which could not be carried into effect. He admitted that the present Bill was very much improved by the change in the preamble and the introduction of the 13th clause; but with all these improvements the principle of the Bill was, that all episcopal and capitular property should be fused into one fund, and distributed by a London board, without reference to local wants or necessities. To that he would decidedly object. He did not think that system of centralisation would be found to work well. Had the Ecclesiastical Commissioners so discharged their functions as to have obtained the sanction and approval of the country? From what passed in that House last year, when the subject was before them, he did not think even the Church Estates Commissioners had obtained the confidence of the country any more than the Ecclesiastical Commissioners. On these grounds he should record his vote against the second reading of the measure, while, at the same time, he would give his noble Friend all the credit he was entitled to for a sincere desire to improve the management of this property.

Lord ROBERT GROSVENOR said, he thought his noble Friend must have been much gratified at all the praises and all the credit he had received for his laudable efforts and intentions, but he thought his noble Friend would have been much better pleased if some of those hon. Friends of his had suggested a means of rendering the measure practicable and carrying it out. The Bill had received the sanction of the House last Session, and his noble Friend had stated that he was prepared to agree to the amendments that had been suggested. He thought it was quite inconsistent in the Dissenters in that House making objections to a measure for the improvement of these estates. The abuses of the present system were acknowledged; the Bill was intended to remedy these abuses, and he hoped the House would not stultify themselves now by rejecting a measure which they had on a former occasion sanctioned.

Mr. APSLEY PELLATT said, he felt called upon to oppose the Bill. It was looked on with great suspicion by a large portion of the constituencies of the metropolitan boroughs. Although the old machinery for the management of these estates was so bad, that proposed by the Bill was not better. In the borough of Southwark there was a small property of forty acres belonging to the diocese of Winchester, and from the disgraceful way in which it was managed it was a nuisance and an injury to the neighbourhood. These estates ought to be sold under the provisions of the Land Clauses Acts, and the money applied to the purpose of education. The Bill was an attempt to perpetuate the aristocratic influence in the Church. The country had suffered enough from the predominance of aristocratic elements in the army and other departments, and would not allow this attempt to tinker them up to succeed.

MR. HEYWORTH said, he also should oppose the Bill. The only remedy for these evils that would satisfy the country would be to sell the entire of the church property, and invest the proceeds in the funds; there would then be no room for mismanagement, and the land would get into the hands of parties who would cultivate it properly.

MR. BARROW said, he felt himself bound to oppose the second reading, as no regard was had in it to the local necessities of the place from which the property had come. He objected also to placing all this property in the hands of a central board, and he thought the rights of the lessees, which had been entirely overlooked, were entitled to some consideration. It was high time that the question was settled, but this measure would not effect it, as every one of its details were considered objectionable.

MR. MIALL said, he was inclined to support the Bill, in so far as its object was to make the property of the Church of England more available for the purposes to which it ought to be devoted than it now was. He would vote for the second reading if the only principle to be affirmed was, that the management of the revenues of the Church ought to be transferred into other hands, to be made more available for the purposes to which they ought to be applied; but the noble Marquess went further, and specified the exact way in which he proposed to attain these objects. He thought it was not a proper time for an individual Member to take up a subject of so much importance. At that moment they scarcely had a Government, or, at least, the Government was not fully crystallised, but was still in a state of solution. If the House went to a division on the question of adjournment, he would vote for the adjournment. He objected to the particular scheme proposed by the noble Marquess for the management of these estates. The errors and abuses already existing were owing to the misconduct of the persons charged with the administration of those revenues; and yet the noble Lord proposed to hand them over to a board that would be principally composed of those very persons—namely, the bishops and dignitaries of the Church of England, who had been described to the House as having been guilty of gross breach of trust. It was a usual habit with them to capitalise the income of the Church, in order to apply it to their own particular purpose; and they forestalled not only their own incomes, but, in many instances, those of their successors for their own individual objects. The property ought not to be placed in the hands of persons who were stated to have been guilty of malversation of funds and breach of trust. He also objected to the proposed scheme because he thought any surplus revenue arising from those sources ought to be devoted to the extinction of church rates. When a proposition to that effect was brought forward by Lord Monteagle, it was said that the surplus was an imaginary one which would never exist; it now appeared that under proper management there would be a surplus, and his objection to the scheme of the noble Marquess was, that he laid hands on his surplus, and turned it aside from a proper application.

SIR JOHN DUCKWORTH said, that, although differing with the principle of the Bill, as proposing to give the distribution of this property to a central body, he would give his vote against the second reading; but, under the circumstances, he did not object, in deference to the noble Lord, to vote for its postponement until the Report of the Government Commission was laid before the House.

Motion made, and Question put, "That the debate be now adjourned."

The House *divided*:—Ayes 71; Noes 102: Majority 31.

MR. HADFIELD said, he might now move the adjournment of the House, but, acting on the advice of friends, he refrained from doing so, and would allow the question to go to a division on the

Motion of the hon. Member for South Northumberland, that the Bill should be read a second time that day six months.

THE MARQUESS OF BLANDFORD said, the House were asked to agree to the second reading on the distinct pledge that the House should not go into Committee until after the Cathedral Commission should have made its Report.

Question put, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."

The House *divided*:—Ayes 102; Noes 66: Majority 36.

Main Question put, and *agreed to*.

Bill read 2°, and *committed* for *Wednesday*, 23rd May.

SPIRITS (IRELAND) ACT AMENDMENT BILL.

Order for Second Reading read.

MR. KEOGH said, he trusted that his hon. and learned Friend who had charge of the Bill would not then press the second reading of it. There were many important provisions contained in it, and it was desirable that the Secretary for Ireland should have an opportunity of looking over them.

MR. VINCENT SCULLY said, he would agree to postpone the second reading of the Bill on the understanding that the measure should receive at an early period the consideration which his hon. and learned Friend said would be given to it, so that legislation on the subject should take place this Session. It was desirable that the Government should as soon as possible make up their minds, and say whether they would oppose the measure or approve of it. If they approved of the Bill, let them adopt it, or introduce it in such a form as would secure the passing of it through the House this Session.

Second reading *deferred* till *Wednesday*, 14th March.

TENANTS' IMPROVEMENTS COMPENSATION (IRELAND) BILL.

Order for second reading read.

MR. WALPOLE said, he hoped the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Serjeant Shee) would not press the second reading, as the Bill had not been yet delivered.

MR. SERJEANT SHEE said, he had not the slightest desire to press it, if the Bill was not in the hands of hon. Members.

MR. KEOGH said, that his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department was quite willing that the Bill should receive a second reading. It was a Bill that had passed in a former Session, coupled with a Bill regarding leasing powers.

MR. SERJEANT SHEE: If the second reading be opposed seriously, I am quite willing to postpone it; but is there any serious opposition to it?

MR. WHITESIDE said, he hoped that when this important Bill was again brought before the House there would be some person present on the part of the Government to discuss its principles. He was surprised to hear that an arrangement had been made between the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General for Ireland, to allow this Bill to pass, when in the Committee that sat upon it the First Lord of the Treasury stated that he objected to the principles of the Bill, as the most extraordinary he had ever heard of.

MR. KEOGH said, he must deny that he had said that there was any arrangement entered into between the Secretary for the Home Department and the hon. and learned Gentleman who had charge of the Bill.

MR. NAPIER said, he would give notice that he should inquire whether the Members of the Government would be content to support the portion of the Bill that constitutes the tenants' compensation part of it, as well as the remaining portion of it.

Second reading *deferred* till *Wednesday*, 18th of April.

ARMY BEFORE SEBASTOPOL COMMITTEE.

MR. BENTINCK, in moving that "the name of Sir George Tyler be substituted in lieu of the name of Sir George Cornewall Lewis in the Army before Sebastopol Committee," said, he must express a regret that the House had not thought fit upon a former occasion to sanction the Motion of his right hon. Friend the Member for Tyrone (Mr. Corry), to place upon the Committee the name of the hon. and gallant Member for Bath (Captain Scobell), because, if they had thought proper to sanction that Motion, there would have been no necessity that he (Mr. Bentinck) should trouble the House on the present occasion. He wished it to be understood that he had no intention of impugning the Committee as it now stood, but, as they would have in the course of their inquiry to cross-examine professional men, whose character and conduct might be called in question, and who would have an interest, therefore, in concealing the truth, it was of the utmost importance that for the objects for which the Committee were appointed there should be upon it at least one naval gentleman. The hon. and learned Member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck), in opposing, the other night, the Motion of the right hon. Member for Tyrone, made a remark which, coming from such a high authority, had struck him (Mr. Bentinck) as being a very singular one, The hon. and learned Gentleman said, it was unimportant that there should be upon the Committee a Gentleman of the naval profession, whose peculiar duty it might be to examine witnesses connected with that profession, inasmuch as it was sufficient that the witnesses themselves should be professional men. Now he (Mr. Bentinck) thought that was a good reason why there should be a naval man upon the Committee to examine these witnesses. It had been his misfortune last year to sit for four months, almost day by day, on a Committee appointed by that House, upon which were Gentlemen of acknowledged legal ability and great Parliamentary experience; but at the end of the four months they were compelled to report to the House that, from the contradictory and unsatisfactory nature of the evidence, they were unable to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion as to the merits of the case. If such was the result of a Committee consisting of Gentlemen so eminently calculated to probe a subject to the bottom, what would be the result in this case, where professional men would be examined who would have an interest in concealing and evading the truth? He fully concurred in the views expressed by hon. Gentlemen of the necessity of exercising extreme caution in this inquiry, as to the nature of the subjects gone into, and if he were to be asked why, entertaining such opinions, he had voted for the appointment of a Committee, he would reply, that, he gave his vote upon that occasion solely on the ground that this was a vote of no confidence in the Government. He felt most strongly the indispensable necessity of having upon the Committee an officer of Her Majesty's navy, and he, therefore, begged to move the Motion of which he had given notice.

CAPTAIN SCOBELL said, he also thought it most desirable that a naval officer should be a member of this Committee. They had spent 5,000,000*l.* for transports, the whole of the army and stores had gone by sea, and why should they not have a sailor on the Committee? They had put two Gentlemen connected with the army on the Committee because they understood army affairs, and why should they exclude the naval profession? They could not have a better naval man on the Committee than the hon. Member who had been now proposed. It was absolutely necessary, in cases of this kind, to have upon the Committee some one who understood the matters to be inquired into. Lawyers could not understand the technical terms of naval matters, any more than seamen could understand the technicalities of law. He had himself sat, but a short time since, upon the Emigration Committee, upon which another naval officer had also sat, and he was quite sure that the members of that Committee would admit that without the nautical men upon it, it would have often been totally at sea.

MR. ROEBUCK: There is a preliminary question, Sir, in this matter which the House ought to consider. Let us clearly understand the circumstances under which the Committee was appointed. It was appointed under an agreement between myself and the noble Lord at the head of the Government. [*Cries of* "Time!"] I must state the facts; the House will draw the conclusion. When I put the names of the Gentlemen whom I intended to move as members of this Committee I found I had made a mistake; they did not meet the wishes or possess the confidence of the House. I therefore waited upon the noble Lord at the head of the Government, and made a proposition to him. It was this—that the Government should choose six of the members of the Committee, and I should choose seven; and that these names should be submitted to the House for its decision. The noble Lord entertained my proposition. To whom did I then go? To the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli), and, in conjunction with him, I named the seven members of the Committee. Among the six nominated by the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) was Sir George Cornewall Lewis; he has ceased to be one of the Committee; hence it is that, acting upon the understanding which existed between the noble Lord, the right hon. Gentleman opposite, and myself, I feel myself bound to give the Government the same opportunity to select a member of, and to preserve the same balance in, the Committee as it was agreed in the first instance they should have. It is only fair that the arrangement entered into upon both sides of the House should be acted upon. Upon that ground alone do I oppose the present Motion. I certainly do not do so with any desire to cast a slur upon the hon. and gallant Member whose name has been proposed. Let me address myself shortly to the only argument which has been used, namely, that there ought to be a naval man upon the Committee. Now, the Committee is not going to judge of naval tactics, it is only going to do that which any man of common sense could understand. The hon. Member for West Norfolk (Mr. Bentinck) has said that the Committee ought to have a naval officer to assist it in understanding naval affairs, and that without such aid matters will be unintelligible. How do, in courts of law, judges and juries decide upon matters of art and of science? By means of scientific witnesses. So we in the Committee shall call scientific witnesses, and from their evidence we shall be enabled to form an opinion. It happens that there are two gallant military Officers on the Committee; but they were were not chosen as officers, but as Members of this House, competent to judge as other Members are of the subjects which would be brought before them. It is upon these grounds, and desiring that the arrangement honestly made should be honestly carried out, that I resist this Motion.

Mr. DEEDES said, he felt some difficulty with respect to this question. He had no desire to prevent the arrangement to which the hon. and learned Member (Mr. Roebuck) had referred being carried out; at the same time he thought it most desirable that a naval officer should be upon the Committee. Of the two objects, he felt himself bound upon the whole to regard the latter as of the greater importance, and he should therefore support the Motion.

Sir GEORGE PECHELL said, it was all very well to talk of judges and juries deciding professional and scientific questions by the aid of scientific or professional witnesses; but the other day the Judge of the Admiralty Court had a couple of admirals sitting by his side.

Motion made, and Question put, "That Sir George Tyler be added to the Committee."

Mr. Roebuck

The House *divided:*—Ayes 74; Noes 87: Majority 13.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Sir John Hanmer be added to the Committee."

Debate arising; and, it being a quarter before Six o'clock, Mr. Speaker adjourned the Debate till *To-morrow,* without putting the Question.

The House adjourned at ten minutes before Six o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS,

Thursday, March 1, 1855.

Minutes.] Public Bills.—1ª Commons Inclosure.

2ª Lunacy Regulation Act, 1853, Amendment; Consolidated Fund (£3,300,000); Consolidated Fund (£20,000,000); Common Law Procedure Act Amendment (Ireland).

ROMAN CATHOLIC PROCESSIONS (IRELAND)—QUESTION.

The Earl of DERBY said, the noble Earl the President of the Council was asked a few evenings ago by a noble Lord (Lord Berners) whether the Government intended to take any steps with regard to a procession of Roman Catholic ecclesiastics, which recently took place in the south of Ireland, contrary to the provisions of all existing statutes. He wished to know if he was correct in understanding the noble Earl to reply that the matter had been referred to the law officers of the Crown, and that in the opinion of those gentlemen there was considerable doubt whether the prohibition applied to ecclesiastics of every description, or only to the regular clergy?

Earl GRANVILLE said, what he stated was, not that there were any doubts as to the construction of the law, but that the matter had been referred to the law officers of the Crown in England, and that they were of opinion that the prohibition in the statute applied only to the regular clergy, and not to secular ecclesiastics.

The Earl of DERBY observed that, perhaps, the noble Earl would favour their Lordships with the reasons which induced the law officers of the Crown to come to that conclusion.

Earl GRANVILLE said, he was afraid he could not comply with the request of the noble Earl. Indeed, he was not sure whether the law officers of the Crown were not divided in opinion upon the subject; but, at all events, he was not in a position to state the grounds upon which they based their construction of the statute.

THE EARL OF DERBY was decidedly of opinion that the prohibition in the statute applied to Roman Catholic ecclesiastics of every description. He did not intend to discuss the policy of the law, but the matter was one upon which it was important that no doubt should exist; and he could assure their Lordships that in 1852, when he had the honour of being at the head of the Government, there was no difference of opinion among the then law officers of the Crown with respect to the proper construction of the Act. It was his duty, in that year, in accordance with their opinion, humbly to advise Her Majesty to issue a proclamation warning all persons against joining in Roman Catholic processions, or wearing the habiliments of Roman Catholic ecclesiastical orders in the public streets. That proclamation, as well as the statute upon which it was founded, was understood to apply to both the regular and secular clergy of the Roman Catholic Church; and he should like to know the grounds of the opinion enunciated by the present English law officers of the Crown, that the law was not prohibitory with respect to the Roman Catholic secular clergy. It would be a strong measure to move for the production of that opinion, and the reasons upon which it was based; but, as he had already said, the subject was one of the greatest importance, and the Government ought to take care that no doubt rested upon it.

THE EARL OF EGLINTON said, that while he held the office of Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, there was no sort of doubt entertained by the then law officers of the Crown that the wearing of the habiliments of their orders in the public streets by the Roman Catholic secular clergy was an illegal act. During his residence in Ireland he did not think it necessary to institute legal proceedings against any parties for a violation of the statute; but upon one occasion he called the attention of the Roman Catholic bishop in a district of Ireland where an illegal procession took place, to the state of the law, and intimated to him that the Government would adopt strong measures if such an act were again perpetrated. He received a very civil answer in return, and the matter was at an end; but there was no doubt at all as to the positive illegality of the procession that had taken place.

EARL GRANVILLE repeated that the opinion of the law officers was, that it was legal for the secular clergy to wear their habiliments in the public streets, but not legal for the regular clergy to do so.

LORD ST. LEONARDS said, that if such was the opinion of the English law officers of the Crown, he could not understand the mode in which the Act had been construed. The provisions of the statute were plain and unmistakable, and it was almost impossible to conceive how any man could doubt that they prohibited both the secular and regular clergy from walking in procession or wearing the habiliments of their orders in the streets.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR said, he had not seen the opinion of the law officers, and his attention had never been distinctly drawn to the clauses of the Act. From a cursory examination of them, however, he was inclined to think that a good deal might be advanced in favour of the view taken by the law officers, that there was no prohibition against the secular priests wearing their ecclesiastical habiliments in the public streets. The prohibition was directed against any Roman Catholic ecclesiastic wearing the habiliments of his "order." Now, he apprehended the habiliments of a priest were not the habiliments of an "order" at all; and the clause being a highly penal one, the rule of law was that it should be interpreted strictly.

EARL GRANVILLE said, the present conversation was an excellent illustration of what he had repeatedly stated to their Lordships with respect to the inconvenience of bringing forward important questions without due notice, and especially when the questions referred to departments of the Government which were not immediately represented in that House. Notice had not been given on this more than on the former occasion; and he could only repeat the answer he had given them—namely, that in considering the legality or illegality of Roman Catholic ecclesiastics wearing their ecclesiastical habiliments in the public streets, the English law officers of the Crown drew a distinction between those who belonged to "orders" and those who did not. He did not mean to express any opinion of his own upon the subject, nor could he pretend to state the reasons which induced the law officers to come to the conclusion at which they had arrived.

LORD ST. LEONARDS called attention to the words of the statute, which were to the effect "That if any Roman Catholic ecclesiastic, or any member of any ecclesiastical order, community, or society, shall, after the passing of this Act, exercise any of the rites or ceremonies of the Roman Catholic religion, or wear the habits of his order save in a place of public worship, or in a private house," he shall be liable to the penalty provided by the statute. The question, therefore, was, whether these Roman Catholic ecclesiastics walking through the streets in their full habiliments were not exercising a rite and ceremony of the Roman Catholic Church in the public streets, and therefore not confined to their own places of worship or to private houses. In his opinion, the Act of Parliament struck directly at such practices.

COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACT AMENDMENT (IRELAND) BILL.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR, in moving the second reading of this Bill, explained that its object was to remedy an accidental omission in the Common Law Procedure Act of last Session. That Bill contained a number of clauses relating to evidence, which it was thought desirable to extend to Ireland, and consequently a clause was introduced, providing that Clauses 19 to 32, which were originally the evidence clauses, should extend to that country. Before the Bill finally became law, the numbering of the clauses was altered, and Clause 18, which was intended to be extended to Ireland, was therefore not included, and it was to remedy this omission that the present Bill was introduced.

Bill read 2ª.

Committee *negatived;* and Bill to be read 3ª *To-morrow.*

MANAGEMENT OF CROWN ESTATES (IRELAND)—

ESTATE OF KILCONCOUSE—MOTION FOR PAPERS.

THE EARL OF EGLINTON moved for a copy of a letter, addressed by the Right hon. T. F. Kennedy, on the 15th July, 1854, to his Grace the Duke of Argyll, Chairman of a Committee then sitting on the subject of the Crown Estates of Kilconcouse; also, copy of a letter addressed by Mr. S. G. Macculloch to the Right Hon. T. F. Kennedy, on the 1st September, 1854, and forwarded by Mr. Kennedy to the Secretary of the Treasury on the 26th February, 1855. The noble Earl said he was not going into the case of Mr. Kennedy, or to discuss the hardships to which he believed that gentleman had been a victim. He might have been tempted to bring the facts before their Lordships if they had not been so very fully discussed in the other House of Parliament, and which had resulted in Mr. Kennedy's zeal, integrity, and veracity being unanimously allowed by the speakers on both sides of the other House. Their Lordships would remember that, in the last Session of Parliament, a Motion was made for a Committee to inquire into the management of the Crown Estates of Kilconcouse, and that, in consequence, a Committee was appointed. In the course of their labours the Committee examined Mr. Kennedy, one of the Commissioners of Woods and Forests, and, as a witness, he gave, as he (the Earl of Eglinton) believed, distinct and very voluminous evidence. Later in the investigation, Mr. Wilson, the Secretary of the Treasury, was also examined, and his evidence came to the knowledge of Mr. Kennedy, who was induced to conceive that the statements made by Mr. Wilson had been such as to be in direct opposition to matters of fact and the statements made by Mr. Kennedy himself. Mr. Kennedy thereupon wrote a letter to the noble Duke the Lord Privy Seal (the Duke of Argyll), who was Chairman of the Committee, dated the 15th July, 1854, in which he requested the noble Duke to allow him to be re-examined if any doubt existed with regard to those matters of fact upon which he had been examined. Mr. Kennedy also requested that letter to be laid before the Committee, and further, that it might be printed with the evidence. He (the Earl of Eglinton) thought that Mr. Kennedy had some slight cause of offence against the noble Duke, because the noble Duke never answered his letter; and, in the second place, the request which he made to be re-examined at that time should be laid before the Committee was not done. At any rate, he (the Earl of Eglinton) was not aware of it. He believed some doubt existed respecting the letter having been read. Mr. Kennedy requested that the letter should be published along with the evidence, but that was not complied with. He (the Earl of Eglinton) thought he had a right to ask the noble Duke to allow this letter to appear. It was of great consequence that Mr. Kennedy should be examined upon the subject, and therefore he hoped the noble Duke would have no objection to his Motion. It would appear as evidence of Mr. Kennedy's veracity on that occasion. He (the Earl of Eglinton) had also given the noble Duke notice that he meant to include in his Motion that a copy of a letter written by Mr. M'Culloch on the 20th September last, and forwarded on the 26th of last month to the Treasury, should be laid upon the table of the House. The letter written by Mr. Kennedy to Mr. M'Culloch mentioned that a report had reached him that Mr. Wilson's evidence varied from his own, and he wrote to ask Mr. M'Culloch for his opinion as to whether he thought there were any discrepancies in his evidence. Mr. M'Culloch's opinion, given at considerable length, entirely bore out Mr. Kennedy's statements contradicted by Mr. Wilson. He (the Earl of Eglinton) was quite aware that Mr. Kennedy's character for integrity, veracity, and zeal in the discharge of his duties had been most satisfactorily spoken to by many Members of the other House of Parliament, but the noble Duke would pardon him for saying that Mr. Kennedy's character, after he had been for so many years a useful public servant, should not, in this minor particular, be suspected. He therefore hoped the noble Duke would not refuse to grant the Motion which he had made.

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL said, that with regard to the first letter it was impossible for him to comply with the noble Earl's request, inasmuch as he did not remain in possession of it. When the noble Earl first spoke to him upon this subject he had no very distinct recollection of having received a letter from Mr. Kennedy; but owing to the kindness of the noble Earl he had been able to refresh his memory on the subject, and he now recollected the circumstances with sufficient distinctness to state them shortly to the House. During the examination of Mr. Wilson, certain statements were made by him which reached the ears of Mr. Kennedy, and which were contradictory, as he thought, to statements of fact made at a previous examination by Mr. Kennedy himself; and previous to the last meeting of the Committee Mr. Kennedy addressed a letter to him, as Chairman of the Committee, the contents of which had been accurately described by the noble Earl. His recollection was, that he did mention the receipt of the letter, and read part of it to the Committee, but they all unanimously agreed that there was not a shadow of doubt upon their minds as to the veracity of Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Kennedy's request to be re-called and re-examined before the Committee was contingent upon their having doubts of his veracity; and as they did not entertain any doubt on the subject, he was not further communicated with. He thought there was considerable objection, on public grounds, to the production of the second letter referred to by the noble Duke. After a Committee of their Lordships' House had taken all the evidence they thought necessary on a particular subject, and had concluded their investigations and laid their Report before the House, it was not competent for any private individual to reopen the matter some months afterwards by sending a letter to the Treasury traversing some of the statements made before the Committee. It was perfectly obvious that there were no means of testing the correctness of the statements contained in such a letter by cross-examination or other means, and he therefore thought it would not be right to produce it.

THE EARL OF EGLINTON said, it was quite palpable that the noble Duke could not grant the first part of the Motion, as the letter was not in existence, and, therefore, he should not press for its production. As to the second part of the Motion, no doubt there was very considerable truth in what the noble Duke had said. But he must remind the noble Duke that he was somewhat in error with regard to the statement of that Committee very generally decided that Mr. Kennedy need not be re-examined.

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL said, nothing occurred to impress the Committee with the slightest doubt as to Mr. Kennedy's veracity.

LORD MONTEAGLE, as a Member of the Committee, must say that, with respect to the evidence of Mr. Kennedy, there was no difference of opinion on the mind of any individual Member as to his veracity. It was probably to be regretted that a little more time was not given to the subject, and then the letter might have been brought before the Committee. Now, however, after so many months had expired, it would be very difficult to allow any document which was not then before the Committee to be referred to.

Then the said Motion was (by leave of the House) *withdrawn.*

BLOCKADE OF THE SEA OF AZOFF—QUESTION.

THE EARL OF AIRLIE wished to ask the noble Earl who represented Her Majesty's Government in that House, whether a squadron of steamers had been sent to cruise near the Sea of Azoff, with a view to the blockade of the Russian ports; and whether any gunboats of a sufficiently light draught of water to enable them to pass the Straits of Kertch had been attached to the Black Sea fleet?

EARL GRANVILLE said, that he could assure his noble Friend that this subject had not been overlooked by the Government. Instructions with respect to it—some of a general, and others of a particular nature—had been sent out to the Admiral in command of the Black Sea fleet; and gunboats had also been sent out for purposes analogous to those to which he had referred. He thought, however, that both the House and his noble Friend would see the inconvenience that might arise from giving categorical answers to questions of this nature.

THE EARL OF AIRLIE then moved for a return of the quantity of wheat and other grain imported into the United Kingdom from the port of Taganrog and the other ports in the Sea of Azoff, in each of the following years—1849, 1850, 1851, 1852, and 1853. In doing so, the noble Earl remarked that considerable quantities, both of grain and iron, had left the Russian ports in the Sea of Azoff since the commencement of the present war, and that, in fact, he believed that the provisioning of the Russian army in the Crimea had been principally conducted from the ports of that sea, and by means of vessels navigating it.

EARL GRANVILLE said, that it was quite true that the provisioning of the Russian army had been effected by means of the navigation of the Sea of Azoff. The attention of the Admiral commanding in chief in the Black Sea had, however, been directed to the best means of preventing this for the future, and he hoped that his efforts for that purpose would be attended with success.

Then the said Motion was (by leave of the House) *withdrawn.*

THE WAR—THE COLONIAL ADDRESSES—QUESTION.

THE EARL OF CARNARVON rose to ask whether it be the intention of Her Majesty's Government to propose a Vote of Thanks or some other public acknowledgment to those colonies or dependencies of the British Crown who, either by their respective Legislatures or otherwise, have evinced their sympathy with the mother country by moral or pecuniary proffers of assistance? He asked this question because he believed that if he obtained a satisfactory answer, it would be received with feelings of pleasure by many in this country and by all in the Colonies. He did not at all doubt the inclination of the Government to do all that was necessary, proper, and grateful under the circumstances: but he would at the same time remind them that the gracefulness and the value of the Thanks, if they did not wholly depend on, yet were very much enhanced by, the promptitude with which they were paid. It might be urged that there was no precedent for the course which he suggested; but he did not think that that circumstance alone should be allowed to stand in the way of doing what was both graceful and just towards the colonists. All precedents had a commencement, and unless very strong reasons to the contrary could be given, he thought they ought not to hesitate to create one, under the peculiar circumstances of the present case. He would call their Lordships' attention to what had actually been done by our various colonies. Canada had contributed to the Patriotic Fund a sum of 20,000*l.*; Newfoundland, 2,000*l.*; Gibraltar, 1,500*l.*; Nova Scotia, 2,000*l.*; Van Diemen's Land, 2,000*l.*; Victoria, 1,500*l.*; besides which, various contributions from other colonies had flowed into the same fund through various channels, and India had contributed no less than 4,000*l.* to the funds of the Central Association. And in addition to all this, Addresses, which had been laid upon the tables of both Houses, had been presented to Her Majesty from various Colonial Legislatures, all breathing the same warm feelings of loyalty towards the Crown, and of ardent attachment to the mother country, and of sympathy with her in the struggle in which she is now engaged. When all were inspired by similar sentiments, it was almost invidious to select one for particular praise; but yet he could not help referring to the peculiar strength of the feelings manifested by the Canadians on this occasion. Men of all parties and sects were unanimous in expressing sympathy with us on this occasion; not a single newspaper expressed a dissentient opinion; and in almost every village meetings had been held to give expression to the sentiments of the colonists. He did not see any reason why the two Houses of Parliament should hesitate to express their thanks to the Colonial Legislatures for the loyalty which they had on this occasion manifested to our common Sovereign. The noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) who seconded the Vote of Thanks to the Army, on a recent occasion, observed that it was no mere matter of form, no idle ceremony in which their Lordships were engaged; and the same observation would apply with equal force to an expression of thanks conveyed to those Colonies who had contributed to this fund. Such a vote would tend to strengthen the attachment which existed for the mother country on the part of the Colonies, and which it was so important to maintain unimpaired at the present crisis, when we were only at the commencement of a contest which might be a long one. He believed that they would not regard it as a mere form, but would appreciate it as the genuine and heartfelt expression of the thanks of the British people for the sympathy they had expressed and the attachment they had manifested to this country on the present occasion.

EARL GRANVILLE said, he should have felt regret that this subject had been brought before their Lordships if he had thought there was the slightest chance that any difference of opinion would exist among the Members of that House with respect to their appreciation of the conduct of the British Colonies in the present emergency. He entirely agreed with the noble Earl that, however useful he might think precedents were on some occasions, precedents ought not to rule their conduct on occasions of this kind. He believed there was no precedent applicable to the present case. It was a most gratifying evidence of the loyalty of the Colonies that, at a moment when they had just been set free from the trammels by which they were formerly bound, one of their first exercises of the privilege of self-government should be to exhibit such unanimity on the part of all classes of politicians as was afforded by these touching and loyal addresses to the Crown. These addresses had been brought particularly to the notice of Her Majesty, and most gracious answers had been returned to them. If it would be any satisfaction to the noble Earl who had put this question, he would be most happy on the part of the Government to produce the answers to those addresses. With regard to the question itself, he thought there might be some little difficulty in point of form in the Houses of Parliament returning thanks to the Colonial Legislatures for addresses which they had presented to the Crown; and as it would be somewhat premature to form a decision on the subject without consideration, he was unable to give a decided answer to the inquiry of the noble Earl. Her Majesty's Government were aware that other addresses of a similar description were in course of transmission from different colonies, and he thought it was desirable that those addresses should be in the possession of the Government before they finally decided upon the steps which they might recommend the Legislature to adopt. At the same time, there being so good a reason for delay, he felt a strong desire that they should not deprive the noble Lord, who had the welfare of the colonies so much at heart, and who had just undertaken the duties of the Colonial Office (Lord John Russell), of the opportunity, if he thought fit, of taking upon himself the initiative in proposing a vote of thanks, or acknowledging in some other mode the sympathy and support of the Colonies.

EARL GREY said, he thought that this was a subject of a somewhat more serious and important character than it seemed to be considered by his noble Friend who had just sat down. He (Earl Grey) confessed that he had heard the reply of the noble Earl with some regret, for he would like to see the Government adopt a decided course, one way or the other, upon this question. The noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) had said that precedents ought not to be adhered to if they stood in the way of measures of serious importance. He (Earl Grey) entirely concurred with that noble Earl; and considered that a slavish regard for precedents ought not to prevent that or the other House of Parliament from taking any course which might be shown to be advantageous to the country. On the other hand, however, it must be remembered that the forms of our constitution, and the precedents which had been founded upon those forms, had not been lightly adopted. There was more wisdom in those forms than, upon a superficial view, they were apt to imagine. He did not mean to express any positive opinion at that moment upon the subject before the House, because he certainly was not quite prepared for the answer of his noble Friend (Earl Granville); but he thought that, according to the principles of the constitution, there would be some irregularity in a direct interference on the part of the Houses of Parliament with respect to this matter. The addresses which had been alluded to had been sent to the Crown; the Crown had thanked the Colonial Legislatures; and he certainly thought it would be a perfectly novel proceeding—so far, at least, as he was aware—if that or the other House of Parliament were to step in and adopt a resolution with reference to those addresses. He could conceive that very great inconveniences might arise from the practice of direct communications between the Houses of Parliament and the Colonial Legislatures. Hitherto it had always been the practice that such communications should pass through the Crown, and he wished to see some good reason shown for departing from that practice before he consented to its abandonment. It was not necessary that that House should come to any formal resolution or vote of thanks to be communicated to the Colonial Legislatures, but there were various other modes in which they might express their sense of the sympathy and good feeling which the colonists had manifested towards us on this occasion. Parliament might address the Crown, expressing their satisfaction at what had been done, or in the course of discussion noble Lords might express their opinions upon the subject; but he certainly did not think that any necessity for a departure from old practice in this case had been established. Without at all wishing to depreciate what had been done by the colonists on this occasion, he wished to observe that the conduct of the Colonies was by no means so entirely without precedent as the noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) seemed to suppose. During former wars the Colonies had rendered much greater assistance to the mother country than they had yet afforded during the present struggle. In one war an expedition was fitted out in Jamaica, entirely at the expense of that colony, for the purpose of attacking one of the French West India Islands. In the famous war of 1756, our then colonies in the United States took a very active part, and they furnished not only money, but troops in aid of this country. No doubt, however, those colonies were then more directly interested in the success of the mother country than our colonies could be said to be at the present time. There were also precedents of much later date for contributions on the part of the Colonies for the support of the empire. When he held the office of Secretary for the Colonies, he laid upon their Lordships' table a large number of addresses to the Crown from, he believed, almost every British Colony, with reference to the famine then existing in Ireland, and those addresses were accompanied by very considerable contributions for the relief of that distress. Those addresses were answered, in a manner which he regarded as constitutional and proper, by the servants of the Crown in the Government, who returned the thanks of Her Majesty, and expressed Her Majesty's sense of the conduct of the Colonies. He was not prepared, without much more consideration, to express a positive opinion against any proceeding with reference to the matter before them on the part of that House, but he did not think it was a question with reference to which, from mere impulse of feeling, they should at once determine upon setting aside the practice and precedents of former years. If such a departure from precedent did take place, he thought it ought to be proposed to their Lordships by Her Majesty's servants who occupied seats in that House.

The Earl of DERBY said, he very much concurred with the noble Earl who had just spoken in the regret and surprise he had expressed at the course adopted by Her Majesty's Government with reference to this subject. The question was one which, in his (the Earl of Derby's) opinion, deserved very serious and careful consideration. He agreed with the noble Earl (Earl Grey) that it was desirable that neither that nor the other House of Parliament should be induced by their feelings to adopt a course, with reference to the expression of their gratitude to the Colonies, which might hereafter become an inconvenient precedent. He was sure there was not a Member of their Lordships' House who did not share the feelings expressed by the noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) with respect to the conduct of our Colonies, and the sympathy they had evinced for the mother country; it appeared to him, however, that the suggestion of the noble Earl, with reference to the expression of thanks to the Colonies, referred to cases which were distinct and different in form, and one of which, at least, was open to grave objection. The noble Earl proposed that thanks should be given, on the part of Parliament, to those Colonies or dependencies of the British Crown which, either by their Legislatures or otherwise, had come forward with subscriptions in money, with assistance in the shape of men or arms, or with addresses expressive of sympathy for this country in the war in which it was at present engaged, Now, there was a great difference between the cases of addresses or assistance voted by the colonists as a body, and by mere individuals in that body; and, with regard to subscriptions proceeding from individuals in these Colonies, it was clear that the House might just as well adopt votes of thanks to the counties of York, Lancaster, Durham, or any other counties in England, for the individual subscriptions of the inhabitants. There was, however, another set of cases such as the noble Earl had referred to, in which the Colonial Legislatures —the Legislature of Canada, for instance —had come forward with very handsome and liberal contributions, not towards directly carrying on the war, but towards a fund for mitigating the sufferings of individuals in the service of Her Majesty, and of Her Ally, the Emperor of the French, arising out of the casualties of war. He was certainly of opinion that in such cases something might be said in favour of some recognition by the Legislature of the loyalty and friendly feeling of the Colonies; but he agreed with the noble Earl opposite in thinking that it was a matter of very great doubt whether in such a case a communication should be made directly between the Legislature of this country and the Legislature of the Colonies, altogether passing over the Crown, in whose service, and in whose cause, and not in the cause of the Parliament—although the Parliament gave its support to the Crown in the performance of its functions—the friendly feeling of the Colonies had been shown. The noble Earl would admit that no precedent existed for such a communication; and it was a matter of grave doubt whether a precedent should be now set, recognising an intercommunication between the Imperial Parliament and the Legislature of the Colonies in matters appertaining to the Crown, which would set the Crown altogether aside. Take the Legislature of Canada, for instance. He (the Earl of Derby) apprehended that the Legislature of Canada at this moment was very much in the position in which the Legislature of Ireland stood previously to the Union; and yet, in every war in which this country was then engaged, though the highest loyalty was exhibited, and supplies were constantly given by Ireland to this country, he believed there was no instance in which the British Parliament, as a Parliament, passed a vote of thanks to the Irish Parliament for assistance afforded to the Crown in carrying on any war in which the Crown was engaged. At the present moment the Legislature of Canada was precisely in the same situation as the Legislature of Ireland at that period; and without meaning any disparagement of the Legislature of Canada, he must nevertheless say, that what it had done was by no means equivalent to what the Legislature of Ireland did in those old times when England was engaged in formidable foreign wars. If their Lordships now commenced an intercommunication between the different Legislatures, and voted the thanks of one Parliament to another for assistance given to the Crown, passing the Crown altogether over, they would for the first time make a material practical difference in the working of the constitution, and would set a precedent, to which it would be difficult to assign the limits in future. What were the services for which this country ought to thank the Legislature of another country? He could conceive no question more difficult. The noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) had alluded to a speech which he (the Earl of Derby) had made, in seconding the Vote of Thanks of Parliament and the country to those soldiers and sailors and gallant allies who had been engaged in carrying on the war, and in shedding their best blood for the independence of the country, and in maintenance of the country's cause; but that was a question entirely different from the question of an independent Legislature giving an expression of their sympathy and a contribution in the character of subjects of the same Crown towards a cause in which that Crown was engaged. Then the Parliament gave the thanks of the country to those serving in our cause and acting under our orders, and they gave those thanks as a meed of approbation for the manner in which the troops had discharged their duty. No doubt that was one of the greatest incentives to future exertion, and one of the greatest encouragements to our troops, and it was received by the army and navy as the highest praise and compliment which could be conferred upon them. Those thanks, however, bore no analogy whatever to a contribution in money or men on the part of a colony as an expression of sympathy with this country in the cause in which it was engaged. In mentioning a contribution in the shape of men he could not but express his regret that Her Majesty's late Government had not given cordial acquiescence and somewhat more encouragement to a proposition which he believed had come from some of the Colonies, either on the part of some individuals or of the Colonies themselves, to give that material assistance which we required more than money at the present moment—namely, the assistance of troops, who were prepared to evince their loyalty and attachment to this country by taking service under the Crown. He believed, and he had taken the liberty of expressing that opinion some time ago, that from several of the North American colonies there would be little difficulty in obtaining one, two, or three regiments, which might have been embodied in the service of this country, and who, he believed, not only on this, but on every other occasion, would readily share in all the dangers and all the glories of the British arms, and who, without ceasing to be citizens of Canada, New Brunswick, or any other colony, and still retaining the feelings which they would naturally entertain towards their native country, would by their continued association with the British army tend most materially to perpetuate that feeling of attachment towards the Crown under which they served which their Lordships' would feel it was most important to maintain. He thought this was a subject well worthy the consideration of Her Majesty's Government. He was not aware of any objections which might have existed against the adoption of such a course, but he must say he regretted that encouragement had not been given and a direct appeal made by Her Majesty's Government to the Colonies to make a contribution to the common cause, the cause of the common Sovereign, in the shape of men ready to fight her battles side by side with the troops of this country. In expressing doubts, and, perhaps, he might say more than doubts, as to a course of proceeding such as that suggested by the noble Earl—namely a direct communication between the Legislature of this country and the Legislatures of the Colonies, and still more, between the Legislature of this country and individuals residing in each of the Colonies—in expressing more than doubts as to the propriety of that course, he not only did justice to the motives which had induced the noble Earl to bring the question before the House, but he rejoiced that the noble Earl had raised the question before their Lordships — not because he thought there would be any difference of opinion as to the course which ought to be pursued as to awarding or not awarding a vote of thanks, but because it gave their Lordships an opportunity at all events for a declaration, which he felt perfectly certain would be shared by every Member of that House, that, whatever course was taken in assenting or objecting to the Motion of the noble Earl, from first to last every Member of that House and of the other House of Parliament could but have one feeling of gratitude and satisfaction at the course pursued by the various colonies, and the proof they had given, not only of their sympathy in the particular cause in which the country was engaged, but, according to their several abilities, of the good feeling which they entertained towards this country in general, and of the community of interests, the community of honour, and the community of glory which they felt to exist between this country and others which were only locally separated from it. Although he doubted the propriety of the course recommended by the noble Earl, which, upon full consideration, he thought would be found neither expedient nor safe with reference to the constitutional practice which their Lordships' were called upon to adopt, yet, at the same time, he felt convinced that the servants of the Crown would duly respond to the various addresses and offers of service which had been received from the Colonies. The Crown was the proper source whence answers to such addresses and offers ought to proceed; the Minister of the Crown was the proper channel of communication between the Crown and the Colonies; and the Minister might rely upon it that in an acknowledgment of the services which had been tendered any expression which might be used testifying the sense Her Majesty entertained of the loyalty of the Colonies would meet with the full and entire concurrence of that and the other House of Parliament. He should rejoice to see laid upon the table, upon the suggestion of the noble Earl or upon the Motion of Her Majesty's Ministers, the answers forwarded by the Minister of the Crown to the various addresses, and Parliament might then have an opportunity, individually or collectively, of testifying their entire concurrence in the gratitude which must have been evinced by the Minister of the Crown for the services which had been tendered.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE said, he hoped he might be permitted, after what had fallen from the noble Earl opposite, to offer a word or two in explanation.

He thought that both his noble Friends upon the bench below him (Earl Grey and the Earl of Carnarvon), and still more the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby), had somewhat misapprehended the grounds taken and the explanations given by his noble Friend near him (Earl Granville). His noble Friend had stated two—and, he thought, two very sufficient—reasons to weigh with their Lordships before they came to a decision upon this important subject; one of these reasons was, that in anything relating to intercommunication with the Colonies it would be most desirable to have the advantage of the opinion of his noble Friend (Lord J. Russell), who was not now in this country, but who might be understood to fill the office of Secretary of State for the Colonies. His noble Friend (Earl Granville) stated that no inconvenience could arise from any delay in this matter, inasmuch as their Lordships were not as yet in a position to form an opinion as to the mode in which assistance had been given, or the various quarters whence it had proceeded. There were, at the present moment, several votes and contributions, some from Chambers and Assemblies, as well as offers of services and contributions from individuals, all of which, in fairness and in justice, ought to be considered together in reference to the expediency of the mode in which they should severally be acknowledged. All that could be said at the present moment had been said by his noble Friend—namely, that some acknowledgment would certainly be made to the Colonies; and he (the Marquess of Lansdowne) agreed with his noble Friend upon the cross-benches that it would be unworthy of the country if an acknowledgment in some authentic form, to satisfy the wishes of the Colonies and meet the wishes of this country, were not made. But his noble Friend (Earl Granville) was naturally anxious, there being no necessity for immediate action, not to prejudge the mode in which the communication of the feeling of the country, should be made to the Colonies. But though the noble Earl had not wished to prejudge this question, he (the Marquess of Lansdowne) did not hesitate to say that he had a strong feeling in favour of the opinions expressed by the noble Earl on the bench below him and the noble Earl opposite, that the votes of the Colonial Assemblies ought not to be made the subject of a Parliamentary vote. He thought it would be greatly to be deprecated if a precedent should be created that had not before existed on a subject involving the relations that existed between these Houses of Parliament and the Assemblies in the Colonies. If they were thus to express their feelings of approbation on the votes of these Assemblies on occasions like the present, they might, on some other occasion, be called upon to express their disapprobation, but God forbid that he should anticipate a period which they were never less justified in anticipating than at present—when the votes of the Assemblies might be hostile to the course pursued by the Parliament of this country; but, in such a case, should he be told that by a vote of this House or the other House of Parliament the votes of those independent Assemblies should be censured? He should be sorry to see the day arrive when, under any possible circumstances, not only a Motion pronouncing on the votes of the Assembly of Canada or elsewhere should be voted by this House, but he should be sorry even to see the day when such a Motion should be entertained, as he thought the greatest inconvenience would arise from such a practice. But, in admitting this, he did not say that a mode might not be devised of conveying, in a most authentic form, the feelings with which this country regarded the unquestionable loyalty, the unquestionable zeal, and the promptitude with which that zeal and loyalty had been displayed by the Colonies in America and in other parts of the world. He also thought it important that that expression of opinion should be conveyed in such a manner as not to imply that it was what it was not; that the contributions made by the Assemblies were contributions to the cause of this country and Parliament, and not to a cause in which they were not as deeply interested as the Government and people of this country. Gratifying as it was to the Government to perceive that the Parliament and the people of this country had shown such zeal in support of that cause; gratifying also as it must be to them that the Colonies had manifested similar zeal; it should nevertheless be borne in mind, that it was not less for the interests of the Colonies than for those of the mother country that this war had been entered upon; and that at which he most rejoiced was the universal support which their cause had met with, and that, throughout the world, wherever British interests were engaged, there had not been a moment's doubt as to the justice and expediency of this war, and of its being to the interests, not only of every British subject in this country, but also of those in every colony, that the war should be maintained with vigour and carried to a successful conclusion. This House should remember, as it had no doubt been remembered in Canada, that it was not in Europe only that Russia had developed its ambitious projects; but that even in America itself—and closely affecting the interests of these Colonies—these ambitious designs had been exhibited. It was with gratification that he saw in all our dependencies that a common feeling of devotion was exhibited to the one great cause, and he was persuaded that Her Majesty's Government would be anxious to recognise the efforts and exertions which had been made by Colonial Assemblies; and he was of opinion with the noble Earl that this recognition should be made through the Government, and duly authenticated for the satisfaction of both Houses of Parliament and of the country. He begged to refer to an observation made by the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby), which was very natural for him to make if he felt that there had been a remissness on the part of Her Majesty's Government in availing themselves of the exertions and of the assistance of a military nature from the Colonies. He could assure the noble Earl that he was entirely mistaken if he supposed that there had been any indisposition on the part of the Government to invite, receive, and encourage, by every means in their power, such exertions or offers of assistance as either the Colonial Legislatures or individuals in the Colonies had made to aid us in the great military operations in which we were engaged. And although it was impossible for the Government to accede to every proposition without reference to its terms, and as to the inconvenience that might arise from it, yet, with regard to obtaining assistance that was unexceptionable, propositions had been and were still being entertained with reference to the great object which the Government had in view. If there was a duty imposed on the Government at this great crisis, it was that of collecting strength throughout the world, wherever that strength could be obtained. It was on this ground that he had supported the Foreign Enlistment Bill and the treaty with Sardinia; and it was on this ground that he should support the voluntary efforts of individuals or of Governments to aid this country by armies or by detached regiments for the purpose of the whole being condensed into that imposing mass of force which it was important at this moment—more than at any other moment of its history—that this country should be prepared with.

THE EARL OF HARROWBY had seen with delight the sympathy which had been exhibited by the Colonies, and felt sure that nothing would more tend to strengthen it than that this country should show that it fully appreciated the good feeling which the Colonies had exhibited.

THE EARL OF DERBY asked whether he understood that the request that the answers to the various addresses from the Colonies might be laid before their Lordships would be acceded to?

EARL GRANVILLE replied in the affirmative.

House adjourned till To-morrow.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Thursday, March 1, 1855.

MINUTES.] NEW MEMBER SWORN.—For Swansea, Lewis Llewellyn Dillwyn, Esq.

NEW WRITS.—For Dudley, *v.* John Benbow, Esq., deceased; for Stroud, *v.* Edward Horsman, Esq, Secretary for Ireland; for Athlone, *v.* William Keogh, Esq., Attorney General for Ireland; for Ennis, *v.* John David FitzGerald, Esq., Solicitor General for Ireland.

PUBLIC BILLS.—2° Ecclesiastical Courts; Exchequer Bills (£17,183,000).

GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY (CHURCH AND SCHOOLS AT DONCASTER) BILL.

Order for Second Reading read; Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."

MR. FENWICK said, that in opposing this stage of the Bill he would remind the House that of the 11,000,000*l.* capital of this Company, only 4,500,000*l.* was original share capital, and that upon the original shareholders the whole of this outlay would fall. It appeared that in the progress of the works which the Company had found it necessary to erect at Doncaster—a town which rejoiced in being the residence of the chairman—a large working population had been collected, and these people the directors considered should be provided with church and educational accommodation. This of course was a legitimate object, but in carrying it out, the directors sought to introduce a novel and unjust principle, namely, that of diverting the funds of the Company from the purposes for which they had been originally subscribed. On that ground he (Mr. Fenwick) opposed the Bill.

MR. HADFIELD seconded the Amendment. He could only add his regret that to all the misfortunes of this Company was now added the bitterness of sectarian strife. The Great Northern Company shareholders had debated this subject with extraordinary vehemence for upwards of two hours on the previous day, and ultimately the show of hands was against the Bill. The Bill proposed to expend about 35,000*l.* on church, schools, and clergymen and teachers' salaries, and this was to be forced from the shareholders, no matter what might be their objections, either on religious or economic grounds. For those reasons he must also vote against the Bill.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months."

Question proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."

MR. BECKETT DENISON said, the Motion for reading the Bill a second time was only to enable it to go before a Committee. The works of the Great Northern Railway were fixed at Doncaster because it was the most convenient place for their iron and coal trade. They employed upwards of 1,000 hands, who lived in houses built near the works by other parties, and it was evidently necessary to provide some educational and religious provision for them. The proposal was agreed to by a majority of the property of the shareholders, and the object of the Bill was to enable them to erect a church and schools if they thought proper. He hoped the House would let the Bill go before a Committee, for there would be plenty of opportunities for any Member, or the shareholders, to oppose it at future stages. He appealed to the House if it was not right for a great mercantile concern to make such provisions for those whom they employed, who without it would be in a most destitute state?

MR. LOCKE said, that the principle now sought to be introduced was an entirely new one. And the House had to consider whether it would permit the money of the shareholders to be diverted from the purposes for which it had been originally subscribed. He might refer the House to the case of Crewe, which was supplied with eight places of worship without a single compulsory advance from the shareholders of the North Western Company. The directors in that case, when anxious to build a church, called only the members of the Church of England together, and from them obtained a voluntary subscription quite sufficient for their purposes. They did not ask for, or require, an Act of Parliament.

LORD STANLEY said, that this was a case in which his feelings were on one side, and his reason on the other. This was not a question for a Select Committee, but a question of principle which the House was bound to decide. If, as it appeared, the majority of the shareholders were favourable to the proposed appropriation of the Company's money, there would be no difficulty in raising the funds, without taking the money of those shareholders who objected to the payment. Considering the principle involved, he had no choice in the matter, but felt bound to vote against the second reading.

MR. BOUVERIE said, it must be borne in mind that the Company had no power without a Bill to grant a site for the church and schools. They heard a great deal lately of the duties as well as the rights of property, and surely it was one of the first duties of property to provide for the religious and moral education of those connected with it. The Great Northern Railway were not in a position to make a voluntary effort to do this.

MR. LABOUCHERE said, he thought that great evils would arise from the adoption of the principle involved in the Bill. The House would be doing a great injury to the Church of England herself by passing this Bill, and the population intended to be benefited by it would be, he had no doubt, better provided for by not introducing this subject of dissension. Suppose an Irish railway Company came to Parliament for a similar Bill. The shareholders of that company would be, perhaps, Protestants, while the workmen would be Roman Catholics. Was the Church in such a case to be Protestant or Roman Catholic? He hoped the House would not agree to the second reading of the Bill.

MR. D. WADDINGTON said, he must congratulate the hon. Member for the West Riding (Mr. Beckett Denison) on having taken this step, for it would conduce greatly to the interests of railway companies. In the railway in which he had taken a prominent part the directors had tried the voluntary system for their hands at the works at Stratford with very little success. It was a very different case some time ago when railways were paying 10 per cent.; but now the shareholders grudge every shilling, and look at their property merely as a matter of pounds, shillings, and pence.

Mr. BRIGHT said, the argument of the hon. Member who had just sat down was, he considered, fatal to the Bill. Was it fair for a portion of the directors to come and ask Parliament to take away the money of the shareholders for a purpose for which they were unwilling to give it freely themselves? He considered the principle to be what had hitherto never been heard of with respect to any commercial establishment whatever; and what he had seen on other lines would be done voluntarily by the shareholders, be they Church of England or Dissenters.

Mr. GLYN said, he could state that the same question had to be decided by the directors of the London and North Western Railway after a large population had been collected at Wolverton. The directors, after due consideration, did not think it right to call upon the great body of the proprietors to erect a place of worship at Wolverton for those who were members of the Church of England. The directors, therefore, called together the members of the Church of England connected with the railway and put the case before them, and they had not the least difficulty in raising a sum of money sufficient for the erection of a church and the stipend of the minister for all time to come. If a similar course were adopted, he was persuaded there would be no difficulty in raising the money required on the Great Northern Railway, without any breach of principle or hardship upon the proprietors.

Mr. LAING said, that as Chairman of the London and Brighton Railway, he wished to state that the directors of that railway had always come to the conclusion that it would not be right for them, as trustees for the shareholders, to tax them for an object of this kind.

Mr. BECKETT DENISON said, that as he had sufficiently ascertained the opinion of the House, he would withdraw the Bill.

Amendment and Motion, by leave, *withdrawn.*

ARMY BEFORE SEBASTOPOL—COMMITTEE.

Mr. ROEBUCK moved, that the Committee appointed to inquire into the state of the army before Sebastopol have leave to report.

Motion put, and *agreed to,* and the Report was brought up.

The clerk at the table then read the following Report:—

"The Select Committee appointed to inquire into the condition of the army before Sebastopol, and to consider the propriety of the course which the Government has adopted to minister to the wants of the army, have come to the following Resolution, which they beg to report as follows:—Resolved, That in the opinion of this Committee the objects for which they have been appointed will be best attained, and danger of injustice to individuals be best prevented, and the public interests best protected, if the Committee be a Committee of Secrecy."

REFORMATION OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS—POLICE, &c.—QUESTION.

Mr. PALK said, he begged to ask whether it was the intention of the Government to introduce any measure for the establishing a general police, and also any measure for the reformation of juvenile offenders; whether it was the intention of the Government to grant any funds for the establishment of reformatory schools; and whether any plan would be proposed for the profitable employment of convict labour?

Sir GEORGE GREY, in reply, said, that his noble Friend (Lord Palmerston) had stated some time ago that the Government did not propose to submit any Bill to Parliament this Session upon the subject of the police. He (Sir G. Grey) fully admitted the importance of that subject, and was anxious that an improved system of police in counties and boroughs should be established. His attention should be directed to the matter, and he hoped at some future time to be able to propose a measure in reference to it. There was, however, a way, under a recent Act of Parliament, by which counties could themselves establish an improved system of police, and the necessity for a compulsory measure arose only from the indisposition in some places to adopt it. With regard to reformatory schools, an Act passed last Session by which power was given to commit juvenile offenders to certain reformatory institutions, on their being certified by the Secretary of State as fit places for the purpose. That power had been exercised in several counties, eight such institutions had already been certified, and proposals had been made and were under consideration for establishing reformatory schools in several other counties. The hon. Member for Stafford had given notice of a Bill to amend the Act of last Session, to which he (Sir G. Grey) alluded, and from other quarters various suggestions of amendment had been likewise made. He, however, on the part of the Government, until they had more experience of the working of the existing Act, was not prepared to propose any alteration. In reference to the questions of funds, it had been decided by the Government that no money should be contributed from the public funds in support of those establishments, on the ground that as the buildings did not belong to the Government, but to what might be called private associations, no security was afforded that they would be permanently devoted to the object for which they were erected. In reference to the employment of convict labour in public works, his attention had been for some time directed to that subject, and at this moment at Portland the labour of convicts was most usefully employed in that way. At Portsmouth a prison had been erected to facilitate the employment of convict labour in the dockyard. A similar prison was now in course of construction at Chatham, with the same object; and at Gibraltar and Bermuda there were establishments of convicts, who were employed upon the public works there with great advantage.

THE TURKISH LEGION—QUESTION.

MR. OTWAY said, he wished to ask the hon. Under Secretary for War whether there was any agreement between Her Majesty's Government and the Porte, by which Her Majesty's Government undertook to provide food for the Turkish soldiers and forage for their cavalry in the Crimea; and if so, if any and what steps had been taken to ensure the delivery of hay sufficient for the large body of Turkish cavalry stationed in or about to be sent to the Crimea?

MR. FREDERICK PEEL said, by the agreement with the Porte it was intended that there should be employed a Turkish extra force, a portion of which was to consist of cavalry, and the horses of that country would no doubt receive their forage from the British Government; but in the course of the last few months such large contracts had been entered into that he did not apprehend it would be necessary to make any special provision for the supply of the Turkish cavalry.

LETTER CARRIERS—QUESTION.

MR. T. DUNCOMBE said, he begged to inquire of the hon. Secretary of the Treasury what, if any, new arrangements have been submitted for the approval of the Lords of the Treasury for the classification of the letter carriers of the metropolis, with a view of improving their salaries and superannuations; and if sanctioned, from what date; also, if it is intended to make any provision for granting to the letter carriers, without deduction from their pay, some relaxation in the form of annual holidays, as recommended in the Report upon the Post Office.

MR. WILSON said, that in consequence of the recommendations contained in the Report of the Committee on the Post Office, an amalgamation had been made of the two classes of letter carriers—those belonging to the general post and those belonging to the district post—by which the two bodies would be made into one, but that body would be divided into four classes. These classes would be of different ranks, to which they would rise progressively. The number of men was about 2,000, and their classification had required a considerable period; but it was now in such a state of progress that he understood it would be carried into execution in the course of a very few days. With regard to the superannuation, the letter carriers had drawn it under the Act without being called upon to make any payment to the fund. As to the holidays of the letter carriers, it had been arranged that each should have a fortnight's holiday in each year without any deduction, but of course the time of leave must be regulated according to the necessities of the Post Office from time to time.

COLONIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PATRIOTIC FUND—QUESTION.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON said, he begged to ask whether there would be any objection to lay upon the table of the House copies of any despatches which had been sent in acknowledgment of the loyal addresses, votes of money to the Patriotic Fund, and other modes in which the Colonies and dependencies of the British Crown had assured Her Majesty of their sympathy and zealous co-operation in the war in which this country was now engaged?

SIR GEORGE GREY said, it was intended to issue a proclamation on the subject, but that the Government considered it would be premature to do so until the accounts from all the Colonies were received. Every day fresh contributions were coming in from the Colonies; yesterday he had received a despatch from Newfoundland, transmitting 2,000*l.*, and a few days ago a similar despatch was received from New Brunswick, forwarding a contribution of 1,600*l.* He was most anxious that it should not be supposed that either the Government or the country were indifferent to these contributions, but he thought it would be better to wait a little, until it was known what all the Colonies had done, before making any public acknowledgment of these contributions.

Sir JOHN PAKINGTON said, he was only anxious to know whether Government contemplated any more formal acknowledgment than had been made in the despatches, in reply to those containing the contributions.

Sir GEORGE GREY said, he thought it might be desirable to take that course, but suggested that it would be better to repeat the question when his noble Friend the Chief Secretary for the Colonies was present.

THE BRIBERY BILL—QUESTION.

Mr. HENRY BERKELEY put the following question to the First Lord of the Treasury:—The bribery and corruption which prevailed at the last general election having given rise to an Act against bribery and undue influence, expiring at the end of the next Session, whether the Government contemplate a renewal of that Act?

Viscount PALMERSTON said, it appeared to him that the Act alluded to by the hon. Member ought to have a fuller trial than it had yet received; and, in all probability, the Government would propose its continuance for a longer period.

ARMY PROMOTION.

Viscount GODERICH said, that in bringing forward the Motion of which he had given notice, although he felt that he needed the kind indulgence of the House to a greater extent even than usual, and although he wished that the task of submitting to the notice of the House a question of such great importance had been undertaken by some Member of greater weight and influence than himself, he nevertheless imagined that no apology would be considered necessary for begging hon. Members to take into their consideration a question of, at the present moment, such overwhelming interest as the system of promotion which existed in our army. At a time like this, when we were engaged in a great and severe contest, and when, if we had not actually met with great disasters, our army had at least been placed in a most critical and perilous position—when the minds of the people of this country were occupied with little else except the condition of that army, and when they were necessarily asking themselves the question —"What is the cause of all those evils which have fallen upon it?"—the House would, he was sure, not grudge any time that might be occupied in the discussion of any question that might be supposed to bear upon the efficiency of the army, and which might be imagined to have some relation to the cause of those unhappy events which they all deplored. The people of this country out of doors, and the wisest amongst them, were inclined to believe that there was but one principle by the application of which we could hope to obtain a safe deliverance from the difficulties and dangers in which we were now placed, and the deep and earnest, but silent demand of the people, and, as it seemed to him, their just requirement, was, that that House and the Government, whatever that Government might be, should act upon one principle only in their selection of persons to fill every office, civil or military, namely, that of placing in every post of trust or command such men only as were qualified to fill it, and that in appointing any man to office, they should look simply to his capacity for discharging efficiently the duties of that office, considering nothing of either his position in society, his family, his connection with one party or another, or any personal influence whatever. He thought it could hardly be urged that those principles were adopted under our present system of military promotion. It could hardly be said that the only consideration on account of which a person was promoted in our army, either in the first instance to the rank of officer, or subsequently to more advanced grades, was the various qualities of military merit which he displayed.

Perhaps it was hardly necessary for him to enter into a long description of the present system of promotion in the army, as it must be well known to every Member of that House. The theory was that the right of promotion rested solely in the Crown, and that right was exercised by a particular Minister—that is, the Commander in Chief. But the power of the Commander in Chief was greatly controlled by a system which had grown up in the army, and which was called the system of purchase. That system was not established, although it was sanctioned, by law; and was in itself only a system of bargain and sale between individual officers of the army, but which, no doubt, was regulated by the Queen's regulations and the orders of the Horse Guards. By that system, in most instances where vacancies were caused by the retirement of officers, those officers received from those who succeeded them a certain sum of money. There was no doubt that the Horse Guards reserved to itself, as it necessarily must, with a view to the maintenance of any efficiency in the service, the right to refuse such persons wishing to purchase commissions as could be shown to be altogether unfit to hold them. But when the vacancy was thus filled up by purchase, those officers who were unable to purchase were passed over, and the selection was limited to the names of those who were on the list for purchase in each regiment; and in that manner, and to that extent, the choice of the Horse Guards was limited; while, although an attempt had been made to limit the sums paid for commissions, it was notorious that much larger sums were constantly paid than those set down in the tables in the Queen's regulations. But when a vacancy occurred by death, or by the promotion of an officer to a higher rank than that of a regimental officer, it was then filled up by the Horse Guards without purchase. That portion of the system was the safety-valve, without which poor merit could never have a chance in the army; but at the same time it involved a great anomaly and injustice. For by the rule of the service if an officer died after investing large sums in the purchase of his commissions, those sums were all forfeited, and his family or heirs got none of the money back, thus inflicting on those individuals a great hardship. As the House would see presently, he was of course not going to object on public grounds to that portion of the system, because it was the only way in which a person who could not purchase up in his regiment had a chance of reaching to high commands. There was, certainly, one other means of entering the army, that is, by having studied at the Military College at Sandhurst; and persons passing a certain examination there were entitled to, and did receive, commissions without purchase, as the reward of merit for proficiency at that Military College. At the same time he believed he ought to state that the College at Sandhurst exercised but little influence on the character of the officers of the army. The number of persons promoted to commissions from Sandhurst was not large, and the college was altogether inadequate to the wants of an army such as ours. There was another aspect of the question on which it was necessary to touch, in order to show what the system was. It was this: The officers of the army were generally drawn from certain classes of the community—he did not mean merely the aristocratic or noble classes, but generally from the wealthier classes, and the soldiers were of course drawn from a very different class. There was, therefore, between the two classes of officers and soldiers a gulf which, though it was certainly passed in some instances, was yet difficult to pass, and which stood in the way of a reasonable object of ambition to the soldier upon enlistment.

This subject was a large one, and it was not his intention to trespass on the House to-night by going into the whole question, but he would confine himself to one portion of it, firstly, because the ground was partially occupied by two other hon. Gentlemen, with whom he felt it would be discourteous to interfere. The hon. Member for Richmond (Mr. Rich) had a notice of Motion on the paper, respecting the military instruction given at Sandhurst; and the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Abingdon (Major Reed) had another Motion, which stood, he believed, for next Thursday, on the subject of the sale and purchase of commissions; and if he rightly understood that notice of Motion, it mainly proposed to deal with the subject as it affected those who were already officers in the army. Therefore he (Lord Goderich) proposed to confine himself to the last aspect of the question he had mentioned, namely, the manner in which the present system affected the great mass of the army, the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers. Besides the reason to which he had alluded there was another reason why he should ask the attention of the House to this branch of the subject now, and it was because the circumstances of the time afforded, he considered, a fair opportunity to deal with it, which in ordinary times and in time of peace did not exist; because it seemed to him that by an increase of promotion from the ranks, the way would be paved to an alteration in the whole system of the army, and in that of purchase, and because by availing ourselves of the large opportunities afforded by death vacancies to promote men to be officers in the army who were not able to purchase commissions, a new element and spirit would be introduced into its ranks. If that was now done, after a short time we should be able to deal more easily with the difficult question of the total abolition of purchase in the army. There could be no doubt that in this question were involved the rights of a number of individuals, and any attempts to do away with purchase without a proportionate compensation would be simple confiscation. He would be the last to advocate such a proceeding, or the perpetration of such an injustice; but he believed that the present system was inconsistent with the advancement of merit, that such principles of administration ought not to prevail in a country like this, and that the whole question was well deserving the attention of the Government and of the House of Commons. That was the reason why he put the question on the ground he had stated, believing that there could not be a better opportunity than the present of dealing with this portion of it, so that the just demands of the people should be complied with, and no injustice done to individuals. He had said that at present there existed a Styx between the officer and soldier which it was difficult for the latter to cross, and he had stated that it was rarely crossed even by the soldier getting into the rank of a commissioned officer at all, and still more difficult was it for the soldier after he had received a commission to get to the command of a regiment or to the rank of field officer.

With regard to the last point he thought he need not argue the question. It was notoriously true that the vast majority, the great universality, of the higher ranks of the army were never reached by the private soldiers. Particular cases, of course, might be quoted, such as that of the late Sir John Elley, but if names were to be brought forward he must ask those who did so to be quite sure that they made against his case. He would exemplify what he meant by a particular instance. It would be remembered that in one of our great campaigns in India the name of a cavalry officer was in the mouth of every one as distinguished for skill and gallantry, that of Colonel Cureton. He believed that all the military gentlemen in that House would admit that he was a most distinguished officer, and he remembered a statement in the newspapers that Colonel Cureton had risen from the ranks. He (Lord Goderich) having then his present opinions on that subject, was truly rejoiced to hear it. In a few days, however, he saw a sketch of the life of Colonel Cureton, in which it was stated that Colonel Cureton was the son of a man who, though poor, was yet in a position which might have entitled his son, under our present system, to have obtained a commission in the army. But Colonel Cureton, being eager to enter the military service, had enlisted against his father's will, and proceeded to the Peninsula. While serving there the Duke of Wellington marked him out as a distinguished private soldier, and, inquiring into his history, found that he was a person who, consistently with the Queen's regulations, was entitled to hold the Queen's commission, and consequently that upon that ground, as much even as upon his great and indisputable merits, he took an early opportunity of having him promoted to the rank of sergeant, and afterwards to a commission. That, therefore, was no example against the case he (Lord Goderich) was endeavouring to prove; and hon. Gentlemen should be careful to know the history of those persons whom they brought forward as examples of having risen from the ranks to the higher grades; for it was not enough to say that a man rose from the ranks, if he had done so under the same circumstances as Colonel Cureton. Now, with reference to the promotion of non-commissioned officers to the rank of subaltern officers in the army, no doubt that was a more common case than their advancement to high commands or to the grade of field officers. He would admit that there were certain positions carrying with them the rank of commissioned officers in the army, which were held almost exclusively by men who had been in the ranks—namely, those of quartermasters and paymasters, which were given to them because they were required to perform certain disagreeable clerkly duties which other gentlemen did not like to undertake. But if any proof of what he said were required, with regard to the general fact, which no special pleading of particular instances could overthrow, that the officers were drawn from one class and the men from another, and that there was no certain hope whatever held out to merit, and that only in extreme cases sergeants and privates obtained military commissions, he would ask the House to listen to a statement of who were the persons who had received promotion of late. Since the war commenced the value of commissions had fallen to next to nothing, purchases had almost ceased, and there were unhappily an enormous number of deaths, the vacancies occasioned by which were entirely at the disposal of the Horse Guards, and might have been filled up exactly as they pleased. Now, he had no means of ascertaining what were the original circumstances of persons promoted to ranks higher than those of ensign and cornet; but since the 1st of October last, when promotion had begun to be very rapid, there had been 521 ensigns' and cornets' commissions filled up by the Horse Guards, and of those 150 had been by purchase. He would allude to those cases no more, except to say that those commissions were of course all obtained by persons who belonged to one class. But out of the remaining 371 ensigns' and cornets' commissions which had gone without purchase, 266 had been given to persons described in the *Gazette* under the somewhat equivocal title of "Gents." Thirty-nine were officers who had been transferred from the militia into the regular army, while of sixty-six sergeants who had been promoted from the ranks of the army, forty had been promoted on the system introduced by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Wiltshire (Mr. S. Herbert); and therefore he was almost justified in saying that, before that change in the system, only the remaining twenty-six sergeants would, under the old plan, have been promoted from the ranks to hold the Queen's commission.

That was the practice followed now, when we had every facility, if we chose it, to adopt a different system, and when the social difficulties which were urged against a change would tell with much less force, because, when men were fighting side by side, those social difficulties were not felt; bullets were no great respecters of persons—the brotherhood of danger bound men together; and if we were to promote men of any class who were deserving the honour of holding the Queen's commission, after having fought side by side in one campaign, a feeling of mutual friendship and respect would be engendered much more easily and quickly than in times of peace. If this then, was the course which was followed under these circumstances he thought that he had established his case, that the principle of the Horse Guards was not to hold out to private soldiers in the army any hope, however limited, that their merit would be rewarded by a commission—always excepting those particular offices which he had before mentioned, which were usually filled from the ranks, and, perhaps, excepting a few cases of those extraordinarily gallant deeds of valour which had been always rewarded by promotion to the rank of officers. If he were right in believing that that was the principle, he would ask the House to consider whether the system founded on it was just? What we asked of our soldiers was, that they should have not merely physical courage, but that they should be possessed of devotion, of self-sacrifice, of powers of enduring privation, of patriotism, and of loyalty. Those were qualities which contained at least the germs of all military genius, and which constituted the sort of character which was required in the highest ranks of the army. What did we do for those men, however? We said to them, "We ask of you all these qualities, but we are not able to hold out to you any certain hope, if you possess them in more than the ordinary degree, that you will meet with the reward of military command." It would hardly be said that courage, or patriotism, or military genius, was the inheritance of any class; and if that were true, surely we ought, if we wished to do justice to those who entered the military profession in any position, to hold out to them some reasonable hope that they should receive the reward of a commission, if they were entitled to it. If he were told that this was a great experiment, he might appeal to the lessons of history, and he might ask the House to remember—at least in this branch of the subject—the case of France. He would ask whether the history of the wars of Napoleon, and of that great army which was among the most successful and the most wonderful which the world had ever seen, did not prove that men might be found in every rank of society fit for the highest military commands? Who was Ney?—who was that Marshal whom the French army called *le brave des braves?* He was the son of a cooper in an obscure part of France. Who was Massena?—the son of a simple citizen of Nice, who enlisted in the army before the Revolution, but finding that no career was then open to him left it in disgust, but, after the change in the Government of France, re-enlisted, and rose to be a marshal of France, to be decorated by the hand of Napoleon with the title of prince, and to be styled the "spoilt child of Victory." It might be said that it was all very well in theory that men should be promoted from any rank; and he might be told, as regarded the case of France—that nation with whom we were in strict alliance, and of whose alliance we were so justly proud—which we every day called a great military nation—he might be told that it was all very true of France, but it was not true of England, or of the English soldier. Did they think the English private soldier was less fitted to hold a commission than the soldier of France, and that he did not possess qualities which entitled him to the confidence of his country? Now, he would appeal to those letters which had been written by our soldiers in the East, and which they had all read with admiration. What were the qualities which they had exhibited in the English soldier? Was it mere brute courage? No; but education, a manly and devoted piety, patience, and a soft and almost womanly pity and feeling for the very enemies to whom they were opposed. He would appeal to the hon. Member for Northamptonshire (Mr. A. Stafford), who was entitled to the utmost gratitude and respect for what he had done to alleviate the distresses of our wounded soldiers—and he would ask that hon. Gentleman whether he had not learnt at the death-beds of English soldiers lessons of loyalty, patience, and devotion such as he had never learnt elsewhere? There was another point to which he wished to allude. For some years past Government had been devoting much attention to the improvement of the condition and of the education of the soldier. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Wiltshire in that House, and the Duke of Newcastle in the House of Lords, both bore their testimony, when at the head of the military departments, to the advantage derived from this improvement in the education of the soldier. He (Lord Goderich) would say, when men were better educated and improved in character, did it not give them a greater claim to that promotion for which their improved education must be intended to fit them? He should hardly be told that the English soldier was wanting in courage, or in any military quality. If he were he might appeal to the hon. and gallant General who sat next him (Sir De Lacy Evans), and he might say to him, "You were at Inkerman—in the 'soldier's' battle,—and you can tell us how that victory was won, and what it was which has gained for it so honourable a name—you can tell us whether or not the men who fought there are worthy of any reward their country can give them—you can tell us what were the deeds of that Sergeant Sullivan, whom you so honourably mentioned in your despatch, and whose name, in obedience to a cruel and puerile etiquette, was struck out of the despatch of the Commander in Chief, and who has never yet been promoted, though since the arrival of your despatch in this country, twelve gentlemen have been made ensigns in the sergeant's own regiment over his head."

If he had in any way established his case, he was, he thought, justified in asking the House to consider whether or not it was expedient to introduce some change in the system? He asked for no extreme measure; he only asked that they should do on a more extended scale what had been done in some measure by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Wiltshire, and establish as a system that which he did not think the plan of the right hon. Gentleman had established on any permanent basis. He felt that when you were educating the soldier—when successive Secretaries at War had devoted themselves to that question of education—and he believed he was right in saying that the noble Lord the present Minister for War had been remarkably distinguished for his efforts in that direction—when you had done all that, you must expect men to feel that they were entitled to be treated differently, as educated men, to what they were before. On that subject he would say no more. But he would ask, if you possessed a system by which every English soldier should know what every French soldier was said to know, "that he carried a marshal's *bâton* in his knapsack," would it not materially affect your recruiting? The right hon. Gentleman the late Secretary at War stated on a previous occasion, in the discussion which took place on the Foreign Enlistment Bill, that great difficulty was experienced, not in obtaining recruits, but in obtaining them of that description which was required for the arduous service in the Crimea. But if the recruiting sergeant were able to say—not, as was formerly the case, as a means of delusion at the bar of a public-house, that every man who went into the army would be promoted to be a general—but if he were able to say truly that there was every chance, if a man enlisted in the ranks, and showed knowledge of his profession and a genius for command, that he would rise to any rank in the service to which his talents might entitle him, you would find the difficulties stated by the right hon. Gentleman to be considerably diminished. He (Lord Goderich) had no doubt that our soldiers were proud at hearing of the scene which was presented in that House when his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Westminster received the thanks of that House in his place. But it would be something more to those men who had enlisted for voluntary service if they could feel that some day that distinguished honour might perhaps be their own. Could that hope ever be held out under the present system? If something was done to hold out such hopes you would obtain recruits from other classes than those you do at present, and get men who could not now enter the army as officers because they were unable to purchase commissions, and who would not enter the ranks as soldiers because no opportunity of rising to the grade of officer was held out to them. If that was done there would be given a tone of morality and high feeling to the army which would be of infinite value.

He might be told that all this was more or less a theory, and that the people of England and the House of Commons did not like theories. He would, however, ask the attention of the House while he showed how the present system affected the efficiency of the service, and inquired whether there would not be a greater efficiency attained by some change. He had stated that since October there had been a number of persons appointed to commissions who had never before been in the army, and, consequently, in the majority of cases they were very young men. Now, for the most part, these 416 gentlemen were mere youths of the description mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. S. Herbert) when speaking of the privates as not having physical power sufficient for their work, and although, of course, he did not mean to say that physical strength was so necessary in the officers as in the soldiers, yet he could say that 416 gentlemen out of the 521 appointed to commissions were, at all events in a certain degree, of that description. Our regiments, from the effects of war, disease, want, privation, and neglect, were but thinly officered, and it would not be long after those gentlemen received their commissions before they were sent out on active service. Well, a young officer went out full of that devotion and gallantry for which English gentlemen were always distinguished, but with scarcely any military experience, except such as he might have exhibited in his examination before getting his commission, which he had often heard derided as regarded its value for all practical purposes. Well, the young officer went out to join the army at an age when, in other circumstances and in another position in the world, he would not be considered fitted for the responsibility which attached to the command of men; and shortly after his arrival in his turn of duty, he would possibly be sent out in command of a picket, where, perhaps, on his skill, knowledge, and vigilance might depend the safety of the army. What generally happened? His commanding officer tells him, "You are going out with a picket, and I dare say you do not know much of the duty you will have to perform; but sergeant so and so is a very steady and experienced man, and he will go on the picket with you, and explain what you ought to do." Surely that was inverting the rule of common sense, to put under the officer's command the man who was to teach him his duty at a post of important responsibility. Another story was told him, which he (Lord Goderich) knew to be true. It was of a young officer, a gallant and generous man, who saw battle first on the heights of the Alma. He said, in writing to his mother, that when the balls began to fall thick around him, and men were dropping on every side, he felt for a few moments a thrill of terror, and was hesitating whether he should turn and fly; but there was behind him a sergeant, whom he described as a brave, tall fellow, and who took him by the back of the neck and thrust him into the battle. [*Laughter.*] Hon. Gentlemen might laugh, but the story was true; and the young officer said that from that hour he never felt fear; and he must have been a gallant and generous man to have told the story. He (Lord Goderich) did not think such a man would have ridiculed the story like those hon. Gentlemen who had just greeted his account of it with laughter; but he was made a soldier by that sergeant, and so, as he had previously stated, their relative positions were inverted. But if hon. Gentlemen laughed at that story, perhaps they would not laugh at an instance which he (Lord Goderich) was told of by a gallant Friend of his, now in command of one of Her Majesty's regiment, and whose name he would willingly mention to any one who might choose to question his authority. That gallant and intelligent officer told him, speaking on the subject of this very Motion, that his remarks on the effect which the present system had upon the efficiency of the army were not only applicable in time of war, but also in time of peace. He said that when he first joined his regiment, or very shortly afterwards, the lieutenant and captain being absent, the command of his company devolved upon him; and the commanding officer said to him, "Of course you don't know the duties of commanding a company; you have had but little experience, and cannot understand them; but sergeant major so and so is an intelligent man; he will tell you what to do, and if you follow his advice, you will not be wrong." That young officer did follow the advice of the sergeant major, and rapidly rose to the rank of a lieutenant colonel—[*Ironical cheers*]—he did so most deservedly, and when he had reached that rank, he had the pleasure of recommending that sergeant to be made an ensign. His gallant friend subsequently told him that he felt their respective places had been reversed, when he was put over the head of the sergeant, while the sergeant, by whose instruction he had profited, was left in that position until he (the lieutenant colonel) had been able to obtain for him that reward which was so justly his due. He (Lord Goderich) did not for a moment desire to propose that the superior grades should be filled exclusively from the private soldiers. All he did say was, that the present proportion, originally about ten or twenty to one, and now, in time of war, at most six to one, ought to be changed; and that it should be laid down as a rule, that where any fitness for command was found among the soldiers, it should be considered that their having been in the ranks, and having been non-commissioned officers, did constitute a strong claim to their promotion.

He had been asked why he did not move for a Committee? It was for two reasons: firstly, that ground was in part occupied by the hon. Member for Abingdon; and secondly, that the matter he was urging was a change which might advantageously be commenced now, one for which the present time was peculiarly favourable, and for which, if we waited for the Report of the Committee, the opportunity would most probably have passed by. The time was undoubtedly favourable to it. We had had 371 original commissions, without purchase, to give away in the last few months; and, of course, we had had a large number of other commissions—generals of all grades, colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, and captains' commissions to give away in the same time. By means of those the principle could be applied now, without injustice to the purchasers, without asking the House to buy them out, and without obliging the House hastily, or in obedience to a popular cry, or in a time of danger, to deal with this difficult and complicated question. If the subject were to be dealt with, it must be now, by immediate action. There was another circumstance which made the present time most opportune. We were fighting side by side with a great Ally, in whose army a totally different system of promotion existed. He knew well enough that in the French army the majority of officers did not rise from the ranks; he did not ask for that in our own; but a certain proportion of the commands in the French army were secured to men who had served in the ranks, and that was all he asked the House to acquiesce in. Now, if report spoke truly, the present condition of the French army did offer a contrast to ours, most unfortunate for us. He did not say but that difference might have been exaggerated, or we might not be so well informed of the state of the French army as of our own; but there was ample testimony to prove that the French army was in a better condition than ours, better fed, better clothed, better cared for. We ought not, therefore, to be prevented by any false pride from examining into the French system, and seeing whether it was one we ought to adopt. Of course he did not say the superiority in the condition of the French army was wholly caused by men being promoted from the ranks; but he could not help thinking that officers just taken from the ranks were likely—not to care more for their men, for he knew that the English officers cared greatly for their men—but to understand their feelings and circumstances better, because they had experienced the same position themselves. Perhaps he might be told that all he was asking, or almost all of it, had been done already by the system introduced by the right hon. Member for South Wiltshire (Mr. S. Herbert). No doubt by that system forty sergeants had been promoted, one in each regiment; and the very fact of that system having been adopted was a strong argument in favour of the proposal he (Lord Goderich) was now urging the House to adopt. The right hon. Gentleman the late Secretary at War had promoted those sergeants, and could not tell him, therefore, that the soldiers of our army were not fit for command. His objection was, that it had not been done upon system, but as a matter of favour. One sergeant in every regiment had been promoted, but there might be in one regiment no sergeant fit for promotion, while in another there might be ten. In the 30th Regiment they did not select the sergeant mentioned by his general, but they selected a sergeant major, probably on account of his seniority, who might be a gallant and good man; but if the system were a good one, it would not have been found impossible to have promoted Sergeant Sullivan. No doubt, if the system were to be carried out thoroughly, the whole system of purchase must be reconsidered, so that when such men had been raised to be commissioned officers, they might afterwards be promoted, if they were fit for it, and not be kept on as old lieutenants and ancient ensigns, with no hope of promotion—the Government must watch over the career of such men afterwards, and take care that, so far as might be consistent with the claims of others, and with due caution in removing the deep-rooted evils of our military system, such men should be enabled to make their way according to their merits. That was all he asked, and he certainly did not consider that he was asking anything unreasonable. But he might be told, and out of the House he had been told, that the men themselves did not like to be promoted, and that when they were they felt themselves uncomfortable. No doubt, if but one sergeant in every regiment were promoted, it was fifty to one that he would feel himself uncomfortable. But if there were, by the frequent and usual course of such promotions, a number of men from the ranks combined with and welded, as it were, into the whole body of the officers, would, he now confidently asked, any such feeling prevail? Would they not be united as one body? Would not the men who had fought together and served their country together learn to live together? He did not suppose that any officer, except some very foolish young gentlemen, would ever treat them with anything but the kindness and respect due from every gentleman to his brother officer, but it was because such men were few now that they were liable to feel themselves in a peculiar and anomalous position. Surely he should not be told that the adoption of such a system would drive out gentlemen from the army. Surely not; the gentlemen of England would never refuse to serve their country because they might have to share the honours of the military profession with men who had risen from the ranks. That would be a result much to be deplored; but he could not, for the honour of English gentlemen, believe it possible. He should be the last man to cast any blame on the officers of our army. He had relations and very dear friends now in the army of the Crimea, and he knew that our officers were brave and honourable, devoted and loyal. He would not that we should do them any injury, but open a fair field, without favour, to other classes; and in such a case he was not afraid of the result for that class from whom the officers of our army were now generally drawn; for they need not fear an equal and fair competition. He hoped the noble Lord at the head of the Government, if he should speak on this debate, would not accuse him, as he did his hon. Friend the Member for Aylesbury (Mr. Layard) the other night, of having indulged in vulgar declamation against the aristocracy, for he (Lord Goderich) had done no such thing. In conclusion, he would remind hon. Gentlemen of what Tacitus had told us of the ancient Germans —"*Reges ex nobilitate, duces ex virtute sumunt.*" He would that henceforth we might imitate the example of our Teutonic forefathers, and choose our military commanders by merit alone. By doing this, we should promote the efficiency of our army, and satisfy the just claims of those brave men to whom, by common consent, much more than to their commanders, were due the splendid victories of the late campaign. By doing this, we should bestow upon the soldiers of our army a somewhat adequate reward for the great deeds of the Alma, Balaklava, and Inkerman. If we took this course, a time would come when, not in Napoleon's army alone, would "every helmet catch some beams of glory," and when the British soldier would no longer fight "under that cold shade of aristocracy," of which the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary (Sir G. Grey) appeared so much to approve the other night, but which he (Lord Goderich) trusted would not be permitted much longer to cast its shadow over the brilliant deeds of the private soldier; and we should thus build up a sound, a stable, and a satisfactory military organisation, because we should have laid its foundations in justice and reason.

Motion made, and Question proposed—

"That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She will be graciously pleased to take into Her consideration the present system of Promotion in Her Majesty's Army, under which Non-Commissioned Officers rarely attain to the rank of Commissioned Officer, and scarcely ever to that of Field Officer, and humbly to represent to Her Majesty that it is the opinion of this House that the said system is injurious to the public service, and unjust to the private soldier in Her Majesty's Army."

MR. FREDERICK PEEL said, there was one important part of the noble Lord's case, which he had admitted to be essentially weak because he had not attempted to represent the inconvenience of the system which he wished to change. The system of promotion by purchase might be faulty in principle, and defective in theory, but it could not be said in truth that it had, in its actual working, operated injuriously to the interests of the country or to the dishonour or the discredit of the English army. He (Mr. Peel) apprehended, on the contrary, that if he had all the armies of the world brought before him, and it were a question to which army he should refer to find officers distinguished for their high sense of personal honour, their courage and unshrinking bravery, and possessing also, in a superior degree, the feelings and habits of gentlemen, the army to which he should refer would be the English army and its officers. Now the question to be considered was, whether those were qualifications indispensable in English officers. He did not underrate the importance of having officers who should, like men who had risen from the ranks, understand with intimate familiarity the duties, wants, and feelings of the private soldiers; but when he considered what our army was, and what this country was—and when he recollected what an extensive tour of colonial service our army had to perform—and when he knew, as he did from his connection with the Colonial Office, what important functions the officers of our army in the colonial service were called on to perform, how delicate and difficult were the duties which devolved upon them, occasionally, and even frequently, required to undertake the administration of the civil government of our colonies, he did not think there were any qualities more indispensable to our officers than those to which he had alluded. The noble Lord had not impugned the character of the English officers, but his view was, that the present system of promotion worked unjustly and injuriously to the private soldiers in Her Majesty's army. Now, it ought not to be lost sight of that no man was constrained to enter the ranks of that army who did not voluntarily proffer his services. It might be said that it would be advantageous if the private soldier were told that if he showed capacity he would rise in rank and might become the colonel of a regiment. But he said, with the noble Lord, that much of this was theory, and that he had failed to point out in what way the present system acted injuriously upon the private soldier. He hardly knew, indeed, to what point he had to address himself. It was admitted by the noble Lord that much had been done to facilitate the admission of privates into the ranks of commissioned officers. But he said, "I want you to systematise what you have been doing;" whilst he declined to offer any definite scheme of his own. Now, he (Mr. Peel) believed that if the advancement of the private soldier to the commissioned ranks were to be made a system, the system which now prevailed must give way. ["Hear, hear!"] He did not believe that the two systems, namely, the system of promotion by purchase and that by merit, could coexist. Therefore, although the noble Lord had endeavoured to reduce the question to a very narrow issue, as if all he required was that Government should act a little more liberally on the principle they had been acting upon of late years, the question did in reality affect the whole system of promotion in the army by purchase. Now, he (Mr. Peel) had no prejudice against the promotion of the private soldier. If he found a man who had distinguished himself in any way, he would say, let that man be assisted to rise to those grades for which he showed his capacity. But the noble Lord brought a somewhat unjust accusation against the Government when he said, "I complain that you have not been acting liberally of late years in the promotion of non-commissioned officers." The noble Lord ought to have been aware that the Government had no power in this matter. It should be recollected that when an ensign who had purchased his commission rose to the rank of lieutenant he relinquished his commission as ensign, but the value of that commission he was entitled to, and expected to receive; and if the Government were to follow the noble Lord's suggestion, and, that ensigncy being vacant, appoint a non-commissioned officer, where should they get the funds to pay the lieutenant for that ensigncy? The Government were placed in that position from the continuance for the last two centuries of the plan of promotion by purchase which was now in force.

Now, before the existing system was changed, let the House understand what it was. He (Mr. Peel) was bound to inform the House what it was, in order that they should not hastily commit themselves to a resolution condemnatory of that system, and in favour of substituting some other, the results of which could not be anticipated. Let it not be supposed that at present there were no non-commissioned officers selected to receive commissions. There were commissions which fell vacant by death, and the practice in filling up death-vacant commissions was to bestow them gratuitously, upon the responsibility of the Commander in Chief. The noble Lord said—Yes, but there was great injustice in that practice, and if he (Lord Goderich) were in favour of the bestowal of commissions by purchase he would keep that principle in its full integrity; "but I do think it unjust," the noble Lord would say, "that while you allow a man to resign his commission in his lifetime, and to realise the value of it, on the other hand, if he has the misfortune to die in the possession of his commission, then you, the State, step in and deprive his family, at the moment when they are most in need of it, of the commission on which their natural protector has been dependent for his own and his family's support." Why, certainly that did appear *primâ facie* to be an injustice; but let it be remembered that a man who sold a commission dissevered himself from the army, and abandoned all claim upon his country; but if, on the other hand, a man died in the possession of his commission, then, although the State might take advantage of the death-vacancy to appropriate his commission, and to promote some non-commissioned officer, the State made also a provision for his widow and family. ["Hear, hear!"] Why, what were the Votes which the House had been lately passing but for gratuitous allowances, and for pensions to widows and families of deceased officers? The only question could be, whether the value of the annuity which was given to the widow exceeded the value of the annuity which might be purchased supposing the representative of the deceased officer were allowed to realise his commission. Now, he would tell the House how these death-vacant commissions were disposed of. In the first place, they were given to the young cadets who passed the examinations satisfactorily at the Military College at Sandhurst. Of course he did not mean those young men who went to that college, and, perhaps, passed their time idly, and never attempted to prepare for its examinations, but who afterwards obtained commissions in the army by purchase. These death-vacant commissions were never given to any cadets but those who had passed their examination, and proved their capacity for the military profession. Whether the education given in that college were the best that could be afforded was another question; but that was one source from which, it would be admitted, the Government might very fairly and properly supply such death-vacancies. Well, the average number of them so absorbed into the army was about thirty a year. But there still remained a considerable number unappropriated, and these had been given either to the sons of meritorious old officers, and efficient public servants, or to non-commissioned officers who had distinguished themselves, and who had been reported by their commanding officers as deserving of promotion, and who were themselves willing to accept commissions; for it did not follow of necessity that every non-commissioned officer would take a commission if it were offered to him. The noble Lord had given some statistics of the extent to which non-commissioned officers had been promoted of late years. He (Mr. Peel) held in his hand a return of the number of non-commissioned officers who had been promoted in the five years ending in February, 1855, and that number, excluding those who had been recently promoted for their conduct in the Crimea, was 129 in five years; while the number who had been promoted in the regiments in the Crimea was not, as had been represented, forty-six only, but was nearly double that—namely, ninety; so that in the course of these five years, 219 non-commissioned officers had been promoted to commissions in the army. Now, he did not mean to say that such a number bore any considerable proportion to the number of commissions that had been filled up in the last five years; but still it was an evidence of the manner in which the Government were disposed to deal with this question. He had heard it said that to allow one non-commissioned officer to be promoted in every regiment for service in the Crimea was but a miserable instalment of what was due to them; but it should be taken as a fair indication of the disposition of the Government. The noble Lord also said, if not in his speech, yet in the terms of his Motion, that the non-commissioned officers thus placed in commission could never rise beyond the rank they first received, or that their subsequent promotion must be very slow, and that they never reached the rank of field officers. The noble Lord ought to consider what impediments there were to prevent their rising to the rank of field officers. They formed only a very small proportion of the whole number of commissioned officers. Let it be remembered what was the constitution of a regiment, and that there were in those regiments which had been lately augmented, in consequence of their being sent to the Crimea, in each regiment ten ensigns, twenty-four lieutenants, sixteen captains, and how above that rank the number was suddenly contracted to two majors, and was reduced finally to one lieutenant colonel; so that there were but three or four field officers in the regiment, while there were from thirty to sixty captains and subalterns. Was it, then, surprising that a non-commissioned officer, even when he became a commissioned officer, having to take his chance with the rest, could seldom have an opportunity of rising to the rank of a field officer? But it was fair to mention that with regard to those non-commissioned officers who were made ensigns after the battle of Inkerman, their commissions, which were only granted in December or January, were ante-dated to the 5th of November, so that of course they enjoyed seniority over any ensigns appointed since that date; and the result was that through the rapid promotion consequent upon active service not a few of those very non-commissioned officers who, for their conduct at Inkerman, became ensigns, had since then become lieutenants already; and he doubted not that others would in their turn shortly succeed to the same rank. The noble Lord had rather sneered at non-commissioned officers being appointed paymasters and quartermasters. Now, they were seldom appointed paymasters, because in that office they would be required to find security for the sums of money passing through their hands; but they were sometimes appointed adjutants and quartermasters, because they showed a predilection for such employment, and were well fitted for it by their previous habits. Another reason for their not rising to the higher ranks was, that such men were generally advanced in years before they obtained the ensigncy, and slowly travelling up to the ranks of lieutenant and captain, had then attained the time of life at which they would naturally desire to retire from the active duties of their profession, and to realise the value of that commission which had been gratuitously given to them. It should also be recollected that, in consequence of the augmentation of the regiments in the Crimea, a considerable increase took place in the number of commissioned officers; and what was the result? The right hon. Gentleman the late Secretary at War determined to realise some profit to the public from the increase of those commissions; and a hundred ensigncies were disposed of at sale, which realised between 40,000*l*. and 50,000*l*.; and this sum would be reserved to relieve the public of some of that charge which would inevitably fall upon it when the war should be over, and when the half-pay list would have to be increased. If the plan of the noble Lord were adopted, he had said that he did not think the other system, that of promotion by purchase, could long be preserved, and therefore it was that he (Mr. Peel) took the opportunity of pointing out to the House some of the advantages which undoubtedly appertained to the present system. He knew but of three ways in which they could fill up vacant commissions—he was not speaking of first commissions, which undoubtedly might be conferred upon non-commissioned officers—and those were by seniority, by merit, and by purchase. He would take first the mode of advancement by seniority. Suppose a majority in a regiment became vacant. At present, if it became vacant by the selling out of the previous incumbent, it was offered to the senior captain of the regiment. He was, perhaps, a very meritorious officer; he was well acquainted with his profession; but he might not have the means of buying the advancement, and, consequently, would be obliged to relinquish the chance of promotion. The offer was then made to the person next to him, who probably had the means, and who, consequently, rose to the majority. Now, he did not deny that that proceeding inflicted a hardship upon the senior captain which it was desirable, if possible, to remove; but in fairness the advantages of promotion by purchase ought to be borne in mind. They did not want their officers to be old men, and particularly those whom they required to go abroad with their regiments, and to share with the common soldier all the privations incident to war. But the result of the system of promotion by seniority would be greatly to extend the average age of their officers. Another objection to seniority was, that the hope of advancement was almost inconsistent with it. They had two majors to a regiment and sixteen captains. Suppose he was at the bottom of the list of captains, and he was anxious to show his capability to command. But he was at the bottom of a list of sixteen captains, and every one of them must go through the office of major before he could obtain the object of his ambition. Would any one say that under such a system as that there was any hope of promotion? He believed that the facility of rapid promotion by purchase had the effect of bringing into their army the most public-spirited and enterprising people of this country. A man said, "I believe I have merit, and means also, and these two combined will enable me to rise rapidly."

It was not true, as some supposed, that when an officer sold his commission he could dispose of it to anybody he pleased. Conditions existed, without compliance with which a junior officer could not purchase a higher grade, and he must have served a certain period, and passed an examination testing his qualifications before he could do so. Again, the purchase of commissions enabled us to get rid of our old officers, and to eliminate from the army those who were incapable of rendering service. Constant complaints were made that the Government appointed old officers to the command of the navy, but the mode in which the army had come to be officered by comparatively young men was mainly to be attributed to this very system of promotion by purchase. A captain past the prime of life said that he could not wait till he would be promoted to a majority, and preferred realising the value of his commission and quitting the service; but if he could be advanced in rank without the payment of any sum of money, where would be the inducement to an old officer to leave the army? If this new plan were adopted, it would be requisite to resort to some violent means of removing these aged captains—a practice that would be extremely painful, and one likewise that he felt confident would be hurtful to the feelings of the country. So great were the advantages of the sale of commissions in this point of view, that Parliament, in fact, had supplemented and facilitated it by holding out pecuniary temptations to induce old officers of different grades to retire upon the half-pay list, in order to make room for younger men; and the abolition of retirement by purchase would cause an absolute stagnation in the current of promotion. During the last five years the number of officers who retired by purchase was thirty lieutenant colonels, twenty-nine majors, ninety-three captains, 115 lieutenants, and forty-four ensigns; the aggregate value of whose commissions was 500,000*l.*; and if the present system was to be abolished it would be necessary, in order to secure the young officers we now had, to vote about 100,000*l.* annually, in order to have the army officered by men of the same age as they now were—assuming that the old officers would no longer retire by selling out. The third mode of promotion was by merit, but the Government had certainly received no very great encouragement to adopt that system. The Horse Guards had instructed Lord Raglan to give commissions to one non-commissioned officer in each regiment, and accordingly he had promoted the sergeant major of the 30th Regiment in preference to Sergeant Sullivan. The Government was therefore attacked by one Member after another, because Sergeant Sullivan, whose merit was said to be superior, did not obtain this commission. If promotion by merit were to be the universal rule, and the Government had confided to it the task of estimating the relative merits of rival claimants, it would have the most delicate and invidious duty to discharge that could possibly be conceived. Moreover injustice must be done to the men belonging to regiments serving in the Colonies. How could the authorities at the Horse Guards learn of the merits of men in Australia or the West Indies, who might be more entitled to promotion than men serving in regiments nearer home—in the Guards for instance. The system would therefore become one of promotion by favouritism rather than one according to real merit. The noble Lord was in error in supposing that the practice of selling commissions had not been legalised, but rested entirely upon the regulations of the Horse Guards; because the provisions of the 49 *Geo.* III. c. 162, gave the requisite legal authority in this matter. [Viscount GODERICH: I did not at all attempt to deny that.] But apart from that, there were great objections to adopting the system of promotion by merit. He would not say great objections so much as real difficulties, which were not to be removed without serious consideration, supposing always that they were to do away with promotion by purchase. If they were to abolish promotion by purchase, it would be absolutely necessary to indemnify those officers who were now in possession of commissions in the army. Suppose they were to buy up the rights of the officers who were in the forty battalions, in the Crimea alone, not counting those in India and the Colonies, the sum would exceed 2,000,000*l.*, and it would also be necessary to raise a further sum to satisfy the claims of the officers serving in India, in the Colonies, and at home. Again, it would be almost impracticable to abolish the sale of commissions. It would not be enough to say that no ensign should be appointed by purchase, because, when officers came to rise from rank to rank it would be found that the power of money would be brought into action in order to displace men who stood in the way of the promotion of individuals. The officer at the head of the list of captains in a regiment had now no inducement to retire, but the fifteen other captains below him might have an interest in getting rid of him as soon as they could, and they would club together to present him with a sum of money if he would retire. He understood it to be often the practice in India at present, where no commissions were allowed to be sold, for the junior officers to contribute a sum of money between them, and offer it to their seniors to induce them to quit the service. That was a variation of the principle prevailing in our own army. Indeed, what was done by us might be collected from the difference that existed between the regulation price and the selling price of our own commissions. Notwithstanding the positive prohibition against the sale of commissions above the regulation price, yet it was well known that they were sold above that price; and he very much doubted whether, even if the noble Lord should render that prohibition still more stringent, it would not be found that money would carry the day, and that a man with wealth would rise above him whose only resource was merit. He did not of course pretend to argue with the noble Lord upon this hypothetical question. It was very possible that the noble Lord could see further and more clearly into this matter than he could; but be must confess, although the subject might be one deserving of consideration in connection with other subjects, that, as far as he had had an opportunity of judging, he did see advantages in the present plan which he should be sorry to part with; while, on the other hand, he perceived inconveniences in the plan suggested by the noble Lord—such as an absolute suspension in the current of promotion—which would justly induce one to hesitate before he agreed to the Address proposed by the noble Lord.

LORD LOVAINE said, he thought the House would not deem him unnecessarily taking up their time if he should make some few observations on one or two points touched upon in the speech of his noble Friend. It was, however, exceedingly difficult for a man who had a practical acquaintance with any subject to argue with another whose knowledge of the subject was mere vague theory. He was of opinion that not any of the reasons adduced by his noble Friend, nor even all of them combined, were sufficient to justify any change in the present system. It was alleged, in favour of a system of promotion from the ranks, that non-commissioned officers having lived and associated familiarly with the men who would be below them, would be more acquainted with their wants, their feelings, and their habits than men who had always moved in a higher class of society, and they would consequently be regarded in a more friendly spirit by them. But he would appeal to every man who had had any experience in the army whether it was not the fact that non-commissioned officers, after promotion, were generally looked upon by the privates with suspicion, and were considered upstarts who had no real pretensions of superiority over them? But it was said that if it should become the rule to promote non-commissioned officers that feeling on the part of the privates would no longer prevail. Supposing that to be so, still what would be the effect of introducing a number of half-educated men into the society of the other officers—men of education, and of refinement of manners? It would be impossible that one class of men could adopt the tastes or manners of the other. He did not say this from the least wish to depreciate the merits of the non-commissioned officers; he knew many of them, and was well acquainted with their many good qualities. Still he maintained that it was impossible that men who had been promoted from that low grade of society from which, unfortunately, this country generally drew its soldiers could associate with men of high education and refined habits. Parliament might enact what law it pleased, still it could not alter the nature of men, or bring about an amalgamation between two such opposite classes. It was a remarkable fact that those non-commissioned officers who had risen to high rank in the army had not proved to be the best commanding officers in the service. He believed it would be found that the men at present constituting the great bulk of the officers of our army were characterised by the great attention and care they bestowed upon the soldiers under their command. It was all very well to talk of Ney and Massena having risen from the ranks, and having become French marshals, but that was the result of a system totally different from what existed in this country. In France every man was compelled to serve in the army; the Government, therefore, had a choice from the whole of the population, and no doubt men of genius and of talent would occasionally rise up, as it were, to the surface, and present themselves for promotion. But a very different system of recruiting the army prevailed in this country. Would the noble Lord exchange that system for the one adopted in France? The great distinction between the foreign and English services was this—that, whereas while we raised our men by enlistment, foreign troops were raised by conscription, and whatever might be the rank, the station, or the social position of the various classes, each was bound to furnish its proper quota to the army. The consequence of that system was, that men of education were much oftener found in the ranks of foreign armies than in our own. The only question in the case of a person about to enter a foreign army was whether he would qualify himself for entering it as an officer by going through the necessary preparatory military schools, or enter at once as a private, trusting to his abilities and conduct for his future advancement. No doubt, when once in the army, he rose without purchase, but what might be in perfect accordance with the system of another country might be by no means suitable to our military organisation. It was said merit should be the only guide, but what was the meaning of the word merit as applied to the army? Some considered the meritorious soldier was the man who displayed a certain amount of education, others military skill, and others again personal courage and valour. For what class of merit were men to be promoted? He would admit the system of promotion by purchase might not be altogether perfect, but it remained to be shown whether, with the materials of which our army was at present composed, it was not the best that could be devised. The only branch of the service in which any other system had been introduced was the Indian, but with what effect? Why it was known that the officers themselves had recourse to a system of subscription to buy out superior officers, in order that each grade might be advanced a step? Objections against the purchase of commissions came with a bad grace from those who complained that one-fourth of their officers were too old, and it was said of many of them that when they attained the rank of a field officer, they found more difficulty in managing their horse than in managing their regiment. Then, with regard to non-commissioned officers, he denied that the introduction of the proposed system would be so beneficial to them as supposed, for not only would they, on being promoted, lose their good-conduct pay, but, after leaving their regiments, would lose all those opportunities of employment which they now possessed, and he could tell the House that there were but few men who stood in so favourable a position on leaving the army, as regarded employment, as sergeants, whose good-conduct pay was a sure proof of the excellence of their character. He had himself known a case where eleven sergeants had refused promotion, because they were convinced that their comforts would not be enhanced by being placed in a social position for which their previous habits and education had not fitted them. He therefore thought, considering what the pay of the army was, what the chances of promotion were, how the officers were treated, how they were maligned if not uniformly successful, the jealousy with which every appointment was viewed, that the eyes of the public were incessantly upon them—that every fault was magnified, and every defect the subject of public discussion—that it would have been far better if the House had turned a deaf ear to those suggestions which had tended to restrict the comforts of the men and circumscribe the utility of the army, and had taken the simple precaution of maintaining a proper establishment in time of peace. Had such been the conduct of the House, it was his firm belief that not only would the non-commissioned officer have found himself better off, but there would have been far greater chance of success in conducting the present war.

MR. OTWAY said, he thought that the noble Lord who had just sat down had done himself no great credit in throwing out a sneer in the way he had done at the manners of the non-commissioned officers. Those men, through long experience and hard service, might be excellent officers, although not quite so refined as the gentlemen who obtained their position by purchase. He thought, also, the noble Lord had come to a very erroneous conclusion as to the effect of the military system in India. It was perfectly true that there did exist a *quasi* system of purchase in the East India service, but there was this great difference between the system as practised in India and in the Queen's regiments, that the Indian officers were at least deprived of the painful mortification of seeing men, sometimes very inferior to themselves in all the qualifications and requirements of an officer, put over their heads merely because they possessed a certain sum of money. He thought the argument of the noble Lord founded on the fact of the refusal of the eleven sergeants to accept commissions told the other way, because, if a large number of meritorious officers of that rank were promoted, the individuals would no longer find themselves in an isolated position among their brother officers. The commissions granted by the Government to these sergeants would no longer be a boon if the system of promotion by purchase were persisted in, since, unless they could scrape up the sum necessary to purchase further promotion, they would have to remain stationary, and would be exposed to the mortification of seeing younger officers pass over their heads. The system of purchase might best be described as the exaction of a property qualification in officers, which of itself was highly objectionable. There would be no difficulty, he believed, in meeting most of the objections stated by the hon. Under Secretary for War. For instance, a forced retirement at a certain age, as was the rule in the French service, where no general remained on active service after the age of sixty, would effectively prevent the ranks of the army being incumbered with old officers, as the hon. Gentleman seemed to think would be the case if promotion by purchase was abolished. The hon. Gentleman had next endeavoured to frighten the House from the project by parading before it the enormous expense which it would entail on the country to refund the sums invested in commissions, but even if that could not be done under 2,000,000*l.*, he should be ready to look upon that as a very small sacrifice for the attainment of so good an end. The system of purchase abolished, the hon. Gentleman seemed to think that nothing was left but to revert at once either to promotion by merit or by seniority, forgetting apparently that there was such a thing as combining the two. A combined system of promotion by seniority and merit would be the most advantageous for the public service, and it was the one which he very much desired to see introduced. The system of promotion in the French army he considered was very fair. In the French army, vacancies were filled up in a fixed proportion —two-thirds by selection, and one-third from the non-commissioned officers. A non-commissioned officer, when nominated for a commission, had first of all to be approved by his captain, by the *chef de bataillon*, by the lieutenant colonel and colonel, and by the inspecting general; and in due time, if he still remained on the list, he became a commissioned officer. Now this system worked very well in the French army. In the Prussian army, which, so far as regarded the officers, was even more aristocratic than our own, the officers being mostly composed of young nobles and of men from the best families in the country, and where the *esprit de corps* was carried to a remarkable extent, when a non-commissioned officer was recommended for a commission he had to be elected by the whole body of the officers, and, if so elected, he at once obtained his commission. It was said that if the system of purchase were abolished it would be a point of considerable difficulty to decide in what manner the army should be officered. In his opinion, commissions in the army ought to be procurable in one of two methods only—either by having passed an examination at a military college, or by distinguished services in the field. Our military colleges at Woolwich and Sandhurst ought to be enlarged, admissions should be given to the sons of old officers and deserving public servants, and commissions provided for them as vacancies occurred; and in this manner a new system of appointment to commissions might be gradually introduced. The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for War maintained that the present system had worked well, and, certainly, if he meant that our officers equalled in gallantry and in everything that made the soldier those of any other army in the world, he would not gainsay him; but still the working of the system had been this, that we knew not at this moment where to put our fingers on generals to whom the public would concur in confiding the command of the army. He (Mr. Otway) had heard the name of General Napier mentioned, a man most distinguished, but whose physical condition would not permit him to go where his gallant spirit would lead him; but he did not know one man in the country who could, with general concurrence, be intrusted with the command of an army. The regimental system, too, though so much lauded, had not worked well. In theory it seemed good, but it was far from being perfect in practice. Consider the life of any young officer in the army. On joining he was put to learn his drill; he passed through the manual exercise, the platoon exercise, and so on, and in a short time he was pronounced to be fit to undertake the duties of a regimental officer. From the first day a young officer joined his regiment to the day he left, he rarely, if ever, attempted anything like a study of his profession. The regimental system, so much lauded, might produce gentlemen, but it was his impression it did not produce soldiers or generals. In other professions, such as the bar or in medicine, it was customary to hear a clever and assiduous young man spoken of as a "rising man;" but the epithet never was nor could be applied to a youthful officer, who never studied at all. The reason why military officers neglected to study after entering the army was because they had no inducement to do so; and that, he (Mr. Otway) contended, was a serious defect in the regimental system. In reference to Sergeant Sullivan, of whom the House had heard a good deal, he wished to make a remark in reply to what had fallen from the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for War. The hon. Gentleman said that authority had been given for the promotion of one non-commissioned officer in each regiment, and that, the colonel of his regiment having selected the sergeant major, Sergeant Sullivan was necessarily passed over. Now, the very complaint he (Mr. Otway) made was, that sufficient commissions had not been placed in the hands of the commanding officer. If that had been the case, Sergeant Sullivan might have received one of the twelve ensigncies which had been filled up without purchase in his own regiment. There were other remarks connected with the subject, which he should defer to a future opportunity, and he would only say now that if the hon. Gentleman would agree to the Resolution proposed by the noble Lord (Viscount Goderich) he would give satisfaction to the country, and concede nothing more than was to be expected from a Liberal Government.

Colonel SIBTHORP said, he thought the Motion was calculated to excite dissatisfaction where none had previously existed. He was most anxious to do justice to the soldier, and ever wished to see merit rewarded, but he did not think the course proposed by the noble Viscount would effect the purpose for which it was designed. Speaking from experience, he should say that to make a rule of promotion from the ranks would not be agreeable to the men and non-commissioned officers. There would always be great dissatisfaction among those who were passed over. It was to the present system that we owed the high reputation of our army; and he objected to change it. He thought some limits might be put to extreme cases of promotion by purchase, such as had been referred to, but when that was done he should say to the noble Lord, "Leave well alone."

Mr. WARNER said, he agreed with the noble Lord who had submitted the Motion to the House, that the only sound rule to adopt was a combination of the system of seniority and merit. There was one question which was very important, and which had not yet been touched upon, and that was, where were we to get soldiers at all if we did not hold out some further inducement? We could not have a conscription in this country, and we must therefore bring our system into such a state as that a sufficient number of men might be obtained without it. Scarcely any one would say that men came forward to enlist in sufficient numbers at present; and he was afraid that the reason was, that we systematically degraded the men who entered our army. We got the habit of speaking of them as though they were an inferior caste. Hon. Gentlemen had last year spoken very disparagingly of the foreign troops which it was proposed to raise; and the consequence had been the total failure of the effort to form a Foreign Legion. Somewhere about this time last year a great deal was said about an army on paper—that the armies of Russia were armies on paper and nothing more; but he should like to know whose was the army on paper now? He hoped that the system of promotion by purchase would be done away with; and that principally because it would be the only chance of enabling us to recruit our army. If we were to maintain our position as a first-rate Power, it could only be by keeping up an efficient army, and one that would make the British name respected all over the world. We certainly wanted two things, military talent to head our armies, and a greater number of men to form them.

CAPTAIN SCOBELL said, the subject now under discussion had a connection with the naval profession, for, though commissions were certainly not sold in the navy, they were, he apprehended, too often given away upon motives far from creditable. The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for War (Mr. F. Peel) had made the usual kind of routine official speech, the Government being evidently not disposed to go before the public in this matter. In the presence of the Prime Minister, however, he should say that if they did not take care, public opinion upon the subject would outrun any Ministry. He could see as plainly as he saw the sun at noonday—when it shone—that this question would never go to sleep until it was set at rest—by final settlement. Buying and selling commissions! Why, how could it be decent or becoming that the Queen's commissions should be bought and sold in the market? No other army in the world allowed such a system, and that alone he considered was conclusive against it. Suppose sergeantcies were allowed to be sold in our army—suppose the sons of shopkeepers could purchase the rank of sergeant, would our sergeants have been what they now were—the best soldiers in our army? The commanding officer of a regiment selected, of course, the best men for the rank, knowing that he was responsible for the character of the regiment, and that it depended greatly on the character of the non-commissioned officers. The present system of purchase could not be rooted out, of course, all of a sudden; but some beginning might be made. No more purchases should be allowed after a given date, and those who had previously purchased should be held harmless. In compensating the holders of present commissions, the expenditure of 2,000,000*l.*, spread over ten or fifteen years, would not be much felt, and would easily extinguish the evil. The system was a serious injury to the aristocracy, as the talented among them were lost in the crowd of those who purchased commissions; whereas, if the commissions were obtainable only by merit, they would stand out conspicuously before the public. It was discreditable to see officers purchasing commissions—buying the several grades of rank, and then "selling out" like shopkeepers. The army was at present made a sort of plaything, and men who had no taste or talent for military life entered it and left it without ever thinking of making it a serious study. But the term aristocracy was a very loose one, for who could say where aristocracy began and where it ended? There was an intermediate class, and this class formed a considerable portion of those who were interested in the purchase of commissions. Hon. Members had all doubtless the same object in view—to secure the honour and safety of the country, and to maintain the credit of the army. If they could get an able soldier who was a duke or a marquess, they should glory in him. Nothing was so satisfactory as to see rank united with talent; but then it was doubly unsatisfactory to see rank without talent getting on at a double pace, while merit was left behind. It was idle to talk of the extent of our present requirements accounting for the inefficiency of our system, for if we could not uphold a small army, how could we sustain a large one? The hon. Gentleman the Secretary of the Admiralty had not long ago expressed a strong opinion upon the abuses prevailing at the Horse Guards, and when such opinions were expressed upon the Treasury bench it was certain that they were not likely to be got rid of easily. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. Osborne) had said, "It is not merit and capacity by which an officer is promoted, but interest and connection." "You must not be satisfied with 'consolidation' of departments —you require a searching reform of the Horse Guards." How can you expect great generals when you debar every man from a commission or promotion who cannot afford to purchase every step of rank? Under the present system the good men sold out, the bad ones often remained. The hon. Secretary to the Admiralty, however, while he reproached the Horse Guards, might have cast his eye on the Admiralty, where commissions, if not sold for money, were often given from favouritism. It had been said that Parliament had been niggard in voting the sums necessary for the maintenance of our army; but that was not so. The Army Estimates were never refused by the House of Commons, and, therefore, that House was not chargeable with the inefficiency of our military establishments. Nothing with an officer was so high a certificate in the eye of the public as that he was a Waterloo man; but nothing could be more wrong than to assume that all Waterloo men were heroes, and fit, in strength and talent, for the arduous service of the present day. These men were worn out and past their prime, and it was not wise to put forward age when they could get youth and stamina and talent combined. In the profession to which he belonged, it was true that commissions could not be purchased, but gentlemen could obtain them in the Admiralty by other means which he need not particularise. Many able and gallant officers were passed over and neglected in his profession, and he considered himself as one of the neglected. There were hundreds of abler men than himself, however, who ought to have been admirals or captains, but who were pining away as hoary-headed lieutenants. In the army the system was not so bad, as a man might part with his commission when tired of the service, and proceed to live with his wife and family. Sir George Cockburn had left it recorded as his conviction that to Parliamentary influence was to be ascribed the absence of that which otherwise would have redounded to the power of the wooden walls of old England. A noble Lord in another place who had held office in the Administration before the last, said that if the administration of the army were assimilated to that of the navy, the army would be a hotbed of jobbery and trickery. The fact was, that both wanted setting to rights. In one, a man might pay his way if he had plenty of money, in the other a man might job his way if he had plenty of interest. He did not deny that war gave a man some chance of promotion, but he was speaking of the ordinary state of things. When they could find sergeants and corporals sufficiently educated to advance them, it was wise to give them promotion; but many sergeants and corporals had not, he would admit, education enough to be advanced to commissions. In such a case they should reward them otherwise, and he was a great advocate for the establishment of an Order of Merit, which would descend to the lowest man in the army. He should support this and every Motion which had for its object the improvement of the army and navy; for he thought that merit alone, and not family interest, should be the test of advancement in either profession. To show how unequally the system worked in the army, he might state that in the 13th Regiment of Foot there were two officers of eight years' standing, who had precedence over officers of twelve, fourteen and sixteen years' standing; in another regiment a man of eight years' standing had precedence of an officer of thirty-two years' standing. He could give a multitude of such instances. How, he asked, could things go on satisfactorily under a system where the grey-headed man found himself lower in the scale than the mere youth? In the dragoon regiments there were such anomalies as officers of nine years' standing being placed above men of fourteen and eighteen years' service. This, he believed, was the first Motion of a series which would come before the House; it might not be worded in the best way, but he trusted that the noble Lord who had introduced it would meet with such support as would encourage others to follow in his footsteps. These things ought not to be pressed on from out of doors, but should be done within. He trusted the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) was prepared to meet the requirements of the times in this respect. Our army was now serving with another in which no such system of purchase existed; and he feared that if the present system prevailed, the efficiency of that army would be impaired. If any more disasters occurred in the East, the Government, by neglecting this subject, might not only weaken their position, but be actually tripped up. For himself, he had no object to serve in supporting the Motion. His naval days were over, and, in giving his hearty adhesion to this proposal, his only desire was to establish that merit should henceforth constitute the claim to advancement in the two services.

SIR JOHN WALSH said, he had always had considerable apprehensions that one of the consequences of the disastrous, ill-conceived, and worse executed expedition to the Crimea, would be to throw an unjust discredit upon our military system, and that popular indignation would be directed against it as a whole. He was aware that a great many *ad captandum* arguments might be used which, in the present state of popular feeling, it might be rather difficult to meet; but the effects of the present outcry upon the whole organisation of the army might be so pernicious, that he trusted the House would approach a subject of such infinite importance in the spirit of cool and impartial consideration. In the first place, he would venture to observe that our regimental system had worked well. It had been compared for the last half-century with the regimental system of every other nation in Europe. He was not afraid to accept a comparison with France; and he asserted that the regimental system of England, as it at present existed, had shown an indisputable superiority, which the whole of our military annals exhibited, and which the recent exploits of our army had substantiated and confirmed. He would not stop to ask what might have been the faults in the Commissariat or the land transport service; he would not inquire what had been the deficiencies or shortcomings of the staff; or whether the commanders had shown great powers of strategy, or had made mistakes; but he would say that the glorious battles of the Alma, of Balaklava, and of Inkerman, demonstrated that our regiments were commanded by excellent officers, by men who had devoted themselves to their profession, who thoroughly understood it, and who fully enjoyed the attachment, the confidence, and the love of their soldiers. He would not attempt to deny that the system of purchase was capable of improvement and amelioration; but what he said was, that with such glorious successes, such prodigies of valour as had lately been witnessed, it was incumbent on them to approach this subject with the greatest caution—to be careful lest by any act of that House they should sow dissension, jealousy, and distrust between the officers and the private soldiers of the army. He wished it to be borne in mind that the system of purchase, on which the remarks of the hon. and gallant officer (Captain Scobell) principally hung, and the system of promotion in the army, were not necessarily connected, and that in the Motion of the noble Lord (Viscount Goderich) there was not a single word about purchase. The system of purchase might be abolished to-morrow, and, at the same time, the system of which the noble Viscount complained as so injurious might remain. The hon. and gallant officer who last spoke referred to the navy, where there was no purchase; but at the same time he observed, that instead of purchase there was interest. Perhaps, then, if the system of purchase were abolished in the army, it might be found that they would get the objectionable system of promotion by interest instead. In the navy there was no question about promoting sailors before the mast to the rank of officers, and yet there was no system of purchase in the navy. This showed that these two questions were entirely distinct. The subject to which the Motion of the noble Viscount referred was the injustice which non-commissioned officers were said to suffer from rarely obtaining promotion. In considering this question, it should be remembered that the whole system of English society was one of different ranks, and one in which, at the same time, merit might always enable a man to rise from one rank to another. In that respect the army followed exactly the course of the whole social system of England. It would be utterly impossible, however, to throw open all the ranks to the private soldier—to enable a man, for example, to begin as a private, and go up through all the grades till he reached that of field marshal. It would be not only impracticable, but, he thought, most injurious to the service. Such a system was not attempted in the navy. Suppose a sailor of eighteen or twenty years of age to be made a midshipman, he would have to learn all the theoretical part of his profession, and the chances were that the lad would never rise beyond the grade which his merit had at first gained for him, because, before he could have distinguished himself as a common seaman and earned his promotion, he would be too old to rise to the higher grades of the service. There must necessarily be exceptions to any rule that could be laid down on this subject, and in any good system of military promotion we could devise we could do no more than provide facilities for occasionally rewarding deserving men, for we could never devise a system by which, as a matter of course, men would make their way from the ranks to the highest positions in the army. He would go further, and say that such a state of things would not be agreeable to the feelings of the great body of the private soldiers themselves. Though this was, no doubt, a subject that required the grave consideration of the Legislature, and though he thought that we could make better regulations for promotion than those now existing, yet, with the views he entertained, he had a very great objection to the Motion of the noble Viscount. He could not say in his conscience that the present regimental system was "injurious to the public service and unjust to the private soldier." He should regret to see such a statement going forth stamped with the authority of a majority of that House. Nothing was at that moment more honourable to the British army than the perfect discipline and subordination which it exhibited, the cordial feeling that subsisted between the soldiers and their officers, and the total absence of anything like a mutinous spirit, notwithstanding all the sufferings to which mismanagement had exposed them. But would it not prove highly injurious to the continuance of this state of things if it were to go out to the Crimea that the House of Commons thought the present system of promotion unjust to the private soldier? Suppose a vote of that House were to excite a spirit of dissatisfaction in the ranks of the army now in the Crimea, would that be likely to lessen the enormous evils under which they now laboured? For these and the other reasons he had stated he should give his vote against the Motion of the noble Viscount.

Lord SEYMOUR said, that having been a member of several Committees appointed to inquire into the question to which the Motion of the noble Lord referred he would beg to trouble the House with a few observations on the subject. No one who heard the speech of the noble Lord, but must give him credit for the best motives; and the treatment of the soldier was, he owned, one which deeply engrossed the attention not only of that House, but of the public generally at the present moment. As to the Motion itself he thought the House must deal with it on its own merits. The House ought not to suffer itself to be led away by mere feeling, but was bound to view the question in its nature, its operation, and its probable consequences. And he would, in the first instance, observe that the Motion brought forward by the noble Lord was really a very small part of the real question which was behind. The Motion of the noble Viscount related more particularly to vacancies by death being, if not invariably, at least more frequently, given to the common soldiers. Now, that sounded very well, but what would be the effect of it? First of all, they must make ensigns of men who had reached a certain time of life; yet they avowed that one of the great reformations which they desired to bring about in our present military system was, to obtain younger officers. Well, but if they sanctioned this step, they would have older instead of younger officers. Another thing they had declared themselves anxious to accomplish was, that young men who entered the army should pass good examinations at Sandhurst or Woolwich, and be intellectually highly qualified for the profession of arms; but if they were to give vacancies caused by death to the private soldier, instead of well-instructed, highly educated, vigorous young officers, they would doubtless have elderly men, of great gallantry and personal courage—elderly men, who might be very brave and useful, and well acquainted with regimental duty, but who certainly were not of that class which the country professed its anxiety to secure. The whole system of education would, by the adoption of the plan of the noble Lord, be greatly interfered with. And again, they must bear in mind that, in sanctioning any such system, it must be applied not only to a time of war but to a time of peace. Now how would the system work in a time of peace? His hon. and gallant Friend (Captain Scobell) said it was provoking to see a man who had served only eight years placed over the head of a man who had been in the service thirty-two years. Well, but he (Lord Seymour) thought that merit was to be the test. Why, to say that a man must be appointed because he was thirty-two years in the service, was not to go by the rule of merit, but by the rule of seniority, which was quite a different thing. And seniority, he must again remind them, was one of the faults much condemned in the present system. Well, but if they did not have seniority, they would probably have what was worse—favouritism. They would certainly have it in time of peace; for how, he would ask, were the merits of officers to be discovered while peace existed? The question was fully considered by the Commission which sat in the year 1840, when the Commission reported concerning Army and Navy promotions. Of that Commission the late Duke of Wellington, Lord Hill, Sir James Kempt, Sir Alexander Dickson, and other distinguished officers were Members, including Lord Grey and several civilians who were not pledged to any particular opinions. Now that Commission reported, that if they wanted young officers there was nothing for it but the system of purchase. They were told that in the artillery the system of purchase did not exist, while in the line commissions were obtained by purchase, and that if the two branches of the service were compared it would be found that the artillery officers were much older men than the officers of the line. When the Duke of Wellington was Master General of the Ordnance he allowed certain officers of that corps to sell their commissions, not for their own advantage, but for the benefit of the service, because those officers had arrived at an age when they were not fit for active service. In consequence of that measure the engineer officers petitioned to be allowed to purchase commissions in the line, without being permitted to sell the commissions which they held in the engineers; thus showing their opinion that the system of purchase was advantageous, not only to the younger officers themselves, but to the service generally. Some hon. Gentlemen seemed to think it was very desirable that officers should sell out, but that it was not desirable that anybody should purchase. Suppose a man entered the army at eighteen, was it desirable he should sell out at forty-eight? The Duke of Wellington said that, in the first campaigns of the war, with the exception of Lord Lynedoch and Sir Thomas Picton, none of the commanding officers were above forty years of age. Would they keep men until they were sixty? If they did not let them sell out, they must pension them off; and at what age would they do so? Would they do so at the age of forty-eight? If they did, look how it would swell the Army Estimates. They must not be led away by eloquent language, but must look at the question like practical men. If they did not pension them off early, they would have the officers of fifty and sixty years of age, when the great complaint now was the want of young ones. Would the public benefit by the plan? Selection might do very well in time of war, for there was then great power of selection—great opportunity for distinction; and privates, by their valour and good conduct, were rightly promoted to commissions. But that, he repeated, could only occur in time of war. In time of peace the difficulty would be greatly increased. In time of peace he knew what it would end in, for if it was attempted it would end in favouritism. There would be no opportunity of testing one as compared with another soldier. They could not expect that a man of thirty-five or forty years of age would submit to an examination. How, then, could merit be tested except by the testimony of the superior officers? and they well knew that, under such circumstances, friendship, private feelings, and a thousand other motives, would prevail, and that favouritism would be the order of the day. It had been said, the system of purchase excluded qualification. Why, how was it that, with purchase, the test or standard of qualification could not be raised as high as was right or expedient? Why not have the education of the soldier the same as at St. Cyr, in France? He thought that the advocates of a system of promotion by merit instead of by purchase should explain the mode in which they proposed to accomplish their object. It was, no doubt, desirable to encourage the retirement of officers who had passed the meridian of life, in order to make way for younger men; but how was this to be done, if the system of purchase were abandoned without, as he had previously stated, increasing very considerably the public expenditure? He objected to this Motion, because he thought it trifled with the question, and was calculated to mislead the House. For his own part, if private soldiers distinguished themselves, he was most desirous that they should be promoted; but the Motion seemed to involve something beyond that. It appeared to him that the main point involved in the Resolution was, that the present system was injurious to the public service; but, before he could vote in favour of such Resolution, he wanted to know what other system could be substituted; and, as yet, no other had been suggested. It was true that it had been said that promotion should go by merit, and not by purchase; but it had not been shown how such a system could be carried into operation.

MR. J. BALL said, he could not understand why the army should be the profession of all others in which it was most difficult for a young man of energy and ability to rise to distinction. In the law the highest office in the State was open to all, and in the Church high positions were also attainable. He was glad that the noble Lord who had just sat down had raised the strongest objection which could be urged against the Motion before the House; but that objection appeared to be confined to the difficulty of getting rid of the system of purchase. The purchase system, no doubt, had some connection with the Motion of his noble Friend (Lord Goderich); but the noble Lord (Lord Seymour) was not justified in saying that the Resolution before the House could have no practical effect unless it did away with that system. With regard to the expense of getting rid of the system of purchase, he would remind the House that the hon. Under Secretary for the War Department had told them that 100,000*l.* a year would be about the sum required. Why, that was a mere flea-bite compared with the sums of money now being expended on the army, and the consideration of such a sum as that ought not to influence the House in making alterations in the present system, if those alterations were at all likely to produce beneficial results. But, to come to the practical part of the question: no one could deny that at the present moment great difficulty was experienced in obtaining recruits of the proper quality for the army. England in 1855 was not the same as England in 1815, when there was little or no emigration going on. Things are different now. Year after year 300,000 of the population of the United Kingdom had been leaving it, and of those about 100,000 were the class of men from whom the army could be supplied. The whole globe was being covered by the young activity of this country, and it was, therefore, necessary to bring into the army, if it could be done, a portion of that strength and activity which was going abroad. In most of the continental States he found Englishmen, Irishmen, and Scotchmen distinguishing themselves in industrial pursuits, and even, in some States, in the military profession. He might be told that the way to induce men of that class to enter the army was to raise the pay and increase the bounty, but if that were done the expense to the country would be far greater than that of getting rid of the system of purchase. The saying of Sidney Smith was a true one, and applicable to the present case, that men were more attracted by a brilliant prize than by the prospect of certain comfort, and in his (Mr. Ball's) opinion, an inducement to enter the army might be opened to the mass of the people of this country much more effectively by offering a certain prospect, that those who distinguished themselves could rise to a higher position, than by offering a larger amount of pay, but holding out no hope of promotion. In his opinion, the noble Lord the Member for North Northumberland (Lord Lovaine) had expressed what he thought was the real objection entertained to this proposal; and that was, the fear that promotion by merit would destroy the character of the army, and introduce among its higher ranks men who were considered not gentlemen. Now, he should be glad to know if hon. Gentlemen who shared that opinion knew what the working people of this country had been doing of late; year by year they had been raising themselves from the degradation of ignorance, emancipating themselves from coarse and vicious habits, and fitting themselves for that future which he believed awaited them. There were instances, he was glad to say, in that House, of men of very humble origin acquiring their position by their own talent and industry; and—to refer to an individual out of that House—he would ask, was the class from which his distinguished countryman, Mr. Dargan, sprang, not fit to enter into the higher ranks of the army? It was, in his opinion, essential for the improvement of the army that inducements to enlist should be held out to that class which it was most desirable to have in the army, because, as the army was necessarily small, it was requisite that it should owe its strength to its efficiency; and that result could only be obtained by inducing men to enter its ranks who, possessing neither money, position, nor connection, were, nevertheless, endowed with military capacity. Whatever might be the fate of the Motion now before the House, the public owed a debt of gratitude to his noble Friend for bringing the subject forward.

LORD ELCHO said, he felt that, never having had the honour of serving in the army, some apology was necessary for presuming to address the House upon this question, but, being about to vote against the Motion of the noble Lord, he was desirous of stating the reasons which induced him to do so. Since his noble Friend had placed the Motion upon the paper he had altered its terms, and the first part of it now ran thus—

> "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She will be graciously pleased to take into Her consideration the present system of promotion in Her Majesty's Army, so far as it relates to non-commissioned officers."

So far as he (Lord Elcho) was concerned, there appeared to be no reasonable objection to the presentation of such an address to Her Majesty, save and except that it was in itself entirely unnecessary. The noble Lord (Viscount Goderich) acknowledged that very recently some forty commissions had been given to non-commissioned officers; but he (Lord Elcho) believed he was not wrong in stating that the number of Commissions recently given to non-commissioned officers in Her Majesty's service was nearer one-hundred than forty. The Motion of the noble Lord called upon the House to affirm "that the system is injurious to the public service, and unjust to the private soldier in Her Majesty's army." Now, he (Lord Elcho) confessed that he was not prepared to vote with his noble Friend in affirming that the system which had so long prevailed, and which was still prevailing in the army, had been and continued to be unjust to the private soldier. He decidedly objected to the principle of calling upon the House to affirm abstract opinions without showing how to give those opinions practical effect. The only result in all such cases was that disappointment was caused where it was intended to give satisfaction. With reference to the question of the purchase and sale of commissions, no man could say, abstractedly, that the system was in itself absolutely commendable. The arguments now brought forward against it arose, however, from the state of public opinion out of doors. People thought that something had gone wrong; they were disappointed that Sebastopol had not fallen; they naturally sympathised in the sufferings and distress to which the army had been exposed; and it had been the fashion of late to attribute the disasters which had occurred in the Crimea to the aristocratic constitution of the army. Now, he was prepared to maintain that the purchase of commissions was not in itself aristocratic. The commissions in the army were open to all classes, whether they belonged to what was commonly called the aristocracy, or to the manufacturing and mercantile classes. Every man, supposing him eligible, could, upon the payment of a certain sum, obtain a commission, and the reason why they were not sought by manufacturing and mercantile men was simply that they considered them a very bad investment for their money. There was much more profit arising from the pursuit of commerce and trade than was to be derived from a wretched ensigncy in a marching regiment, and it was for this simple reason that the army did not contain so many men of the manufacturing and mercantile classes as he could wish to see there. The officers of the army were essentially gentlemen. He did not mean that they had Norman blood in their veins, or were able to boast of ancient lineage, but by gentlemen he meant that they were educated men, and he hoped that nothing would ever be done by that House to change the character of the British army in that respect. With a view of insuring that a man who held a commission was an educated man, they had seen of late that an examination had been established through which every officer must pass before he could obtain a commission; and, to prove that it was important that an officer should be a gentleman, he would quote an opinion of the Duke of Wellington, who said, with respect to the qualifications of a British officer, that it was necessary he should be in turn police-office, gaoler, judge, and jury—that whether in peace or war, acting as a magistrate, sitting in judgment, or as a juryman, or whether engaged in the more immediate duties of his profession in the field, he must never cease to be the officer and the gentleman. The system of promotion by purchase certainly seemed at first sight opposite to one's sense of justice, for it appeared hard that a meritorious officer who was without the means of purchasing his way to a higher rank in the service should see a person, perhaps inferior to himself in all the requisites of an officer, placed over his head; but they must look at the question as practial men, and not in a one-sided manner. It was no new question, for it had been discussed before Committees and Commissions, which had always come to conclusions in favour of the system of purchase. The Commission of 1840 reported that that system had during a long period "afforded the means of maintaining the efficiency of the army. The hon. and gallant Member for Bath (Captain Scobell) had denounced the system of promotion not only in the army, but also in the navy, in which it went by merit, so that there was something to be said upon both sides of the question. It was urged that the effect of not promoting a greater number of non-commissioned officers was to discourage deserving men from entering the army, and to damp the courage of the British soldier in the field. He thought, however, he need only appeal to recent events to show that it did not produce the latter effect, for the battles which had been fought in the Crimea were essentially soldiers' battles. The army was now enduring great sufferings, but he would ask whether it would be in a more favourable position if a greater number of non-commissioned officers had been promoted? He apprehended that it would not. He did not wish that any impediment should be thrown in the way of the promotion of deserving soldiers, and he rejoiced at the change which had been introduced into the army with the view of obtaining a better class of men, such as the diminution of corporal punishment, the granting of good conduct pay, and the establishment of libraries. There could be no doubt that those changes had already borne fruits when they remembered the letters that had been published from the soldiers in the Crimea, many of which, in sentiment, feeling, and expression, would do honour to any Member of that House. He hoped the time would come when a larger proportion of privates would be promoted, but he was afraid lest the House should, in obedience to a cry out of doors, adopt a course from which it would hereafter be difficult, or perhaps impossible, to withdraw, and lest, in their anxiety to raise the character of the British soldier they should lower that of the British officer.

Sir DE LACY EVANS: Sir, I have not come down to the House this evening for the purpose of trespassing at any great length upon it, but as this is a subject on which I have on former occasions expressed my humble opinion, although unsuccessfully, I think it my duty to offer a few words in support of the noble Lord's (Viscount Goderich's) Motion. The noble Lord who last addressed you has expressed his great apprehension lest the House should be driven into the adoption of some imprudent resolution in consequence of the cry which has arisen throughout the country upon this subject. But I, at all events, and I believe there are many others in the same situation, am not in the slightest degree influenced by the cry, if there be such a cry—I am merely expressing the same opinions that I have always entertained on this subject. There have been various objections raised to the Motion of my noble Friend. The Under Secretary of the War Department—I believe that is his title, but there have been such frequent transmutations of place that I am not quite certain about it—dwelt chiefly upon the financial part of the case; the noble Lord the Member for Totness (Lord Seymour) dwelt pretty strongly upon the results of the Commission of 1840, at the head of which was the illustrious Duke of Wellington, and other Commissions, of 1833 and 1836, were referred to by the noble Lord who last spoke. For my part, I must confess that the decisions of those Commissions have not such supreme authority over my mind, because they were, in point of fact, the decisions of the Duke of Wellington. No military man upon those Commissions, as we all know, would have presumed to differ from him in opinion upon a question of this nature, and it is not to be wondered at, because, with the transcendent knowledge and great abilities of the noble Duke, such a difference would have been looked upon as presumption; and some of us, who ventured to be guilty of that presumption, of differing in the slightest degree from the opinions he expressed, suffered for it accordingly. The noble Duke no doubt entertained firm convictions upon this subject, but are we still to be bound by those convictions? are we to remain for ever under the law of the Medes and Persians? Is there to be no change because certain opinions were held by a great man who was biassed by his opinions upon subjects not at all connected with the army, but connected with political matters, connected with the institution of aristocracy, which the noble Duke conceived to be a matter of more importance than the efficiency of the army? [*Cries of* "No, no!"] Hon. Members may cry "No, no!" if they will, but those who will look to the general course of conduct of the noble Duke after, not during the war, will agree with me. I do not pretend to say that these opinions influenced him during the war; I think he was a totally different man after the war to what he was when he had the command of an army in the field; he was then a practical commander and did not think about, or meddle with, politics. But when the war was over, military considerations became quite secondary in the noble Duke's mind to political matters. I say, therefore, that I for one, do not bow implicitly to the decisions of these Commissions; they were predetermined when the noble Duke expressed an opinion in favour of the existing state of things. The noble Duke expressed his opinions upon other matters than that of promotion by purchase; he thought that, as the army had performed all the actions which he had directed extremely well (and so it certainly had), there was no sort of necessity for alteration or improvement. I believe that he held the same decided opinion with regard to politics, but he was nevertheless obliged ultimately to change a few of them. He was even obliged to change his opinions upon some military subjects. He proved that even his great mind was liable to prejudice, by opposing the introduction of the present system of metal caps instead of flints; he also opposed the introduction of that admirable weapon the Minié rifle, which has recently rendered our army such admirable service—and yet we are told that, because the noble Duke once entertained a certain opinion upon the subject of promotion by purchase, we are never afterwards to deviate from that opinion. If the system of purchase be so admirable a thing, why not introduce it into all the institutions of the country? why not introduce it into your navy and into your civil offices? why not set up your Secretaryships of State for sale? Sir, the system is a corruption—it is dishonourable to the country—it will be a disgrace to this House if you continue to sanction it, and the people of Europe wonder at its existence. But some gentlemen come with their sixpenny economy and tell us, forsooth, that if we attempt to establish a system of promotion by merit it will cost us 100,000*l*. a year. That is the statement of the hon. Gentleman who has been selected to fill the second place in the conduct of the war. Well, Sir, my opinion is that it is a very cheap thing if you can get it for 100,000*l*. a year. Sir, it is said that it is not the sons of the aristocracy merely who purchase their promotion, but also the sons of the manufacturer and the shopkeeper. But it is not so easy to pass some of the higher steps when he goes to the Horse Guards if he is the son of a humble person. My objection to the system of purchase is, that it affords facilities for the manifestation of a favouritism which entirely eschews the commonalty, and admits only to the higher prizes of the profession the sons of gentry and nobles. Do not suppose that I wish to exclude the aristocracy or the gentry from the army; on the contrary, I desire very much to see a larger proportion of the nobility and gentry than of the commonalty in the command of the army, but what I object to is the exclusion of the latter, and that those should be deprived of the opportunity of coming to the higher appointments in the army who by nature are possessed of the talents to render great service to their country. It has been well asked, why we should not, upon the same principle, set up situations on the bench for sale? But that is not so, and the result is, that we see upon the bench what never occurs in the army—namely, that the sons of the humblest persons in the scale of society have risen to the highest rewards in their profession. But that is morally impossible in the army. It is almost impossible even for the sons of the gentry. Look at my own position? We are beaten by time. We are kept back until we are worn out. Those who have more friends get up to the higher ranks of the army; but, if there is a question of selecting some one for the command of a corps or an army, the answer is—"Oh! such a man is not of such a class," and "Do not talk to us of him." When the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for War tells us that fifty or even one hundred commissions have been sold for appointments in the Crimea, and when he impresses this upon us as a great economy, that by the sale of these fifty or one hundred commissions all ulterior expense to the country will be avoided, I really think he is putting the question on a low and inferior ground. I think it is a most discreditable view of the subject, that these persons—because they possess more money, or at least their fathers—should be put over the heads of those non-commissioned officers, not to say those private soldiers, who have borne all these dangers and all these difficulties and hardships with unexampled fortitude and bravery. You will set aside these fifty or one hundred commissions for what?—because 50,000*l*. will be made of them. This is false economy altogether. If this be a good thing, you are bound to carry it out in all institutions. You have no alternative. We are gradually approaching an amelioration, nevertheless, for it is now contended that a few promotions may be given. There was a time when it was contended that all the soldiers should be nobles, and in some countries it was necessary for a man to have ten or twelve quarterings of nobility before he could be admitted into the army.

But that has passed away. There have been great officers of all classes of the community. Princes have become great officers. Now and then nature inspires a prince with that description of genius, and noblemen and gentlemen also. But let us compare the number of great officers that have arisen in which the very highest classes alone obtain the command, and compare them with the same countries where at periods of revolution all classes have free scope for the development of their energies and abilities. Where you have ten great officers in the one case, you have fifty in the other. In the time of Louis XIV. there were great commanders no doubt, but we had a greater commander than all his. Our own Revolution was political rather than military, but still there was a gentleman of great power and position—Mr. Oliver Cromwell—who made himself heard of. But compare the commanders of Louis XIV., when they were all men of family, with the military talent manifested at the period of the French Revolution. Some of Napoleon's best generals were men of very humble birth, and of very little education. Do not suppose that the examination of your colleges are a certain proof of fitness for military command. What we do not sufficiently bear in mind is the great amelioration which has taken place among the population, and especially in the army. Look to the general orders of the Duke of Wellington during the Peninsular war, and compare them with the general orders issued to the army of most recent date, you will find in that comparison proof positive that crimes and offences were committed in a vastly greater ratio at that time than they are now. Sir, I had the command of a small force, about twenty years ago, which was well-abused in this House. It was collected under the most unfavourable circumstances. A great many crimes and offences, no doubt occurred in it, but this I remember, that not a single capital crime and no capital punishment occurred in that force. People said, what good discipline there must have been among them. It was not from that purely, because the discipline must necessarily be more imperfect in such an army than in an army officered upon our own plan, but the conduct of the men afforded proof of the very great amelioration which had been going on in the population of this country. Now with regard to our army in the Crimea, and which previously was in Turkey, I declare I cannot call to mind that anything like a capital crime has been committed by any one of those soldiers. Their conduct has been most eminently obedient and subordinate. And is this the kind of army which ought to be excluded from the hopes of advancement, and the members of which ought not to be allowed to entertain those aspirations and hopes of honour and distinction that belong to other classes of society? Why, Sir, when I have passed the pickets and outposts in the Crimea—the most severe and unpleasant duty to which a soldier can be exposed except a general engagement, and scarcely excepting even that—it has sometimes occurred to me how painful it was to see those brave men exposed to such dire miseries, to wounds, and toils, and almost to certain death from disease, with so little of anything to hope for in the future. I appeal to the noble Lord the First Lord of the Treasury, and to the hon. and right hon. Gentlemen near him, who have the power to remedy this, and I ask them to remember that these are men like themselves. In the conventional sense of the term these brave men may not be gentlemen—a term, however, which is not very correctly used on all occasions, for we have known men of high rank who are not gentlemen, and we know people of lower rank who are essentially gentlemen and capable of high and noble aspirations. But it is contrary to the general spirit of the orders of the Sovereign to suppose that any one in the military ranks is not a gentleman. If you speak of polished manners it may be so, but if you lay it down as a principle that you are determined to proceed on a more liberal system in this respect, you will find that persons of still higher conduct, and still better education, will enter the ranks of the army. I have no fear of any sort of inconvenience or danger from the proposition of the noble Member for Huddersfield; indeed I think it is a very moderate proposition. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Bury (Mr. F. Peel) has represented it to be almost impossible to do away with the system of purchase. Why, Sir, the system will do away with itself, if you will only allow it. There is an end of all claim when an officer dies who has bought a Commission, and, consequently, there is an end of the whole system in process of time, if you do not sell some fifty or hundred commissions, as you did the other day. I think it was most improper, most culpable, and most shameful to send persons, by purchase, into your army in the Crimea, and thus set them over the heads of men who had fought at Alma, at Inkerman, and at Balaklava—men who are toiling there, and whose lives are exposed almost every hour of the day, but who have not the money required to purchase their promotion. During the discussion I have heard some gentlemen say the present system works well. So it was said of the close boroughs, and though they are not altogether extirpated, many of them have ceased to exist. There is no abuse without some countervailing advantage. I do not mean to say that by the system of purchase you do not secure a greater number of educated young men for the army than you would in the first instance without it; but the advantage is far more than counterbalanced by the ultimate injury it inflicts, and in the depressing influence it exercises on those praiseworthy aspirations of honour and ambition which, in military life, are so essential and so necessary for the public benefit. Again, I say it is false economy to continue this system. The idea of selling the command of a regiment is in itself an absurdity. It is absurd to commit a thousand men, not for a moment, either, but for a long period, to the command of a person because he happens to have two qualifications—that he is beyond a certain age of juvenility, and that he has a certain amount of money. Those are the sole qualifications, except that he shall not have got into any scrape; but because a man has not got into a scrape, and possesses money and seniority, he is trusted with the management, care, and efficiency, moral and physical, of 1,000 men. But if it is a good system, after all you are totally inconsistent, because if it is right to intrust 1,000 men to a gentleman who possesses 5,000*l.* or 6,000*l.*, you ought to intrust 3,000 men, or a brigade, to a gentleman who has 15,000*l.*, and a whole division to one who has 20,000*l.*, or something of that kind. If it is a good system, you are bound to carry it out and prove it to be so. Then there is the argument of youth. Undoubtedly youth is an important element in every relation of life (I wish I had a little of it), and I do not mean to say that the change does not require a great deal of consideration; but if there be good will on the part of the Government, I think they might be successful in abolishing the system, without entailing on the army too many old officers. Not that youth should be the only qualification, for if there are many old blockheads there are not a few young ones. The noble Lord (Lord Seymour) alluded to a passage in the Report of one of these Commissions to the effect that no other system but that of purchase could have provided young and efficient officers during a long period of peace, and a quotation was also given from an opinion of the illustrious Duke, to whom I have presumed to refer, as to the qualifications which officers ought to possess—namely, to be good judges, good juries, good gaolers, &c. Now, I have been a long time in the army, and I do not profess to possess those qualities. I think it rather an exaggerated estimate of military requirements; but, if it be not, I say you are not certain that a man having 5,000*l.* will be a good judge, a good jury, or a good gaoler. It is argued that you could not have obtained so many youthful officers by any system except the system of purchase; but I say it is comparatively unimportant what class of officers are in the army in time of peace. So far as the public interest is concerned, if there were no other means of admission but by purchase, you would have officers quite good enough for all purposes. It is when an important crisis like the present occurs that the system of purchase is shown to be totally fallacious, and might bring with it great calamities. It is true this country has enjoyed a long peace—a peace, I believe, most unprecedented—and it may be said, now that a great and distinguished Minister is gone to Vienna and we are going to have peace again, what is the use of altering the system? But I am afraid another year's peace cannot be judiciously calculated upon, even after this matter shall be settled, which I fear will not be settled very soon. In time of peace it is very unimportant, but when war comes, it is the very worst description of economy to tolerate any system which does not contribute, in time of need, the most competent and able officers for the direction of your fleets and of your armies.

What is the usual result of the existing system? It is not easily traced; but it is worth examining, for it will be seen that anything more absurd, if the object be to secure the services of young and efficient officers to the higher commands, could not be devised. The result is this, that when gentlemen have the good fortune by purchase or favouritism to get into the higher ranks of the army, the Government have no option but to employ them, and then, after some disaster, perhaps, has befallen our arms, they are obliged to provide for them, and to provide also double or treble the number of troops to carry on the war which else would not be necessary. It is possible, too, that in this way, our wars have been often comparatively fruitless and unnecessarily prolonged for a series of years, owing to the inefficiency of the executive officers who were called to the head of our armies. If that be true, it becomes a most serious matter to consider what is the system by which the commanders of our armies are obtained. I must say I think it is impossible to defend the existing system. Then we shall be told that favouritism will have more free scope if you abolish the system of purchase. I fear human nature is such that favouritism will always have free scope; and I believe that under the purchasing system you give additional force to favouritism. But surely, if there be any country in the world in which favouritism can be checked, it is this, where the public eye is always upon the authorities; and where there is always a probability of making them responsible for their actions. I am afraid I have detained the House too long on this subject, and the more especially as I believe there are other Motions to be brought forward connected with the staff appointments, upon which I intend to make a few observations. There is, however, a subject which has been referred to by one or two hon. Gentlemen who have addressed the House, which is almost personal to myself, and upon which I wish to say a few words—that is the case of Sergeant Sullivan. I hope I shall not be accused of egotism when I say that I think a great mistake has been made by the authorities in this matter. As commander of a division, and not only commander of a division but as commander in chief of the division, I recommend several officers for promotion, and I also recommend one sergeant for a commission. I was sorry afterwards that I had not recommended three or four privates also for commissions, whose meritorious conduct I thought entitled them to promotion; but when writing the report, it occurred to me, that if I did so it would be thought a most terrible outrage upon all received opinions, and I forbore. I did, however, recommend the sergeant, and would say, as I commanded on the spot, and witnessed the gallant conduct which I thought entitled him to promotion, it was not correct that all the other recommendations, that is, as to the officers, should have been acted upon; and, of course, if they had not it would have shown such a want of confidence in my discretion that I must have resigned my command—it was not right, I consider, that the officers should have had their promotions, while my recommendation in the case of the sergeant remained unattended to. I certainly did think myself that it was a monstrous piece of inconsistency on the part of the authorities, that it was by no means in good taste, nor was it very decorous to me personally that my recommendation in the case of Sergeant Sullivan should have been so slighted, and that he should have been omitted from the list of promotions, at all events unless it was supposed that the man was in some respect, or in some act, a culprit. But there was not the slightest ground for such a supposition; he is a man of high character, besides being a man of great gallantry and ability, and he had previously distinguished himself at the battle of the Alma. The noble Lord the Prime Minister the other night gave, in reply to a question upon this subject, one of his usual dashing sort of answers, saying instructions had been sent out to promote one sergeant in each regiment—that had been done, and there was an end of the matter. But why only one? And there being only one, why was not Sergeant Sullivan selected? The result of the order in the way it was given was this—the communication from the Government requiring one sergeant to be recommended from each regiment went to the commander of the forces, and as it did not refer to any particular battle or any action, but merely stated that it was intended to give a commission to one sergeant in each regiment, it would be referred from the commander of the forces to the commander of each division, and by him to the officer at the time in command of each regiment, so that eventually the patronage rested with the officer who happened at that moment to be at the head of the regiment. He had hardly a choice but to recommend the superior sergeant—namely, the sergeant-major; and, of course, the sergeant-major, being the most prominent sergeant, received his commission. That was useful and proper as far as it went undoubtedly, but it did not meet the other question—namely, was it right or was it not to give encouragement occasionally to gallant actions in which great courage and great presence of mind were exhibited, whereby the enemy was effectually checked, and hundreds of lives were probably saved? The sergeant-majors were very meritorious and useful men, but if you say they are to be promoted as a matter of course when promotion takes place under such circumstances, then the adjutants, who stand in the same place amongst the subalterns as the sergeant-majors do amongst the sergeants, ought also to be the only subalterns promoted, and not those officers who had most distinguished themselves by their gallantry. I am opposed almost as much to seniority as a principle as I am to the system of purchase, for we shall never get competent men to lead and direct the national forces if we depend upon seniority, and I do not think the regulations now existing on that point are satisfactory, or conducive to the interests of the country. With regard to their naval and military commanders, a rule exists in some countries which I think would be useful, and would put an end to the complaints as to the injustice of seniority. The body of senior officers are a most numerous class, and I know you cannot advance a man who is a junior, as a reward for meritorious conduct, without exciting some envy and unpleasant feeling in those who are his seniors. But the public will insist upon the advantage they derive from the promotion of the superior man notwithstanding. With regard, however, to this particular case of Sergeant Sullivan, I think a direct professional affront has been (unintentionally, I am sure) put upon me, and I shall persevere in my attempt to obtain what I consider justice for him; and, to show the want of willingness in the higher classes to advance on this subject of army promotion. I am sorry for the course which has been taken, because I am sure, if you attempt to make this promotion of non-commissioned officers a mere promotion of sergeant-majors, you will altogether fail in obtaining the beneficial results you expect from it. Men are selected for sergeants major because they are good drill masters, good disciplinarians, and men of firmness and strong character, and they are undoubtedly very useful in their way; but it does not follow that they will be equally useful when transferred to the higher ranks of the profession, when something like mental accomplishment as well as courage and firmness are required. This Sergeant Sullivan was recommended by me for promotion for distinguished services of which I, while he was under my command, became cognisant. I make no complaint that some other non-commissioned officer of the same regiment has been promoted, but I complain that by passing him over my recommendation has been set aside by a major or captain perhaps, who might have been temporarily in the command of the regiment at the time, and who was consequently the person called upon to recommend the one non-commissioned officer for promotion.

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT: Sir, I am very sorry to stand in the way of the noble Lord (Lord Stanley), who has intimated his wish to address the House; but, seeing that he and many other hon. Members are desirous of doing so, I shall endeavour to put my observations into as short a space as possible. The hon. and gallant General who has just sat down is an example that merit is not always overlooked in our army. I rejoice to hear him giving his opinion on this subject, which he is so competent to discuss, after having returned from a field where he established for himself an undying reputation; and, at any rate, he is an instance that merit, gallantry, and military skill are better passports to higher honours than any which interest or political connections can bestow. In looking at this question we have travelled a good deal out of the Resolution, moved with so much ability by the noble Lord the Member for Huddersfield. We have discussed, not only the question whether or not non-commissioned officers should be promoted, and what the number of these promotions should be, but we have naturally, though insensibly, come to discuss a different question, namely, the rule of promotion in the army, whether it shall be by seniority simply, or by seniority combined with purchase, or whether it ought to be for merit. The accusation made against the army is, that it is essentially an aristocratic profession. Now, I think that those who say this have not defined in their own minds very clearly what they mean by aristocratic. My hon. and learned Friend (Mr. J. Ball) says the army is the closest profession in England, while the gallant Officer the Member for Bath (Captain Scobell) comes forward and greedily claims that distinction for his own profession—the navy. The hon. and gallant Member for Westminster (Sir De L. Evans) asked who ever heard of purchasing promotion in the law? I confess when I heard that I looked round to see whether my hon. Friend the Member for West Surrey (Mr. Drummond) was in his place, who, if he had been present, would, I think, have said, "Look at the list of the bench, and see if you can find a man who has not found his way there through this House!" And how is a seat in the House of Commons occasionally obtained? ["Hear, hear!"] I do not want to put the two cases on parallel ground, for they are dissimilar; but when it is said that the army is the most aristocratic profession, I apprehend that you mean that the army is the profession in which it will be found that, in proportion to the whole number, most persons of high rank engage themselves. I do not know whether this is the case or not; but this I can state, that there is no profession—neither the church, navy, nor law—which can show you so many men who have risen to eminence, or, if not to eminence, to a station in life to which they were not born, as the army can. Is it a fact that instances of men being raised from the ranks are so rare? Last year eighty-eight non-commissioned officers were promoted and received commissions. This was a large number, unusually so, I shall be told; but I have a right to cite it, because the system is growing. This, I say, was a large number—eighty-eight persons. Now, what was the history of these men? They came into the army as privates, they are men who had handled the plough or the shuttle, they got in the army a good education, they rose to be non-commissioned officers, they became commissioned officers, having received a commission, which is a diploma not given by any other profession. The words officer and gentleman are identical—they stamp the position of the man who receives them—he rises to the social position of a gentleman. You may in the law point to men of humble origin: a Lord Chancellor was a man of humble origin, but he himself had a liberal and a most expensive education; you have an Archbishop of York who was a man in some sense of humble origin—that is, his father was—but the Archbishop received the highest and most refined University education; but this is not the case with those whom I have cited as having risen from the ranks of the army. Those who say that the army is the most aristocratic profession may be correct; I cannot say whether they are or not; but this I can say, that it is also the most democratic, for the greatest number of men of low station through this profession find their way to the higher ranks. Some years ago I was Secretary at War. I hope the House will excuse my stating this, but I do so in order to show what were my opinions and intentions towards the army then—in 1845. I felt it my duty to alter the good conduct warrant. I made two or three considerable changes; I increased the pay of the soldiers, by shortening the periods of good conduct, by which they would obtain larger pay; I also made another change, which I think has worked very beneficially: I found that the number of non-commissioned officers promoted in a year was small—it varied from twelve to eighteen, or perhaps twenty, in a year; but I found, also, that there were many others who would not accept their promotion. It is very true that the pay of a non-commissioned officer, his prospects of a pension, and the advantages he receives in having his uniform and his barrack accommodation found him, are greater, in proportion to his rank and station in life, than the pay and emoluments of a commissioned officer; but, in addition to this, there was the fact that, when you promoted a man to be a commissioned officer, he was positively ruined by the expenses incident to his position. He had to borrow money to buy his uniform—if he belonged to the cavalry he had to borrow money for the purchase of his horse—he became involved in debt, he grew soured and dissatisfied with his position; and the end of it all was that the man whom you wished to reward you had ruined. I, therefore, laid down the rule that every non-commissioned officer thus promoted should receive 100*l.* for his outfit if he was in the infantry, and 150*l.* if in the cavalry. Then, as to the sergeants, who, it is said, do not receive good conduct pay (which was originally an increased allowance for length of service, to which allowance sergeants were not entitled), they, in lieu of that pay, received good conduct rewards, in the same manner as general officers, colonels, and other officers, and by the warrant which I prepared, the sergeants' names were annually printed with the Army Estimates. The object I had in view was, that non-commissioned officers should at any rate have the means of being promoted without injury to themselves. Of course the effect of this was to render promotion more easy, and therefore more frequent. I think it is an advantage that non-commissioned officers should be occasionally promoted; but we must speak plainly about these matters, and must look, not only to the good of individuals, but to the good of the service. I believe it is for the good of the service that these men should be promoted, but I think at the same time that there should be a limit to the number and amount. I am not, however, going to attempt to fix the number or the amount—no man will feel himself able to do that; but this I think I can do —namely, prescribe the principles which ought to guide you in making these promotions. Some persons have said, in answer to the charges which have been made on the subject of aristocratic influence, that the aristocrary ought to be favoured in the army. I do not say that there are no men now-a-days who hold that notion, for I know there is no opinion in the world so absurd but that some blockhead or another will be found to entertain it; but if you are going to say that, because a man is a private or a non-commissioned officer, he ought to be promoted, then you are making exactly the same mistake, though in the opposite direction, as the foolish people to whom I refer. I hold that the aristocracy ought to enjoy no favour. That, I believe, is a rule to which no sensible person will raise an exception. The aristocracy of England are very powerful; and why? Because they are rich and of ancient birth? Not at all. It is because they mix and strive with their fellow-men, and descend into the arena of competition with them; and I say that you must not handicap them, and make the race more difficult for them than it is for any other class of the community. There ought to be perfect equality here. Well, can there be any more sensible or rational rule for appointing any man to a profession, or for promoting him in it afterwards, than the sound old maxim of *detur digniori?* You want to have the fittest man for the place. You may discuss about the relative claims of different officers all night, but I defy you to come to any other rational conclusion than this. I admit the difficulty of securing the most suitable men for the appointment, but I repeat that the rule ought to be "the best and fittest man for promotion you have to offer." Now, there are exceptions to all rules, and you may say, "If you drive this rule too far you will exclude non-commissioned officers;" and, no doubt, in a certain degree, you might exclude them. The hon. and gallant officer below me (Sir De L. Evans) in the course of his observations said, and I believe justly to some extent, that the good conduct of the ranks of our army is owing to the concurrent amelioration in the conduct of our population generally. No doubt that is the case; but I claim more for the soldier than that. Take the average behaviour of a given number of peasants out of the army, and that of an equal number who have enlisted, and compare them together, and I say you will find that the soldier is the better man of the two, and for this reason—that he has been trained, he has been taught to respect others, and in learning that, he has been taught also to respect himself; he has received an education—(and I hope I may take some pride in the fact)—higher in its standard than the education given in our National or in our British and Foreign schools, because you have masters qualified up to a very high degree to instruct your troops. The schoolmasters in the army are not men who have learnt no more than they are actually required to teach; they are far more proficient than that, for I know it to be a fact that many of your regimental schoolmasters give lessons and lectures to the officers; and I am very glad that this is so. Now, we have heard great complaints of late of the inefficiency of the staff of our army. I have expressed my own opinion already of the excellence of our regimental officers, but I think I can point out why and where the deficiencies of the staff exist. When I brought in the Army Estimates last year, I made a proposal—and took the money for it—to establish a system of instruction for officers, and to insist on a rigid examination upon every case of promotion and every successive step of advance. That plan I am sorry to say is still in abeyance. The officers of our army have encountered a rougher test in actual service in the field than the examiners appointed at home could have devised. When the army is in the field it is exposed to the stern test of experience, and you cannot ask men at such a time to compute logarithms. However, my intention was, that, in every district, the ablest men who had passed high degrees at Sandhurst, and whose attainments and character I thought would influence the young officers, and induce them to apply themselves to study in order to qualify themselves for passing the examinations, should be selected as instructors; but as fast as I gave these directions, Lord Hardinge was giving his directions for the very same men to be sent out for the staff to the East, in which he was quite right; and, therefore, it was impossible for the work I had planned to proceed. But I trust that my hon. Friend the Under Secretary for the War Department will keep his eye on this important subject, and the moment he has an opportunity of doing so, will revive the scheme, and press it rapidly forward. Now, I do not say, that by an examination before promotion you will necessarily get the best man. You must constantly make mistakes; but on an average the rule will prove successful. You may now and then keep out the best man, who, although he may have no great turn for book-learning, would be the fittest person for the situation; yet, generally speaking, the best men will be those who have carefully studied the theory of their profession, for no man can be less successful in the practice of his profession for having made himself master of its theory. Well, do you intend to have a strong educational test, and to insist upon the highest military attainments in granting promotion in the army? Or, on the other hand, will you say, "No; we mean to choose men because they were first privates and subsequently non-commissioned officers; and, in order to secure these persons, we will dispense in their case with an examination?" You must do that; and, what is more, I am prepared to do it, to a certain extent. The present examination on admission to the army is a ridiculous examination. The examination for the navy is more rational. The examination of a naval cadet is something very simple, and extends to what every boy who has been to a school ought to know. But in the army you send a youth to be examined at Sandhurst, and subject him to a process which all depends on "cramming" beforehand. He has got to learn certain books that have been written by certain professors at Sandhurst, and of course there is nothing like leather; and this wretched lad having "crammed" for hours before is often unable to answer, and is therefore sent back and not allowed to go with his company because he does not, perhaps, know the date of the death of Nero's second wife, or some matter of that kind. I wished to do away with that sort of examination altogether, and to establish a simple examination in the first instance. When a lad is first examined, do not ask him such questions as I have just mentioned, and do not tell him beforehand what he will be examined in; but if he be a boy coming from Eton, or any other public school, first ascertain what he has been taught there, and whether he has learned it well—not whether he has certain specified attainments, but whether he is possessed of good, fair, average abilities. After that, when he is to be re-examined for his lieutenancy, and still more for his captaincy, you should go higher, and question him not only as to languages and mathematics, but about his military learning and acquirements—whether he understands outpost duty, the nature of picket duty, and services of that description; and, if the improved system of instruction continue, I hope we shall have an annual encampment for the regular training of our officers and men. That will be the sound mode of dealing with the question of military education. It is a mode that, I must confess, will be incompatible, to a certain extent, with the admission to commissions, at present, at least, of a large number of men from the ranks; I say with their admission at present—I say nothing of how many you may be able to admit ultimately. But, recollect that even if you adopt an examination as the test of admission, and your private soldiers are brought to a high state of military education and can pass the prescribed examination, you will not then have got hold of the best materials. I know it is delicate ground to tread upon, but what do we mean by a "gentleman" and a "liberal education?" I confess, with the hon. and gallant Officer below me, that I have seen men of very high rank to whom no amount of politeness could induce me to apply the term "gentleman." On the other hand, I confess that I have seen men of very humble station whose natural liberality of mind has fairly entitled them to that appellation. But if you set up a merely educational test, you may indeed have a man filled with intellectual cramming up to a certain point, but that alone will not endow him with the qualities which are calculated to inspire confidence in those under him. Men of genius will rise from the lowest ranks, as they have done at all times, and will force their way forward by means of the great qualities with which they are gifted. But I do not think I have ever seen a man of genius who was a vulgar man. Such a person may, indeed, be ignorant of some conventional forms, but that has nothing in the world to do with the point; and I repeat, that I have never known an exception to the rule, that a true man of genius is never a vulgar man. Men of genius will always be found, and when found they ought to be promoted. It is for the advantage, no doubt, of the lower ranks of the army that there should be pretty frequent promotion from the ranks; but what I object to is the laying down of the rule that, because a man belongs to the ranks, therefore he should be promoted. That would be introducing a system of class promotion, and would be saying that, because a man came from a particular class, he should be promoted, and not because he was worthy of promotion. When a man is promoted from the ranks, he has to calculate what it is he has lost, and to set against it what he has gained. Now, non-commissioned officers are generally married men, and are receiving either the pay of sergeants or of sergeant majors. I will here just observe that I think the hon. and gallant General (Sir De L. Evans) was in error when he said it was the object of the Government, in giving one commission to a non-commissioned officer of each regiment, to confer patronage on the colonel. It was not the intention of the Government that those promotions should be used in the way of patronage by the colonels of the regiments. It was intended that those promotions should be conferred in the way of reward to the regiment in the person of that non-commissioned officer, who by his good conduct and gallantry should be considered the best entitled to it. With regard to the case of Sergeant Sullivan, I have no hesitation in saying, if it be the case that, besides distinguishing himself in the field, he is a man of high character and respectability, and if he has not been promoted, it is an injustice done to him. I only hope the hon. and gallant General has had the goodness to represent to Lord Hardinge the claims of that man. [Sir De Lacy Evans: I have done so.] I am glad to hear it, because I am certain that Lord Hardinge will do what is right in the matter. He, of course, will refer to the colonel of the regiment to know the reasons why Sergeant Sullivan was not promoted, and if it should be shown that he is deserving of it, I have no doubt Lord Hardinge will direct it to be done. But the question before the House is this—is the system to be a system of purchase, of seniority, or of merit? I admit fully and entirely that in argument there is a great deal to be said against the system of purchase. But before the House of Commons decides upon or deals blindly with that question—[An hon. Member: Why blindly?] I will show you presently, but I say before the House decides upon that question, they must weigh in the balance what will be the cost, on the one hand of retaining, or on the other of abolishing that system. My hon. Friend the Under Secretary for the War Department says that the change of system is to be effected at a cost of 100,000*l.* a year; but I have seen a statement which estimates the value of the existing commissions at no less a sum than 5,000,000*l.*

Mr. FREDERICK PEEL: What I stated was, that the 100,000*l.* was the sum which it would be necessary to raise to induce persons holding commissions to retire from the army.

Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT: But I say that when you come practically to deal with the question, you must first of all make up your mind to put your hand in your pocket and pay to the tune of 5,000,000*l.* My hon. Friend says that he should only require 100,000*l.* to induce the present holders of commissions to retire from the army; but if they do not leave the army, what then will happen? They will crowd the lists of ranks gained by seniority to an unprecedented degree. I sat last year on a Commission which I am almost ashamed to acknowledge, after what the hon. and gallant General has said of it, and in that Commission we discussed the means of rendering the army more efficient in the upper ranks. The Commission was, I consider, very fairly composed. There were on it civilians, such as Lord Panmure, Earl Grey, Mr. Ellice, and others, who possessed a most intimate knowledge of the subjects brought before us, and who took very enlightened views upon them. There were also military men, who, it may be supposed, watched carefully over the interests of their profession. Well, we made a Report. Now, I do not say that that Report embodies all my opinions upon the subject of promotion in the army; but at any rate it was a step in the right direction. We laid down this rule—That it should be, and ought to be in the power of the Crown to reward merit in the army irrespective of seniority; that professional men for professional exploits ought to be rewarded by professional advancement, and that without reference to seniority. The army, I know, look to seniority as a safeguard against having younger men placed above them; and I am an advocate, also, to a certain extent, of that system; for it must be admitted there are advantages arising from the rule of seniority. But, at the same time, I cannot conceal from myself that it has many defects, and that it is liable to very great abuse. The Commission proposed to guard against abuse in the promotions to the higher ranks in the army by giving to it the greatest publicity; and, accordingly, they recommended that the promotions should be made public either by an Order in Council, or by means of the *Gazette*. In short, we associated the act of the Crown with such forms as should give to it the greatest solemnity while conferring on any person military promotion, in order that the public might see that it was honestly made, and that no jobbery or act of favouritism had been committed; not but that the public will say, for a time at least, that these selections are jobs. I read very recently in a newspaper a description of what was said to be a most scandalous job at the Horse Guards. It was said that a person of the aristocratic name of Rowland Hill Gordon, after a short period of service, on account of his high connections, had actually been promoted to the rank of captain in the Guards. Well, I inquired into this, and what did I find the facts to be? Why, that this Rowland Hill Gordon, so far from having any aristocratic connections, was a person of whom nobody had ever before heard, till, while serving in the army at Sebastopol, he bravely distinguished himself in resisting a sortie of the Russians that came upon the British camp, and kept them back until Lieutenant Colonel Waddy came up to his assistance with his men and successfully repulsed them. It was for that gallant conduct that this officer was brought into the Guards, and I rejoice to see it. The public may hence learn that promotions in the army are not always to be attributed to nepotism or jobbery at the Horse Guards. Well, Sir, you must come to this at last; if not, then you must adopt some other system than that which now prevails. Reference has been made to the Indian army. The Indian army, without doubt, is worthy of great praise; but if you compare the Indian army with the Queen's army you will find there is, in many respects, a great difference between the two services. Comparing the two services, man for man, you will find that the ages of the officers in the Indian service are so great that of those who are at the head of it you have a far smaller number fit for service than you have in the Queen's army. It must be recollected, also, that in the Indian service the pay on retirement is much larger than in any other army; and that the system of expenditure is such as would not bear the scrutiny of one year's Army Estimates in this House; and yet there are not sufficient youth among the officers to make the army efficient in its upper ranks. With respect to the question of purchase, I will not enter into it now nor give any opinion on its merits, but I cannot help observing that there prevails a great misconception in the public mind on that subject. People seem to think that when an officer retires from the army his commission is put up for sale to the highest bidder, and that there was a sort of scramble who should obtain it. That is not the case. Neither is there any injustice inflicted on the other officers by the sale of the commission. They remain exactly in the same position they previously held. But, though no injury is sustained by the sale of the commission, still, no doubt, great occasional injustice is perpetrated by the system of purchase, especially when an officer dies or is killed in action, and who may have paid a large sum of money for his commission. In that case the whole of the money is lost to his family. Still, he purchased with his eyes open, and hastened his promotion at his own risk. Well, you must weigh the whole question carefully before you decide. Let us now look at the manner in which it bears upon the particular question of the noble Lord the Member for Huddersfield. I much doubt if you were to ask the non-commissioned officers of the army whether they would like the system of promotion advocated by the noble Lord to be adopted, that most of them would prefer to remain in their present position. They would look at their own pay, at the pension they would by and by receive, not to mention the barrack accommodation, and the uniform that is given to them. Besides, their wives often turn a good penny at washing; and then they would contrast this, their present condition, with what it would be were they to be promoted to the rank of an officer. Their wives would be obliged to dress like ladies. At any rate, they could be no longer engaged in those menial services by which they now obtained an addition to their husband's pay. Supposing there was no purchasing of commissions, and that a man who was promoted to the rank of an officer had nothing to look to but his half-pay after a service of twenty-one years, I think that such a man would consider himself to be much better off as a non-commissioned officer, considering the pension he would have received as a sergeant major. But what is the actual course pursued by men who are promoted from the ranks? They first have an ensigncy, then a lieutenancy, and then a captaincy, and generally when they have reached that grade they retire from the service on their half-pay. Sir, I do not mean to say that men rise from the ranks without being distinguished soldiers. The noble Lord (Viscount Goderich) has quoted Sir John Elley as an instance; another is General Cureton, who at one time was a corporal in the 14th Light Dragoons. He was promoted to an ensigncy in the 16th, and subsequently rose to the rank of general. His was an example of a rapid and successful career. There are many other officers in our service in a similar position, and though some who have so risen have been accused of being deficient in their power of commanding others, that was not generally the case. Observations have been made during the discussion with respect to foreign service. I believe in the French service one-third of the officers are necessarily raised from the ranks, but the House will bear in mind that the French army is raised by conscription, and gentlemen of small means in the country, who cannot afford or are not willing to pay for a substitute, allow their younger sons to be taken; and it very often happens that because they are the sons of gentlemen they are selected as officers. That is quite a different thing. I have heard it said by French officers "that one of the greatest advantages your army has is that all its officers are gentlemen, and your men obey them more willingly than they would do officers of another class." But with respect to their army there is this to be said—that having nothing besides their pay, and having, from want of means, to walk their marches, their duty is hard, and they get soured with discontent. Now, take the Russian service. In that service all the officers pass through the rank of non-commissioned officers, even the Grand Dukes, I believe. But that again is quite a different system. That is the system in existence under an autocratic government, where there is always a complete fusion of ranks under one predominant head. I am not prepared to say that there may not be some advantage in a system which necessitates that the commanding officer should possess a perfect knowledge of the internal condition and economy of the regiment which he commands; but in the case of our army the men are volunteers, and I affirm that if you were to lay down any such fixed principle of promotion, you would get inefficient officers, because you would get uneducated men. You may, it is true, get men educated, using the word in a restricted military sense, but you would not get them educated in that manner which enlarges and liberalises the human mind. In other professions there have been instances of the effect of such restricted professional education, for in ecclesiastical affairs you have seen men who may be very learned theologians, but who have become very troublesome members of society. You cannot argue general principles upon such assumptions as have been made. The noble Lord (Viscount Goderich) has put the case of a young officer entering upon a campaign in the Crimea, and has told you that a sergeant, as a professional man, was more able to command than he. That may be very true at the moment, but who would be the best commander that day six months? Drilling is one thing, commanding another. What is the old saying in the army, "The sergeant drills the men, but the officer fights them." The officer must set them an example in many ways that require superior talent when the men are under great difficulties and discouragements. That fearlessness under responsibility which assists the officer who has been accustomed to it from his birth upwards does not always assist the officer who rises from the ranks, and it is therefore nothing more than a reasonable expectation that the liberally educated man, on a general average, will make a better officer than a man who has risen from the ranks. Then why is it that in spite of this you do promote a very fair proportion of men from the ranks, and I say, if you select your non-commissioned officers well, you ought so to do, because there can be no doubt that up to a certain point, though not, I think, to so high a point as had been contended for by some hon. Members to-night, by giving commissions to those who rise from the ranks, you may well induce some persons of a higher class than the ordinary men who form those ranks to enter the army. It is not a question of principle, but a question of degree, and I think it would be most unwise and most dangerous in this House to lay down any fixed rule, or indicate an intention of laying down a fixed rule, which may either lead to misconception, or create hopes that cannot afterwards be fulfilled. I am glad this subject has been discussed. I have great confidence in the steady annual increase of commissioned officers rising from the ranks—I am confident that the number will not retrograde, and all I ask is that the House will not sanction the indiscriminate promotion of any rank brought from any particular class of society, or lay down any rule upon the subject other than that which I have quoted—*detur digniori.*

Sir ERSKINE PERRY said, the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down has put forward some ingenious arguments in behalf of purchase which have been much cheered on the benches opposite him, and he has stated many difficulties which attend promotion from the ranks. But as his own mind is evidently not convinced by his own arguments, and as the difficulties suggested by him do not deter him from recommending such promotion, he may be set down as friendly to my noble Friend's Resolution, and any serious refutation of his reasoning is uncalled for. The question, as it has been argued to-night, has scarcely been placed high enough; for it is but a portion of a still greater question which is coming before the House in many different shapes, and from many independent quarters, all having reference to one object, the opening up of every career in life, civil or military, to merit, as distinguished from mere political or aristocratic claims. If a deeper inquiry be made as to the cause of these symptoms, there could be no difficulty in attributing it to the great democratic movement which is displayed in the civilised parts of Europe during the present century. He would appeal to all thoughtful men, and especially to contemporaries and friends of his own, whom he saw on the opposite benches, such as the right hon. Members for Midhurst and Dublin University (Messrs. Walpole and Napier), men who have read in the same books, studied in the same schools, and witnessed the same facts as himself, whether it was not quite clear that the change indicated in the present Resolution must take place in England sooner or later. The old feudal character of armies, with the wide gulf between officers and the ranks, had given way on the Continent, and whether one approves of it or not, it is inevitable that it must give way here also. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir J. Graham), had taken credit the other night for having strengthened the democratic element in this House. He and his colleagues who supported him had done so in an eminent degree; and the consequence was, that during the last twenty years a silent revolution had taken place, by which antiquated institutions and caste privileges had been swept away. Few men in the House, perhaps, stood in a more favourable position for observing the extent of this revolution than himself, for having taken a very active share in political struggles at an early period of life, his subsequent absence from England, from 1841 to 1852, enabled him to compare England at these two periods, and the contrast was astonishing. Two strongholds of privilege still remained, the Government and the army, and the deep feeling of discontent now prevalent — that neither of these was so well conducted as it might be, showed that the vigorous onslaughts of reform must speedily be applied to these also. His noble Friend, who had introduced the Motion in a temperate speech, but who had very modestly left much ground untouched, because other Members had notices on the paper respecting it, had been reproached for not having pointed out any evils in the existing system. But if evils are to be pointed out, the whole country has already proclaimed them by stating that the army system, which has been so carefully fostered during the last forty years, has completely broken down on the first outbreak of war. The failure is not denied by any one, but cause after cause is successively assigned and found wanting; and now the form of the criticism usually is that it is not individuals, but the system which is in fault. But who made the system? The army authorities have had it completely in their own hands, the civil power has never interfered, perhaps had not the authority to interfere. In the Commission presided over by the Duke of Wellington in 1840, the Report stated that, in the opinion of the Commissioners, the results of the last war showed that the existing systems in both army and navy were all that could be desired. In another Commission, Lord Fitzroy Somerset stated that, after his long official experience, he had not the least notion how the civil administration of the army could be conducted better. But the main evil of the present system was to be found in the recruiting department. All military writers agree that a good system of recruitment is the basis of a well-organised army. But it is impossible that the present system can go on if the people continue to improve as they have done in intelligence. The Duke of Wellington, in a memorandum drawn up by him in 1829, stated that it would be impossible to obtain recruits in England at a period of distress. The means by which recruits are now obtained must pain every philanthropist to the core who looks into the details. It clearly appears by the evidence that they are only obtained by cajolery, by misrepresentation, and by immoderate drinking. These facts were skilfully drawn out from the Adjutant General (Sir George Brown) in the Committee on Army Expenditure, by the examination of the right hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir J. Graham). To remedy evils like these, recourse must be had to a higher class of motives than are now depended on for attracting men to the army; rational hopes must be held out of a possibility of rising through merit and military qualifications, and the army would never then find a lack of adventurous spirits who would seek the profession of arms. Lord William Bentinck, who was a statesman as well as a soldier, had pointed out that the granting commissions in the line would have this effect, and would attract a better class of men to the ranks. It was notorious that the most enlightened States of the Continent have adopted the principle embodied in the noble Lord's Resolutions; but he would refer only to three, France, Prussia, and Sardinia. France had been compelled to cast the old feudal system to the winds in 1793, when it was found ineffectual to defend her soil from the foreign invader. On adopting the new and more generous principle, she was enabled to send 1,000,000 men in arms to the frontier, who expelled the enemy, and carried the eagles of France into every corner of continental Europe. Prussia, when exhausted and helpless, after the battle of Jéna, adopted the same principle, which resuscitated the country and carried her subsequently to Leipsic and Waterloo. Sardinia, again, during the revolutionary cataclysm of 1848, was wise enough to base a national army on principles which find an echo in every human heart. But the statesmen of England, if they are really fit to lead the Liberal party, and to direct the destinies of the country into the course of progressive improvement, ought not to wait for the moment of crisis and collapse, but, reading the signs of the times aright, with wise forethought, they should frame permanent measures. Burning thoughts had been uttered in that House, by the hon. Member for Aylesbury, and had been listened to with distaste by many. Day by day articles appeared in the public press which might be termed revolutionary. But the question with reflective men was, whether the facts on which these views were founded were true—whether the mismanagement and disasters which they described were capable of being arrested by the employment of abler minds. England, in many respects, was never so flourishing as at the present moment; wealth was increasing, education extending, the condition of the masses becoming day by day an object of greater care; religion was manifesting a remarkable revival; above all, liberal opinions were penetrating into every class with all the vigour of youth, yet, side by side with these, a deep spirit of discontent lies smouldering, and that, too, amongst thoughtful and well animated classes of society, because they believe shortsightedness and exclusive caste views prevail amongst our rulers. It was with an earnest desire to deprecate the occurrence of evils which wise statesmanship could undoubtedly avert, that he called upon the noble Lord at the head of the Government to satisfy those independent supporters of his, on the Liberal side, who wished for nothing but the peaceful march of progress and order, that he is equal to the great trust now reposed in him by the voice of the people, and that he would take in hand the important reform which the Resolutions of his noble Friend shadowed forth.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON: Sir, it is impossible to deny that the subject which my noble Friend (Viscount Goderich) has brought this evening under the consideration of the House is one of great importance, and also of great interest. It is important because it regards one of the great institutions of the country—an institution upon which depends the defence of the dignity and the honour of the country. It is also of interest because it concerns, I may say, all classes of the community. I should, however, in the first place, beg leave to say that I differ with many of those who have spoken to-night in an opinion and as to a fact. In opinion I differ with the hon. and learned Gentleman who has just sat down, and who has talked of the great democratic movement which has been making progress during the last twenty or forty years. I hear a great deal about aristocratic views and democratic progress, but, if the hon. and learned Gentleman means what I conceive he does, that the humbler classes of this country have, during the last forty years, made great and rapid progress in everything which constitutes worth and value as men, I deny that that is a democratic movement. I say it is an aristocratic movement. I am delighted to see the humbler classes raising themselves in the scale of society by cultivating those virtues and intellectual qualities which dignify men and entitle them to the respect of their fellow men in a higher position of the scale of the community to which they all belong. I am not afraid of that kind of democratic movement. I am glad to see it, and I hope it will continue. I differ also in regard to a fact. One argument of my noble Friend, and of those who have followed him, has been that the system which he has endeavoured to recommend is essential for the purpose of encouraging recruiting for the army, and his argument of course is, that the present system is a discouragement and prevents that recruiting. Now, Sir, that is not the fact. So far from the recruiting of the army having been stopped or discouraged by this condition of things, the recruiting for the army never went on so prosperously as it has done during the last year, the year 1854, and the beginning of the present year. During the last war, I believe, the greatest number of men raised for the army in any single year did not exceed 25,000. In the year 1854, Sir, we raised 35,000, and in the month of January of the present year we raised 6,000 men, being at the rate of 72,000 men per annum. Why, Sir, I do not wonder at that. In the first place, the great increase which has taken place in the population of this country must furnish a large supply of men who enter the service. But then there is that in the spirit of the British nation which leads this people to court the dangers of war when they see the brilliant achievements in the field of their fellow-countrymen; and, so far from those dangers checking the martial spirit of the country, they increase it, independently of the system of promotion, or of the purchase and sale of commissions. Depend upon it, that in moments of national danger and crisis, the spirit of the people of this country will rise in proportion to the emergency, and you will ever find them ready to enter your armies for the defence of their native land and for the maintenance of its ancient renown Now, Sir, with respect to the purchase and sale of commissions, that is a matter which has often attracted and engaged the attention of Parliament and of the public out of doors; and it is a question, I am willing to confess, surrounded by considerable difficulties. I have no hesitation in saying that, had we to form an army now for the first time, no human being would dream of making commissions matters of purchase and sale. But it is one thing to determine what you will do with a system you are about to establish, and it is another to decide how you will deal with a system which has long existed and has grown and increased with time. I believe myself, that, with respect to the purchase and sale of commissions in the army, that practice is the remnant of an ancient system, which has ceased in regard to all other things. An hon. Member has said, you might as well make the office of Secretary of State a matter of purchase and sale. Well, we all know that, at one period, it was a matter of purchase and sale; and in the time of Charles II. an ancestor of mine was unable to become Secretary of State because he had not money wherewith to purchase the office. The practice of purchasing and selling commissions in the army is, then, the remnant of an ancient system which has ceased to exist in respect to almost every other matter. Abstractedly, I have no hesitation in saying that it is an evil. In itself I do not defend it; but at the same time one must also admit that, like many other things which, abstractedly, are evils, it is not unaccompanied by certain advantages which in some degree counterbalance the inconvenience. One great evil of a military system is the slowness of promotion, by which you get into the upper ranks of the army men who by age are disqualified from performing the duties of their respective positions. It is manifest that in a service where no purchase and sale of commissions exist, and where officers get on by regular gradation, there is a tendency to have the upper ranks filled by a greater number of men of advanced age. That is the case, I believe, comparatively, in the Artillery, and, to a certain degree, in the East India Company's service. On the contrary, a system which allows of the sale of commissions does, by enabling officers to leave the service, who from their age have no prospect of employment, and who are willing to retire to private life, accelerate the current of promotion, and tend to bring younger and abler men into the higher ranks of the service. That is one counterbalancing advantage in any system of purchase and sale. It is manifest, too, that to contemplate the entire abolition of that system involves considerations of great magnitude, which would require very deliberate examination, and its cessation would involve also considerable expense to the public. I am not, therefore, prepared to say that Her Majesty's Government could consent to the sort of off-hand resolution proposed by my noble Friend, by which the House and the Government would be committed to an opinion as to the practicability of changing the system to which that Resolution relates ; and it is a great mistake to say, as I have heard it said or insinuated, that the purchase and sale of commissions imply that commissions are put up to auction and given to the highest bidder. Though a man is compelled to pay the price of the commission to which he may be promoted, still the Commander in Chief exercises the same discretion in selecting the man to be permitted to purchase as if he were choosing a man for promotion without purchase at all. Complaints have been made on the one hand that the system of purchase in the army prevents able men from passing to the higher ranks, and then my hon. Friend the gallant Officer who sits behind me (Captain Scobell) stated that promotion without purchase tended in the navy to precisely the same results. The fact is that every system by which members of a numerous profession are raised from rank to rank by superior authority also will be liable to the same imputations ; where one is to be promoted, and twenty, thirty, or an hundred passed over, every man who is unsuccessful naturally imagines that his own qualities are equal, if not superior, to those of the candidate preferred ; and whether it be in this country or in any other, you will always find that in a large profession, such as the army or navy, there will be an immense number of men complaining that promotion is given from interest, favouritism, caprice, or some motive other than a real desire to choose the fittest and most proper individual. No arrangements that could possibly be made would prevent imputations and feelings of that sort prevailing among the members of a numerous profession. With respect to another part of the subject—namely, the promotion of non-commissioned officers to commissions in the army—I think the line which my right hon. Friend the late Secretary for the Colonies said had been pursued while he was Secretary at War is a line which ought to be pursued and which will continue to be followed. It is a mistake to suppose that peculiar talent is confined to any particular class in the community. Nature has scattered with an indiscriminate hand among all classes of society those intellectual and moral qualities which fit a man for any situation, as far as mere qualities can do. You will find among the private soldiers of the army, as among the humblest classes of society, men well described by my hon. and gallant Friend as "nature's gentlemen," who by their high qualities and noble feelings, are so far fitted for any situation in which they may be placed. But for the purpose of military command more than natural qualities are essentially required. There must be cultivated intellect, acquired knowledge, and experience, which enable a commander to deal with the events of the day, and also to entitle him to the respect and obedience of those placed under him. We are told to look at the example of France and of other continental countries ; but, as my right hon. Friend (Mr. S. Herbert) justly pointed out, there is an essential and fundamental difference between the armies in those countries and our own. In France and in other continental countries the armies are raised by conscription, which sweeps men from every class, taking the educated as well as the uneducated ; and among the privates of the French army are to be found young men who have received as good an education as persons who move in any sphere of life. These men, when they have passed two years as privates, are as fit to be officers as any persons in this country who, after receiving the best education, are allowed to purchase their commissions. Our army, however, being recruited by voluntary enlistment, the privates naturally come from the humbler classes of society. They enter at an age when education has hardly made any considerable progress, and the portion of the humbler classes likely to enter the army does not comprehend those who by their attainments would probably in the occupations of civil life find profitable employment. They are young men of aspiring and daring character—men of action rather than study, who like the exertions and dangers of a soldier's life, and who have therefore, perhaps, not paid, or had the opportunity of paying, any great attention to the cultivation of their minds. It is true that after they get into the army they do, under the arrangements made by my right hon. Friend, acquire an education which, perhaps, they never would have received if they had not enlisted into the ranks. But, even with that advantage, it is not every private or non-commissioned officer who can attain to that kind of intellectual cultivation which would fit him for the commission of an officer. Then the position of an officer involves certain expenses which, if a promoted sergeant be unable to meet, renders his situation painful and disagreeable to his feelings. Moreover, we all know that men who have passed a certain period of their lives in a certain association do not readily adapt selves to become members of a different class, and it often happens that the promotion of a sergeant, instead of being an advantage to him, really places him in a painful position, though at the same time he may be gratified by the honour conferred on him. Still, I entirely agree that it is desirable to hold out to privates and non-commissioned officers that good conduct and distinguished service in the field before the enemy will obtain for them the reward of a commission, if a commission they should be desirous to have. In the course of last year I believe that there were little short of one hundred commissions so given. My hon. and gallant Friend (Sir De Lacy Evans) stated that those commissions given to the army in the Crimea seemed not to have been disposed of in the manner in which he was sure they were intended to be applied, and that he was certain that it was never intended that those commissions should be distributed as matter of favour and patronage by the colonels of regiments. The only intention was, that they should be conferred upon those non-commissioned officers in each regiment who most distinguished themselves in the course of the campaign; and if in any case the commanding officer had not selected the non-commissioned officers the most worthy of promotion, he has not executed the intentions with which the Commander in Chief gave him the power of so selecting them. I can say, then, Sir, that I can assure the House that it is the anxious desire of Her Majesty's Government that this system of admitting a certain proportion of well-conducted non-commissioned officers to commissions in the army shall be continued, and in my opinion there will always be—owing to the increased education which is being given to privates and non-commissioned officers of the army—a very considerable number of sergeants who will be fit to receive those commissions, and who, by their education and good conduct, may hope to rise to higher ranks in the service. Such being the desire and intention of the Government, and such being the opinion which they entertain of the matters which the motion of my noble Friend embraces, I should hope that he would not, by dividing the House on this matter, give the erroneous impression to the public that upon the main principles which are concerned there is that difference of opinion and sentiment which a division would appear to indicate, and that he would leave it to the Government to follow out that course which has already been so ably and properly begun under the auspices of my right hon. Friend the Member for South Wiltshire (Mr. S. Herbert). I am sure that we appreciate fully the great importance of holding out to the humbler ranks of the army those prizes which I will not say are necessary to stimulate their exertions, because their own sense of duty is sufficient for that purpose—but those prizes which are the proper rewards of good conduct, and which, while they not only gratify the feelings of those who receive them, tend also to inspire in the minds of their fellow comrades a respect for the institutions under which they live, and a confidence that good conduct in the humblest classes is sure to meet with the appropriate and distinguishing reward.

Viscount GODERICH, in reply, observed that he had nothing to add to what had fallen from his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Westminster (Sir De Lacy Evans); because any words of his would only weaken the effect which that speech was calculated to produce. The two speeches which had proceeded from the Treasury benches did not lead him to the conclusion that he should be fulfilling the task which he had undertaken if he were to withdraw his Motion. The first part of the speech of the noble Lord, who had just spoken answered the last part; and, under these circumstances, he must press the Motion to a division.

Mr. OWEN STANLEY said, that if the noble Lord the Member for Huddersfield, insisted upon going to a division, he should be bound to vote with him, although he did not concur in the terms of the Motion, because he thought it desirable that the House should mark in some way its feeling of the necessity for a change in the mode of carrying out the system of promotion in the army.

Question put.

The House *divided* :—Ayes 114; Noes 158; Majority 44.

List of the AYES.

Acton, J.
Anderson, Sir J.
Ball, E.
Ball, J.
Barnes, T.
Bass, M. T.
Biggs, W.
Bland, L. H.
Bouverie, hon. E. P.
Bowyer, G.
Bramley-Moore, J.
Bright, J.
Brocklehurst, J.
Brockman, E. D.
Brown, W.
Campbell, Sir A. I.
Challis, Mr. Ald.
Cobbett, J. M.
Cobden, R.
Cogan, W. H. F.
Cowan, C.
Craufurd, E. H. J.
Crook, J.
Crossley, F.
Currie, R.
Dent, J. D.
De Vere, S. E.
Dillwyn, L. L.
Divett, E.
Duke, Sir J.
Duncan, G.
Duncombe, T.
Dunlop, A. M.
Ebrington, Visct.
Ellice, E.
Ewart, W.
Fagan, W.
Fenwick, H.
Ferguson, J.
Forster, C.
Forster, J.
Fox, W. J.
Gardner, R.
Goodman, Sir G.
Gower, hon. F. L.
Greenall, G.
Greene, J.
Grenfell, C. W.
Gwyn, H.
Hadfield, G.
Hanmer, Sir J.
Hastie, Alex.
Hastie, Arch.
Heywood, J.
Heyworth, L.
Howard, hon. C. W. G.
Hutchins, E. J.
Ingham, R.
Jackson, W.
Keating, R.
Kennedy, T.
King, hon. P. J. L.
Kinnaird, hon. A. F.
Laing, S.
Langton, H. G.
Laslett, W.
Lee, W.
Lindsay, W. S.
Mackie, J.
MacGregor, John
Maguire, J. F.
Mangles, R. D.
Marshall, W.
Miall, E.
Milligan, R.
Milnes, R. M.
Morris, D.
Mostyn, hon. T. E. M. L.
Mowatt, F.
Murrough, J. P.
Norreys, Sir D. J.
North, F.
O'Brien, P.
O'Connell, D.
Otway, A. J.
Parker, R. T.
Paxton, Sir J.
Pechell, Sir G. B.
Pellatt, A.
Perry, Sir T. E.
Phillimore, R. J.
Pigott, F.
Pilkington, J.
Reed, J. H.
Ricardo, J. L.
Ricardo, O.
Roebuck, J. A.
Russell, F. C. H.
Scholefield, W.
Scobell, Capt.
Shelley, Sir J. V.
Smith, J. B.
Stanley, hon. W. O.
Strickland, Sir G.
Strutt, rt. hon. E.
Sullivan, M.
Thompson, G.
Vivian, H. H.
Walmsley, Sir J.
Warner, E.
Wickham, H. W.
Wilkinson, W. A.
Williams, W.
Wise, A.

TELLERS.
Goderich, Visct.
Layard, A. H.

List of the NOES.

A'Court, C. H. W.
Adair, R. A. S.
Adderley, C. B.
Archdall, Capt. M.
Baring, H. B.
Baring, rt. hon. Sir F. T.
Baring, T.
Baring, hon. F.
Bellew, T. A.
Bennett, P.
Bentinck, G. W. P.
Beresford, rt. hon. W.
Berkeley, C. L. G.
Bethell, Sir R.
Bramston, T. W.
Brand, hon. H.
Brotherton, J.
Buckley, Gen.
Carnac, Sir J. R.
Castlerosse, Visct.
Cavendish, hon. G.
Cecil, Lord R.
Chelsea, Visct.
Child, S.
Cholmondeley, Lord H.
Christy, S.
Clive, R.
Colvile, C. R.
Cowper, hon. W. F.
Dalrymple, Visct.
Dering, Sir E.
Duckworth, Sir J. T. B.
Duff, J.
Duncombe, hon. O.
Dunne, Col.
Du Pre, C. G.
Egerton, E. C.
Elcho, Lord
Elliot, hon. J. E.
Elmley, Visct.
Emlyn, Visct.
Euston, Earl of
Filmer, Sir E.
Fitzroy, rt. hon. H.
Floyer, J.
Forester, rt. hon. Col.
Fortescue, C. S.
Franklyn, G. W.
Freestun, Col.
Frewen, C. H.
Gilpin, Col.
Gladstone, rt. hon. W.
Gladstone, Capt.
Goddard, A. L.
Goulburn, rt. hon. H.
Graham, rt. hon. Sir J.
Greaves, E.
Greene, T.
Gregson, S.
Grey, rt. hon. Sir G.
Grey, R. W.
Grogan, E.
Grosvenor, Lord R.
Hale, R. B.
Halford, Sir H.
Hall, Sir B.
Hamilton, G. A.
Hankey, T.
Harcourt, Col.
Harcourt, G. G.
Hardinge, hon. C. S.
Heathcote, G. H.
Heneage, G. F.
Herbert, rt. hon. S.
Herbert, Sir T.
Hervey, Lord A.
Hotham, Lord
Johnstone, Sir J.
Jones, Capt.
Kendall, N.
Kerrison, Sir E. C.
Knatchbull, W. F.
Knox, Col.
Knox, hon. W. S.
Langton, W. G.
Lennox, Lord A. F.
Lennox, Lord H. G.
Liddell, H. G.
Lovaine, Lord
Luce, T.
Lushington, C. M.
Macartney, G.
MacGregor, James
Malins, R.
Mandeville, Visct.
Meux, Sir H.
Miles, W.
Milner, W. M. E.
Michell, W.
Molesworth, rt. hn. Sir W.
Monck, Visct.
Morgan, O.
Mowbray, J. R.
Napier, rt. hon. J.
Newdegate, C. N.
North, Col.
Pakenham, T. H.
Pakington, rt. hn. Sir J.
Palk, L.
Palmerston, Visct.
Peacocke, G. M. W.
Peel, Sir R.
Peel, F.
Peel, Gen.
Pennant, hon. Col.
Philipps, J. H.
Pinney, W.
Portman, hon. W. H. B.
Powlett, Lord W.
Price, Sir R.
Pritchard, J.
Repton, G. W. J.
Ricardo, S.
Robertson, P. F.
Roche, E. B.
Sawle, C. B. G.
Seymour, Lord
Seymour, H. D.
Shelburne, Earl of
Shirley, E. P.
Sibthorp, Col.
Smith, A.
Smyth, J. G.
Stafford, A.
Stafford, Marq. of
Stanhope, J. B.
Stanley, Lord
Steel, J.
Stuart, W.
Taylor, Col.
Thornely, T.
Tomline, G.

Mr. O. Stanley

Traill, G.
Tyler, Sir G.
Vance, J.
Vernon, G. E. H.
Villiers, rt. hon. C. P.
Walcott, Adm.
Walpole, rt. hon. S. H.
Walsh, Sir J. B.
Walter, J.
Whatman, J.
Whitbread, S.
Whiteside, J.
Whitmore, H.
Wilson, J.
Wynn, Lt. Col.
Wyvill, M.

TELLERS.

Hayter, rt. hon. W. G.
Mulgrave, Earl of

ARMY BEFORE SEBASTOPOL COMMITTEE.

COLONEL DUNNE said, he would beg to move that Sir George Brooke Pechell be added to the Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol. There was no one connected with the naval profession on the Committee. The hon. Member was well known for the attention he paid to all naval affairs, and he had the utmost confidence in his judgment and discretion,

MR. ROEBUCK said, he had no objection whatever to the Gentleman proposed, but, as he had stated last night, he had entered into an arrangement with other parties with reference to the appointment of the Committee, and as it was the part of an honourable man to keep by any arrangement which he might make, he would adhere to the Committee, as already appointed. He, therefore, opposed the Motion.

COLONEL NORTH said, he wished to know whether the hon. and learned Gentleman was to be understood as opposing the nomination of the hon. Baronet on the part of the Government?

MR. ROEBUCK said, he did oppose the Motion on the part of the Government.

COLONEL NORTH: Then the House must understand that there was an objection on the part of the Government to have a naval Member on the Committee.

MR. BENTINCK said, the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Roebuck) last night seemed to imply that there had been in the course taken by Members on the Opposition side of the House, a direct breach of agreement. That charge he most distinctly repudiated, and he could not concur in the doctrine on which the charge was founded. The hon. and learned Gentleman told them that he had formed his Committee in conjunction with the noble Lord at the head of the Government and the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli). He could not have quoted higher authorities; nor was he inclined to cavil at the names of the Members selected. He believed they were all men eminently qualified to discharge the duty intrusted to them; but he denied that Members on that side of the House were guilty of a breach of contract because they did not agree to that about which they had never been consulted.

ADMIRAL WALCOTT felt bound to say, that he thought it would have been conducive to the object of the House in appointing this Committee, that of instituting a full and searching inquiry, if a naval officer had been placed upon it, and that it would have been regarded as a compliment by that branch of the service with which he had the honour to be connected; but he apprehended the opportunity for that graceful and necessary compliment had now gone by, and he no longer desired to support such a Motion.

MR. FREWEN said, he understood from the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, that he had entered into an arrangement by which six Members of the Committee were to be selected by the Government, and the other seven were to be selected with the concurrence of the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire, as the leader of the Opposition. If such an arrangement had been entered into, he (Mr. Frewen) considered that good faith ought to be kept, but at the same time he did not think that the compact would be broken by adding two Members to the Committee—one on each side, especially as it appeared to him very important that there should be a naval officer upon the Committee.

COLONEL DUNNE said, he must express his surprise that the Government were afraid of having a naval officer on the Committee. He believed the inquiry would turn in a great measure upon naval tactics, and upon the negligence displayed in the transport service, and he did not think the Committee would possess the confidence of the country unless it included a naval officer among its Members.

Question put, "That Sir George Brooke Pechell be added to the Select Committee on the army before Sebastopol."

The House *divided*:—Ayes 61; Noes 99; Majority 38.

Order read for resuming Adjourned Debate on Question [28th February], "That

Sir John Hanmer be added to the Committee."

Question again proposed.

Debate *resumed.*

COLONEL DUNNE said, Sir John Hanmer was now serving on an Election Committee which had not yet terminated; but, as a majority of the House had decided that the Committee was to be an inefficient one, he would offer no further opposition.

Question put and *agreed to.*

The House adjourned at half after One o'clock.

APPENDIX.

List of the Ayes and the Noes in the House of Commons, Tuesday, Dec. 19, 1854, on the Second Reading of the Enlistment of Foreigners Bill.—(*See page* 618.)

List of the Ayes.

Acland, Sir T. D.
A'Court, C. H. W.
Acton, J.
Adair, H. E.
Adair, R. A. S.
Anderson, Sir J.
Annesley, Earl of
Atherton, W.
Bagshaw, J.
Baines, rt. hon. M. T.
Ball, J.
Baring, rt. hn. Sir F. T.
Barnes, T.
Bass, M. T.
Berkeley, Adm.
Berkeley, hon. H. F.
Bethell, Sir R.
Biddulph, R. M.
Biggs, W.
Blackett, J. F. B.
Bland, L. H.
Bonham-Carter, J.
Bouverie, hon. E. P.
Brady, J.
Bramston, T. W.
Brand, hon. H.
Brocklehurst, J.
Brockman, E. D.
Brotherton, J.
Brown, H.
Brown, W.
Bruce, Lord E.
Butler, C. S.
Byng, hon. G. H. C.
Cardwell, rt. hon. E.
Caulfield, Col. J. M.
Cavendish, hon. C. C.
Chambers, T.
Chaplin, W. J.
Cheetham, J.
Clay, Sir W.
Clinton, Lord R.
Cockburn, Sir A. J. E.
Coffin, W.
Cogan, W. H. F.
Collier, R. P.
Cowan, C.
Cowper, hon. W. F.
Currie, R.
Dalkeith, Earl of
Dashwood, Sir G. H.
Davie, Sir H. R. F.
Denison, J. E.
Divett, E.
Drumlanrig, Visct.
Duff, G. S.
Duke, Sir J.
Duncan, Visct.
Duncan, G.
Dungarvan, Visct.
East, Sir J. B.
Elcho, Lord
Ellice, rt. hon. E.
Elliot, hon. J. E.
Esmonde, J.
Ewart, W.
Fagan, W.
Feilden, M. J.
Fergus, J.
Ferguson, Col.
Ferguson, Sir R.
Ferguson, J.
FitzGerald, Sir J.
Fitzgerald, J. D.
Fitzroy, hon. H.
Fitzwilliam, hon. G. W.
Forster, C.
Forster, J.
Fortescue, C. S.
Fox, W. J.
Freestun, Col.
Freshfield, J. W.
Gladstone, rt. hon. W.
Glyn, G. C.
Goodman, Sir G.
Gordon, hon. A.
Gower, hon. F. L.
Grace, O. D. G.
Graham, rt. hn. Sir J.
Greene, J.
Greene, T.
Gregson, S.
Grenfell, C. W.
Grey, rt. hon. Sir G.
Grey, R. W.
Grosvenor, Lord R.
Grosvenor, Earl
Gurney, J. H.
Hall, Sir B.
Hankey, T.
Harcourt, G. G.
Hardinge, hon. C. S.
Hastie, Alex.
Hastie, Arch.
Headlam, T. E.
Heathcoat, J.
Heathcote, Sir G. J.
Heathcote, G. H.
Heneage, G. F.
Herbert, H. A.
Herbert, rt. hon. S.
Hervey, Lord A.
Hogg, Sir J. W.
Howard, hon. C. W. G.
Howard, Lord E.
Hughes, W. B.
Hutchins, E. J.
Hutt, W.
Ingham, R.
Jackson, W.
Jermyn, Earl
Keating, R.
Keating, H. S.
Keogh, W.
Kershaw, J.
King, hon. P. J. L.
Kinnaird, hon. A. F.
Labouchere, rt. hon. H.
Laing, S.
Langton, H. G.
Lee, W.
Lindsay, W. S.
Locke, J.
Loveden, P.
Lowe, R.
Luce, T.
Mackinnon, W. A.
MacGregor, John
Mangles, R. D.
Manners, Lord G.
Marjoribanks, D. C.
Martin, J.
Massey, W. N.
Matheson, Sir J.
Milligan, R.
Milner, W. M. E.
Milnes, R. M.
Mitchell, T. A.
Molesworth, rt. hn. Sir W.
Moncrieff, J.
Monsell, W.
Mostyn, hon. E. M. L.
Mulgrave, Earl of
North, F.
O'Brien, P.
O'Brien, J.
O'Connell, D.
O'Connell, J.
Osborne, R.
Owen, Sir J.
Paget, Lord A.
Palmerston, Visct.
Patten, J. W.
Paxton, Sir J.
Pechell, Sir G. B.
Peel, Sir R.
Peel, F.
Peel, Gen.
Pellatt, A.
Perry, Sir T. E.
Phillips, J. H.
Phillimore, R. J.
Phinn, T.
Pigott, F.
Pilkington, J.
Pinney, W.
Pollard-Urquhart, W.
Portman, hon. W. H. B.
Price, Sir R.
Ramsden, Sir J. W.
Reed, J. H.
Ricardo, J. L.
Ricardo, O.
Rich, H.
Richardson, J. J.
Robartes, T. J. A.
Roebuck, J. A.
Rumbold, C. E.
Russell, Lord J.
Russell, F. C. H.
Russell, F. W.
Sadleir, J.
Sawle, C. B. G.
Scholefield, W.
Scobell, Capt.
Scrope, G. P.
Scully, F.
Scully, V.
Seymour, H. D.
Seymour, W. D. (Sund.)
Seymour, W. D. (Hull)
Shafto, R. D.
Shelburne, Earl of
Smith, J. A.
Smith, rt. hon. R. V.
Smollett, A.
Stafford, Marq. of
Steel, J.
Stephenson, R.
Stirling, W.
Strickland, Sir G.
Sutton, J. H. M.
Tancred, H. W.
Thompson, G.
Thornely, T.
Thornhill, W. P.
Townshend, Capt.
Tynte, Col. C. J. K.
Uxbridge, Earl of
Vernon, G. E. H.
Villiers, rt. hon. C. P.
Vivian, H. H.
Warner, E.
Waterpark, Lord
Watson, W. H.
Wells, W.
Whatman, J.
Whitbread, S.
Wickham, H. W.
Wigram, L. T.
Wilkinson, W. A.
Williams, M.
Williams, W.
Wilson, J.
Winnington, Sir T. E.
Wood, rt. hon. Sir C.

Wortley, rt. hon. J. S.
Wrightson, W. B.
Wyndham, W.
Wyvill, M.
Young, rt. hon. Sir J.

TELLERS.

Hayter, rt. hon. W. G.
Berkeley, G.

List of the NOES.

Adderley, C. B.
Alcock, T.
Alexander, J.
Arbuthnott, hon. Gen.
Archdall, Capt. M.
Arkwright, G.
Bailey, C.
Ball, E.
Baldock, E. H.
Bankes, rt. hon. G.
Baring, T.
Barrington, Visct.
Barrow, W. H.
Bateson, T.
Bentinck, Lord H.
Bentinck, G. W. P.
Beresford, rt. hon. W.
Berkeley, Sir G.
Boldero, Col.
Booker, T. W.
Bright, J.
Bunbury, W. B. M.
Burroughes, H. N.
Butt, G. M.
Butt, I.
Cairns, H. M.
Campbell, Sir A. I.
Carnac, Sir J. R.
Cecil, Lord R.
Chambers, M.
Chelsea, Visct.
Cholmondeley, Lord H.
Christopher, rt.hn. R.A.
Christy, S.
Clinton, Lord C. P.
Cobbett, J. M.
Cobbold, J. C.
Cobden, R.
Cocks, T. S.
Codrington, Sir W.
Coles, H. B.
Conolly, T.
Corry, rt. hon. H. L.
Davies, D. A. S.
Deedes, W.
Dering, Sir E.
Disraeli, rt. hon. B.
Drax, J. S. W. S. E.
Drummond, H.
Duckworth, Sir J. T. B.
Duncombe, hon. W. E.
Dunne, Col.
Egerton, W. T.
Egerton, E. C.
Elmley, Visct.
Evelyn, W. J.
Farrer, J.
Fitzgerald, W. R. S.
Fitzwilliam, hn.C.W.W.
Floyer, J.
Follett, B. S.
Forester, rt. hon. Col.
Franklyn, G. W.
Frewen, C. H.
Fuller, A. E.
Gallwey, Sir W. P.
Galway, Visct.
Gardner, R.
Gaskell, J. M.
George, J.
Gibson, rt. hon. T. M.
Gilpin, Col.
Gooch, Sir E. S.
Graham, Lord M. W.
Greenall, G.
Grogan, E.
Guinness, R. S.
Hadfield, G.
Hale, R. B.
Hall, Gen.
Hamilton, Lord C.
Hamilton, G. A.
Hamilton, J. H.
Hanbury, hon. C. S. B.
Hayes, Sir E.
Henley, rt. hon. J. W.
Herbert, Sir T.
Hildyard, R. C.
Hill, Lord A. E.
Horsfall, T. B.
Hotham, Lord
Hudson, G.
Hume, W. F.
Johnstone, J.
Jolliffe, Sir W. G. H.
Kelly, Sir F.
Kendall, N.
Kennedy, T.
Knatchbull, W. F.
Knightley, R.
Knox, Col.
Knox, hon. W. S.
Laffan, R. M.
Langton, W. G.
Laurie, J.
Lennox, Lord A. F.
Lennox, Lord H. G.
Leslie, C. P.
Liddell, hon. H. T.
Lindsay, hon. Col.
Lisburne, Earl of
Lockhart, A. E.
Lockhart, W.
Lovaine, Lord
Lowther, hon. Col.
Lowther, Capt.
Lytton, Sir G. E. L. B.
Macartney, G.
MacGregor, James
M'Mahon, P.
Maddock, Sir H.
Malins, R.
March, Earl of
Masterman, J.
Maunsell, T. P.
Meux, Sir H.
Miall, E.
Miles, W.
Milton, Visct.
Michell, W.
Montgomery, H. L.
Montgomery, Sir G.
Moore, J. B.
Morgan, O.
Mowbray, J. R.
Mullings, J. R.
Mundy, W.
Muntz, G. F.
Murrough, J. P.
Naas, Lord
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TO

HANSARD'S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES,

VOLUME CXXXVI.

FIRST VOLUME OF SESSION 1854-55.

Explanation of the Abbreviations.

1*R.* 2*R.* 3*R.* First, Second, or Third Reading.—*Amend.*, Amendment.—*Res.*, Resolution.—*Com.*, Committee.—*Re-Com.*, Re-committal.—*Rep.*, Report.—*Adj.*, Adjourned.—*cl.*, Clause.—*add. cl.*, Additional Clause.—*neg.*, Negatived.—*l.*, Lords.—*c.*, Commons.—*m. q.*, Main Question.—*o. q.*, Original Question.—*o. m.*, Original Motion.—*p. q.*, Previous Question.—*r. p.*, Report Progress.—*A.*, Ayes.—*N.*, Noes.—*M.*, Majority.—1*st Div.*, 2*nd Div.* First or Second Division.

☞ When in the Text or in the Index a Speech is marked thus *, it indicates that the Speech is reprinted from a Pamphlet or some authorised Report.

When in this Index a * is added to the Reading of a Bill, it indicates that no Debate took place upon that stage of the measure.

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